

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
Contested Materials Collection  
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
47	34	3/23/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	Author and recipient unk RE: draft on strategy between now and Wisconsin. 4 pgs.
47	34		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Other Document	Talking points (Democratic Situation): The New Hampshire Democratic Primary. 4 pgs.

**DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]**

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
N-1 [Doc 124]	Memo	Memorandum on Strategy, Tactics, now and wisconsin, with attached draft copy	3/23/72	C (mix)
N-2 [Doc 125]	Memo	Khachigian to Buchanan, re: "nonpartisan" voter education, with attached draft copy	3/8/72	C (mix)
N-3 [Doc 126]	Memo	Talking Points (Democratic Situation) - The new Hampshire Democratic Primaries, with 2 draft copies	3/7/72	C (mix)
N-4 [Doc 127]	Memo	Research Two for Research One, re: Division of responsibilities <del>attached to N-4</del>	3/2/72	C (mix)
N-5 [Doc 128]	<del>Memo</del> notes	"notes on attack material" [attached to N-4 case file]	2/14/72	C (mix)
N-6 [Doc 129] [Doc 130]	Notes	Handwritten, "Phone discussion with w/Strachan..." [attached to N-4 case file attachments: 1) Handwritten notes, re: "Meeting, 2/22/72 Dick Howard, Bob Chase, Van Shumway, Peter Millspaugh" 2) <sup>Two</sup> Draft copies of N-4 memo, 2/28/72 - 12/25/72	2/10/72	C (mix)

FILE GROUP TITLE  
NIXON PROJECT

BOX NUMBER

5

FOLDER TITLE

March [1972]

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

**Collection:** Kenneth L. Khachigian  
**Box Number:** 5

**Folder:** March [1972]

<u>Document</u>	<u>Disposition</u>	
124	Return	Private/Political
125	Retain	Open
126	Return	Private/Political
127	Retain	Open
128	Retain	Open
129	Retain	Open
130	Retain	Open

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM ON STRATEGY BETWEEN NOW AND WISCONSIN

Because of unavailable data and because Wisconsin itself holds the keys for developing further strategy, it is somewhat difficult to plan effectively for the period between now and Wisconsin.

On the surface, it would be in our distinct interest for George Wallace to once again upset the field -- or at least pull as many delegates away as he can. Continued success by Wallace simply drives him deeper into the Democratic National Convention and sets the stage even more clearly for the assertion that the national Democrats are out of step with their rank and file.

Our impression is that Muskie will not do spectacularly well in Wisconsin. If he loses to Humphrey, Hubert will have many reasons to claim he's on his way again. If Muskie scores a poor third, Humphrey will be even stronger and the money will probably start falling in (with a drop-off to Muskie). Unless someone knows something we don't, there isn't enough good information to recommend continued targeted attacks on Muskie. Just leave him alone -- we don't want to elevate him now. Besides, the other Dems are beginning to smell the blood and they will be all over one another. And we shouldn't attack HHH yet because it's too early to know if he's on the way up.

Thus, our recommendation, strange as it may seem, is to sit back and wait until the Wisconsin primary is over when we can assess with more directness where our attention ought to lie. If anything be done, it is to help George Wallace.

At the risk of repeating ourselves, opposition attack activities must serve a purpose which meshes with our own campaign strategy, which furthers RN's chances of winning and which strikes heavy blows with effectiveness. Lacking these aims, we should just sit back and wait. That is about where we are now, and our reluctance to go on the offensive is guided by our best judgment of the road to Miami at this point in time.

3/23/72

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3-1-72

- TALKING POINTS (DEMOCRATIC SITUATION) -- THE NEW HAMPSHIRE  
DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY

-- If Muskie gets less than 50% of the vote, the outcome is "astonishing." Coming in a state whose border is 25 miles from the place where Muskie was born and raised; a state to which Muskie is regarded as a "neighbor;" Muskie's back yard; and a state where Muskie visits every year -- the results must be considered a setback to his candidacy.

-- Muskie had virtually no opposition, especially considering his opponents insignificance ratings in national public opinion polls. Such an outcome indicates Muskie's support is soft and that Muskie was less than a heavyweight.

-- Frankly, we had considered Muskie to have the nomination virtually sewed up. To win by such a narrow margin indicates that Muskie, as of now, might not make the distance and that Hubert Humphrey must be considered a very real challenge to the Muskie candidacy. Humphrey is a much better campaigner, and as the titular head of the Democratic party has a great deal of broad-based support throughout the country. The big winner of the N.H. Primary was the man who didn't even appear on the ballot -- Hubert Humphrey.

-- If Muskie scores between 50% and 60%, much of the same above applies. It should be considered the most minimal of victories for Muskie and a pyrrhic victory. Anything less than 60% in his political back yard indicates a great weakening of Muskie's support.

-- If he gets around 65%, it should be noted that this was very much expected -- that we thought he would get at least 65%, especially considering his lack of major opposition and his geographic proximity. Only a Muskie victory of 70% could be considered anything near the proportions of a candidate who is supposed to be so clearly a "frontrunner."

-- In light of Muskie's small margin of victory, Republicans will surely reassess Muskie's strength. He certainly is no longer the formidable "Lincolnesque" figure that he might have been considered.

-- Asked about the crying incident, we have no comment on how it affected the election. The public should be the judge of a presidential candidate's loss of composure over one or two isolated news articles. There is some question on how Muskie would hold up against the pressures of a full-blown presidential campaign and the pressures of the Oval Office. After all, it is just starting. Most likely, Muskie's indecisiveness and the uncertainty on where he stands probably hurt Muskie more than anything else.

-- In general, the primary shows the disarray that pervades Democratic party ranks. They have no true leadership -- nothing like the FDR--Truman--Kennedy--Johnson tradition. They are confused, disunited, and leaderless and must do better to merit the public's support in November over a strong President.

(Democratic Election)

TALKING POINTS -- THE NEW HAMPSHIRE DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY

-- If Muskie gets less than 50% of the vote, the outcome is "astonishing." Coming in a state whose border is 25 miles from the place where Muskie was born and raised; a state to which Muskie is regarded as a "neighbor;" Muskie's back yard; and a state where Muskie visits every year -- the results must be considered a setback to his candidacy.

*insignificant  
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*andrewed up. narrow*

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*and the pressure of the Oval office.*

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*major*

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*likely*

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3/7/72

**ALK**  
**TAKING POINTS -- THE NEW HAMPSHIRE DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY**

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FDR--  
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