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FILE GROUP TITLE

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Document (1972) 10/72

RESTRICTION CODES:

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
B. National security classified information.
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NA FORM 1421 (4-85)
### Presidential Materials Review Board

#### Review on Contested Documents

**Collection:** Kenneth L. Khachigian  
**Box Number:** 7  
**Folder:** November [1972] [1 of 2]

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Milton Viorst who is distinguished by his interview with George McGovern which produced McGovern's comment comparing Ho Chi Minh favorably to George Washington -- Viorst, whose range and thus danger, does not extend out of Washington to more than newspapers.

Mankiewicz whose journies into the predictive mode show about the same prescience as Mank the politician whose predictions of a triumphal McGovern worried Republicans enough to ensure that McGovern was indeed thoroughly defeated. If the Republicans had not had a Frank Mankiewicz in the McGovern high command, they would have had to invent one.

Not EVEN any mea culpa

Mr. Kraft could fully spend the rest of his life trying to explain away his errors -- but the only safe prediction is that Joe Kraft will make more, yes, errors.

The problem with the crystal ball brigade is that it wants to write history before it happens.

Would justifiably provoke RN to say: "Who are those pundits and why are they saying those terrible things about me?"
One wishes at times that he was really as abrasive as he is accused of being -- in that case he could make his partisans happy by hoisting up the oh-so-wrong columns, editorials and television commentaries in a beaming the same manner that Harry Truman once held up that premature Chicago Tribune front page and say: "I told you so!"

John Kenneth Galbraith, who, it will be recalled, said during the Tet Offensive of 1968 the Saigon Government would fall within a "fortnight." Webster's will either have to change its definition of that word or Galbraith might have to eat it.

Hobart Rowen, whose self-described "Marxist revolutionary" son married George McGovern's daughter -- is always quick to predict the worst for Mr. Nixon's policies, but then wouldn't he; blood is thicker than water, they say.

Harriet Van Horne, whom one reads in the evening one much for the same reason asks for arsenic in his hors-d'oeuvres (sp?), surely has a pad-locked her door by now against the invaders. Harriet, are you still there, or have you been done in by the "Bloody Assizes?"

Mr. Chuang Tse-tung, head of the table tennis delegation from the PRC during visit in Rose Garden on April 18, 1972 said:
“This time last year the U.S. table tennis team, headed by Mr. Steenhoven, made a friendly visit to China, and today, in the warm spring season, when flowers are in full bloom, the Chinese table tennis delegation is here on a reciprocal visit.”

“Warm spring season!” “Flowers in full bloom!”

Omigosh -- tricked by diplomacy again.
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They will argue that liberalism is still viable -- that we still need busing, and all the other liberal schemes, and that they need only wait until they get a standard bearer who won't make the same mistakes McGovern did. The following analysis serves to debunk that viewpoint, and, it seems to me, should be put out as much as possible to counter all the opinion contra. This memorandum focuses on why McGovern lost -- any analysis of the high points of the RN victory should be taken up in a separate memorandum.

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By this time in Oregon and California, McG had the only effective organization and a huge public relations advantage. The media was busy explaining why they were wrong about the early primaries, and in deference to McG were giving him every break possible. Michigan and Maryland were in between, but McG avoided media setbacks because the Wallace shooting knocked everything else off the front page. Yet those two states were another hint that McGovern represented the wrong side of the political spectrum. That story was lost in the Wallace tragedy.
By the time McGovern got out to the West Coast, the regular Democrats found out that they were in the process of being had by McGovern. But it was too late. The Dem party had been infiltrated by the McGovern guerillas, and there was no time for pacification. (Maybe the fact that McGovern seemed to think more of the Communists in Vietnam than their opponents colored his political strategy: he was the Viet Cong of the Democratic party).

Thus, McGovern won the California, South Dakota, New Mexico and New Jersey primaries all on the same day -- a tribute to irreversible momentum. (As McGovern said that night: "I can't believe I won the whole thing" -- neither could his fellow Democrats who probably swore that night that they would do anything to try to stop him.) But California was the true turning point in the 1972 presidential campaign and it turned on issues, not on McGovern's personality or bad tactics.

McGovern saw a 20 point lead in the polls drop to 4%. In short, he was devastated by the HHH one-man shredding machine. The issues caught up with him, and HHH was able to articulate them in his hammering staccato fashion as no other figure in American politics could do. Those three national debates -- which could not be filtered by the writing press or Frank Reynolds and his gang -- were the real Waterloo for McGovern. Vast attention was given to the welfare plan, the defense plan, the Vietnam bug-out, the fact that McGovern had voted against Jewish interests. HHH
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Luckily for McG the next primary was New York, and he couldn't lose it because there was no preferential vote -- only delegate selection. Thus, the small left-wing delegate machine moved on, aided and abetted by only a little over a 10% voter turnout.

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THE CONVENTION

The Convention also had to be quite harmful to McGovern. By this time McGovern was tarred on the issues, but it was too late to stop him -- he really had it wrapped up after California. Nevertheless, the leftism was fully exposed on national television, and the shock for some probably has not yet worn off. The spectacle of the abortion people, the libbers and the homosexuals was too much. McGovern was seen, finally, to be the radical that his positions made him out to be, and this hurt.

Then came the compromises -- putting the abortion, women's lib, and other minority planks over the side -- along with George Wiley and Gloria Steinem. It was time to kiss and make up with Daley, though Daley would resist. But the sum total was a picture of just another politician, one who would make deals to win and compromise his principles -- or at least certain principles.
But McGovern walked out of that convention a radical. For all intents and purposes he could not escape that label through November. It was not because of mistakes in his strategy or flaws in his tactics and it was not George McGovern the man or personality. It was his position on the political spectrum -- he was on the left, and he believed in his ways.

EAGLETON

I think the death blow was already delivered before the Eagleton affair. It only confirmed everything which had already been building up against McGovern. Those who argue that Eagleton was the turning point don't know what they're talking about. Eagleton was extremely important in terms of harming McGovern's credibility and trust. But even before Eagleton the seeds were planted -- Eagleton merely made it harder for McGovern. Without the Eagleton affair, McGovern would have still been weighted by his positions.

Blaming the Eagleton affair will be a liberal cop-out and a McGovern staff cop-out. Eagleton did not make McGovern lose a 20-point lead in the California balloting. We have got to stop the myth of the Eagleton thing before history writes that it was this and only this which cost McG his crack at the Presidency. It just ain't true. There was a Gallup after the Dem convention and before Eagleton which saw RN gaining three points. McGovern was already on the way down.
RADICALISM -- THE FATAL FLAW

Hubert Humphrey was always thought to be a radical. He had radical ideas, like McGovern. But the people around HHH were not radical. He had pals all around him -- cigar-chomping boys who prowled the back rooms. McGovern was surrounded by radicals -- all those damn hippy kids and free love adherents, etc. McGovern's politics were caught up in the culture of the "movement" and only made his radicalism seem worse.

These were not flaws of the man or his tactics -- again, they were basic defects of the radical liberal movement. McGovern thought that the kooky people around him were logical extensions of his new politics, of the coming home of America, and of the revolutionary basis of his candidacy. I would think that McGovern never did see what was wrong in saying that Henry Wallace was still "right," that the Soviets would treat him as a "friend" and not test him; or question why the Rubin and Hoffman endorsements were bad.

His friends -- Galbraith, Schlesinger, Steinem, et al. -- all came from the closed club of liberal intelligentsia which saw the historical movement through its own narrow vision. These were not casual campaign mistakes, they were the most profound of judgmental errors. McGovern misread the mood of the country and refused to admit it because liberal intellectuals always think they have a monopoly on wisdom. (I'm quite serious about this -- I never knew a liberal college professor who was otherwise, and McG is a former college professor)
THE CAMPAIGN

The campaign itself was marred by the same fundamental flaws of ideology. I don't believe at all that it was a tactical error for McGovern to campaign in the early days on Vietnam and some of the most leftish positions. I think he believed that his surrender policy in Vietnam (he was actually to the left of the Viet Cong in his proposals) was the right position and probably the politically expedient position. The income redistribution plan and some of the other way-out ideas were still in his speeches in early September, although not explicitly. And throughout, there was Vietnam, where McGovern grew to higher reaches of sell-out. He dumped his $1000-per-person plan for a $4000-per-four-persons plan and gave out detailed explanations of how this would work.

Basically, I don't think that McGovern forsaked his radicalism. He simply tried to make it sound not all that bad in the campaign. Sure, he made some stupid mistakes, but the singular mistake was the belief that he could sell to the steelworker in the fall what he spoonfed to the students in the winter -- a disrespected political philosophy.

Finally, the McGovern campaign tactics and language were classics in New Left politics. The pure smear, the overstatement, the disruption, the Hitler analogy, the fostering of discord and the planting of fears -- all permeate the liberal ideology. When liberals disagree, the first charge
they make is "fascist" or "Hitler." It is reflexive. It is the formbook liberal tactic -- to many liberal politicians, the ideology imbues the form -- the substance is the form. And in the end you cannot fault McGovern for his tactics without really faulting his ideological base.

NOTES

It might be said that McGovern lost the election because of the way he won the nomination. He sold his soul to the left and had little inclination to seek salvation. That massive political error cannot be laid alone to ineptitude -- it is no less than a major misreading of American values and the cultural ethos of our country.

The polls showed over and over again that the public resented McGovern "running down America." And while Haynes Johnson traveled the country talking about alienation, he missed the fact that Americans are basically at peace with themselves, satisfied with their lives, and optimistic about the future. What he saw was good old American skepticism -- the "show me" attitude -- and he mistook it for a penetrating anomie and social listlessness.

Not only did the polls show McGovern misreading the country's mood, they also showed that McGovern misread the public's perception of the correct position on the issues. Harris found out in the summer that the President had the preferable position on 15 out of 16 issues. This shows an unusually high perception of McGovern's radical views -- moreover, this was
a huge jump over the period in the primaries where McGovern was viewed as benign. This confirms that McGovern was hurt deeply by HHH’s efforts in California and that that was the most harmful point in the McGovern candidacy.

It was not that McGovern played the wrong strings -- he was playing the tuba in a string orchestra. He was out of syncopation; out of tune; and blaring fortissimo while the public wanted pianissimo.

In a nutshell, McGovern was wrong from the start. His radical politics took a good shellacking from the American public -- a deserved repudiation of alien ideas. Let’s not blame it on his political amateur standing -- after all, he did some quite intelligent politicking at times -- let’s put the blame where it belongs: on the elitist, leftward movement in America which was born of Kennedy, raised in the Great Society and cut down by the grocer’s son who saw the excesses and called ‘em like he saw ‘em.
Political Memorandum 11/7/72

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the storm they read about the "kids."

Their duty was to win elections and not worry about ideology. The McG people believed that winning elections was a part of the ideology -- that the two were intertwined, and that their radicalism was the wave of the future. But give the devil his due -- the organization worked well and played the delegates and the convention states like violins.

THE CONVENTION

The Convention also had to be quite harmful to McGovern. By this time McGovern was tarred on the issues, but it was too late to stop him -- he really had it wrapped up after California. Nevertheless, the leftism was fully exposed on national television, and the shock for some probably has not yet worn off. The spectacle of the abortion people, the libbers and the homosexuals was too much. McGovern was seen, finally, to be the radical that his positions made him out to be, and this hurt.

Then came the compromises -- putting the abortinn, womens lib, and other minority planks over the side -- along with George Wiley and Gloria Steinem. It was time to kiss and make up with Daley, though Daley would resist. But the sum total was a picture of just another politician, one who would make deals to win and compromise his principles -- or at least certain principles.
But McGovern walked out of that convention a radical. For all intents and purposes he could not escape that label through November. It was not because of mistakes in his strategy or flaws in his tactics and it was not George McGovern the man or personality. It was his position on the political spectrum -- he was on the left, and he believed in his ways.

EAGLETON

I think the death blow was already delivered before the Eagleton affair. It only confirmed everything which had already been building up against McGovern. Those who argue that Eagleton was the turning point don't know what they're talking about. Eagleton was extremely important in terms of harming McGovern's credibility and trust. But even before Eagleton, the seeds were planted -- Eagleton merely made it harder for McGovern. Without the Eagleton affair, McGovern would have still been weighted by his positions.

Blaming the Eagleton affair will be a liberal cop-out and a McGovern staff cop-out. Eagleton did not make McGovern lose a 20 point lead in the California balloting. We have got to stop the myth of the Eagleton thing before history writes that it was this and only this which cost McG his crack at the Presidency. It just ain't
true. There was a Gallup after the Dem convention and before Eagleton which saw McGovern was already on the way down.

RADICALISM -- THE FATAL FLAW

Hubert Humphrey was always thought to be a radical. But the people around HHH were not radical. He had pols all around his -- cigar-chomping boys who prowled the back rooms.

McGovern was surrounded by radicals -- all those damn hippy kids and free love adherents, etc. McGovern's politics were caught up in the culture of the "Movement" and only made his radicalism seem worse.

These were not flaws of the man or his tactics -- again, they were basic defects of the liberal movement. McGovern thought that the kooky people around him were logical extensions of his new politics, of the coming home of America, and of the revolutionary basis of his candidacy. I would think that McGovern never did see what was wrong in saying that Henry Wallace was still "right" that the Soviets would treat him as a "friend" and not test him; or question why the Rubin and Hoffman endorsements were bad.

His friends -- Galbraith, Schlesinger, Steinem, etc. all came from the closed club of liberal intell.
saw the historical movement through own narrow vision. These were not casual campaign mistakes, they were the most profound of judgmental errors. McGovern misread the mood of the country and refused to admit it because liberal intellectuals always think they have a monopoly on wisdom. (I'm quite serious about this -- I never knew a liberal college professor who was otherwise, and McGovern a former college professor)

THE CAMPAIGN

The campaign itself was marred by the same fundamental flaws of ideology. I don't believe at all that in the early days it was a tactical error for McGovern tocampaign/on Vietnam and some of the most leftish positions. I think he believed that his surrender policy in Vietnam (he was actually to the left of the Viet Cong in his proposals) was the right position and probably the politically expedient position. The income redistribution plan and some of the other way-out ideas were still in his speeches in early September, although not explicitly. And throughout, there was Vietnam, where McGovern grew to higher reaches of sell-out. He dumped his $1000-per-person plan for a $4000-per-four-persons plan and gave out detailed explanations of how this would work.
Basically, I don't think that McGovern forsaked his radicalism. He simply tried to make it sound not all that bad in the campaign. Sure, he made some stupid mistakes, but the singular mistake was the belief that he could sell in the fall what he spoonfed to the students in the winter — a misguided political philosophy.

Finally, the McGovern campaign tactics and language were classics in New Left politics. The pure smear, the overstatement, the disruption, the Hitler analogy, the fostering of discord and the planting of fears — all permeate the liberal ideology. When liberals disagree, the first charge they make is “fascist” or “Hitler.” It is reflexive. It is the formbook liberal tactic — to many liberal politicians, the ideology is the form — the substance is the form. And in the end you cannot fault McGovern for his tactics without faulting his ideological base.

NOTES

It might be said that McGovern lost the election because of the way he won the nomination. He sold his soul to the left and had little inclination to seek salvation. That massive political error cannot be laid alone to ineptitude — it is no less than a major misreading of American values and the cultural ethos of our country.
The polls showed over and over again that the public represented McGovern "running down America." And while Haynes Johnson traveled the country talking about alienation, he missed the fact that Americans are basically at peace with themselves, satisfied with their lives, and optimistic about the future. What he saw was good old American skepticism -- the "show me" attitude -- and he mistook it for a penetrating anomie and social listlessness.

Not only did the polls show McGovern misreading the country's mood, they also showed that McGovern misread the public's perception of the correct position on the issues. Harris found out in the summer that the President had the preferable position on 15 out of 16 issues. This shows an unusually high perception of McGovern's radical views -- moreover, this was a huge jump over the period in the primaries where McGovern was viewed as benign. This confirms that McGovern was hurt deeply by HHH's efforts in California and that that was the most harmful point in the McGovern candidacy.

It was not that McGovern played the wrong strings -- he was playing the tuba in a string orchestra. He was out of syncopation; out of tune; and blaring fortissimo while the public wanted pianissimo.
In a nutshell, McGovern was wrong from the start.

His radical politics took a good shellacking (sp?) from the American public -- a deserved repudiation of alien ideas. Let's not blame it on his political amateur standing -- after all, he did some quite intelligent politicking at times -- let's put the blame where it belongs: on the elitist, leftward movement in America which was born of Kennedy, raised in the Great Society and cut down by the grocer's son who saw the excesses and called 'em like he saw 'em.
McGovern lost because of the way he won

-- said that it is McGovern's tactics -- the way he runs the campaign, not the liberal ideology. This is their way of blaming McG without blaming leftism --

But his tactics are a logical outgrowth of ideology -- the elitism, close-mindedness, excessive moralism, etc. In the case of the extreme left procedures are part of the ideology -- here is step by step of how McG won nomination, how he lost election.

-- Begin with party reform -- here is where McG smart politician -- as few others saw the potential of having a tight, solid base to win a victory in a widespread field of candidates -- won primaries by dumb luck -- New Hampshire (Muskie error and media help -- after all, Muskie won) -- Florida, Wallace, zip for McG though great interest in race -- Illinois, a handful (if we realized we should have known by then he would nick a dime his opposition to death) -- Wisconsin, won because of Repub.

Muskie crossovers to McG and Wallace, otherwise HHH -- Rhode Island -- won with something like 10% vote turnout -- Mass. and Pa. -- McG won one and HHH the other -- Muskie sandwiched unmercifully -- Mass was obvious, low turnout but heavy student and left-wing vote; Pa -- vote for delegates, and thus McG's tight organization victorious. -- Indiana HHH --
Ohio -- by that time, media love affair was on, McG
getting nothing but good press -- new face, clever ads --
no one knew where he stood and again good org. -- HHH old
face. Ohio hurt. -- Tennessee -- zip for McG --
North Carolina, zip for McG -- Nebraska, McG won, but for
first time indicator of HHH attacks, big McG lead was
cut in the last days -- first time HHH started on military,
abortion and related issues -- Avoided Va, except
for delegate votes (no loss could be had thus) -- Maryland
and Michigan same day -- wash because of Wallace, but started
to show how in two Democrat states, McG was not wave of future --
evaded busing issue in Mich, but would catch up later --
Oregon, foregone conclusion for McG, overwhelming buildup --
Only now do any Democrats realize what happening to them --
they were infiltrated and found the guerrillas too late (maybe
the premier lesson for McG from Vietnam war) -- Finally
Calif., N.J., New Mexico, and South Dakota (I can't believe
I won the whole thing -- and unfortunately for McG, neither
could other Dems who decided they couldn't swallow him and
would start against him although too late -- but Calif.
was turning point in terms of McG v. RN on the whole campaign. --
McG saw a 21% poll lead drop to 4% on election day -- for the
first time in campaign, issues caught up -- and HHH was
able to articulate them in his hammering staccato fashion in
three national debates -- That was the real Waterloo for McG just as California was for Goldwater -- New York --
obvious, the leftists were in control and only about a 10% turnout again -- sure thing for McG.

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McG won because he was organized and Rick Stearns
who helped write the rules also ran the organization.
Meanwhile the press started writing about populism and
McG being the "anti-politician" -- covering the leftism
in their purple prose -- Moreover, all those syrupy stories
about the McG wunderkinder -- Caddell (whose poll information
has been so spectacularly wrong but universally praised) --
Stearns, Pokornay (with the prairie sod in his ears); Grandmaison,
Mankiewicz (who is the dumbest pol I believe we have ever
tired) -- good wit but lousy strategist) -- They started
to believe they were superior to all the old-timers who
probably resented this because they worked hard but
only laughed at. -- Yet the org was still there, and
played the rules like violin -- as good as Barry did in 1964 --
but Barry actually represented his party more than McG did
his. --

Convention -- the leftism was fully exposed on national
television, but the sheer momentum would not deprive
McG he was dead before the balloting -- the spectacle
in the media -- queers, abortionists, women's lib,
Then the political acts -- putting the liberals, the welfare people and others over the side -- screwing everybody on the minority planks -- this was printed in a rash of articles after convention and it took hold -- finally, McG was seen to be a politician just like the rest -- the desire to kiss and make up with Daley etc. 

Eagleton affair merely confirmed what was building up -- it served the purpose of dramatizing everything that was wrong with McG and probably caught the press at a time when they were fed up with the way McG had been given the sweetheart treatment -- the warts were there and it was time to show them, with a vengeance.

But through it all, the left-readadalism showed through -- the welfare and defense plans, the taxing, the abortion, amnesty and pot positions -- he could not escape them (and he would have been better off if he didn't try to keep compromising and switching -- this was the worst thing he could have done) -- but this was a minor flaw in tactics; it was the basic radicalism of the positions which went to the core of gut Democrats. HHH always talked like a radical but all those pols around him showed he was ok, but McG not only talked like a radical, but had radicals around him --
-- youth vote -- took it for granted; arrogance and elitism of left was the reason McG acted this way -- his downfall with youth; he left them somewhat -- but it is what left-wing has always attempted to do, win over hard-core in private and in primaires and then ignore them in Fall to get the big one.

Then the campaign -- he chose to campaign for weeks on the issues of the left -- Vietnam (where he was truly crushed; this probably hurt him equally with other issues); tax loopholes; redistribution -- and he sometimes backed off, but tried to still believe in it -- e.g., substitute $1,000 per person with $4,000 per family (big deal).

Finally, the language and tactics -- in the end, pure New Left -- innuendo, smear, overstatement, disruption, fostering discord, planting fears -- it was a classic in the way New Left ideology permeates form -- the liberal substance is the liberal form -- you cannot attack McG's tactics without attacking his ideology.

Also notes: Polls showed that people thought McG was running down America; didn't buy his defense plans, his tax plans; his foreign policy and isolationism; and basically found themselves to his right -- also they viewed McG as too far left -- polls showed time after time that ideology was a major weakness.
Americans did not think they were sick or racist or warmongering or heartless towards poor -- Magoo was pulling at wrong strings -- there might be things wrong with U.S. but George wouldn't ever admit it was a good country and would never admit for example that North Vietnam was a bad country -- the fatal left-wing flaw -- lack of consistency and moral fervor "only I am right and everyone else is wrong".