<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box Number</th>
<th>Folder Number</th>
<th>Document Date</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Document Type</th>
<th>Document Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Report featuring President's Posture Thru '71 and discussion of Democratic and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Republican Campaign themes, as well as the discussion on the focus of Hope and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Idealism. 12pgs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11/13/1970</td>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>To: The President From: Jim Keogh RE: Request for some post-election thoughts. 7pgs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. President's Posture Thru '71

All that can be heard among friends and foes alike is how the President must soften his image, return to being President and not candidate, lower his voice, stop shaking his fist, etc., as if windup off-year campaign activity were planned year-round.

We would do well to dismiss the straw man of stridency and examine how best to portray the President as what he is:

He is not now, and never likely to become, a beloved figure of benignity, and it would be a mistake to attempt to strike such a pose.

He is not a man who believes that national unity is a prerequisite to progress; instead, he has pointed out that progress comes first, and then will lead to a form of unity, or at least a reduction in the level of bitterness.

Thus, his posture should be that of a man willing to fight for the kind of progress for which the time is ripe. The representative of "all the people" must not play it so cool as to refuse to do battle for their interests, and these interests are controversial.

The posture for '71 cannot be unitarian, apolitical, ameliorating, lofty -- the posture of a Chairman of the Board.
The posture should be firm, calm, decisive, certain of where he wants to take the country and willing to damn the torpedoes to get there -- the posture of a President.

I agree with the conventional wisdom that the President must appear "Presidential," but I do not define that word to mean soothing and not-boat-rocking, as some do -- I think it means surefooted and certain about goals, reserving final judgment to history.

Needed for this now is an Order of Battle: a clearly understood line of priorities in both legislation and administration.

We should begin twisting arms and publicly fighting for the Family Assistance package. The controversy on the right will position us firmly in the center, and we will have something to crow about that is epochal.

We should have a tough-minded state of the union that lays out the great choices that cannot be avoided next year (cut inflation or have full employment at once, spend more on education or insist on reform, take chances on defense with big cuts or push the Nixon Doctrine of peace through strength) and makes the decisions and sells them persuasively. Recognize the controversy and address it soberly and rationally rather than obfuscate it.

We should have a fresh, new high-priority program for next year. Health will be the issue; the Domestic Council is now working on a big health proposal; this should be given the major push for 1971.

Above all, we should not try to produce a "new image;" the general impression of the first two years is a good one to build on. We should press our strengths: Surefootedness in foreign affairs (driving home its meaning to Americans at home in terms of no more war and no more draft) and placing the public interest ahead of the special interests (where there is much more work to be done showing how we are bringing about a genuine prosperity).
Every posture to be effective must have a single underlying theme into which all others are fitted. In RN's case it is this: He is the single indispensable force toward bringing about a full generation of peace.

II. One Possible Picture in the Summer of 1972

a. All the troops home from Southeast Asia; draft ended; non-Communist regime of some type still in Saigon.

b. Middle East still troublesome, but new truce in effect.

c. SALT talks moderately successful, but defense spending on rise again because of Soviet conventional buildup and Chinese nuclear buildup.


e. Continued extremist bombings and acts of terror, including kidnappings.

f. Inflation rate between four and five per cent.

g. Unemployment rate around five per cent.

h. Real GNP growth rate about four per cent.

i. Interest rates below 7%, housing booming.

j. Budget 15 billion in deficit, President urging spending restraint.

k. Environment still an issue, but losing appeal.

l. Presidential approval rating about 50%, having dipped under but recovered strongly after Summit meeting.

m. Wallace a factor again, stronger on Hue Long populism this time.
n. Lindsay-Gardner fourth party effort negative, now behind Democrats.

o. Dems to nominate a centrist like Muskie or Kennedy, with a Southerner for Vice President. Gallup Poll shows President slightly ahead, Harris substantially behind.

p. Family Assistance Plan checks beginning to go out nationally with big Demo push for increases.

III. If the foregoing is 70% accurate, the Democratic campaign themes will be:

a. End violence by "bringing us together" -- without divisive President.

b. End inflation with some form of controls.

c. "Get the country moving again" -- faster growth, full employment.

d. Divert defense dollars to meet human needs at home.

e. Massive health and education aid.

f. Time for a change.

IV. Our likely Appeals:

a. Peace without Surrender.

b. Prosperity without War.

c. Confidence in the President as President.

V. The Weakness in our Appeals:

a. Peace without Surrender. Biggest weakness here is "What have you done for me lately?" Churchill did a fine job in World War II, but then it was time for Labour. Peace is a powerful promise in time of war or in threat of war (Wilson in 1916; He
Kept Us Out of War) but it loses potency in time of peace.
Ironically, the achievement of peace is a wasting political
asset: The more secure the peace, the less gratitude goes to
those who bring it about. Besides, gratitude for past success
is the thinnest reed to lean on in politics.

b. Prosperity Without War. ("Oh, there he goes about the
war again. Took him three years to get out, and there are
still millions unemployed.") Inflation is always an attacker's
issue, and a turn in the rate of increase is a purely intellectual
defense -- bread costs more, and that's what counts. People
will still remember the boomtime of the Sixties and forget the
war causes and hope for the kind of soaring markets and full
employment of those days.

c. Thus, we will be playing Republican basic strength (keep
out of war) at a time when that issue will be losing its gut appeal,
while the Democrats will be playing their strength (good times
with the party of the people) at a time when their issue will be
gaining in appeal.

d. Meanwhile, the social issue -- personal security, resent-
ment at redistribution of wealth and power by Washington fiat --
will be somewhat blunted by our incumbency. The agitators are
again the Ins. On the whole, we will continue to benefit from our
concern with the Forgotten American, but not to the extent of
slicing deeply into the labor vote, certain decimating Wallace.

e. Confidence in the President as President -- the power of
the incumbency -- will continue to be an asset. Undecideds will
tend to play it safe with the President they know. But the news
focus in 1972 will all be on the selection of the Democratic
nominee; his campaign organization will be bleeded and freshly
tested; and he will go into the campaign with the momentum of a
convention victory and the mantle of new solutions to all our problems.

How, then, should we plan now to make our own appeals unbeatable?
VI. The Peace Theme

a. The President has already sounded the tocsin for "a full
generation of peace." This cannot be allowed to be dropped as
only a '70 campaign phrase -- it is a phrase central to his Ad-
ministration, and must be repeated and reprinted by all
Administration spokesmen. It should be the title of a USIA
documentary; of a book of Nixon foreign policy speeches; of a
Kissinger article in Foreign Affairs Quarterly; of Rogers' speeches
and a Reader's Digest byline. The Full Generation of Peace should
be worked into the Bicentennial planning, it should be the theme
of the Christmas Tree lighting and of Christmas sermons across
the country; it should also be the new theme of the White House
Conference on Children and Youth, because they are the ones who
will enjoy it -- indeed, they will be the "generation of peace" as
we succeed.

This phrase has in it what the Silent Majority, the Forgotten
American, the New Federalism and Forward Together never had --
a specific, realizable promise of hope. When we in the Administra-
are completely tired of it, we will know that we have just begun to
get it across, and we should then redouble our efforts. This is our
own 'war to end wars' and we must not let it go.

b. Punctuating the Peace. We cannot permit peace to limp
in unheralded, causing people to wonder retrospectively, "When
did the war end?" Absent a break in negotiations and a formal
truce-signing, we must create a war's ending of our own. One
time for this would be when the last combat troops left in Vietnam
come home next spring -- there should be a national parade, in
six cities, with veterans of the war marching alongside the last
detachment of troops coming home. Then the following year, when
the last of the remaining troops come home, we should declare
"Homecoming Day" with appropriate festivities.

c. Arms Control. The average American has only the vaguest
idea of what the SALT talks are. Any form of success there, which
we would consider of the greatest significance, would be greeted by
a pleased yawn by the general public.
It may be that we have not played up their significance because of the possibility of stalemate; if, however, there develops a likelihood of even partial success, we should dramatize it with a Presidential visit to Vienna and formal signing of Stage I with Soviet leaders.

Such a ceremony would at once be contrasted with the Kennedy-Khrushchev debacle in the same city, and the summit meeting would be limited to one subject with success foreordained. A subsequent full-range summit would be possible at a later date.

The political tail cannot be made to wag the diplomatic dog, but if progress is forthcoming, we should recognize the fact that the meaning of SALT has not yet begun to permeate the public consciousness, and plan for a much wider understanding of what it means for defense spending and the likelihood of peace.

d. The President as Peacemaker. There was a sign in Illinois that Ollie Atkins got a picture of: "Welcome, Mr. Peace." This is the sign that must appear everywhere in 1972, without our inducement; the President should become known next year as "Mr. Peace." At a commencement speech next June he should be introduced as such, not by a university president but by a student. This, of course, can never be officially sponsored or used by Administration officials, but it should be welcomed when used by supporters. In this way, the President will be the personification of lasting peace. (The use of the term "Mister" can be highly effective: RN used it in his nomination of Goldwater in taking him from "Mr. Conservative" to "Mr. Republican" to "Mr. President".) Mr. Peace, of course leaves all other Misters behind. It is a sobriquet that will ring true as he actually brings the world closer to peace and specifically ends our involvement in a war.

c. The President as Peacekeeper. The preservation of peace, in these times, requires a strong defense. "Only a Strong America can Keep the Peace" should be the theme with which we confront those who would slash the defense budget; "penny-wise and lives foolish" is what we tell those who invite war through US weakness. Exceptions of Wilson, FDR and Truman on preparedness necessary.
We must bridge the gap between making the peace and keeping the peace to overcome the "what have you done for me lately" syndrome. The threat of war will be real after Vietnam; we cannot allow a complacency to settle in, or an attitude to develop that says "You did just fine at what you are best at (ending a war), now let's give the Democrats a chance to do what they're best at (ending unemployment)."

Despite summits, despite possible detentes, we must continually point out the continuing danger to the peace that requires a vigilant, strong President to counter. There is nothing phony about this: The threat will exist, and it is proper national policy to make sure the public knows it. The temptation to say "we've made peace" should be resisted, and replaced with "we've taken the first step -- now the next steps are all-important."

VII. Prosperity Without War

If we do pretty well in slowing inflation and pretty well in reducing unemployment, we could still lose on this issue because (a) it is always attackable as "not enough," and (b) the Democrats have greater public confidence as the party of boom.

Therefore, we merhandizing all we do here not only as precedent-shattering (nobody really cares about how tough it was for us to do) but in terms of how much better off the average man is and in what danger he would be in if the reckless types got in again.

To the workingman, our sell should be "You never got a real raise in the Sixties, but you did get a real raise in the Seventies -- and even bigger real raises are in store."

On unemployment, much as this distresses the purists, we must break away from the old way of figuring unemployment. Total unemployment is a phony figure, since "full" employment starts just under 4% -- but 4% unemployed sounds too much like a lot of people out of work involuntarily, and is too easy a political target. The only unemployment figure that counts is breadwinner unemployment -- married men -- and that is a figure that must be
established as "priority unemployment" and that is the figure we can expect to see heading downward in '71 and '72. There will be screams of rage, but let us change the basis for comparison -- we have a good case to make, economists know it, and it is about time we began judging our efforts in terms of "real" unemployment and setting aside part-timers, teenagers, voluntarily unemployed job-hunters and the rest.

Another aspect of unemployment we must remember is this: It is not so much the number of unemployed that gets the news play, it is the direction of the trend. It is better politically for a 5.5 rate to drop to 5.0 in 1972 than for a 4.0 rate to rise to 4.5. Thus, it is not only economically right for us to take our lumps early next year, but it is politically right as well.

The stock market is important politically. It would be far better for it to sit for a while and then begin a long climb starting toward the end of next year. It will go up when money is easier to borrow and investors are convinced that you are determined to see good times in '72, with a sound basis laid for a genuine prosperity in '73. For that reason we should not seek to change the game plan now -- it would appear to be a panic result of the '72 elections. We suffered this year for doing the right thing, now let's get the nourishment out of it in '72.

One selling theme in '71 should be, "at last you can make plans for the future." We have a relatively stable dollar, and we're chipping away at breadwinner unemployment -- this spells real security at last. Another theme should be "prosperity for all the people" -- reminding the fixed-income people how they suffered in Democratic "prosperity."

To get this across, the President should do some fireside chats in '71 -- FDR's fireside chats were almost always on the subject of the economy, and they gave people the impression he was getting something good done against great obstacles. The speeches were not simplistic; he flattered the public by talking a little over their heads on economic affairs. The important thing is not to utterly educate, but to instill confidence that we're moving right along and things are steadily getting better.
This area, I think, is where the Vice President and the Cabinet should spend a lot of time. Not right away -- the message will not sustain two years of banging away, no message will. But as soon as a turn becomes more evident in 1971, we should begin to hit hard on how right we were, and how wrong were those who would have turned the nation toward rationing and black markets. (Note: We should never talk about "controls" which are popular; the results of controls are not, and we should concentrate on them.)

VIII. Use of the Vice President

The VP doesn't need 'selling' to his supporters, for he can do no wrong in their eyes; nor can he be forgiven by committed partisan Democrats he tagged with "radical liberal."

To widen his support in the middle, we must overcome the sloughing-off of him as a joke by some. The attack on him that would sway many people is not so much that he is a divider (the other side of that coin is that he is a wrangler and a fighter for his beliefs; which will gain him affection) but that he is ludicrous. So: no more big words, no more alliterative flourishies, and no more jokes about him by other members of the Administration, even about golf.

He is an "homme sérieux" and should undertake a series of speeches and articles probing social concerns at great length and with profound seriousness. In this way, he would not be backing off his image of the stern pointer-outer of defects in the body politic, but he would be much harder to attack as inconsequential or frivolous. His views would have to be countered by long and sober-sided tracts, and we should seek out print "debates" on the counterculture, on apathy, on elitism, on the real meaning of intellectualism, on the future of federalism and the like.

It may get a little boring, and it will not make the front pages as much, and it will require the hiring of a good, deep thinker-writer to help out, but it will fit philosophically and it will let some wounds heal over time. By '72, he will be stronger than ever for a political campaign.

"Lying low" would be a mistake; digging deep would be the most productive course.
IX. The White House Glow

1971 should be a year of expanded social, cultural and educational activity in the White House itself. It should be the center of newsworthy activity and a frequent dateline, especially with TV film coverage of innovative events.

We already have a plan ready to go on a series of White House lectures by eminent historians and political scientists to an Administration audience every third week in the East Room. This will take a minimum of Presidential time (perhaps two welcomes in the entire series) and be a source of continuing stories.

We should have at least one Duke-Ellington-type night a month. For each Irving Berlin salute, there should be a Burt Bacharach salute; for each Bob Hope or Jackie Gleason, there should be more modern comics to poke fun at ourselves; for each "1776" there should be a non-musical dramatic presentation, from both on and off Broadway.

The guests at these functions should no longer be limited to fat cats or Administration staff or old friends; they should include TV news editors, society columnists from Detroit and Los Angeles who have never been to a White House function, sports reporters and columnists at functions honoring sports greats, etc.

One of our troubles is that we try something new, it works, and then we drop it before it has a cumulative impact. Case in point: The astronauts dinner in Los Angeles. We should do at least four major state dinners in cities around the nation next year, bringing the full panoply of pomp and circumstance into action in different regions. It will have ten times the impact it gets in Washington and locations and invitations can be picked for the greatest mileage.

Our goal is not recapture Camelot, or to exude a chi-chi image; our aim should be to reflect the excitement of a spectrum of American life and make sure that reflection is adequately disseminated.

The war is ending. Let's turn on the lights.
X. Focus for Hope and Idealism

The Bicentennial Commission, after a year of horseing around, is beginning to come to grips with a plan for the years leading up to 1976.

The President should identify himself as interested in this project and be the center of two events as yet unplanned: Thomas Jefferson's birthday on April 13 and the Fourth of July 1971. A speech about the full generation of peace from the steps of the Jefferson Memorial, and an event on the Fourth of July in Philadelphia should bring into focus the President's ideas about what he wants for the nation and what he thinks the American spirit is all about.

We have posed all kinds of questions in our "national goals" report; the President should begin answering them next year.

In addition, at least one of the President's daughters should become closely associated with the Commission's activities as they begin to generate interest.

The White House Conference on Children and Youth can also be a springboard for our concern with idealism and the American future. The President should give a formal speech here and then make some surprise visits to smaller seminars to listen as well as speak. Out of this conference should grow a National Youth Service, a project Rin promised in the '68 campaign, and one which can channel some energies into worthwhile projects based on voluntarism.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 19, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Election Analysis and the Future

I. Analysis of the President's Election Efforts

Had to be a plus--some gains and avoided big losses. It was a defensive rather than offensive strategy--no way to win big and much to lose. Democrats outnumber us 5-3.

The President should have campaigned. Our prime issue was the social issue, and it blunted the economic issue by getting so much news play and by putting the Democrats on the defensive for some time.

The achievements on the war were spotlighted by the President but not by the press. It did not have the news appeal or glamor of the social issue. To spend much time defending on the economic issue would have called attention to the pocketbook squeeze without relieving the squeeze.

Thus, little fault can be found with the Presidential campaigning. It drew crowds, publicity, and votes, and saved us from disaster.

Our problem seems to be that with our limited budget capacity and lack of Hill support, we do not have a stunning array of achievements to show what we have done materially for people, especially their pocketbooks. We have been in the position of financing Democrat programs and maybe even cutting back on some. We are caught in the position of reporting on the progress we are making.
in solving the nigh-insoluble problems left on our doorstep.

We don't have anything visible to run against such as LBJ. Now we are in power, and most people think we are running everything in Washington. So, when we hit law and order, we are responsible for it, in the public view.

Thus, the prime available issue was used. At the end we probably overdid it, especially with the last TV show and its production defects. In addition to the TV show, candidates have privately criticized the negative ads and too many Washington suggestions.

Had the President sat back we would have gotten the blame for more losses, and no net gains in the Senate. This value of campaigning is clearly indicated by the following vote chart in the Maryland area visited by the President:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republican Registration</th>
<th>Democrat Registration</th>
<th>Beall Vote</th>
<th>Tydings Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th Legislative District</td>
<td>6,260</td>
<td>28,600</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Legislative District</td>
<td>4,870</td>
<td>24,840</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Legislative District</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>25,240</td>
<td>8,600</td>
<td>8,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. Posture the President Should Maintain Through 1971

Through the end of this year the President should be shown working hard and as cordially as possible with the lame duck session. This should shed the partisan image the campaign developed and blunt the idea that the Congress is going to
"get him" for his campaign activities. Also, this would show the President pressing on to get his domestic program moving against the odds and with a willingness to accept the election results whether viewed as good or bad. Any anti-Congress remarks should come from the Cabinet. The President should appeal to the public without appearing to be critical of Congress or partisan.

Then comes the spirit of Christmas and Presidential family togetherness—a good way to conclude the year.

In 1971, there should be more attention given to the domestic side than previously. Partisanship should be kept very limited by the President. However, the basic political spade work for 1972 should be accomplished on a carefully planned schedule by the staff, the RNC, and any outside groups. This includes organizing and propagandizing activities for the President in all states—done on a regional breakdown. Every state should be organized outside the GOP down to the community level. We should establish and supply PR committees in each state with the capability to provide speech material, speaking engagements, letters to editors and Congress, and general PR assistance to all political groups in their states. We need to do this on a regional basis in order to get across the right points in the right places. This would include special attention and treatment for key leaders.

The organizations would be patterned on the citizens operation of 1968. The key names on a state by state breakdown is available. The weak sisters can be weeded out and new blood injected. We will want to get key leaders as we did with the school desegregation committees. Some of these could be starters in the South. To keep these groups interested and organizing, we could send in Administration spokesmen. In all of this, we would keep the President aloof except for private receptions at the White House—like we had for the New Jersey group. The President can appear for
half an hour and then let us feed them first class in the Conference Dining Room. Those New Jersey people were much impressed—cocktails, a talk with the President, a West Wing tour, a White House dinner with a Cabinet member and some staff, and trinkets to take home. The tab for 20 was $184.

I am already getting calls from state leaders wanting me to come for a strategy and planning session for the 1972 campaign. The idea was laid before the Southern Chairmen this week and they fully agree. They want the citizens idea explained to their GOP leadership to get their understanding and assistance in rounding up the most effective non-GOP leaders. The pessimistic columnists had scared them into readiness to launch the 1972 efforts right away.

The RNC needs to get going on party organizational drives. The 1970 performance was not very effective. One reason was the lack of organizational push from the RNC. An expert like Dick Richards of Utah (barely missed election to Congress) should direct such an effort. He is a former State Chairman and Nixon loyalist. The RNC should also study and organize to get the 18-year-old vote.

Presidential visits to states on Presidential business should continue. This is the best non-political campaigning. It would be good to have hit every state with some meeting. 1971 would be a good year to show more courageous leadership actions such as the Cambodia operation. Let's go against the safe or sure route on some domestic matters, even where there is a risk of defeat on an issue—just so we know where we can reasonably expect to wind up. Naturally, these must be issues of public concern where the traditional route is the safe and expected one but where the public really yearns for boldness, even if the action hurts at that time. The Cambodia venture is a perfect example—knowing what to reasonably expect eventually but appearing very bold and
risky at the time of action. A suggestion would be to move with vigor against the hippie revolutionary groups. Also, to abolish some more OEO programs and jobs (CAPs) and do it in the name of fighting waste.

Such planning and thinking may require establishment of a private think tank team.

III. Recommended Changes in Relations with the Media

1. More regional briefings.
2. More news conferences--the President makes points on TV.
4. Let's get some friends to invest in news media purchases.
5. More regional treatment of our PR activities, especially to serve our political and propaganda units we are to set up in 1971.
6. A black PR assistant to work on the black news media.
7. Do more to plug anti-Administration leaks. Leaks should only be positive.

IV. Use of the Vice President and the Cabinet

1. Substantive use of the Vice President to show he is more than a speaker and politician--a potential President.
2. His staff needs strengthening, especially someone like Harlow whose advice and sincerity he respects and will heed.

3. Continue to show support for the Vice President.

4. Why not have more frequent Cabinet meetings, using the Vice President in place of the President to conduct idea, advice, and political briefing sessions to be transmitted to the President and to pass on orders the President need not or may not desire to give?

5. Continue our speakers bureau and use the Cabinet to make more appearances where the President and Vice President can't accept.

V. Relations with Congress

A tough job—will be tougher now. Strategy and use of the public to assist us will be important. We may need more staff here. Many of our problems here may stem from not enough time and personnel to do the little but essential ego-rubbing—like periodic visits to their offices to hear them out and seek their advice, on both sides. A visit by a White House aide always impressed me when on the Hill. They can never be satisfied, but we can politick them more with more help.

Our biggest complaints come on departmental liaison shops. We may need a super liaison chief for all of them.

Congressmen feel an air of arrogance from our people in the departments and non-liaison people in the White House. We should school all our people on Congressional relations and the way to rub their egos with rather than against the grain.

Friendly Democrats should especially be wooed with an independent type Nixon Democrat they respect.
Timmons seems to need more identification with clout or proximity to the President.

Big receptions at the White House get Congressmen down here and in the presence of the President. They can then say they get down here frequently.

We should have a few Congressional friends who secretly listen for us on the Hill. These people talk and gripe mightily. Knowing their thinking and tempers can be helpful. Also we should have some planted talkers of our own in the cloakrooms. The listeners aren't necessarily the talkers.

MacGregor and Bush working at a high level should help.

Harlow will leave a hole.

VI. Presidential Travel

Continue to visit states on Presidential visits.

A trip to Moscow or to Japan after the trade battle.

VII. Other Suggestions

1. We need better control over the Executive Branch. We got better control on the final phase of desegregation and avoided troubles when Morgan was given a special assignment.

2. We need a czar to get the President's will implemented outside the White House. This should be either the Vice President or a Cabinet-rank man known to have the confidence of the President. He would insure one voice where we want one voice and orchestrate more than one when desired. Also, he would enforce house cleaning and bureaucrat control. We will have more trouble here as we head toward 1972.
3. We still don't get enough political action out of our people. The Democrats play politics while Republicans rely too much on merit. Result: they win more than we do. We even defy the laws of politics with some of our "meritorious" actions. Some look for a way to say "no" when "yes" is easier. VA and GSA find a way to say "yes."

4. We need more political input on entertainment and church. A good job was done on this Sunday's service.

5. We need more substance to go with the PR techniques we are using. At the end of four years we must show some meat with the potatoes. What can we sell in 1972—that we have ameliorated problems and reformed programs left by Democrats, but what else have we done. We need more emphasis on substance.

6. The Administration needs to project a warmer and more human image. This can't be contrived—must be honest. Examples: The White House staff picked up wood along the Potomac one Saturday; Tricia's Halloween party for D. C. children; General Hughes' cooperation in providing a military helicopter to move a crash victim to a hospital—these and some other human interest stories all got good press, but we need more!

7. More direct Presidential involvement in selected "human interest" situations would be good. The President might consider doing something where the "Bring Us Together" theme can be renewed. If we don't hang on to that line—and do it legitimately, the Democrats are going to take it and turn it on us in 1972.

8. This Administration hasn't displayed much of a sense of humor—except for Martha Mitchell. We appear a little negative and unhappy, and this particularly turns off the younger people—many of them really do think that "Democrats have more fun."
We (Republicans and the Administration) tend to come over as being stuffy. Better PR should be able to improve at least part of this. (The Buckley family has been very successful in projecting a positive and human image while being conservative.)

We should really work at projecting this warmer image at the Congress.

Harry S. Dent
Memorandum to the President

From Patrick J. Buchanan

November 6, 1970

STRATEGY

Looking back, in my view, the Social Issue was clearly the right one upon which to focus in the campaign. We took the lead on it with the Vice President's speeches; forced one Democrat after another to defend himself, to get on the right side of it -- and thus precluded their taking the offensive on the only good issue they had -- the economic one. Secondly, the issue clearly worked. Tunney spent half the campaign getting out of police cars; Stevenson was talking about his Marine Corps record by the campaign's end and wearing a flag pin in his lapel; Humphrey ran on law and order -- and Kennedy was calling campus militants "campus commandos." (The President might have noted on election night that the Senior Senator from Massachusetts now has a haircut.) What happened this campaign -- in a number of instances -- was that Democrats like Tunney and
Stevenson got themselves back on the right side of this issue, through speeches and spots, as Scamanon and Wattenburg had urged them to do -- and once they got right on this issue; it became a contest on personalities and on the economic issue, I would guess, and they won hands down.

On the other hand, if Ottinger had gotten well on this issue he would very probably be the new Senator from New York.

Those Democrats who did go hardline on law and order apparently gave up nothing on their left -- just as S-W contended (the kids have nowhere else to go) and won the suburbs. Moreover they were able to endorse the President's peace initiative and Mideast policy, thus losing nothing there.

Those candidates, who came off in the election as out and out liberals, Gore and Goodell and Duffy -- and did not get well on our issues -- were defeated.

The legitimate question to ask the Mortons and others is what issues they would have had us run on, take the offensive on. Had we devoted our campaign to the economic issue -- those final statistics about a seven billion deficit for the first quarter, the .5 retail price increase, the GM loss, the massive increase in industrial price index would have been crippling blows. Had we devoted all our effort to the economic issues, Gore would have won -- and Buckley very probably lost.
As for our domestic programs -- from my travels around the
country with the Vice President -- everybody thought revenue
sharing was nice while most of our guys were running away from
the Welfare Plan -- and we constantly had to stress work incentives.
All through the South and Southwest this was hurting, not helping us.

My main reservation about the Social Issue campaign was that
we started too hard, too early. We threw the Democrats completely
on the defensive in the first two weeks -- but they still had six weeks
to get well on the issue, to alter their campaign spots to deal with
the issue; and like Tunney and Stevenson and Kennedy, they clearly
succeeded in doing this. Smith specifically started his hard-line too
soon, considering media's impact.

One thing we underestimated by a long shot is our ability to
command the media and get our points across -- we do not need to
hit something day in and day out for eight weeks now -- we can do it
in a matter of two-hours and be successful. In retrospect we might
have been better off to start out -- not full-bore -- but low-keyed,
light and positive, and then gone over on the all-out offensive around
the second week of October -- which would not have given the opposition
enough time to re-orient their campaigns.

There is another point that should not go unanswered. The
"social issue" was not a "missile gap" issue -- i.e., a complete
creation of our campaign -- it was an issue created by the people
of this country who declared it to be their prime concern in state
after state after state. It would have been utter folly not to recog-
nize public concerns on this issue; recognize we were positioned
correctly and go after our opponents.

When one considers the other issues; the economy -- where we
had problems; foreign policy, where the Mideast could go up, where
the U.S. Soviet relations were cooling; and RN had proposed a cease-
fire which the doves could say they had called for long ago -- we had
nothing to draw a sharp line of division with them; nothing which we
could take to the country and say clearly -- here we stand; here they
stand -- throw them out for this reason and put us in. We have to
remember that we were trying to throw them out of office -- not keep
ourselves in -- and in that kind of effort you have to go on the offensive
for the people are not going to understand why there is a need for a
change.

THE ECONOMY

Clearly, this must have hurt -- I see nothing else to explain why
Reagan did not get the margin everyone predicted -- after the dismal
campaign of Mr. Unruh. Also, it seems to me the only explanation
why our Western Senators went down so badly when we had felt they
might all run a close race.
(Incidentally, whoever was giving us the optimistic poll information ought to be called upon for some ample explanation why they were so far off.)

Looking at the races by State -- which we have to do -- I think we can see what won or lost it. There were it seems no national trends -- as this was not a national election.

Connecticut, the President certainly helped -- so also did the Vice President in convincing conservatives and GOPers that Weicker was acceptable and even desirable. This helped with the Dodd voters.

In New York, the White House and Vice President can legitimately claim to have won this by the attack on Goodell, bringing liberals into his camp, and by letting New York know that Buckley was both acceptable and desirable. The Social Issue here finished the Democratic candidate -- what else explains why a young, good-looking Democrat can't get 40 per cent of the vote in New York. Also, Rocky hit hard on the Social issue.

In New Jersey, our friend, Gross injured himself with his campaign tactics -- wherein he took left-wing anti-Nixon positions and then shifted himself back. I don't know the ultimate reasons for his defeat -- but a social issue campaign by Cahill against a drawing board liberal won by half a million in that state.
In Pennsylvania, God knows why Scott won so narrowly against an unknown -- we ought to find out. Perhaps economy.

In Maryland, the President helped certainly -- but this was an "anti-Tydings vote" because in my view Tydings ran a hell of a good strong campaign. The Mahoney people just couldn't hack him.

In Virginia we had a nice liberal Republican running and he got 15 per cent of the vote.

In Tennessee, we were running against a hell of a campaigner, in Albert Gore; he had the best media and press of any campaigner in the country; he ran as a fighting underdog, the "Grey Fox," and the only reason we beat this fellow was the issues -- not on candidates or personalities.

In Texas, I don't know why George Bush lost -- but he lost to a fellow who was as tough or tougher than he was on the social issues. So, this surely did not lose Texas. Economy, desire for 1 Dem and 1 GOP Senator (originally won for Tower) and perhaps even rumor about Bush for Agnew hurt.

Florida, we got beat because we beat ourselves with the Carswell gambit, with the Kirk-Guerney-Cramer feud, which turned off the voters of both parties -- and because the Democrats came up with two populist conservatives who had no scars and a lot of attractiveness.
If I were a Florida Republican, I would have been fed up with the GOP nonsense and Kirk myself -- and the fellows elected seemed conservative enough.

As for the nonsense that this proves the failure of the Southern Strategy -- we ought to ignore it. Bentsen and Chiles are not liberals. The only two Southern liberals in this election -- Gore and Yarborough were defeated. Any Southern Strategy is part of a presidential strategy -- it does not apply to Democratic conservatives running at the State level -- indeed, RN and Vice President Agnew are as popular as ever south of the Mason-Dixon line -- and would sweep that area still in a national election.

In Indiana, we had a candidate who was not the most attractive fellow in the world; some of his tactics brought out into the open were questionable; if he wins it will be because of the issues, and because of our visits. Certainly, it won't be on his personality.

In Michigan, the GOP had a disastrous primary and came out with the worst possible candidate -- and Hart is attractive, without enemies, and the Warren incident made it hard to handle the social issue -- and Mrs. Romney's basic positions are unsuitable to that kind of campaign.

In Illinois, Stevenson scrambled for his life after the first two weeks of the campaign -- and succeeded in getting well on the issue by his flag pin, emphasizing his Marine career, hiring Foran as his
Deputy Campaign Manager and climbing between the sheets with none other than old Law and Order himself, Richard J. Daley.

In Missouri — money, and a young and attractive candidate almost knocked off Symington, who has lost touch with the people of the State of Missouri.

In the West, we went down like Ninepins in the Senate races — the only thing I can see as the reason here is that perhaps the Social Issue does not have the bite of the economic issues in the great plains. But the economic issue does — as the President knows from hearing the howls of GOP Senators at even the least mention of a cutback in public works. Perhaps the farm vote let loose here. Shuman's gripes and drops in farm prices had been ominous portents.

In California, it must have been the economy — since everyone agreed that Reagan ran a tremendous campaign, was popular, and Unruh was a joke. Also, again, Tunney spent the campaign getting out of police cars — and if that issue was neutralized, then Murphy was through, due to Technicolor, age, condition and economy.

THE HOUSE

Most analyses indicate that one percent in unemployment can be translated into an additional loss of five House seats above and beyond
usual off-year losses -- well, we had two points of unemployment
higher than full employment -- and that might well explain our 10
defeats in the House. Also, a number of popular House incumbents
were put up for Senate races -- which contributes to that figure.
(US News showed that 51 seats were average off-year loss in those
years when unemployment was on the increase.)

THE GOVERNORS

Here is the big loss; here is the major problem -- along with
the State Legislatures. Again, we can go down them one by one.

Pennsylvania -- They had us on the State issues after the Shafer-
Broderick Administration.

Ohio -- The scandal plus a commonplace candidate against
Gilligan lost this even before it was started. (Note -- however,
Gilligan was outraged and went to court on that quote we were using
against him.)

Wisconsin -- A real disaster here, a real problem for 1972 --
partially explained by the incredible showing of Proxmire, who gets
the entire Democratic vote; who does well on a national television;
and who has the image in Wisconsin of a fellow who saves the taxpayers
dollars. Erickson was regarded all along as a weak sister and his poor
showing pulled Olson down as well.
Maine and Rhode Island -- the near losses here for Democrats indicate the vulnerability of Governors in times of rising prices and rising taxes; vulnerabilities which have little to do with whether they are pro-Nixon or Democratic. (Muskie's coattails showed little attraction here.)

Arkansas -- A populist Democrat got the Wallace vote, and Mr. Rockefeller did not run on the Social Issue; indeed he would have been especially hard put to hit permissiveness. He lost this one himself -- and Bumpers is an example of the new breed of hard-headed Democrat populists that did well all over the South.

Florida -- Kirk lost it for well-known reasons.

The Western Governors -- I don't know why some of these failed to win; it would be worth a close investigation -- but ab initio I would attach it to State issues, to the vulnerability of executive incumbents -- who are blamed when things go wrong more readily than might a Congressman or Senator be blamed.

FINAL POINTS

SOME TURKEYS

One reason we did not do better was that in many states, we did not field our strongest possible candidate. George would have done
better than Lenore; Lugar better than Roudebush; Finch better than Murphy; Laxalt better than Raggio; Andrews better than Kleppe; most anyone better than Smith. We had a few turkeys out there -- and it is not an easy thing to unseat an incumbent Senator; the odds are long against it. (Something like 8-1.) Indeed, two of ours who lost were appointed -- not elected to the job -- Goodell and Smith.

CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING

Much of this has become counterproductive because of the massive nature of it; because of the negative publicity it gets from press and networks. Also, some of the harsher attacks from our side are certain to gather the irate attention of the liberal media -- just as those cutting ads in the final weeks outraged all networks -- and they said so. The adverse reaction to campaign ads may not have helped our last night's stump speech appearance. But clearly the technical problems with that show outranked any gain or loss based on substance of speech.

On the law and order issue -- clearly it can be overdone as we believe Smith overdid it in the suburbs -- where he ran as poorly as any Republican ever ran. There is a point of diminishing returns on the Social Issue -- as George Wallace found out. But our problem was that we began too early too hard in my view -- enabling the Democrats to reposition themselves and effectively defend it.
SOCIAL ISSUE

It was the right issue for us in 1970 -- but we should remember that in 1972 -- they will be using it against us to some effect, if it is not visible that there has been a national change in either climate or statistics.

THE PRESIDENT

-We are getting a bum rap on the President's campaign -- being accused of appealing to fears, of a divisive polarizing campaign -- that is simply not true -- but it is a result of our natural enemies in the Media. The President however, did go out and fight for his candidates, in the GOP -- and the presentation of RN as a partisan necessarily involves some attrition in his national image as President of all the people, above the battle. We ought to review here whether the gains from this campaigning is worth the risk of depreciation of our most vital political asset -- the Presidency.

THE CAMPAIGN

Victory has a thousand fathers; defeat is an orphan. Some of the bitching and moaning are now coming from individuals who had no hand in the selection of the strategy -- and much of what they say might reflect certain sour grapes. This should be taken into consideration just as the consideration that those who favored this strategy (i.e., me) also have an investment in its vindication.
VICE PRESIDENT

He carried out his assignment to the letter. We kept the national media off our backs — gnawing at us — until the final two weeks by virtue of an unprecedented amount of fresh, useable copy. We ran a rough hard-hitting campaign, which has been distorted by the media — but which raised both money and enthusiasm and good publicity very nearly everywhere we went.

The President will recall that in 1958, with more serious economic dislocation, and a popular Republican President, and a hard campaign — we lost 57 seats in the House. We did one hell of a lot better this year — and among the reasons is the aggressiveness of our campaign against the Democrats, the media we received by virtue of the Vice President's controversial positions and his out-spokenness — and the strategy we used which was devised and approved by the President.

But, just as the President suffered nationally, by his reputation as a fighting partisan in the fifties — so also, has this Vice President.

Strong recommendation is that he be given responsibility for some domestic area where he can come off as a fighting progressive — also, that he be authorized to deliver some speeches on new Nixon Administration initiatives, in domestic policy. And perhaps a major speech
or two outlining Administration foreign policy. All these things he can garner great publicity for -- at the same time he broadens his own national image -- and thus becomes a more effective campaigner on the stump.

Because of the nature of the request -- I will withhold for the time being thoughts both substantive and political -- looking toward 1972.
In answer to the request for some post-election thoughts, I would like to take the liberty of spinning out my personal reactions without necessarily trying to establish their general validity.

First, I believe that the campaign schedules of the Vice President and President were almost exactly right. It was wise to start the Vice President early and tough and -- considering the gravity of the situation -- to have the President come in with an intensive move at the end.

Looking first at the Vice President's campaigning, it seems to me that he came on as he should have -- hard and natural. But then he tended to overdo it.

First -- and perhaps a minor point -- he piled up too much alliteration. A little about pusillanimous pussyfooting and nattering nabobs of negativism was fine -- it got attention -- but then he did so much of this that it became a joke and even many of our good friends got to be a little embarrassed about it.

Beyond this, he seemed to be indulging in overshrill and over-kill. Instead of landing a good hard punch and letting his target
drop, he pounded and pounded. The media began dwelling on this and eventually many of our supporters began to feel that maybe the Vice President was hitting too hard. The Christine Jorgensen line about Goodell is an example. By then Charlie was bloody and reeling, and that line left the Vice President open to charges of cruelty and bad taste that made even some of his best fans wince.

Fairly early in the campaign, we made a hard turn -- and in my opinion, it was too hard a turn. At the meeting with the Cabinet on August 19 when political matters were discussed, the President struck what seemed to me to be a very good tone. The President said the economy would be the most important factor in the election. Above all, the President urged, spokesmen should take a positive position on what the Administration is doing and is trying to do, should also be positive about our candidates, should hit what the Congress has not done but should beware of building up opposition candidates by attacking them in a negative way.

Then, along the way, we bought Scammon and Wattenberg. And, in my judgment, we bought more of their theory than we should have. The opposition soon saw what we were up to and moved toward joining us.

In our intense concentration on the Scammon and Wattenberg thesis, we did not pay enough attention to the fact that the economic
issue -- fear of depression -- was cutting us to the bone in a broad sweep across the west. The irony of this is that the President had warned repeatedly about this issue -- the fear of what might happen in the economic situation, not necessarily what the present situation was. The opposition exploited this fear expertly. We did not pay enough attention to the issue.

Despite all this, I think the President's campaigning was -- in the main -- close to target. Ultimately it came through the media as too negative -- and that's a serious problem -- but anyone who was really paying attention knew there was a great deal of the positive, too. The Anaheim rally was generally fine on national television -- a bit too much of Reagan and Murphy for national consumption -- but the President was just right.

Then we made a shattering error. Putting the Phoenix rally speech on national television the night before the elections was a dreadful blunder. First of all, a taped rally speech is basically not a good piece of material for national use on TV. In this instance, the sound, the setting, the approach made the President seem angry and harsh and almost mean. The substance was unobjectionable but the effect was not Presidential. And the strategy gave the opposition an opportunity to put on Muskie who seemed very statesmanlike, even if quite dull.
It was a mistake to have the President on television at all the night before this election. By then the people had heard enough campaigning. But if the President felt it was necessary to go on, then the format should have been a quiet chat in a studio or office setting -- the kind of presentation in which the President has proven that he has no peer.

In the last analysis, I do not think that the Monday night mistake had much effect on the results. But I am concerned that it was damaging to the President's image in the longer term. It left the wrong tone and opened the way to the interpretation that the whole campaign was bitter and harsh.

Turning from the general tone to a specific area, I believe that in retrospect it was a mistake for the Administration to be wooing the leaders of organized labor. We throw a big Labor Day dinner for them and they go out and bludgeon us with rhetoric and money spent for the opposition. Besides, they are on the wrong side of a very big issue: inflationary pressure. I realize there are other factors involved here, but I fear that when the Administration cosies up to the labor bosses it only tends to alienate a lot of other people who are more likely to be on its side.

As for the future, I think the Administration must now realize that it is "the Government in Washington, D. C." From now on, there should be intense concentration on achievement and solid
accentuation of the positive. It is no longer profitable to emphasize what the Administration is against; from now on, the emphasis must be on what the Administration is for -- what it has done and is doing. I fear that with our constant feeling that we do not do a good enough selling job we have come too close to the attitude that it doesn't make much difference what we do so long as we sell it right.

In terms of the Administration's relationships with the media, I can do no better than repeat what I wrote in a memo in June:

"I believe we are relying too much on what -- to use a crude term -- I can only describe as gimmicks. We would do ourselves more good by being more straightforward.

Too many people are spending too much time drawing up too many game plans. This may make us feel better and it may make a record on paper -- it seems to show action -- but I doubt that it is getting results that are worth all that effort.

Let's face a few facts. Most of the working media people are 1) against us, and 2) suspicious of us. In the main, they are hard to fool, although they often fool themselves -- and that usually gives them an even more negative
stance so far as we are concerned. It is very difficult for us to put anything over on them; it is practically impossible for us to subvert them. If they were for us we could do these things; since they are not, we can't.

When we try a gimmick they usually are waiting at the entrance to the alley and they wind up making us look more devious than we are. This gives us a credibility problem. The results more often turn out to be counter-productive. And the media wind up being more suspicious of us than ever.

I think we should do what we're going to do and present our case for it straightforwardly and not try to be quite so cute. In the long run, this could be a big plus with the media. They would be unbelieving at first, then startled when they realized that we really were playing it straight. In the end, while they might not be any more for us, I believe they would respect us.

One tactic that I believe we should use more is the honest-to-God calculated leak. I don't mean a contrived leak where we are just trying to sell a line, but a factual leak of a coming development. This is probably the best way to get a favorable first story out in a big way. The
reporter and editor who have the story are too anxious to protect it to let our opposition tear it apart before they deliver it. And a reporter or editor who knows that he is getting a big break on some important stories is a little less apt to be negative.

All this may seem too simple and too direct but I believe that in the long run it would be a better approach than trying to con a cynical media corps that has seen so many gimmicks for so many years. A straightforward approach might shock them toward straight reporting."

###