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47	14	9/22/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Letter	To: Charles W. Colson. From: Charles S. Snider. RE: Wallace, MacGovern and Nixon campaign. 4pgs.
47	14	4/17/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	To: H. R. Haldeman. From: W. Richard Howard. RE: Surrogate scheduling program. 10pgs.
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Same

September 25, 1972


MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT: Wallace People

I have been very impressed with Charlie Snyder, Wallace's top man, who sent me the attached letter which I thought you might like to read. While it is rambling, he makes two very interesting points.

The first is the overture now being made to Wallace by McGovern. This is for real. I don't think there is a chance of their succeeding but the McGovern people are presenting some very persuasive arguments.

The second point deals with the campaign theme, and while he hasn't stated it very well, I think the trust issue is a very powerful one. Right now we own it. Snyder suggests that we exploit it, a point with which I concur on the positive side.

THE WALLACE CAMPAIGN



September 22, 1972

N-G WI
NAC 32070 2
9/26/72

The Honorable Charles W. Colson
Special Council to President
White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Chuck:

Paul Johnson, the McGovern coordinator for more than half of Florida, was in my office Thursday.

Here is what he said:

"I have been over North Florida and Central Florida where I am the campaign manager for McGovern and I find that the people are not for McGovern and they are not for Nixon. They are still for George Wallace. They are waiting for George Wallace to drop even a feather of a hint as to where they should go. And that is where they will go."

He came here with a long brief on similarities between McGovern and Wallace. It was a part of the increasing courtship of the campaign by the McGovern forces. They are using "party man" and "Democratic candidate in 1976" and such other hoopla to sell the thought that Wallace must anoint the McGovern-Shriver ticket. There is an "undecided" group among Wallace people, but it is decidedly more anti-McGovern because of his supporters than the man or issues. I keep emphasizing the word "supporters." So, when you say people are against McGovern, they mean to a much greater degree, that they are against welfare cheats, queers, amnesty seekers, militants, hippies, etc. But somehow this supporter image has been pushed aside. Paul Johnson said "We are having our young people cut their hair, shave their mustaches, and clean up to get away from bad supporter image." In line with this,

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the McGovern national organization has attempted to employ as a speechwriter and consultant one of our campaign people who has been responsible for the Governor's statements since 1958. He turned them down because he is loyal to me although the offer was most attractive.

Now cometh Ted Kennedy. And in line with this, Morris Dees has been on the phone almost daily to the man they tried to employ as a speechwriter. He says the turning point of the McGovern campaign would be the Wallace endorsement.

None of which is going to happen. Right now, we have a state that is 99 and 44/100 percent pure Nixon and Alabama straws in the wind will be a key to what Wallace does or does not do. I have been keeping him informed of this feeling and it is cemented at this stage.

Now, I would like to hitchhike mentally with you. In other words, I want to present some viewpoints that in our intellectual redneckism (as opposed to pointy-headed intellectuals) might give you and the Nixon organization an insight that I feel is missing.

We are in touch with all three parties and their supporters. I believe I have found a key to this campaign that is not present anywhere else in your organization.

The key word is trust. President Nixon said in his book "Six Crises" that "in politics, victory is never total."

There is no total victory today. There is too much executives. Too much over-confidence. Too little impact to the average citizen.

If I can drop back and punt for a second, McGovern came out of the Democratic convention scarred to hell and back as a hippie-loving, abortion-pushing, amnesty-favoring, homosexual supported liberal. Then he capped this with the Eagleton disaster. He was down and dirty and untouchable by average citizens.

Now, I want to make this point...there are liberals and left-ists but they are few in number and there are conservatives like the Birchers, etc. but they are few in number. The election is decided by average citizens who are not left, right or middle of the road. They are political wanderers who favor a little of the left, a little of the right, and a little of the middle of the road. Mainly they are concerned about a job, a three-bedroom house, a car, school, church, children, maybe a boat, and retirement. They don't know Bangladesh from an Eskimo, and they have absolutely no concept about what is happening in Vietnam, Korea or Japan and trade deficit is something for the economists.

They are sold politics by the tube. This is a TV political year, pure and simple, and that's it. Right now, they have McGovern, a man they can't stand. But the Democrats are working on this, in reverse. They are trying to destroy Nixon's popularity by convincing the people that McGovern might be a man you can't stand but Nixon is a man you can't trust.

So the word is trust. Trust is the key. So Nixon has to sell trust. Only not trust in Nixon but trust in the people. If you could come up with a theme that Nixon trusts the people. Nixon trusts America. Nixon trusts freedom. Nixon trusts the realness of our times. Then you get away from trust in Nixon and you associate trust with Nixon with trust in America and trust in the people and everytime that McGovern and his crowd try to break this trust image, they create an impression that they don't trust the people, they don't trust America, they don't trust freedom.

I know how I would have our man present this theme. And I know how our staff could take this one line and break it off in the McGovern crowd because they are saying you can't trust America. In effect, they are still trying to sell the old saw that "would you buy a used car from Richard Nixon?"

I see this. Others see this. This is what the next 40 days is all about. The concept must be that trust is the key. The wheat deal, Watergate, Vietnam, all of this is tied in to breaking down trust in Nixon but if the Nixon team can turn this around and make it appear that this radical crowd is trying to destroy trust in America, then you have a victory so fantastic that even the polls you now have would be underestimated.

This "Now, more than ever" line is great and I like it. I know it is good. But where are the lines that go with it that explains why? Why not because Nixon trusts the people and Nixon trusts America--and that is why he is needed now more than ever because our times demand trust.

I see things happening across the country that polls won't reflect. The Democrats are still taking "issue" polls only--not image polls. They are cracking on the anti-issues in an attempt to crack trust.

I know the campaign is geared toward the middle of October but I also know that NOW is the time for action to get the Nixon campaign moving toward the Average citizen.

The average citizen wants to hear trust. He wants to be re-assured. Reassured. Reassured. This what it is all about.

These are thoughts for what they are worth.

With kind personal regards, I am

Sincerely,



Charles S. Snider
Executive Director

CSS/bjc

5th Draft: April ¹⁷~~14~~, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: W. Richard Howard
SUBJECT: Surrogate Scheduling Program

On April 12, Chuck Colson, Dwight Chapin, Jeb Magruder, Larry Higby (part of the meeting) and I met to discuss the surrogate scheduling program. This meeting was held in response to your April 10 memorandum on this subject and an attempt was made to come up with an agreed upon proposal to improve the surrogate scheduling operation.

It was agreed that this operation can be divided into three major functions:

1. Planning and strategy of the surrogate operation;
2. Execution of surrogate events, including maximizing the impact of the event;
3. Distribution of issues and lines for surrogates to use -- that is, effectively using the surrogates to sell points of importance to us.

We also agreed that there are clearly political and non-political events to be scheduled. All events should be looked at from the standpoint of political value, but as to many, it is our interest to have our surrogates (at least those in the Administration)

speaking in their official capacity rather than overtly as a surrogate. Hence, the auspices under which they are scheduled is quite important.

I. Planning and Strategy. This function is defined as including both creative scheduling and the initial first level liaison with the key spokesmen. This means that events and visits are created or located, and specific key spokesmen are locked into the events. At this point, the execution phase begins.

A. Creative Scheduling. It was agreed by all present that creative scheduling for the surrogates would be the responsibility of 1701 and that they would have authority for decisions relating to who goes where, when and why. Magruder indicates that the creative scheduling function is presently being handled by Marik, Teeter and himself. He also indicated that the planning and analysis functions are being directly related to surrogate scheduling thereby providing the necessary guidelines. It is felt that this function could be more productive if a surrogate strategy section were included in each state plan and if 1701 would begin drawing on those with past experience to obtain additional input.

--It is recommended that for each key state, the State Chairman, the 1701 political operative responsible for that

State, and the 1701 scheduling staff, develop a detailed surrogate strategy. This surrogate strategy plan should outline the important issues in each state and determine which surrogates most effectively present these issues. Not only should it be determined who should and shouldn't be used in each state, but the desired number of appearances should be estimated. This would be the substantive section of the overall surrogate strategy plan and the White House should be totally involved in the development of this section. The plan should also contain a political section outlining each state's estimated requirements for key political drawing cards such as the VP, First Family, celebrities, etc. I believe it is important for this type of thinking and planning to be done for each key state and that these plans be periodically revised. Without them, only a Speakers Bureau operation exists. -- It is further recommended that Magruder, Marik, and Teeter set up an informal advisory brain trust consisting of Chapin, Whitaker, Cole and myself who have all been involved in past scheduling operations. This group should periodically meet and review the Key State plans so that their inputs and thinking can be included in the overall surrogate guidelines. It would be useful if the 1701 political operative concerned with each

state attended these meetings during the time their state is under discussion. Obviously O'Donnell and Porter should also attend.

B. Spokesmen Contact. During the discussion of this subject, Magruder proposed that all contact with the surrogates (a list of 30 key spokesmen developed by 1701 which include Cabinet officers, White House Staff, Senators, Representatives and Governors) be made by personnel located at 1701 and that demands on the time of these key spokesmen should be totally controlled by 1701. The thinking behind his proposal is that a key spokesman should be contacted by only one person regarding his surrogate activities, because contact by more than one would be confusing and may even create demands which counter each other. It was further proposed by Magruder that Pat O'Donnell physically move to 1701 in order to better coordinate this effort, and to increase the political emphasis of the scheduling function.

Colson's view is that O'Donnell should remain in the White House working closely with 1701 and functioning as a resource of the surrogate scheduling operation there. The logic behind this position is that there will always be the requirement for a scheduling function within the White House.

This is true because of the many requests for various White

House briefings and special scheduling operations such as; busing road shows, economic road show, Kissinger foreign policy briefings, the special youth speakers operation and, of course, to continue the use O'Donnell makes of the sub-Cabinet group. Also, of course, we do have some success scheduling Laird and Rogers which couldn't ~~readily~~ be done from 1701.

It is also important to take full advantage of the clout of the White House. With most non-political (but obviously politically important) forums, initial contact by the White House, as opposed to 1701, will be necessary to the success of placing our speakers in these forums. This latter point is particularly sensitive especially when programming committees of large national forums which are made up of jealous and protective factions of all political persuasions. Many non-political groups want Administration spokesmen but will shy away from spokesmen scheduled by either political party or political organization like 1701. If contacted by 1701, these organizations might well feel obligated to invite someone from the Democratic side. In addition, if the trip is arranged by the White House, press arrangements can be made directly by Clawson and Snyder or by the agencies under Barker's supervision. TV interview shows in particular, governed as they are by the FCC's expansion of the equal time doctrine

(the Zapple ruling) are reluctant during a political period to take a "political spokesman" whereas they can very easily accept a Cabinet member if he is appearing as an "Administration Spokesman".

I am of the strong opinion that the fastest and most effective ^{way to stifle a surrogate scheduling} program is to over organize it. It would probably be beneficial to have a single contact for each key spokesman who would control all requests for him, but let's not hide from reality. Each Cabinet officers, Senator, etc. has multiple demands on his time from numerous sources, and he always will.; he must continuously determine the priorities of several requests and I believe the President very effectively indicated the importance of the political surrogate program. A periodic reminder of this importance may be necessary.

There was also no agreement on the requirement for the entire scheduling operation to be together physically. I believe it would be ^{folly} (sheer stupidity) to set this up ^{exclusively} at 1701 and fail to take advantage of our incumbency.

It was agreed that at some time in the future the surrogate program would heat up and White House scheduling requirements would decrease in number and importance so that it might be desirable to merge the White House and 1701 scheduling operations in one location. Magruder proposes

this merger take place in July. Colson believes that September and October will be the most important and proposes the change, if desirable, be made in August or September.

Based on the above discussion the following recommendations are made:

--O'Donnell stay in the White House but be used

by 1701 when White House clout is necessary for

specific scheduling events. Hewould continue

to handle White House briefings, road shows,

specialized briefings, key non-political forums,

and, of course, the entire non-surrogate operation,

and, of course, the entire surrogate operation should be developed, tested

--It was further recommended that O'Donnell and the

scheduling personnel at 1701 meet almost daily to

review scheduling opportunities, priorities, and

requirements, and the decisions with respect to the

execution for the particular day. O'Donnell would

act as the agent for 1701 in obtaining Cabinet members

and Administration spokesmen in accordance with these

decisions. As to the former, press and

-- It is further recommended that Colson, Magruder,

and Chapin review the surrogate program again during July

to determine when and if the scheduling operations should

be merged.

II. Execution and Coordination. Discussion of this area was not extensive because there was relative agreement. It is recommended that once the key spokesman is locked into a visit, responsibility for the success of that visit arrangements-wise, is turned over to John Foust. Foust should have overall responsibility for the logistics and the political value of the visit. Foust should coordinate directly with each key spokesman's scheduler and it will

be his duty to ensure that each visit contains those events that will have the best political effect. Foust should also coordinate the advance men, where used.

As the campaign continues, new events and techniques to expand the political effect of a surrogate visit should be developed, tested and expanded. Therefore, the guidelines for both scheduling and execution will constantly change to reflect the political situation.

The responsibility for maximizing the media impact of every appearance will depend upon the nature of the forum, the capacity in which the surrogate is speaking (i.e. surrogate or Administration representative) and of course who the surrogate is. 1701's surrogate list is about $\frac{1}{2}$ political figures (Congressmen, Senators, and Governors) and $\frac{1}{2}$ Administration spokesmen. As to the former, press and TV arrangements of necessity must be made by 1701. The White House couldn't do so without becoming overtly political. The Administration spokesmen's press and TV arrangements should be handled as they are now, ~~under~~

~~Barker's supervision.~~ The Departmental PIO's ⁸ arrange then or when necessary they can be arranged directly by Snyder and Clawson.

III. Lines and Issues. One of the most important aspects of the surrogate operation of course is to ensure that a particular surrogate hits a line which we want hit. The issues to be emphasized at present come from either the President, Haldeman, Mitchell, Colson or a combination. It would be highly desirable in the future if Mitchell, Haldeman, and Colson can coordinate this on a regular basis.

It was agreed that it would be Colson's responsibility to be sure that Noel Koch has the particular line for use by Hill spokesmen including of course surrogates when they are here in Washington, that the RNC have it for use by party workers, to ensure that Des Barker has it for use by Cabinet officers, that Van Shumway have it for use for press purposes and Committee personnel and workers and, of course, that Clawson and Snyder have it in connection with their responsibility in programming Administration and press opportunities. This relates to substantive issues either domestic or foreign policy. As to the political lines to be taken, this, of course, is determined by Mitchell, and Shumway has the responsibility for seeing that all of our people are instructed as to that particular line at that time. Substantive fact sheets will continue to be generated from here in the White House, but also sent to 1701 for their use in speakers kits, political surrogate briefings, etc. Political fact sheet would, of course, be handled by 1701 and passed on to the White House for

information only.

This does not involve a significant change in our present modus operandi. It does require very close coordination, ^{and} ~~which~~ ~~it~~ ^{this will} was agreed ~~to~~ take place on an almost daily basis between Magruder's office and Colson's office.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 17, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON 
SUBJECT: Issue Management

The following is intended as an appendix to Malek's memo to you regarding issue management. I have a number of quarrels with the Malek paper primarily in that the solution to the problem is not setting up new organizational structures; it is in having someone, somewhere, sometime, someplace make the decision as to the issues we need to pursue, how we are going to pursue them and then let the troops execute.

One major caveat in considering the issues: this is that this has to be the most volatile year ever in terms of issues. What looks very dynamic today may fizzle in a week. On the other hand, we have to start somewhere and begin sometime. The worst of all results would be to fight the campaign on whatever issue happens to be hot in October because it may or may not be "ours". I am also excluding from this analysis, obviously, foreign policy issues or questions which go to the P. R. aspects of the President's image. The whole issue of trust, candor and credibility is one that can't be dealt with as a separate issue; in my mind it is the "bottom line" of how well we handle the issues and how well we project the President's personal strengths in handling these issues. It also is a function of the gap between rhetoric and performance and unless we can close the gap we are, in my mind, not going to be able to do very much on the trust and credibility issue. It can't be handled by P. R. in a vacuum; it is really determined by how the public perceives the President in handling the tough issues.

The following is my analysis of the gut issues and some thoughts on the substantive follow-through we need.

A. The New Populism. Without trying to define this, I think it falls right now into three categories; 1) we are for the big guy, the Democrats are for the little man; 2) taxes and 3) disenchantment with government -- i. e., the bureaucracy. As to these three:

1. We are stuck with the big business label and it will be hard to shed. There are a number of blue collar initiatives we can take, however, many of them outlined in my memo to you of May 21, 1971 (ironically, almost a year ago). If we can start coming forward with some of these initiatives and sharpen up our P.R. in this area (for example with our pension program which we have totally neglected) then we might be able to slide away from the big business label somewhat. Obviously, from a P.R. standpoint, no visible association with big business or establishment-type events should be considered for the President.
2. There is no way politically that we can defend the present tax structure, nor should we. Either Humphrey or McGovern will attack it hard, notwithstanding the obvious hypocrisy of their position. The dissatisfaction of millions of people can be exploited very effectively by the "outs"; we are the "ins" and the fact that the Congress has created the present tax structure simply doesn't sell as a defense (see again, my memo of May 21, 1972, page 7). There are 66 million homeowners. Curbing property taxes is a natural issue. It should be ours; but we have skirted all around it. We made an unsuccessful attempt to equate revenue sharing with property tax relief and we hit the issue hard in this year's State of the Union, but there has been almost no substantive follow-up.

Bryce Harlow notwithstanding, (the business community isn't going to go with McGovern or Humphrey), we should quite candidly acknowledge that the present system is deficient, inequitable, overly complex, that the heaviest burdens are on middle-class people, that people shouldn't get away scott-free without paying any taxes and that property taxes are the most regressive and onerous of all.

We can say that we have tried in a number of ways to change the tax structure (citing our position in 1969 versus that of the Congress) and we are going to change it. We should proclaim it the number one priority of the second Nixon term. Ehrlichman got off to a good start with the briefing a week ago, but if it is not followed up by a continuous flow of substantive steps, the briefing will have proved to be counter productive or all John will be interpreted to have said is "let's wait until next year". That is not good enough. We should insist that the ACIR come in with a report in June and meet with the President. The President should adopt the recommendation that property taxes not be used for school financing purposes. He should then, by direction to the appropriate departments, order the preparation of legislative proposals to accomplish specific objectives and there should be subsequent announcements by various Cabinet officials of progress in their assigned areas of responsibility. Shultz can become highly visible as the architect of the next tax plan. By Executive Order, the President can direct a simplification of tax forms and procedures. By July 1, we will be able to announce that one essential underpinning of the new Nixon tax program will be a minimum tax on everyone regardless of tax shelters; in short the rich must pay a fair share of taxes. (We proposed this in 1969 and were defeated -- it will not hurt our "fat cats"; they aren't the ones getting off scott-free.) By September 1 the public should have gotten a very good firm understanding of four or five key elements of the tax package that we will propose to the Congress in January of 1973. By that time, the President should have been seen visibly involved in managing a major Administration effort to come up with a fresh approach. In fact, I would propose this be June's number one issue insofar as the President is concerned -- meetings with tax experts, Treasury officials, etc. etc.

What I am suggesting here is a specific program with a series of substantive actions that result in a rather well defined set of principles that will govern whatever we propose next year (and what we discuss in the campaign). We can cut the ground out from under the demagogic arguments of McGovern and Humphrey if we do this. Otherwise we will be reacting defensively through the months of September and October.

3. Particularly if McGovern is the nominee, he will campaign against the establishment and the unresponsiveness of Government. This is an issue Wallace has used very effectively. Since we run the bureaucracy, we will be tarred with that brush. A major effort should be undertaken to put some day light between the President and the bureaucracy. We have opportunity for this at least once a week if we will use it. The housing scandals in FHA give us a perfect platform to call people in, raise hell, let a few heads roll and issue strong vigorous Presidential directives. We have done this a few times, I think very effectively in the drug area but need to do it more. Within 24 hours of the next mine disaster, the President should turn on the Bureau of Mines, perhaps fire someone and once again, issue a whole set of new, tough orders. Moreover Shultz and Weinberger can be very effective for us during the campaign and in the months leading up to it in talking about reducing the federal bureaucracy. Nobody understands reorganization; they do understand cutting back on bureaucrats. Substantively we have done all the right things management-wise; now it is time to do a few demagogic things which will have high visibility and show a tough, forceful President cracking down on the bureaucracy. This goes to the heart of the issue of Government being responsive to the people.

- B. Busing. The fundamental problem with our position on busing is that it is not clearly perceived. People know the President is against busing but in the South they know they have already instituted busing plans, which the moratorium won't help, and in the North they see the courts rushing forward with new busing orders. Nowhere is the gap between rhetoric and performance any clearer than in this area and I would submit this one really fuels the credibility issue.

In part our program is not understood because the moratorium is in fact offensive in the South (they believe it will stop busing in the North, but do nothing about busing that has already begun in the South) and it is not clear in the North that it will do anything. If Congress acts on the moratorium and the courts respect the statute, then we will have something to run on in those areas affected but we still have a problem in the South. If Congress does not act, we

have got to run against the Congress, once again, with a major effort in key areas. If Congress rejects the proposal, the President should consider calling for a constitutional amendment making it very clear, especially in the South, that existing busing plans can be undone.

Our whole objective here is to simply get our position clearly understood nationally. Once it is understood, then we need not campaign on it as a national issue, but rather exploit hell out of it in key areas. I would argue that busing, unlike a lot of other issues, is clearly voter motivational. It is one of those issues in particular areas that is absolutely decisive in a voter's mind. He will put up with anything else if he feels that we not only are against busing, but can and will do something about it (witness Michigan yesterday, which I hope will lay to rest the last vestiges of doubt around here as to whether or not busing is a cutting issue).

- C. Inflation/Food Prices. Inflation as an issue probably is worthless. People do not really know what the CPI means, nor is it terribly important to them that Rumsfeld succeeded in rolling back the price of Ford Pintos by \$30 a car. What counts is the one basic commodity that people buy every day -- food. Food prices have been rising so long that people think they are rising even when they are not. They are relatively stable right now and perhaps the best that we can hope for is to simply neutralize the food price issue. On the other hand, if they begin to go up again, we know the political impact this can have. We should be prepared to take very dramatic, bold action, perhaps another freeze, before the issue gets away from us. I happen to believe the Sindlinger polls in March which showed a significant political upheaval building in the country over this one issue. I would urge that we not only be prepared for very dramatic action if food prices begin to rise again, but that we also consider possible ways to insure now that prices do not rise so that we can crow about having stabilized food prices (for example meat import quotas).

All of the other components of the economic issue are in my opinion either cosmetic or regional. Obviously we should talk about doing things to create more jobs, but at this point in time, they are either

going to be there or they are not. The President should obviously be postured against unemployment but there isn't a hell of a lot substantively that we can do. Regionally we can exploit the defense spending issue very effectively particularly if McGovern is the opponent.

In short, except for the food price issue I think that there is not much that we are substantively lacking in this area (at least that we can do anything about).

- D. Welfare. I assume that our game plan is clear -- get no bill from the Congress and then blast Congress for having failed to act. If we can pull this off, it will give us the best of both worlds. I would urge, however, that we be prepared once we are out of danger insofar as Congress acting, that we take executive action (even if it is later upset in the courts) to do something about the welfare problem. The President might consider an Executive Order cutting off funds to welfare recipients who fail to meet certain work standards, (a rigid enforcement of the Talmadge Bill with a strongly worded Presidential statement will do it). The HEW bureaucracy will revolt and everyone in this building will argue the legality of it and its ineffectiveness. The impact could be absolutely electric if it were done under the proper circumstances in September. The President could say he has waited 4 years for the Congress to do something, the Congress hasn't acted and that he is therefore taking firm and decisive executive action to eliminate abuses in the welfare system. We can play around all we want with pilot programs in New York and California as we have done to curb excesses in the welfare program. What we need to get through to the folks, however, is a very bold action by the President which would highlight his commitment to end welfare abuses and at the same time the Congress' inability to deal with the problem. (I watched something very similar to this on the state level turn a gubernatorial election 180° around in 1970.) There will be 50 reasons why we shouldn't do this, but someone should figure out exactly how we can if we want to.
- E. Drugs and Crime. I don't know whether there are additional substantive steps that can be taken, but I would assign two or three of the very best minds we have to develop additional substantive initiatives in this area.

P. R. wise we can be helped enormously on the crime issue by building Pat Gray. He is a great subject to work with and in the final analysis this may be the best weapon we have. There is much more we can do as far as Presidential visibility is concerned -- a helicopter trip over the Rio Grande, building up Ambrose, visits to treatment centers and meetings in key cities with strike forces.

- F. Environment. If the Harris theory is correct that the election will be decided by the over \$15,000 a year, upper middle-class, white suburbanites, we should start planning carefully ways in which to promote our record in the environmental area. I have no illusions that this is a cutting issue; it is not. It is, however, a good, rather appealing little package that could be used especially with certain constituencies and we should not neglect it simply because none of us feel it will be decisive in the election. Substantively, we need do nothing but there should be a complete strategy for exploitation of the good record we have made.
- G. No Fault Automobile Insurance. I believe this is a real sleeper issue and that we should poll on it as quickly as possible, particularly in those states where it has either come into effect or has been debated in the legislature. Auto insurance is a little like property taxes, everybody feels they are being cheated. The Democrats really have not gotten out front on this one. There is still time for aggressive Presidential leadership and we can take over the issue right now. It's an excellent antidote to the big business versus little guy syndrome. At the moment, we really have no position.

Key Voter Blocs

In the last two meetings with Ehrlichman, Mitchell, you, MacGregor and Harlow, I have been emphasizing the need for analytically determining what will be the decisive voting blocs in the '72 election. I suspect we will never refine this to a scientific analysis and so perhaps we should come to some subjective consensus.

I can never get out of my mind the '48 election (see again my memo of May 21, 1972). Truman won it, among other reasons, by cultivating the

self interest of a few key voting blocs. We have precisely the same opportunity with the white ethnic, blue collar, new middle class, Catholics. In this area we are blowing it. In my opinion, we have a wider gap between promise and performance here than in any other area and with just a little substantive effort, we can do a great deal. For example:

1. We can support the Mills bill (which has strong bipartisan cosponsorship) providing tax credits for parents who have children in non-public schools. This issue can be exploited to a fare-thee-well and even if we are only talking about 7 or 8 million Catholics (which is Morey's argument) that is one hell of a powerful bloc. With the support of the Catholic hierarchy, we can undertake a very effective organizational effort in November. Humphrey is all for aid to parochial schools so at the very least we would neutralize him on this issue. McGovern is against it and here the opportunities are immense in the key states. This is like busing; if properly exploited in key areas, it is a cutting issue.
2. We can also support a form of guaranteed annual income for the building trades. All of the staff work has been done on this within the Federal Government. Almost everyone recognizes the need for something substantive in this area. It will happen in the next 2 to 3 years. All we need to do is seize the issue now, endorse it and then campaign selectively within the areas where it too can be a cutting issue.
3. Finally, we have the whole open-housing issue. Freezing Romney in place or even selectively rolling him back could pay enormous political dividends.

The second voter bloc of major concern is the aging. It can be statistically established that no Republican has been elected (or perhaps can be) without a solid majority of the over-60 voters. Our program is right now so much mush; we embraced the Kennedy nutrition program which is of concern to poverty level elderly only. This is sheer nonsense because that is not the aging group that will ever vote Republican. Our highest priority in this area should be to get an agreed upon Social Security increase so that the Democrats will not base their campaign on higher Social Security

benefits or force us to veto the increase presently contemplated in the Congress which in turn will become a highly symbolic campaign issue. Also, with some clever legislative maneuvering, we could lift the earning ceiling limitation on Social Security recipients out of H. R. 1 and attach it to another bill so that perhaps we would have this one good one to talk about with our elderly constituency. The property tax issue is also big with the old folks. We are badly treading water in this area; especially if Humphrey should be our opponent, we will be in deep trouble. His image is good with the elderly and he can really hurt us in key areas. We are not well positioned.

In my view, if we can solidify the traditional Republican vote with the over-60's and make the inroads I think possible with the Catholics (including marginal gains with the Spanish-speaking -- we are doing well in this area) these two blocs could be decisive.

As a final item, I have recommended to you before that we compile a list of goody type announcements that can be issued virtually every day in September and October -- things like maritime contracts, parks being returned to the states, special manpower grants in key states, etc. Some of these will provide excellent forums for Presidential participation, and will in any event have strong political appeal at the time of maximum impact. As best I can tell, these are being let out now as they become ready. I suggest that as many as we think judicious be held back to be used during the key months and to give us at least the option of involving the President in them. We may be overly sensitive to what appears blatantly political but I would have no hesitation in recommending that the President go to an event like the San Diego Shipyard event in September to do another major maritime award. Whether the press calls it political or not, it will get through to the people, at the very time we want to remind them very visibly of what the President is doing for them. I believe that we should brazenly exploit the advantages of incumbency while all the other side can do is promise.