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**FILE GROUP TITLE**

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Political Articles [1970]

**RESTRICTION CODES**

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MEMORANDUM FROM RICHARD MCCORMACK

RE: November 13-14 Meeting of the American Association of Political Consultants To Discuss with Campaign Managers the Results of the Recent Elections in Texas, California, New York, Arkansas and Minnesota

I. The Overall Program
2:00 Contact Politics ... "Knot Tying, Cook-outs and Jimmies" 😍

How the telephone can be used as the basic tool of a campaign — recruiting volunteers, surveying voter attitudes, telephone-mail; the one-two punch.

Matt Reese
Matt Reese & Associates
Washington, D.C.

3:45 Break

4:00 Election Day ... "Helping the Little Old Lady across the street ... But what if she doesn't want to go?"

The best utilization of challengers, watchers, ballot passers, drivers, telephone workers, etc. What to do from before the polls open until after they close: ballot security and getting an honest count; what to do in bad weather; working with volunteers and paid workers. How campaigns can determine election day strategy.

Jerry Harkins
Jerry Harkins & Associates
Washington, D.C.

5:30 Closing Comments

Matt Reese
F. Clifton White

5:45 End of Conference

Press Note: The conference will be open to the
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13th

THE 1970 CAMPAIGNS—HOW WE RAN THEM

9:00 Registration
(Coffee will be served in the Lobby of the Forum Theater during registration.)

10:00 Welcome
F. Clifton White
President, AAPC

10:15 Opening Remarks
Milt Reese
Program Chairman and Treasurer, AAPC

10:30 The Minnesota Senatorial Race
Jack Chestnut,
Campaign Manager for Hubert Humphrey
David Kroeseng,
Campaign Manager for Clark MacGregor

11:30 The Texas Gubernatorial Race
Edith Mabe,
Campaign Manager for Paul Eggers
Mickey Smith,
Campaign Manager for Preston Smith

12:30 Lunch Break
(No lunches are scheduled as part of the conference.)

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 14th

NUTS AND BOLTS—PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER

9:00 Coffee
Forum Theater Lobby

9:30 Campaign Planning . . . "Be Prepared"
Strategy and tactics, research and planning, targeting, organization and staff, schedule and advance, press and public relations, techniques of voter contact, advertising, budgeting.
Edward Failor
Fred A. Niles Communications Co., Chicago, Illinois
John Lorenz
Cyr Picard & Associates, Washington, D.C.

10:45 Break

11:00 Using the Mails . . . "Smoke Signals and Semaphore"
Philosophy, statistics and mechanics of successful use of direct mail in politics.
Ray Waters
Demographics, Inc., Little Rock, Arkansas

12:30 Lunch Break
II. 

A. **A General Comment**: Because of the large number of outsiders at the meeting, including members of the press on an "off-the-record" basis, there was less than absolute frankness on the part of many participants, as well as a good deal of glorification of individual candidates. The large number of spectators (150) made impossible in-depth questioning of individual speakers.

B. **Summary of Main Ideas Derived from the Seminar**

1. Visits by outsiders to help candidate are most valuable when restricted to fund raising and to delivering general non-controversial speeches cleared in advance with the local people. Otherwise, outside "help" is often quite counterproductive and leads to a waste of scarce staff time to advance the outsider's speech. This was a pretty general feeling.

2. The lack of early money caused severe problems for the campaigns. Perhaps the National Committee could raise a slush loan fund for selected candidates to be repaid at the end of the campaign. Careful controls to ensure ultimate repayment.

3. There is no national recipe for winning local elections. Outside meddling is usually counterproductive. Winning campaigns are usually those which did a thousand details well.

4. It would be useful to do a telephone poll of campaign managers all over the country to investigate the details of each campaign: what went well, what went badly, what the national party could have done to improve things.

III. **Significant Comments by Various Speakers**

A. **Clifton White**

Outlined the purposes of the seminar—to exchange technical information and to identify key campaign mistakes.

B. **Jack Chestnut**, Campaign Manager for Hubert Humphrey
The Humphrey campaign effort began in January with the crea-
tion of an organizational manual which defined the tasks, respon-
sibilities and individual authority of each key staff member.

Campaign was broken down into three phases: Pre-primary
with emphasis on organization and research. Primary phase
stressing high visibility for candidate. Campaign itself relying
on use of media.

Initially did very thorough voter breakdown using computer and
registration information to locate potential areas and population
groups for concentration of effort.

Had to overcome the fact that HHH hadn't visited some areas of
his state in many years.

On the basis of this poll decided on HHH theme---You Know He
Cares.

Attempted to reach voters by Humphrey booths at county fairs,
sending out 120,000 computerized "personal" letters containing
an explanation of why he wanted to run, bumper sticker, and
return envelope for donations.

Held fundraising dinners in each Congressional district but left
money in the district where it was raised for use by Congres-
sional candidate and HHH jointly.

To avoid problems, HHH took no part in the Governorship pri-
mary and thus, after the primary, was able to establish a single
campaign office in each area for all D.F.L. candidates.

Gained a great deal of free media time by exploiting talk shows
and news programs all over the state.

Held only one press conference during entire period---one
announcing his candidacy.

Established an effective phone bank operation which made
140,000 contacts.

Alleged GOP errors in campaign:
1. The primary left scars.

2. The Governor and Senatorial candidates didn't work together.

3. "Fear" theme fell flat.

4. GOP theme "Would be a full-time Senator" totally ineffective.

5. People could see that HHH was not a "sick, sick, sick, tired old man" as alleged by GOP.

6. Outside help by Administration visits totally ineffective.

C. David Krogseng, Campaign Manager for Clark MacGregor

The main reason for the Democratic victory was not the activities of the campaign manager, but rather the personality, background, and prominence of Humphrey himself.

The Republican organization was in excellent shape.

The campaign made several hundred thousand telephone contacts.

Republican National Committee had vast quantities of information on HHH's past speeches and positions. Too much to be able to handle.

Poll data on voter attitudes turned out to be accurate. But it was difficult to cause the 28 percent who felt that HHH talked too much, or the people who felt he had sold out to LBJ, etc. to feel strongly enough about these things to vote against him.

MacGregor experienced a critical shortage of "early" money which he badly needed to overcome Humphrey's voter identification lead (76 percent to 99.6 percent).

Early October showed promising MacGregor gains.

What went wrong?

1. Republican issues weren't effective. HHH killed the law-and-order issue with a tough speech to the Bar Association. HHH better able to convince voters to "vote your wallet".
2. MacGregor plagued by a "you can't win" image—worsened by leaks out of Washington that MacGregor was written off.

3. GOP didn't work together in state.

4. "Outside assistance" apparently wasn't terribly helpful. (Humphrey's manager said our Administration speakers did little but tie up MacGregor's campaign staff.) When pressed, MacGregor's man stated that outside assistance was "on balance, helpful" in a most unconvincing tone.

NOTE: Subsequently we watched respective campaign spots for television. MacGregor made a rather wooden impression. HHH's were considerably more effective.

D. Eddie Mahe, Campaign Manager for Paul Eggers

Strategy was predicated on a low voter turnout--below 2,000,000.

Actual turnout: 2,250,000.

The Bush/Bensten race took most of the local interest.

Urging that Government works better when the Legislature and the Governor are of different parties was contrasted by the national Republican election theme of "a Republican Senate" as well as by the experience of other states where taxes soared under these conditions.

Three newspapers out of 600 supported Eggers.

Eggers' stand on marijuana hurt (he favored lighter penalties.).

Democrats were united in campaign.

The referendum on "liquor by the drink" brought out a huge voter turnout of liquor-hating, Republican-hating upstate Baptists.

Eggers was severely ill during the Spring which reduced his vitality during remainder of campaign.
Eggers hated camaras and wanted to get the filming over early in June. Later when the campaign changed, they didn't have enough money left to scrap their old footage and make new, more relevant films for TV spots.

2,000,000 newspaper supplements made for Eggers.

750,000 telephone and canvas contacts made for him.

What went wrong?

1. Campaign never jelled (changed campaign managers once).

2. Money came in very late in October.

3. Of 254 Texas counties, 125 had Eggers organizations of note. 75 counties didn't even have token Eggers organizations.

4. Needed more money. Planned budget, $1,000,000; actual budget, $620,000.

E. Mickey Smith, Campaign Manager for Preston Smith

Governor Smith was well known throughout Texas.

Was described by press as a dull, plodding Governor.

Opposition came out early with their media approach, so it was easy to counteract.

Stressed accomplishments of Governor.

Yarborough faction did not sabotage Smith, as feared.

F. Steve Martindale, Campaign Assistant to Senator Goodell

Financial difficulties were major reason for Goodell failure in New York.

Vice President Agnew brought pressure on the President of the Stock Exchange to dry up fund sources on Wall Street.
Daily News poll caused people to vote for Ottinger or Buckley so as not to waste vote.

Goodell's "instant liberal" image didn't hurt him except among conservatives.

Voters went conservative three to one in Goodell's old upstate constituency.

Goodell seriously considered pulling out of campaign and allegedly would have done so if he had believed this would have stopped Buckley.

G. Clifton White

Preliminary poll in New York indicated that 66 to 68 percent of voters identified selves as moderates or conservatives.

Had to establish own organization across the entire state.

Buckley had serious voter identification problem.

Lacked early money for campaign.

Buckley hadn't made an impact on upstate Republicans before 1970 because he had never really visited the area politically.

Buckley went on TV before the other candidates to overcome the voter identification problem.

Polls at one time gave Goodell 50 percent of vote during the Spring. Ottinger had 47 percent of vote at another period of early campaign.

Campaign strategy tried to make Goodell and Ottinger seem like twins, ideologically.

Republican precinct workers and county chairmen sympathized with Buckley.

Thirty daily newspapers supported Buckley, while only three or four supported the other candidates, including the New York Times.
Buckley scared Ottinger away from using the television during a key period in the campaign by accusing him of buying the election. The big spender image rarely affects voters, but it does scare candidates.

The Vice President was enormously helpful to Buckley by legitimizing him as the Republican candidate, securing money and party support for him.

Fifty percent of the county chairmen actively or passively helped Buckley.

H. Tom Reed, Campaign Manager for Governor Reagan

Started fund raising in March so as to deny funds to Unruh and to get the thing over with. Collected $2,000,000 from 250,000 people (Others suggested that $4,000,000 was collected.).

Established a student organization for Reagan to prevent overt anti-Reagan efforts on campuses.

United Republican Party. Kuchel endorsed Governor.


Spread Governor Reagan too thin by overconfidence on efforts to elect state legislature candidates.

Late in campaign, Reagan lead dropped from 13 percent to 7 percent.

I. Phillip Schott, Campaign Manager for Jess Unruh

Reasons for loss:

1. Had very little money.

2. Money all came in at the very end of the campaign.

3. Pundits predicted a Reagan victory—Unruh could never shake the loser image.
Undertook a massive registration drive for Democrats (800,000 registered Democrats).

Net change in statewide registration plus 400,000 Democrats, 190,000 Republicans.

Constant telephone tracking and polling. Twenty calls per day tabulated once a month to isolate campaign planning from the "flap-of-the-day" syndrome which often produces bad, hasty changes.

III. Second Day: Nuts and Bolts

A. Edward Failor, Niles Communications Center

1. Candidate must initially cultivate opinion makers before public campaign really gets started.

2. Mass contact must be governed by the following concepts:
   a. Masses won't listen to long, windy commentary or to a profusion of issues.
   b. Image of candidate as achiever should be stressed by affirmation, repetition.
   c. Affirmation campaign cannot become bogged down in logic. "Dewey gets things done."

3. Campaign advertizing
   a. Analyze assets of candidate.
   b. Analyze electorate's past voting behavior and current attitudes.
   c. A theme must be decided upon early and maintained.
   d. Whole creative approach should be decided upon early and stuck to.
   e. Creative team should be enthusiastic supporters of candidate, should know candidate well.
4. Budgeting—urged realism and thoroughness.

5. Research divided into two phases: hard and soft data.
   a. Hard data, past election results and voting patterns, obtained from registration forms and should include location of swing voters, ethnic breakdowns, how often each bloc votes, easily computerized.
   
   b. Soft data
      (1) Synchronic poll (whom do you prefer now?)
      (2) Diachronic poll (what type of candidate and attitudes do you generally prefer. Diachronic poll is generally more reliable and useful.

6. It's imperative that the man in charge of the scheduling of the candidate knows the area and local personalities.

7. Advance men must inform candidate of local issues and local concerns so that the speech will be relevant.

8. To get a sense of the way the campaign is going, an occasional systematic debriefing of campaign foot soldiers is useful.

9. Get together from time to time with campaign managers from other area races.

10. Polls are generally off by three to four percent.

11. Media advertizing should zero in on programs preferred by target voters.

12. The press, the candidate himself, and the voters have expectations from a campaign. Each must be met.

B. Matt Reese: Election Day, the day of the organization

   The precinct organization is still extremely important. Television is obviously important, but to supplement, not supplant, the vital work of the organization.
Election laws should be carefully studied to determine what is permissible locally—an inquiry should be initiated as to what is customary. You must know who controls the machinery on election day and make provision in advance if corruption is anticipated.

Absentee ballots procedures should be studied. If possible, all your campaign workers should vote in advance to obviate the necessity of their taking off an hour on election day to vote.

Make all assignments to your volunteer workers in writing and keep the record, both to make sure that the workers get the assignments straight and to give you a record as to whom your people are.

It's also a good idea to make an organization chart and make it public so that your volunteers feel some status and public onus if they fail in their area.

Arrange in advance for the care and feeding of your campaign volunteers.

Set aside money for a party for your campaign volunteers election night (Even if you lose, there will be other elections).

C. Jerry Hopkins: Fraud

1. Make sure your votes get counted and your opponent's votes get counted only once. Ascertain that "local" voters really are local voters. Check credentials.

2. Check for mirrors over the machine.

3. Make sure that the machines register zero when polls open.


5. Paper ballots are a disaster in corrupt areas.

6. Get somebody infiltrated into the office where voting machines are stored to prevent fraud and quietly to inform you if it is taking place.
7. Send a first class mailing into particularly bad precincts so that the dead and moved residents will have the envelopes returned stamped accordingly so that you can check the registered rolls against them.

A book on vote frauds is badly needed, both to help guide the public and to make those who perpetrate the frauds a bit uneasy.

D. Joe Napolitan, Matt Reese

Napolitan felt that the professional effort devoted to the reelection of Governor Burns of Hawaii was the best in the country.

Problems of the Governor:

a. He was 61 years old looking for a third term.

b. He was opposed by Tom Gill, his former Lieutenant Governor who had a 20 percent lead in the polls.

c. Polled interest groups on both sides of many questions felt that Governor Burns supported the other side.

d. Public lacked knowledge of Burns' accomplishments.

e. Hawaii had greatly grown and changed during the past decade.

Governor's assets were:

a. He had a good organization with zeal and money.

b. He had a good record as Governor.

The campaign to reelect him was divided into three phases:

a. The Plan

b. The Plan and the Man

c. The Man
The plan was to convince the voters that Hawaii had progressed under Burns. Television was the leading media tool for this campaign. Showed advances in environment protection, education, industry.

TV was featured in short bursts of two-week duration.

The campaign media first showed only Hawaii and its improvements for the first two-week blitz.

The second two-week blitz showed Hawaii's improvements and Governor Burns.

The third two-week blitz showed only Governor Burns.

E. Use of Mails

Mailings with computerized letters are helpful when:

a. Candidates are not effective speakers on television.

b. When a state is large and there is no way to cover the state with one or two TV channels.

c. When a candidate is an unknown.

A form letter campaign should be conducted only after a careful voter breakdown using registration forms to determine to whom you should send the letter, i.e., your potential supporters.

It's difficult to change people's minds with a letter. Letters only tend to reinforce existing views.

The one-to-one relationship should be stressed in the mailing.

Mail bulk rather than first class because nobody notices what the stamp says and even the Post Office Departments tends to handle everything as first class.

Repetition is important in mailings.

Letters should be kept short and simple.
Every letter should include a request for funds and a return envelope.

By planning ahead you can often save literally half the costs of mailing.

You can often save by sharing the mailing lists with other candidates of your party.

Too much mailing a la Rockefeller in Arkansas can be disastrous.

Mailing campaign must be closely related to the rest of the campaign.

Precincts should be graded according to a ranking so that you will be able to devote your time and money accordingly. Factors in ranking include:

a. Party registration
b. Party alignment
c. Past election performance
d. Turnout
e. Switch/split propensity
f. Ethnic/economic makeup
g. Organizational effectiveness
h. Public opinion poll indicators

Based on this precinct profile, a percent-of-effort index to allot time and money is made for each precinct.

The campaign should be thoroughly organized and planned.

Volunteer forces are established.

a. Block captains. Recruited through telephone contact.
Block captains are supposed to visit each family in block.

You must constantly check up on block captain to make certain that she does her job (3/4 are women, as a rule) and should send them a kit including a badge, sample of things to say, literature and a return card to let the headquarters know that she has worked.

After the literature is sent to the block captain, a followup call should be made to allay fears and urge them to get on with the job.

Subsequently, block captains receive a letter from the candidate's wife, thanking them for their past efforts and asking them to get out the vote on election day.

b. Cleanup captains. These agree to work the final three hours for registered but lazy voters to pick them up and get them to the polls during the last three hours of the election.