

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
 Contested Materials Collection
 Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
46	31	9/15/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Chapin to Strachan RE: results of the next Gallup Poll. Duplicates attached. 3 pgs.
46	31	9/15/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Chapin to Strachan RE: results of the next Gallup Poll. Handwritten note added by Haldeman. 1 pg.
46	31	7/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Doug Hallett to Haldeman RE: general campaign strategies created in response to a Higby memo. 5 pgs.
46	31	7/22/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Clawson, through Higby, to Haldeman RE: general campaign strategies. 2 pgs.
46	31	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Price to Haldeman RE: the First Family's campaign schedule. 2 pgs.
46	31	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From John Scali to Haldeman RE: an addendum to a previous election strategy memorandum. 2 pgs.
46	31	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Whitaker to Haldeman and Ehrlichman RE: general campaign strategies in response to queries from Ken Cole and Higby. 8 pgs.
46	31	7/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Safire to Haldeman RE: planning for the Republican National Convention. 1 pg.

5/9

September 15, 1972
11:40 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GORDON STRACHAN

FROM:

DWIGHT L. CHAPIN

Should we be thinking of putting the word out that we expect the Gallup Poll to fall off anywhere between 8 and 12 points the next time it comes out? The point here is to start building expectation for a drop and get the word out early. If we don't drop, it's all the better; and if we do drop, at least we've started building a cushion for it.

Do you want to check Bob on this?

[1-1-4 mem]

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[S-1-4 not I]

(5)

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Do you want to check Bob on this?

[E-1-4 met]

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1972
11:40 a. m.

IS To Open

MEMORANDUM FOR:

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FROM:

DWIGHT L. CHAPIN

H.

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Do you want to check Bob on this?

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

Doug Hallett
~~CHARLES COLSON~~

SUBJECT:

Larry Higby's Request of July 19.

The following is in response to Mr. Higby's request that I update and amend my thoughts expressed in my response to your June 12 memorandum -- you seem to have a virtually insatiable appetite for advice you have no intention of following. (That's a joke. No, it's only half a joke.)

The first point I want to reiterate is relatively minor. As you may recall, I suggested that the period between the conventions was a good opportunity to focus on domestic issues with some dramatic, colorful Presidential participation. To date, I have seen no such effort made.

My major point is more central. As you may recall again, my earlier memorandum stressed the difference between a national strategy and a local, regional and interest-group strategy. On a national level, I felt, and feel, we should be aiming squarely at those peripheral urban ethnics and upper-middle-class whites in the Northeast, industrial Middle West, and California who are Senator McGovern's only hope for election -- and that we should be aiming at them with a forward-looking, progressive positive approach geared around reprivatization, getting government off people's back, reordering priorities, decentralization, etc. On the local, regional, and interest-group level, in turn, I felt, and feel, we should be directing our negative issues -- abortion, acid, homosexuality, our more extreme rhetoric about national security, tax reform, welfare reform, etc. -- in carefully-designed, well-researched, probably printed and front group formats so that we ourselves are not hurt by our own efforts.

To date, it has appeared as if this strategy were deliberately being contravened. In particular, our positive national material -- the pamphlets, the "Lift of Leadership" book, the speech inserts, etc. I have seen -- is the same old, puffy bullshit which almost put the nation to sleep in 1968. More seriously, the dominant tone of our national campaign, at least so far, has been negative and negative in what I think is a counterproductive way. Specifically, Secretary Laird's charge about the F-15 and Senator Eagleton, his overly-lavish rhetoric -- "white flag budget" -- and under-researched "analysis" of Senator McGovern's defense budget, the Vice President's rhetoric -- "no-no-bird", Secretary Connally's charge about Senator McGovern's Vietnam policy undermining the President's negotiating posture (really now, who believes that?), and Clark MacGregor's Capitol Hill Club Speech, to name only what I can cite off the top of my head, are all counterproductive. They detract attention from Senator McGovern's extremism and attract attention to our own. They are not credible. They undermine the President's stature and the advantages of his incumbency while giving McGovern the stature he lacks. They give an open invitation to the media to screw us. Most importantly, they turn off the people we know are going to be the swing voters in this election and leave the forward, progressive and potential/even the middle ground to Senator McGovern.

On the other side of the ledger, because we are doing the above, we seem satisfied with not doing out in the boondocks, what we should be -- getting rigorously analytical, well-documented statements of Senator McGovern's views out to the various interest-groups on each of the major issues -- Israel to Jews, parochial schools and abortion to Catholics, national security to veterans, etc. In fairness, we have done a few mailings, particularly of the Israel position and the overly-rhetorical Laird defense budget analysis. We have not done nearly enough. And while I do not know what we have done in the organizational sphere, I fear we are spending a lot of time talking to, stroking, dining, and salivating over groups we know are going to support us anyway while ignoring the opportunity to expand our constituency -- at least if the fact that there is not one Vietnam veteran on our Veterans' re-election committee is any example, that is true.

There are some yard-sticks to measure the success of our campaign so far. It was my understanding that the President wanted us to begin going after McGovern in a rational manner right after the California primary -- how much was done? It was my understanding that we were going to use the Democratic Convention -- that we were going to encourage division, have our own demonstrations by front groups, etc. -- how much was done?

And it was my understanding that we were not going to let Senator McGovern get away with switching his positions and moving to the middle ground on the particulars of his issues -- how much has been done?

In my humble view, this campaign needs a rather radical reorganization and redirection. The Good Lord is watching over the President and is going to get him re-elected -- if only because nobody else will -- but there is no point in taking chances. My suggestions follow:

1. Part of the problem is simply organizational. While you up there may know what the hell is going on, those of us down here who do the actual writing and telephoning, etc. do not. There is massive duplication of effort, inter-office rivalry, competition, holding back of material from one another, etc., etc. which is not benefitting the President. We need some consolidation. I would suggest:
 - (a) Combining the Colson interest-group operation with 1701's -- 1701 would get lead responsibility -- and it would also get Colson. Most of the White House-connected re-election efforts -- dinners, funding requests, etc. -- have already been accomplished. (If they haven't, it's too late.) Now what we need is a hard-driving organizational and political effort and that can only be done from a campaign headquarters. Colson could take as many people from here as he needs, reorganize the operation, fire and hire people, etc. Malek would retain his administrative role, but Colson would have the lead in idea development and kicking ass.
 - (b) That is not all Colson would have. He'd be MacGregor's deputy with authority to run all over the place. It needs it -- still.
 - (c) A skeleton Colson staff would remain here under Colson's direction to provide such support activities as are needed -- agency contact, White House mailings, writing assistance, speaker programming, etc.
 - (d) Writing -- now being done at the RNC, White House, 1701, and God knows where else -- would be consolidated under one chief -- perhaps Bill Safire should take the job for the campaign. No matter whose payroll anybody was on, he would be under one guy and all requests for writing assistance would be funnelled to that one guy.

- (e) Press and media relations have to retain a split identity -- and, in any event, the Klein-Clawson operation seems to coordinate pretty well with the Shumway operation. P.R. -types like Rhatican, though, would go with the campaign. Such P.R. activities as the Domestic Council or NSC need would be handled within their own ranks or by the Colson support staff remaining at the White House -- requests would go through Colson.
 - (f) For political purposes, the Domestic Council political operation -- presumably Ed Harper -- would report to Colson at 1701.
 - (g) Democrats for Nixon should report to Colson and coordinate with the 1701 interest-group operation. If it continues to develop as it is now -- as a separate Connally-Colson preserve -- it is going to be duplicative and maybe even competitive.
 - (h) The enthusiasm factor needs to be weighed in. You should be visible to your staff (I've been writing memoranda to you for two years and have, not once, ever met you). So should the President. Starting now, the President should have a series of afternoon pep session-cocktail parties and get everybody to at least meet him in cycles of decently small groups. You couldn't believe how lax people are around here -- and mainly, I think, because they find it virtually impossible to have any personal identity with the President.
2. Not all the problem is organizational, however. We have got to remember that Senator McGovern cannot win this campaign. Only Mr. Nixon can lose it. That being true, we should not be so response-oriented and so quick to jump at every quiver in the McGovern camp. A light travel and speaking schedule for the President should be locked in -- and something attached to the President so he gets an electric shock if he tries to break it. The same goes for everybody else.
 3. Since our lack of ability to verbalize any positive themes and our constant resort to the negative may be as much due to a lack of awareness of what those positive themes should be as anything else, Pat Moynihan should be asked to come down for the campaign, with authority to write or assign to outside writers the President's substantive speeches as suggested in my earlier memorandum. We would also get the additional benefit of having somebody around with a sense of humor.

4. Whatever the November Group is doing -- and I don't know anybody at the White House who knows -- should be available for comment to people who are (a) political and (b) have been around the President for more than one campaign.

I hope you will find these suggestions both annoying and helpful.

cc: Charles W. Colson

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 22, 1972

EYES ONLY/ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
THRU: L. HIGBY
FROM: KEN W. CLAWSON *KC*
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

(1) The President has maintained a high-level, busy executive posture between the conventions with the single exception of greeting Frank Fitzsimmons and members of the Teamsters Union Executive Board at San Clemente. I think this exception to the generally high-level tone the President has set was a justifiable one and really quite valuable.

(2) I am still convinced that in general terms the high level Presidential posture is still the most valid, but it is only meaningful if all 100 plus surrogates and, for that matter, the whole government apparatus is campaigning like hell from this moment until election day.

I feel strongly that to "free" the President to comfortably maintain his image as a Presidential candidate lies in how effectively the surrogates and the government apparatus really hurl themselves into the campaign. If we are less effective than we should be, I envision it becoming necessary for the President to come off his best posture and to, in effect, take over the campaign by interjecting himself fully into the fray. I find most Cabinet Officers and high-level surrogates with whom we deal are anxious to campaign extensively, but I think it is imperative that we monitor the surrogates program extremely closely to make sure we are getting every ounce of energy into the campaign.

As far as travel is concerned, I still believe that it should be Presidential-related travel, keyed to our target states and specific voting blocs.

(3) I think we should take great pains to paint McGovern as a "minority leader of a minority constituency." I think we should give every indication that any "regular, normal" American, whether he be Republican, Democrat or Independent, can find leadership and solice under the Nixon umbrella. I think that we should use words like "elite, fringe, extremist" and even in some cases "radical" to portray the constituency of Senator McGovern. Every effort should be made to isolate McGovern's more vocal backers from the mainstream of the Democratic Party and the nation as a whole.

Whether McGovern is before his time or after his time in philosophy and in substance, he and his followers should be portrayed as a small, closely-knit cadre of over-educated, lazy, fat-of-the-land type minority. In foreign policy, where we are in my opinion, miles ahead, McGovern should be portrayed as inexperienced, rural, yokel, naive and isolationist. Personally, he should be portrayed as an individual who is not the kind of man that world leaders could respect. Indirectly, he should be portrayed as womanish, weak and a waffler. In short, a man without backbone, a candidate whose positions are never firm, who lacks courage to make the hard decisions and to stick to them in the face of adversity. For example, in Florida when he indicated he would keep a residual force in Southeast Asia on one day and then completely back away from it in the face of opposition from some of his more radical supporters in the Doral Hotel Lobby.

(4) As we were able to do in 1968, the McGovern people will have the advantage of being able to attack every little or big mistake from one end of the Executive Branch to the other and pin all of the failures and errors and foibles on the President. I personally think that Ted Kennedy will still be McGovern's most effective campaigner and that he will trumpet the health issue all over the country if we don't preempt him to the best of our ability starting now.

Kennedy, who seems bent on the '76 nomination for himself, will probably be given press coverage equal to McGovern's wherever he speaks, and I think we can count on his stumping for McGovern extensively so that he may report after McGovern loses in November that he did everything in his power to elect the Democratic ticket. We probably ought to have a team whose speciality is to monitor Kennedy and respond to him.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB HALDEMAN
FROM: RAY PRICE
SUBJECT: First Family Scheduling

I haven't thought this one through carefully, but would hope that they'd be scheduled extensively. They've become a first-rate asset. In particular, we should get them on as many talk shows as possible. I caught Tricia on the Merv Griffin show the other evening and she was a knockout -- real star quality, said all the right things, and was stunning in all respects. At a time when average Americans are worried about holding the family together as an institution, about alienated kids, etc., simply demonstrating that RN has daughters like these who are as loyal to him as they are is an enormous plus -- especially with parents and grandparents.

Booking them into some political forums is fine -- but where I think they can be most useful is in those situations that give them a chance to express their (and RN's) concern for people. This sense of caring about people is one that we're weak on, and that we've got to bring through more successfully -- and they have the credentials to help do it. In particular, as a result of the coverage of her travels Mrs. Nixon has built up great strength in this regard. Merely by visiting nursing homes, hospitals, disaster areas, etc., she can remind people of it. We might again have her make non-political visits to some outstanding volunteer projects, that are doing things for people. Incidentally, I was rather forcefully struck a few weeks ago, when looking at the pictures of Jacqueline Kennedy's visit to Kennedy Center, surrounded by the "beautiful people," etc., that there might be a strong if somewhat subconscious vein we could tap: I suspect that a lot of people today, comparing the two, might suddenly come to realize how refreshing it is to have a working, gracious, involved, concerned and mature First Lady, rather than a frivolous pleasure-seeker from Camelot.

I'd like to see all three give a lot of attention to the elderly. Not only are the elderly a big voting bloc, and the most conspicuous non-quota group from the Democratic convention (where they were represented by a token Colonel Sanders), but they in particular would respond both to Mrs. Nixon and to the girls.

A possibility that just occurs to me now: maybe we could organize a Grandparents' Day at the White House, with Mamie as an honored guest, and stir a lot of sewing-circle speculation that maybe RN-PN are soon to be grandparents. They'd love it in Peoria.




Raymond K. Price, Jr.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: JOHN SCALI 
SUBJECT: Election Strategy Addendum

I have these points to add to my Election Strategy memorandum:

1. It is increasingly clear McGovern's main supporters, those providing the vital thrust, will be the college-educated, young reformers obsessed with Vietnam as an issue. We should make a determined, skillful effort to separate from them as a bloc, the non-college, working youth. For each college grad already lined up behind, or inclined toward McGovern, there are three to four young workers who labor in the factory, the corner grocery, the farm, the office or in retail business. There is a natural rivalry between them which can be exploited for the President's benefit. Why not organize a "Working Youth for Nixon" organization which will dramatically publicize the gulf between them and the kooky college crowd. We might think of a big convention of the working youth, highlighting their support of the President and their deep interest in issues that bear directly on improved conditions for their advancement. This must be more than just lip service and a one-shot rally. To further wean young labor from McGovern, for example, the President could concentrate some attention on an issue which we have ignored: Ideas and studies to relieve the monotony of factory assembly work, a problem which already has caused some strikes. Presidential concern about how to improve quality of life for factory workers, particularly, would be welcome. This is an issue which McGovern and which labor has ignored thus far, but one with widespread appeal.

2. The President must devote more time and attention to an effort to "humanize" Richard Nixon. If not, he will come off second best by contrast to McGovern, the humble Methodist minister's son, who will "level" with the American people when elected President. I think it is folly in the extreme for the President to adopt a DeGaulle mold. He is already vulnerable to criticism that he is a "loner", isolated from the real America. How do we do this? In two ways (1) by becoming gradually more accessible to the press and by informal comments now and then which include "I made a mistake on that one, but I have learned" ... There is nothing that appeals to the fibre of Americans than to know that even the President will admit an occasional mistake. This will strike a responsive chord and humanize him more in the eyes of the voters; (2) by impromptu actions which seem unrelated to picking up votes. I have in mind such activities as not-previously-announced visit to a trade school where he would spend three to four hours carefully examining how students are taught, or a night-time visit to a police precinct where he would spend several hours at the station house and in a police cruiser. I would envision all of these as events announced after the fact, tending to prove that they are not publicity stunts. Newsmen, of course, would complain afterward but let them. The amount of TV reporting and print coverage would be almost as great afterward, once newsmen reconstructed the visit. I strongly recommend that this be tried over a period to help dispel the belief the President is in the hands of Madison Avenue and does not do anything which is not carefully programmed for maximum political advantage in advance.

I am not proposing that the President suddenly become a folksy, back-slapper. That would be out of character. But, he can successfully soften his image as the distant leader.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1972


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MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN
JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN

FROM:

John C. Whitaker



SUBJECT:

Campaign Strategy

This is in response to Ken Cole's request for ideas on what the President might do from now through November, and Larry Higby's memorandum of July 19 (Tab A) requesting an update of my earlier thoughts on campaign strategy.

First, there are a number of things that the President can do that McGovern can't, capitalizing on the fact of being President. He can sign a bill, with a hoopla signing ceremony (or veto one frowning into the free TV cameras); he can have substantive meetings with international leaders, or their emissaries; he can have substantive meetings with Governors or Mayors (McGovern can meet with the latter group, but only in the stance of being briefed or looking strictly political.)

The idea of speeches only from the Oval Office gives me some problems. Beyond the obvious Presidential ones like veto messages or reports on the status of peace talks on Vietnam, it seems to me that other substantive dissertations, on either domestic or foreign topics such as drugs, busing, crime or international detente, whether on TV or radio, would, I assume, have to be paid for. This is out of my field, but I think that, particularly in the middle of a campaign, even truly national addresses will have to be accompanied by equal time for Democratic rejoinder under the Fairness Doctrine. Thus I am not

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sure how many of our eggs we want to put in the speech-from-the-White House basket. As a partial alternative, it seems to me that the plethora of fairly major Administration announcements which we traditionally handle by a 2,000-word handout from Ziegler accompanied by a Cabinet Officer press briefing might better be handled from now to November by the President himself making a 100-word statement to the TV cameras in Ziegler's shop. This will net us purely news TV coverage -- no opportunity for free reply -- and 30 to 90 seconds on the national evening news which is as much as we could expect from a more exhausting event like an all-day trip to St. Louis.

At the Convention

I feel strongly that we should get the President in and out of Miami Beach as quickly as possible because of the danger of confrontation with demonstrators (assuming that our best intelligence is the same as what I pick up from the papers). The relatively dull predictable show on the inside is bound to drive the TV networks outside the Convention Hall looking for street drama. Even a minor fracas there, dull though it may be, would probably be more photogenic than the business of the convention. Any interplay between the President and the demonstrators is going to be compared by the media and the viewers with the scene of the McGovern confrontation with the hippies in the Doral lobby which got pretty good notices. I think an overnight at Key Biscayne would be running a real risk because, even though you can seal off the causeway, there would probably be a confrontation there or outside the President's compound. Any defensive maneuver like that would just be played as the President ducking these strident types whom McGovern at least had the guts to talk to.

Thus my suggestion for the President's personal involvement with Miami Beach would be for him to leave about eight o'clock on Wednesday night (possibly with live TV from the South Lawn of

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his departure, either consulting with HAK or JDE on pressing State business, or even pouring over papers in his residence). I would fly directly into Homestead Air Force Base (TV but closed arrival and no comment to press), and chopper to the convention site timed for the President to make his acceptance speech about 10:15. (By 9:00 p. m. EDT people are not off the Los Angeles freeways and in front of their TV sets.) Immediately after his acceptance speech, I would have him make an unexpected visit to a separate location where a large, screened youth group would be having a meeting, unwarned that the President would join them. The point would be to have all under 25, and even some screened long-hairs, to drive home the point that everybody under 25 with long hair isn't for McGovern. After about a 30-minute hard-hitting speech to this group (maybe even some Q&A's, if we trust our screening enough), I would have the President get back in his helicopter and get back to Washington so that on Thursday he could be back at his usual stand being President. On Thursday, I would try to get lots of film in the White House (bill signing, National Security Council or Cabinet Meeting) -- in other words, strictly "playing President."

If our media types have hard data showing that the Wednesday TV audience will be a bust if we have a dull Tuesday night show, I would like to see a scenario such as I have just outlined moved up to Tuesday night if we can possibly get away with it without ruining the convention to the extent that Wednesday is purely anti-climax. Even a precedent-shattering move like having a two-day convention would be better in my mind than having the President spend two days in Miami Beach. One final thought -- if the problem is to build some drama into Wednesday night to assure a good TV audience, might it be possible to delay announcement of the President's choice of a running mate until then? -- That's "bassackwards" to tradition, but why not - provided the President doesn't plan to announce the V. P. pre-convention.

Particularly if we restrict the President's time in town, the risks of confrontation with hippies apply nearly as strongly to Mrs. Nixon and the rest of the First Family and to the Vice President. I agree that we should do everything we can to avoid their

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being in direct proximity to the demonstrators, but this kind of defensive strategy argues even more strongly for having the President do a youth-oriented event while in town such as the youth forum described above.

General Campaign Strategy

We have become the heir of the old FDR coalition -- almost -- and the South for sure - ethnic groups in the North (Jewish and Catholic in particular) and, to a lesser extent, Labor. We should push Jewish and Catholic events for the President and embrace the tax credit for private schools more visibly -- beyond just endorsing the Mills bill. -- I know some Christian Scientists who don't buy this.

Assuming that the President's lead in the popularity polls is now about 16%, I think that we should run a low-risk campaign unless that gap gets down to 8%, or is dropping toward 8% precipitously. The question, as I see it, is how to run such a low-risk campaign without appearing to be doing so. Here is my list of don'ts:

- Don't do any large political rallies - not one.
- Don't engage in any debates .
- Don't hold any press conferences for only the national press that are advertised in advance. -- East Room format.

The press is vital. The President has won when the press was with him (1968) and lost when the press was not (1960 and 1962).

(1) I think he has to give them some deep-think liberal red meat to pontificate about and give at least the appearance of accessibility. The thought pieces, I think, can be delivered as radio addresses. The theme would be of a thoughtful, forward-looking President winning the peace abroad and of solving our domestic problems, but with the job only half done. Interviews with pundits would be good.

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(2) As for press conferences, on the national level maybe 2 or 3 from now to the election. I would have the President do quickie press conferences in the Oval Office so that the national scribes don't come in loaded for bear.

(3) In addition, I would concentrate on the regional media in places like, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Dallas, St. Louis, Detroit and New York by calling press conferences without warning. While the national press would have to be included in these, and would be primed with their questions in advance, the softer questions from the more numerous regional reps should predominate. In addition, properly chosen regional sessions like these can ensure that the President's message gets to the voters in areas which he needs to win, but can't afford the time to pick his way through personally. For example, we could cover the southern media effectively from Atlanta and New Orleans, and New England by visiting Boston (a town which is tough to get in and out of because of the huge numbers of students, but where the New England impact should be worth the aggravation). -- Denver for the Rocky Mountains and Portland for the Pacific Northwest. We may want to consider paying for campaign air time to televise these in the particular region. The first few we might get away with scheduling without any advance notice on staff time in areas where the local media speaks to a particular constituency without having to pull the reporters out of the boondocks (such as Chicago for the farm belt). The strategy of suddenly-called press conferences in cities could change to announcing press conferences in advance -- buying regional TV time and sucking in reporters from the boondocks if his point spread with McGovern narrows, and he wants to increase the risks.

I recognize that the appearance of large crowds applauding the President is desirable on the nightly TV news. While I think the risk of rallies (hippies and a bore to the press) to produce them is too great to run, I think we can accomplish the same result in the eyes of the TV cameras by doing motorcades on the way to substantive events. The motorcade can stop occasionally and, if the crowd is friendly, the President could step up on his car

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and deliver a short general purpose speech. (By this time we must have something better than the old LBJ bullhorn.) This will require us to develop a pithy five-minute speech, or a series of them -- but not the 25-30 minute "the speech" for rallies that he has used in past campaigns.

One thing that we often talk about but seldom get done is a local color event. This is another easy way to free TV time and can help portray the President as a human being as opposed to the Machiavellian politician that McGovern will seek to make of him. I remember the success of the President's early morning visit to the peace demonstrators at the Lincoln Memorial, and hope that we can be imaginative enough to work in some similar "unplanned" scenes like dropping by a local diner at 7:00 a. m. and sharing a cup of coffee with a couple of truck drivers.

I have a general aversion to telethons, but if we are looking for a television extravaganza, I like the format of the international town meeting. By satellite, we could have the network representatives in a number of international capitols relaying live questions answered by the President here in Washington. This would play to his strength -- international affairs, and even hostile questions, unlike those that come from domestic hecklers, tend to unite our citizens as "us" against "them." A "foreign heckler" will unite the country just like the Jews and Arabs would love each other if attacked by moon men. I like that format so much that I think we should consider paying for it. If we can get it free (and equal time for McGovern), then let him sympathize with the foreign heckler -- a good trap.

Pace of Campaign

Before the convention I think the President should schedule one major domestic event out of town. He should also continue to be visible going about the serious business of Government. Right after the convention, on Friday, August 25 (the day after his return from Miami), I think he should do a substantive domestic

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event in either Philadelphia or Chicago. (I would prefer Chicago because I think we ought to save Philadelphia for Labor Day, although I don't have any specific event in mind for that important date -- I'm just tempted by the Rizzo angle.) The Chicago event could be a meeting with midwestern farm media together with Butz and Peterson highlighting the Russian grain deal. Although I don't know how, it would be nice to get Daley involved. A noon-time motorcade sounds like a natural, but that brings echoes of '68 which is a definite negative. On August 29, I think he should go off to Texas to do screwworms with Escheverria and John Connally (don't laugh, it's really a good regional story), but because that would be a joke as a national newslead, we need another event besides screwworms with a Mexican-American flavor done the same day.

As the campaign progresses, I would attempt to schedule no more than one trip a week -- and always substantive. The only out-of-country trip I can foresee might be one to Mexico, depending on how we read the effect on and need for the Chicano vote. The rest of the newsleads would come from Washington and, with the exception of paid radio talks and paid TV, would be natural outgrowths of being President.

The First Family

I think we should bend every effort to get them out of Washington and keep them on the road. Human interest shots in the Washington papers aren't going to be of any help. The only specific thought I have is that Mrs. Nixon's Legacy of Parks national tour was so successful that we may want to replay it -- if there is one thing that we can find in all of the key states, it's parks.

Theme of Campaign

From the disarray of the Democratic years, the President has made an important start at restructuring international and domestic affairs to bring us peace, stability and progress. But his reforms

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are still in the process of becoming -- his Presidency is only halfway home. We need to put that theme into a catchy phrase to compete with McGovern's (Fauntroy's?) "Come home, America." The major danger, as I see it strategically, is that McGovern will succeed in identifying himself as a general spokesman for discontent and the need for change -- a mood that the polls show is shared by a majority of the people. We have got to avoid being cast as defenders of the status quo. We should try to show, rather, that the President's first term has been one of change -- in restructuring international relationships, in proposing basic governmental reform, in salving the American spirit from the divisiveness of 1968 -- but that his type of change builds on the past that has made our country great and does not repudiate it.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 20, 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: BILL SAFIRE
RE: CONVENTION

I was talking to Howard K. Smith last night about what he expects for television coverage, and he said that all the TV people expected a pretty dull convention with the likelihood of violence in the streets. That's not good -- will associate us with violence, inability to reduce dissent, etc.

Howard wondered if we were planning the usual lineup -- President and Vice President acceptance speeches on the same night. He suggested that if, for the first time, they could be on different nights, they would be separate news events, each a must for coverage in full.

Moreover, it occurs to me, a mass audience is less likely to sit through two long speeches practically back to back; in addition, if the VP's speech is really good, it detracts from the President's, and if it is no good, it loses the audience.

Therefore, why do we not do something radical in the way of political conventions and nominate the Vice President on one night, have him accept that night, and do the President the next night?

This would be met with a lot of cluck-clucking as anti-traditional, but the real reason for putting them together in the past was to first determine the Presidential nominee and have him select the running mate; with a sitting President who will make his choice known before the Convention, that reason is obviated.

Thus, we could have two separate and distinct news stories, better ratings, and a more solitaire setting for the President on his night. Worth considering?

cc: Dick Moore