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ELECTION 1970: ANATOMY OF A DISAPPOINTMENT

Amid all the post-election jockeying and posturing, the amazing thing is that no one thought to compare the 1970 election to the one to which it bears the greatest resemblance: 1954.

The similarities are striking. A Republican President was halfway through his first term, having defeated a non-incumbent Democrat two years earlier in the midst of a limited war in Asia. By means of a successful peace initiative, the Republicans had turned the war into a non-controversial issue. But the economy was in a mild recession, and Republicans understandably tried to deflect the focus to other matters. The Vice President, campaigning in the West, charged that incumbent Democratic Senators were "almost without exception members of the Democratic party's left-wing clique which... has tolerated the Communist conspiracy in the United States."

Republican opportunities for Senate gains were striking. Running six years earlier, Harry Truman had pulled in nine new Democratic Senators; of the seats contested in 1954, 21 were Democratic, only 11 Republican. Many of the Democrats were liberal. Some analysts contended that the Republicans could be expected to lose substantially, both because of the recession and the long-standing tradition that the party in power loses many seats in off-year elections. Other analysts pointed to the large numbers of Democratic Senators seeking re-election, and to the fact that the Republican President had not had substantial coattails two years earlier. Republicans had gained 22 House seats and only one Senator in 1952, unusually small gains for a year of Presidential victory.

Hoping for uncharacteristic off-year gains, the President and Vice President put their prestige squarely on the line. While the Vice President concentrated on hard-hitting partisan attacks, the President, according to Congressional Quarterly, "appealed to the voters to return a Republican Congress and he campaigned harder and longer than any other President had ever done in a midterm election."

When the returns were in, there was disappointment for both sides. The Republican loss in the House -- 18 seats -- was well below the midterm average. But the seemingly golden opportunity for Senate gains had been frustrated. The GOP did pick up three previously Democratic seats. But four previously Republican seats went Democratic, giving the Democrats a net gain of one. The heavily Democratic "Class of 1948" was still heavily Democratic, now by a margin of 22 to 10.
The Administration claimed a moral victory, pointing to their less-than-average midterm losses. But Democrats pointed to the intensive Presidential efforts to affect the result, and claimed that those efforts had failed. Liberal Republicans began a campaign to dump the Vice President which was to last until the next Republican convention. Political analysts across the spectrum said the new Democratic governorships would serve as a vital Presidential base. And the press was virtually unanimous in its major finding: Dwight Eisenhower would be vulnerable in 1956.

Although this analogy makes a mockery of much of the currently fashionable analysis, Republicans should not come away wholly comfortable about the 1970 returns. To be sure, it is premature to talk of Richard Nixon as a lame-duck President. Unfortunately, it is equally premature to talk of the Republican Party as the nation's natural majority coalition.

The fact that Dwight Eisenhower was easily re-elected following his party's mild setback of 1954 is an important point, and may be applicable to President Nixon's situation now; but the overriding fact of the Eisenhower years was the failure of the President and Vice President to build an enduring GOP majority in the nation. It seems to us that this failure is in grave danger of repeating itself.

Particularly illustrative in this respect is the pattern of the Senate races. In the eleven states of the industrial Northeast, Republicans won two previously Democratic seats, and a conservative Republican captured a third that had been held by a liberal Republican. But in the thirty-nine states outside the Northeast -- 33 of which had been carried by either Nixon or Wallace in 1968 -- the election was a standoff. Republicans captured Democratic seats in Tennessee and Ohio, but Democrats turned the tables in California and Illinois.

The heart of the Republican disappointment was the small, rural, conservative states of the Plains and Mountains. These thirteen states all voted overwhelmingly for Richard Nixon in 1968, by margins ranging from 8 per cent (Nevada) to 28 per cent (Nebraska). At the beginning of this year, Republicans targeted five Democratic Senators who seemed eminently eligible for retirement. They were McGee (Wyoming), Moss (Utah), Cannon (Nevada), Montoya (New Mexico), and Burdick (North Dakota). Bright, attractive candidates won Republican nominations in the five states; four had been personally recruited by President Nixon, three were incumbent Representatives, and all were conservatives. All but one (William Raggio of Nevada) seemed like possible victors as late as two weeks before the election. All lost. The one who came closest (New Mexico's Anderson Carter, with 47 per cent of the vote) was the one who had not been
recruited by Mr. Nixon, and the only one who had been through a divisive primary. The worst showing was made by Rep. Thomas Kleppe (38 per cent in North Dakota), whom an impartial poll had shown two points behind before the President's October visit to the state. In Nebraska, conservative veteran Roman Hruska barely survived a lightly regarded challenge by a perennial Democratic office-seeker. In the entire Plains and Mountain region, the most conservative and Republican area of the entire nation, only Sen. Paul Fannin of Arizona emerged with a solid Republican win.

The pattern is inescapable: the area that was most pro-Nixon in 1968 was the least pro-Nixon in 1970; the area least pro-Nixon in 1968 (the industrial Northeast) gave the party its most striking successes of 1970. The big Eastern wins in New York, Connecticut, and Maryland all took place in states carried by Hubert Humphrey in 1968. Not exactly a harbinger of partisan realignment.

Except in this sense: traditional Democrats deserted their party in substantial numbers in states where the primary was won by candidates who seemed radically out of step with the rank and file. The fact that "New Politics" Democrats like Joseph Duffey in Connecticut, Richard Ottinger in New York, and Howard Metzenbaum in Ohio scored most of their primary wins in the eastern half of the nation (George Brown, for example, was defeated in the California primary) may go a long way toward explaining the drift of Eastern Democrats -- particularly urban Catholics -- toward the GOP. In states where bread-and-butter liberals like John Tunney, Hubert Humphrey, and Harrison Williams controlled the Democratic primaries, the Republican-vs.-radical alignment proved impossible for the party to make credible.

But the other half of the coin -- the failure of conservative Republicans to beat liberal Democrats in overwhelmingly conservative states -- contains the major finding of the 1970 Senate elections. This is the failure of the Nixon Administration to satisfy its own constituency.

It is tempting to attribute this Administration failure to the economy. But a careful look at the returns does not justify such a sweeping assumption. After a post-election survey of 129 House districts and 13 states with Senate elections where unemployment was at or above the national average, Congressional Quarterly concluded: "Unemployment was less than a decisive issue in the over-all outcome of the Congressional election." Only in the Midwest and Plains states, where declining farm income and
related problems were a factor in substantial Democratic gains, does there appear to have been a trend based on economic issues." Indeed, the entire nine-seat Democratic gain in House races would have been wiped out had traditionally Republican Farm Belt districts voted as they had in 1968. And House returns, not Senate or gubernatorial returns, are the traditional barometer of economic unrest. If unemployment had been the decisive factor many pundits have claimed it to be, Democrats would have scored net House gains in other areas than farm-related ones.

One must look elsewhere than economics for the Democratic trend in the most anti-liberal sections of the nation. The simplest answer seems applicable: the pro-Nixon voters of 1968 are not getting what they thought they were going to get.

In 1968, candidate Nixon campaigned against excessive Johnson domestic expenditures; President Nixon has retained every one of the Great Society programs (including the Job Corps, which he pledged to abolish) and has increased the outlays for many of them: Candidate Nixon categorically pledged not to support a guaranteed annual income; President Nixon has proposed the Family Assistance Plan, seen as exactly that by all who have examined it, and regarded at least as a massive increase in the Federal welfare load by everybody else. Candidate Nixon called for decentralization; President Nixon has installed the most rigidly centralized White House bureaucracy in history. Candidate Nixon attacked the Democratic-fostered "security gap"; President Nixon has cut defense spending to the bone, causing a massive aerospace slump in such key 1970 battlegrounds as Texas, New Mexico, and Southern California.

The one area where the 1968 Nixon constituency seems at least partially satisfied is the South. The Administration policy of appointing strict constructionists to the Supreme Court and of working with, rather than against, Southern leaders in implementing court-ordered desegregation, must be judged at least a partial success. With the primary defeat of Ralph Yarborough and the November defeat of Albert Gore, the era of "national liberalism" in the South has come to an end. Of the 22 Senators who will represent the Old Confederacy in the 92nd Congress, only one--William Fulbright of Arkansas--is left of center on the national spectrum. A similar pattern has emerged among Southern members of the House in recent years.
This move to the Right in the South has not yet resulted in a heavy realignment toward the Republicans, and certainly did not in 1970. Of the 106 Southern House seats, only one changed partisan hands this year (the Virginia seat of a retiring Democrat went Republican). But Republicans held all four of the seats vacated by incumbents who went for higher office, and the GOP will be in position to benefit from the mandatory changes of Southern district lines with the 1970 Census. The loss of two Governorships (while gaining one) was disappointing to local Republicans, but less so to the Nixon Administration. The two GOP lame-ducks, Winthrop Rockefeller and Claude Kirk, were the only two prominent Southern Republicans who voted for Nelson Rockefeller at the 1968 convention. Pretty much exploded is the Ripon Society thesis that the way to Republican gains in the South is a "moderate" coalition involving Negroes and silk-stocking liberals. Another Ripon favorite, liberal gubernatorial nominee Paul Eggers in Texas, went down to his second straight crushing loss to colorless conservative Democrat Preston Smith. Liberal Republicans will win every now and then in the South (though only one, Governor Linwood Holton of Virginia, now holds major office of any kind), but this will occur only on a temporary basis, as a direct result of Democratic factionalism. When the Democrats get around to mending their own coalition, as they did this year in Arkansas, such gerr-built political structures will inevitably come crashing down. "Like it or not," for the foreseeable future Southern Democrats will have a rarely breakable lock on Negro loyalty.

The failure to perceive this was a major reason for one of the biggest Republican disappointments of 1970: the defeat of George Bush in Texas. Since the election, Bush has said privately that the central mistake of his campaign against conservative Democrat Lloyd Bentsen was his open wooing of Negro and Mexican-American voters. Bush, no liberal himself, credits this tactic with bringing out a far bigger than expected rural conservative vote for Bentsen. At the same time, Bush was unable to push his Negro and Mexican vote totals much above his 1964 levels, when his opponent was liberal Ralph Yarborough. Bush is reported to have said: "If I couldn't get them in this situation, there's no sense in any Republican trying for them ever again."

Ray Garland, the Ripon backed "moderate" Senate candidate in Virginia, may have come to similar conclusions. Running as the center man between liberal Democrat George Rawlings and conservative independent Sen. Harry Byrd, and bidding openly for a Negro-Republican coalition, Garland found himself squeezed from both ends. Rawlings swept the Negro vote in all areas -- and Byrd carried most of the Republican ones. Garland was left with 15 per cent of the vote -- the worst Republican showing in a generation. Though Byrd was tacitly backed by the Administration,
his remarkable 53 percent victory has not been widely cited as a triumph of the Southern strategy, either by the press or the Ripon Society. One wonders what would have been their reaction if Byrd had come close to losing to either Rawlings or Garland. At any rate, Ripon-acclaimed Governor Holton, who backed Garland, is reportedly having second thoughts about the strongly liberal image he has projected in his first year of office.

But the most encouraging outcome in the South -- over and above the statewide sweep in Tennessee, the Byrd win, and despite the losses of Bush and Rep. William Cramer in Florida -- is the suddenly modest standing of George Wallace. The victories of moderate, locally based Democrats like Governor-elect Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, Jimmy Carter of Georgia, and Reubin Askew of Florida, have caused an overnight erosion of Wallace's organizational base outside the hard-core states of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Shortly after the election, loyalist Southern Democrats like Sen. Ernest Hollings of South Carolina, himself slightly right of center, started making distinctly anti-Wallace sounds, and Wallace's own profile has been noticeably low of late. If President Nixon carries through his pledge to appoint a Southern conservative to the next Supreme Court vacancy, and continues his relatively smooth handling of desegregation, Wallace may not run. In a two-man race with a liberal Democrat, Nixon would be favored to win all 128 of the Southern electoral votes. The Southern strategy has positioned itself for possibly massive success in 1972.

But ACU has always maintained, the Southern strategy is not enough. The Supreme Court and school desegregation, both of which the Administration has handled reasonably well, bulk much larger as issues in the South than anywhere else. The failure of Republican candidates in strongly Republican states is symptomatic of the Administration's failure to satisfy the non-Southern voters it won in 1968. And the 1970 Catholic gains will quickly evaporate if the Democrats nominate, as expected, a Catholic for President in 1972 -- unless strong steps are taken between now and then to mold a new, creatively conservative Administration program to appeal to a new majority of voters.

The Administration should take the following negative steps:

1. Removal of Secretary George Romney of the Housing and Urban Development Department. If Romney is permitted to continue with his
radical, divisive plan to relocate slum dwellers in suburbia -- a plan even liberals like Robert Kennedy repudiated -- he will become as much of a liability to the Administration as he was to his wife Lenore in her Michigan Senate race. Aside from the social arguments against the Romney plan, suburbia is the political focal point of any majority coalition for the Republican Party. To permit Romney to proceed along his present path is political lunacy.

2. Removal of Secretary of Agriculture Clifford Hardin. When Hardin's department (which is studded with holdover Democrats) announced a cutback in dairy price supports right before a special 1969 House election in the heaviest dairy district in the nation, that was a minor disaster. But when the Department released figures two days before this year's election showing the lowest farm prices since 1934, Hardin became the single man most responsible for the Republican Farm Belt disaster, and thus for the net nine-seat House loss. He should be replaced by a working Republican politician who will clean the department's liberal bureaucrats right out -- for good.

3. Scrapping of the Family Assistance Plan. ACU is amply on record concerning the merits of this bill, so we will confine ourselves to a simple political statement: if FAP is ever implemented, it will become the single biggest long-term Republican liability since the Great Depression. The majority of Americans clearly believe that welfarism has gone much too far -- not that it needs to be radically expanded, as FAP would in practice do. The GOP as the party of expanded welfare is a losing proposition.

4. A serious effort to cut domestic expenditures -- starting with the unpopular Great Society programs but definitely not excluding public housing and older bankrupt urban renewal items. A successful effort to cut back domestic spending could lead the way to a politically potent tax cut by 1972.

The Administration should take the following positive steps:

1. Announcement of support for the voucher plan, which would give parents a free choice between private and public education for their children. Such an initiative would intersect with two powerful political currents: the concern of Catholic voters over the decline of the underfinanced parochial school system, and increasing dissatisfaction on the part of a much broader group with the public school system in general.
A recent Gallup Poll found that the largest single problem cited by
dissatisfied parents was discipline, and that 53 percent believe that
public school discipline is "not strict enough." An earlier poll found
that a majority of parents would send their children to private schools,
were they financially able.

2. Reprivatization of necessary, but badly performed, government
functions. One example would be a bill repealing the monopoly of the
new Postal Corporation on first-class mail.

3. Increased defense expenditures, particularly for nuclear weapons
and other hardware. Aside from the strategic necessity of this step in
the face of the massive Soviet nuclear and naval buildup, the sectors of
the economy aided will be those most available to Republicanism.

4. Tough new legislation to curb street crime and political violence.
Because of the Democrats' near-unanimous cave-in to Vice President
Agnew on the crime issue, a new legislation is unlikely to meet with
much Congressional opposition. In 1972, Republicans will no longer be
able to label Democrats as the party of permissiveness; they will have
to be able to "point with pride" to their own record. The only way to
reverse the rise in street crime and pornography, and curb radical
violence, is through much stronger legislation than has heretofore been
passed. Otherwise, the crime issue will work for the Democrats in 1972.

The Administration's rhetoric in 1970 was more than adequate; the
speeches of Vice President Agnew, in particular, brought conservative
ideas to an audience bigger than ever before. But 1970 also proved that
rhetoric is not enough. If the Administration is to hold its supporters of
1968, much less take advantage of the promising opportunities to expand
its base, it must carve out a moderately conservative position that has
its root in deeds as well as words. We are convinced that a majority of
Americans wants to go this way; if the Administration agrees, the
Republican Party can become the embodiment of that majority, in 1972
and beyond.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE 1970 CAMPAIGN

Memorandum to the President
From Patrick J. Buchanan
November 6, 1970

STRATEGY

Looking back, in my view, the Social Issue was clearly the right one upon which to focus in the campaign. We took the lead on it with the Vice President's speeches; forced one Democrat after another to defend himself, to get on the right side of it -- and thus precluded their taking the offensive on the only good issue they had -- the economic one. Secondly, the issue clearly worked. Tunney spent half the campaign getting out of police cars; Stevenson was talking about his Marine Corps record by the campaign's end and wearing a flag pin in his lapel; Humphrey ran on law and order -- and Kennedy was calling campus militants "campus commandos." (The President might have noted on election night that the Senior Senator from Massachusetts now has a haircut.) What happened this campaign -- in a number of instances -- was that Democrats like Tunney and
Stevenson got themselves back on the right side of this issue, through speeches and spots, as Scammon and Wattenburg had urged them to do -- and once they got right on this issue; it became a contest on personalities and on the economic issue, I would guess, and they won hands down.

On the other hand, if Ottinger had gotten well on this issue he would very probably be the new Senator from New York.

Those Democrats who did go hardline on law and order apparently gave up nothing on their left -- just as S-W contended (the kids have nowhere else to go) and won the suburbs. Moreover they were able to endorse the President's peace initiative and Mideast policy, thus losing nothing there.

Those candidates, who came off in the election as out and out liberals, Gore and Goodell and Duffy -- and did not get well on our issues -- were defeated.

The legitimate question to ask the Mortons and others is what issues they would have had us run on, take the offensive on. Had we devoted our campaign to the economic issue -- those final statistics about a seven billion deficit for the first quarter, the .5 retail price increase, the GM loss, the massive increase in industrial price index would have been crippling blows. Had we devoted all our effort to the economic issues, Gore would have won -- and Buckley very probably lost.
As for our domestic programs -- from my travels around the
country with the Vice President -- everybody thought revenue
sharing was nice while most of our guys were running away from
the Welfare Plan -- and we constantly had to stress work incentives.
All through the South and Southwest this was hurting, not helping us.

My main reservation about the Social Issue campaign was that
we started too hard, too early. We threw the Democrats completely
on the defensive in the first two weeks -- but they still had six weeks
to get well on the issue, to alter their campaign spots to deal with
the issue; and like Tunney and Stevenson and Kennedy, they clearly
succeeded in doing this. Smith specifically started his hard-line too
soon, considering media's impact.

One thing we underestimated by a long shot is our ability to
command the media and get our points across -- we do not need to
hit something day in and day out for eight weeks now -- we can do it
in a matter of two-hours and be successful. In retrospect we might
have been better off to start out -- not full-bore -- but low-keyed,
light and positive, and then gone over on the all-out offensive around
the second week of October -- which would not have given the opposition
enough time to re-orient their campaigns.

There is another point that should not go unanswered. The
"social issue" was not a "missile gap" issue -- i.e., a complete
creation of our campaign -- it was an issue created by the people of this country who declared it to be their prime concern in state after state after state. It would have been utter folly not to recognize public concerns on this issue; recognize we were positioned correctly and go after our opponents.

When one considers the other issues; the economy -- where we had problems; foreign policy, where the Mideast could go up, where the U.S. Soviet relations were cooling; and RN had proposed a cease-fire which the doves could say they had called for long ago -- we had nothing to draw a sharp line of division with them; nothing which we could take to the country and say clearly -- here we stand; here they stand -- throw them out for this reason and put us in. We have to remember that we were trying to throw them out of office -- not keep ourselves in -- and in that kind of effort you have to go on the offensive for the people are not going to understand why there is a need for a change.

THE ECONOMY

Clearly, this must have hurt -- I see nothing else to explain why Reagan did not get the margin everyone predicted -- after the dismal campaign of Mr. Unruh. Also, it seems to me the only explanation why our Western Senators went down so badly when we had felt they might all run a close race.
(Incidentally, whoever was giving us the optimistic poll information ought to be called upon for some ample explanation why they were so far off.)

Looking at the races by State -- which we have to do -- I think we can see what won or lost it. There were it seems no national trends -- as this was not a national election.

Connecticut, the President certainly helped -- so also did the Vice President in convincing conservatives and GOPers that Weicker was acceptable and even desirable. This helped with the Dodd voters.

In New York, the White House and Vice President can legitimately claim to have won this by the attack on Goodell, bringing liberals into his camp, and by letting New York know that Buckley was both acceptable and desirable. The Social Issue here finished the Democratic candidate -- what else explains why a young, good-looking Democrat can't get 40 per cent of the vote in New York. Also, Rocky hit hard on the Social issue.

In New Jersey, our friend, Gross injured himself with his campaign tactics -- wherein he took left-wing anti-Nixon positions and then shifted himself back. I don't know the ultimate reasons for his defeat -- but a social issue campaign by Cahill against a drawing board liberal won by half a million in that state.
In Pennsylvania, God knows why Scott won so narrowly against
an unknown -- we ought to find out. Perhaps economy.

In Maryland, the President helped certainly -- but this was an
"anti-Tydings vote" because in my view Tydings ran a hell of a good
strong campaign. The Mahoney people just couldn't hack him.

In Virginia we had a nice liberal Republican running and he got
15 per cent of the vote.

In Tennessee, we were running against a hell of a campaigner,
in Albert Gore; he had the best media and press of any campaigner
in the country; he ran as a fighting underdog, the "Grey Fox," and
the only reason we beat this fellow was the issues -- not on candidates
or personalities.

In Texas, I don't know why George Bush lost -- but he lost to a
fellow who was as tough or tougher than he was on the social issues.
So, this surely did not lose Texas. Economy, desire for 1 Dem and
1 GOP Senator (originally won for Tower) and perhaps even rumor
about Bush for Agnew hurt.

Florida, we got beat because we beat ourselves with the Carswell
gambit, with the Kirk-Guerney-Cramer feud, which turned off the
voters of both parties -- and because the Democrats came up with two
populist conservatives who had no scars and a lot of attractiveness.
If I were a Florida Republican, I would have been fed up with the GOP nonsense and Kirk myself -- and the fellows elected seemed conservative enough.

As for the nonsense that this proves the failure of the Southern Strategy -- we ought to ignore it. Bentsen and Chiles are not liberals. The only two Southern liberals in this election -- Gore and Yarborough were defeated. Any Southern Strategy is part of a presidential strategy -- it does not apply to Democratic conservatives running at the State level -- indeed, RN and Vice President Agnew are as popular as ever south of the Mason-Dixon line -- and would sweep that area still in a national election.

In Indiana, we had a candidate who was not the most attractive fellow in the world; some of his tactics brought out into the open were questionable; if he wins it will be because of the issues, and because of our visits. Certainly, it won't be on his personality.

In Michigan, the GOP had a disastrous primary and came out with the worst possible candidate -- and Hart is attractive, without enemies, and the Warren incident made it hard to handle the social issue -- and Mrs. Romney's basic positions are unsuitable to that kind of campaign.

In Illinois, Stevenson scrambled for his life after the first two weeks of the campaign -- and succeeded in getting well on the issue by his flag pin, emphasizing his Marine career, hiring Foran as his
Deputy Campaign Manager and climbing between the sheets with none other than old Law and Order himself, Richard J. Daley.

In Missouri -- money, and a young and attractive candidate almost knocked off Symington, who has lost touch with the people of the State of Missouri.

In the West, we went down like Ninepins in the Senate races -- the only thing I can see as the reason here is that perhaps the Social Issue does not have the bite of the economic issues in the great plains. But the economic issue does -- as the President knows from hearing the howls of GOP Senators at even the least mention of a cutback in public works. Perhaps the farm vote let loose here. Shuman's gripes and drops in farm prices had been ominous portents.

In California, it must have been the economy -- since everyone agreed that Reagan ran a tremendous campaign, was popular, and Unruh was a joke. Also, again, Tunney spent the campaign getting out of police cars -- and if that issue was neutralized, then Murphy was through, due to Technicolor, age, condition and economy.

**THE HOUSE**

Most analyses indicate that one percent in unemployment can be translated into an additional loss of five House seats above and beyond
usual off-year losses -- well, we had two points of unemployment higher than full employment -- and that might well explain our 10 defeats in the House. Also, a number of popular House incumbents were put up for Senate races -- which contributes to that figure. (US News showed that 51 seats were average off-year loss in those years when unemployment was on the increase.)

THE GOVERNORS

Here is the big loss; here is the major problem -- along with the State Legislatures. Again, we can go down them one by one.

Pennsylvania -- They had us on the State issues after the Shafer-Broderick Administration.

Ohio -- The scandal plus a commonplace candidate against Gilligan lost this even before it was started. (Note -- however, Gilligan was outraged and went to court on that quote we were using against him.)

Wisconsin -- A real disaster here, a real problem for 1972 -- partially explained by the incredible showing of Proxmire, who gets the entire Democratic vote; who does well on a national television; and who has the image in Wisconsin of a fellow who saves the taxpayers dollars. Erickson was regarded all along as a weak sister and his poor showing pulled Olson down as well.
Maine and Rhode Island -- the near losses here for Democrats indicate the vulnerability of Governors in times of rising prices and rising taxes; vulnerabilities which have little to do with whether they are pro-Nixon or Democratic. (Muskie's coattails showed little attraction here,)

Arkansas -- A populist Democrat got the Wallace vote, and Mr. Rockefeller did not run on the Social Issue; indeed he would have been especially hard put to hit permissiveness. He lost this one himself -- and Bumpers is an example of the new breed of hard-headed Democrat populists that did well all over the South.

Florida -- Kirk lost it for well-known reasons.

The Western Governors -- I don't know why some of these failed to win; it would be worth a close investigation -- but ab initio I would attach it to State issues, to the vulnerability of executive incumbents -- who are blamed when things go wrong more readily than might a Congressman or Senator be blamed.

FINAL POINTS

SOME TURKEYS

One reason we did not do better was that in many states, we did not field our strongest possible candidate. George would have done
better than Lenore; Lugar better than Roudebush; Finch better than Murphy; Laxalt better than Raggio; Andrews better than Kleppe; most anyone better than Smith. We had a few turkeys out there -- and it is not an easy thing to unseat an incumbent Senator; the odds are long against it. (Something like 8-1.) Indeed, two of ours who lost were appointed -- not elected to the job -- Goodell and Smith.

CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING

Much of this has become counterproductive because of the massive nature of it; because of the negative publicity it gets from press and networks. Also, some of the harsher attacks from our side are certain to gather the irate attention of the liberal media -- just as those gutting ads in the final weeks outraged all networks -- and they said so. The adverse reaction to campaign ads may not have helped our last night's stump speech appearance. But clearly the technical problems with that show outranked any gain or loss based on substance of speech.

On the law and order issue -- clearly it can be overdone as we believe Smith overdid it in the suburbs -- where he ran as poorly as any Republican ever ran. There is a point of diminishing returns on the Social Issue -- as George Wallace found out. But our problem was that we began too early too hard in my view -- enabling the Democrats to reposition themselves and effectively defend it.
SOCIAL ISSUE

It was the right issue for us in 1970 -- but we should remember that in 1972 -- they will be using it against us to some effect, if it is not visible that there has been a national change in either climate or statistics.

THE PRESIDENT

We are getting a bum rap on the President's campaign -- being accused of appealing to fears, of a divisive polarizing campaign -- that is simply not true -- but it is a result of our natural enemies in the Media. The President however, did go out and fight for his candidates, in the GOP -- and the presentation of RN as a partisan necessarily involves some attrition in his national image as President of all the people, above the battle. We ought to review here whether the gains from this campaigning is worth the risk of depreciation of our most vital political asset -- the Presidency.

THE CAMPAIGN

Victory has a thousand fathers; defeat is an orphan. Some of the bitching and moaning are now coming from individuals who had no hand in the selection of the strategy -- and much of what they say might reflect certain sour grapes. This should be taken into consideration just as the consideration that those who favored this strategy (i.e., me) also have an investment in its vindication.
VICE PRESIDENT

He carried out his assignment to the letter. We kept the national media off our backs -- gnawing at us -- until the final two weeks by virtue of an unprecedented amount of fresh, useable copy. We ran a rough hard-hitting campaign, which has been distorted by the media -- but which raised both money and enthusiasm and good publicity very nearly everywhere we went.

The President will recall that in 1958, with more serious economic dislocation, and a popular Republican President, and a hard campaign -- we lost 57 seats in the House. We did one hell of a lot better this year -- and among the reasons is the aggressiveness of our campaign against the Democrats, the media we received by virtue of the Vice President's controversial positions and his out-spokenness -- and the strategy we used which was devised and approved by the President.

But, just as the President suffered nationally, by his reputation as a fighting partisan in the fifties -- so also, has this Vice President.

Strong recommendation is that he be given responsibility for some domestic area where he can come off as a fighting progressive -- also, that he be authorized to deliver some speeches on new Nixon Administration initiatives, in domestic policy. And perhaps a major speech
or two outlining Administration foreign policy. All these things he can garner great publicity for -- at the same time he broadens his own national image -- and thus becomes a more effective campaigner on the stump.

Because of the nature of the request -- I will withhold for the time being thoughts both substantive and political -- looking toward 1972.
November 6, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: 1970 Congressional Campaign

Neither the failures nor the successes of this campaign can be attributed to any one factor. Indeed, there were significant regional and local factors which weighed heavily in the final outcome. As an illustration, one half of our total national House losses occurred in four contiguous Congressional districts located in North Dakota, South Dakota and Minnesota. Obviously, the farm issue was critical and nothing else in the national campaign could overcome it.

We must also remember the inherent difficulty of translating Presidential popularity into support for individual candidates. We lost many states that you would have carried handily had this been a Presidential election. We just couldn't succeed in making your supporters feel that they had to vote for your candidates. Nor historically, has this ever been easy to do.

Your campaigning was vital in terms of arousing our own troops and eliminating the apathy, which contrary to the normal historical pattern would have this year worked against us. Finally, by campaigning you demonstrated your loyalty to the candidates and to the party. The results, had you not campaigned, would have been far worse and you would have taken the full blame which would have hurt in 1972.

Beyond these general observations, I think some specific points can be made:

1. Law and order is a national issue but it affects voting patterns differently in different areas. The issue helped us in the liberal urban, suburban Northeast but, ironically did very little for us in the conservative, rural Midwest and Far West.
The reason, I think, is that the issue is meaningless where there is no crime and violence problem. If the people in North Dakota are not really concerned about crime or the safety of their homes, they can't get very worked up about their own Senator just because of his poor record on that issue. In the urban areas of the East, where fear of crime and violence is widespread, our stand on law and order (and that of our candidates) was the key issue (except where the economic issue surpassed it).

2. Except in the urban Northeast, we did not succeed in making the public believe that Democrat, Liberal permissiveness was the cause of violence and crime. There are a combination of reasons for this. As noted above, people in the more conservative states, while they are all for law and order, don't blame their own liberal Senator for a problem that they don't personally confront. Secondly, the Democrats in many cases recaptured safe ground on the issue: Stevenson is a classic example. Thirdly, our campaign pitch didn't really come across in a way to lay the responsibility onto the Democrats. In this sense we were, perhaps, too negative. Everyone knew that we were against permissiveness and violence but we didn't sell the point that violence and disorder in our society are caused directly by the rhetoric, softness, and catering to the dissidents which the Democrats have engaged in. We just didn't make the connection in the mind of the average voter.

3. The war issue became neutralized in the campaign. People are generally very satisfied with your handling of the war. Because they are and because it, therefore, has become something of a non-issue, they weren't motivated to vote against those who have opposed you on the war. In short, the issue would have been an enormous plus had you been the candidate but it didn't significantly benefit our supporters or hurt our opponents. Evidence of this was in Massachusetts which has been the most "dovish" state in the
union. There was a war referendum on the ballot --
440,000 supported immediate withdrawal, 190,000
supported an all-out military victory and 711,000
supported the President's peace plan. At the same
time doves won big margins. Your success with the
peace issue probably helped us generally, but it
didn't hurt our opponents.

4. The economic issue hurt badly. The pocketbook
issue is always the gut issue in any campaign. It
was this year a question of fear more than fact;
concern over whether the country is heading into
another recession or, perhaps even depression
coupled with continued inflation, was a potent
factor in a number of areas. As Scammon has
pointed out in his book, the social issue is domi­
nant only if there is no pocketbook issue. This
one obviously hurt us in California. (Also, how­
ever, was the problem of Murphy's image, age and
the Technicolor retainer.) It hurt in a number of
Congressional races particularly in the Midwest
and in certain areas of particularly heavy
unemployment (the vote in Seattle is an example).
The economic issue was compounded by the GM strike
which unquestionably cost us the Indiana race --
if we have lost it -- and made the Taft race closer
than it should have been. The general economic
issue was further compounded by the farm problem.
Republicans did badly in those states in which high
parity price support has always been the issue
(Nebraska, the Dakotas, Kansas, for example); witness
the four contiguous House seats in which the farm
issue beat us and a number of districts that we should
have won, but for the farm issue. We had been warned
of discontent in the Farm Belt but it was too late to
counter it.

5. In general, we probably peaked too early. The Vice
President peaked in late September, his line became
very predictable and with many voters "old hat."
Once committed to it, there was, of course, no way
to turn around; perhaps, the tempo and approach could
have been varied. Clearly, the Vice President had a
very healthy impact in arousing our troops, raising
money and generating campaign activity. (His Goodell
strategy was a key to New York.) Once he had peaked, however, his line became increasingly ineffective in winning either Democrats or Independents.

In this general regard the Democrats scored against us, by engendering sympathy. They charged us with dirty campaigning and excess spending, which tended to make us appear to be "overkilling." They were clever in making this more of an issue than it should have been. The press continually reported that we were outspending the Democrats 5 to 1 but failed to report that approximately $3 million was being spent on Democratic campaigns by the Council for a Livable World, the McGovern Fund ($1 million alone), COPE and the National Committee for an Effective Congress. I am told this issue killed Burton even though Moss outspent Burton 2 to 1. Winthrop Rockefeller was a case in point, as was the sympathy for Lawton Chiles "poor boy" campaign.

People became tired of the campaign ten days to 2 weeks before it was over. We took the blame for excessive spending in campaigning. This hurt us as people became sick of politics and the usual charges and counter charges which they then tended to dismiss.

6. We made significant inroads with the blue collar, white ethnic vote, George Gallup's comments to the contrary notwithstanding. This vote elected Beall, defeated Duffey, elected Buckley and put Prouty over big. We are scoring in this area because of law and order and patriotism. (We are conducting an analysis of selected blue collar districts to test this conclusion.) Prouty, who was a colorless, ineffective campaigner, carried Democratic blue collar wards in Burlington because of their antipathy toward his excessively liberal opponent. The same happened in Baltimore. Dodd took the blue collars away from Duffy. Buckley swept the white ethnic, blue collar vote. Significantly we did well in areas where unions we have begun to win over are strong (construction workers); badly, where we haven't made progress (the UAW, steelworkers).
7. As in every campaign, there were mistakes made in individual states which hurt us.

Texas: For weeks prior to the election, George Bush was convinced that he had the election won provided no one rocked the boat. He refused to allow us to use some very derogatory information about Bentsen. He resisted any ads -- positive or negative -- and refused to attack Bentsen. We probably should have forced him to do more. Dick Scammon thinks that Bush lost it for this reason and because he ignored the social issue and tried to be more liberal than Bentsen.

Maryland: In the case of Beall, he similarly refused to attack. We ended up doing it for him in a variety of ways and the political situation in Maryland reversed itself dramatically in the last week of the campaign.

Florida: Clearly the split in the party cost us the state.

Illinois: There was no way ever to elect Smith but his campaign grew excessively negative and, I am told, turned the liberal moderates in the Chicago suburbs sour. Also Ogilvie has serious splits in the party (there are some serious warnings here for 1972).

Ohio: The state ticket scandal cost us the Governorship.

Maine: With just a little help from the national level we might have elected a Governor (Irwin was hurt by the feeling the state was written off).

Pennsylvania: Shafer was so disliked, no Republican could succeed him. Scott won, which indicates the Governorship was purely a state issue.

New Jersey: Our candidate made classic mistakes, shifting positions and creating distrust.
Michigan: There was no hope without a candidate.

8. Negativism. Rightly or wrongly, the Democrats and the press made us (the Vice President in particular) appear to be too negative. As indicated in my memo on the Broder articles, we need to stress more and more the positive theme of accomplishment; that we are not only against unlawfulness and disorder but that we are doing things to control it and that we are reforming Government. We need to promote our record of accomplishment as we have done so well in foreign policy.

Conclusion: We made maximum use of national media. Our analysis shows that your campaign resulted in giving us twice the coverage the Democrats got. Without this, I am convinced the result would have been much worse because, especially in the closing days, the effect of your campaign was to take the economic issue out of the news.

As indicated above, in hindsight, I think we could have won a few more, particularly in the Senate, and with stronger party machinery could have done better with our Governorships.

On balance, we did better than the press and the pundits credit us with doing. If you accept the premise that it is inherently difficult for Presidential popularity to rub off on local candidates, then we did very well, particularly in the House.

Finally, I do not think the elections reflect any loss of support for you. To the contrary, I am convinced that had this been our election, we would have won big.

Charles W. Colson
MEMORANDUM FOR

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: MURRAY CHOTINER

RE: CAMPAIGN MANAGERS

CALIFORNIA
Murphy for Senate/Bill Roberts

Roberts knows his business but too many times I would call the Murphy headquarters and was informed that he was at his own office, which means, like so many other professional campaign managers, he had other "fish to fry" which required his attention.

Like too many professional campaign managers who have their own agencies -- he was inclined to concentrate on media which is commissionable -- as a result precinct organization, direct mail and the volunteer side of a campaign is relegated to second place.

ILLINOIS
Smith for Senate/Jim Mack

Nice guy but never seemed to be able to give an answer, which meant he had to check with other people. He may have been the manager in name but not in fact. I also felt I was merely relaying messages to "someone" through him.
INDIANA
Roudebush for Senate/Gordon Durnil
Durnil is a fine person but obviously without authority. Everything went through Keith Bulen. Bulen had so many things going at the same time that sometimes it was hard to know which project received his undivided attention.

MICHIGAN
Romney for Senate/Al Boyer
He is very personable, has good ideas, but I always felt he lacked political judgment.

MISSOURI
Danforth for Senate/Wayne Millsap
Millsap is a lawyer and was one of the hardest working managers of all those with whom I came into contact. He is knowledgeable.

NEW MEXICO
Carter for Senate/Dennis Howe
He was a hard worker, was knowledgeable, but I always felt he didn't have enough confidence in himself.

NORTHERN DAKOTA
Kleppe for Senate/Jim Groot
He was imported from out of state through Jim Allison. He seemed particularly well-qualified and knew what he was doing.
OHIO
Taft for Senate/John Kelley

This is another case where he didn't seem to have either authority to act or confidence to do so.

UTAH
Burton for Senate/Brad Hays

Exceptionally well-qualified. The only objection to Brad is that he was spread between Utah and Wyoming, with excursions to Virginia and elsewhere. He was part of the Roy Pfautch organization.

Other possible objections to Brad's operation were that the local people resented to the very end the importation of an out of state manager and the fact that he always wasn't available on the scene.

WYOMING
Wold for Senate/Roy Pfautch

Roy is very knowledgeable but, here again, was another case of a professional organization taking on too much work. The result was -- he was not available and Brad Hays had to come over from Utah to assist.

General observations are:

1. My contacts in most instances were with the candidates. Therefore, other than those listed above, I cannot give you impressions of managers in other States.

2. Professional managers, strictly speaking, are not the answer. We need Party people who are campaign oriented with the ability to conduct campaigns.
3. They should not be spread too thin. A statewide campaign is all a good campaign manager should endeavor to handle.

In short, we need more good campaign managers.
MESSAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: MURRAY CHOTINER
SUBJECT: PENNSYLVANIA

With the exception of Senator Hugh Scott, the election in Pennsylvania was something of a debacle.

Steps to regroup and rebuild should start early if we hope to have any chance of carrying the State in 1972, as well as recapturing the Governorship in 1974.

With that thought in mind, I met with Bob Kunzig this morning. I will be meeting with State Chairman Cliff Jones this afternoon and will talk with Senator Scott when he returns from Mexico on Sunday. I will also meet with Jack Jordan, former State Chairman, and now at HUD.

You will be impromptuned to appoint Ray Broderick and/or Ray Shafer to an important post.

May I respectfully suggest that doing so will not contribute anything significant towards rebuilding the GOP in Pennsylvania, according to well-informed sources.

At the moment, the only two names that appear to be on the horizon for future public office in Pennsylvania are Bob Kunzig and Dave Maxwell, formerly Insurance Commissioner for Pennsylvania, and presently General Counsel at HUD.