

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
47	15	4/3/1972	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	For: the file. RE: random thought from Lou Harris. 4pgs.
47	15	8/25/1960	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Report	The Simulmatics corporation. Nixon before Labor Day. Simulmatics report No. 3. 33pgs.
47	15	1/3/1972	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	To: Charles W. Colson. From: Doug Hallett. RE: Broder and Johnson's basic points in their series "The Politicians and the People". 8pgs.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

April 3, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Random Thoughts from Lou Harris

Harris believes that the President needs, between now and the election, to continually create "straw men". Meany affords us the best opportunity, but we've got to work at creating others -- deliberate enemies. The President is against those who plunged us into Vietnam but now want to sell out America's honor. The President is against those retailers who over-charge consumers. The middle man example in the food price issue is a perfect illustration. If there isn't a natural villain, create one so that the President can be the defender of the public interest against natural enemies.

Harris believes that the President should be forceful but not strident; that whenever he is strident, the President brings out the hostility of a latent anti-Nixon feeling which still exists with a large body of people, but that when he is deliberate, quiet, rational, forceful, he does not engender this latent hostility.

Harris believes that we should downplay the campaign throughout the year, make it as boring as possible. Harris believes that a bland campaign will help us in that we will benefit greatly from a low turnout. Also, people react better to the President if he does not polarize on gut issues. This does not mean that we should not address the issues; we should defuse as many as possible, but not arouse the passions of the electorate with a very divisive issue that might bring out our opponents (as with anti-labor legislation, for example).

Harris believes the key to our success is in avoiding having the American electorate act emotionally or precipitously with respect to the President's candidacy. He points out that as his pollsters question people, they get a better response after the questioning than at the outset. More people favor the President's re-election after they have been walked through the issues than when they are first confronted with the question cold, "Do you favor the President as against Candidate X?"

One of the President's strong points is that people think he is trying hard. He is beginning to develop a characteristic of sincerity, that he is really working at solving the problems. Harris advises that we should articulate everything we do rationally, calmly, quietly, and forcefully. Make people think, make people thoughtful. Do not provoke instant emotional reactions. The President's style has come through very

well as being deliberate. We should not let him go swinging or overreacting. If our opponent becomes strident, we should take it in stride. The more irresponsible the opposition becomes, the more the President is helped in being looked at as a solid, steady, strong and deliberate statesman. Be the "solid brick in the middle" Harris suggests. Ask people to think of the issues seriously.

In this same vein, we should turn the lack of so-called charisma into an asset, arguing that no one has the right to use the office of Presidency for the development of a personality cult, that personal promotion is not the measure of one's success as President. One cannot run the country through charm, rather through ability. Nixon's style is to be serious and dedicated, that that is more important than personal image.

Harris believes that Nixon's image is now being sharpened as a rational, thoughtful, deliberate leader, all of which can be destroyed if there is a spontaneous reaction or a sharp galvanizing of the opposition in the months ahead. Harris believes that if people are asked calmly and quietly to think through the choice for President, that the President cannot be beaten by any of the present Democratic Presidential candidates. If on the other hand, the election turns into

a heated, highly controversial, emotionally charged campaign, we will simply bring out enough anti votes to defeat us; there are just more of them than us and if we galvanize them, we (not the Democratic candidates) can beat ourselves. The key at the moment is to maintain the tone that we have presently achieved and to hold it throughout the election year.


Charles W. Colson

JK

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NIXON
BEFORE LABOR DAY

Simulmatics Report No. 3

Copy Number 51

Note: This edition will be revised as
later data becomes available.

August 25, 1960

NIXON BEFORE LABOR DAY

This report, like its companion piece (Simulmatics Report No. 2: Kennedy Before Labor Day) contains five major areas of analysis:

The Nixon image before Labor Day with special emphasis on Nixon's appeal to women voters; the Furst-Simulmatics survey of August 13-18, 1960, processed with data in our survey bank; the salient issues (with the exception of foreign affairs); Nixon's weaknesses among important voter-types; and Nixon's strength among Negroes and Southerners.

This report should be read keeping in mind the information and analysis in Kennedy Before Labor Day. Obviously Kennedy's advantages are Nixon's disadvantages and vice versa. In the following summary of our Nixon report we have therefore paralleled to a degree our Kennedy summary in an effort to delineate Nixon strategy from the Nixon point of view.

SUMMARY

Nixon's personal image is predominantly favorable, although this is not based on friendliness or charm. He has fewer amiable traits, voters feel, but he seems self-confident, competent, and sober-minded. This image, when coupled with the preeminence of the foreign affairs issue, is responsible for Nixon's current lead over Kennedy.

Of all group reactions to Nixon, the most important is that of the women voters. Women like Nixon better than Kennedy; they like him better than men do. They have more confidence in him, trust him, and like him better on TV. They care very much less about party than men do and party is Nixon's major shortcoming. If Nixon wins, the women's vote will have been decisive.

Nixon has been less effective on TV than Kennedy. The crucial TV debates are therefore a risk for him. Should he be able to trap Kennedy into approaching the debates at his own level of super-coolness, he can "win" the debates. The danger to Nixon is that Kennedy can make use of his more personable traits--including a range of emotions such as fervor, humor, friendship, and spirituality beyond the expected seriousness and anger--and thus cause Nixon to "lose" the debates.

Nixon is better known than Kennedy. Almost everyone has an opinion about him. Most undecided voters are trying to make up their minds about Kennedy.

Personality alone will not, as we have said, be decisive in this election, but Nixon can be hurt if his campaign style does not capitalize on his personal assets. Should Nixon campaign intensely, but above party strife and personal attack, and if he can get Kennedy to campaign at this level with him, he may lose a few Republicans and bored Independents who will stay at home, but he can gain among the undecided Democrats and Independents. Among the latter group, many still need reassurance that he is indeed sober-minded, mature, and competent.

The issues of this campaign right now are foreign affairs, party, and religion.

The religious issue can be a headache for him.

The foreign affairs issue is Nixon's greatest source of strength.

The party issue is his greatest weakness.

Religion: Nixon is maintaining Republican Catholic votes and is picking up some anti-Catholic votes. As long as the issue remains relatively quiescent, he stands to gain. (The religious issue is analyzed in our Kennedy report. It is not, therefore, dealt with as a separate section here.)

Foreign Affairs: Nixon's strength, as we have indicated, derives from the belief of many voters--women, especially--that he is better able to deal with the Russians. This is the issue currently on voters' minds. It is discussed in Simulmatics Report No. 4: Kennedy, Nixon, and Foreign Affairs.

Party: Nixon's image is an important contribution to the fact that party lines are so definite in this election. Republicans like Nixon very much; a substantial number of Democrats strongly dislike him. Nixon is vulnerable here because there are more Democrats than Republicans.

It is axiomatic that Nixon's chances improve as a national mood of nonpartisanship increases. He gains votes as an international statesman, loses as Mr. Republican.

Nixon has done a good job of organizing his supporters. His task is to minimize their partisan fervor, to blur party lines, and to avoid insofar as possible the bread-and-butter issues that tend to stir Democratic party feeling.

Only a minority still see him as "Tricky Dicky". He has benefitted by the passage of time. He is popular with many young voters who have no recollection of the so-called "old Nixon". Even so, a number of voter-types actively dislike him. Among these are:

East Coast, well-to-do, Protestant, male, Democrats and Independents
Jews, Democrats and Independents
West Coast Chinese and Japanese, Democrats and Independents
Big city industrial workers, Democrats and Independents
Farmers, Democrats, Independents and Republicans
West Coast, small town, lower income, Republicans
East Coast, Protestant, working class, male, Republicans

Nixon's challenge among voters that actively dislike him (or his record) is the redirection of their attention from the man--or the issue that concerns them--to the international scene. This can be his best hope, for example, in the Midwest where he is faced with a farm revolt.

Nixon is doing well among Negroes and Southerners.

Should Nixon be able to keep the campaign focused solely on foreign affairs (and away from domestic issues); should he wage a campaign that tends to disassociate himself from the Republican party, he will better his chances in these ways: he can pick up some votes leaning to Kennedy on the religious issue. He avoids obvious contrasts between his own personality and Kennedy's. He minimizes his losses among groups that regard him as reactionary.

Conclusion: At this point, Nixon is ahead, but any campaign development that tends to emphasize his Republicanism (in terms of domestic and foreign issues) and engage him in a partisan struggle will affect the final vote of those 23% of voters who are as yet undecided.

NIXON BEFORE LABOR DAY

Simulation - Documentation - Analysis

Contents

I. What is Nixon's Image	page 7
The Women's Vote	page 14
Young Voters	page 18
II. Party Feeling and Domestic Issues	page 21

I. WHAT IS NIXON'S IMAGE?

The general public image of Nixon today is predominantly favorable.

- A. Nixon is no hero any more than Kennedy is. He is not vastly popular, but he has made an impression on almost everybody. On balance, this is a marked advantage. The public views him as follows:

The Furst-Simulmatics Survey asked Independents and Republicans who have decided to vote for Kennedy what they thought about Nixon, i.e., why they had turned against him? Among the questions asked were, is he "too liberal" and is he "too conservative"? "Too conservative" was chosen over "too liberal" two to one, 26% to 13%. It is apparent that Nixon is still viewed as a conservative, in spite of efforts to liberalize his image. Although some pundits find little difference between Nixon and Kennedy, the public readily places Nixon right of center and Kennedy left of center.

Many voters hold a strong bread-and-butter resentment toward the right-of-center politics that they feel Nixon represents. The educational level of voters who say they dislike Nixon reinforces this contention:

Percent of Voters by Educational LevelWho Say they Dislike Nixon

<u>Years of School</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Less than 6 years	19
7 - 8 years	13
9 - 11 years	8
12 years	6
More than 12, but no College	4
Some College	5
College completed	6

These figures and other data in our survey bank thus indicate, contrary to popular belief, that ideological liberals are not the only ones who dislike Nixon. Hostility toward him is often found among Democratic anti-Catholics and anti-Negroes because of the economic issue. Nixon's gradual move toward a more liberal image is partially aimed at this type of hostility.

B. Voters who actively dislike Nixon are a minority-- a substantial minority and a vehement one, but still a minority. About one person in five or six when asked to rate Nixon indicated that he actively disliked him.

These people who dislike Nixon, however, are largely loyal party Democrats.

Here are the percentages, by party, of voters who dislike Nixon:

Republicans	8
Independents	23
Democrats	37

C. Nixon is not disliked by the majority of voters. They view him as a sober and honest man. His image is not that of a dirty fighter or of "Tricky Dicky".

However, an occasional vestige of that once widespread image appears. For example: In the group of Republicans and Independents who have decided to vote for Kennedy, as noted above, 26% called Nixon conservative, and 13% liberal--ideology, therefore, counted for 39% of their anti-Nixon vote. Compare this to the percentage of voters who gave personality reasons for their anti-Nixon vote: only 17% said Nixon cannot be trusted and 30% said they just didn't like Nixon.

Kennedy, incidentally, fares better in terms of personality, which also lends weight to the conclusion that the old image of Nixon as "Tricky Dicky" still has a few adherents. Only 9% of Democrats and Independents who are voting for Nixon said Kennedy can't be trusted, and only 21% said they "just don't like him".

The sharpest test of trustworthiness was a question asked of all 1817 respondents in the Furst-Simulmatics survey:

"Which man would you trust most as a person?" The replies were:

Kennedy	27%
Nixon	24%
Both equally	30%
No Answer or Don't Know	19%

Distrust of Nixon is particularly prevalent among Jews. Only 4% of them regard him as more trustworthy than Kennedy:

	<u>Whom Can you Trust?</u>		
	<u>% Protestants</u>	<u>% Catholics</u>	<u>% Jews</u>
Nixon	33	11	4
Kennedy	20	42	40
Both	29	31	29
Don't Know, No Answer	18	16	27

Distrust of Nixon is highest in the East:

	<u>Whom Can You Trust?</u>				
	<u>% East</u>	<u>% Midwest</u>	<u>% West</u>	<u>% Border</u>	<u>% South</u>
Nixon	19	25	26	31	24
Kennedy	31	27	23	21	28
Both	28	34	27	27	30
Don't Know, No Answer	23	14	24	21	18

Distrust of Nixon is more prevalent among men:

	<u>Whom Can You Trust?</u>	
	<u>% Men</u>	<u>% Women</u>
Nixon	21	25
Kennedy	31	24
Both	31	29
Don't Know, No Answer	16	22

D. As we point out in our Kennedy Report, Kennedy does better than Nixon on the dimension of friendliness.

This is particularly so among Jews and in the East. Only 8% of Jews find Nixon friendlier as against 44% Kennedy. In the East only 18% found Nixon friendlier as against 41% Kennedy. For the population as a whole, the figures are 25% Nixon friendlier, 36% Kennedy friendlier.

The most significant difference in regard to the image of friendliness is between men and women. Nixon does better among women here, as on all points.

Who is Friendlier

	<u>%</u> <u>Men</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Women</u>
Nixon	22	27
Kennedy	42	33
Both	24	25
Don't Know, No Answer	12	15

E. The most important aspect of the Nixon personality is his image of competence, experience, and self-confidence. Here is Nixon's great vote catching asset, particularly when it is applied to dealing with the Russians. This is shown by the Furst-Simulmatics survey:

Who Seems More Self-Confident
About What He is Doing

	%	%	%
	<u>All Respondents</u>	<u>White Men</u>	<u>White Women</u>
Nixon	33	30	34
Kennedy	29	35	25
Both	25	24	26
Don't Know, No Answer	13	10	15

Who Could Do the Best Job of Dealing
With the Russian Leaders

	%
	<u>All Respondents</u>
Nixon	43
Kennedy	24
Both	8
Don't Know, No Answer	25

The importance of this aspect of the Nixon image cannot be over-rated. We refer the reader to Simulmatics Report No.4: Kennedy, Nixon, and Foreign Affairs, which deals specifically with how the public's interest in world affairs is threatening to undermine a massive Democratic majority. If Nixon wins the election it will be a triumph for the image of Nixon's experience and competence.

THE WOMEN'S VOTE

THE WOMEN'S VOTE

The Furst-Simulmatics survey shows that Nixon is winning the women's vote.

Voters Preference by Sex, Whites Only

	<u>%</u> <u>Men</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Women</u>
Kennedy for sure	30	20
Leaning Kennedy	<u>12</u>	<u>13</u>
Kennedy Total	42	33
Nixon for sure	25	29
Leaning Nixon	<u>12</u>	<u>14</u>
Nixon Total	37	43
Undecided	22	24

This result is foreshadowed in the Simulmatics survey bank data. It shows that there is less anti-Nixon feeling among Democratic and Independent women than among such men:

Gap Between Independent Males and Females
Regarding Hostility to Nixon

	<u>Percentage Points</u>
City	Men 11 over Women
Town	Men 6 over Women
Rural	Men 2 over Women

Several factors are responsible:

1. Women voters in general, and educated urban residents in particular, are less susceptible to the ties of class and party than men. They are more influenced by image and less influenced by hard economic issues. Their relative preference for Nixon can be seen as an assertion of independence from their husbands as well as a specific reaction to the Nixon and Kennedy images. Other pro-Nixon points are his association with Eisenhower; self-made character; and his image of the clean-cut, quiet, conscientious family-centered public servant. Some women find him easier to understand.
2. The image of the Kennedy machine has hurt Kennedy and helped Nixon among these political romantics.
3. There is some envy of Mrs. Kennedy's beauty and her position in the world.

4. In the Southern and Border cities, women favor Nixon because of their conservative, anti-Catholic views. These views are, of course, shared with the men in Southern and Border States, but the men are more involved in the politico-economic system of civic life in the Southern communities which makes it harder for them to break with the Democratic party. Similar factors explain why small town and rural Democratic women in the South stay more loyal to the Democratic party than do those in the cities. But women in the big cities of the South have broken out of the traditional social system far enough to express traditional attitudes in a new, i.e., Republican, way.

Percent of Protestant Voters Who Would
Vote for Democrat against Nixon

By Class and Region

	<u>% Men</u>	<u>% Women</u>
Border states, well off	79	54
Border states, poor	76	65
Southern Big City, well-to-do	69	46
Southern Big City, middle class	75	60
Southern Big City, poor	75	60

YOUNG VOTERS

YOUNG VOTERS

Nixon also has an advantage among young voters who have been introduced into politics in the Eisenhower era.

Many of Nixon's political limitations follow from the "old Nixon" image, composed of white-collar McCarthyism, partisanship, and conservatism. Young voters were not exposed to the old Nixon. They see the "new Nixon", a man above party, concerned with welfare proposals, foreign policy and civil rights. This new image is attracting younger Independents and Democrats. Nixon is distinctly more popular among those who could not vote before 1952.

Percentage of Democrats Who Say
They Like Nixon, by Age

<u>Age</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
21-29	57
30-39	43
40-49	46
50-59	49
60-69	44
Over 70	41

The Furst-Simulmatics survey shows the following vote among different age groups which emphasizes Nixon's advantages with the very young, who don't know him as a conservative, and the very old who are conservative.

Percentages of votes among the Different
Age Groups

<u>Age</u>	<u>% Kennedy</u>	<u>% Nixon</u>	<u>% Undecided</u>
Under 25	44	47	9
26 - 34	41	39	21
35 - 45	38	35	27
46 - 55	33	39	27
Over 56	34	45	21

II PARTY FEELING AND DOMESTIC ISSUES

II. PARTY FEELING AND DOMESTIC ISSUES

Nixon is controversial, but he is controversial between parties, not within parties. The Nixon image tends to polarize the parties. The fact that he is the Republican candidate is one of the things that makes it likely that party-line voting will predominate in this election. Nixon, of course, expects to blur party-lines. He will not stress party. He will present himself only as an international statesman, not as Mr. Republican--unless he is engaged in an all-out party-line fight by an aggressive, partisan Kennedy.

Nixon is ahead of Kennedy because of the prevailing belief that he can deal with the Russians better than Kennedy. The major threats to Nixon's candidacy are that he represents the Republican party and that his opponent is Catholic. (See our analysis of the religious issue in Simulmatics Report No. 2.)

The issue of party feeling and the entire range of domestic issues that operate within its context are the source of Nixon's greatest vulnerability. His weaknesses are analyzed here in terms of those undecided voter-types who would vote against him should Kennedy be able to develop a feeling of intense partisanship in the country on bread-and-butter issues.

We also discuss briefly two notable areas of Nixon strength--the Negro Independents and Southerners.

The Kennedy campaign policy toward Nixon is more important for its impact on Democrats and Independents than for any possibility of seriously breaking Republican ranks.

Among a number of Democratic and Independent groups with important blocks of undecided voters, the persons who dislike Nixon are quite numerous.

THE ELITE

One such group is well-to-do Eastern metropolitan Protestant men. The Democrats and Independents among them include many of the intelligentsia, top professionals, and liberal elements of the leading elites of the country. Those who say they dislike Nixon are 78% of the Democrats and 35% of the Independents.

WORKERS

Big city working class Democrats show the expectable dislike of Nixon as a representative of big business Republicanism. Protestant and Catholic workers, however, behave somewhat differently. Catholic workers are more likely to vote against Nixon regardless of the Democratic candidate. This is because of their strong party identification. But Protestant workers are more critical of Nixon, presumably because they were less involved with his anti-Communist campaign some years back. But these subtleties aside, the essential point is that the Nixon image is definitely not that of a friend of the workers:

Worker Attitudes Toward Nixon

Metropolitan, Working Class Voter	% Who Dislike Nixon		% Who Would Vote for a Democrat Against Nixon	
	Male Voters	Female Voters	Male Voters	Female Voters
Eastern Catholic	39	33	62	62
Protestant	42	52	61	58

Midwestern Catholic	47	46	77	73
Protestant	46	45	70	75

Western Catholic	36	26	73	70
Protestant	58	49	72	57

FARMERS

The most significant type of farmer voter is the Mid-westerner. Here we find a subtle pattern not unlike that just noted for city workers: i.e. the farmers who are most likely to vote against Nixon and those who most dislike him are not exactly the same. Among the Independents, for example, poor, farm-area residents are more likely to vote against Nixon because they feel closer to the Democrats. But, among the well-off farm owners, criticism of Nixon is most vocal. These latter voters are the conscious elements in the farm revolt.

Midwestern Independent Rural Voters
by Income Group

	% Vote for Any Demo- crat Against Nixon	% Who Dislike Nixon
<u>Well-off farm owners</u>		
Men	37	29
Women	33	26
<u>Poor farm area residents</u>		
Men	44	14
Women	39	15

The Midwestern rural area is clearly a fruitful ground for Democratic effort. The current attack on Nixon's farm policies should pay off there. This is particularly important, because as noted in our Kennedy Report, anti-Catholicism would otherwise be strong among precisely these same people. Keeping the farm issue salient will help offset the impact of the religious issue in this self-consciously Protestant area.

The Furst-Simulmatics survey revealed the weakness of Nixon on the farm issue. Respondents were asked first, what the three most important issues were and then, who would do better on those issues, Kennedy or Nixon?

Confirmed Nixon voters generally cite their own man* and confirmed Kennedy voters do the same--but the undecided make the difference.

Undecided Voters Who Say Farm Issue
is Important

<u>Kennedy Better on it</u>	<u>Nixon Better on it</u>	<u>Total</u>
88	12	100%

The farm issue is the issue on which Kennedy led Nixon far and away among uncommitted voters who cared about it. Since we are only asking people their judgment on things that are important issues to them, Kennedy's lead on the farm issue among these people is a major advantage.

*7% of Nixon voters who cared about the farm issue conceded that Kennedy was better on it and another 6% of Nixon voters said the candidates were indistinguishable. This 13% is a higher proportion than for any other issue of Nixon voters favoring Kennedy or, at worst, not opposing him.

ANTI-NIXON REPUBLICANS

There are a number of exceptions to Nixon's solid Republican front.

A small but significant number of California Republicans still remember the "old Nixon". From his days as a state politician and Senator he has a residue of resentment. This does not mean that California Republicans as a whole will not support him. On the contrary, they will. But it means that scattered among his strong Republican supporters are a few potential dissident votes for Kennedy from people who "knew him when". In a close California vote, these votes could be valuable.

Who are these anti-Nixon Western Republicans and where are they to be found? The Simulmatics program--because it partitions the population into such small groups--can spot them. They are lower income voters in the smaller cities and towns where people are more conscious of what their representatives have done for the community. In those places and in that social class dislike for Nixon was expressed by:

36% of Republican men

26% of Republican women.

The fact that this feeling is centered among lower class people indicates that it is essentially an economically based objection to the old reactionary Nixon who was no friend of the working man, the old folks, or of needed local public works.

In California, then, it seems clearly desirable for Kennedy to play on the economic record of the old Nixon. California is one place in the country where some people who are not confirmed Democrats recall his past.

We should make it clear that this is likely to provide only a small offset to Nixon's advantages as a local boy and Kennedy's disadvantage of being less well known there. (See our Kennedy Report.) Among the Western town lower class Republican voter-types discussed here, Kennedy gets just 8% of the votes.

Lower income, Protestant Republican men in metropolitan areas show some of the same objections to Nixon on bread-and-butter grounds as noted just above. As often happens when labor issues are involved, the men vote more along conventional economic lines than do the women. The fact that Catholics do not show the same proportion of anti-Nixon feeling among these working class Republicans may be attributed to the appeal of Nixon's anti-Communist record among them. The Republican Protestant big city working class men who expressed dislike of Nixon were:

In the East	15%
In the Midwest	15%
In the West	19%

These are small numbers, but for one Republican in six in a particular group to say he doesn't like Nixon is a significant factor to be exploited politically. We conclude that there are gains to be had from keeping voters focussed on the old Nixon and his reactionary economic views.

Note on the Importance of Party Alignment in This Election

Despite these exceptions, the general rule is that party today largely determines attitudes toward Nixon. Even among social groups which, as a whole, overwhelmingly do not like Nixon, those members who say they are Republicans do like him.

For example, Eastern Jews and West Coast Orientals are typical groups among whom Nixon is unpopular. Note that in both groups the Republicans among them like Nixon and the anti-Nixon ratio is at most the one-in-six noted above.

Nixon and Eastern Jewish Voters

	<u>% Anti-Nixon</u>
Eastern, well-off, Jewish Democrats	55
Eastern, poor, Jewish Democrats	62
Eastern, well-off, Jewish Independents	69
Eastern, poor, Jewish Independents	71
Eastern, well-off, Jewish Republicans	15
Eastern, poor, Jewish Republicans	15

(Note that few people care to say they don't like someone, so that 30% represents substantial dislike.)

Nixon and Western Buddhists, Etc.

	<u>% Anti-Nixon</u>
Western Buddhist, etc., Democrats	45
Western Buddhist, etc., Independents	29
Western Buddhist, etc., Republicans	0

From this type of data we conclude that there is no reason to expect a repetition of the 1948 Republican stay-at-home revolt. Nixon is liked by his party. Even the Republican dissidents mentioned above have been loyal GOP voters since 1948. Typically, conservative Republicans are content to hope for return of the "old Nixon"; moderate Republicans hope for more of the "new Nixon".

NEGROES

Nixon is running very strongly among Negro Independents. Almost one-half have declared a preference for him. Johnson on the ticket helps Nixon here. While standard-of-living appeals will lessen Negro pro-Nixon sentiment, only an extremely bold position on civil rights would gain Kennedy a strong Negro majority (e.g., a categorical Kennedy pledge to rigidly enforce the bar on government contracts to companies engaging in discriminatory employment practices).

Negro Independents' Vote Intentions

		<u>%</u> <u>Lower Class</u>
East	For Nixon	47
	Against Nixon	32
Midwest	For Nixon	56
	Against Nixon	29
West	For Nixon	36
	Against Nixon	54
Border	For Nixon	59
	Against Nixon	36
South	For Nixon	32
	Against Nixon	21

In the Furst-Simulmatics survey in the middle of August, the over-all Negro vote divided as follows:

	<u>%</u> <u>Men</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Women</u>
Kennedy	41	43
Nixon	34	31
Undecided	<u>24</u>	<u>27</u>
	100	100

Nixon's Negro vote is impressive when compared to the 1952 and 1956 elections in which Negroes gave the Democrats 3/4 and 2/3 of their

SOUTHERNERS

The problem of the South is complex. Nixon is not personally popular in the South. Until the conventions, the strong Democratic feeling in the South coupled with Nixon's occasional statements on civil rights resulted in considerable critical comment about him. 41% of rural, Protestant, Democratic men expressed dislike of him. So did 43% in the towns. But personal attitudes toward Nixon as a man are not the crucial factors in the South. The determinants are rather civil rights, liberalism, and factional struggles in the Democratic Party. We found in our Furst-Simulmatics survey that Nixon was winning in the South even though he was not getting as favorable ratings on ability to deal with the Russians, self-confidence, or interest in "people like you" as in most other parts of the country.

		<u>%</u> <u>East</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Midwest</u>	<u>%</u> <u>West</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Border</u>	<u>%</u> <u>South</u>
Best in dealing with the Russians:						
	Nixon	38	46	48	46	42
	Kennedy	26	24	17	17	28
Most self-confident:						
	Nixon	32	35	31	35	30
	Kennedy	30	30	27	26	32
Best for people like you:						
	Nixon	20	30	31	35	27
	Kennedy	33	33	27	25	28

Nixon is not personally popular in the South though, as we have seen, he does much better with big city women there. Kennedy retains some personal popularity, but the regional political pressures are likely to determine the outcome. Right now these are in Nixon's favor.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 3, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHARLES W. COLSON

FROM: DOUG HALLETT

Broder's and Johnson's basic points in their series "The Politicians and the People" are the following:

(1) People are less angry, less passionate, less pessimistic about the future than they were a year ago. What was analyzed last year as fear about the future has now turned to apprehension. While two-thirds of the people surveyed still feel the country is no better off than it was in 1968, there is less immediate concern about short-run disintegration and collapse.

(2) The President's strength has increased considerably as a by product of the China trip, the new economic policy, etc. On the other hand, the President's initiatives have also made him seem more unpredictable, more mysterious, more inconsistent than he did before to many Americans. He is the first choice of a minority of the electorate. At a time when people are looking for direction and purpose in their leaders, the President remains a remote and uncertain figure.

(3) There is considerable confusion and indecision about 1972. Never have political loyalties and allegiances been weaker. Party structures are almost meaningless in most areas of the country. People want to vote for the man, not the party. With the possible exception of the economy, no clear-cut issues are likely to stand out this election year.

(4) The real issue is the psychological issue of trust and confidence. People are alienated from their government; they feel powerless; they question whether their leaders can respond to their fundamental concerns. 60 percent do not believe their leaders tell them the truth.

(5) The youth vote is likely to be smaller than the vote of the electorate-at-large and young people are not likely to participate in large numbers in the political process. While young people are hostile to the President, they will not have a significant effect on the election.

(6) Muskie is the only Democratic contender both known to a majority of the electorate and known positively. Kennedy and Humphrey are better known, but less liked. While he has potential, however, Muskie has not yet developed the broad base of support and respect he would need to defeat the President.

(7) Wallace and Agnew are too controversial to be accepted as leaders. While many people agree with their statements, they sense they are not tolerant enough to be President. Wallace and Agnew are too sure of themselves.

It is important to note that Broder's and Johnson's conclusions are based on a distorted sampling of the electorate. They interviewed only 300 people. All pollsters agree that in-depth interviews with only a small sampling permits the interviewers to reinforce their own preconceived notions. Broder's and Johnson's sample does break down parallel to the 1968 election results, but it is far from representative. Only one Southern state was included in the survey. 26 percent of the sample were new voters -- and half of these were college students. These and other distortions have led to conclusions at variance with more scientific polls. Whereas polls indicate that blacks have gained confidence in the system in recent years, for example, Broder and Johnson assert they are more alienated.

On the other hand, I think the basic theme of the articles -- the alienation issue is accurately portrayed. Nothing else could account for the wide variation between popular support for the President's basic stands and support for his leadership. Nothing else could account for the President's dominance of the issues and his relatively weak showing, both in the trial heats and in the confidence polls.

The following is my point-by-point analysis:

(1) People are less pessimistic about the future -- This is true. The campuses have calmed. The doomsday rhetoric has quieted. People are beginning to believe, for the first time, that the war is ending and that the economy will not fall apart. Such events as the Moscow and Peking trips even show promise of leading the way to a better future.

Unfortunately, however, the President's success in the areas listed above is not necessarily translatable into votes at the polls. The President's support is based on professionalism, not on any personal or psychic or intellectual loyalty. People expect the President to be an effective tactician. Inversely, if he is not -- if his professionalism shows any weakness -- his base of support is likely to decline. While it will be hard for the Democrats to

counter if everything is going alright next fall, if one or more of the above issues have gone bad the President may not receive credit for anything he has done. One weakness in the chain will cast into doubt the long-run viability of every link, leading the way to such questions as: "Why couldn't we have gotten out of Vietnam faster? Why didn't the President impose wage-price controls earlier?"

Indeed, the President's successes may even work against him in a curious sense. In 1968, the President was acceptable to many people to whom he would not normally be acceptable. People such as Walter Lippman were for him because they thought we needed a tough, flexible operator to deal with the kind of problems we had then. Now that the immediate technical problems have been solved, now that the wounds have been healed to some degree, we can afford -- we may need -- other kinds of leadership. The same people who wanted an operational President in 1968 may be looking for a philosophical one in 1972: They are no longer scared about the present; they are concerned about the future -- and they want someone who can help define it for them. As it stands, the President does not fill the bill.

(2) The President's strength has increased as a result of dramatic new initiatives, but these same initiatives have made him a more remote figure to many Americans. I don't think there is any question but that the President has gained as a result of his initiatives and is much better positioned for the campaign than he was six months ago. What is remarkable is that he has gained so little, standing now only 2 or 3 points above where he was six months ago.

In my view, this is our fault. Given the President's public personality when he entered office, given the over-inflated rhetoric of the sixties, it is not surprising that people were suspicious of promise and waiting for performance when the President took office. We recognized this in the first six months to a year of the administration. In the last two years, however, we have done virtually everything imaginable to undermine our own credibility and consistency.

In 1969, we were going "forward together." In 1970, we had a "New Federalism." By 1971, we had hyped it up to a "New American Revolution." Who knows what it will be this year? The Second Coming, perhaps?

We show no consistency of effort and commitment. The welfare program is pronounced the greatest domestic program since the New Deal, but we expend far more effort trying to place G. Harrold Carswell on the Supreme Court. We start off with a very exciting and challenging commitment to

the first five years of life, but denounce day-care (no, middle-class day-care) as committing the government to communal living.

Even our major efforts have a tinsely glow to them. The China trip and the economic policy may be admirable in themselves -- they are certainly incredible as they were ballyhooed by us. And all the time we are doing this, we tell the American people it was the previous administration which is responsible for overheated rhetoric and expectations -- and that we are the ones who are calming things down.

In the short run, of course, there have been benefits from our dodges and turns and from our Junior Chamber of Commerce boosterism. Maybe Agnew has even scored once or twice. But in the long run, I think, we have undermined the seriousness of the President and his Presidency. It is no wonder that today we find the public doubting anything we do, seeing in us instability when their greatest want -- greater than any special-interest need -- is for just the opposite.

(3) 1972 is uncertain. With the possible exception of the economy, no issue -- concern, no political allegiance, no party-loyalty seems likely to dominate. There is opportunity in the disintegration of the nation's institutions -- church, family, town, university, union. There is opportunity to reach and win over large numbers of newly-independent voters. It is not opportunity of which we have taken the fullest advantage. We have not allowed ourselves to restructure public dialogue, provide new direction and new loyalties. While we have solved short-term problems and may benefit from having done so, we have not added new certainty or direction to the public mood.

Just the reverse, in fact. We have remained committed to all the folderol of the past -- superficial "Presidentialism," Billy Graham home-town religion, We're no. 1, partisanship excess -- at the same time we do everything possible to undermine the past's core. Substantively, we have been by-and-large on track (although we are not dealing seriously with the economy, a problem which is structural not cosmetic). P. R. -- wise, we have behaved as village burghers, testing the wind, dragged into every reform, declining to identify ourselves with our own concerns, failing to recognize the coherency and broader meaning of our own programs.

Take our non-fiscal justification for vetoing day-care, for instance. In the days of farms and small villages, having mothers bring children up at home made sense. Women were intimately involved in the production process of the farm. Children were able to roam and learn in a broadly educational environment. But now? Homes are isolated from places of work; staying

home means staying uninvolved. As for children, staying home means remaining in a sterile, homogenous suburban neighborhood or an even more confining urban apartment. Of course we need day-care -- massive day-care. Far from committing government to communal living, day-care means, instead, committing government to preserving some semblance of the community bringing-up process which we have enjoyed for most of our national history and giving women the same opportunity to feel productive and useful that their grandmothers had.

On many other issues, we exhibit the same kind of narrow provincialism -- even when we are on the right side of the issue. I don't believe people buy it anymore. Even when it is the best they can articulate, I think they expect more from their leaders. We have failed to give it to them -- and are, I think, paying the price.

(4) The real issue is the psychological issue of trust and confidence. I don't think it is quite as dominant as Broder and Johnson do, but I think it is much more important that we generally acknowledge. People don't "feel" the President's leadership -- except for a few brief moments such as the China announcements. The strongest, most memorable statements the President has made while in office have been statements of anger or know-nothingism or blatant politics; i. e. Carswell defeat, Calley conviction, Cambodia, vetoing day-care, pornography, abortion. They have not been devoted to explaining what the President is and what he is trying to do.

This is more than charisma -- at least charisma in the John Lindsay sense. It involves finding words and mediums which express the core of the President's character. Lyndon Johnson is not a superficially charismatic man, yet in his early years, before the war wore him down, his speech and his actions reflected a personal force that we never get from the President. Eisenhower could garble every other sentence, but, when you watched him on television, you knew he was a leader. Even Truman, haberdasher that he is, was able to express to his constituency a raw cussedness which was central to his leadership.

Richard Nixon? Man on the make; ashamed of and constantly running away from his past; manipulator; unsure of his convictions; tactician instead of strategist; Grand Vizier of all Rotarians, substituting pomposity for eloquence. That is the public impression. And that is why he is weak today. By 50 percent to 40 percent, the American people do not think he has any broad conceptual framework, any sense of direction or purpose.

In a sense, the nature of leadership is not nearly so important as its fact. That has been our mistake. We have adopted a pacification strategy, this

for that group, that for this, with deliberable avoidance of controversial intellectual and social stands, trying to reassure the left, which cares everything about words, with substance, trying to reassure the right, which cares everything about substance, with words. We have ended up alienating everyone -- and we will not be able to correct that until we start realizing that tomorrow's headline is not nearly so important as next fall's "impression"; that next week's tactical advantage may come at the expense of next November's strategic victory.

(5) The youth vote is likely to be relatively unimportant in 1972. Broder and Johnson confirm two of our own opinions: young people are going to vote less frequently than the rest of the population and they are not going to work in significant numbers for political candidates. Broder and Johnson are victims of their own distorted sample on their third point. Their analysis that young people are far more hostile to the President than the population-at-large is not born out by the polls. Kennedy has a substantial lead over the President in the trial heats, but he is the only Democrat who has any lead among the youth vote.

On the other hand, once the Democrats nominate one man and he has achieved a visible, stylish identity, he could take the same kind of lead among youth Kennedy now has. The President's support in this group is thin because of Vietnam, unemployment, etc.

(6) Muskie is the only Democrat both known to a majority of the electorate and known positively to it, but does not yet have the strategic advantage over the President. One of the most disturbing factors in our approach as we enter the campaign year is our gross underestimation of Muskie. He has been brilliant, as good as the President was in 1968, and he shows promise of being far more effective than the President has ever been in the public phase of his campaign. If he has not yet emerged as the President's equal, he also does not yet approximate the President's stature as he will as a nominated candidate for President.

People around here counting on a significant fourth party are, I think, crazy. Muskie is going to do so well in the primaries that no one will join McCarthy even if he does do it. Without irreparably damaging his right flank, Muskie has moved far enough left to have the tacit support of somebody like Al Lowenstein. Establishment reformers like Gilligan are already in his corner publicly. The Democrats want to win this year -- I don't think they're going to allow themselves to destroy their chances with suicidal splintering.

Most important of all, Muskie's public image is everything the President's is not: strong, reflective, prudent, even wise. The President could not maintain early leads against Pat Brown and Hubert Humphrey. How in the hell we think he's going to do better against an Ed Muskie with his usual plastic statesman, say-nothing strategy is beyond me.

(7) Wallace and Agnew are too controversial to be accepted as leaders. More evidence for the alienation theory. It is not just that Wallace and Agnew are too strident -- it is also that they are somehow too facile, too quick, too simplistic. People know that what they have traditionally believed -- and what Agnew and Wallace preach -- is not right anymore; that it needs replacement; that the society has changed and that their public leaders must deal with those changes even if they can't.

The lesson of Wallace and Agnew is that people want to be led -- they don't want to see their leaders mouth the same idiocies they do over a Saturday night beer. Yet that is exactly what we try to do -- elevating the idiocies into wordy, billowy speeches, to be sure -- practically every time the President makes a prepared, public statement.

I would caution, however, that Agnew's unsuitability for the Presidency does not mean he should be replaced as Vice-President. This should be decided on the basis of comprehensive polling this spring. There are too many people who say they would vote for the President, but "not that Agnew." On the other hand, I would regret very much having Governor Connally on the ticket, not just because I would hate to seem him close to the White House, but, more importantly, because he would overshadow -- and thus undermine -- the President. The President was right in his original intent with Agnew -- he runs better with nobody.

Conclusion: The same as usual: Not all the foreign trips to all the foreign capitals in the world are going to help the President unless they are coupled with a far more serious effort to deal with his very weak relationship with the American people.

The following steps should be taken:

(1) Get new speechwriters -- this is the most important. This President has the least experienced, least able group of speechwriters in recent history. We need guys with clout, who are involved and know a lot about substance, and who can put stuff together which is coherent, purposeful, and comprehensive -- which will have the same effect as the President's masterful desegregation statement.

Ideally, we would have guys like Daniel Boorstin, Irving Kristol, Edward Banfield, and Nathan Glazer. We probably can't get them, but the President ought to speak to Moynihan about it. We need and want people from that Public Interest -Commentary School and Moynihan would know where to locate good people whom we could get.

(2) Calm the P. R., stop getting overexcited about each new issue, and instill some consistency and follow-through in our P. R. -- political operation. We should not be aiming at taking advantage of each new issue by itself, but at taking advantage of each new issue as it relates to the President's over-all approach. Above all, avoid the cheap-shot, the head-line hunt, the simple slogan.

(3) Realize that what is important about the President is that he is the first President to realize that the hyper-individualistic -- "We're No. 1" -- frontier American philosophy is bankrupt and outdated. The President is the first President to comprehend that internally and externally this country and its people are part of a community structure -- as such, the President is the first real conservative President the country has ever had. He has readjusted both foreign and domestic policy away from twentieth century liberalism, realizing that an unbridled commitment to individualism in the modern world is enslaving and destructive; that both Vietnam and the war on poverty are symbols of its bankruptcy; that real freedom and real individualism cannot be conferred from above, but must be worked out organically within a community structure by community norms -- hence an incomes-decentralization strategy instead of a services strategy in domestic policy, hence the Nixon Doctrine instead of Wilsonian zealotry in foreign affairs. This should be the basic theme in every utterance made by this Administration.

(4) Stop displaying the President as if he had a stick up his ass. Put him in gutsy, colorful, photographic situations with people. Take him out of airplanes, hotels, and military reservations and put him in hospitals, police cars, outdoors, in urban areas, at local union meetings, on tough university campuses, at Indian reservations, etc. Use the White House more imaginatively.

(5) A more imaginative use of media -- we shouldn't be afraid to put the President in conflict situations -- the Rather thing was good insofar as it went (by far the best of conversations), but we can go farther. Show that the President can handle both his enemies and the people by putting him in situations with them. We should also be hitting much more the prestige mags with prestige pieces. Personally, I thought the President's 1967 Foreign Affairs article was more a travelog than an analysis, but even it has had impact far beyond its immediate readership.