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<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
46	41	5/21/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Colson to Haldeman RE: a response to RN's request that his staff make the 1972 presidential campaign more meaningful to people. Seventh page missing. 16 pgs.
46	41		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Newspaper	Copy of Henry Owen's "1948 Revisited: A Political Lesson," an article published in the "Washington Post" in May of 1971. 2 pgs.
46	41		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Chapin to Haldeman RE: general campaign strategies for RN in 1972. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 10 pgs.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 21, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT: Political Strategy

This is in response to the President's request for "some free thinking" on how to make our programs more meaningful to the people. This can only be done effectively in the context of the overall campaign strategy; hence this analysis attempts to broaden the question somewhat -- and to examine several ways in which the President's base of political support can be strengthened for 1972.

The primary emphasis here is on domestic issues; we obviously have the greatest control in this area and there is more certainty in the political effect of what we do. This by no means suggests that international issues may not be decisive -- they very well could be -- but with international conditions as volatile as they are it would be foolhardy to predicate a total strategy on them.

The following is an effort to identify some of the major factors that have proven decisive in prior elections, assess where we stand today in relation to those factors and suggest certain strategic considerations for 1972.

A. RECENT PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS

At the risk of oversimplifying history, successful Presidential politics in modern times have been generally built on one (or a combination) of four dominant factors.

1. Personal Image - Charisma: Kennedy is the classic example. Despite a mediocre Administration, an undistinguished record in foreign affairs and a poor legislative tally, he might well have been re-elected

in 1964; if so it would probably have been largely due to the successful mystique he created (with the help of a friendly press). The fact that he was able to maintain a substantial base of political support a year before the election would suggest that even a relatively ineffectual President can support himself on personality alone.

2. Respect for Leadership: Clearly FDR was the master in this category. A large majority of the people were convinced that FDR was the Nation's only salvation; it was irrelevant that most New Deal programs didn't work and that we were so preoccupied at home that we watched the world drift into the most dangerous war in history. Roosevelt's gift was the believable promise -- setting the great goals which he would inspire the Nation (a very important point which you made in our meeting). The 1941 "Four Freedoms" speech, for example, became the national credo; young and old alike knew what the four freedoms were. (Even though it was 30 years ago I can still remember the Four Freedoms Saturday Evening Post cover.) With a few well chosen phrases he was able to rally enduring support through difficult times.¹
3. Success on the Big Issues: There were at least two elections in modern times decided principally on the grounds that times were good, the President had done a satisfactory job of running the country and there was no great public demand for a change; the big issues of the day were well in hand. The first was Coolidge's election in 1924; the second, Ike's in 1956. The Peace, Progress and Prosperity slogan clearly reflected the public mood in 1956. Ike had the big issues well under control; he had restored the country to a period of normalcy. He was obviously also greatly helped by his powerful "Father image". Ike fit the times and the times fit Ike.

¹It was all the more remarkable in that the "Four Freedoms" were enunciated by Roosevelt, after he had been in office for eight years, at the tag end of a speech in which he outlined the dismal state that the world was then in, that we were at war or would be soon, that great sacrifices were necessary, that our defense production program was a disaster, that we weren't equipped to fight the war and that all hell was breaking loose.

3.

4. The Voters' Self Interest: On certain occasions in modern times the people have been moved to vote primarily according to their own economic self-interest. 1948 is the classic example. Certainly President Truman had little charisma (at least at the time); the times were not that good and there was a strong sentiment for change in the country. Although Truman was a strong, tough individual, it can hardly be said that in 1948 there was widespread public respect for his leadership as there had been for Roosevelt's. Yet he won -- largely because he made his own re-election important to the economic interest of large segments of the voting population. In 1964 Lyndon Johnson succeeded in appealing to the economic interests of key groups and in frightening the electorate as to the economic (and international) consequences of electing his opponent.

B. WHERE WE STAND

These four categories give us some yardstick -- albeit arbitrary -- to examine where we stand and our opportunities.

1. Image-Charisma: We cannot and should not try to make the President something he isn't. (I gather this is the point of Buchanan's memo, as it was the point made in the Pierson column.) It would be foolish and counter productive to try to build a Kennedy-type mystique -- there isn't time, the press would never let us get away with it nor is it necessarily a very reliable source of political strength. A President doesn't have to be likeable, have a sense of humor or even love children. It is important only that his personal qualities engender confidence.
2. Respect for Leadership: There is an important distinction between this and the image point above (a distinction we haven't clearly made). We can and we should make people better understand the President -- why he is the strong, determined, disciplined and self-confident leader that he is.

The Connally thesis in this respect is absolutely valid. Those who know the President and work with him as we do, recognize his brilliant, extraordinarily retentive and perceptive mind, his long-range strategic view of problems, his high purpose and we, in turn, come to have enormous confidence in him. We must try to get this across; the electorate can develop some of the same confidence if the story is told correctly. The obvious handicap in developing the Connally thesis is that it will almost invariably be filtered out, discounted and at times ridiculed by a very hostile press. The press have painted so many negative images over the years that even if we do the most superb job in the world, I doubt that we can shift enough opinion in the next 18 months to make this the decisive factor in the election. Whatever we can do, however, will help and is important.

The great goals approach is perhaps the toughest. Roosevelt's speech caught the public imagination at a time when the country was uniting in the face of a common danger. The President has used some truly great phrases -- a "Generation of Peace" etc. Maybe because of the press or because the country has become excessively blasé, these haven't become national rallying themes. Between now and next year's State of the Union, we should study in depth those things the people of the Nation most desire and the way in which we can state the goals for the country that will, in fact, inspire and gain confidence. None of us should shoot from the hip in this area. We must know the public mood, not just what the polls report, but by examining it in depth. If there is any one thing peculiar to our times it is the extreme volatility of public attitudes, caused more than anything else by the constant impact of the electronic media which can cause very dramatic almost overnight shifts in attitudes.

5.

What people may want more than anything else is to have their confidence in the future re-established and our constituency at least wants to believe in America and in what they regard as fundamental values. They are tired of constantly being told what is wrong with society and of having their consciences wracked with continuous recrimination. We are on the right side of this issue but the real question is how to lift 200 million people out of their seats.

In short, I believe that this is a terribly important area for us. We must work to develop public confidence in the President personally, to gain respect for him as a leader and to give the nation an uplift; the obstacles are, however, very great and this, therefore, should be but one of several strategies.

3. The Big Issues: Obviously the war (foreign policy generally) and the economy are the two big ones; our domestic program next.

a. The War. Even if we are virtually out of Vietnam the Democrats will cynically argue that we could have ended it much sooner, that we dragged it out to no avail and that we got out only because the Doves in the Congress forced us out. A war weary people are likely to want to turn their attention to other things and forget Southeast Asia. What they will be more concerned with is who can best keep the peace. It is obvious to us that by remaining strong, by getting out of Vietnam on a responsible basis, by preserving the credibility of the United States we are doing a better job of building a lasting peace. On the other hand in an era of growing isolationism, people might well feel that our firmness and our resolve to do those things necessary (Laos and Cambodia) run a greater risk of getting us into another war than the head-in-the-sand Dove line. We can be vulnerable to demagoguery on this issue.

6.

Moreover the war is, in a sense, a negative issue. We are badly hurt if we don't end it but we may not gain a great deal of credit if we do.²

Obviously if major events -- SALT, Disarmament, a summit, Vietnam, China -- go our way there could be such an overwhelming positive reaction in the foreign policy area that the President would be unbeatable regardless of anything else. While we are hoping this happens, we should not rely on it since so much of this is beyond our control.

b. The Economy. Even if the economy is back in full swing by next year, as I personally expect it will be, the Democrats will argue that we still have inflation and we had more unemployment through the Nixon years than under the Democrats. The Democrats will traffic heavily on the public's traditional suspicions about economics. In almost every issue poll the Democrats outscore us in public confidence with respect to handling of the economy and thus this is at best always an uphill issue. Whether we win on this will depend on whether we are able to allay fears about the future, convince people that unemployment will not again rise and that prices can remain relatively stable.

c. The Domestic Program. This may well be our biggest problem at the moment but, at the same time, our biggest opportunity. Our domestic programs are "managerial oriented" not "people oriented". In my view this is both a PR and a substantive problem with a much heavier emphasis on the latter. As you pointed out, there is very little "what's in it for me" in our domestic program.

²It is very much like the recent demonstrations. Had there been a disaster, we would have been hurt; we handled it beautifully and gained little -- not because the people don't associate the President with the handling of the demonstrations (because they did) -- but rather because it is a negative issue and there is little profit in what the public regards as something basically unpleasant. Two pollsters have told me that even though the public overwhelmingly agreed with our stand on the demonstrations entirely and even though people associated the President with the demonstrations, that this does not translate into a positive response with respect to the President.

work hard in the hopes that they will be able to educate their children. The desire for education is strongest among those adults who did not obtain a higher education themselves; and they represent perhaps our most significant political potential. Most Americans who work resent those who do not and especially resent paying higher taxes for loafers who abuse the welfare system. Finally most middle class Americans fear a catastrophic illness which can wipe out their savings and security. Middle-aged people worry about their retirement; older people worry about their ability to live on their retirement and rising prices. The farmers have a set of economic problems all their own.³ There are things we can do at this point to position ourselves and our programs on the right side of many of the pocketbook issues that such a profile suggests. For example:

- a. Revenue Sharing. Most people today look at general revenue sharing as simply another "hand out" from the Federal Treasury to local politicians. If the public has a poor attitude toward Federal bureaucrats, it has a worse perception of local politicians.

Unfortunately our revenue sharing does not have any tangible, economic meaning to the individual. We haven't made the case that it could mean a reduced property tax burden.

We had the choice originally of proposing what would have been the purest form of revenue sharing, i.e. individual tax credits by individual taxpayers for a portion of local income, sales or real property taxes. After a very extensive study, the Domestic Council and the Treasury concluded that general revenue sharing involving grants from the Federal government to states and local communities was more equitable, more efficient and would

³The social issues are perhaps equally important -- race, crime in the streets and narcotics -- but these aren't economic and are essentially negative. We are also postured correctly on these.

provide the financial assistance needed more quickly. It was clearly a better solution on the merits, but it ran headlong into the opposition of Byrnes and Mills who over the years had favored the credit approach; it also ran counter to the traditional Republican philosophy of revenue sharing, first advanced by Mel Laird in the Fifties and subsequently endorsed by various Republican Policy papers through the Sixties. Most importantly it missed the political mark (a point Clark MacGregor and I vainly tried to make before the final decision was made).

A credit arrangement would give the opportunity (also the burden) to state and local communities to increase their levels of taxation. (The majority of which are now controlled by the Democrats)

It is not too late to do this, although we would need an excuse to shift our position -- perhaps if Mills scuttles our bill or perhaps whenever we propose a value added tax. With a new source of Federal revenue we could couple with it a tax credit revenue sharing arrangement arguing that the value added tax permits a much larger (and different form of) revenue sharing.

It would be ideal if we could find a way to do this in the present Congress --(it could pass since Byrnes and Mills are committed to this approach) -- so that next April 15 every taxpayer would be able to check a new box on his Form 1040 and receive a federal credit refund -- a direct abatement for local taxes. We could argue that we -- the Nixon Administration -- had brought tax relief to homeowners and taxpayers all across the country.

b. Tax Credits for Education. Perhaps coupled with revenue sharing tax credits we could include some tax credit or deduction for educational expenses. Costs of higher education are becoming nearly prohibitive for middle income families, the group which offers us the greatest opportunity

for political gain. For years there have been proposals in the Congress to provide some tax credit or deduction arrangement. The issue is there for the taking. Indeed it is expensive, but once again, if it were coupled with a substitute tax arrangement we could do it and still be fiscally responsible. This is clearly a prime "what's in it for me" issue.

c. Lifting the Ceiling of Earnings of Social Security Recipients. What is better Republican philosophy than to encourage Social Security recipients to earn more than the current \$1800 ceiling? We worry about all the little things we can do to improve upon HEW's programs to benefit the aging. These get us absolutely nothing politically and really appeal only to the professional senior citizens' lobby. The vast majority of retired citizens couldn't care less about pilot programs for feeding the elderly in Chicago. What they really care about is making ends meet when they retire. Lifting the ceiling, for example to \$3000 would be expensive and would probably also have to be tied to something like the value added tax to give us the fiscal rationale. The fact is, however, that it is a very powerful "what's in it for me" economic issue and particularly potent with a constituency whose support is vital to us (remember too that the retired vote can be decisive in California and probably is decisive in Florida).

d. Medical Program. Our present medical program is so complicated that as you point out few of us ever know what is in it, let alone the vast majority of the American people. We should seize upon one or two salient points like catastrophic health insurance, more doctors, and initiatives like the cancer cure and then demagogue these points to death.

We mainly want to neutralize this issue because we can't win on it; the Democrats can always offer more in the way of national health insurance than we can responsibly accept. The fact remains however that we can talk about it -- and continually should -- the need for curing dread diseases, better medical services and our health insurance program. The key to this one is to keep it simple and understandable and relate it always to the individual's economic (and health) interest.

5. Welfare Reform. We own this issue presently; we must keep on hitting it, constantly. People simply don't like to pay taxes to support loafers. The tougher we are in tightening the work requirements, the more the political gain. It is indirectly, therefore, a "what's in it for me" economic issue.
6. Special Interest Cultivation -- 1948 Example. In developing those issues which appeal to the voters' economic self-interest it is particularly instructive to examine the Truman election of 1948. There are some interesting political similarities with our own situation. Truman was derided and scoffed at by the sophisticated opinion makers, as we often are. He faced a hostile Congress, as we do. Based on results of the 1946 election, he could not count on his party being in the majority. He was faced with a third party threat. He had been forced to do unpopular things in the international field and he had inherited the difficult economic problems of converting from war to peace.

While Dewey went into the 1948 campaign talking about national unity, peace and the need to make government more effective, Truman devoted all of his resources to the bread and butter gut issues.⁴

A recent column by Henry Owen (attached as Tab A) makes the very perceptive point that Truman won the election because people thought he would better protect their bread and butter interests -- "pocketbook politics had carried the day, dignity and efficiency came in a poor second." The Owen column interestingly enough makes the point that the same issues that elected Truman are perhaps even more important today.

If, indeed, there is a valid lesson from the 1948 election, it is that we can build the same kind of a political base to make the President's re-election important to the economic self-interests of large segments of the voting population -- and we

⁴ According to Truman's biographer, Cabell Phillips, "Dewey and his men believed that the concepts of the managerial revolution, which had so captivated the eastern electorate in the post war years, would captivate the rest of the country as well."

must escape the Republican managerial syndrome. For example -- (these are only examples, a very comprehensive analysis should be prepared to pick our best targets and best issues):

a. Labor and Building Trades: We are on the verge of being irreparably damaged with the "hard hats" even though 6 months ago this represented one of our most fertile fields for political gain. We had to crack them hard on the wage issue and we did. We are not, however, intensifying the minority hiring campaign in the building trades. While most people view this as a racial question it is, plain and simple, a pocketbook issue with the "hard hats"; they interpret our efforts as an attempt to break down the existing union structure, to destroy the apprenticeship program and to eliminate their job security.

There are approximately 3.8 million building tradesmen in the United States; at the moment they feel that we are threatening not only wages but, more important, job security.

As with so many issues, this requires a tough political choice. Do we play to the blacks, which in my opinion will get us nothing, or do we play to the "hard hats", a large percentage of whom we got in 1968 and as to whom we had been making enormous political progress. This is a natural "new" constituency, newly emerging middle-class Americans, most of them homeowners living in the suburbs, becoming increasingly conservative on social, international and racial issues. The combination of wage stabilization, Davis-Bacon and minority hiring will make it impossible for any of their leaders to support us or to make gains with the rank and file.

We have another opportunity with the building trades. Most building tradesmen have discovered that their hourly wage increases have been largely offset by the fact that they are working less and less throughout the course of a year; the

higher their hourly wages, the greater the incentive for labor saving devices and hence the less labor hours available. Many of them are beginning to seek annual contracts, rather than hourly wage increases. It is argued that hourly wages could be significantly reduced by annual contract negotiations, thereby benefiting both the worker and the cost of construction. We don't have to endorse this; we merely have to recognize the problem which we have not done. If we were merely to announce a study of the feasibility of annual contracts in the building trades, asking the Construction Industry Collective Bargaining Council to come up with recommendations, the political impact could be huge.⁵

This is the kind of issue that we need with labor generally. One of the recommendations that the Rosow Report made was that we provide for vesting of pension plans after perhaps 10 or 15 years. Every blue collar employee has a direct economic stake in this. While it is a tough issue with business it is one that could help us make real inroads with the rank and file of labor. All we need are a couple of major items like this, which represent very direct pocketbook benefit to the individual worker and regardless of what Al Barken and Cope do next year we will make important gains with the rank and file.

b. Business Community. While the business community's political clout is minimal it is a source of support we cannot overlook; the attitude of business leaders has an impact on the white collar, professional category as to which Muskie has shown surprising strength in the polls.

This has been the most activist Administration in history in the field of anti-trust, the environment and consumer issues. We can argue that had the Democrats been in power

⁵ Such studies have been conducted over the years in the Department of Labor; merely recognizing them and grabbing the issue is all that is required.

they would have been worse, but that is a tough case to make with politically naive businessmen. All we have to do to help business in the pocketbook is to begin to slow down dramatically in the anti-trust field, gradually in the other two.

c. The Farm Vote. In 1968 we kicked hell out of the Democrats on the issue of parity. It was 74; today it is slightly below 70. Hardin tells us that there is no way between now and next November to get back up to the 1968 level. (This is in the nature of the parity formula). This one fact alone tells us with certainty that this will be a 1972 issue.

We can, however, get farm prices up; farmers have been in a very severe price/cost squeeze. Farm prices have to improve by the Fall of 1972 (regardless of the impact on the wholesale price index) if we are to regain our traditional support in the farm belt. It can be done on a commodity by commodity basis as we know from our experience with milk. We can further aid the farmer by programs such as REA, home ownership loans, etc. As to these, we have been acting as good Republican managers, consistently cutting back on the farm budget; the time is now at hand to begin increasing it.

d. The Retired Vote. In addition to the obvious -- an increase in the earnings' ceiling of social security recipients and cost of living social security increases -- there are special retired groups we can appeal to: for example the 850,000 retired military personnel, a large number of whom live in Florida (62,000) and California (145,000). In 1968 we promised to support recomputation of military pay; we have not. Finally we have underway a study which will lead to some recomputation recommendations; it will be very modest but a step forward, correcting some of the gross inequities in the present military retirement

system. This is a real pocketbook issue. When the recommendations come from the study committee in July (approximate cost \$150 million a year) there will be strong opposition from OMB. If we want to practice pocketbook politics, this is a very good place to start.

e. Veterans Groups. I have had a running battle for months over cuts made by OMB in the VA hospital care budget. The amount cut was slightly in excess of \$100 million. Two months ago a head count of the Veterans Affairs Committees in the House and the Senate revealed that we would be rolled in both committees; it was clear that not only would these funds be restored but the Congress would probably add substantially to our budget requests and would, moreover, attach a mandatory spending clause. Had we been willing to restore the \$100 million cut, we could have gotten the agreement of the veterans organizations to stick with our budget figures; we would have avoided a confrontation with the Congress and we then simply could have withheld funds during FY 1972. As it is now, we will probably be forced to spend the money and will have lost on a gut economic issue with the veterans organization whose membership totals over 6 million. Their recent publications point up the ludicrous situation we find ourselves in: on one page they strongly support us for our foreign policy and on the next tear us apart for cutting health care for the veterans. What's more, we gave Teague, Hartke and Albert a marvelous issue -- you may recall two weeks ago they were all on national TV networks blasting the Administration for being "anti-veteran."

My sole point is that we can do a much better job in appealing to the economic self-interest of large groups of citizens than we have done. We have to be just a little less concerned about managerial efficiency and a little more concerned about "people politics".

In this area we cannot ascribe fault to our public relations effort; nor really can public relations help us. In some cases it is downright dangerous to make a major PR effort when substantively we have serious problems. Salute to

Agriculture is a very good case in point. The public believes that most politicians are phoney and we only give our critics an opportunity to exploit this when we launch major PR efforts in an attempt to cover up a basic economic or political problem.

The other side of this coin is equally valid. If we have made the right political decisions, the public relations effort is relatively painless. For example, if we were to do something in the building trades area, we would have no difficulty in getting our story told and getting the credit. Through mailings, trade journals and speeches every building tradesman would very soon know what we had done.

C. CONCLUSION

After two and a half years the die is fairly well cast on the big issues. Either we have or we have not done the things necessary for those issues to be working for us next year.

We do have, however, two areas which we can most effectively exploit -- and there is time to do it. Revamping our domestic program to make it more people oriented and making a major effort to cultivate the economic interest of those voting blocs that either have represented our traditional constituency or should be part of our emerging new constituency. These are identifiable. The ways to reach them politically are no mystery and we have all the equipment -- the advantage of incumbency -- with which to exploit them.

I am especially impressed, as you may have gathered, by some of the fascinating parallels with the Truman re-election in 1948. Truman rejected the advice that he try to reform his image or that he mount a major sales effort. What he did instead, based on the Clark Clifford memo of November 1947, was to analyze cynically, coldly and shrewdly the rag-tag assortment of special interest groups and minorities that FDR had welded together into a majority coalition; he determined what political and economic favors were necessary to retain or regain their loyalties and then met them head on. As a result Truman devoted all of his resources to the subject which most Americans cared most about then (and perhaps still do): How to make a living.

17.

While I have emphasized the similarities with 1948, I, of course, recognize that the circumstances then were quite different than they are now. In April of 1948 Truman had a 36% approval rating in the Gallup Poll and for him, therefore, this was a last ditch desperate effort. We are certainly not in that condition.

Nonetheless in formulating our strategy for 1972, there is the political gain of exploiting to the fullest the advantages of incumbency -- which on the issues we have not done as well as we could.

**C
A**



I. 48 Revisited: A Political Lesson

By Henry Owen

GOVERNOR DEWEY'S death brought back memories of the 1948 election. The conventional wisdom is that he lost because of his personality. Maybe so; but a hard look at the voting results suggests an alternative explanation, which brings to mind Philip Guedalla's remark that historians spent so much time wondering how Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo that they forgot to ask how Wellington won it: that the 1948 election wasn't so much lost by Governor Dewey as it was won by President Truman. And that the way in which it was won may have important lessons for the future.

Shortly before the 1948 Democratic convention, Arthur Krock summed up the prevailing view: "A President whose defeat at the next poll is generally prophesied faces difficulties in performing his office that could conceivably bring disaster . . . At this writing, the President's influence is weaker than any President's has been in modern history." Although the country was fairly prosperous, the conversion from war to peace had been a rough one, and Mr. Truman's style in coping with these problems seemed to a good many opinion-shapers—in his own party, in the Congress, and among the press—to be crude, erratic, and bumbling.

A natural pre-election remedy would have been for the President to concentrate on improving the areas where he was criticized most—his style and image: trying to seem more business-like, dignified, and efficient. But shrewdly, he judged that this was not the heart of the matter. Late in November 1947, he had received from Clark Clifford a lengthy and perceptive memorandum outlining a proposed strategy for the coming campaign. It ticked off the major voting blocs—farmers, labor, and Negroes—and the specific issues which concerned them. From then on—in his 1948 State of the Union message, in his proposals to a special post-convention session of the Congress, and in his election campaign—the President zeroed in on these issues. He warned farmers about falling agricultural prices; he spoke to workingmen about the need for housing, Social Security, and minimum wage legislation. His oratory and style were crude, but he addressed the subject which most Americans cared most about: how to feed, house, and clothe

GOVERNOR Dewey did not. He talked in a dignified way about peace, and national unity, and the need to make government more effective. His advisers were not passionately concerned about bread and butter issues; he mistook their highminded interests for the voice of the country. To quote Truman's biographer, Cabell Phillips, "Dewey and his men believed that the concepts of the managerial revolution, so captivating to the Eastern elite in the postwar years, had captivated the rest of the country as well." As Phillips points out, "intellectually, his campaign was on a higher level than Truman's, just as it was in the matter of taste and decorum."

Soon after the election, the Saturday Evening Post sent Samuel Lubell out to interview voters and find out what had happened. His answer was simple: "People had voted for Truman because they thought he would protect their bread and butter interests. Labor rolled up the traditional Democratic majorities; farmers worried by the 80th Congress' refusal to extend grain storage, were seeking down to earth promises which they didn't find in Dewey speeches." Pocketbook politics had carried the day; dignity and efficiency came in a poor second.

Since 1948, large changes have taken place in the country. Affluence and education have increased; memories of the Great Depression have receded. And so it seems plausible to believe those who now tell us, as they did in 1948, that bread and butter issues no longer dominate American political life. The trouble is that most of this talk takes place between the relatively small number of Americans (less than 20 per cent) who have incomes over \$15,000 a year. Their numbers have grown, as the numbers of the poor have shrunk; but Census reports tell us that almost two-thirds of Americans are still in between, with incomes between \$5,000 and \$15,000 a year. If everything is going well, these blue and white collar workers have the time and inclination to share affluent Americans' concern with other issues; but when inflation or recession threatens, their attention focuses sharply on a few key questions: What's going to happen to overtime pay? Will salary increases outpace inflation? Is the wife's part-time job in jeopardy?

AFFLUENCE HAS, if anything, strengthened the hold of economic issues on these lower middle class voters: The rise in their living standards (and in their borrowing) has made them highly vulnerable to shifts in the economic tides. Fending off these threats is concern number one. This is not only in the U.S. but in other major industrial countries. Former Prime Minister Wilson had it all over Ted Heath on image; but he lost the last British general election because voters associated him with rising prices and unemployment. In Germany, as Flora Lewis pointed out recently in The Washington Post, worries over inflation and other domestic issues have dominated recent elections; the press may be fascinated with Brandt's image as the great practitioner of Ostpolitik, but the voters aren't.

President Truman won because he understood the dominance of these economic issues, and spent more time addressing them than worrying about his image. His answers may no longer be relevant, and they were sometimes wrong even in 1948, but he was asking the right questions. If recent elections in the United States and abroad mean anything, they suggest that winning candidates in the industrial world will still be those who give priority to these bread and butter questions, despite the continuing fascination of well heeled political observers with style and related matters. Here is a good reason to review the memories of 1948.

May 14 - 71

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN

This is a memorandum to follow up the meeting which you had last Thursday concerning Presidential goals and the general problem of putting the President out front on issues and in situations where he can relate more to the people.

PHILOSOPHY

We have always known that others are better at selling the President than he is at selling himself. He gets into trouble or does not come across as well when he has to sell what he has done.

The point is that he has initiated revolutionary-type programs, made tremendous strides both in foreign and in domestic affairs; yet this has not been communicated or evidently realized by the public at large.

Although I had hoped to be able to read and research more than I have, the following are some of the historical points out of Thomas Bailey's book which relate to the problems

we are having communicating the President and the relationship of a President to

the people. The comments made on April 11-71 -
are as follows: (1) He is in position -

PRESIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP TO PEOPLE

1. President Wilson ran into problems when he gave the impression he was concerned with people inmasses rather than with people as individuals. (Don't talk about masses. Talk about the people or the family, or the man, or the student, or the housewife. Relate on an issue at the point of lowest common denominator.)
2. A President should not start a crusade that people are not in the mood for. Move off but do not get too far out front. (People are in a mood for a crusade against cancer, medical care, and human related goals.
They have difficulty and it is easy to get too far ahead of them on intangibles such as revenue sharing, or reorganization. Revenue Sharing must be brought to them in a very personal way.

D o p e l Desalting of water may be an issue where we are putting the President too far out front.)
3. The people look to the Commander in Chief as also being the teacher in chief. (President Nixon does a good job here. He has a simplistic approach to explaining complicated matters. The November 3 speech, the troop withdrawal announcements, and other activities would seem to rate him high in this area. Perhaps we should do more events putting the President in situations where he must

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explain things to the people.)

4. Some times "bad politics" turn out to be "good politics" when the people perceive the President has the best interests of the country in mind. (The move into Cambodia should be a perfect example of this as should revenue sharing in its own way. On revenue sharing, he is moving against special interests groups to benefit the people. On the SST, he stayed firm for it because it was important for the country and in the long run would have been best for the country although at the time it was bad politics.

NOTE: According to Bailey, all great incumbents have been in some degree greatly inconsistent. He says that Jefferson when the chips were down had the courage to be inconsistent. The President's removal of the Department of Agriculture from the organization plan would fit this mold. A leader with programs must remain firm. Make concessions for the substance of the goal, but retreat a little here for more there. The Agriculture example fits this perfectly.

5. Voters will overlook Presidential shortcomings but seldom forgive failure to provide leadership when constructive action is urgently

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needed. (We must have gained all kinds of points here, if this is true, on the NATO exercise. The same should be true of the forthcoming SALT statement).

6. People admire a Chief who commands allegiance, unites sections, inspires people to greater patriotism, arouses a challenge that will appeal to better selves." This is the area where the President shines; therefore, we probably do not do enough. The Regional Media Briefings tie into this. The participation in a Fourth of July exercise or the Pendleton and West Point exercises should hook into this beautifully. The State of the Union which the President anticipates should be the thing that arouses the challenge that will appeal to people to better themselves. We need to do more in terms of relating to the betterment of individuals and with the Government's purpose being for the betterment of individuals and not the betterment of an organized bureaucracy."

All strong Presidents have had powerful enemies. (President Nixon qualifies here.)

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

1. Presidential direction to a degree must coincide with the tide of the times.

(The News Summary points out that Forbes' Magazine has done a study among businessmen and they have come up with a conclusion that Ralph Nader should be the running mate on some Presidential candidate's ticket next time around.

This is ^{h/t} to our ears, but may reflect a tide in the consumer area which we have been rebelling against. Another case in point could be the understanding of the drug problem. I do not mean legalization, but to what degree do we show a deep understanding of the problems of the humanitarian aspects versus the law and order side. We should probably execute the pusher but it is how we deal with the addict that perhaps we should question.)

2. Bailey says that "we associate great revolutions, to use this over-used word, with all great Presidents." Washington presided over a conservative counter-revolution, Jefferson over the electoral revolution, Lincoln over the counter-revolution, Wilson over the new Freedoms' revolution, and FDR over the New Deal revolution.

(Maybe the new American revolution is not far off-track. WE are at a key point in history where perhaps another counter revolution – the people's counter-revolution – is necessary in order to maintain those ideals of government in which we believe.)

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3. For FDR, radio was made to order. It amplified his self-assured manner, his genius for over-simplification, and his matchless voice. (Going back to the first debate, everyone said the President won on radio. The President has an excellent radio voice. Perhaps we are on target by continuing with the radio speeches. However, perhaps we are missing a golden opportunity to move off with the fireside type chats on television. However, we have discussed this often but we have never had the guts to try it. Perhaps we are wrong in setting down a pattern of four network interviews and one on ones and we should try the new vehicle.)

4. The Presidential giants were all activists and fall into the "impact of office category." Lincoln demonstrated what could be done in persuading the people to accept over stretching of the Constitution in surmounting crises. Teddy Roosevelt operated on the stewardship theory that he could do anything that the Constitution did not prohibit. People are primarily interested in how effective a man is in discharging his duties entrusted to him and in not how good he is for the office. (The key here is basically the President's design of his office. What does he envision it to be? In other words, President Nixon's concept of the Presidency—*What is it you want the President?*)

5. On the legislative front, historically the role of executive as Representative in Chief has been of immense importance. Presidents must lead and drive Congress. Instead of blaming the Legislative Branch for its failures to legislate, people will tend to blame the Executive. In modern times, the influence of the President sinks as that of Congress rises and vice versa. (If this is true, the President or the Executive Branch should see that a drumbeat of prodding Congress is maintained and that periodically with vetoes or on major issues (NATO/SST and others) The President bangs away in exerting as much leadership as possible. We should remain out front pushing hard for our flagship policies ~~and~~ preempting to any degree possible those programs offered by our opponents.
6. Undue candor can be harmful to the President. (Perhaps this is why DeGaulle had and kept his aloofness. I doubt that candor, when you take all of the ~~risk~~ situations where the President has been candid, adds up to a total plus for the President. It increases the element of ~~mistake~~ risk and it gains very little when it is used except for a fleeting moment. Candor should only be a technique for striving to achieve a certain goal.)

NOTES ON RELATING PROGRAMS TO PEOPLE

1. We need to set our priorities within the White House against those programs which the President and the Administration in toto should get behind based upon which will do the most positive things for those people who comprise the constituency which will elect the President in 1972.
2. We should take those programs and dissect them in singling out which phases of the program appeal to what particular group and then proceed with selling that aspect of the program to that group.
3. Where a program comes into conflict with a group of substantial supporters such as agriculture does under the Reorganization plan, then some minor shift should be made in the program or a major undertaking should be put in the works which convinces those people alienated that the program in the long run is good for them.
4. We should not run off with false ideas as to what programs the people really prefer. For example, what makes ~~maxx~~ us think anyone is interested in desalting the water, especially when it has no bearing on desert areas but rather only on large metropolitan areas.

5. There must be a tight political group which analyzes each program as to what it does for people. A controlling factor not only has to be the initiation of the programs if indeed we go with any new programs, but at OMB.. The Gifford control at OMB is extremely important. We need to take and analyze every program as it comes through OMB with a ruthless political eye as to what it will do for us., ~~but~~ balancing those which help our opposition or alienate any of our people. The political group which decides what programs go and what programs don't ~~should~~ ^{for Domestic} ~~for OMB~~ be made up of Ehrlichman, Cap Weinberger, and Other NH Flanigan. It should be a closely knit group which has the President's backing.
6. ^A A complete reevaluation of our programs and their potentials in terms of what they do for people should be undertaken with polling a part of this if necessary. The Domestic Council should immediately prepare breakdowns for all their programs as to what it does for what group of people. They should list the pros and cons on each issue as it orients to people. Again, this has got to be done with a cold political eye and not on the basis of what is substantively good for the country. This is perhaps a task that Morgan should move into since he does have a fairly good political mind and it would be a way of easing him out of what he is doing.
7. A historical research study should be done to see what the common trends are among incumbent Presidents in regard to the major issues and indeed what it is that the people are looking ~~at~~ in a President. I know that some of this work

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is underway through Derge. I also know that you have studied the Bailey book and have pulled out much from that. It is important, however, that we keep the President postured right through the next sixteen months and this may be even more important than all the programs put together.