

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
 Contested Materials Collection  
 Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
46	11	1/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haldeman to Higby RE: Muskie's public image in comparison to that of RN. 1 pg.
46	11	1/3/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Hallett to Colson RE: the main points of a series entitled "The Politicians and the People" by Broder and Johnson. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 8 pgs.
46	11	1/13/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Other Document	Transcript of a conversation between "M" and "G," possibly referring to Magruder and Strachan, respectively. 9 pgs.
46	11	1/13/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Teeter's reports of polling information to the Attorney General. 1 pg.
46	11	12/21/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: guidelines for campaign polling involving the memo recipient and the Attorney General. Handwritten note added by unknown. 3 pgs.
46	11	2/3/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	Handwritten notes involving Teeter and his forwarding of information to the Attorney General and Magruder. 1 pg.

Teeter  
L.

January 12, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. LAWRENCE HIGBY  
FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN

In his analysis, Hallett makes the point that Muskie's public image is everything the President's is not: strong, reflective, prudent, even wise.

The President on the other hand, is viewed as a man on the make, ashamed of and constantly running away from his past, manipulator, unsure of his convictions, tactician instead of strategist, grand vizier of all Rotarians, substituting pomposity for eloquence. Further, the American people do not think he has any broad conceptional framework or any sense of direction or purpose.

These are arguable points and they should be pursued by some valid polling as soon as possible. In other words, we need to test the Nixon image versus the Muskie image against the hypotheses laid out by Hallett.

HRH:kb

[Item A-2]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 3, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHARLES W. COLSON

FROM: DOUG HALLETT

Broder's and Johnson's basic points in their series "The Politicians and the People" are the following:

(1) People are less angry, less passionate, less pessimistic about the future than they were a year ago. What was analyzed last year as fear about the future has now turned to apprehension. While two-thirds of the people surveyed still feel the country is no better off than it was in 1968, there is less immediate concern about short-run disintegration and collapse.

(2) The President's strength has increased considerably as a by-product of the China trip, the new economic policy, etc. On the other hand, the President's initiatives have also made him seem more unpredictable, more mysterious, more inconsistent than he did before to many Americans. He is the first choice of a minority of the electorate. At a time when people are looking for direction and purpose in their leaders, the President remains a remote and uncertain figure.

(3) There is considerable confusion and indecision about 1972. Never have political loyalties and allegiances been weaker. Party structures are almost meaningless in most areas of the country. People want to vote for the man, not the party. With the possible exception of the economy, no clear-cut issues are likely to stand out this election year.

(4) The real issue is the psychological issue of trust and confidence. People are alienated from their government; they feel powerless; they question whether their leaders can respond to their fundamental concerns. 60 percent do not believe their leaders tell them the truth.

(5) The youth vote is likely to be smaller than the vote of the electorate-at-large and young people are not likely to participate in large numbers in the political process. While young people are hostile to the President, they will not have a significant effect on the election.

(6) Muskie is the only Democratic contender both known to a majority of the electorate and known positively. Kennedy and Humphrey are better known, but less liked. While he has potential, however, Muskie has not yet developed the broad base of support and respect he would need to defeat the President.

(7) Wallace and Agnew are too controversial to be accepted as leaders. While many people agree with their statements, they sense they are not tolerant enough to be President. Wallace and Agnew are too sure of themselves.

It is important to note that Broder's and Johnson's conclusions are based on a distorted sampling of the electorate. They interviewed only 300 people. All pollsters agree that in-depth interviews with only a small sampling permits the interviewers to reinforce their own preconceived notions. Broder's and Johnson's sample does break down parallel to the 1968 election results, but it is far from representative. Only one Southern state was included in the survey. 26 percent of the sample were new voters -- and half of these were college students. These and other distortions have led to conclusions at variance with more scientific polls. Whereas polls indicate that blacks have gained confidence in the system in recent years, for example, Broder and Johnson assert they are more alienated.

On the other hand, I think the basic theme of the articles -- the alienation issue is accurately portrayed. Nothing else could account for the wide variation between popular support for the President's basic stands and support for his leadership. Nothing else could account for the President's dominance of the issues and his relatively weak showing, both in the trial heats and in the confidence polls.

The following is my point-by-point analysis:

(1) People are less pessimistic about the future -- This is true. The campuses have calmed. The doomsday rhetoric has quieted. People are beginning to believe, for the first time, that the war is ending and that the economy will not fall apart. Such events as the Moscow and Peking trips even show promise of leading the way to a better future.

Unfortunately, however, the President's success in the areas listed above is not necessarily translateable into votes at the polls. The President's support is based on professionalism, not on any personal or psychic or intellectual loyalty. People expect the President to be an effective tactician. Inversely, if he is not -- if his professionalism shows any weakness -- his base of support is likely to decline. While it will be hard for the Democrats to

*very perceptible*

counter if everything is going alright next fall, if one or more of the above issues have gone bad the President may not receive credit for anything he has done. One weakness in the chain will cast into doubt the long-run viability of every link, leading the way to such questions as: "Why couldn't we have gotten out of Vietnam faster? Why didn't the President impose wage-price controls earlier?"

Indeed, the President's successes may even work against him in a curious sense. In 1968, the President was acceptable to many people to whom he would not normally be acceptable. People such as Walter Lippman were for him because they thought we needed a tough, flexible operator to deal with the kind of problems we had then. Now that the immediate technical problems have been solved, now that the wounds have been healed to some degree, we can afford -- we may need -- other kinds of leadership. The same people who wanted an operational President in 1968 may be looking for a philosophical one in 1972. They are no longer scared about the present; they are concerned about the future -- and they want someone who can help define it for them. As it stands, the President does not fill the bill.

(2) The President's strength has increased as a result of dramatic new initiatives, but these same initiatives have made him a more remote figure to many Americans. I don't think there is any question but that the President has gained as a result of his initiatives and is much better positioned for the campaign than he was six months ago. What is remarkable is that he has gained so little, standing now only 2 or 3 points above where he was six months ago.

*correct*

In my view, this is our fault. Given the President's public personality when he entered office, given the over-inflated rhetoric of the sixties, it is not surprising that people were suspicious of promise and waiting for performance when the President took office. We recognized this in the first six months to a year of the administration. In the last two years, however, we have done virtually everything imaginable to undermine our own credibility and consistency.

*too much rhetoric!*

In 1969, we were going "forward together." In 1970, we had a "New Federalism." By 1971, we had hyped it up to a "New American Revolution." Who knows what it will be this year? The Second Coming, perhaps?

We show no consistency of effort and commitment. The welfare program is pronounced the greatest domestic program since the New Deal, but we expend far more effort trying to place G. Harrold Carswell on the Supreme Court. We start off with a very exciting and challenging commitment to

the first five years of life, but denounce day-care (no, middle-class day-care) as committing the government to communal living.

Even our major efforts have a tinsely glow to them. The China trip and the economic policy may be admirable in themselves -- they are certainly incredible as they were ballyhooed by us. And all the time we are doing this, we tell the American people it was the previous administration which is responsible for overheated rhetoric and expectations -- and that we are the ones who are calming things down.

In the short run, of course, there have been benefits from our dodges and turns and from our Junior Chamber of Commerce boosterism. Maybe Agnew has even scored once or twice. But in the long run, I think, we have undermined the seriousness of the President and his Presidency. It is no wonder that today we find the public doubting anything we do, seeing in us instability when their greatest want -- greater than any special-interest need -- is for just the opposite.

(3) 1972 is uncertain. With the possible exception of the economy, no issue -- concern, no political allegiance, no party-loyalty seems likely to dominate. There is opportunity in the disintegration of the nation's institutions -- church, family, town, university, union. There is opportunity to reach and win over large numbers of newly-independent voters. It is not opportunity of which we have taken the fullest advantage. We have not allowed ourselves to restructure public dialogue, provide new direction and new loyalties. While we have solved short-term problems and may benefit from having done so, we have not added new certainty or direction to the public mood.

Just the reverse, in fact. We have remained committed to all the folderol of the past -- superficial "Presidentialism," Billy Graham home-town religion, We're no. 1, partisam excess -- at the same time we do everything possible to undermine the past's core. Substantively, we have been by-and large on track (although we are not dealing seriously with the economy, a problem which is structural not cosmetic). P. R. -- wise, we have behaved as village burghers, testing the wind, dragged into every reform, declining to identify ourselves with our own concerns, failing to recognize the coherency and broader meaning of our own programs.

Take our non-fiscal justification for vetoing day-care, for instance. In the days of farms and small villages, having mothers bring children up at home made sense. Women were intimately involved in the production process of the farm. Children were able to roam and learn in a broadly educational environment. But now? Homes are isolated from places of work; staying

as many programs

home means staying uninvolved. As for children, staying home means remaining in a sterile, homogenous suburban neighborhood or an even more confining urban apartment. Of course we need day-care -- massive day-care. Far from committing government to communal living, day-care means, instead, committing government to preserving some semblance of the community bringing-up process which we have enjoyed for most of our national history and giving women the same opportunity to feel productive and useful that their grandmothers had.

On many other issues, we exhibit the same kind of narrow provincialism -- even when we are on the right side of the issue. I don't believe people buy it anymore. Even when it is the best they can articulate, I think they expect more from their leaders. We have failed to give it to them -- and are, I think, paying the price.

(4) The real issue is the psychological issue of trust and confidence. I don't think it is quite as dominant as Broder and Johnson do, but I think it is much more important that we generally acknowledge. People don't "feel" the President's leadership -- except for a few brief moments such as the China announcements. The strongest, most memorable statements the President has made while in office have been statements of anger or know-nothingism or blatant politics; i. e. Carswell defeat, Calley conviction, Cambodia, vetoing day-care, pornography, abortion. They have not been devoted to explaining what the President is and what he is trying to do.

This is more than charisma -- at least charisma in the John Lindsay sense. It involves finding words and mediums which express the core of the President's character. Lyndon Johnson is not a superficially charismatic man, yet in his early years, before the war wore him down, his speech and his actions reflected a personal force that we never get from the President. Eisenhower could garble every other sentence, but, when you watched him on television, you knew he was a leader. Even Truman, haberdasher that he is, was able to express to his constituency a raw cussedness which was central to his leadership.

Richard Nixon? Man on the make; ashamed of and constantly running away from his past; manipulator; unsure of his convictions; tactician instead of strategist; Grand Vizier of all Rotarians, substituting pomposity for eloquence. That is the public impression. And that is why he is weak today. By 50 percent to 40 percent, the American people do not think he has any broad conceptual framework, any sense of direction or purpose. This is probably the attitude of most of the intellectuals. In a sense, the nature of leadership is not nearly so important as its fact. That has been our mistake. We have adopted a pacification strategy, this

*Handwritten notes:*  
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may  
be  
a good  
one  
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point  
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out

*HKE - note  
a very legitimate  
criticism*

for that group, that for this, with deliberable avoidance of controversial intellectual and social stands, trying to reassure the left, which cares everything about words, with substance, trying to reassure the right, which cares everything about substance, with words. We have ended up alienating everyone -- and we will not be able to correct that until we start realizing that tomorrow's headline is not nearly so important as next fall's "impression"; that next week's tactical advantage may come at the expense of next November's strategic victory.

(5) The youth vote is likely to be relatively unimportant in 1972. Broder and Johnson confirm two of our own opinions: young people are going to vote less frequently than the rest of the population and they are not going to work in significant numbers for political candidates. Broder and Johnson are victims of their own distorted sample on their third point. Their analysis that young people are far more hostile to the President than the population-at-large is not born out by the polls. Kennedy has a substantial lead over the President in the trial heats, but he is the only Democrat who has any lead among the youth vote.

On the other hand, once the Democrats nominate one man and he has achieved a visible, stylish identity, he could take the same kind of lead among youth Kennedy now has. The President's support in this group is thin because of Vietnam, unemployment, etc.

(6) Muskie is the only Democrat both known to a majority of the electorate and known positively to it, but does not yet have the strategic advantage over the President. One of the most disturbing factors in our approach as we enter the campaign year is our gross underestimation of Muskie. He has been brilliant, as good as the President was in 1968, and he shows promise of being far more effective than the President has ever been in the public phase of his campaign. If he has not yet emerged as the President's equal, he also does not yet approximate the President's stature as he will as a nominated candidate for President.

*a good point*

People around here counting on a significant fourth party are, I think, crazy, Muskie is going to do so well in the primaries that no one will join McCarthy even if he does do it. Without irreparably damaging his right flank, Muskie has moved far enough left to have the tacit support of somebody like Al Lowenstein. Establishment reformers like Gilligan are already in his corner publicly. The Democrats want to win this year -- I don't think they're going to allow themselves to destroy their chances with suicidal splintering.

Most important of all, Muskie's public image is everything the President's is not: strong, reflective, prudent, even wise. The President could not maintain early leads against Pat Brown and Hubert Humphrey. How in the hell we think he's going to do better against an Ed Muskie with his usual plastic statesman, say-nothing strategy is beyond me.

*H - good item to read in March - Compare the 2 on these items - This may be to make a reflection of current belief column*

(7) Wallace and Agnew are too controversial to be accepted as leaders. More evidence for the alienation theory. It is not just that Wallace and Agnew are too strident -- it is also that they are somehow too facile, too quick, too simplistic. People know that what they have traditionally believed -- and what Agnew and Wallace preach -- is not right anymore; that it needs replacement; that the society has changed and that their public leaders must deal with those changes even if they can't.

The lesson of Wallace and Agnew is that people want to be led -- they don't want to see their leaders mouth the same idiocies they do over a Saturday night beer. Yet that is exactly what we try to do -- elevating the idiocies into wordy, billowy speeches, to be sure -- practically every time the President makes a prepared, public statement.

I would caution, however, that Agnew's unsuitability for the Presidency does not mean he should be replaced as Vice-President. This should be decided on the basis of comprehensive polling this spring. There are too many people who say they would vote for the President, but "not that Agnew." On the other hand, I would regret very much having Governor Connally on the ticket, not just because I would hate to seem him close to the White House, but, more importantly, because he would overshadow -- and thus undermine -- the President. The President was right in his original intent with Agnew -- he runs better with nobody.

Conclusion: The same as usual: Not all the foreign trips to all the foreign capitals in the world are going to help the President unless they are coupled with a far more serious effort to deal with his very weak relationship with the American people.

The following steps should be taken:

- (1) Get new speechwriters -- this is the most important. This President has the least experienced, least able group of speechwriters in recent history. We need guys with clout, who are involved and know a lot about substance, and who can put stuff together which is coherent, purposeful, and comprehensive -- which will have the same effect as the President's masterful desegregation statement.

*H - note - pass to Price*

Ideally, we would have guys like Daniel Boorstin, Irving Kristol, Edward Banfield, and Nathan Glazer. We probably can't get them, but the President ought to speak to Moynihan about it. We need and want people from that Public Interest - Commentary School and Moynihan would know where to locate good people whom we could get.

(2) Calm the P.R., stop getting overexcited about each new issue, and instill some consistency and follow-through in our P. R. -- political operation. We should not be aiming at taking advantage of each new issue by itself, but at taking advantage of each new issue as it relates to the President's over-all approach. Above all, avoid the cheap-shot, the head-line hunt, the simple slogan.

(3) Realize that what is important about the President is that he is the first President to realize that the hyper-individualistic -- "We're No. 1" -- frontier American philosophy is bankrupt and outdated. The President is the first President to comprehend that internally and externally this country and its people are part of a community structure -- as such, the President is the first real conservative President the country has ever had. He has readjusted both foreign and domestic policy away from twentieth century liberalism, realizing that an unbridled commitment to individualism in the modern world is enslaving and destructive; that both Vietnam and the war on poverty are symbols of its bankruptcy; that real freedom and real individualism cannot be conferred from above, but must be worked out organically within a community structure by community norms -- hence an incomes-decentralization strategy instead of a services strategy in domestic policy, hence the Nixon Doctrine instead of Wilsonian zealotry in foreign affairs. This should be the basic theme in every utterance made by this Administration.

*Worry on this. Typical Gop slogan*

(4) Stop displaying the President as if he had a stick up his ass. Put him in gutsy, colorful, photographic situations with people. Take him out of airplanes, hotels, and military reservations and put him in hospitals, police cars, outdoors, in urban areas, at local union meetings, on tough university campuses, at Indian reservations, etc. Use the White House more imaginatively.

*H - good!*

*H - what do you think?*

(5) A more imaginative use of media -- we shouldn't be afraid to put the President in conflict situations -- the Rather thing was good insofar as it went (by far the best of conversations), but we can go farther. Show that the President can handle both his enemies and the people by putting him in situations with them. We should also be hitting much more the prestige mags with prestige pieces. Personally, I thought the President's 1967 Foreign Affairs article was more a travelog than an analysis, but even it has had impact far beyond its immediate readership.

*H - An abrupt change ed we had*

1/13/'72

M All right, now let's put it this way. If I want to screw a guy I would have written it that way.

G Really?

M Yea. You just put it to him in such a way that there was no way he could come back to you other than "get that son of a bitch out of the meeting".

G No, you could have covered it with the AG.

M No, my point is how you wrote the memo. It is how you wrote the memo or how you say something to someone. I would have said it to the AG if that was my situation in a much different way. Well for an example, all sorts of things that we have done that Bob asks for as far as your participation - remember? And even though I would have a little problem over here or over there I worked around it - right? I figured out some way, when it came down to hiring Greg Petersmeyer or when it came down to getting Gordon into this meeting or that meeting - of making it sound O.K.

G I understand. But all of those are minor little problems.

M That's O.K., this is a minor little problem.

G Not if I have irreparably damaged my relation . . .

M I did not say you had. I said that if you continued doing that you would. Even Gordon, don't you ever give anyone a

little editorial license? Haven't you known me well enough yet to know that there are times when I purposely exaggerate a bit to make my point.

G Yes, but Jeb, a complete lack of judgment.

M I think you showed a complete lack of judgment in that case - yes. He didn't say that, by the way, I think you did!

G Well, you know, if I have a complete lack of judgment --

M That is the case -- I have had some complete lackings of judgment too. I can remember one night when I got mad at your friend's wife! Right? That was a complete lack of judgment on my part -Right?

G O.K. - we all have those but that is different than getting unhappy at some staff guy and getting unhappy at the Attorney or having the Attorney General of the United States get unhappy with you.

M My point is that I think it was a complete lack of judgment. I don't think the Attorney General thought about it five more minutes.

G But what is really going to happen? Will I be frozen out of information?

M Now there you did not quote right -- I said that "IF" it

continued to the point where people thought: 1. That you were playing tricks on them --

G Which I am not.

M I know you are not but sometimes it seems as though you are and that is why I said to be a little careful about trying to find out information from the Klein's of this world. Do not ever indicate lack of trust in a person or that he is not telling you the truth. Always take it that he is. That because of that you would be eventually -- sure! You know, if that continued -- if everybody thought you were playing games and I said you don't want to do that any more so let's not do it any more. You are not frozen out.

G I know, but that stuff you would "have to give me because it is written and we might get asked about it". I am talking about the information in terms of -

M Gordon Strachan - don't you know that if I really wanted to fool around I could do it and you would never know?

G Yea, I know.

M You know I could. If I didn't want to give you memos there would be no way in hell you would ever get them.

G That's right.

G We talked two weeks ago about the subject - about how crucial I think it is that my relationship with the AG be one of confidence if not respect.

M You know where your relationship with the AG should be, by the way?

G What?

M Non-existent - basically.

G I know but he knows who I am and if he thinks Haldeman's got some little shit working for him --

M The AG happens to think that about almost everyone on the White House Staff. Now you don't right this down Gordon.

G I am not writing it down -- I can't write when I am holding the phone.

M He thinks everyone at the White House, except Haldeman is a little shit -- you know that! He thinks everyone is an absolute disaster over there with some minor exceptions (I am not sure if there are any -- I am kidding you now!). But as you know, the White House Staff is not exactly overwhelming. Of course, anybody at the White House would sort of fit that discription and he doesn't think about staff guys. He never worked with them -- I am the first guy I think that has ever been able to break through his desire not to get \_\_\_\_\_ and I don't know how I did it but I was lucky.

G The point is that he (AG) realizes that I do a lot of things for Bob and he knows who I am and he calls me by my first name and I sort of view it as a special relationship with Mudge Rose or whatever, but, the net result is that if that in any way deteriorates my his relationship with the President then I should leave.

M Yes, you should leave if it deteriorates to the point where it is un -- you know how I would know, by the way? He would tell me.

G He would?

M I am just sure he would, by the way. He would say to me "Jeb, you know, I am just getting fed up with what I gather is happening over here and I think you ought to tell Haldeman". He wouldn't handle it himself -- he would do just what he told me to do with his friend ~~of~~ Rita Hauser Monday which I had to do painfully and tell her "Rita dear you are not going to run the womans operation". He didn't do it - I did it. And that is exactly how it would happen. Do you think he would do that with Bob? You needn't worry about it.

G But this incident which we talked about last night -

M It did not do you an irreparable harm. It was, I think, a lack of judgment -- I don't want to be too extravigant but -- I do think that continued incidents of this kind ....

G How pissed off do you think the Attorney General was?

M At the time?

G Yea.

M At the time he was annoyed.

G Humph.

M I think. Now that is my judgment. He said something like "that is ridiculous - - I will have to talk to Bob about it" and that was it. It was very embarrassing to me Gordon, and you know -- I really was. I can't think of ever being embarrassed quite in that way -- especially by a "little shit"!!

G Well ....

M But Gordon, you shouldn't resign. You should get a kick in the ass -- which I thought I did give you last night and you should try to figure how to get around some of these things a little bit and I do think that they way you wrote that memo (I don't blame Bob now that I heard the memo). You know, we are in this together. This is not you saying Magruder is doing this.

G No??

M Well - I never write memos to the AG - you see all of my memos. I never write them in that way.

G Yea. But I am never doing anything.

M Yes you are -- you are reporting but have a little humaness Gordon. That is Larry's great benefit. He is human underneath that bald head of his! I am serious now though, I don't blame you. I wanted you to be upset. That is why I laid it on. I wanted you to go home and think "Jesus Christ".

G Well I sure did that.

M I wanted you to. I said to myself -- Gordon and I have another nine months to go and I want him to think about these things so that next time we figure out a better way of doing it. That is the whole exercise -- don't make the mistakes again.

G If it is between you and me - fine. If it's the AG's attitude then ...

M The AG did not say anything about you at all.

G Well if he ever does you have GOT to tell me.

M I will -- I will guarantee you that if the Attorney General of the United States says anything to me of a derogatory nature about you I will tell you directly.

G But you have a feeling -- which you seemed to have last night that you might ..

M I have a feeling that your almost complete lack of judgment in that one case, if continued, would cause damage with your

relationship with the AG.

G O.K.

M And I think that is a true statement without any of the frills or desire to make you think about things over the evening - lose a little sleep and a few other things.

G O.K.

M I am serious Gordon. I really am.

You are a fantastically fine person and I mean that. You are a little legalistic and you are not in the legal business right now and I would like to see you get a little less, well you know -

G Factual.

M Yes, we are humans. We are all dealing in a very pressurized atmosphere - right? And we are all going to be very up tight and we have to try and stay as loose as we can be.

Ok - I will be loose for awhile!

G Let me show Larry the memo.

M No, now look - destroy the ~~ex~~ memo. Seriously. Destroy that memo and talk to Larry.

O.K.

O.K. Will do.

[Item U-4]  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Not sent  
per JSM

Administratively Confidential

January 13, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN **G**

SUBJECT:

Campaign Poll Information

On January 10 you asked me to call Jeb Magruder to remind him that your agreement with the Attorney General required Bob Teeter to report the polling results only to the Attorney General, without Magruder present.

I reached Magruder as he was waiting outside the Attorney General's office. He and Teeter walked in and Magruder excused himself saying that Gordon Strachan had called to say that Magruder should not be present at the meeting.

Last night Magruder told me that I had "permanently damaged my relationship with the Attorney General" by directing who should be present in his meetings. According to Magruder, you should have called the Attorney General personally because the "Attorney General is very status conscious" and does not like to hear from junior staff people. He was "livid". This incident did "irreparable harm" to my position because it indicated a "complete lack of judgment". The result is that I will be "frozen out" of all but the most perfunctory information from Magruder.

Obviously, if this is really the Attorney General's attitude toward me, it is very doubtful that I can continue to serve as your liaison with the Campaign Committee. Therefore, if it would be in the best interest of the President, please accept my resignation.

As to the substantive solution of the access to polling information, I would suggest that when Bob Teeter has the written reports on the first four surveys next Tuesday you and the Attorney General meet with Teeter together. This will accomplish two things. First, Magruder will not think he is being discriminated against as the Attorney General's staff man. Second, the point will be reemphasized with Bob Teeter that he is to report to you and the Attorney General alone.

[Item 11-5]  
December 21, 1971

Not  
sent -  
superseded  
by Tal  
Papay/AG

Administratively Confidential

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Polling Guidelines

To prevent any misunderstanding about the procedures for handling polls, two questions need answers.

The first concerns the conducting of telephone polls for the President. In the past only the President, you, Higby, Tom Benham at ORC, and I have been aware that such polls are being conducted. Two reasons for this procedure are sensitivity of the subject matter (e.g. Calley) and the necessity for quick answers (2 1/2 days at maximum).

You have mentioned the possibility of clearing with the Attorney General an 800 special account of which 300 was to be for polling. Since this 300 was to be separate from the campaign polling budget, it may be that you didn't want Bob Teeter as Campaign polling consultant involved. However, you have granted Bob Teeter access to the most sensitive polling information, including the Image Study.

If the decision is to not use Bob Teeter, a method of informing the Attorney General should be established. When the "secret Administration poll" showing McCloskey at 22% appeared in the press last week, I asked Magruder if he knew anything about it. He said no and reported that the Attorney General had asked the same question on December 18. Magruder told the Attorney General that he did not but that the poll "might be one of those telephone polls conducted by Haldean's office". This type of comment, whether intentionally designed to have the Attorney General suspect White House staff political activities or not, cannot add to the impression and reality of full disclosure to the Attorney General, through Teeter, of all polling matters.

Three solutions to the problem of telephone polls are:

1. Conduct all polls through Bob Teeter. Questions, negotiations with the vendors and results would all flow through Teeter. This would be similar to the old relationship with Dr. Derge.

2. Continue the current system of working directly with Tom Benham of ORC. Teeter could be simultaneously advised of the general subject matter of any polls conducted here. Because of your December 9 memo, the Attorney General knows that Teeter has full access to past polling information. It would seem logical to keep Teeter informed of future polls. Informing Teeter, who is to have direct access to the Attorney General, would also lessen the subtle pressure by Magruder to be privy of all poll information.

3. Haldeman discuss directly with the Attorney General general clearance to conduct polls without question. This clearance could be obtained simultaneously with your discussion of the 300 polling budget.

4. Haldeman advise the Attorney General directly when a telephone poll is being conducted.

RECOMMENDATION:

That all telephone polls continue to be conducted directly with Tom Benham of ORC, but that Bob Teeter be advised concurrently.

AGREE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAGREE \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENT \_\_\_\_\_

If you approve any system involving a separate 300 budget, a new payment system should be established because Dr. Derge has terminated Behavioral Research Associates.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Herb Kalmbach set up another legal shell, probably a Delaware corporation, to process payment to ORC.

AGREE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAGREE \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENT \_\_\_\_\_

Second, the question of who is to request or assign projects to Bob Teeter needs to be resolved. Higby mentioned that you wanted Teeter to examine the Catholic vote and ecology conclusions reached by members of Ehrlichman's staff. Presumably Teeter's analysis would go to you and the Attorney General. However,

Magruder is working to have all projects for Teeter go through him. Teeter had been scheduled to be in Washington on December 20. Magruder told Teeter that it would not be necessary for him to be here this week. I had talked to Teeter over the weekend about some projects we wanted him to do. Teeter naturally thought Magruder had the last word.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Teeter be informed that he is to accept projects from you and the Attorney General, but that his analyses go only to you and the Attorney General directly, not through Magruder.

AGREE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAGREE \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENT \_\_\_\_\_

You may want to cover this decision with the Attorney General. It will be added to your talking paper of pending matters

GS:dg

G<sup>(JSM)</sup> → AG - is this type of stuff AG wanted for Teeter - yes, AG very pleased

AG + JSM asked Teeter to prepare:

① 5 page summary by Teeter of data + any accompanying charts

② Vendors summary of Vendor's report on ST - no vendors "

③ Strategy recommendations

JSM likes idea of 1 page for Strategy Committee - Teeter

AG → would talk generally to Cam Sha Grp, + in detail to Bailey + Maick

AG is really pissed off at delay; memo due dates set.

Schedule on telephone polls.

AG wants to meet u/H + Teeter on 2/7.