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<td>N-1 [Dec 31]</td>
<td>Letter</td>
<td>Dulles to R.M. W. Republican appeal to minority voters in 1972</td>
<td>8/70</td>
<td>C(Nixon)</td>
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**FILE GROUP TITLE**
PPP

**FOLDER TITLE**
MEMOS 1970 - R.M. WOODS 26 July - September - December

**RESTRICTION CODES**
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August 1970

To: Miss Rose Mary Woods
From: David Dulles
Re: REPUBLICAN APPEAL TO MINORITY VOTERS IN 1972.

George Wallace has dealt the putative "Southern Strategy" a body blow.

By winning the Alabama gubernatorial primary, Wallace has made it altogether likely that he will run for President. As a number of journalists and other observers have projected, he will probably carry about five Southern states, thus denying their electoral votes to either major Presidential ticket in 1972. He is also likely to draw enough "conservative" votes from the Republicans to allow the Democratic ticket to prevail in a number of large industrial states outside the deep South. The unions can be expected, contrary to 1968, to act early and with maximum impact to protect the traditional Democratic power base in the ranks of organized labor from vulnerability to the Wallace appeal. A fourth party movement is unlikely, for want of organization, resolved leadership and funds. Thus, overall, Wallace is a threat to the Republicans rather than to the Democrats.

While I do not have the figures, I am reliably told that even in 1968 if those black voters who supported Nixon-Agnew had stayed home, let alone voting for Humphrey-Muskie, President Nixon would not have been elected. Of course, like the 1960 Presidential election, the returns in 1968 produced such a close race that any number of factors could have been and undoubtedly were decisive in the sense that if all other factors had remained constant, one element could have reversed the outcome or at least thrown the election into the House of Representatives.

Despite the disintegration of the Democrats in 1968, when they nearly won, their current financial troubles, the popularity of the President and Vice President in today's polls and the Democrats' lack of an heir-apparent, they can be expected to mount a formidable campaign in 1972. The Vietnam War will probably be less of an issue than it was in 1968, because of troop withdrawals. A major armed confrontation in the Middle East in the interim is possible but less than probable. Our domestic social crisis will not be fundamentally improved except with respect to white youth, so far as appears. Because of our current tax structure, the persistence of racial discrimination and the prevailing distribution of income, the combination of inflation and unemployment will still be an acute problem for tens of millions of Americans. Our
failures to provide adequately for urban capital investment, sub-college education and general medical care in past years will not have been solved and the results of those failures will be more conspicuous, possibly, than at present.

For all of these reasons, pocketbook issues are likely to be of exceptional importance in 1972. In addition, crime suppression will still be a painful and critical problem. Transportation and housing frustrations will also be serious.

For the Administration to be re-elected, as I believe it will be, it would be prudent to have available a campaign approach which will appeal to minority voters, black and Spanish, to a much greater degree than they were appealed to by either Democrats or Republicans in 1968. Such voters will probably be more active, better informed and more thoroughly organized than ever before. They are likely to be more sensitive to issues, as compared with institutional loyalties and symbolic associations, than previously because of advancing sophistication. Most important, the emerging pattern of public controversies suggests that with regard to crime, inflation, taxes, income maintenance and even discrimination, they have commonalities of interest with other low and lower middle income Americans which have not been exploited.

Primarily because of the yet-unappreciated but colossal failure of bureaucracy to deliver on political promises (especially with regard to service programs as opposed to income maintenance and law enforcement) in the period subsequent to World War II, the Republican Party is ideologically far better able to exploit these commonalities of interest than the Democrats. Moreover, the Administration has a very good record regarding:

- welfare reform
- social security
- unemployment compensation
- employment discrimination
- school desegregation
- food distribution
- housing technology
- taxation of the poor, and
- inflation control

compared to the Democrats.

Neither political party is likely to let the other get away with a landslide, given television, polling, citizen participation, decline of the machines and increasing voter inclination to cross party lines and split tickets. Thus the 1972 election, like those of 1960 and 1968, is likely to be close. The possibility cannot be ignored.
Work should begin now to prepare, on a stand-by basis, for a massive Republican effort to attract the minority vote in 1972. This should involve:

1. Polling, to determine present black and Spanish attitudes on the issues and, particularly, what these people do and do not know of Administration actions in their interests, and what they think the Administration should do;

2. Organization of cadres of minority leaders who will be able to generate mass personal campaigning for the Administration in ghetto and other heavily minority communities, based on analysis of the polling showing those elements of minority communities least likely to remain captive of the Democrats;

3. Development of a wide array of draft substantive presentations, such as the Nixon radio address on manpower delivered in October (?) 1968, for use in the 1972 campaign;

4. An analysis of which minority media, particularly radio and newspapers, will be most cost-effective.

Such an exploration ought to show that, dollar for dollar, investment of campaign resources in the minority community may well yield as many votes favoring reelection of the President as expenditures directed toward the nation at large or toward other groups. Moreover, it will very likely prove true that, in terms of issues, such an approach need not be prejudicial to the Republican appeal directed toward other elements of the American constituency.