

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
48	30		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Report	The Elections of '70 and '72. 13 pgs.
48	30		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Report	The Elections of '70 and '72. 13 pgs.
48	30	8/24/1970	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to The President RE: The Elections of '70 and ' 72. 10 pgs.
48	30	8/24/1970	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to The President RE: The Veep and the Campaign of 1970. 4 pgs.

THE ELECTIONS OF '70 & '72

"The Real Majority" by Scammon and Wattenburg contains a credible and workable blueprint for our defeat in 1972. Its three hundred pages contain a realistic cogent strategy for a liberal Democrat in 1972. However, the presentation of that strategy points up a counter-strategy which Republicans are going to have to adopt if they are not to lose the historic opportunity we have had for the last five years.

We can no longer count on our Democratic friends to cooperate in their own demise -- as they have in recent years. Liberals are waking up all over America. Columnists like Breslin and Harriet Van Horne and Mankiewicz, peaceniks like Sam Brown, politicians like HHH, Muskie and Lindsay are clearly moving on a new tough course -- a course outlined in this book. They have begun talking of law and order; they have ceased apologizing for student militants and black radicals; they are silent on bussing. We are no longer going to win the race for Middle America by default. The Democrats are moving to win back their white collar defectors and they are going about it the Scammon-Wattenburg way.

Attached is a comprehensive review of their analysis and strategy for Democratic victory. Appended is the outline of a counter-strategy we should follow in the 1970 elections.

THE HEART OF THE BOOK

Given the President's ability to wind down the war in 1972 and relatively stabilize the economy, Presidential elections throughout the coming decade will turn on the "Social Issue". First discovered by Goldwater and Wallace, the Social Issue is now the issue on which Middle America will vote -- if one candidate is on the wrong side as Humphrey was in 1968. This social issue embraces drugs, demonstrations, pornography, disruptions, "kidlash", permissiveness, violence, riots, crime. The voters will not tolerate "a liberal" on these issues, and will vote against him on this issue alone as victories for hard-liners Daley in Chicago, Maier in Milwaukee, Stenvig in Minneapolis and Yorty in Los Angeles clearly demonstrated.

It is "in the center of American politics that victory lies" and polls conclusively show that the center of American politics today wants

tougher administrators on campus, a crackdown on crime, pornography and drugs. If the Democrats do not move into that center position on the "Social Issue", then "goodbye Democrats".

"It is the judgment of the authors that the manner in which the Democratic Party handles the Social Issue will largely determine how potent a political force the party will be in America in the years to come."

THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM

From 1963 to 1969 the number of those identifying themselves as "conservative" has risen from 46 to 51 percent -- while those identifying as "liberal" has nose-dived from 49 to 33 percent.

Summer 1969 (Gallup)
(The Way Americans Identify Themselves)

<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Moderate Conservative</u>	<u>Moderate Liberal</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
23	28	18	15	16

In any normal election the moderate conservative (Republican) should have an advantage over the moderate liberal (Democrat). However, what this simple analysis fails to take into consideration is that when individuals consider themselves "conservative", it is "conservative" on the social issue -- Americans will not abide a "liberal" on the social issue. At the same time, however, polls show Americans clearly favor medicare, aid to cities, anti-poverty efforts, aid to education -- issues traditionally defined as "liberal". How do we explain the dichotomy. Say the authors:

"... the attitudinal center of American politics today involves progressivism on economic issues and toughness on the "Social Issue".

The party that can hold this center will win the Presidency.

THE SOUTH

"When the Democratic vote goes from 72 percent in 1944 to 31 percent in 1967, something has happened, and it has been something tidal ... The Democrats in the South were hurt by being

perceived (correctly) as a pro-black national party, but they were also hurt by the other nonracial aspects of the Social Issue that had become identified with liberal Democrats: soft on crime, "kidlash", morals and disruption ... The villains in Agnew's tirade were almost exclusively white (kids) --but throughout the South bumper stickers blossomed reading "Spiro is my hero", and a Southern politician was quoted as saying he was voting for Agnew in 1972 and if that meant voting for Nixon, so be it ... In no southern state are there enough Presidential Democrats to put together a statewide majority ... Although the divorce may not be final the question now is which of the two suitors the South will accept: "Wallaceite or Republican".

CRUCIAL QUESTION FOR '70s

"The key election fact of the seventies is that Democrats, by carrying non-southern states of Quadcali (California plus the Northeast Quadrant from Wisconsin to Massachusetts*) can win national elections without the South, although it is more difficult than it used to be. Assuming that Republicans stay near the center, the electoral question of the seventies is whether the Democrats will be able to cope with the Social Issue electoral forces at work in the society and, by coping, hold together the FDR Coalition and build upon it.

"As this book is being written in the early part of the year 1970 the votes of the unyoung, unpoor, unblack Quadcalians are still very much up for grabs. The machinist's wife in Dayton may decide to leave the Democratic reservation in 1972 and vote for Nixon or Wallace or their ideological descendants. If she thinks that Democrats feel that she isn't scared of crime but that she's really a bigot, if she thinks that Democrats feel that the police are Fascist pigs, and that the Black Panthers and the Weathermen are just poor, misunderstood, picked-upon kids, if she thinks that Democrats are for the hip cultures and that she, the machinist's wife, is not only a bigot but a square, then goodbye, lady -- and goodbye Democrats."

*(Quadcali consists of the Northeast Quadrant of the country from Wisconsin to Massachusetts including California; the authors say it is the key to victory in Presidential elections; and they dump generously on Border State Strategies and "Sun Belts" etc. This is the weakest part of the book. It is an effort to contrast their approach with the Phillips Approach by suggesting Phillips wants to trade Illinois for Alabama, or New Jersey for Mississippi, which is nonsense. Basically, there is much in common between the two strategies -- more than Scammon and Wattenburg would care to admit.)

ON LOW-KEY & "LOCAL" CAMPAIGNING

"And how many people can be assembled to hear or even glimpse a candidate in the flesh on a given day? Twenty-five thousand? Fifty thousand? A hundred thousand? Two hundred and fifty thousand? A two minute clip on each of the three network news shows during the campaign will yield the candidate an audience of many tens of million Americans! Hubert Humphrey or Richard Nixon will be seen by more residents of New Jersey if he says something fairly noteworthy in Oregon than if he says something banal in Trenton, Montclair, Newark, Camden, and Tenafly all in the same day."

What about the shot in the arm given party workers by the personal appearance?

"There is probably some limited truth to this, but again one must remember that far more party workers throughout the nation are enthused seeing their candidate in an effective two-minute spot on a news-broadcast appearance on television than can be enthused by a candidate's visit to Weehawken, Union City, Bergen and Short Hills ..."

"The people in New Jersey, like the rest of Americans will be judging their Presidential choices largely on the basis of national television, national magazines, national columnists, and national reporters appearing in their local newspapers and largely on national issues and national images."

"LIBERALISM AND BUSSING!"

"All of this represents the beginnings of a strategy for liberals in the seventies. Beware of the 'liberal' label but do not be despondent about the liberal program ... Beware of the Social Issue. It cuts deep and must be approached on little cat feet. There is learning as well as leading to do. There can be no pandering to disruption or crime; the public is not buying the notion that there are not bad boys, only bad environments ..."

REPUBLICAN AWARENESS

"There can be no question that a good deal of Republican gardening will be done on the Social Issue. When Vice President Agnew says:

'The rank-and-file Democrat in this country does not share the philosophy of permissiveness expressed by the best publicized moral and intellectual leaders of our society. He read with disgust all the rave reviews the press gives the latest dirty movie or dirty book ...'

then it is clear that the Republicans are aware of this strategy."

FORMULAS FOR SUCCESS

"This is the nature of centrism. Democrats must heal the wound of the Social Issue. Republicans must prove that they are the party of Middle America and not of the fat cats."

A FOURTH PARTY

"Furthermore, unlike the Wallace situation, an extreme left party would take almost all its votes from one party -- the Democratic Party. If it ever got strong, then, it could only be a "spoiler" ensuring Republican victories. As a weak party, however, an extreme left party might be helpful to Democrats, by getting the crazies out of the tent, decreasing the identification of 'Democrats' as radicals."

LINDSAY & CHARISMA

Charisma counts in an election, but it only makes the difference when both candidates have acceptable positions on the Social Issue. The Lindsay charisma did little for him when we consider that three of five New Yorkers voted against returning him in the mayoralty in the most liberal city in America. Had the "oppositionist" vote not been divided, even the wholly uncharismatic figure of Mario Procacino would have cleaned up the floor with him.

Lindsay, in effect, scored a "victory defeat".

"What other phrase better describes the results of an election in which a politician with national aspirations pulls only one in four votes of the 'white workingman', or if one chooses to look at Lindsay specifically as a potential Democratic candidate, what kind of recommendation is it to say that he received fewer than half the Jewish votes the last time out."

As of today, if Lindsay were nominated as a Democrat, RN would crush him. If he were nominated as a Republican, he could conceivably bring about the election of George Wallace -- so much for Big John.

MYTHS & ASSERTIONS

1. The authors proceed to explode one popular press myth after another in this volume.

Myth No. 1: The vote in the primaries and general election in 1968 was a vote "against Vietnam".

McCarthy, the "dove" in New Hampshire, only got 18% of the total vote in that state -- and a University of Michigan survey showed that 60% of the McCarthy votes were from hawks dissatisfied that LBJ had not done enough to end the war. In addition, at the time of New Hampshire, by 51 to 40 percent Americans did not want to stop the bombing; by 44 to 36 percent Americans avored an invasion of North Vietnam. Candidates and press may have been talking about it, but Vietnam was not the voting issue of 1968.

The contention that the McCarthy vote in the Wisconsin Primary was an anti-war vote seems implausible on the following grounds: That same day an anti-war amendment in dovish Madison was defeated 58-42; a law-and-order pro-LBJ Mayor (Maier) won over a liberal anti-war candidate 86-14; LBJ was still leading McCarthy two-to-one nationally; and Republicans who would later vote for "hawkish" RN crossed over by tens of thousands to vote for Eugene.

Finally, in the last Wisconsin full page ads of RN, LBJ and McCarthy, in the Wisconsin primary, not a single one mentioned the word Vietnam -- though the media played it as the key to the election.

Myth No. 2: The Conventions were rigged -- the popular choices Rockefeller and McCarthy denied nomination by the bosses.

Nonsense -- Nixon and Humphrey were far and away the popular choices of their parties -- (RN over Rocky 60-23; HHH over McCarthy 58-38) -- and thus the only Democratic choices. Rigged conventions are exceptional. The only convention in the last twenty-five years where the candidate with the widest support in his party was not nominated was Goldwater in 1964.

Myth No. 3: By forging a coalition of the young, the poor and the black and the intellectuals, the Democrats can put together a new and winning coalition. Scammon and Wattenburg believe this a prescription for disaster. First, the young and the poor and the black vote is the lowest percentage of any groups in America. Secondly, the young and the poor are hardly monolithic in voting patterns. A poor white from the Midwest was a likely Nixon voter; a poor white in the South a Wallace voter, and a poor black in the cities a Humphrey voter. Neither are the young monolithic in their voting patterns. More than any other group to vote, they tend to vote like their parents. In addition, as a group 21-29 year olds are more hawkish than the over-50s; Wallace did his best among the 21-29 group.

As for the intellectuals, those with college degrees are more likely to vote Republican than Democratic. If you are talking about Ph. D.s -- the Democratic vote is greater here -- but the number of voters is so miniscule as to be irrelevant.

True, blacks are solidly Democratic -- but it is also true that among races black voting percentages are the lowest--

"... the 'drop-off' alone in the Wallace vote in the last six weeks of the campaign, was about equal to the total number of black votes cast in 1968."

We must face facts, say the authors: the average voter is unpoor, unyoung, unblack, unintellectual. The average voter is a 47-year-old housewife from Dayton, Ohio, whose brother-in-law is a cop and who is herself married to a machinist. Even if the voting age is dropped to 18 -- the average voter is still well over forty years of age.

"You can knock the 'liberal intellectuals' out of the Democratic coalition, and you've lost the front bumper; knock out the black vote, and you've lost the fenders and the back seat; but knock out labor, Middle America, or the unpoor, unyoung, unblack, and you've lost the engine, and the car won't run. This is an unpleasant fact to some, but fact it is."

Further, it is interesting to note that in 1968, 22 percent of the population could be considered "poor"; by 1972 that figure will be down to 15 percent; further:

"... of the poorest dozen states in the nation, six went for Nixon, five went for Wallace and only one for Humphrey. The richest state in the nation -- Connecticut--went for HHH."

(However, it is true that the pool of non-voting black represents a great plus for Democrats if they can get them registered and voting, since unlike the poor and young -- blacks do vote in blocs -- Democratic blocs.

"Six in seven voters are over thirty. Nine out of ten are unpoor, nine out of ten are white."

'PACKAGING' NIXON

Myth No. 4: The "packaging" of RN won him the election.
Ridiculous. All candidates are packaged to one degree or another. But Stenvig won in Minneapolis with \$3,600 spent. While HHH was saying he was running poorly in the polls because of RN's TV, Muskie was running 17 points ahead of Agnew in polls --yet Agnew had the same TV exposure as RN, and Muskie as Humphrey. "Voters are not nitwits." RN was ahead because he

"...was more closely attuned to the temper of a larger segment of the electorate than was his opposition. He was a man for the season. That may sound simplistic; it is simplistic -- and accurate ... The feelings that Nixon capitalized on were not part of a Southern Strategy or a Border State Strategy -- they were part of a national strategy that was attuned to the national malaise we have discussed earlier... It may be said in fact that Agnewism as a social thought won the election for Nixon, while Agnew, the individual, almost lost it for him."

Myth No. 5: The Kennedy victory in Gary, uniting hard hats and blacks, showed how formidable he would be in a general election.
Again -- no such thing, contend the authors. RFK won the blacks and the union workers; but he did not have to compete against either Wallace or HHH, each of whom would have had tremendous drawing among one or the other of these groups.

"The authors also go to lengths to show how RFK moved to the Center throughout the primaries by abandoning his early frenzied campaigning pace, by clipping his hair, speaking in low-keyed voice,

accusing McCarthy of seeking to have blacks from Watts forcibly integrated in Orange County, talking to Indiana's concern about riots, war and Communism. Say the authors, Bobby was not selling out, but simply addressing himself to concerns of a country where half the women are afraid to go out at night.

WALLACE '72

In 1972 Wallace should, as he did in 1968, take seven million votes from Nixon and three million from the Democrat.

PRIMER FOR DEMS

Chapter Twenty of the book offers Democrats a Primer on precisely how to phrase their appeal to the voters. Example:

Do Not Say: 'Well, I don't agree with the Students for a Democratic Society when they invade a college president's office, but I can understand their deep sense of frustration.'

Do Say: 'When students break the law they will be treated as lawbreakers.'

Example:

The Democrats made a disastrous error in saying "Law and order is a code word for racism." This is a losing position on the Social Issue -- they should say "I am for civil rights and against crime." They should not link the two.

ON CANDIDATES

A Presidential aspirant must above all be a "take charge guy". Humphrey would have been better off had he come down on one side or the other on Vietnam -- rather than leaving the impression of being wishy-washy.

CONCLUSION

"To know that the lady in Dayton is afraid to walk the streets alone at night, to know that she has a mixed view about blacks and civil rights because before moving to the suburbs she lived in a neighborhood that became all black, to know that her brother-in-law is a policeman, to know that she does not have the money to move if her new neighborhood deteriorates, to know that she is deeply distressed that her son is going to a community college where LSD was found on the campus -- to know all this is the beginning of contemporary political wisdom."

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1970

Given this Scammon-Wattenburg thesis--which is right on the mark for Democrats -- we are in serious danger of being driven back to our minority party posture. Our needs seem crystal clear.

1. We cannot allow the Democrats to get back on the right side of the Social Issue. This they are attempting to do right now with tough talk, etc. They have to be branded -- and the brand must stick -- as permissivists, as indulgent of students and black rioters, as soft on crime. This can be accomplished with their record in the last Congress. But for us to contest with them primarily on the Economic Issue -- Big Spenders, etc. -- as the major assault seems not a prescription for success. Republicans for forty years have been tarring Democratic Congresses with "Big Spender" labels, and Democrats have been winning those Congresses, lo, these same Forty Years.

The focus should be on tarring them with "ultra-liberalism" and "radicalism" -- especially on the Social Issue where we are strong and they are weak.

2. Where are the swing voters in 1970? We must assume left-wing Democrats are going for their Democratic Candidates and Republicans are going for Republicans, come hell or high water. The swing voters are thus Democrats -- law and order Democrats, conservatives on the "Social Issue", but "progressive" on domestic issues. This is the Wattenburg thesis -- and it is basically correct. How to conduct ourselves then.

Tar the Democratic Leadership specifically with the "radical" label on social policy; tar them as well with the "obstructionist" label on the President's programs for reforming society, for getting America moving; tar them as for bussing -- and against our crime control legislation.

Frankly, we should go after the "Daley Democrats" -- but we cannot get these voters by using rehashed Republican arguments or stale Republican rhetoric.

"Big Spenders" is a theme that might work, will work, with our Republicans -- we are using it in all our GOP literature -- but will it have any real bite with the union guy to whom big spending may mean the medicare for his mom or old man? (Foot-dragging Congress does not seem charged with much electricity, either.)

3. Seaman contends that a hard-line on riots etc. by Democrats may anger "liberals", but liberals have no place to go anyhow except the Democratic Party. Just so, regular Republicans have no place to go in 1970 (no Wallace) but the GOP. So, let's go straight after the Daley Democrats.

4. We should win these Democrats to the Presidential banner by contending that RN is a progressive on domestic policy blocked by "obstructionists" in the left-wing leadership of the Democratic Party; that RN is a hard-liner on crime, drugs and pornography, whose legislation is blocked by "ultraliberals" in the Senate who care so much about the rights of the criminal that they forget about the right of society; that the President is a man trying with veto after veto to hold down the cost of living but is being thwarted by radicals and wild spenders who would, given the chance, create the kind of inflation that would put Indonesia in its heyday in the shade; that the President is a man in foreign policy who is moving toward peace with honor but whose efforts are being attacked and undercut by unilateral disarmers and isolationists who think peace lies in an abject retreat from the world and the dismantling of the Army, Navy and Air Force. This is said strong -- but these would be the ways we could best appeal to the patriotic, hard-line pro-medicare Democrats who are the missing element in the Grand New Party.

5. There is no conflict between garnering national publicity and helping local Senate candidates -- the two are thoroughly complimentary.

The Democrats -- see Seaman's book -- are only now coming around to recognize what we knew in 1966 and 1968 -- that a strong statement in Oregon is more effective in getting to voters in New Jersey than a banal statement in Trenton, Tenafly, Newark and Elizabeth. The way to help the Senatorial Candidate is to praise him to the skies, fine -- but to hammer the national Democratic Leadership in a manner that will keep our big press corps excited and with us; that will get network time every night if possible with our message; and so help every Republican Senatorial Candidate while we are helping the local one.

All we have to do to forfeit that national publicity is run around talking about "cattle and oil" in Casper, as has been suggested already. We ought to remember also, that when we give up the television time -- on the networks -- someone else, namely our Democratic friends, gets it.

A hard-hitting tough campaign can help bring home Senators and Congressmen who live or die on a few national percentage points.

6. Clearly, from the Scammon book, we should treat the liberal Democrats as being not only the party of "bugout" but the party of bussing, the advocates of "compulsory integration," the party whose last Attorney General banged down the door in Chicago in order to testify on behalf of the Chicago Eight, the leadership that let this country turn into the porno capital of the world, and is blocking RN's effort to change that. Also, the Democratic Leadership has altered its historic foreign policy position to kow-tow to student radicals who bully-ragged those same leaders in the streets of Chicago, etc. The Democratic Leadership should be portrayed as selling out to the crazies in their own ranks -- and selling out the interests and views of the good patriotic Democrats who number in the millions. We might even say LBJ was destroyed by the "ultra-liberals" in his own party.

7. We should stay on the offensive, taken the "out" (and offensive) position even though we are the "ins" (and defensive) by hammering at the "liberal Eastern Establishment" that is responsible for what has happened to America, the "Establishment" that is frustrating our efforts to right the wrongs in Society, the Establishment whose wards are tearing up the colleges, the Establishment that indulges rioters, etc. (Of course, said in better phraseology, but the need to be on the offensive, to act as "outs" seems vital.)

8. The Economic Issue. To get into a debate on whether or not we are in a "recession" seems an utterly foolish idea -- since the very discussion of "recession" is surely not going to help us and since anyone who is hurt in the current economic situation is not likely to be convinced he is not being hurt by anybody's rhetoric. Rather than debate whether or not the investors and brokers and unemployed are being hurt, let's go after the Democratic radicals whose wild schemes are frustrating our efforts to stop the rise in prices. This is the Big Spender theme -- but in different rhetoric, tougher rhetoric, equating the Democrats with the same kind of ultraliberalism in spending that they follow on the Social Issue. Call them ultra-liberals.

THE ELECTIONS OF '70 & '72

"The Real Majority" by Scammon and Wattenberg contains realistic cogent strategy.

Certain columnists, and politicians like Humphrey and Muskie, are clearly moving on a new tough course -- a course outlined in this book. They have begun talking of law and order; they have ceased apologizing for student militants and radicals; they are silent on bussing.

Republicans are no longer going to win the race for Middle America by default. The Democrats are moving to win back their white collar defectors and they are going about it the Scammon-Wattenberg way.

THE HEART OF THE BOOK

Given the President's ability to wind down the war in 1972 and relatively stabilize the economy, Presidential elections throughout the coming decade will turn on the "Social Issue." First discovered by Goldwater and Wallace, the Social Issue is now the issue on which Middle America will vote, if one candidate is on the wrong side as (Humphrey was in 1968.) This social issue embraces drugs, demonstrations, pornography, disruptions, "kidlash," permissiveness, violence, riots, crime. The voters will not tolerate a "liberal" on these issues, and will vote against soft candidates as victories for hard-liners Daley in Chicago, Maier in Milwaukee, Stenvig in Minneapolis and Yorty in Los Angeles clearly demonstrated.

It is "in the center of American politics that victory lies" and polls conclusively show that the center of American politics today wants tougher administrators on campus, a crackdown on crime, pornography and drugs. If the Democrats do not move into that center position on the "Social Issue," then "goodbye Democrats."

"It is the judgment of the authors that the manner in which the Democratic Party handles the Social Issue will largely determine how potent a political force the party will be in America in the years to come."

THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM

From 1963 to 1969 the number of those identifying themselves as "conservative" has risen from 46 to 51 percent -- while those identifying as "liberal" has nose-dived from 49 to 33 percent.

Summer 1969 (Gallup)
(The Way Americans Identify Themselves)

<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Moderate Conservative</u>	<u>Moderate Liberal</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
23	28	18	15	16

In any normal election the moderate conservative (Republican) should have an advantage over the moderate liberal (Democrat). However, what this simple analysis fails to take into consideration is that when individuals consider themselves "conservative," it is "conservative" on the social issue. Americans will not abide a "liberal" on the social issue. At the same time, however, polls show Americans clearly favor medicare, aid to cities, anti-poverty efforts, aid to education -- issues traditionally defined as "liberal." How do we explain the dichotomy. Say the authors:

"... the attitudinal center of American politics today involves progressivism on economic issues and toughness on the "Social Issue."

The party that can hold this center will win the Presidency.

THE SOUTH

"When the Democratic vote goes from 72 percent in 1944 to 31 percent in 1967, something has happened, and it has been something tidal.... The Democrats in the South were hurt by being perceived as a pro-black national party, but they were also hurt by the other nonracial aspects of

the Social Issue that had become identified with liberal Democrats: soft on crime, "kidlash," morals and disruption. . . . The villains in Agnew's tirade were almost exclusively white (kids) -- but throughout the South bumper stickers blossomed reading "Spiro is my hero."

CRUCIAL QUESTION FOR '70s

"The key election fact of the seventies is that Democrats, by carrying non-southern states of Quadcali (California plus the Northeast Quadrant from Wisconsin to Massachusetts *) can win national elections without the South, although it is more difficult than it used to be. Assuming that Republicans stay near the center, the electoral question of the seventies is whether the Democrats will be able to cope with the Social Issue electoral forces at work in the society and, by coping, hold together the FDR Coalition and build upon it.

"As this book is being written in the early part of the year 1970 the votes of the unyoung, unpoor, unblack Quadcalians are still very much up for grabs. The machinist's wife in Dayton may decide to leave the Democratic reservation in 1972 and vote for Nixon or Wallace or their ideological descendants. If she thinks that Democrats feel that she isn't scared of crime but that she's really a bigot, if she thinks that Democrats feel that the police are Fascist pigs, and that the Black Panthers and the Weathermen are just poor, misunderstood, picked-upon kids, if she thinks that Democrats are for the hip cultures and that she, the machinist's wife, is not only a bigot but a square, then goodbye, lady -- and goodbye Democrats."

* (Quadcali consists of the Northeast Quadrant of the country from Wisconsin to Massachusetts including California; the authors say it is the key to victory in Presidential elections; and they scorn Border State Strategies and "Sun Belts" etc. It is an effort to contrast their approach with the Kevin Phillips Approach by suggesting Phillips wants to trade Illinois for Alabama, or New Jersey for Mississippi, which is nonsense. Basically, there is much in common between the two strategies.)

ON LOW-KEY & "LOCAL" CAMPAIGNING

"And how many people can be assembled to hear or even glimpse a candidate in the flesh on a given day? Twenty-five thousand? Fifty thousand? A hundred thousand? Two hundred and fifty thousand? A two minute clip on each of the three network news shows during the campaign will yield the candidate an audience of many tens of million Americans! Hubert Humphrey or Richard Nixon will be seen by more residents of New Jersey if he says something fairly noteworthy in Oregon than if he says something banal in Trenton, Montclair, Newark, Camden, and Tenafly all in the same day."

What about the shot in the arm given party workers by the personal appearance?

"There is probably some limited truth to this, but again one must remember that far more party workers throughout the nation are enthused seeing their candidate in an effective two-minute spot on a news-broadcast appearance on television than can be enthused by a candidate's visit to Weehawken, Union City, Bergen and Short Hills...."

"The people in New Jersey, like the rest of Americans will be judging their Presidential choices largely on the basis of national television, national magazines, national columnists, and national reporters appearing in their local newspapers and largely on national issues and national images."

"LIBERALISM AND BUSSING"

"All of this represents the beginnings of a strategy for liberals in the seventies. Beware of the 'liberal' label but do not be despondent about the liberal program.... Beware of the Social Issue. It cuts deep and must be approached on little cat feet. There is learning as well as leading to do. There can be no pandering to disruption or crime; the public is not buying the notion that there are not bad boys, only bad environments...."

REPUBLICAN AWARENESS

"There can be no question that a good deal of Republican gardening will be done on the Social Issue. When Vice President Agnew says:

'The rank-and-file Democrat in this country does not share the philosophy of permissiveness expressed by the best publicized moral and intellectual leaders of our society. He read with disgust all the rave reviews the press gives the latest dirty movie or dirty book....'

then it is clear that the Republicans are aware of this strategy."

FORMULAS FOR SUCCESS

"This is the nature of centrism. Democrats must heal the wound of the Social Issue. Republicans must prove that they are the party of Middle America and not of the fat cats."

A FOURTH PARTY

"Furthermore, unlike the Wallace situation, an extreme left party would take almost all its votes from one party -- the Democratic Party. If it ever got strong, then, it could only be a 'spoiler' ensuring Republican victories. As a weak party, however, an extreme left party might be helpful to Democrats, by getting the crazies out of the tent, decreasing the identification of 'Democrats' as radicals."

LINDSAY & CHARISMA

Charisma counts in an election, but it only makes the difference when both candidates have acceptable positions on the Social Issue. The

Lindsay charisma did little for him when we consider that three of five New Yorkers voted against returning him in the mayoralty in the most liberal city in America. Had the "oppositionist" vote not been divided, even Mario Procaccino would have won.

Lindsay, in effect, scored a "victory defeat."

"What other phrase better describes the results of an election in which a politician with national aspirations pulls only one in four votes of the 'white workingman,' or if one chooses to look at Lindsay specifically as a potential Democratic candidate, what kind of recommendation is it to say that he received fewer than half the Jewish votes the last time out."

MYTHS & ASSERTIONS

1. The authors proceed to explode one popular press myth after another in this volume.

Myth No. 1: The vote in the primaries and general election in 1968 was a vote "against Vietnam."

McCarthy, the "dove" in New Hampshire, got only 18% of the total vote in that state -- and a University of Michigan survey showed that 60% of the McCarthy votes were from hawks dissatisfied that LBJ had not done enough to end the war. In addition, at the time of New Hampshire, by 51 to 40 percent Americans did not want to stop the bombing; by 44 to 36 percent Americans avored an invasion of North Vietnam. Candidates and press may have been talking about it, but Vietnam was not the voting issue of 1968.

The contention that the McCarthy vote in the Wisconsin Primary was an anti-war vote seems implausible on the following grounds: That same day an anti-war amendment in dovish Madison was defeated 58-42; a law-and-order pro-LBJ Mayor (Maier) won over a liberal anti-war candidate 86-14; LBJ was still leading McCarthy two-to-one nationally;

and Republicans who would later vote for Nixon crossed over by tens of thousands to vote for Eugene.

Finally, in the last full page ads of Nixon, LBJ and McCarthy in the Wisconsin primary, not a single one mentioned the word Vietnam -- though the media played it as the key to the election.

Myth No. 2: The Conventions were rigged -- the popular choices Rockefeller and McCarthy denied nomination by the bosses.

Nonsense --- Nixon and Humphrey were far and away the popular choices of their parties -- (Nixon over Rocky 60-23; Humphrey over McCarthy 58-38). Rigged conventions are exceptional.

Myth No. 3: By forging a coalition of the young, the poor and the black and the intellectuals, the Democrats can put together a new and winning coalition. Scammon and Wattenberg believe this a prescription for disaster. First, the young and the poor and the black vote is the lowest percentage of any groups in America. Secondly, the young and the poor are hardly monolithic in voting patterns. A poor white from the Midwest was a likely Nixon voter; a poor white in the South a Wallace voter, and a poor black in the cities a Humphrey voter. Neither are the young monolithic in their voting patterns. More than any other group to vote, they tend to vote like their parents. In addition, as a group 21-29 year olds are more hawkish than the over-50s; Wallace did his best among the 21-29 group.

As for the intellectuals, those with college degrees are more likely to vote Republican than Democratic. If you are talking about Ph. Ds -- the Democratic vote is greater here -- but the number of voters is so miniscule as to be irrelevant.

True, blacks are solidly Democratic -- but it is also true that among races black voting percentages are the lowest --

"... the 'drop-off' alone in the Wallace vote in the last six weeks of the campaign was about equal to the total number of black votes cast in 1968."

We must face facts, say the authors: the average voter is unpoor, unyoung, unblack, unintellectual. The average voter is a 47-year-old housewife from Dayton, Ohio, whose brother-in-law is a cop and who is herself married to a machinist. Even if the voting age is dropped to 18 -- the average voter is still well over forty years of age.

"You can knock the 'liberal intellectuals' out of the Democratic coalition, and you've lost the front bumper; knock out the black vote, and you've lost the fenders and the back seat; but knock out labor, Middle America, or the unpoor, unyoung, unblack, and you've lost the engine, and the car won't run. This is an unpleasant fact to some, but fact it is."

Further, it is interesting to note that in 1968, 22 percent of the population could be considered "poor;" by 1972 that figure will be down to 15 percent; further:

"... of the poorest dozen states in the nation, six went for Nixon, five went for Wallace and only one for Humphrey. The richest state in the nation -- Connecticut -- went for HHH."

"Six in seven voters are over thirty. Nine out of ten are unpoor, nine out of ten are white."

'PACKAGING' NIXON

Myth No. 4: The "packaging" of Nixon won him the election. Ridiculous. All candidates are packaged to one degree or another. But Stenvig won in Minneapolis with \$3,600 spent. While Humphrey was saying he was running poorly in the polls because of Nixon's TV, Muskie was running 17 points ahead of Agnew in polls -- yet Agnew had the same TV exposure as Nixon, and Muskie as Humphrey. "Voters are not nit-wits." Nixon was ahead because he

"... was more closely attuned to the temper of a larger segment of the electorate than was his opposition. He was a man for the season. That may sound simplistic. It is

simplistic -- and accurate.... The feelings that Nixon capitalized on were not part of a Southern Strategy or a Border State Strategy -- they were part of a national strategy that was attuned to the national malaise we have discussed earlier.... It may be said in fact that Agnewism as a social thought won the election for Nixon, while Agnew, the individual, almost lost it for him. "

Myth No. 5: The Kennedy victory in Gary, uniting hard hats and blacks, showed how formidable he would be in a general election. Again -- no such thing, contend the authors. RFK won the blacks and the union workers; but he did not have to compete against either Wallace or Humphrey, each of whom would have had tremendous drawing among one or the other of these groups.

The authors also go to lengths to show how RFK moved to the Center throughout the primaries by abandoning his early frenzied campaigning pace, by clipping his hair, speaking in low-keyed voice, accusing McCarthy of seeking to have blacks from Watts forcibly integrated in Orange County, talking to Indiana's concern about riots, war and Communism. Say the authors, RFK was not selling out, but simply addressing himself to concerns of a country where half the women are afraid to go out at night.

WALLACE '72

In 1972 Wallace should, as he did in 1968, take seven million votes from Nixon and three million from the Democrats.

PRIMER FOR DEMS

Chapter Twenty of the book offers Democrats a Primer on precisely how to phrase their appeal to the voters. Example:

Do Not Say: Well, I don't agree with the Students for a Democratic Society when they invade a college president's office, but I can understand their deep sense of frustration.

Do Say: When students break the law they will be treated as lawbreakers.

Example:

The Democrats made a disastrous error in saying "Law and order is a code word for racism." This is a losing position on the Social Issue, -- they should say "I am for civil rights and against crime." They should not link the two.

ON CANDIDATES

A Presidential aspirant must above all be a "take charge guy." Humphrey would have been better off had he come down on one side or the other on Vietnam -- rather than leaving the impression of being wishy-washy.

THE AUTHORS' CONCLUSION

"To know that the lady in Dayton is afraid to walk the streets alone at night, to know that she has a mixed view about blacks and civil rights because before moving to the suburbs she lived in a neighborhood that became all black, to know that her brother-in-law is a policeman, to know that she does not have the money to move if her new neighborhood deteriorates, to know that she is deeply distressed that her son is going to a community college where LSD was found on the campus -- to know all this is the beginning of contemporary political wisdom."

ANALYSIS

Given this Scammon-Wattenberg thesis, Republican needs in the campaign of 1970 seem crystal clear.

1. Republicans cannot allow the Democrats to get back on the right side of the Social Issue. This they are attempting to do with tough talk, etc. Republicans should brand the Democrats as permissivists, as indulgent of student and black rioters, as soft on crime. This can be accomplished with their record in the last Congress. For Republicans to contest with Democrats primarily on the Economic Issue -- Big Spenders, etc. -- as the major assault seems not a prescription for success. Republicans for forty years have been tarring Democratic Congresses with "Big Spender" labels, and Democrats have been winning those Congresses for these same Forty Years.

The Republican focus should be on branding Democrats with "ultra-liberalism" and "radicalism" -- especially on the Social Issue where Republicans are strong and Democrats are weak.

2. Where are the swing voters in 1970? Republicans must assume left-wing Democrats are going for their Democratic Candidates and Republicans are going for Republicans, come hell or high water. The swing voters are thus Democrats -- law and order Democrats, conservatives on the "Social Issue," but "progressive" on domestic issues. This is the Wattenberg thesis -- and it is basically correct. What, then, is the best Republican strategy?

Brand the Democratic Leadership specifically with the "radical" label on social policy; brand them as well with the "obstructionist" label on the President's programs for reforming society, for getting America moving; brand them as for brutally enforced integration that leads to violence rather than understanding and cooperation between the races. Brand them for being against the Administration's crime control legislation.

"Big Spenders" is a theme that might work, will work, with Republicans -- it is being used in all GOP literature -- but will it have any

real bite with the union guy to whom big spending may mean the medicare for his mom or old man? (Foot-dragging Congress does not seem charged with much electricity, either.)

3. Scammon contends that a hard-line on riots, etc. by Democrats may anger "liberals," but liberals have no place to go anyhow except the Democratic Party. Just so, in most cases regular Republicans have no place to go in 1970 (no Wallace) but the GOP.

4. Republican candidates and strategists should win these Democrats to the Presidential banner contending that President Nixon is a progressive on domestic policy blocked by "obstructionists" in the left-wing leadership of the Democratic Party; that the President is a hard-liner on crime, drugs and pornography, whose legislation is blocked by "ultraliberals" in the Senate who care so much about the rights of the criminal that they forget about the rights of society; that the President is a man trying with veto after veto to hold down the cost of living but is being thwarted by radicals and wild spenders who would, given the chance, create the kind of inflation that would put Indonesia in its heyday in the shade; that the President is a man in foreign policy who is moving toward peace with honor but whose efforts are being attacked and undercut by unilateral disarmers and isolationists who think peace lies in an abject retreat from the world and the dismantling of the Army, Navy and Air Force. This is said strong -- but these would be the ways Republicans could best appeal to the patriotic, hard-line pro-medicare Democrats who are the missing element in the Grand New Party.

5. There is no conflict between garnering national publicity and helping local Senate candidates -- the two are thoroughly complimentary.

The Democrats -- see Scammon's book -- are only now coming around to recognize what Republican strategists knew in 1966 and 1968 -- that a strong statement in Oregon is more effective in getting to voters in New Jersey than a banal statement in Trenton, Tenafly, Newark and Elizabeth. The way to help the Senatorial Candidate is to praise him to the skies -- but also to hammer the national Democratic Leadership in a manner that will keep the big press corps interested; that will get

network time every night if possible with the Republican message; and so help every Republican Senatorial Candidate while helping the local one.

All Republicans have to do to forfeit that national publicity is run around talking about "cattle and oil" in Casper, as might be suggested. Republicans ought to remember also that when television time on the networks is given up -- someone else, namely Democrats, get it.

A hard-hitting tough campaign can help bring home Senators and Congressmen who live or die on a few national percentage points.

6. Clearly, from the Scammon book, Republicans should brand the liberal Democrats as being not only the party of "bugout" in Vietnam but the advocates of compulsory integration that leads to violence rather than understanding, the party whose last Attorney General banged down the door in Chicago in order to testify on behalf of the Chicago Eight, the leadership that let this country turn into the pornography capital of the world, and is blocking President Nixon's effort to change that. Also the Democratic Leadership has altered its historic foreign policy position to kow-tow to student radicals who bully-ragged those same leaders in the streets of Chicago, etc. The Democratic Leadership should be portrayed as selling out to the crazies in their own ranks -- and selling out the interests and views of the good patriotic Democrats who number in the millions. Republicans might even say LBJ was destroyed by the "ultraliberals" in his own party.

7. The Economic Issue. To get into a debate on whether or not the country is in a "recession" seems an utterly foolish idea for Republicans -- since the very discussion of "recession" is surely not going to help the GOP cause and since anyone who is hurt in the current economic situation is not likely to be convinced by anybody's rhetoric. Rather than debate whether or not the investors and brokers and unemployed are being hurt, Republicans ought to go after the Democratic radicals whose wild schemes are frustrating the President's efforts to stop the rise in prices. This is the Big Spender theme -- but in different rhetoric, tougher rhetoric, equating the Democrats with the same kind of ultraliberalism in spending that they follow on the Social Issue.

###

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file's record
100
100
100

August 24, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Patrick J. Buchanan

THE ELECTIONS OF '70 & '72

"The Real Majority" by Scammon and Wattenburg contains a credible and workable blueprint for our defeat in 1972. This is a volume the President cannot afford to overlook. Its three hundred pages contain a realistic cogent strategy for a liberal Democrat in 1972. However, the presentation of that strategy points up a counter-strategy which Republicans are going to have to adopt if they are not to lose the historic opportunity we have had for the last five years.

We can no longer count on our democratic friends to co-operate in their own demise -- as they have in recent years. Liberals are waking up all over America. Columnists like Breslin and Harriet Van Horne and Mankiewicz, peaceniks like Sam Brown, politicians like HHH, Muskie and Lindsay are clearly moving on a new tough course -- a course outlined in this book. They have begun talking of law and order; they have ceased apologizing for student militants and black radicals; they are silent on bussing. We are no longer going to win the race for Middle America by default. The Democrats are moving to win back their white collar and blue collar defectors and they are going about it the Scammon-Wattenburg way.

Attached is a comprehensive review of their analysis and strategy for Democratic victory. Appended is the outline of a counter-strategy I believe we should follow in the 1970 elections.

THE HEART OF THE BOOK

Given the President's ability to wind down the war in 1972 and relatively stabilize the economy, presidential elections throughout the coming decade will turn on the "Social Issue." First discovered by Goldwater and Wallace, the Social Issue is now the issue on which Middle America will vote -- if one candidate is on the wrong side as Humphrey was in 1968. This social issue embraces drugs, demonstrations, pornography, disruptions, "kidlash," permissiveness, violence, riots, crime. The voters will not tolerate "a liberal," on these issues, and will vote against him on this issue alone as victories for hard-liners Daley in Chicago, Maier in Milwaukee, Stenvig in Minneapolis and Yorty in Los Angeles clearly demonstrated.

It is "in the center of American politics that victory lies" and polls conclusively show that the center of American politics today wants tougher administrators on campus, a crackdown on crime, pornography and drugs. If the Democrats do not move into that center position on the "Social Issue," then "goodbye Democrats."

"It is the judgment of the authors that the manner in which the Democratic Party handles the Social Issue will largely determine how potent a political force the party will be in America in the years to come."

THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM

From 1963 to 1969 the number of those identifying themselves as "conservative" has risen from 46 to 51 percent -- while those identifying as "liberal" has nose-dived from 49 to 33 percent.

Summer 1969 (Gallup)
(The Way Americans Identify Themselves)

Conservative	Moderate	Conservative	Moderate Liberal	Liberal	No Opinion
23		28	18	15	16

In any normal election the moderate conservative (Republican) should have an advantage over the moderate liberal (Democrat.) However, what this simple analysis fails to take into consideration is that when individuals consider themselves "conservative," it is "conservative" on the Social Issue -- Americans will not abide a "liberal" on the social issue. At the same time, however, polls show Americans clearly favor medicare, aid to cities, anti-poverty efforts, aid to education -- issues traditionally defined as "liberal." How do we explain the dichotomy. Say the authors:

"...the attitudinal center of American politics today involves progressivism on economic issues and toughness on the Social Issue."

The party that can hold this center will win the Presidency.

THE SOUTH

"When the Democratic vote goes from 72 percent in 1944 to 31 percent in 1967, something has happened, and it has been something tidal... The Democrats in the South were hurt by being perceived (correctly) as a pro-black national party, but they were also hurt by the other nonracial aspects of the Social Issue that had become identified with liberal Democrats: soft on crime, "kidlash," morals and disruption... The villains in Agnew's tirade were almost exclusively white (kids) -- but throughout the South bumper stickers blossomed reading "Spiro is my hero," and a Southern politician was quoted as saying he was voting for Agnew in 1972 and if that meant voting for Nixon, so be it... In no Southern State are there enough Presidential Democrats to put together a statewide majority... Although the divorce may not be final the question now is which of the two suitors the South will accept: Wallaceite or Republican."

CRUCIAL QUESTION FOR '70S

"The key election fact of the seventies is that Democrats, by carrying non-Southern States of Quadcali (California plus the Northeast Quadrant from Wisconsin to Massachusetts*) can win national elections without the South, although it is more difficult than it used to be. Assuming that Republicans stay near the center, the

electoral question of the seventies is whether the Democrats will be able to cope with the Social Issue electoral forces at work in the society and, by coping, hold together the FDR Coalition and build upon it.

"As this book is being written in the early part of the year 1970 the votes of the unyoung, unpoor, unblack Quadcalians are still very much up for grabs. The machinist's wife in Dayton may decide to leave the Democratic reservation in 1972 and vote for Nixon or Wallace or their ideological descendants. If she thinks that Democrats feel that she isn't scared of crime but that she's really a bigot, if she thinks that Democrats feel that the police are Fascist pigs, and that the Black Panthers and the Weathermen are just poor, misunderstood, picked-upon kids, if she thinks that Democrats are for the hip cultures and that she, the machinist's wife, is not only a bigot but a square, then goodbye, lady -- and goodbye Democrats."

*(Quadcali consists of the Northeast Quadrant of the country from Wisconsin to Massachusetts including California; the authors say it is the key to victory in presidential elections; and they dump generously on Border State Strategies and "Sun Belts" etc. This is the weakest part of the book. It is an effort to contrast their approach with the Phillips Approach by suggesting Phillips wants to trade Illinois for Alabama, or New Jersey for Mississippi, which is nonsense. Basically, there is much in common between the two strategies -- more than Scammon and Wattenburg would care to admit.)

ON LOW-KEY & "LOCAL" CAMPAIGNING

"And how many people can be assembled to hear or even glimpse a candidate in the flesh on a given day? Twenty-five thousand? Fifty thousand? A hundred thousand? Two hundred and fifty thousand? A two minute clip on each of the three network news shows during the campaign will yield the candidate an audience of many tens of million Americans! Hubert Humphrey or Richard Nixon will be seen by more residents of New Jersey if he says something fairly noteworthy in Oregon than if he says something banal in Trenton, Montclair, Newark, Camden; and Tenafly all in the same day."

What about the shot in the arm given party workers by the personal appearance?

"There is probably some limited truth to this, but again one must remember that far more party workers throughout the nation are enthused seeing their candidate in an effective two-minute spot on a news-broadcast appearance on television than can be enthused by a candidate's visit to Weehawken, Union City, Bergen and Short Hills ..."

"The people in New Jersey, like the rest of Americans will be judging their Presidential choices largely on the basis of national television, national magazines, national columnists, and national reporters appearing in their local newspapers and largely on national issues and national images."

"LIBERALISM AND BUSSING"

"All of this represents the beginnings of a strategy for liberals in the seventies. Beware of the 'liberal' label but do not be despondent about the liberal program ... Beware of the Social Issue. It cuts deep and must be approached on little cat feet. There is learning as well as leading to do. There can be no pandering to disruption or crime; the public is not buying the notion that there are not bad boys, only bad environments ..."

REPUBLICAN AWARENESS

"There can be no question that a good deal of Republican gardening will be done on the Social Issue. When Vice President Agnew says:

'The rank-and-file Democrat in this country does not share the philosophy of permissiveness expressed by the best publicized moral and intellectual leaders of our society. He read with disgust all the rave reviews the press gives the latest dirty movie or dirty book...'

than it is clear that the Republicans are aware of this strategy."

FORMULAS FOR SUCCESS

"This is the nature of centrism. Democrats must heal the wound of the Social Issue. Republicans must prove that they are the party of Middle America and not of the fat cats."

A FOURTH PARTY

"Furthermore, unlike the Wallace situation, an extreme left party would take almost all its votes from one party -- the Democratic party. If it ever got strong, then, it could only be a "spoiler" ensuring Republican victories. As a weak party, however, an extreme left party might be helpful to Democrats, by getting the crazies out of the tent, decreasing the identification of 'Democrats' as radicals."

LINDSAY & CHARISMA

Charisma counts in an election, but it only makes the difference when both candidates have acceptable positions on the Social Issue. The Lindsay charisma did little for him when we consider that three of five New Yorkers voted against returning him to the mayoralty in the most liberal city in America. Had the "oppositionist" vote not been divided, even the wholly uncharismatic figure of Mario Procacino would have cleaned up the floor with him.

Lindsay, in effect, scored a "victory defeat."

"What other phrase better describes the results of an election in which a politician with national aspirations pulls only one in four votes of the 'white workingman,' or if one chooses to look at Lindsay specifically as a potential Democratic candidate, what kind of recommendation is it to say that he received fewer than half the Jewish votes the last time out."

As of today, if Lindsay were nominated as a Democrat, RN would crush him. If he were nominated as a Republican, he could conceivably bring about the election of George Wallace -- so much for Big John.

MYTHS & ASSERTIONS

1. The authors proceed to explode one popular press myth after another in this volume.

Myth No. 1: The vote in the primaries and general election in 1968 was a vote "against Vietnam."

McCarthy, the "dove" in New Hampshire, only got 18% of the total vote in that state -- and a University of Michigan survey showed that 60% of the McCarthy votes were from hawks dissatisfied that LBJ had not done enough to end the war. In addition, at the time of New Hampshire, by 51 to 40 percent Americans did not want to stop the bombing; by 44 to 36 percent Americans avored an invasion of North Vietnam. Candidates and press may have been talking about it, but Vietnam was not the voting issue of 1968.

The contention that the McCarthy vote in the Wisconsin Primary was an anti-war vote seems implausible on the following grounds: That same day an anti-war amendment in dovish Madison was defeated 58-42; a law-and order pro-LBJ Mayor (Maier) won over a liberal anti-war candidate 86-14; LBJ was still leading McCarthy two-to-one nationally; and Republicans who would later vote for "hawkish" RN crossed over by tens of thousands to vote for Eugene.

Finally, in the last Wisconsin full page ads of RN, LBJ and McCarthy, in the Wisconsin primary, not a single one mentioned the word Vietnam -- though the media played it as the key to the election.

Myth No. 2: The Conventions were rigged -- the popular choices Rockefeller and McCarthy denied nomination by the bosses.

Nonsense -- Nixon and Humphrey were far and away the popular choices of their parties -- (RN over Rocky 60-23; HHH over McCarthy 58-38) -- and thus the only democratic choices. Rigged conventions are exceptional. The only convention in the last twenty-five years where the candidate with the widest support in his party was not nominated was Goldwater in 1964.

Myth No. 3: By forging a coalition of the young, the poor and the black and the intellectuals, the Democrats can put together a new and winning coalition. Scammon and Wattenburg believe this a prescription for disaster. First, the young and the poor and the black vote

is the lowest percentages of any groups in America. Secondly, the young and the poor are hardly monolithic in voting patterns. A poor white from the Midwest was a likely Nixon voter; a poor white in the South a Wallace voter, and a poor black in the cities a Humphrey voter. Neither are the young monolithic in their voting patterns. More than any other group to vote, they tend to vote like their parents. In addition, as a group 21-29 year olds are more hawkish than the over-50s; Wallace did his best among the 21-29 group.

As for the intellectuals, those with college degrees are no more likely to vote Republican than Democratic. If you are talking about Ph. Ds -- the Democratic vote is greater here -- but the number of voters is so miniscule as to be irrelevant.

True, blacks are solidly Democratic -- but it is also true that among races black voting percentages are the lowest --

"... the 'drop-off' alone in the Wallace vote in the last six weeks of the campaign was about equal to the total number of black votes cast in 1968."

We must face facts, say the authors: the average voter is unpoor, unyoung, unblack, un-intellectual. The average voter is a 47-year-old housewife from Dayton, Ohio, whose brother-in-law is a cop and who is herself married to a machinist. Even if the voting age is dropped to 18 -- the average voter is still well over forty years of age.

"You can knock the 'liberal intellectuals' out of the Democratic coalition, and you've lost the front bumper; knock out the black vote, and you've lost the fenders and the back seat; but knock out labor, Middle America, or the unpoor, unyoung, unblack, and you've lost the engine, and the car won't run. This is an unpleasant fact to some, but fact it is."

Further, it is interesting to note that in 1968, 22 percent of the population could be considered "poor"; by 1972 that figure will be down to 15 percent; further

"... of the poorest dozen states in the nation, six went for Nixon, five went for Wallace and only one for Humphrey. The richest state in the nation -- Connecticut -- went for IIII."

(However, it is true that the pool of non-voting black represents a great plus for Democrats if they can get them registered and voting, since unlike the poor and young -- blacks do vote in blocs -- Democratic blocs.)

"Six in seven voters are over thirty. Nine out of ten are unpoor, nine out of ten are white."

'PACKAGING' NIXON

Myth No. 4: The "packaging" of RN won him the election. Ridiculous. All candidates are packaged to one degree or another. But Stenvig won in Minneapolis with \$3600 spent. While HHHI was saying he was running poorly in the polls because of RN's TV, Muskie was running 17 points ahead of Agnew in polls -- yet Agnew had the same TV exposure as RN, and Muskie as Humphrey. "Voters are not nitwits." RN was ahead because he

"...was more closely attuned to the temper of a larger segment of the electorate than was his opposition. He was a man for the season. That may sound simplistic; it is simplistic -- and accurate ... The feelings that Nixon capitalized on were not part of a Southern Strategy or a Border State Strategy -- they were part of a national strategy that was attuned to the national malaise we have discussed earlier ... It may be said in fact that Agnewism as a social thought won the election for Nixon, while Agnew, the individual, almost lost it for him."

Myth No. 5: The Kennedy victory in Gary, uniting hard hats and blacks, showed how formidable he would be in a general election. Again -- no such thing, contend the authors. RFK won the blacks and the union workers; but he did not have to compete against either Wallace or HHHI, each of whom would have had tremendous drawing among one or the other of these groups.

(The authors also go to lengths to show how RFK moved to the Center throughout the primaries by abandoning his early frenzied campaigning pace, by clipping his hair, speaking in low-keyed voice, accusing McCarthy of seeking to have blacks from Watts forcibly integrated

in Orange County, talking to Indiana's concern about riots, war and Communism. Say the authors, Bobby was not selling out, but simply addressing himself to concerns of a country where half the women are afraid to go out at night.

WALLACE '72

In 1972 Wallace should, as he did in 1968, take seven million votes from Nixon and three million from the Democrat.

PRIMER FOR DEMS

Chapter Twenty of the book offers Democrats a Primer on precisely how to phrase their appeal to the voters. Example:

"Do Not Say: 'Well, I don't agree with the Students for a Democratic Society when they invade a college president's office, but I can understand their deep sense of frustration.'

Do Say: 'When students break the law they will be treated as lawbreakers.'"

Example:

The Democrats made a disasterous error in saying "Law and order is a code word for racism." This is a losing position on the Social Issue -- they should say "I am for civil rights and against crime." They should not link the two.

ON CANDIDATES

A Presidential aspirant must above all be a "take charge guy." Humphrey would have been better off had he come down on one side or the other on Vietnam -- rather than leave the impression of being wishy-washy.

CONCLUSION

"To know that the lady in Dayton is afraid to walk the streets alone at night, to know that she has a mixed view about blacks and civil rights because before moving to the suburbs she lived in a neighborhood that became all black, to know that her brother-in-law is a policeman, to know that she does not have the money to move if her new neighborhood deteriorates, to know that she is deeply distressed that her son is going to a community college where LSD was found on the campus -- to know all this is the beginning of contemporary political wisdom."

August 24, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Patrick J. Buchanan

THE VEEP AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1970

Given this Scammon-Wattenburg thesis -- which I believe is right on the mark for Democrats -- we are in serious danger of being driven back to our minority party posture. Our needs seem crystal clear.

1. We cannot allow the Democrats to get back on the right side of the Social Issue. This they are attempting to do right now with tough talk, etc. They have to be branded -- and the brand must stick -- as permissivists, as indulgent of students and black rioters, as soft on crime. This can be accomplished with their record in the last Congress I believe. But for us to contest with them primarily on the Economic Issue -- Big Spenders, etc. -- as the major assault seems to me not a prescription for success. Republicans for forty years have been tarring Democratic Congresses with "Big Spender" labels, and Democrats have been winning those Congresses, 10, these same Forty Years.

The focus should be on tarring them with "ultra-liberalism" and "radicalism" -- especially on the Social Issue where we are strong and they are weak.

2. Where are the swing voters in 1970? We must assume left-wing Democrats are going for their Democratic Candidates and Republicans are going for Republicans, come hell or high water. The swing voters are thus Democrats -- law and order Democrats, conservatives on the "Social Issue," but "progressive" on domestic issues. This is the Wattenburg thesis -- and I think it is basically correct. How to conduct ourselves then.

Tag the Democratic leadership specifically with the "radical" label on social policy; tag them as well with the "obstructionist" label on the President's program for reforming society, for getting America moving.

Frankly, we should go after the "Daley Democrats." No one can do this better than the Vice President -- but we cannot get these voters by using rehearsed Republican arguments or stale Republican rhetoric.

"Big Spender" is a theme that might work, will work, with our Republicans -- we are using it in all our GOP literature -- but will it have any real bite with the union guy to whom big spending may mean the medicare for his mom or old man? (Foot-dragging Congress" does not seem charged with much electricity, either.)

3. Scammon contends that a hard-line on riots etc. by Democrats may anger "liberals," but liberals have no place to go anyhow except the Democratic Party. Just so, regular Republicans have no place to go in 1970 (no Wallace) but the GOP. So, let's go straight after the Daley Democrats.

4. The Vice President should win these Democrats to the Presidential banner by contending that RN is a progressive on domestic policy blocked by "obstructionists" in the left-wing leadership of the Democratic Party; that RN is a hard-liner on crime, drugs and pornography, whose legislation is blocked by "ultraliberals" in the Senate who care so much about the rights of the criminal that they forget about the rights of society; that the President is a man trying with veto after veto to hold down the cost of living but is being thwarted by radicals and wild spenders who would, given the chance, create the kind of inflation that would put Indonesia in its heyday in the shade; that the President is a man in foreign policy who is moving toward peace with honor but whose efforts are being attacked and undercut by unilateral disarmers and isolationists who think peace lies in an abject retreat from the world and the dismantling of the army, navy and air force. This is said strong -- but these I would think would be the ways the Vice President could best appeal to the patriotic, hard-line pro-medicare Democrats who are the missing element in the Grand New Party.

5. There is more about to "low-key" the Vice President's campaign in 1970 -- to have his focus specially on the local issue and not seek the national publicity. There is no conflict between garnering national publicity and helping local Senate candidates -- the two are thoroughly complementary.

The Democrats -- see Scammon's book -- are only now coming around to recognize what we knew in 1966 and 1968 -- that a strong statement in Oregon is more effective in getting to voters in New Jersey than a local statement in Trenton, Tonawly, Newark and Elizabeth. The way for the Vice President to help the Senatorial Candidate is to praise him to the skies, fine -- but to hammer the national Democratic leadership in a manner that will keep our big press corps excited and with us, that will get network time every night if possible with our message; and so help every Republican Senatorial Candidate while we are helping the local one.

Right now the Agnew tour is getting tremendous publicity as the potential best show in town. All we have to do to forfeit that national publicity is run around talking about "cattle and oil" in Casper, as has been suggested already. We ought to remember also, that when we give up the television time -- on the networks -- someone else, namely our Democratic friends, gets it.

Mike Mansfield says the Democrats have no one to compete with the Veeep on the hustings. We have a tremendous advantage here -- which we should use, not throw away by talking about local issues that carry no national wallop.

We should have something topical and tough for the national media every day. If the Vice President can raise the Republican Administration a few points in the polls and the President by his decisions and actions raise it several more the effect will be like raising the water level and all the boats in the lake will rise at once.

A hard-hitting tough campaign can help bring home Senators and Congressmen who live or die on a few national percentage points.

6. Clearly, from the Scammon book, we should tar the Democrats as being not only the party of "bugout" but the party of bussing, the advocates of "compulsory integration," the party whose last Attorney General banged down the door in Chicago in order to testify on behalf of the Chicago Eight, the leadership that let this

country turn into the porno capital of the world, and is blocking RN's effort to change that. Also, the Democratic leadership has altered its historic foreign policy position to kow-tow to student radicals who bully-ragged those same leaders in the streets of Chicago, etc. The Democratic Leadership should be portrayed as selling out to the crazies in their own ranks -- and selling out the interests and views of the good patriotic Democrats who number in the millions. We might even say LBJ was destroyed by the "ultra-liberals" in his own party.

7. We should stay on the offensive, taken the "out" (and offensive) position even though we are the "ins" (and defensive) by hammering at the "liberal Eastern Establishment" that is responsible for what has happened to America, the "Establishment" that is frustrating our efforts to right the wrongs in Society, the Establishment whose wards are tearing up the colleges, the Establishment that indulges rioters, etc. (Of course, said in better phraseology, but the need to be on the offensive, to act as "outs" seems to me vital.)

8. The Economic Issue. To get into a debate on whether or not we are in a "recession" seems to me a utterly foolish idea -- since the very discussion of "recession" is surely not going to help us and since anyone who is hurt in the current economic situation is not likely to be convinced he is not being hurt by anybody's rhetoric. Rather than debate whether or not the investors and brokers and unemployed are being hurt, let's go after the Democratic radicals whose wild schemes are frustrating our efforts to stop the rise in prices. This is the Big Spender theme -- but in different rhetoric, tougher rhetoric, equating the Democrats with the same kind of ultraliberalism in spending that they follow on the Social Issue.

9. Finally, to change the Vice President now into the traditional Republican campaigner is to change a winning strategy for a losing one.