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MEMORANDUM FOR: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

FROM: KENNETH L. KHACHIGIAN

A Gallup Poll released on July 5th with interview dates prior to the Supreme Court ruling showed that 45% of the American public had not heard or read about the Pentagon papers. Considering that millions of words and hours of television time have been devoted to this very major news event, it is interesting that almost half the public greeted the event with a yawn.

I think this phenomenon tells us something very important; namely, the propensity of those of us in Washington to be inordinately influenced by what is printed in the POST, the TIMES, or what appears on network television. Our instinct seems always to attempt to counter that which has become conventional wisdom on the Eastern seaboard rather than concerning ourselves a little more with what happens west of the Alleghenies.

We should also learn from this that specific issues and events are transitory in nature. They are not the things which will ultimately influence the voters on election day. Thus, it is my candid opinion that the precious commodity called "Presidential presence" is being expended on specifics which are not determinative factors in the contemporary American political experience.

Events taking place today or even a year from today will probably have little impact on the 1972 elections. Events and headlines come and go. But impressions, as opposed to events, are built up over months and years, and it is my belief that such impressions will have a greater impact on voter behavior than do specific occurrences.

Two substantive issues loom large in every Presidential election: war and peace, and the economy. The President told us this at the midterm election post-mortem last November. With those two exceptions, substantive issues will not govern in any major way the ability of the President to be re-elected (barring a scandal or major gaffe).

In short, welfare reform, revenue sharing, ecology and other substantive matters (including to some extent, I think, law and order) should not be the major thrusts of Presidential emphasis during the campaign. We have programs in these areas, and we have initiatives. Our opponents cannot accuse us of inaction. Beyond that, that the President ought to be really talking about what I think are the "impression-creating" matters.

We have got to use the Presidency to our greatest advantage and that means communicating to the people the stuff of the Presidency. It will require the President to address himself in the campaign to such broad subjects as social stability, belief in our future, a vision of what's ahead for America, a sense of direction and purpose, and finally a rejection of all those who are afraid of the future.

Franklin Roosevelt was his own best P.R. man. He convinced the public, in one of America's darkest hours, that fear (read, pessimism) was the only thing to fear. This one public posture has enabled Roosevelt to make hazy the rest of the history of that period.

And we must do the same. President Nixon should confront the masochistic, self-flagellating hysteria which is generated so often in the media that it has become believable. I really believe the President can brand it as a great deal of hogwash. I mean a bit more than the "What's Right With America" speech. I think the theme has to be a little more profound and philosophical, a theme which will stir middle America to a rejection of those who are bleating over a "sick America."

As always, the President has led the way in this. I think his own remarks and speeches reflect precisely what I am arguing. If you read the transcript of the Kansas City Briefing, you will see that the inspiring nature of his talk is the kind of rhetoric which will

be required in 1972. But we have to go beyond that and support the President in that theme. So, in a full-blown campaign, the media effort, the support effort of all the players, the activities of Cabinet and senior White House Staff should reflect a positive affirmation of the steady leadership that this President has brought to the nation in a troubled time.

This is our greatest asset, and it should be hammered home to those who concern themselves with Presidential image-making. We don't need to make an image or change an image, we only have to project thoughtfully and intelligently that which we already have. We don't work for Richard Nixon because of revenue sharing, and reorganization. We work for him because in each one of us he triggers a mechanism which says: this man is the right man for America in this particular time of history. Those things are impressions. They work for us, and I think we ought to get to work making them work for the electorate.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 25, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
SUBJECT: The Odds Against Henry Jackson

That Senator Jackson is a candidate for his party's nomination -- there is no question. That he can win it -- there appears little hope. But Jackson has some very high cards to play which make him a strong contender for Vice President, and a powerful force at the Democratic National Convention.

JACKSON'S STRENGTHS

1. He has almost all the moderate and conservative columnists in the palm of his hand. They like, admire and respect Scoop Jackson. A cursory review of the last three months finds supportive presidential talk about Jackson from columnists White, both Alsops, Kilpatrick, Alexander, Cuneo, the Drummonds several times, Gould Lincoln, Chamberlain, Wilson -- and on and on. (Evans & Novak are solicitous.) They provide him with regular backpage support in most of the papers of the nation. Even columnists who disagree with him (Wicker, Viorst) respect him.

2. A choice not an echo: He is the single national Democrat who stands as a clear alternative against the crowd of Bayh, Hughes, Muskie, McGovern, Humphrey, Kennedy crowd. He emerges thus a visible rallying point for conservative Democrats at the '72 convention.

3. Having hired the capable adviser Ben Wattenburg, he is paralleling the Scammon-Wattenburg thesis. His attacks on "environmental extremists," his denunciation of fellow Democrats for paying "homage to the radical fringe," his focus on bread-and-butter issues, the economy and jobs, his call for Democrats to stay on the "Economic Issue," not the war; his rough terminology which is being described in liberal circles as "Agnewian" -- in all these instances, Jackson is setting himself up against the trendy,

bell-bottomed, elite of the left wing of his party -- and with the working man center and right of his party. On issues, he is carving out his own independent sector within the Democratic Party.

4. His super-hawkish anti-Soviet stand in the Middle East, his fight for SST, against the "environmental extremists," for space and defense, not only make him first choice of George Meany -- but guarantee a well-financed campaign from Aerospace, from Defense Industries, from the Jewish Community, from Big Labor.

5. He is well respected by his Senate colleagues. A Drummond Poll of the Senate found that 18 percent of Democrats felt Jackson "most qualified to be President" ahead of Humphrey -- second only to Muskie -- (interestingly, EMK got less than anyone, three percent or one vote of those polled.)

6. He gets excellent press coverage.

7. His hard-line on the Soviets, and on strategic defense, wins him publicity plaudits from the Republican Conservative Community. While such is of little use in a run for the nomination, it might be to any Democrat for his Vice President.

8. On Vietnam he is down-playing his support of the President, leaving it high enough to be visibly opposed to the rest of the pack, but shading it a bit. Domestically, he pays occasional obeisance to such myths as the "repression" by the Administration. Enough to keep his dues up -- but not nearly enough to close the sizable gap that exists between him and the liberal left of his party.

9. He is the best vote-getter in the Senate -- winning his primary against a Galbraithian type by 85 percent -- and beating our candidate in the general by the same margin -- 85 percent of the vote in a northwestern industrial state. This evidence of massive support across the party lines and throughout the ideological spectrum makes him especially attractive as a Vice Presidential nominee.

10. His strength with press was evident in a poll of editors at ASNE who felt he would probably have nearly best chance of any Democrat of defeating RN.

DEFICIENCIES

1. He has almost no recognition nationally. This will force him to raise his profile rapidly, to announce fairly early, and probably to go the primary route -- and it is doubtful how well he can do against Democrats like Muskie.

2. He is apparently an unexciting speaker, who often bores even those audiences who agree with him. One friend called him a "Barry Goldwater without charisma."

3. His nomination would sunder the Democratic Party. And with left-wing strength greater at this convention than the past, difficult to see how his nomination could be swallowed by a Democratic Convention. (However, if a Teddy Kennedy were nominated and Democratic conservatives sufficiently outraged -- a Kennedy-Jackson ticket might do for the party what the Kennedy-Johnson ticket did in 1960, bring it together again. Where Johnson had the opposition of Labor and support of the South -- Jackson for Veep would have both the South and Labor in his corner.)

4. He is sixty years old, at least will be, when the Democratic Convention is over. This is his last chance to be on a national Democratic ticket, after three decades in the Senate.

JACKSON'S CHANCE

Having carved out an independent Churchillian Position, if you will, on the Soviets, on the Middle East -- whence war is likely to come if it comes -- Jackson is dependent upon circumstances. If the Vietnam war is raging, and there is calm between East and West -- Jackson has next to nothing going for him.

But if Vietnam is removed as an issue, and the Soviets become belligerent in Europe or the Middle East or the Mediterranean or anywhere, then Jackson may very well appear the man for the times. If national focus turns upon American weakness in the face of a rapidly arming Soviet Empire, then Jackson could generate real support among Conservative Democrats, Meany unions and the South -- and even conservative Republicans.

No other Democrat seems today capable of making credible a hard-line policy against the USSR.

But in such times Jackson will have a long shot for the top position, and an inside track for the Vice Presidency.

THE FLORIDA PRIMARY

Jackson cannot win in New Hampshire; his lack of public recognition requires him to step out early if he is to have any hope at the Convention. Thus he is forced, it seems into the primaries. Thus Florida -- according to two writers -- which is the same day as New Hampshire -- becomes crucial to Jackson.

If Jackson wins in Florida, and Muskie is defeated, then the Muskie opening day becomes a flop; Muskie's candidacy is damaged; the Jackson candidacy becomes interesting -- and the stage is set for a bitter division at the Convention.

While we may be desirous ourselves of having a massive turnout for RN in Florida -- there may be something worth while for us in assisting the efforts of Scoop Jackson in that State. Something we ought to keep in mind.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be the initials 'JPB' or similar, written in a cursive style.

August 24, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Patrick J. Buchanan

THE VEEP AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1970

Given this Scammon-Wattenburg thesis -- which I believe is right on the mark for Democrats -- we are in serious danger of being driven back to our minority party posture. Our needs seem crystal clear.

1. We cannot allow the Democrats to get back on the right side of the Social Issue. This they are attempting to do right now with tough talk, etc. They have to be branded -- and the brand must stick -- as permissivists, as indulgent of students and black rioters, as soft on crime. This can be accomplished with their record in the last Congress I believe. But for us to contest with them primarily on the Economic Issue -- Big Spenders, etc. -- as the major assault seems to me not a prescription for success. Republicans for forty years have been tarring Democratic Congresses with "Big Spender" labels, and Democrats have been winning those Congresses, lo, these same Forty Years.

The focus should be on tarring them with "ultra-liberalism" and "radicalism" -- especially on the Social Issue where we are strong and they are weak.

2. Where are the swing voters in 1970? We must assume left-wing Democrats are going for their Democratic Candidates and Republicans are going for Republicans, come hell or high water. The swing voters are thus Democrats -- law and order Democrats, conservatives on the "Social Issue," but "progressive" on domestic issues. This is the Wattenburg thesis -- and I think it is basically correct. How to conduct ourselves then.

Tar the Democratic Leadership specifically with the "radical" label on social policy; tar them as well with the "obstructionist" label on the President's programs for reforming society, for getting America moving.

Frankly, we should go after the "Daley Democrats." No one can do this better than the Vice President -- but we cannot get these voters by using rehearsed Republican arguments or stale Republican rhetoric.

"Big Spenders" is a theme that might work, will work, with our Republicans -- we are using it in all our GOP literature -- but will it have any real bite with the union guy to whom big spending may mean the medicare for his mom or old man? (Foot-dragging Congress" does not seem charged with much electricity, either.)

3. Scammon contends that a hard-line on riots etc. by Democrats may anger "liberals," but liberals have no place to go anyhow except the Democratic Party. Just so, regular Republicans have no place to go in 1970 (no Wallace) but the GOP. So, let's go straight after the Daley Democrats.

4. The Vice President should win these Democrats to the Presidential banner by contending that RN is a progressive on domestic policy blocked by "obstructionists" in the left-wing leadership of the Democratic Party; that RN is a hard-liner on crime, drugs and pornography, whose legislation is blocked by "ultraliberals" in the Senate who care so much about the rights of the criminal that they forget about the rights of society; that the President is a man trying with veto after veto to hold down the cost of living but is being thwarted by radicals and wild spenders who would, given the chance, create the kind of inflation that would put Indonesia in its heyday in the shade; that the President is a man in foreign policy who is moving toward peace with honor but whose efforts are being attacked and undercut by unilateral disarmers and isolationists who think peace lies in an abject retreat from the world and the dismantling of the army, navy and air force. This is said strong -- but these I would think would be the ways the Vice President could best appeal to the patriotic, hard-line pro-medicare Democrats who are the missing element in the Grand New Party.

5. There is move afoot to "fox-key" the Vice President's campaign in 1970 -- to have him focus specially on the local issue and not seek the national publicity. There is no conflict between garnering national publicity and helping local Senate candidates -- the two are thoroughly complimentary.

The Democrats -- see Scammon's book -- are only now coming around to recognize what we knew in 1966 and 1968 -- that a strong statement in Oregon is more effective in getting to voters in New Jersey than a banal statement in Trenton, Tenafly, Newark and Elizabeth. The way for the Vice President to help the Senatorial Candidate is to praise him to the skies, fine -- but to hammer the national Democratic leadership in a manner that will keep our big press corps excited and with us, that will get network time every night if possible with our message; and so help every Republican Senatorial Candidate while we are helping the local one.

Right now the Agnew tour is getting tremendous publicity as the potential best show in town. All we have to do to forfeit that national publicity is run around talking about "cattle and oil" in Casper, as has been suggested already. We ought to remember also, that when we give up the television time -- on the networks -- someone else, namely our Democratic friends, gets it.

Mike Mansfield says the Democrats have no one to compete with the Veep on the hustings. We have a tremendous advantage here -- which we should use, not throw away by talking about local issues that carry no national wallop.

We should have something topical and tough for the national media every day. If the Vice President can raise the Republican Administration a few points in the polls and the President by his decisions and actions raise it several more the effect will be like raising the water level and all the boats in the lake will rise at once.

A hard-hitting tough campaign can help bring home Senators and Congressmen who live or die on a few national percentage points.

6. Clearly, from the Scammon book, we should tar the Democrats as being not only the party of "bugout" but the party of bussing, the advocates of "compulsory integration," the party whose last Attorney General banged down the door in Chicago in order to testify on behalf of the Chicago Eight, the leadership that let this

country turn into the porno capital of the world, and is blocking RN's effort to change that. Also, the Democratic leadership has altered its historic foreign policy position to kow-tow to student radicals who bully-ragged those same leaders in the streets of Chicago, etc. The Democratic leadership should be portrayed as selling out to the crazies in their own ranks -- and selling out the interests and views of the good patriotic Democrats who number in the millions. We might even say LBJ was destroyed by the "ultra-liberals" in his own party.

7. We should stay on the offensive, taken the "out" (and offensive) position even though we are the "ins" (and defensive) by hammering at the "liberal Eastern Establishment" that is responsible for what has happened to America, the "Establishment" that is frustrating our efforts to right the wrongs in Society, the Establishment whose wards are tearing up the colleges, the Establishment that indulges rioters, etc. (Of course, said in better phraseology, but the need to be on the offensive, to act as "outs" seems to me vital.)

8. The Economic Issue. To get into a debate on whether or not we are in a "recession" seems to me a utterly foolish idea -- since the very discussion of "recession" is surely not going to help us and since anyone who is hurt in the current economic situation is not likely to be convinced he is not being hurt by anybody's rhetoric. Rather than debate whether or not the investors and brokers and unemployed are being hurt, let's go after the Democratic radicals whose wild schemes are frustrating our efforts to stop the rise in prices. This is the Big Spender theme -- but in different rhetoric, tougher rhetoric, equating the Democrats with the same kind of ultraliberalism in spending that they follow on the Social Issue.

9. Finally, to change the Vice President now into the traditional Republican campaigner is to change a winning strategy for a losing one.