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48	6	10/26/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Khachigian to Haldeman (Per Buchanan) RE: Campaign Appearances. 2 pgs.
48	6	10/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to Haldeman and Colson RE: Image of Nixon after corruption charge from McGovern. 1 pg.
48	6	10/13/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Colson RE: McGovern and the "corruption" issue. 3 pgs.
48	6	11/7/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Khachigian to Buchanan RE: Analysis of why McGovern lost. 14 pgs.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 26, 1972

POLITICAL MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN (Per Buchanan)

FROM: KEN KHACHIGIAN

We have suffered in silence long enough. It's time to come out fighting. There is the distinct appearance that we are acquiescing by our denials and no comments. We need to go on the attack and to do it hard. It is time for the same type of speech that Ed Muskie delivered in 1970 this time coming from the Veep -- with a big build-up.

McGovern and the left, aided and abetted by the POST et al. are out to destroy the President. They know they will lose and are going down as irresponsibly as they can. But if this stuff sticks -- per McGovern's speech last night -- they have it in their power to make the President a lame duck on November 8th. Not by defeating RN, but by so undercutting his integrity and authority that they will have effectively destroyed his ability to govern. Either we turn that around, or the next four years are going to be unbearable.

Recommendation: The Veep goes on national television with a very low key, but tough, speech which Buchanan and I can collaborate on. The theme is that the McGovernites in their desperation are lying, maligning honorable men, and engaging in the worst kind of divisiveness for their selfish personal gain. Their goal is no less than the destruction of the President with lies and demagoguery.

There need only be about five minutes of defensive stuff. Then we launch into a major, devastating attack which could turn this whole thing around overnight. McGovern won't be expecting it, and it could take him days to recover.

We now have the laundry list of McGovern immorality and corruption, the bribes in his campaign, the smear tactics he used in 1962, 1968, and the smears today, the quashing of the Bobby Baker inquiry, the brand new car he got, the 1968 campaign where he didn't reveal his secret contributors, the nepotism on his own payroll, etc. Frankly, all these, taken together, could make McGovern shrivel in hypocrisy.

Then we go through all the issues that McGovern is trying to cover up -- the welfare, defense, and high budget stuff, plus his total surrender to North Vietnam and finally all his irresponsible statements on J. Edgar Hoover, etc. It could break his back.

I am perfectly aware that they think this is their issue, but we have enough now to make it our issue. The risk is two or three points in the polls, but the gain

is our own integrity and keeping RN's ability to govern. Done right, this one half hour could utterly destroy Magoo, and we ought to be willing to take the chance and go with it.

KK
FXI

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN
CHARLES COLSON

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

Some ideas sent in that have some merit: Considering the "corruption" charge, etc., why not have the President photographed in quasi-religious services; either Sunday services, funerals, if they come up -- or other -- which in and of itself makes McGovern look nasty in the character of his charges.

Secondly, strongly recommend that we take out ads in all major black publications attacking McGovern for taking blacks for granted -- and calling on blacks to repudiate that sentiment. These ads would serve to force McGovern to spend money to answer them -- and they might well weaken him in the black community as McGovern has never been strong there personally. This is the one major voting block where McGovern wins overwhelmingly -- and some hard negative ads might convince blacks either to "go fishing" or cut McGovern.

Buchanan

KK

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 13, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
JOHN EHRLICHMAN
CHARLES COLSON

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

McGovern appears to have but one card left to turn over -- the "corruption" issue. And it is not a bad one. There is a theme abuilding in the media, which runs like this: What has happened that America and Americans are sympathetic that they will not become enraged at the atmosphere of scandal and chicanery that now exists in Nixon's Washington. Agronsky, Sidey, Severeid, Reasoner, Shana Alexander and a host of others are pushing the theme.

The Times has put its top Mafia guy on the Watergate-Espionage-Sabotage issue -- and the Washington Post may very well have a few more trumps to play.

My concern is that we not "freeze the ball" with our twenty-odd point lead, and three and a half weeks to go -- as we did in 1968. We have two possible lines of attack as I see it, and I would prefer the latter.

First, is to attack the Post head-on along these lines. "Just as in 1968, the leftist press is digging up all the dirt it can print between now and the election to salvage the collapsed McGovern campaign. In 1968 it was the Times when their smear on Agnew; in 1972 it is the Post's desperate last-ditch effort to smear the President on Watergate. Innuendo and unproven charges are being given the kind of ride they have not gotten since the days of Joe McCarthy. Where Dick Tuck's screw-ball antics were applauded and laughed off -- pranks performed by some over-zealous types a) have not even been tied to the President's organizations; and b) are condemned as though we were running a concentration camp."

Something along these lines -- taking the attack to the Post. However, before proceeding up this avenue, we had best know exactly how much more the Post has than the stuff it is running right now.

However, my preferred line would be for us to use the above only as an "answer" and to respond to the Washington Post's vendetta, and the others who are fortifying McGovern's charges, with their venom and outrage -- by stepping up the attack on McGovern on our issues. To this end, I believe that:

A) The earlier we use Connally, the broader the audience, the better. This speech not only creams McGovern -- it turns the focus of a national debate back onto our issues -- foreign policy, defense cuts, amnesty, bipartisan tradition -- and hits McGovern hard for his radicalism.

B) We need new and more attack ads, in my view; and a crash program should be initiated to provide them. What are the issues hurting McGovern most? When we find these, we ought to have one minute reminder ads -- for massive use on a state-by-state basis in the waning days of the campaign.

C) We ought to consider the possibility of placing print ads in black papers all over the country condemning McGovern for not placing such ads and "taking blacks for granted." An ad which says in effect -- you won't see McGovern taking an ad in this paper because he thinks you're already in his pocket.

D) While we have hit McGovern some on his Vietnam speech, it is not enough, and not hard enough -- his speech disappointed and concerned even Kraft and Reston -- we should be hitting him hard and repeatedly, and at high levels on Vietnam.

E) We have several "bombs" lined up like the Defense Budget Analysis, the Welfare Analysis, the Connally Speech -- we need more major "events" or "attacks" at high levels, which can frame the debate in our terms, not theirs. We must keep the country thinking of McGovern and his idiotic schemes, his ineptitude and his radicalism -- if we are going to hold onto our existing lead.

F) The time is approaching I would think, when we would want to move the issue further by calling for a "vote against extremism" and get prominent Democrats and Union Leaders to start talking publicly, and calling for the "repudiation" of the Radical Left that has seized our party.

G) Perhaps we need once again to go back through all our anti-McGovern material -- pick out only the harshest and toughest material we have -- and feed that to the press for one more round.

In brief conclusion, the next ten days are crucial to breaking the back of the McGovern campaign; we ought not to be holding back material now -- but pouring out everything we have. We should be getting as much of this anti-material into the record as possible; if McGovern has made no progress by two weeks before the election, the stampede might begin, and that may be it.

Buchanan

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 7, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
FROM: KEN KHACHIGIAN 
SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF WHY MCGOVERN LOST

Attached is a fairly detailed political analysis of why McGovern did not win in 1972. The reason for this exercise is to offer up the response to the commentary which will maintain that McGovern lost not because of his ideology but because of himself. I. e., it will be argued that extreme liberalism is still a valid political phenomenon but that McGovern was the wrong candidate to carry the colors.

There are many ways to respond to this, and I have done so with an analysis of the many different factors of the McGovern movement. However, each time we return to the basic reason: that McGovern was trying to sell an unpopular, unwanted ideology to the American people.

Eagleton will get a great deal of blame from some -- but McGovern was tarred way before Eagleton. It began in California where HHH tied the albatross around McGovern's neck, and we took it from there. Labor didn't walk out because of Eagleton, but because of the McGovern platform.

Right on down the line, it is simple to disprove the argument that we were in a personality contest. Make no mistake about it, the contest was between drastically differing political philosophies -- and the left got a good licking in a fair contest.

Whether you measure it by polls, the actual results, or by sentiment in certain areas, McGovern was tied down to the thinking which America didn't want. Vietnam dovishness, welfarism, isolationism, pacifism, permissiveness, and a host of other gut issues found McGovern on the far left -- objectively on the far left.

To say that he ran a bad campaign or that he bungled the Eagleton affair or that he made too many mistakes misses the fundamental reason for the rejection of McGovern. The attached tries to chronicle the McGovern defeat, and in my judgment, should provide enough for some of our people to move out to columnists and opinion-makers. I think the President -- in his post-election analysis -- should make an important effort to knock down in advance some of the stories we will see. This memo might give him some ideas in that direction.

Ken Khachigian
November 7, 1972

POLITICAL MEMORANDUM
WHY MCGOVERN LOST

A massive effort must be taken after the election to head off the liberal establishment effort to detract from RN's election victory. That effort will take many tacks -- such as RN didn't bring in a Congress; people voted against McGovern not for Nixon, etc. However, the liberal apologists will push one line extra hard: the defeat was not for the ideas of left-liberal movement but rather for the bearer of those ideas.

They will argue that liberalism is still viable -- that we still need busing, and all the other liberal schemes, and that they need only wait until they get a standard bearer who won't make the same mistakes McGovern did. The following analysis serves to debunk that viewpoint, and, it seems to me, should be put out as much as possible to counter all the opinion contra. This memorandum focuses on why McGovern lost -- any analysis of the high points of the RN victory should be taken up in a separate memorandum.

THE CENTRAL POINT TO MAKE

To those who argue that McGovern had bad strategy and bad tactics and that he made too many mistakes to run a good campaign, we have one basic response: the tactics of the liberal movement are the logical outgrowth of the liberal ideology. That is, don't blame McGovern per se, blame the philosophy. Elitism, close-mindedness, moral righteousness, viewing things as good versus evil and the penchant for overstatement are all

fundamentals of the liberal-left political ideology. If McGovern ran a bad campaign -- don't blame his strategy because the strategy is the ideology. The personal flaws of McGovern were bred of the flaws of his political philosophy.

Thus, McGovern could change his mind on central issues, and then with a straight face defend his credibility. This hurt his standing with the voters, but being trained in the narrow view as he has, he sees his position only in moralistic terms, or, as PJB put it, as the true believers.

People rejected the McGovern philosophy pure and simple. If the questions of his credibility and wishy-washyness arose, it was only because of his approach to public policy -- one in which he could cut aircraft carriers back from 16 to 6 and still maintain with a straight face that this would not affect the strength of the sixth fleet. That is the underlying problem with the left radicals, i. e., that the wild things they propose really won't disjoint things important to citizens or voter blocs.

But there are other things to look at in terms of what McGovern did wrong, and I'll take them in sequence.

THE PARTY REFORM

It is not for nothing that the Democratic Party reform was promulgated under the "McGovern Commission." This is where we underestimated McGovern. Immediately, he saw the potential of these guidelines -- they

served his purposes perfectly. The reforms brought precisely those people into the process who would directly further his candidacy. Moreover, it was only McGovern at that point who saw that the complexity of the rules would be baffling to those who did not know them, and he hired the fellow who knew the rules best to be his delegate counter -- Rick Stearns.

His opponents did not see soon enough the potential of having a tight solid base which could bring victory in a field of many candidates. Therefore, McGovern moved quickly to pre-empt the party's left wing, and knowing that and with tight organization and his left flank protected, he could conceivably get the nomination. To that extent the liberal-left issues were winners for McGovern in the early stages of the game.

PRIMARIES

McGovern made it through the primaries with skill, luck, and, later, with a little help from his friends in the media. New Hampshire was a Muskie disaster, and McGovern was clever in making his loss out to be a victory. McGovern's first score. McGovern was wiped out in Florida in what should have been the first test of the McGovern political philosophy -- but it was not reported that way. It was said that McGovern never expected to win Florida. Nevertheless, his views on gutting the space program, support for massive busing, and a few other positions surely were important in the Florida defeat.

Next came Illinois where McGovern wisely worked more on getting a foothold while avoiding a direct test with Muskie. This strategy -- a good one -- brought him to Wisconsin which he targeted from the beginning as his strongest state with the youth-lust and an excellent organization. There the tight-knit support for his radicalism and an excellent youth turnout gave him a victory. Moreover, the Republicans helped by crossing over for McGovern and Wallace. If only Democrats had voted, HHH would have won. Yet Wisconsin was the key for McGovern and most importantly it knocked Lindsay out and gave McG an unexposed left flank.

From Wisconsin on, it was not very difficult for McG. He took Rhode Island because there was only about a 10% Democrat turnout -- and the tight organization, getting the liberals and doves out, did it again. Then came Massachusetts and Pennsylvania with Muskie mercilessly caught in between HHH and McG. By this time the press was necking in the back seat with McGovern, and Massachusetts was a cinch while HHH kept Muskie at bay in Pa. Again, the organization also went to work in Pa. to pick up some delegates -- what proved to be a good strategy for McG; he nickel-dimed his opposition. Throughout, McGovern was assisted by low voter turnouts coupled with his zealots going to the polls in droves. April 25th served to put Muskie over the side -- a hapless victim on a fast track.

Through Ohio, Indiana, Tennessee, and North Carolina, in my judgment, the press effectively protected McGovern. He didn't do real well in any of these states -- except Ohio -- yet they only said it was because he didn't try. Yet, by then they should have known that the McGovern ideology was like death in those states. Moreover, in Ohio he was basking in the media glow which did not mention his radical positions at all, but rather how he represented "the alienated and discontented." That left McG free to use his excellent TV spots to bilk the voters of their support. They only saw a nice guy on the tube, not a radical.

Nebraska was the beginning of the end for McGovern. For the first time, his opposition began to hammer effectively at the McGovern leftism. Abortion, amnesty, pot, welfare and defense all became problems. It was too late for HHH to have much of an impact, but the seeds were planted. The threat that Offutt Air Base in Omaha would be closed by McGovern was the first big hit.

By this time in Oregon and California, McG had the only effective organization and a huge public relations advantage. The media was busy explaining why they were wrong about the early primaries, and in deference to McG were giving him every break possible. Michigan and Maryland were in between, but McG avoided media setbacks because the Wallace shooting knocked everything else off the front page. Yet those two states were another hint that McGovern represented the wrong side of the political spectrum. That story was lost in the Wallace tragedy.

By the time McGovern got out to the West Coast, the regular Democrats found out that they were in the process of being had by McGovern. But it was too late. The Dem party had been infiltrated by the McGovern guerillas, and there was no time for pacification. (Maybe the fact that McGovern seemed to think more of the Communists in Vietnam than their opponents colored his political strategy: he was the Viet Cong of the Democratic party).

Thus, McGovern won the California, South Dakota, New Mexico and New Jersey primaries all on the same day -- a tribute to irreversible momentum. (As McGovern said that night: "I can't believe I won the whole thing" -- neither could his fellow Democrats who probably swore that night that they would do anything to try to stop him.) But California was the true turning point in the 1972 presidential campaign and it turned on issues, not on McGovern's personality or bad tactics.

McGovern saw a 20 point lead in the polls drop to 4%. In short, he was devastated by the HHH one-man shredding machine. The issues caught up with him, and HHH was able to articulate them in his hammering staccato fashion as no other figure in American politics could do. Those three national debates -- which could not be filtered by the writing press or Frank Reynolds and his gang -- were the real Waterloo for McGovern. Vast attention was given to the welfare plan, the defense plan, the Vietnam bug-out, the fact that McGovern had voted against Jewish interests. HHH

was vicious and relentless and he did for us what we could have never done for ourselves. Moreover, he did to McG what Rockefeller did to Goldwater: he labelled McGovern.

Luckily for McG the next primary was New York, and he couldn't lose it because there was no preferential vote -- only delegate selection. Thus, the small left-wing delegate machine moved on, aided and abetted by only a little over a 10% voter turnout.

THE MEDIA IN THIS PERIOD

McGovern got more than his share of breaks from the press in the early days. They covered for his radical positions by writing tons of essays on populism and anti-politicians and alienated voters. Moreover, McGovern's staff was being given the kid-glove treatment. Stories followed on the McG "wunderkinder." Caddell (whose poll information has been so spectacularly bad, yet universally praised) was made out to be Gallup and Harris rolled into one. Stearns, Grandmason and Pokorny (who Sidey eulogized with the prairie sod in his ears) were "master strategists" -- and oh so young! Mankiewicz was quoted from coast to coast -- the man with the quick wit and fast repartee (in my opinion Mankiewicz is an absolute political lightweight who covered up with a quick wit -- he gave monumentally bad advice).

These "kids" began to believe their press clippings and probably thought it was a good time to screw the old-liners. I would guess that the boys in

the clubhouse didn't appreciate either their treatment or the stories they read about the "kids." Their duty was to win elections and not worry about ideology. The McG people believed that winning elections was a part of the ideology -- that the two were intertwined, and that their radicalism was the wave of the future. But give the devil his due -- the organization worked well and played the delegates and the convention states like violins.

THE CONVENTION

The Convention also had to be quite harmful to McGovern. By this time McGovern was tarred on the issues, but it was too late to stop him -- he really had it wrapped up after California. Nevertheless, the leftism was fully exposed on national television, and the shock for some probably has not yet worn off. The spectacle of the abortion people, the libbers and the homosexuals was too much. McGovern was seen, finally, to be the radical that his positions made him out to be, and this hurt.

Then came the compromises -- putting the abortion, women's lib, and other minority planks over the side -- along with George Wiley and Gloria Steinem. It was time to kiss and make up with Daley, though Daley would resist. But the sum total was a picture of just another politician, one who would make deals to win and compromise his principles -- or at least certain principles.

But McGovern walked out of that convention a radical. For all intents and purposes he could not escape that label through November. It was not because of mistakes in his strategy or flaws in his tactics and it was not George McGovern the man or personality. It was his position on the political spectrum -- he was on the left, and he believed in his ways.

EAGLETON

I think the death blow was already delivered before the Eagleton affair. It only confirmed everything which had already been building up against McGovern. Those who argue that Eagleton was the turning point don't know what they're talking about. Eagleton was extremely important in terms of harming McGovern's credibility and trust. But even before Eagleton the seeds were planted -- Eagleton merely made it harder for McGovern. Without the Eagleton affair, McGovern would have still been weighted by his positions.

Blaming the Eagleton affair will be a liberal cop-out and a McGovern staff cop-out. Eagleton did not make McGovern lose a 20 point lead in the California balloting. We have got to stop the myth of the Eagleton thing before history writes that it was this and only this which cost McG his crack at the Presidency. It just ain't true. There was a Gallup after the Dem convention and before Eagleton which saw RN gaining three points. McGovern was already on the way down.

RADICALISM -- THE FATAL FLAW

Hubert Humphrey was always thought to be a radical. He had radical ideas, like McGovern. But the people around HHH were not radical. He had pols all around him -- cigar-chomping boys who prowled the back rooms. McGovern was surrounded by radicals -- all those damn hippy kids and free love adherents, etc. McGovern's politics were caught up in the culture of the "movement" and only made his radicalism seem worse.

These were not flaws of the man or his tactics -- again, they were basic defects of the radical liberal movement. McGovern thought that the kooky people around him were logical extensions of his new politics, of the coming home of America, and of the revolutionary basis of his candidacy. I would think that McGovern never did see what was wrong in saying that Henry Wallace was still "right," that the Soviets would treat him as a "friend" and not test him; or question why the Rubin and Hoffman endorsements were bad.

His friends -- Galbraith, Schlesinger, Steinem, et al. -- all came from the closed club of liberal intelligentsia which saw the historical movement through its own narrow vision. These were not casual campaign mistakes, they were the most profound of judgmental errors. McGovern misread the mood of the country and refused to admit it because liberal intellectuals always think they have a monopoly on wisdom. (I'm quite serious about this -- I never knew a liberal college professor who was otherwise, and McG is a former college professor)

THE CAMPAIGN

The campaign itself was marred by the same fundamental flaws of ideology. I don't believe at all that it was a tactical error for McGovern to campaign in the early days on Vietnam and some of the most leftish positions. I think he believed that his surrender policy in Vietnam (he was actually to the left of the Viet Cong in his proposals) was the right position and probably the politically expedient position. The income redistribution plan and some of the other way-out ideas were still in his speeches in early September, although not explicitly. And throughout, there was Vietnam, where McGovern grew to higher reaches of sell-out. He dumped his \$1000-per-person plan for a \$4000-per-four-persons plan and gave out detailed explanations of how this would work.

Basically, I don't think that McGovern forsaked his radicalism. He simply tried to make it sound not all that bad in the campaign. Sure, he made some stupid mistakes, but the singular mistake was the belief that he could sell to the steelworker in the fall what he spoonfed to the students in the winter -- a disrespected political philosophy.

Finally, the McGovern campaign tactics and language were classics in New Left politics. The pure smear, the overstatement, the disruption, the Hitler analogy, the fostering of discord and the planting of fears -- all permeate the liberal ideology. When liberals disagree, the first charge

they make is "fascist" or "Hitler." It is reflexive. It is the formbook liberal tactic -- to many liberal politicians, the ideology imbues the form -- the substance is the form. And in the end you cannot fault McGovern for his tactics without really faulting his ideological base.

NOTES

It might be said that McGovern lost the election because of the way he won the nomination. He sold his soul to the left and had little inclination to seek salvation. That massive political error cannot be laid alone to ineptitude -- it is no less than a major misreading of American values and the cultural ethos of our country.

The polls showed over and over again that the public resented McGovern "running down America." And while Haynes Johnson traveled the country talking about alienation, he missed the fact that Americans are basically at peace with themselves, satisfied with their lives, and optimistic about the future. What he saw was good old American skepticism -- the "show me" attitude -- and he mistook it for a penetrating anomie and social listlessness,

Not only did the polls show McGovern misreading the country's mood, they also showed that McGovern misread the public's perception of the correct position on the issues. Harris found out in the summer that the President had the preferable position on 15 out of 16 issues. This shows an unusually high perception of McGovern's radical views -- moreover, this was

a huge jump over the period in the primaries where McGovern was viewed as benign. This confirms that McGovern was hurt deeply by HHH's efforts in California and that that was the most harmful point in the McGovern candidacy.

It was not that McGovern played the wrong strings -- he was playing the tuba in a string orchestra. He was out of syncopation; out of tune; and blaring fortissimo while the public wanted pianissimo.

In a nutshell, McGovern was wrong from the start. His radical politics took a good shellacking from the American public -- a deserved repudiation of alien ideas. Let's not blame it on his political amateur standing -- after all, he did some quite intelligent politicking at times -- let's put the blame where it belongs: on the elitist, leftward movement in America which was born of Kennedy, raised in the Great Society and cut down by the grocer's son who saw the excesses and called 'em like he saw 'em.