

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
49	41		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Bryce Harlow to the President. RE: Re-election efforts. 8pgs.
49	41	11/13/1970	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Jim Keogh to the President. RE: Post-election thoughts. 7pgs.
49	41	11/10/1970	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Lyn Nofziger to the President. RE: The President's Election efforts. 7pgs.
49	41	11/18/1970	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Patrick Buchanan to the President. Further analysis of election. 9pgs.
49	41	11/13/1970	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Tom Charles Huston to the President. RE: 1970 elections and prospects for 1972. 16 pgs.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
N10 [94]	MEMO	From Hallett to Rose Re: Tentative thoughts on President's present situation	5/6/70	C (NIXON)
N2 [95]	MEMO	From Harlow to RN Re: Assessments of election efforts	N.D.	C (NIXON)
N3 [96]	MEMO	From Keogh to RN Re: Post-election thoughts	11/13/70	C (NIXON)
N4 [97]	MEMO	From Kofziges to RN Re: Response to request from Haldeman	11/10/70	C (NIXON)
N5 [98]	MEMO	From Buchanan to RN Re: Election results	11/18/70	C (NIXON)
N6 [99]	MEMO	From Keogh to RN Re: Hart's manuscript	11/12/70	C (NIXON)
N17 [100]	MEMO	From Huston to RN Re: 1970 Election + Prospects for 1972	11/13/70	C (NIXON)

FILE GROUP TITLE

PDF

BOX NUMBER

8

FOLDER TITLE

President's Handwriting November 1970

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
N 8 [101]	MEMO	From Magrignan to RN Re: Dev experience of the past two years.	11/13/70	C (NIXON)
N 9 [102]	MEMO	From Chapin to RN Re: Lewis called	11/19/70	C (NIXON)
N 10 [103]	MEMO	From Buchanan to RN Re: Forthcoming analysis of the election	11/20/70	C (NIXON)
N 11 [104]	MEMO	From Leonard to Attorney General Re: Kent State	11/24/70	C (NIXON)
N 12 [105]	MEMO	From Timmons to RN Re: Foreign Policy Support	11/24/70	C (NIXON)
N 13 [106]	MEMO	From Harper to Ehrlichman Re: Some Beech Park numbers	N.D.	C (NIXON)
N 14 [107]	MEMO	From Klavigan to RN Re: Memo from Charles Walker	11/30/70	C (NIXON)
N 15 [108]	MEMO	From Walker to RN Re: Administration's stance...	11/30/70	C (NIXON)

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President's Handwriting November 1970

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
N16 [109]	MEMO	From Waldman to Ebelichman Re: Linn	9/14/72	C (NIXON)

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President's Handwriting November 1970

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Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: President's Office Files
Box Number: 8

Folder: President's Handwriting November 1970

<u>Document</u>	<u>Disposition</u>		
94	Retain	Open	
95	Return	Private/Political	
96	Return	Private/Political	
97	Return	Private/Political	
98	Return	Private/Political	
99	Return	Private/Political	
100	Return	Private/Political	
101	Retain	Open	
102	Retain	Close	Invasion of Privacy
103	Retain	Close	Invasion of Privacy
104	Retain	Close	Invasion of Privacy
105	Retain	Close	Invasion of Privacy
106	Retain	Open	
107	Retain	Open	
108	Retain	Open	
109	Retain	Open	

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

E.O. 12065, Section 6-102

By MH NARS, Date 1/21/80

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRYCE HARLOW *BH*

You have already received, I am sure, far better assessments of the elections and the rest than I can furnish, in part because I was preoccupied with the Vice President's campaign and therefore didn't share in your effort or watch it as closely as I otherwise would have. So I will make my comments as brief as I can on the points raised in Bob Haldeman's November 7 memorandum.

1. Your election efforts:

a. To all the VP's crew, it appeared that your campaigning did very excellently what the VP wasn't supposed to do and couldn't do -- stir up the general public and preempt both the national and local media. Assuming that the main objects of campaigning, aside from fund-raising, are to remind and stimulate, I believe the timing, execution and placement of your efforts are not challengeable even in hindsight.

b. I fear we may have been guilty of overkill in such places as Texas (perhaps the only place); the heavy involvement of both the President and Vice President may have flushed out more opposition votes than supporters, and I believe it was agreed from the beginning that a small vote was desirable in Texas. Nonetheless, the Bush people have no basis for complaint; you and the VP did precisely as his campaign crowd asked.

c. I feel a bit lame in making this point, since I was not in Washington to share in the decision-making and suspect there are considerations I am unaware of -- but I have the uncomfortable feeling that the Vice President had already driven home, powerfully and effectively, the law and order theme by the time you hit the trail and that he had already

peaked with that message to the country. So by mid-October all of us might have been better advised to swing away at least partially from this issue we may have already won (even the most radical Democrats had joined us on law and order by that time) and clobber the economic issue, plus bragging on Administration achievements. That is a gut feeling -- sheer smoke-shoveling -- but by the time you took to the road we were already in worried conferences in the VP's group on what to do about newly adverse developments in the economy and farm areas (the announcement of low parity in the closing days of the campaign was a disaster!). In other words, I vaguely sense even now (as the VP did in the last two weeks of the campaign) that we were overstressing an issue we had already won and on which the Democrats had covered themselves, and we failed then to modify course to take on escalating troubles in agriculture and the economy. Bob Haldeman may recall my distraught telephone call ten days or so before election about the economic problem -- which gave rise to Bill Safire's excellent statement for our candidates to use (and which we did use at Hartford and Tuscon) - but I rather suspect we might well have charged on these other issues in the closing days, or at least given them greater emphasis, instead of sticking overlong to law and order.

d. Even if we had done what (c) above suggests, I must concede that local candidates would have raised plus-perfect hell on the ground that you were campaigning too blandly; certainly everywhere the VP went, the local lust was for raw meat. Moreover, the press was hovering about with pencils poised, eager to charge that the campaign had been so nasty, so bitchy, that you and the VP had to confess wrong-doing and turn tail and run. So even if the country had drifted away from law and order in the closing days, had you and the VP changed subjects or muted the attack, there's no telling what the national reaction might have been. It could have been a disaster for you or the VP or both. There's no way to tell.

e. The bottom fell out in the Midwest and West. If that area had held up as I, at least, anticipated, we would have done excellently -- the 5 to 8 seat gain I personally expected in the Senate. The only constants in

that region that can explain this collapse, best I can figure, are: unemployment (spotty), high interest rates (epidemic and very basic), inflation (general), farmer surliness (a sleeper; never once even mentioned to us by any campaign manager or candidate in the entire area), and maybe a regional disinterest in law and order, inasmuch as both Democrats and Republicans are law abiding and square in that part of the country. It is easy to particularize on the races out there and conclude that oddities in each state account for the poor showing, but I can't buy that. I believe that, while state peculiarities obviously influenced every race in the western reaches, so also did they in the rest of the country where we fared far better -- so there are bound to be special troubles out west which did us in. I can't help but wonder what might have happened in North Dakota if our thrust had been not law and order, where Burdick was immune, but on the arrogance and cynicism of the Democrats' refusal to pass the farm law. But even there, as you know, both the Farm Bureau and the Farmers' Union oppose this legislation, so that, too, might have been a loser. That tends to force me back to the desirability of the economy argument - that you had wound down both inflation and war while avoiding recession, and the Democrats are plainly incompetent on both counts. It is conceivable that we might have salvaged a race or two in the mountains and plains if we had done that.

f. The fact remains, whatever happened, that the whole campaign was directed toward one goal - unshackling you in the Senate. You did precisely that -- a far better showing than the pillar of political gold, Eisenhower, made in 1954 and 1958 - indeed, the best off-year showing of any Republican Administration in memory. So liberal pundits notwithstanding, your object was achieved, and the proof will be seen in 1971 and 1972 in the performance of the Senate. That is all that matters; the rest is only hostile rationalization and yearning.

g. Finally, I reject as inane the argument that your campaigning demeaned the Presidency and will plague you through 1972. Never has this been so before, and unless the media take it upon themselves to make it so (even that won't

work, in my opinion) the whole orgy of 1970 will be dead and gone except for (1) the wholesome Senate results and (2) the gubernatorial disadvantages, by the time you deliver your State of the Union Message. It is true, of course, that the Phoenix film was a well-rounded disaster, but everybody knows that, and it too is an isolated episode that soon will pass.

2. Presidential posture for the future:

I don't think the election of 1970 influences your future posture in any significant aspect other than (1) you can now move more surely in national security affairs; (2) law and order are now politically neutralized unless you wish to test the Democratic commitment to their sudden campaign turn-about; and (3) Party regularity is enhanced a bit by the Goodell shafting. Otherwise, your posture, I believe, should be just what it would otherwise have been anyway - that of a deeply concerned President earnestly devising sensible solutions for overriding national problems, and that will automatically come to be as public and press attention turn to issues in the rump session of Congress and your programs for 1971 and 1972.

For the future, I anticipate that your removal of American ground forces from combat will be a vast political plus in 1972 -- that a healthy economic situation will be critical for success, for it will likely be the centerpiece of the 1972 campaign -- and that matters of the environment, race and the cities will be peripheral, though crucial in key spots around the country. I needn't add, I know, that the farm situation requires almost as much attention as the general economy, because so much of your strength resides there, and I would hope for tremendous emphasis on rural development plus a greater sensitivity to farm needs (such as continuation of the ACP, now scheduled for the axe). My hope remains that you will "come clean" with Congress on the economy and the fiscal situation and will brace them with the same hard alternatives that you have had to wrestle with, making them shoulder responsibility right along with you for inflation,

deficit financing, full employment troubles and high interest rates -- all versus sharply higher taxes plus a withered federal establishment. I feel the country is incredibly mixed up over all this -- insistent upon vastly costly new programs but adamantly against the high cost of government. If next year you can hit just two or three of the sexiest domestic programs with all your might and main and slough off the rest, and assure adequate financing, 1972 ought to take care of itself.

3. Changed relations with media:

a. I urge only that you handle them, as you have sought to do, coolly, fairly and at arm's length, excepting your obvious friends who are entitled to special care and feeding. I would foreswear severe retaliatory attempts against journalistic malefactors, because I think this inevitably backfires, and anyway reporters declared off-limits are seen by your Administration people despite the ban. I do press for more frequent press conferences (once a month, on average), and far less daily concentration on this or that critical column or article or, even, leak. I have long had a feeling that we overreact to daily drivel and in the process not only consume energies and time that could be fruitfully used in other ways, but also in this way we tend to spotlight the very problems we try to smother. Said differently, I feel we ascribe too much importance to a columnist or commentator - that we only flatter them and hurt ourselves when we spend time countering their writings and broadcasts.

I do hope your regional backgrounders with the press out in the countryside are carried forward. These, I have felt, are the most rewarding innovation with the media that you have hit upon since taking office.

4. Use of Vice President and Cabinet:

a. I have suggested to the Vice President that (a) he work really diligently with minority groups, devoting not less than two-thirds of his time on this (not only the blacks, but also the Indians, Mexicans, etc.); (b) he spend half his remaining time on youth (which ties in with the minorities); and (c) he use such time as he has left for

intergovernmental relations, serving as your political (not operational) nexus with Republican governors and your political counter-weight against the strengthened Democratic governors. On this point, I have told him it is important to avoid operational responsibilities because the problems of governors range across the entire government and require far too elaborate a staff and too much time for him to oversee it.

None of the foregoing has his approval, and he may reject all of it. I have urged that whatever he concludes must have, first, your very clear-cut personal blessing - plus, second, hard notice to the Executive Branch and White House staff that whatever areas you agree upon are definitely made the exclusive responsibility of the Vice President.

b. I feel the Cabinet has been insufficiently used as such and that the Cabinet members feel isolated from you by layers of staff. The all-important "personal relationship with The Boss" has gone out of it. I urge at least one conventional Cabinet meeting a month (with an Administration-wide agenda, not a technical, specialized topic or program), plus one or two hours set aside weekly for Cabinet officers to visit personally and privately with you on matters of their own choosing: whether official or personal. I believe the team-spirit values of the foregoing would well justify this investment of your precious time.

5. Relations with Congress:

a. I suggest that a hard decision is overdue here: either use Bill Timmons in keeping with his official status, or take on someone who will be so used. I have sensed a reluctance to use Timmons directly with you, in connection with the most important issues and members of Congress. He is often left out of meetings and breakfasts, etc., on Congressional matters in favor of others not charged with Congress -- and contacts with Congress by the White House staff increasingly bypass Timmons instead of going through him.

No Congressional man can be worth his salt if the Hill feels he is ineffectual with the President or lacks easy access to the President. Therefore, I urge that Bill be so used, but if this can't be, a more acceptable person should be installed in his place. Success in this area requires not only Bill's open and frequent identification with you, but also acceptance as a prime mover by your Staff -- for example, his inclusion in Bob's eight o'clock staff meeting on the same basis as Ehrlichman, Shultz et. al.

The Congressional function is so immensely important to you. If it is kicked around, ignored, or handled as a subordinate White House activity, the cost is excessive.

b. Some means needs also to be found to involve the Congressional group more effectively in program formulation, instead of being often used as clerks to cart bad news to the Hill. A great deal of needless trouble can be avoided by the early input of Congressional people. While this is attempted now, I feel it is inadequately done and intensifies your Hill troubles. Involved here also is the instinctive reaction in every Executive Branch activity (it is chronic in every department as well as in the White House) that the Congressional side of things is a confounded nuisance, therefore in time it gets pushed into a corner. In my opinion, it should have at least the same attention and emphasis as the press in all areas of the White House.

6. Presidential Travel:

a. I have no competency in this area, other than to state the obvious -- that where you will need the greatest strength in 1972, you should manifest the greatest personal involvement. This would include special identification with agricultural regions over the next two years, adequate attention (with the Vice President also) to the South, continued appeal to blue collar people by open identification with them at various places in the country, an improved relationship with the business community (speeches to business organizations here and there in the country), and some overt actions making very

clear your concern for the little folk and disadvantaged in the society. Trips abroad should be, I believe, very widely spaced, because we are entering a season in which national concerns will probably rivet more on domestic problems than on foreign troubles.

All in all, I believe you are entering a period in which you will wish to keep on winding down the war as you wind up the economy, get both shipshape not later than August 1972 (earlier if at all possible), and devote your other efforts to proving to the country that you are President of all the people, whether they are for or against you and your Administration. If the country believes you are doing well with the war and the economy and are seeking selflessly for sensible progress in just a few other areas of particular concern, you will, I believe, win going away in 1972.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 13, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: JIM KEOGH

In answer to the request for some post-election thoughts, I would like to take the liberty of spinning out my personal reactions without necessarily trying to establish their general validity.

First, I believe that the campaign schedules of the Vice President and President were almost exactly right. It was wise to start the Vice President early and tough and -- considering the gravity of the situation -- to have the President come in with an intensive move at the end.

Looking first at the Vice President's campaigning, it seems to me that he came on as he should have -- hard and natural. But then he tended to overdo it.

First -- and perhaps a minor point -- he piled up too much alliteration. A little about pusillanimous pussyfooting and nattering nabobs of negativism was fine -- it got attention -- but then he did so much of this that it became a joke and even many of our good friends got to be a little embarrassed about it.

Beyond this, he seemed to be indulging in overshrill and overkill. Instead of landing a good hard punch and letting his target

drop, he pounded and pounded. The media began dwelling on this and eventually many of our supporters began to feel that maybe the Vice President was hitting too hard. The Christine Jorgensen line about Goodell is an example. By then Charlie was bloody and reeling, and that line left the Vice President open to charges of cruelty and bad taste that made even some of his best fans wince.

Fairly early in the campaign, we made a hard turn -- and in my opinion, it was too hard a turn. At the meeting with the Cabinet on August 19 when political matters were discussed, the President struck what seemed to me to be a very good tone. The President said the economy would be the most important factor in the election. Above all, the President urged, spokesmen should take a positive position on what the Administration is doing and is trying to do, should also be positive about our candidates, should hit what the Congress has not done but should beware of building up opposition candidates by attacking them in a negative way.

Then, along the way, we bought Scammon and Wattenberg. And, in my judgment, we bought more of their theory than we should have. The opposition soon saw what we were up to and moved toward joining us.

In our intense concentration on the Scammon and Wattenberg thesis, we did not pay enough attention to the fact that the economic

issue -- fear of depression -- was cutting us to the bone in a broad sweep across the west. The irony of this is that the President had warned repeatedly about this issue -- the fear of what might happen in the economic situation, not necessarily what the present situation was. The opposition exploited this fear expertly. We did not pay enough attention to the issue.

Despite all this, I think the President's campaigning was -- in the main -- close to target. Ultimately it came through the media as too negative -- and that's a serious problem -- but anyone who was really paying attention knew there was a great deal of the positive, too. The Anaheim rally was generally fine on national television -- a bit too much of Reagan and Murphy for national consumption -- but the President was just right.

Then we made a shattering error. Putting the Phoenix rally speech on national television the night before the elections was a dreadful blunder. First of all, a taped rally speech is basically not a good piece of material for national use on TV. In this instance, the sound, the setting, the approach made the President seem angry and harsh and almost mean. The substance was unobjectionable but the effect was not Presidential. And the strategy gave the opposition an opportunity to put on Muskie who seemed very statesmanlike, even if quite dull.

It was a mistake to have the President on television at all the night before this election. By then the people had heard enough campaigning. But if the President felt it was necessary to go on, then the format should have been a quiet chat in a studio or office setting -- the kind of presentation in which the President has proven that he has no peer.

In the last analysis, I do not think that the Monday night mistake had much effect on the results. But I am concerned that it was damaging to the President's image in the longer term. It left the wrong tone and opened the way to the interpretation that the whole campaign was bitter and harsh.

Turning from the general tone to a specific area, I believe that in retrospect it was a mistake for the Administration to be wooing the leaders of organized labor. We throw a big Labor Day dinner for them and they go out and bludgeon us with rhetoric and money spent for the opposition. Besides, they are on the wrong side of a very big issue: inflationary pressure. I realize there are other factors involved here, but I fear that when the Administration cozies up to the labor bosses it only tends to alienate a lot of other people who are more likely to be on its side.

As for the future, I think the Administration must now realize that it is "the Government in Washington, D. C." From now on, there should be intense concentration on achievement and solid

accentuation of the positive. It is no longer profitable to emphasize what the Administration is against; from now on, the emphasis must be on what the Administration is for -- what it has done and is doing. I fear that with our constant feeling that we do not do a good enough selling job we have come too close to the attitude that it doesn't make much difference what we do so long as we sell it right.

In terms of the Administration's relationships with the media, I can do no better than repeat what I wrote in a memo in June:

"I believe we are relying too much on what -- to use a crude term -- I can only describe as gimmicks. We would do ourselves more good by being more straightforward.

Too many people are spending too much time drawing up too many game plans. This may make us feel better and it may make a record on paper -- it seems to show action -- but I doubt that it is getting results that are worth all that effort.

Let's face a few facts. Most of the working media people are 1) against us, and 2) suspicious of us. In the main, they are hard to fool, although they often fool themselves -- and that usually gives them an even more negative

stance so far as we are concerned. It is very difficult for us to put anything over on them; it is practically impossible for us to subvert them. If they were for us we could do these things; since they are not, we can't.

When we try a gimmick they usually are waiting at the entrance to the alley and they wind up making us look more devious than we are. This gives us a credibility problem. The results more often turn out to be counter-productive. And the media wind up being more suspicious of us than ever.

I think we should do what we're going to do and present our case for it straightforwardly and not try to be quite so cute. In the long run, this could be a big plus with the media. They would be unbelieving at first, then startled when they realized that we really were playing it straight. In the end, while they might not be any more for us, I believe they would respect us.

One tactic that I believe we should use more is the honest-to-God calculated leak. I don't mean a contrived leak where we are just trying to sell a line, but a factual leak of a coming development. This is probably the best way to get a favorable first story out in a big way. The

reporter and editor who have the story are too anxious to protect it to let our opposition tear it apart before they deliver it. And a reporter or editor who knows that he is getting a big break on some important stories is a little less apt to be negative.

All this may seem too simple and too direct but I believe that in the long run it would be a better approach than trying to con a cynical media corps that has seen so many gimmicks for so many years. A straightforward approach might shock them toward straight reporting."

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 10, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Lyn Nofziger *LN*

In Response to Request from H. R. Haldeman

1. The President's Election Efforts. I believe his decision to help was 100 percent correct. I believe the average American appreciates a fighter and a man who is loyal to those under him. Too often, loyalty is thought of as a one-way thing -- from the troops to the leader. The President has made loyalty a two-way street; it will pay-off in the long run.

I think there is some merit to some of the second-guessing. First, instead of making Vietnam pretty much of a nonissue, it is possible we could have made it more our issue, although, in Tennessee where Brock did it, he didn't win so big. Secondly, everyone I have talked to says Muskie won the Monday night TV presentations. The criticism of our presentation has been that our production was poor technically and that Muskie came off as the reasonable man.

Overall, however, I believe the President's campaigning was a tremendous plus. I believe the question to be asked of the critics is: Would you have had him do less? The fact is, if he had done less and if the Democrats had won more, they would have been kicking him around for not having done enough.

The image of the President now is of a fighter. That is not a bad image; it is one that breeds respect. If we equivocate, we lose that respect.

2. The President's Posture. It has to be one of continue to fight for the things and principles in which he believes. I do not think he needs any change in his modus operandi. However, a sterner public stance

toward inflationary actions by both business and labor might be helpful, for the fact remains that most employed persons are not members of unions.

His posture with Congress should be one of wanting to work with Congress, but at the same time absolutely refusing to surrender to it. I believe it is better to fight and lose than not to fight because win or lose the buck always winds up on his desk.

3. Relations With The Media. My feeling is that the President should have more televised press conferences.

1. He handles them well. Each one to date has been a plus.
2. The media is going to beat him over the head with this issue, saying he is afraid to face them and/or that he is denying the public the right to know.
3. He will eventually reach the point where, when he has a press conference, the media will say that he knuckled under to pressure.
4. All told, the scarcity of press conferences is creating an anti-Nixon issue which we don't need.
5. I don't think we need one every week, but certainly once every 4-6 weeks is not unreasonable from our point of view. It is infrequent enough to keep the press unhappy but frequent enough so they don't have an issue.

I like the idea of meeting with small groups of friendly columnists from time to time. I think it should be extended to small groups of friendly reporters who write for individual papers. For instance, Jack Jarrell from the Omaha World Herald; Ray McHugh from Copley, Lou Hiner from Pulliam, George Embrey from the Columbus Dispatch, and others. I do not believe in rewarding the President's enemies in the media; it does not make friends of them.

4. Use Of The Vice President And The Cabinet.

The Vice President. The Vice President, I think, has functioned effectively. However, recognizing always that he and we are up against a hostile media, his effectiveness can be nullified if he is used solely as a "hatchetman" because he will be labeled as such. Obviously, we

need a hatchetman, but he should not be exposed as the only one. The National Chairman should carry a much larger share of this burden in the future. At the same time, the Vice President should be given some positive assignments during the next year to year and a half, so that he will be more effective when he takes the stump in 1972. Consideration might be given to making him the major day-to-day spokesman on domestic affairs, thus taking some of this burden from the President.

The Cabinet. From p. r. and political standpoints, the Cabinet is a weak one. For instance, not one has aroused enough excitement to be considered in the press today as a possible successor to the Vice President or a possible Presidential nominee. The only one who has built any kind of a political name is Hickie, who did it in opposition to the President. It is obvious that they cannot all run around getting headlines, but we might consider arbitrarily picking two or three of them, and set out to build their political images so they can be used effectively in 1972 and thereafter. I do not believe we should leave the building of strong party spokesmen to chance. The President can build two or three Cabinet officers and half a dozen members of the Congress, but it must be a deliberately planned and executed effort. It must be a continuing thing.

Regardless, I believe all members of the Cabinet should continue to be utilized on a programmed basis, and be provided with political speaking engagements and political input. We need not only to sell the President, but also to sell the Administration. If we minimize the issues for the Democrats we minimize their chances, regardless of who their candidate is.

5. Relationships With Congress. Relationships with the Congress have gotten better as this Administration has become more familiar with the attitudes of Congressmen of both Houses. A never-ending effort is needed, however, to keep relations good. I believe the President already is accessible to members to about the maximum. However, we should assure that senior staff members and Cabinet and subcabinet should also be accessible and cooperative, especially where Republicans are involved. I cannot see any reason to do anything drastically different, but I believe our people must be kept continually aware of the need to be accessible and courteous, even if we can't do anything for the individual Congressman at the time.

6. Presidential Travel. I believe there should be as much as possible without it appearing that the President is neglecting his duties.

1. It takes the government to the people and this should be the approach.
2. It counters the "isolation" charge which may be phony but which must be countered.
3. It builds confidence in the people when they see that the President can move about with impunity. It is good for the country, and if the President is doing something that is good for the country it is good for him.

7. The New York Election. It is apparent that the Buckley victory was a Republican victory; not a Conservative victory. The Conservative Party was poorly structured, and there was much internal bickering. As a result the Buckley campaign was staffed, organized and run largely by Republicans. The Conservative vote in New York is largely a dissident Republican vote. I would suggest wrapping Jim Buckley close to this Administration, in the hopes that we can use him to build a strong middle-of-the-road base for the New York Republican Party, with which we can wrest the Party from the liberals four years from now. I think we can do better by bringing the Conservatives back into a middle-of-the-road Republican Party then we can by creating a permanent three-party situation there.

8. The Negative Aspects Of The Next Two Years. I believe, still, that more people vote against than vote for. I believe we must, therefore, begin actively to collect and disseminate information that will give people reasons to vote against Muskie, Kennedy or whoever the Democratic nominee for President may be. I believe we must do the same thing in the key Senatorial races.

Our perennial weaknesses have been:

1. poor research
2. poor use of research
3. failure to attack on a continuing basis; people forget easily

We must say again and again and again that Muskie is a polluter, that he is already running for President, that he has no standing in the Senate, etc. We must never let the public forget Chappaquidick, or that there is insanity in Tunney's family, or that Stevenson, McGovern and Ramsey Clark are cop-haters. We must magnify and repeat the stories of their every mistake and misstep.

This will take: 1) good research; 2) a few spokesmen who are willing to attack regardless of the cries of outrage; 3) a continuing dissemination of this stuff to the media and through the media. We must begin now in all areas.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Patrick J. Buchanan

- (1) The President already has my analysis of the election results. Would reiterate several points.

First, where our operation was far ahead of the field in assessing the impact of the mass media in the 1968 elections --- in the length and intensity of the 1970 campaign we did not take into proper account the enormously enhanced power the Vice President, but especially the President have to dominate the media as incumbents. In past years, it took weeks and months to hammer home a single issue. The same can now be accomplished in days. The 1972 campaign should be thought out on the same kind of basis the President thought out his entire 1966-1968 political profile. Now is our time for a "political moratorium". Further, the fall campaign of 1972 should be so constituted as to emphasize various and changing themes, saving the strongest pitch for possibly the last week (or two). We should not underestimate our ability to make a case, our ability to focus national attention on a single theme or the capacity of the public for being turned off by "overkill."

Second, reexamine the instruments of campaigning. Frankly, to what degree, if any, does campaigning enhance an incumbent's stature in the public mind? Is a rally with a cheering crowd and an effective cheer line by the President on night TV as good a forum for taking RN's case to the country as a nine p.m. press conference telling the nation why RN needs these men. Will the nation respond in better political terms to Nixon the campaigner, or to Nixon the President making his campaign speeches quietly and forcefully in prime time from the Oval Office? Has the day of the front-porch campaign --- or its modern counterpart --- returned?

If I were to make a shotgun judgment now as to what kind of campaign the President should run in 1972 --- I would recommend that he wrap himself in the trappings of his office --- give once a week major address on nationwide television at night -- and make not more than a handful of separate campaign appearances at noon to

show the nation, via networks, the President has the confidence of the people in the provinces -- he is their man.

But the President clearly needs an intensive analysis on the effects of campaigning per se. The team we have put together is by general judgments the best campaign team in history. Even our media adversaries say they wish we could run the government as well as we can run a campaign. The danger that lurks is that we shall become so enamoured of our success at managing the techniques of campaigning, 1968 style, that we may lose sight of the fact that they may now be irrelevant -- or worse, counter-productive -- for a sitting President in 1972.

Third, there are states such as Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio and Florida, essential to victory in 1972, where the Party has been mangled. We have to begin now to move to resolve differences and bring these parties together, or else begin almost at once organizing our own political machinery for the elections of 1972. John Sears told me that if the President were interested, he would draft a political memorandum with his thoughts on what should be done now and in the coming year, both on an organization basis and a strategy basis with regard to downgrading Muskie, and perhaps building up Humphrey as our opponent, on countering Wallace and strengthening our political machinery in the swing states. If the President is interested -- I will tell him to move on it right away.

(2) Posture of the President through 1970 and into 1971.

The immediate necessity is to put politics and the campaign of 1970 behind us. Nothing we can do or way further is going to alter judgments, already made, about whether or not 1970 was a success or a failure. Our case has been presented -- the other side has presented its version of the results -- and the commentators and columnists have by and large already staked out their positions. Anything more is overkill.

This is consistent with my strong view that the time for Nixon the politician campaigning for his party is over -- the time is now for the President to represent himself to the nation as the elected President of the American people -- above the political wars now certain to ensue within the Democratic Party.

Through its gross distortion of the kind of campaign the President conducted, the media has driven home the impression of Nixon the partisan of the United States. We must not play into their hands with top-level White House discussions of the campaign of 1970 or the prospects for 1972 in either party. We must get back exclusively to the business of governing and leading the nation.

The election-eve impression left of RN the strident partisan -- and Muskie the national conciliator -- can be reversed in a matter of weeks. My strong recommendation is that at the President's first press conference, following the election -- which will be a bear-baiting exercise -- he demonstrate humor, a relaxed attitude, exude confidence -- and speak in terms of politics being behind us and now moving forward to work together on the nation's business at hand. Speak of the national need -- in calm reasoned terms -- for what the President has requested for the defense of friendly nations; speak of the need for action in areas where action has been delayed and people have unnecessarily suffered for that delay. (Unless I hear otherwise, this would be the kind of mood I would try to put into the Q. and A. for the next appearance.)

(With regard to Muskie, he suffers from the fact that he is not considered an outspoken leader by the ideological wing of his party -- he is likely, as McGovern is doing now, to begin taking potshots at us, which will be clearly political. We ought to simply dismiss them as political -- not engage in head-to-head -- and let him go about destroying his media image by himself, which he may well be forced to do to win the hearts of the ideologues that dominate the left wing of his party.)

Looking at further horizons, I see a need for the President to move back toward the role of national reconciliator --- symbolic gestures toward the black majority should be made (not to win votes; we can't) but to indicate to the great middle that the President is attempting to answer the crucial needs of the entire nation --- none excluded.

We also need to have something positive and appealing for the working people of this country in the way of tangible major domestic programs. Since, in any choice between a counterfeit liberal and the real McCoy, the country will take the real McCoy -- we ought to have some domestic initiatives of our own -- with the Nixon brand clearly on them. Regrettably, we are now pouring billions into programs like OEO, Model Cities, Urban Renewal, etc. for which we get no credit whatsoever.

My thought would have been to terminate or diminish as many of their programs as possible in order to shift the considerable amount of dollars into Nixon programs -- which would have a visible impact by 1972. To this degree, I concur with Phillips: To put together a new majority in American politics, we are going to have to provide the working men and women, white and blue collar, with more than rhetoric; we have to bring home the bacon; whether in the form of parochialism, or what.

Finally, to counter the impression being pushed by the media that this is an Administration concerned only with cold statistics, an Administration long on public relations gimmickry and short on substance and vision -- I feel the President should seek out occasions to demonstrate "humanity" and "heart" -- spontaneous occasions, not planned meetings to demonstrate a symbolic affinity with, and concern for the unemployed and the less fortunate.

The old Republican nemesis is the national image of the party of the bankers, party of business, the party that doesn't really give a damn about people. The Democrats are going to use this in 1972 as they have in every election since 1932 -- and we need to consciously consider words, deeds, symbolic acts that will give the lie to this charge before it is made by the National Democratic Party in earnest.

(3) Recommended Changes in Relations with the Media

The networks are not with us. NBC is openly hostile. The national press is in an ugly mood -- over both the lack of press conferences, and the feeling that we are B.S.ing them about the election returns. Given their natural affinity for a political fight, given their ideological pre-disposition, given their normal enthusiasm for the challenger, the underdog -- our situation here is not good.

On the plus side, it has never really been that good -- the hostility of the liberal media was always one element we had to consider. What to do.

We are never going to be loved by the national press corps -- that is a given fact. Any transparent attempts to become buddies will fool no one; will succeed nowhere. What our specific focuses should be, I believe are these:

- (a) Go over the heads of the national press to the nation on more televised press conferences. Where we run into a problem of over-exposure, do them in the morning or at noon. Have the national press in for more of the Presidential, non-televised press conferences. These carry risks -- but this

instrument is among our most effective; we are extremely good at it; invariably the President scores with the people, if not with the press.

- (b) While our differences with the national media remain irreconcilable we should take the initiative to ease tensions a bit. While there is much psychologically satisfying in roasting them with regularity, there is not much political profit in this. We have garnered much of that already. If we intend to take them on -- and hard -- we ought to first re-establish good relations, and wait until the fall of 1970.

Any future attacks on the media should be rifle shots -- at NBC for a specific abuse -- and not be perceived in such a way as that we are roasting the entire corps. This tends to leave some of them so browned off they make a special effort to gut us at every opportunity.

Our best hope for a fair shake lies now with the Reasoner-Smith team at ABC. We ought to give them our best leaks -- provide them with the best breaks. If we have to pick one network to do some major special on -- clearly it should be this one.

In attacking and supporting, we should as mentioned above, be selective --- a Herb Kaplow who will do something fair for us on the worst network, should not be slighted -- while Chancellors and Vanocurs should get nothing. And if we move on the attack, it should similarly be selective.

4. Use of the Vice President and the Cabinet

Like the President -- but to a far greater degree -- the Vice President should shift over from the political offensive to the policy offensive. The time for combativeness, for political in-fighting, is clearly over for now. In my view, the Vice President should be given a good slice of the domestic franchise to oversee, an issue or issues, a program or programs, to demonstrate the other side of the man -- the capable and competent executive working to get things done. His role as the President's Terrible Swift Sword should be minimized; he should be used in this assignment only when necessary; the President should utilize Cabinet Members and White House Staffers with good liberal credentials to start carrying the fight. They have capital in the bank to do it; the Vice President needs to replenish capital.

The Vice President makes an effective low-key presentation on television; when he is provided a new franchise, he should take to the networks to argue his case. He should be shown fighting for something -- not just against somebody. It would enhance his stature if he were given a foreign assignment of some duration --- this would broaden his image with the public; he might well make a campus appearance or appearances; he might well make a surprise visit for a A. and A. session with black leaders; he should be given the opportunity to demonstrate his abilities other than as simply campaigner; he should be provided the opportunity to show the many other facets to his personality other than fierce partisan.

The Veep is the most loyal of the President's soldiers; he took more wounds and scored more direct hits in the campaign than any other of the President's men --- this was his job. But, to continue to do that job effectively, he needs to retire temporarily a political gladiator to show the nation that he is something other than the War Lover of American Politics.

Whenever, there is a new program to be announced that the President is not going to announce --- the Vice President should be the one before the cameras. Whenever RN is about ready to let something go of significance in the domestic arena --- the Vice President might well be the one who gets the headlines by giving an inkling of the new progressive direction of the Administration.

(The Cabinet)

Unless specifically asked, I would feel it presumptuous to recommend changes in the President's highest appointed body. But my views briefly are these: The President's commitment to clean up the Department of State has manifestly not been carried out by those given the franchise -- the President's men are not the men dominating that body --- the career service historically hostile to the President has too many positions of power -- and we are going to suffer damaging leaks in the 1972 campaign unless we do something about it. The Secretary of the Interior does this President no good and a great deal of harm with his transparent attempts to ingratiate himself with the liberal media. While I continue to admire Secretary Romney's tenacity and guts, he is a committed believer in the compulsory integration of American society --- to solve the race problem. My feeling is that this is socially dangerous at this time and politically disastrous---and we spend too damn much time and effort trying to change peoples minds to change their policy to accord with the President. We might attempt changing the men rather than the minds. Finally, in the area of the economy, a mortal danger for 1972, we need

a man at Treasury who can articulate the President's policies, a staunch loyalist, who has both credentials and capability in the economic and political areas.

(5) Relations with Congress

With regard to the regular Republicans, we are still in good shape. As for the "Baker's dozen", they are going to make their own decisions as to what to do --- depending on their own political hides; they care as little about ours as we do about theirs. For example, Hatfield -- a True Believer -- can be expected to depart little from his former path. Percy, the Opportunist, who is up in 1972, is already making friendly noises. My view is that we ought not to wage war with them -- but to treat them in accord with the degree of support they give us -- and not lean upon them. Where we can find areas of agreement, exploit them; and see if we can convince them -- in their and the party's interests -- to minimize the degree of Goodellism that goes on.

As for the Democrats, as one of our aides put it, we are going to be "walking through a vat of acid," for the next two years. In the Senate -- half a dozen have their eye on the President -- and all their decisions, actions, statements, attacks and support are going to be on that basis. There is nothing at all we are going to be able to do with them. We should have our Cabinet and White House staffers programmed to answer their charges --- to deal with them on the political warfare level.

As for our own Congressional Relations --- in my view Bill Timmons is not only absolutely loyal -- but also the most hard-working of the President's men in the least enviable of Presidential assignments. I think he needs more manpower over there; I think he needs more visible identification as the President's man for Congressional relations; I think he needs more access to the President himself and his inner councils; I think he needs to be given more credibility for his job on the Hill --- by the President's visible demonstration that he is our man on Capitol Hill.

Finally, the President should place the onus for starting the political war on the Democratic Party in Congress --- by letting them fire the first few shots. Perhaps, when this Congress fails to act, as it will, and goes home for Christmas -- the President could, more in sorrow than anger, go on the nation's networks or lead off a press conference with a doleful recounting of its failures to act in the national interest --- and the President's hopes that the new Congress will serve the nation a little better.

(6) Presidential Travel

Abroad: The exigencies of foreign policy will dictate if the President must go abroad to advance the national interest. From the standpoint of RN's political posture, I strongly recommend against any "Grand Tour" trips ala the recent sojourn to Europe and the Mediterranean. The President is generally conceded high marks for his handling of foreign policy. The nation via television has already seen the President moving through countless cheering throngs abroad. Repeat performances will be redundant; they will be written off in the media -- as the last trip was by some traveling reporters -- as politically motivated. We have drawn down our balance in this account -- there is not much capital left in foreign visits over the next six months. Lest we be charged, as we have been charged, of going abroad in search of crowds while the gnawing domestic problems remain unsolved, I recommend against. Also, by not going abroad in the near future, the President will have positioned himself well for a major foreign visit in early of mid-1972 -- when it would be perceived as something of a far greater interest, and when it could more effectively underscore the President's successes overseas in time for the 1972 elections.

At Home: Consistent with the view that the President must put the partisan image back of himself, reflect the "humanity and heart" of the Administration, reassume the posture of President of all the American people, I would recommend spontaneous visits, stop-offs to areas of social depression in the country -- whether of unemployed whites or rural blacks.

Because of the appreciable amount of negative reportage we are receiving for "staging" events -- these would necessarily have to be truly spontaneous; symbolic of the President's personal concerns for the people he leads. Democrats have consistently been superior to Republicans with this sort of communication -- and given our party's hereditary image as the Party of Big Business -- this is a woeful weakness. Such visits will also blunt the inevitable charge of the 1972 elections that Republicans are concerned only with cold statistics like 5.5 percent unemployment -- that the President doesn't give a damn about poor people.

Similarly, however, as the nation has seen the President in cheering throngs abroad -- so also, from the campaign, has it seen streets lined with cheering people at home. Though the motorcading through the crowds may serve as a rejoinder to any contention the President is not popular with the people -- it also would seem redundant in the aftermath of the election.

(7) Final Points.

First, we are getting some nasty criticism for having exploited the San Jose incident, and for alleged being an Administration more interested in image than substance -- long on P.R. and short on accomplishment. If pressed, this attack could be very damaging and I recommend we consider drawing in our horns on the P.R. operation side of things. The nation is one that is very keen to and very down on P.R. -- and the last thing we want in the world is to have the press start picking up the McGinnis theme of hucksterism. We should have a high level review of the effectiveness -- or again the word comes to mind, the possible "overkill" of this side of the operation. At all cost we should avoid any tarnishing of the President's image as President in the minds of the people -- and these attacks bother me.

Finally, at all costs we must avoid, in the wake of the election, and in the pressure the President is assuredly getting from the left, any kind of transparant public move to the left. This damaged us after Kent State and such would now be tacit admission the Restons and Sideys were right and we were wrong on the campaign. It would be disheartening to the bulk of our support. Rather than any left or right move it should be a forward move away from the partisan role of the campaign toward fulltime President again.



PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

4:00 P.M. MTG WITH JEFF HART

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 12, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JIM KEOGH *JK*

Jeff Hart is nearly finished with his manuscript for "The Great Comeback" -- the book on your course from November 1962 to January 20, 1969. He has interviewed all of the key people who were part of that history, and it is my understanding that he has been given thorough cooperation. What he would like to have from you is some personal insight and feeling about those years, including some material which he can use in direct quotes. He will have some specific questions. Hart has excellent judgment, is friendly toward us, and I am confident that he will produce a good book. I recommend that you talk with him as freely as you feel appropriate.

Hobe Lewis tells me that if Hart produces a manuscript in January -- as he intends -- it would be no problem to bring the book out next October. On a rush basis, Hobe thinks he could get it out in June. I believe that October would be better, since this timing would put it on the Christmas books list for next year and would give it a good spin into 1972. It would also avoid the problems that might arise in a rush situation with regard to checking and revising.

The possibility that we might bring Hart onto the staff has been discussed from time to time during this past year. In my opinion, Hart would be a good man to have on the staff. He did well in the things he wrote for us during the campaign. However, I think it would be a mistake to bring him onto the staff before this book comes out. The book will have a much better reception if Hart is a professor at Dartmouth than it will if he is a member of the White House staff when it is published. If he is a member of the staff, I fear that a rather general reaction might be that he has merely written what we wanted him to write. Therefore, I think that consideration of whether he should be brought onto the staff should be deferred until after the book is published and reviewed.

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By MH NARS, Date 1/21/82

November 13, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Tom Charles Huston *TH*

SUBJECT: 1970 Elections and Prospects for 1972

Perhaps the most significant result of the 1970 elections is that the rank-and-file Democrats came out of it convinced that they can win the Presidency in '72. It is only necessary to remember the difference in attitude among Republicans in the dark days following the Goldwater debacle and in the jubilant days following the 1966 elections to realize that the psychology of victory should not be underestimated as a political factor.

The fact that many folks now believe that a Democrat can win in '72 could, however, work to our advantage. Our best hope is that the ambition of the Democrat contenders will re-open the ideological wounds self-inflicted upon the party in 1968. Of particular interest is the possibility that the Kennedy people may decide that 1972 is the year for a Democrat, and if Teddy doesn't move, he will be out for eight years and that is too long to wait. Initially I would think this impulse to move would be stronger among the Kennedy camp-followers than with the Senator himself, but he

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A. W. WOODS
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By AW MHC, Date 1/21/82 2

might very well be convinced that all is forgiven and he should go for the big one. Should this happen, I would look for the Kennedy allies in the media to pull a "Romney" on Muskie and knock him out of consideration as a serious contender. Broder is already warning Muskie to be on the alert for such a move.

POSTURE THE PRESIDENT SHOULD MAINTAIN IN 1971

The President's posture in 1971 should not be much different than it was in 1967 -- he should maintain a relatively low profile and leave the arena to the hustling contenders. A Democrat aspirant will be pressing hard to make out an independent record in the Senate that qualifies him as the preferable nominee, which means he will have to promote himself at his colleagues expense. This may work in several ways. For example, I would not be surprised to see Senator McGovern open up on Muskie on the grounds that he compromised on the law and order issue at the expense of principle. The left-wing of the Democratic Party is not at all happy with the shift many of their candidates made on the law and order issue; after all they have a considerable investment in the repression issue. If we played our hand properly, we could see a fine row going among the Democrats over who has yielded to political expediency at the expense of the young, the black, and the poor.

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If we wish to pursue a policy of leaving the Democrats enough rope for a family lynching party, it follows that the President should strike a posture of studied statesmanship and bold leadership. The contrast should be between a working President coping with tough problems and bickering Democrats jockeying for partisan advantage.

If I had to select a single word to characterize the posture the President should assume, it would be "candor." Candor requires that one take others into his confidence, that one convey a sense of partnership, of shared experience; it requires an openness of opinion as well as of deed, a willingness to admit mistakes as well as to claim success. The best illustration is the November 9, 1969, address on Vietnam. It was a masterpiece precisely because the viewer had the impression that he was being talked with, not to; that the President was taking him into his confidence, explaining the problem and discussing the solution, asking for understanding without demanding support.

In pursuing a policy of candor, it is not necessary to ignore political realities. The political battle is waged on two levels. Where the public interest is demonstrably at stake, the appearance and the reality must be one. What is done and how it is done are equally important and both must be clearly visible and credible. However, where the problem is strictly political (i. e., tactical) the appearance must often be at odds with the reality.

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4/21/80 4

It was said of President Van Buren that he rowed toward every objective with muffled oars. This is a wise and necessary political tactic, one which we appear to have foresworn in the recent election, but it is a difficult and dangerous one, for the temptation is to confuse the tactic with the strategy. The distinction is between political objectives and national goals. Candor is a philosophy of government, "muffled oars" a practice of politics -- and practice should always be the servant of philosophy.

THE MEDIA

We take the media too seriously. It is hostile, it is irritating, it is even on occasion demaging, but there isn't much we can accomplish by worrying that David Brinkley is going to burp in our face. We have attempted to neutralize the media by employing tactics that presuppose that ideological hostility can be overcome by advertising techniques. We should deal with the media on our terms and in a manner that is conducive to presenting the image we want to get across, not the image that someone else (usually our enemies) expects of us.

There are several dangers from a concentrated effort to maximize media coverage. First, the risk of over-exposure. Studied aloofness is often the best politics (DeGaulle certainly understood this). The President

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E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By MT NARS, Date 1/21/80 5

doesn't have to intrude on everyone's supper to earn their respect, confidence, and support. Second, there is the risk that an extensive media effort will look contrived. We are already seeing columns accusing us of attempting to substitute a media-created image for substantive programs and policies. We are rather overt in our media orientation and the public might conclude that we are trying to con them.

We should use the media to project the image we want on the terms we desire. In this respect, I believe we should concentrate on portraying RN as a working President, as an educator who uses the media as a means of reaching and educating the people and not as a means of exploiting or deceiving them. Obviously, what I am saying is that the media should be used to convey the candor of the President. Specifically, we should have more televised press conferences, more in-depth discussions with network commentators, and some televised "fireside chats." Moreover, we should not go to the people only when an issue is burning and we should not go simply to solicit overt support. We should try some new formats. In short, we should use the media as a precise and targeted weapon.

The burden of carrying the day-to-day message to the people on the programs and policies of the Administration should fall to the Veep, the Cabinet, the National Chairman, and the Congressional leadership. It is

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By AH MMS, Date 1/21/81 6

not enough to say that they don't do the job -- we should see that they do it. The President should not be burdened with the inadequacies of daily television news coverage. Unless we are prepared to go all the way and buy a network, we ought to quit worrying about the problem. It is fruitless to attempt to meet Brinkley, et. al. on their own terms and all we can get in the process is ulcers. It's not worth it.

THE VICE PRESIDENT

The Vice President did his campaign assignment well, but he may have committed political suicide in the process. To an increasing portion of Middle America, he is coming across as radical as those whom he attacks. He needs to develop an image as a reasonable and credible man, a task which he can easily handle if encouraged to do so.

Many people believe the Vice President has told a lot of truth, albeit in language that they regard as excessive. However, people can tolerate only so much unpopular and disconcerting truth. They want to be reassured, not alarmed. More importantly, they want to believe in the man as much as the message. The Vice President should shift his emphasis without yielding an inch on the substantive issues he raised. He should de-escalate the rhetoric without de-escalating the substance of his message.

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ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
E.O. 12958, Category 5-102
By AH SARC, Date 1/21/80 7

The Vice President should take four steps in the months ahead. First, he should address himself to proposed solutions to the problems he has outlined. He should indicate that having identified various problems, he is now ready to offer possible solutions. Second, he should make a conspicuous effort to resume the exercise of his official responsibilities, i. e., presiding over the Senate, presiding over the various councils he chairs, etc. He needs to reassert himself as a working as opposed to a campaigning Vice President. One area where he should concentrate his efforts is in the field of inter-governmental relations. He should be our principal spokesman for the New Federalism. Third, the President might consider giving the Vice President a more prominent role in the formulation and articulation of our domestic programs. And finally, the Vice President should arrange to appear on as many interview-type television shows as possible where he can develop his image as a rational, reasonable, and believable man.

The risk of such a course is that the Vice President will be ignored by the national media. However, I don't think that is too important. If he gets out in the country he will get local coverage by virtue of his office. Moreover, if he begins to play a prominent role in substantive policy and program areas, he will have to get national media attention by virtue of the newsworthiness of the subject matter.

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1/21/82 8

Consistent with my view that the President ought to maintain a rather low and select profile, it might be advantageous to let the Vice President assume a more prominent substantive role. Not only would this enhance the prestige of the Vice President, but it would buffet the President and enable him to avoid exposure except on the big ones where we want to make a decisive point.

CONGRESS

We are going to have to get along with Congress if we want to get our legislative program through. In addition, we want to encourage the Senate Democrats to fight among themselves in anticipation of securing advantage in the race for the nomination. We should avoid institutional attacks or affronts; we should also avoid making a major fight out of minor issues. However, on carefully selected issues of major importance to the success of the Administration, we should not hesitate to fight like hell. Although beyond the scope of this memorandum, I might note in passing that I believe there is political profit to be gained from drawing the line with Congress on foreign and defense policy.

The key to our success on the Hill will be our ability to forge a fairly united Republican team in the Senate. We should make every effort to pacify the liberals consistent with the policy posture of the President.

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However, I think we should not overlook the possibility of putting pressure on the deviants within the ranks of the party, making use of Dole, Tower, and other loyalists for this purpose. In addition, we should not let Hatfield, et. al. forget what happened to good old Charlie. We should also emphasize that we must all sink or swim together in '72 and it is certainly not in the interests of those seeking re-election to be publicly at odds with their President. If possible, we might consider our own "shadow" leader, a loyalist in the Senate who is unofficially recognized as the President's personal spokesman, a man who can count noses so that when it is obvious we have the votes we can leave the deviants alone and let them do their own thing. This would probably get Hugh Scott's nose out of joint, but since he is so expert at looking after his own skin, I don't see why we should be reluctant to do the same.

PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL

Consistent with my suggestion of a low profile, I would recommend against extensive travel except where demonstratively purposeful. While the exposure when abroad is extensive, I am not convinced that it has any lasting impact unless associated with concrete accomplishments. I keep thinking of LBJ and the Spirit of Glassboro -- what a fleeting moment of glory that was!

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
E.O. 12066, APR 27 8-100 10
By MH DATE 1/21/80

THE CABINET

We need some changes in the Cabinet. While perhaps I am vindictive and narrow-minded, I have never forgiven Secretary Hickel for the letter he sent during the Cambodian operation which was a gratuitous embarrassment to the President. He should have been fired upon receipt of the letter and he has no claim to his seat by virtue of estoppel. He still should go.

If Secretary Romney persists in his plan to launch a massive federal integration drive in northern suburban housing developments, he should be sent back to Michigan to discuss the political wisdom of his plan with the voters of Warren, Michigan.

There are a couple of other potential nominees for retirement, but Hickel and Romney are initially adequate to get the message across that loyalty and good judgment are values highly regarded in this Administration.

At the sub-Cabinet level there should be a major purge. We are being screwed daily by people who have been held over or (I say this reluctantly) by people whom we appointed. HEW could afford a complete house-cleaning from Under-Secretary on down, and I suspect that I could put together a list of two dozen top-notch candidates for purging without even bothering to consult Senators Goldwater and Thurmond.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

11

While I am on the purge kick, I would like to put in a word for a man who should be first on any list: Randy Thrower. The best argument against Thrower is that there is no one in the White House who dares call IRS for information without fear that word of the inquiry will be leaked. I am a strong admirer of Van Buren's "muffled oar" strategy, but it is only possible if you have control of your own Administration. I assume that we intend to play for keeps in '72 and that means we need to have the goods on the guys who are determined to do us in. We need control of IRS. It is less important that the Commissioner be a tax whiz than that he be willing to follow orders. Thrower can't. He is arrogant and insubordinate and should go immediately.

Finally, a word about method. The impression is abroad that we are afraid to purge disloyal or incompetent personnel. This is dangerous for it breeds contempt as well as insubordination. Certainly there will be screams of outrage if we have a massive purge, but the screams will last about 10 days and we will have a loyal team for the next two years. Surely we can afford to take the heat when the stakes are so high. Cabinet shake-ups are not unusual in American history. Jackson fired his entire cabinet save the Postmaster General. Truman fired Wallace when he was the

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
S.G. 1000, Section 6-102

By PHH MARS, Date 1/21/82

darling of the liberals, progressives, and communists. Roosevelt had no compunction about throwing overboard anyone whom he regarded as a political liability. We should draw up a list of those who are either disloyal or incompetent, find suitable replacements, and strike with a single sudden blow. While the screams in the liberal press would be awesome, the long-term benefits would be more than compensating. We have to get control of the government; there are too many Trojan horses within the walls as we prepare for what could be a close election in '72.

PARTY ORGANIZATION

I am beginning to sound like Stalin, but we also need a purge at the National Committee. Larry O'Brien stands head-and-shoulders above our man as a party chairman. He is a gut fighter and he is effective. During the past campaign, many of us were appalled at the inability of the National Committee to produce. And Jim Allison's appearance on television the morning after the election where he admitted to our major defeats and discounted the impact of the President and Vice President was hardly helpful. Moreover, there have been so many columns about how the White House refuses to listen to the sound advice of Morton and Allison

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE

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1/21/80 14

Jim Buckley's campaign suggested that large numbers of traditionally Democratic voters are searching for alternatives and not merely on the law and order issue. In fact, the interesting thing about Buckley's campaign is that he, as a professed conservative running on a third party ticket, came across as a more reasonable and credible candidate on a variety of issues than many regular Republicans who thought they were waging a "conservative" campaign. These fellows were about as successful in their efforts as I would have been running as a New Leftist, for the voters can spot a phony. The heavy-handedness of their campaigns suggested that they thought the conservative alternative was what the New York Times said it was.

Since 1964 there has emerged a new generation of principled but practical conservatives of whom Buckley is but one. On many university faculties there are young intellectuals who are developing alternatives to current programs whose intellectual well spring is the New Deal. We ought to consider opening some lines to these people and soliciting their ideas and suggestions. There is doubtless going to be a big push for a program of national health insurance. I fear we may respond with a proposal that merely splits the difference with Meany, that accepts his major premises

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

15

and opens the door to socialized medicine. On such major issues where it is obvious we should do something, we ought to look beyond the bureaucracy of HEW and consider other alternatives. We ought not let Buckley and Reagan become the spokesmen for an emerging conservative program. We don't have to make any sharp swing to the right, but we ought to translate some of our conservative rhetoric into a few conservative programs. We might find as Reagan did that they don't hurt us politically. And if we choose those that are directed to ethnics, blue collar workers, and Catholics, we might find they help us considerably.

A FINAL SUGGESTION

It might be worth the trouble and expense to ask a group of talented political types on the outside to take on the assignment of keeping their ear to the ground and passing on their thoughts and recommendations for your study on a regular basis. I have in mind such people as Kevin Phillips, John Sears, a couple of young intellectuals with public opinion analysis backgrounds. These people might be able to give us an insight on a regular basis that would be helpful in gaining a fresh perspective on what is happening in the country. Perhaps this is unnecessary, but it might be of some help.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

16

HH

1/21/82

In conclusion, I would suggest we take the following steps over the near-term: (1) get control of the government; (2) emphasize substantive policy and minimize media exposure; (3) start organizing for '72 by establishing a working organization at the White House, putting in a new team at the National Committee, identifying key states that require special party-building attention, and considering the use of outside analysts; and (4) have the Vice President shift his emphasis to a positive tone in order to establish himself as a reasonable and believable man and a working member of the policy team.

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