

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
46	2	5/11/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Teeter to Mitchell RE: Teeter's final analysis of the first wave of campaign polling. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 8 pgs.
46	2	4/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Magruder RE: calling into question Teeter's polling data, particularly his analysis of certain demographic groups. 2 pgs.
46	2	4/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Teeter to Mitchell RE: formulating a campaign theme based on recent polling results. 3 pgs.

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

May 11, 1972

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

E.O. 12065, Section 6-102

By omp NARS, Date 6-16-80~~CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL

FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER

SUBJECT: Final First Wave Analysis

During the past several weeks we have analyzed the first wave polling results utilizing a number of the most advanced statistical techniques available. This analysis has enabled us to identify the most important independent variables which influence presidential vote and to develop a very sophisticated analysis package which can be run and interpreted rapidly on all of our subsequent polling.

While it is not necessary to have knowledge of these techniques in order to use the results, I would be happy to go over them in more detail with you anytime.

Our conclusions from this analysis are:

1. Past party voting behavior is the single most important factor which affects the presidential vote. The classification of voters into behavioral Republicans, Democrats, or Ticket-splitters accounts for almost three times as much of the variance why people vote for or against the President as is explained by any other variable. This appears to be particularly true in Wisconsin, Indiana, and California.
2. The next most important factors affecting the Presidential vote are the voters' perceptions of the President's trust and his issue handling ability. Trust is best defined by the following variables -- honesty, open minded, and just. Seemingly, these personality traits are related to perceptions of credibility. To a lesser degree the presidential vote is related to perceptions of competence -- experienced, trained, and informed.

Most voters have a general perception of how well the President handles issues and problems overall and that appears to be more important to voting than is their perception of his handling of any one or two issues. This overall issue handling ability seems to be perceived by the voters as a single personality dimension similar in many ways to the dimensions of trust, competence, etc.

The only individual issues which appear to have any significant independent effect on voting are Vietnam, inflation, and general unrest. Vietnam and inflation were also, fortunately, the issues that the President was seen as handling well, and his ability to handle the general unrest problem was rated about equally to that of his opponents. ?

? Those issues on which the President is rated relatively poorly -- crime, drugs, and (unemployment) -- do not appear to affect presidential voting to any major degree. This is particularly true of crime and unemployment. Apparently the President is seen as having done a good job on those problems that the voters think have gotten better overall, while he is seen as having done a poor job on those problems which have become worse during the last few years. There also appears to be little believability that the President will make much difference in the crime or drug problems.

malek 3. Demographic bloc voting is significantly less important than past party voting behavior, and less important than perceptions of the candidates trust, competence, and issue handling ability. Once party behavior is taken into account there is little difference in the vote for various demographic groups. In other words, differences in the rate that various demographic groups support Nixon can be explained almost entirely by party preferences rather than membership in any particular demographic group. The factors having some but small effect on the vote are age, income, and education. Generally speaking, voters who are older, have higher incomes, and have more education seem to have a greater propensity to vote for the President, primarily because of their propensity to vote Republican more than as a result of their demographic group. Bloc voting against the President is evident only with a limited number of groups -- blacks, young voters (18 to 25 year olds especially in California), and Jewish voters in New York. All appear to oppose the President to a greater degree than would be predicted by their past voting behavior or party preference.

It appears to be possible to improve the vote for the President in several demographic groups where he is weak. We have made these conclusions from our analysis of the data from the individual voting blocs:

- A. Older voters (60 years and over) are the single most important group in the election. In Missouri and Oregon, the President is especially weak. Taxes, inflation, and the economy are the important issues.
- B. The President is running very poorly with young voters (18 to 24). Heavy turnout and registration by this group could be devastating. The percentage of Republican support among youth is very small. Vietnam and the economy are the issues. We have special weakness in California and Wisconsin.

- C. The vote for Nixon among blacks varies greatly. The President is running well with this group in the south, the border states, and New Jersey and New York. There is a severe credibility problem and racial appeals to this group are unlikely to work. Pocketbook issues will be important.
- D. Spanish-Americans are supporting the President to a greater degree than expected. The support appears to be flexible. We could expect to improve our support with this group by at least 15% in California.
- E. Ethnic support in Philadelphia is very weak and seems to be causing our poor showing there.

4. The importance of each of the vote determining factors varies considerably from state to state. Generally, the relative importance of these factors in affecting the vote is listed below:

- Party
- Nixon Trust
- Comparative Issue Handling Ability
- Age
- Opponents Competence
- Income
- Religion
- Education

After party, the voters' perceptions of Nixon trust and comparative issue handling ability are the factors which have the greatest influence on the President's vote.

The factors in the individual state studies are shown in Attachment A. Attachment B graphically shows the importance of these factors.

5. While the President was in relatively good shape against any of his potential opponents in January, there was a relatively small undecided vote for that point in time and there appears to be some limits on the President's potential vote. There are relatively large groups of voters who vote for the President on all of the sample ballots and who vote against the President regardless of who his opponent is on all the sample ballots. This indicates to me that once the Democratic nominee is selected the undecided vote may be very small. This, along with the probability that the Democratic candidate will increase his support and that the ratio will get closer during September and October, means that we should attempt to build as large a lead as possible between now and the national conventions on the theory that we will lose ground after the conventions. Moreover, every point we can gain between now and the conventions will come with less effort and at less cost than those percentage points needed during the fall campaign.

6. There does not appear to be any definite ideological basis for voting on any of the ballots. That is, very few people if any are voting for the President because they feel he is particularly conservative or liberal, or that people are voting against the President because they feel he is too conservative or too liberal.

7. The Vice-President's approval rating is somewhat lower than the President's in almost all of the states but follows up and down about in line with the President's. I cannot identify any particular segment of voters with whom the Vice-President is either adding or subtracting from the ticket.

8. The net effect of a Wallace third party candidacy was very small in January and has undoubtedly changed since then. We should defer any hard conclusions as to whether we want him on or off the ballot until after the second wave of polling, but my inclination at this point is that we would do better without him on the ballot.

9. There is no question but that we have a very realistic chance to carry any or all of the big states -- New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Texas, and California and we should continue to make a maximum effort in those states. California appears to me to be the one state where we may not be doing as well as we might be at this time and where there are indications of future problems. Voters in California seem to have a more fixed perception of the President. That is, of course, logical in that California voters probably know him better than those in any other state.

Recommendations

Based on our analysis, we make the following recommendations:

1. A ticket-splitter analysis should be done in each of the priority states by precinct or ward and township. For the rest of the country, the analysis should be done by county. This is undoubtedly the most efficient way to locate ticket-splitters and to develop priority areas for both our organizational and communications efforts. Moreover, it will allow us to identify Democratic areas which have some propensity to split their ticket, and from these areas we may be able to cause ticket-splitting in favor of the President.

2. With apparently small undecided vote, a strong organizational effort will be critical. I would recommend putting a disproportionate share of our resources into organizational personnel to assure that this effort is maximized. I also think our organizational effort should be structured so that we have the flexibility to concentrate our people in a few states late in the campaign, even to the degree of assigning one to each county or congressional district for the top priority states in late September and October.

Special organizational effort should be made to improve the President's voting strength in Philadelphia (especially with ethnics), New York City (outside Manhattan), Buffalo, Los Angeles (Orange County), Baltimore suburbs, Montgomery County (Maryland), Mid-Texas (Austin), rural Missouri, and Kenosha/Racine Wisconsin.

3. As indicated before, I think the development of an overall theme or idea for the campaign is imperative and that this should be done before the Democratic convention and should center around the President's hopes and aspirations for our country. To be effective it must be positive and give people the hope that many of our problems can and will improve.

4. As the President's overall issue handling ability is more important to determining vote than his handling of any individual issue, those issues on which he is perceived as handling well should be emphasized and those he is seen as handling poorly should only be used if we have an impressive story to tell or if the appeal is designed for some particular group.

5. We should emphasize the following personal attributes in our media programs:

Trust - Just
Honest
Open Minded

Competence - Experienced
Trained
Informed
Competent

It is possible to use the President's ability to handle issues in communicating the above attributes. No special effort needs to be directed to make the President appear -- warm, relaxed, and having a sense of humor. To the extent that it is possible to convey these characteristics, we should do so, but not at the expense of the trust and competence variables.

6. Special efforts should be implemented to maximize the President's strength with specific voting blocs.

A. A campaign directed at older Americans through the voting bloc group should be given top priority. Maximum available resources should be allocated into this program. A massive turnout drive should be implemented, and a supportive direct mail effort should be considered. Because of the current high level of registration, no special effort in this regard needs to be made to register older voters. Special emphasis should be made to improve our level of support with older Americans in the following priorities:

Missouri (Primarily Rural)
Oregon
Texas
Wisconsin
Maryland
Indiana
California
Pennsylvania
New York

Taxes and inflation should be given emphasis.

- B. All registration drives among young voters should be stopped. Our primary objective with this group should be low turnout and persuasion of Democrats and swing voters to vote for the President. Areas for special emphasis to improve support among young voters should be:

Wisconsin
California
Maryland
Pennsylvania
New York

Primary issue emphasis should be made on Vietnam, jobs for youth, and pollution.

In meeting our objective of converting Democrats and independents, we must be careful not to direct our young voter campaign solely at our own voters. To keep turnout at a minimum we should attempt to keep the marijuana referenda now proposed for California and Michigan off the ballot if possible.

- C. The Jewish vote bloc should implement a program to improve the President's strength with this voter group in New York state. Careful consideration should be given to the question of parochial schools with this group. Our data indicates support of aid to parochial schools may be a negative with Jewish voters.
- D. In order to carry several critical northern states we will need to carry a greater percentage of blacks than we did in 1968. Because of our credibility problems, we must be careful in making any racial appeals so that our efforts are not counterproductive.

MARKET OPINION RESEARCH


ATTACHMENT A

CALIFORNIA		NEW JERSEY		OHIO		TEXAS		NEW YORK		PENNSYLVANIA		WISCONSIN		INDIANA	
Party Type	21%	Party Type	7%	Opp. Issue	11%	Nixon Trust	10%	Age	12%	Opp. Competence	9%	Party Type	29%	Party Type	14%
Opp. Trust	4	Nixon Trust	6	Party Type	6	Party Type	8	Party Type	7	Party Type	7	Opp. Issue	11	Age	8
Age	4	Opp. Competence	6	Education	5	Nixon Issue	8	Nixon Issue	7	Income	7	Income	9	Income	3
Income	4	Age	5	Age	4	Age	7	Nixon Trust	5	Age	5	Nixon Trust	4	Opp. Issue	3
Nixon Strength	3	Opp. Issue	4	Opp. Strength	3	Nixon Strength	5	Opp. Issue	4	Opp. Issue	2	Nixon Issue	4	Religion	2
Nixon Competence	3	Income	4	Nixon Issue	3	Opp. Issue	3	Income	4	Education	2	Age	4	Nixon Trust	2
Sex	3	Religion	3	Religion	2	Income	2	Education	4	Nixon Competence	1	Religion	2	Opp. Trust	1
Nixon Trust	2	Nixon Issue	2	Opp. Competence	1	Religion	2	Nixon Competence	2	Opp. Trust	1	Education	1	Nixon Strength	1
Nixon Issue	2	Sex	2	Nixon Trust	1	Opp. Strength	2	Sex	2	Nixon Trust	1	Nixon Competence	1	Education	1
Education	2	Education	1	Income	1	Opp. Trust	1	Opp. Trust	1	Nixon Issue	1	Opp. Competence	1	Nixon Issue	1
Opp. Competence	2	Nixon Competence	1	Nixon Competence	*	Nixon Competence	1	Nixon Strength	1	Religion	*	Nixon Strength	1	Nixon Competence	1
Opp. Strength	1	Nixon Strength	*	Opp. Competence	*	Opp. Competence	1	Opp. Competence	1	Sex	*	Opp. Trust	1	Opp. Strength	*
Opp. Issue	1	Opp. Strength	*	Nixon Strength	*	Education	*	Religion	1	Nixon Strength	*	Opp. Strength	*	Sex	*
Religion	1	Opp. Trust	*	Sex	*	Sex	*	Opp. Strength	*	Opp. Strength	*	Sex	*	Opp. Competence	*

* Less than 1%

Numbers following each factor indicate percentage of influence on the presidential vote.

ATTACHMENT B



Numbers under boxes indicate probability of voting for Nixon. The higher the number, the greater the probability of voting for Nixon.

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

April 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JFK STUBBINS

FROM:

GEORGE F. BROWN

SUBJECT:

Teeter's Interim
Analysis Report

As we discussed this morning, I reviewed Teeter's Interim Analysis Report carefully. I spent 1 1/2 hours with Ted Garrick asking questions regarding the conclusions, format, and analysis procedure. Besides some very real problems with the text and methodology, the conclusion of the memorandum poses a very serious question regarding the whole campaign thrust. The conclusion on Page 9 is: "Demographic bloc voting is significantly less important than voting behavior in affecting the election. The only exceptions to this rule are blacks, young voters in California, and Jewish voters in New York."

Either the campaign is organized regardless of the results of the polling data or the polling data is wrong. All the work by Larik, Blawiestein and Males's voter blocs have been aimed at the argument that particular demographic groups will be decisive in this election. The appeals have been aimed at blacks, Spanish speaking, blue collar, labor, etc. Now the conclusion from the polling is that only blacks, young voters in California and Jewish voters in New York are important. If that's the case, someone much more capable than Paul Stang should be in charge of blacks, Ben Plets should take all his troops to California, and Garment should probably work full time in New York with whatever resources he needs to capture the Jewish vote.

The real purpose of this long, rather rambling memorandum is to raise the whole question of Teeter's capability and service to the campaign. He continues to spend less than one day a week here in Washington. As you know, Bob has been very interested in making sure that he reviews what are recouted to be the key States. Thus, the meeting has been cancelled from here today, but the re-scheduling has been made even more difficult with Teeter's absence.

There is one final note that you and I should review carefully concerning the availability of the items indicated above listed by the rolls. This concerns a very scholarly attack on the "Scientific and Technical Reports" by Roy Lewis within the Scientific Council.

CS/jb

[Item N-3]

COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 333-0920

April 12, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By CMP NARS, Date 6-16-80
THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

ROBERT M. TEETER

R.M.T. by [signature]

SUBJECT:

Campaign Theme

As we begin to focus the campaign exclusively on the general election and as the President increases his travel schedule, I think it important that we develop a central theme or idea for the campaign. It is important that the President's campaign have one central idea -- a message that everyone knows by election day to which various statements and actions can be tied. It does not necessarily have to be a slogan, although one could emerge later. The main point is that the campaign have a central idea or message that the majority of voters find attractive and would support.

Based on my analysis of our first wave data and the other research data I have looked at, I am concerned that the President is viewed as a tactician without an overall strategy or master plan for the country. This causes voters to interpret many of his positions and programs as things done for political expediency or to appease specific special interest groups rather than as part of an overall plan to move this country toward a perceivable set of goals or objectives. A majority of voters do not apparently think the President has such a master plan. No one seems to know how the President would like to leave the country after eight years "for his children and grandchildren."

I think it is imperative for the President and for the campaign to articulate his master plan to the voters and to show how the President's positions and programs fit into the plan. This should become the campaign theme -- the idea that ties everything together.

While this is important for every campaign and every President, I think it is particularly important for this one. It is a relatively well-accepted fact that he does not have any great personal appeal and will not be re-elected on the basis of personality or personal appeal. Moreover, because of the current issue structure and the type of problems he has had to deal with, I think we would have trouble trying to fight the campaign on a series of specific issues.

As an incumbent, the President is always open to the charge that he should have done more. More importantly, the general attitude in the country toward government, and politicians is very negative. If the voters know and understand what the President is trying to do for the country and how each of his programs are a part of that plan, it should be easier to gain support for his programs.

Also, the fact that voters are concerned about more issues now than has been the case in previous campaigns and also because the solutions to many of these problems are complex, it will be difficult for the President to attract the ticket-splitter on the basis of specific issues. Rather, he is going to have to appeal to these swing voters on the basis of a set of well-articulated goals for the country and further showing that his programs are moving the country toward these goals, and that he is more capable of leading the country toward these goals than his opponent.

The essential elements of this theme are what the President believes to be the destiny of the nation and the element of hope. The President could do this well. It would be positively received in the press and it is the type of approach which the public apparently wants and would favorably receive. The President may find that a "destiny speech" is the appropriate vehicle to deliver such a theme. It would allow him to stay on the high road and elevate the level of the campaign. It would be something he could develop and use now as President and yet carry into the campaign. It would give the campaign a common thread with which to tie things together while giving many of his individual statements and positions a prospective which they currently lack, yet be general enough so that the President would not be trapped by events between now and the election.

By giving the voters the idea that he has a master plan, the President would go a long way in solving the credibility problem. If the voters could see his various positions in the context of an overall strategy the President would be less suspect of being political. This approach gives the administration more breath and depth by tying things together such as China, Vietnam, welfare reform, bussing, economic controls, revenue sharing etc. It would also emphasize the complexity of the job and give us the benefit of being evaluated on the record as a whole.

While I recognize that the President should not get into a position of over promising, and also realizing that anything he says must be believable, I think his basic theme must restore the element of hope. I believe our data clearly shows that the people have lost hope that things can and will get better. More recently, there are indications that the public is looking for someone to restore this feeling of hope and optimism which has characteristically been the American attitude.

I have the feeling that the President has been very close to this idea several times when he has talked about the loss of the American spirit and desire to be number one, but his choice of words has left him just off the mark. Possibly a slight change of words or emphasis could make this basic idea catch hold. Also, I have the feeling that the President has used this approach to defend unpopular positions in the past, such as the SST. He has left the impression that we should strive to be number one so that we will be better than everyone else, not just for the sake of excellence itself. This is a subtle difference which has occurred in our society in the past 10-20 years.

We have the advantage of time to experiment with this approach over the next several weeks while the Democrats are involved with the primaries. The various domestic appearances which the President makes during the spring and summer present an excellent opportunity to try to find the combination of words and ideas that catch. Possibly the President needs a "new" inaugural address to be used on some occasion when people least expect it, such as during a campus appearance or before ethnics. It may be possible to tie this approach to the Bicentennial.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY~~