

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
Contested Materials Collection  
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
52	4	4/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Dick Moore to Dick Howard RE: Jessel and attachment (which is not in file). 1pg.
52	4	4/3/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Charles W. Colson to "The File" RE: Random Thoughts from Lou Harris (of campaign). 4pgs.

## DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
N1 [Doc 63]	Memo	From Moore to Colson Re: McGovern and the media	10/5/72	C (Nixon)
N2 [Doc 64]	Memo	From Moore to Howard Re: Jessel	4/20/72	"
N3 [Doc 65]	Memo	From Colson to "THE FILE" Re: Random Thoughts from Lou Harris	4/3/72	"
N4 [Doc 66]	Memo	From Colson to Moore and Safire Re: Wage/Price Controls	2/15/72	"

FILE GROUP TITLE

SPECIAL STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER

9 5

FOLDER TITLE

[RICHARD MOORE] CHARLES COLSON 1972

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

**Collection:** Special Staff Files  
**Box Number:** 5

**Folder:** [Richard Moore] Charles Colson 1972

<u>Document</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
63	Retain Open
64	Return Private/Political
65	Return Private/Political
66	Retain Open

April 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK HOWARD

FROM: DICK MOORE

Re the attached, the President does know Jessel and usually replies personally. However, he did so as recently as March 8, and I think Georgie is being a little pushy.

I am attaching a draft reply, but I really think this is something that should be decided by Rose Woods. I suggest you send it to her, and if she agrees, perhaps she can arrange to have it procedded and signed by whomever she thinks is appropriate.

My draft makes no reference to the proposed gift, since I do not know whether the President would wish to accept it or not. Again, Rose would know.

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Random Thoughts from Lou Harris

Harris believes that the President needs, between now and the election, to continually create "straw men". Meany affords us the best opportunity, but we've got to work at creating others -- deliberate enemies. The President is against those who plunged us into Vietnam but now want to sell out America's honor. The President is against those retailers who over-charge consumers. The middle man example in the food price issue is a perfect illustration. If there isn't a natural villain, create one so that the President can be the defender of the public interest against natural enemies.

Harris believes that the President should be forceful but not strident; that whenever he is strident, the President brings out the hostility of a latent anti-Nixon feeling which still exists with a large body of people, but that when he is deliberate, quiet, rational, forceful, he does not engender this latent hostility.

Harris believes that we should downplay the campaign throughout the year, make it as boring as possible. Harris believes that a bland campaign will help us in that we will benefit greatly from a low turnout. Also, people react better to the President if he does not polarize on gut issues. This does not mean that we should not address the issues; we should defuse as many as possible, but not arouse the passions of the electorate with a very divisive issue that might bring out our opponents (as with anti-labor legislation, for example).

Harris believes the key to our success is in avoiding having the American electorate act emotionally or precipitously with respect to the President's candidacy. He points out that as his pollsters question people, they get a better response after the questioning than at the outset. More people favor the President's re-election after they have been walked through the issues than when they are first confronted with the question cold, "Do you favor the President as against Candidate X?"

One of the President's strong points is that people think he is trying hard. He is beginning to develop a characteristic of sincerity, that he is really working at solving the problems. Harris advises that we should articulate everything we do rationally, calmly, quietly, and forcefully. Make people think, make people thoughtful. Do not provoke instant emotional reactions. The President's style has come through very

well as being deliberate. We should not let him go swinging or overreacting. If our opponent becomes strident, we should take it in stride. The more irresponsible the opposition becomes, the more the President is helped in being looked at as a solid, steady, strong and deliberate statesman. Be the "solid brick in the middle" Harris suggests. Ask people to think of the issues seriously.

In this same vein, we should turn the lack of so-called charisma into an asset, arguing that no one has the right to use the office of Presidency for the development of a personality cult, that personal promotion is not the measure of one's success as President. One cannot run the country through charm, rather through ability. Nixon's style is to be serious and dedicated, that that is more important than personal image.

Harris believes that Nixon's image is now being sharpened as a rational, thoughtful, deliberate leader, all of which can be destroyed if there is a spontaneous reaction or a sharp galvanizing of the opposition in the months ahead. Harris believes that if people are asked calmly and quietly to think through the choice for President, that the President cannot be beaten by any of the present Democratic Presidential candidates. If on the other hand, the election turns into

a heated, highly controversial, emotionally charged campaign, we will simply bring out enough anti votes to defeat us; there are just more of them than us and if we galvanize them, we (not the Democratic candidates) can beat ourselves. The key at the moment is to maintain the tone that we have presently achieved and to hold it throughout the election year.

  
Charles W. Colson