

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
 Contested Materials Collection
 Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
44	10	9/27/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	To: Gordon Strachan From: Jeb Magruder RE: For Your Information - California Polls. Includes memos from Thomas C. Reed, Robert H. Marik, Harry Dent RE: "Listening Post" data. Survey data and California poll for 09/09/1971 attached. 19pgs.
44	10	7/2/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	To: Gordon Strachan From: Dick RE: For Your Information RE: DMI analysis of "When the Voter Makes Up His Mind Prior to Voting." DMI analysis and memos from Jim Cavanaugh, Dick, and Ron Baukol attached. 58pgs
44	10	4/13/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Letter	To: Bob From: Thomas C. Reed RE: Thanks for your call. Discussed data enclosed. Highlights of Post-Election DMI statewide California Survey from November 5-8, 1970, attached. 5pgs
44	10	5/26/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	To: H.R. Haldeman From: Gordon Strachan RE: Polls from Minnesota and California with interesting sections marked. Minnesota and California polling data RE: Vietnam war and other candidates attached. 9pgs

COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

September 27, 1971

FOR: GORDON STRACHAN

FROM: JEB MAGRUDER

For your information.

*H needn't
see
pills-
lolil*

September 27, 1971

Mr. Thomas C. Reed
Member for California
Executive Committee
Republican National Committee
P. O. Box 371
San Rafael, California 94902

Dear Tom:

The "Listening Post" project looks to be a very useful barometer of the political climate for the President in California. I will appreciate receiving subsequent reports as they are issued and will see that the information is transmitted to the appropriate people connected with the campaign.

I think we have arrived at a good arrangement with Compass Systems and the Reapportionment Trustee Committee. The next step will be for us to work out plans to assure that the system is used most effectively in winning California in 1972. I will be in contact with you as we proceed in that direction.


Many thanks for your help.

Sincerely,

Robert H. Marik

RHM:jm

cc:JSM Jeb - Who else should see this?



Republican
National
Committee.

22 September 1971

Thomas C. Reed
Member for California
Executive Committee
Republican National Committee
P. O. Box 371
San Rafael, California 94902
(415) 456-7310

Dear Bob:

We have embarked on a continuous polling project in the Los Angeles area which should give us a reasonable estimate of the President's strength and possible opponents in California.


I am enclosing a memorandum explaining the system and a summary of the first, August, results.

Very best regards,

Thomas C. Reed

Mr. Robert Marik
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, #272
Washington, D.C.

Bob - Hope I was of some help. please
don't hesitate to call. Tom




Republican National Committee.

Thomas C. Reed
Member for California
Executive Committee
Republican National Committee
P. O. Box 371
San Rafael, California 94902
(415) 456-7310

"Listening Post" consists of 1,000 telephone interviews monthly in Los Angeles and Orange Counties. Respondents are those over 18, whether registered to vote or not.

Voting patterns during the 1960's indicate that if one knows the vote results in Los Angeles and Orange Counties, he also knows the upper and lower bounds of all statewide results. In particular, Nixon or Reagan, when running for President or Governor, never did better statewide than their percentage of the total vote in Los Angeles and Orange combined, and never did worse than their percentage in Los Angeles alone.

The 1964 Goldwater presidential election involved a north-south split, but even so, the rule was approximately correct. The chart below illustrates this result.



Since President Nixon and Governor Reagan will be the principal political figures in California in 1972, it seems reasonable to save costs by tracking only in Los Angeles and Orange Counties and extrapolating statewide implications.

The polling organization for "Listening Post" is DMI. The project contract continues monthly through May 1972, with a final pre-primary report on 1 June, five days before the primary.

1,000 telephone interviews in Los Angeles and Orange Counties 10 August-30 August 1971 (5 days before and 15 days after the 15 August presidential economic statement).

1. REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY (Republicans only)

"If the Republican Presidential Primary were held today, and the nominees were Pete McCloskey and Richard Nixon, for whom would you vote?"

	This Survey	May 1971 Statewide
Nixon	75.1%	74.4%
McCloskey	7.5%	7.7%
Undecided	17.4%	17.9%

2. DEMOCRAT PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY (Democrats only)

"Which Democrat would you personally like to see nominated for President?"

	This Survey	Statewide "Field" Poll Published 9/8/71
E. Kennedy	32.3%	37.0%
E. Muskie	17.5%	19.0%
H. Humphrey	13.1%	13.0%

3. GENERAL ELECTION

A. Nixon-Kennedy-Wallace: "Now suppose the election for President were held today and the candidates were Richard Nixon, Republican; Ted Kennedy, Democrat; George Wallace, American Independent; how would you vote:

	Nixon	Kennedy	Wallace	No Answer
Total	39.4%	44.0%	8.5%	8.0%
Republicans	75.1%	12.0%	7.5%	5.4%
Democrats	19.8%	61.4%	8.8%	10.0%
Age 18-24	25.2%	65.4%	4.9%	5.5%
Age 25-34	34.1%	50.6%	8.6%	6.7%
Spanish surname	22.3%	61.7%	8.5%	7.4%

B. To measure a base level of support: "Now if the election for President were held today and Richard Nixon were running for reelection, would you vote for him?"

	Yes	No	Depends	No answer
Total	30.4%	43.5%	17.6%	8.5%
Republicans	58.8%	16.6%	19.1%	5.5%
Democrats	14.3%	60.8%	17.9%	7.0%

4. MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS:

National:

Economic (inflation, unemployment, etc.)	35%
Vietnam, war and peace	20%
Environment	12%

State of California:

Economic		55(!)
(Unemployment	20%	
Too much Welfare	19%	
Taxes	10%	
Inflation	<u>6%</u>	
Environment		14%

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*File
Polly
Diagrams*

Date: September 27, 1971

TO: BOB HALDEMAN

FROM: HARRY DENT *ASD*

Please handle _____

For your information ✓ _____

*If need not
see
9/27*

Sent to Haldeman, Nofziger, Magruder 9/27/71

Rank

*Copy to - Haldeman
- Magruder
- Nofziger*



Republican
National
Committee.

21 September 1971

Thomas C. Reed
Member for California
Executive Committee
Republican National Committee
Box 371
Rafael, California 94902
(415) 456-7310

Dear Harry:

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I am enclosing a memorandum explaining the system and a summary of the first, August, results.

Very best regards,

Thomas C. Reed

Mr. Harry S. Dent
The White House
Washington, D.C.

*I've sent a copy
directly to A/G Mitchell.
You're all in danger with Brownell
back in town (yours).*

*Best to Rose
T.*


Republican
National
Committee.

Thomas C. Reed
Member for California
Executive Committee
Republican National Committee
P.O. Box 371
San Rafael, California 94902
510 456-7310

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The polling organization for "Listening Post" is DMI. The project contract continues monthly through May 1972, with a final pre-primary report on 1 June, five days before the primary.

"LISTENING POST"
Preliminary Survey Results, 21 September 1971

EXHIBIT B

1,000 telephone interviews in Los Angeles and Orange Counties 10 August-30 August 1971 (5 days before and 15 days after the 15 August presidential economic statement).

1. REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY (Republicans only)

"If the Republican Presidential Primary were held today, and the nominees were Pete McCloskey and Richard Nixon, for whom would you vote?"

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Spanish surname	22.3%	61.7%	8.5%	7.4%

"LISTENING POST" Preliminary Survey Results, 21 September 1971

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	Yes	No	Depends	No answer
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4. MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS:

National:

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Vietnam, war and peace	20%
Environment	12%

State of California:

Economic		55%(!)
(Unemployment	20%	
Too much Welfare	19%	
Taxes	10%	
Inflation	<u>6%</u>	
Environment		14%

Against Senator George McGovern, who presently is not as well-known to the rank and file voters as some of the other Democratic candidates and Hubert Humphrey the 1968 Democratic nominee, Nixon had small leads. However, Nixon had a sizeable or extremely large lead when pitted against other Democratic presidential contenders, such as Senators Birch Bayh, Henry Jackson, William Proxmire, Fred Harris, and Congressman Wilbur Mills. Nixon's biggest lead occurred when Los Angeles Mayor Samuel Yorty was listed as the Democratic presidential nominee.

	All voters -- Statewide			All voters -- Statewide	
	Wallace out	Wallace in*		Wallace out	Wallace in*
Nixon	48%	43%	Nixon	49%	46%
McGovern	41	39	Harris	29	25
Undecided	11	9	Undecided	22	19
Nixon	49%	43%	Nixon	50%	47%
Humphrey	41	38	Mills	27	22
Undecided	10	8	Undecided	23	20
Nixon	49%	45%	Nixon	60%	53%
Bayh	33	29	Yorty	24	20
Undecided	18	15	Undecided	16	18
Nixon	49%	45%	Nixon	51%	46%
Proxmire	34	28	Jackson	28	27
Undecided	17	15	Undecided	21	16

(*In these trial heats Wallace's strength ranges from 9 to 12 percentage points. As in the other pairings, the Wallace vote does not appear to effect significantly the relative position of the two major party candidates.)

A comparison of Nixon's early August 1971 position vis-a-vis two of his possible Democratic rivals next year with previous California Poll measurements illustrate the decline in his popularity. For example in two cases where previous measurements are available a previous lead of six percentage points over either Kennedy or Muskie had been transformed to an 11 percentage point deficit behind Kennedy and a 7 percentage point deficit to Muskie.

	All voters -- Statewide		
	August 1971	May 1971	November 1970
NIXON	39%	44%	47%
MUSKIE	46	45	41
WALLACE	10	4	4
UNDECIDED	5	7	8
NIXON	38%	43%	47%
KENNEDY	49	46	41
WALLACE	7	3	4
UNDECIDED	6	8	8

(MORE)

Nixon's announcement of his new economic program has occasioned considerable favorable comment, and since making it, it is believed by many observers that his popularity position with the voters has improved.

It is quite clear that the domestic economy had emerged as the number one issue, and that Nixon's re-election chances hinge on his ability to fulfill the promise of his new program that he can turn the domestic economy around.

-30-

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SEP 17 1971
116

THE CALIFORNIA POLL

THE INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL STATEWIDE SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION
ESTABLISHED AND OPERATED BY FIELD RESEARCH CORPORATION SINCE 1946

San Francisco Headquarters
145 Montgomery Street
San Francisco 94104
392-5766

Los Angeles Office
3142 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles 90005
385-5259

Mervin D. Field, Director
Robert Heyer, Editor

INFORMATION ABOUT THIS SURVEY

Dates
Dates of interviewing:

August 2 - 8, 1971

Population
Population covered by survey:

Representative cross-section of California adult public

Number
Number of interviews:

This report is based on opinions of a sample of 508 persons: 181 self-identified as Republicans, 252 as Democrats, and 75 other party or no political affiliation.

Sample
Sample design:

The survey interviews are selected in accordance with a probability sample design which provides for random (i.e., non-judgmental) selection of households. Assignments in a particular place are done in clusters with randomly drawn addresses as starting points for each cluster of interviews. For this survey, 240 clusters throughout the state were selected. Each cluster consisted of a set of consecutive households beginning with the designated starting household. Interviewers made up to three calls on every listed address in an attempt to complete an interview. One adult per household was selected for interview on a systematic basis to provide a balance by sex and age. Interviewing was conducted during late afternoon and evening on weekdays and all day on the week-end. The sample is designed to be self-weighted on all variables of interest, such as area of state, degree of urbanization, political party affiliation, and socio-economic status. Whenever imbalances in key variables occur in the sample due to sampling variability or other factors, corrective weights are applied during the data processing stage to return the sample to proper proportion.

Wording
Wording of the questions on which report is based:

"I know that the 1972 presidential election is more than a year away, but let's assume it was being held this month. If you were voting today, who would you vote for? (CARDS WERE SHOWN TO RESPONDENT LISTING TRIAL HEAT PAIRINGS.)

"Now, let's assume that in addition to the two major parties -- Democrat and Republican -- there was also a George Wallace ticket. If you were voting today and the presidential ballot looked like this who would you vote for? (CARDS WERE SHOWN TO RESPONDENT LISTING THREE PARTY TRIAL HEAT PAIRINGS.)

(See reverse side for answers to some typical questions about the Poll)

NOTE TO EDITORS: Following are answers to some questions frequently asked about The California Poll. These may be helpful for your own background or to answer questions put to you about The Poll. Any or all of this may be published at your option.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE CALIFORNIA POLL

Q. Who runs The California Poll ?

A. The California Poll is owned and operated by Field Research Corporation, an independent national public opinion and marketing research agency with headquarters in San Francisco. The Poll was founded in 1946 and has been published continuously since that time. The Poll is non-partisan.

Q. Who pays for the surveys conducted by The California Poll ?

A. The cost of operating The California Poll is underwritten by 13 newspapers and four television stations in California. Each one pays an annual fee for exclusive publication or broadcast rights in its area. The Poll does not accept fees from any candidates, political parties, or individuals who have any interest in the data being published. Its sole purpose is to report public opinion objectively and accurately.

Q. How are The California Poll's surveys conducted ?

A. The surveys are made by means of personal interviews conducted by trained interviewers using printed questionnaires. Survey respondents are selected by scientific methods to assure that an accurate cross section of adults in all walks of life throughout the state and representing all shades of political belief are included in their proper proportion in the sample.

Q. Are the same people interviewed in each survey ?

A. No. Fresh samples of respondents are drawn for each survey. (Panels of respondents re-interviewed at intervals are also a valid and valuable research technique for certain special purposes, but they are seldom used for surveys of the type conducted by The California Poll.)

Q. How are the samples selected and how many people are interviewed ?

A. Samples are drawn by probability sampling methods which give each household in the state an equal chance of being called on for an interview. Within households, the interviewers select adult respondents to fit sex and age quotas to match the state population as a whole. Samples vary in size between 500 and 1000 respondents per survey.

Q. Do people give honest answers to surveys of this type ?

A. In countless surveys of this type we have found that people are remarkably candid in talking to our interviewers, and wherever we have an opportunity to test the validity of their answers (for example, in an election) there is good evidence that they have actually given us their true opinions. We recognize that without public confidence surveys of this kind would be impossible and so we guarantee each respondent complete anonymity. After a percentage of the interviews have been validated by supervisors, the data are compiled only as statistical summaries. Names of survey respondents are never released for sales or political use.

Q. Are sample surveys of this type accurate ?

A. Time after time it has been demonstrated that carefully designed samples of this size are very reliable. Wherever the results can be checked against known data, they have proved to be accurate with relatively narrow tolerance limits. For example, a survey of 1000 respondents typically will be accurate within plus or minus approximately 4.5 percentage points, and a survey of 500 respondents has a tolerance range of about 6.7 percentage points. Thousands of such surveys are done each year for business and government and great reliance is put on their findings.

[See reverse side for specific information about
the current survey.]

August 20, 1971

File
Calif.
Polls

MEMORANDUM FOR

✓ H. R. HALDEMAN
GEORGE SHULTZ
CHUCK COLSON
SECRETARY CONNALLY
SECRETARY HODGSON

The attached poll was recently completed in Southern California by J. D. Power and Associates. John Ehrlichman asked that I forward it for your attention.

Tod R. Hullin
Administrative Assistant
to John D. Ehrlichman

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 20, 1971

MEMORANDUM TO NEAL BALL

FROM: Judith C. O'Neil

SUBJECT: Poll Reaction to President Nixon's Wage/Price Controls

The following figures were obtained from Barry Robertson of the J.D. Power & Associates firm in Los Angeles. They conducted the poll and gave it in the form of a release to the local TV stations (Los Angeles and San Diego). KTTV in Los Angeles released it last night.

There were 400 households interviewed, and 1/4 of those households had at least one union member there. Here are the questions which were asked and the results:

1. Do you approve or disapprove of the wage freeze?

75% - Approved	13% - Disapproved
82% - Republicans	90% - Republicans
75% - Democrats	12% - Democrats
65% - Union Members	16% - Union Members
77% - Non-Union Members	12% - Non-Union Members

2. Do you approve or disapprove of the price freeze?

86% - Approved	6% - Disapproved
90% - Republicans	4% - Republicans
87% - Democrats	5% - Democrats
83% - Union Members	7% - Union Members
87% - Non-Union Members	6% - Non-Union Members

3. Do you approve or disapprove of the import surcharge?

71% - Approved	15% - Disapproved
76% - Republicans	12% - Republicans
69% - Democrats	18% - Democrats
69% - Union Members	18% - Union Members
72% - Non-Union Members	14% - Non-Union Members

4. How likely is it that the President will disband the freeze at the end of 3 months?

8%
9% - Republicans
60% - Democrats
9% - Union Members
70% - Non Union Members

Probably Will
27%
31% - Republicans
23% - Democrats
23% - Union Members
29% - Non Union Members

Probably Will Not
33%
28% - Republicans
41% - Democrats
34% - Union Members
33% - Non Union Members

Definitely Will Not
15%
20% - Republicans
11% - Democrats
21% - Union Members
13% - Non Union Members

Mr. Robertson said that they are also trying to break this down even further according to age, salary, etc. and that so far they have been able to determine that of the Low Income group (\$10,000 or less) 71% approved of the freeze.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FU
~~FB~~

July 2, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR GORDON STRACHAN

The attached memo is for your information. We are still trying.

Dick

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 1, 1971

File
Polls -
Calif.

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY CASHEN

FROM: JIM CAVANAUGH 

I talked with my AMA contacts yesterday to see if they had a DMI analysis of "When the Voter Makes Up His Mind Prior to Voting." They said they didn't, but would check around to see if there were anything like this available.

They have looked at this question as they have reviewed the results of post-election surveys in congressional races. As you probably know, as a general rule the more widely known the candidate is, the sooner the voter makes up his mind.

Dick -

I will keep you posted if anything further develops on this one.

Hee

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Gordon -

I hope this
is what you
are looking
for.

- Dick -

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 8, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DICK HOWARD

FROM:

RON BAUKOL

Ron

SUBJECT:

DMI Analysis

Attached is the DMI analysis of "When the Voter Makes Up His Mind Prior to Voting". As you can see, it is part of a bigger analysis. According to Cavanaugh, there is no separate study on this topic.

This analysis has worthwhile data on when people decide (see pp 23, 28-30) but the other information presented is very sketchy. The piece reads like a come-on for a more detailed (and expensive) survey; it raises many questions and answers few.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By Emp/psl-NARS, Date 5-23-80

BEHIND THE 1970 ELECTIONS:

An Overview Of
Benchmark, Panel And
Post-Election Surveys
Conducted Across The Nation

On Behalf Of The
AMERICAN MEDICAL POLITICAL
ACTION COMMITTEE
By
Decision Making Information
Written
February, 1971

DECISION MAKING INFORMATION

DMI

PREFACE

Santayana claimed that those who do not learn from the past are condemned to relive it. Although we are not pessimistic in regard to last year's election outcomes, we see no reason why 1970 should not serve as a valuable learning experience and a springboard to greater success in future years.

To our knowledge, the information we are about to discuss represents the most extensive body of post-election survey research ever available (it is certainly the most recent). The points we will cover raise many critical questions about the techniques and impact of campaigns. Although we list some of those questions, this "menu" is by no means exhaustive.

Readers may develop additional questions (or may disregard some that we have raised) in order to direct our efforts to produce an in-depth, highly focused examination of these surveys -- specifically geared as much toward planning for the future as toward accounting for the past.

DECISION MAKING INFORMATION

DMI

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DECISION MAKING INFORMATION

DMI

INTRODUCTION

The fourteen (14) post-election surveys discussed in this report were conducted by Decision Making Information via telephone between November 3 - 7, 1970. A total of four-thousand, five-hundred and twenty (4,520) registered voters were interviewed. Eleven (11) of the fourteen (14) surveys represented the second or third survey in those specific areas during 1970, so that there is a good deal of trend data, as well. In these eleven (11) cases, one half ($\frac{1}{2}$) the sample was "freshly" drawn, with the other half ($\frac{1}{2}$) drawn from voters interviewed in previous survey(s), so that trends could be discussed. The remaining three survey samples were drawn entirely on a random probability proportionate to size basis.

The areas surveyed include:

DECISION MAKING INFORMATION

DMI

	<u>BENCHMARK</u>	<u>PANEL</u>	<u>FIRST</u>
<u>GUBERNATORIAL</u>			
California	X	X	X
New York	X	X	X
Minnesota	X	X	X
<u>SENATORIAL</u>			
North Dakota	X	X	X
Texas			X
Utah	X	X	X
Wyoming	X	X	X
<u>CONGRESSIONAL</u>			
California 38	X	X	X
Kansas 2			X
Minnesota 6	X	X	X
New Mexico 2	X	X	X
New York 34	X	X	X
Utah 1	X	X	X
Wisconsin			X

4,520 Interviews

Telephone

November 3 through November 7, 1970

DECISION MAKING INFORMATION

DMI

IT IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR READERS TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THESE SURVEYS ARE NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES AS A WHOLE. However, when certain post-election sample characteristics are compared with those of another sample -- a representative sample of voters drawn for a national survey conducted by Decision Making Information in 1970 -- the similarities are noticeable.

DECISION MAKING INFORMATION

DMI

EDUCATION

	Grade School Or Less	Some High School	High School Grad.	Some College	College Grad.	Post Grad.
Post Election Selected Areas (N = 4520)	9.0	14.3	34.0	23.4	11.3	7.0
National Probability Sample (N = 2000)	14.4	17.9	33.9	17.6	10.0	6.2

INCOME

	\$10,000 Plus	\$7,000 \$9,999	\$5,000 \$6,999	Under \$5,000
Post Election Selected Areas (N = 4520)	43.5	29.8	13.0	13.6
National Probability Sample (N = 2000)	56.3	15.5	9.3	19.0

DECISION MAKING INFORMATION


 The logo consists of the letters 'D', 'M', and 'I' stacked vertically in a large, bold, sans-serif font. The 'D' is on top, 'M' is in the middle, and 'I' is on the bottom.

Nonetheless, while we will discuss the post-election results in ways that may imply national representivity -- for the sake of simplicity and brevity -- we cannot say with any measured degree of confidence that these results are, necessarily, reflective of nation-wide patterns.

DECISION MAKING INFORMATION

DMi

ISSUES IN THE 1970 ELECTIONS

There appears to be ample justification for spotlighting Unemployment as a clear dividing issue in 1970's campaigns. For, despite the fact that all campaigns are not won and lost on the basis of issues, no single issue more clearly separates voters along partisan lines than does Unemployment.

In our fourteen (14) post-election surveys, voters were shown a list of eight (8) key issues, and asked to tell us how important a role each of them played in determining their vote. Examining these issues on the basis of how often each was described as "extremely important" in determining vote, they can be rank ordered across all surveys as follows:

- | | | | |
|---------------|---|----------------------|---|
| 1. Drug Abuse |) | } Clearly top ranked | } Ranked in the top three by both Republicans and Democrats |
| 2. Crime |) | | |
| 3. Inflation |) | | |
| 4. Taxes |) | | |

DECISION MAKING INFORMATION



- 5. Pollution
- 6. Vietnam ₎
- 7. Unemployment ₎ > Trailing
 well behind
- 8. Campus Protests -- Definitely in last place

On the surface, these findings actually appear to minimize the role of Unemployment. However, a closer look at partisan responses indicates that Unemployment was clearly the least salient issue among Republicans -- ranked solidly in last place -- while Unemployment was far more salient among Democrats -- ranked fourth, and quite close to third ranked Inflation! In fact, the disparity in Republican/Democrat evaluations of the importance of Unemployment stands as the most obvious single issue-difference between these voting blocs.

Unfortunately, the task of producing an acceptably definitive analysis of the role of issues in 1970 is complicated by the fact that these overall tendencies (even among Republicans and Democrats) are not uniform across all surveys. Some of the important questions yet to be answered involve:



1. What issues seem to be most important in terms of geographic location? Are there implications for differing issues-thrusts in different sections of the nation?
2. What issues seem to be most important in terms of differing elective offices? Are Congressional elections bound up with different issues than are those for U. S. Senate? Do these differences, if they exist, suggest that certain candidates may speak on specific kinds of issues with more credibility, since those issues seem to be closely associated with determination of vote for that particular office?
3. Aside from partisan and geographic differences, what demographic characteristics are associated with a tendency to see certain issues as important vote determinants? Do older voters attend to different issues than younger voters? Does the same apply to more versus less educated voters, more versus less affluent voters, union members versus non-union members, highly efficacious voters versus low efficacy (alienated) voters, etc.?

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MASS MEDIA AND CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING IN 1970


At first blush, the 1970 campaigns appear to have reached the electorate almost at will. When voters were asked to indicate recall of campaign advertising or contact, the results border on astonishing:

1. Three out of four voters (72%) recalled television campaign advertising.
2. Two out of three voters (68%) recalled newspaper campaign advertising.
3. Likewise, two out of three voters (63%) remembered receiving direct mail from campaigns and, amazingly, almost three out of four voters who recall receiving such mail claim to have read it!
4. Over half the electorate (57%) recall exposure to campaign billboards.
5. Almost half of the electorate (41%) recall radio campaign advertising.
6. One out of three voters (33%) remembers being contacted by at least one party via telephone, and urged to go to the polls.

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RECALL OF CAMPAIGN CONTACT



DECISION MAKING INFORMATION




However, if the qualitative impact of these communications is an important criterion, then the post-election surveys raise some crucial questions in regard to 1970's races. These surveys also asked voters to recall the most important things they learned about each candidate. When voters responded to this question, they were then asked to supply the source from which they learned these important pieces of information. In the following table, the solid bars indicate the extent to which each source was named as a supplier of the "most important thing learned about" the candidates. The dotted bars allow us to compare these percentages with the ones involving simple recall of campaign advertising.

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SOURCE OF MOST IMPORTANT
INFORMATION ABOUT CANDIDATE



41%

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The table, SOURCE OF MOST IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT CANDIDATES, reveals three salient points:

1. In virtually all cases, there is a tremendous "slippage" between recall of advertising via some medium, and that medium as a source of "most important information". [Moreover, the plain fact is that some voters could not recall the source of important candidate information, and even more voters were unable to remember any important information they learned about a candidate -- explaining why the solid bars do not total 100%.]
2. Television appears to be the most "efficient" medium -- in terms of its comparatively smaller proportion of "slippage", and mass media appear to be more "efficient" than do direct mail or telephone (although these last two were probably used later in the campaign, after important candidate information had already been transmitted via the other communication channels).
3. The role of friends and family as suppliers of important candidate information seems surprisingly low.

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
Unfortunately, even this degree of "slippage" between recall of campaign advertising, and source of important candidate information does not reveal the entire problem. Focusing on those voters who had received their most important candidate information via the "mass" media (television, newspaper and radio), the surveys asked whether that information had been communicated in a news format, or in an advertising format. [Here, it is vital to remember that mass media accounted for almost 90% of the recalled sources of important candidate information.]

The following table (FROM WHAT MASS MEDIA FORMAT WAS MOST IMPORTANT CANDIDATE INFORMATION SECURED) reveals that important candidate facts were more likely to be absorbed from news formats than from paid advertisements. Consequently, the "slippage" between campaign advertising and important information is even greater than at first might be supposed.

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FROM WHAT MASS MEDIA FORMAT
WAS MOST IMPORTANT CANDIDATE
INFORMATION SECURED



(41%) OF ALL VOTERS

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


However, even these findings can be misleading since there is tremendous variation between individual campaigns. In point of fact, the following table (NEWS VERSUS ADVERTISING AS SOURCE OF IMPORTANT CANDIDATE INFORMATION IN FOUR STATES), which concentrates on four statewide races, almost seems to suggest that the more money spent on political advertising, the less important information was recalled from that advertising (assuming that Governor Rockefeller expanded the greatest dollar volume, Governor Reagan next, and so on).

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NEWS VERSUS ADVERTISING FORMAT AS SOURCE OF IMPORTANT CANDIDATE INFORMATION IN FOUR STATES



OF ALL VOTERS REMEMBERING MASS MEDIA

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Naturally, there is probably another factor at work here. Governor Rockefeller, running for a fourth term, was a long and well established "newsmaker"; as was Governor Reagan -- running for his second term. On the other hand, the Bentson-Bush race, and to an even greater extent, the Head-Anderson contest in Minnesota, matched lesser known, more "recent" political figures. It is likely that New York and California voters had been highly exposed to the actions and statements of their incumbent Governors well in advance of campaign advertising.

Nonetheless, since advertising usually represents the largest single class of campaign budget items, the post-election surveys may well hold clues to some critical answers:

1. What kinds of voters recall campaign advertising in what kinds of media? Are Democrats and Republicans alike? Are young and old alike; union versus non-union; Easterners versus Westerners versus Mid-Westerners; etc.?
2. What kinds of voters seem to secure important candidate information in news formats versus advertising formats?

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3. What is the real function of advertising in political campaigns? Are dollars wasted in the case of established political figures and maximized in relation to relative unknowns? What should be the goals of paid advertisements in these two kinds of races?
4. Given the encouraging readership of direct mail, what is its role in situations involving relative unknowns versus established newsmakers? Should its timing be changed?
5. Is there any relationship between issues and advertising recall?
6. Given the apparent voter orientation toward news formats, can there be a more supportive relationship between a candidate's publicity/public relations program and his advertising program -- or should advertising be geared to something else entirely?
7. How do all of these questions apply to the Congressional race versus the contest for U. S. Senate versus Gubernatorial campaigns?

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In essence, we have all heard the classic contention that fifty percent of all campaign advertising is wasted -- but that no one knows which fifty percent. Is it possible that more than fifty percent is wasted -- or at least mis-directed? Do these post-election surveys offer opportunities to determine which "fifty percent" is wasted?

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THE TIMING OF VOTER BALLOT CHOICES IN 1970

A sizable group of political scientists claims that political campaigns actually persuade very few voters, but are merely activities to reinforce vote decisions that have been made independently of the campaigns themselves. In some ways, the post-election surveys cast grave doubts over this contention.

Certainly, many voters had indeed made their choices before the campaigns reached full swing. As a whole, the surveys indicate that one out of three voters (33%) had chosen their man before August, and that half the electorate (50%) had committed by the end of September, 1970! Then, almost paradoxically, as campaigns began to hit their stride, there was a lull during the first half of October (when only 11% of the electorate committed) and an even greater drop in commitment during the third week of October (with 8% reaching decisions) as the campaigns actually neared their peaks.

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
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On the other hand, our findings indicate that between the last week in October, and the elections themselves (the last ten [10] days), almost one voter in three (31%), reached his decision point -- with seventeen percent (17%) actually committing either one or two days prior to the election, or on election day itself! Clearly, it is possible to contend that a decisive bloc of voters were in a position to be influenced by the campaigns themselves, since they did not make up their minds until quite late in the game (see table: CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE OF INDIVIDUALS INDICATING WHEN THEY FINALLY MADE UP THEIR MINDS TO VOTE).

*how do we
identify these
last minute
decisions*

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Naturally, these overall figures do not highlight the extremely wide variations from one state to another, or from one campaign to another. For example, in California's gubernatorial contest, almost sixty percent (60%) of the electorate had chosen before August and less than twenty percent (19%) committed during the last ten (10) days. However, in California's 38th Congressional District (Senator Tunney's old district), only one voter in five (21%) had selected his congressional choice before August, while fully half the electorate (50%) did not choose until the last ten (10) days!

Further examples indicate that in Texas' U. S. Senate race, over forty percent (42%) of the electorate had committed prior to August, while only twenty-five percent (25%) made up their minds during the last ten (10) days. Roughly similar patterns characterized the Wyoming and North Dakota U. S. Senate campaigns,-- although a more detailed analysis is clearly necessary before one can confidently claim that a pattern of early decision making in statewide races exists (since the Utah Senate contest and New York's gubernatorial campaign might be tabbed as notable exceptions to that pattern if only surface data

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are considered). Readers may wish to examine the table:
WHEN DID YOU FINALLY MAKE UP YOUR MIND HOW YOU WOULD VOTE
FOR _____?

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WHEN DID YOU FINALLY MAKE UP YOUR MIND HOW YOU WOULD VOTE FOR _____ ?

	0	10	20	30	40	50	60
CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR <i>me</i> Before August Last 10 Days	XXXXXXXXXX						
CALIFORNIA 38 C.D. Before August Last 10 Days	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX				
NEW YORK GOVERNOR <i>me</i> Before August Last 10 Days	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX			
NEW YORK 34 C.D. Before August Last 10 Days	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXX					
UTAH SENATE <i>me</i> Before August Last 10 Days	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXX			
UTAH 1 C.D. Before August Last 10 Days	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXX					
MINNESOTA GOVERNOR Before August Last 10 Days	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXX					
MINNESOTA 6 C.D. Before August Last 10 Days	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXX		
TEXAS SENATE Before August Last 10 Days	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXX	
WYOMING SENATE <i>me</i> Before August Last 10 Days	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXX	
NORTH DAKOTA SENATE <i>me</i> Before August Last 10 Days	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXX		
KANSAS 2 C.D. Before August Last 10 Days	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX					
New Mexico 2 C.D. <i>me</i> Before August Last 10 Days	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXX		
WISCONSIN 1 C.D. Before August Last 10 Days	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXX				

DECISION MAKING INFORMATION


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Still another dimension of ballot-choice-timing bears close scrutiny: when did voters make up their minds to vote for specific candidates? The following two tables (TIMING OF THE VOTE DECISION FOR CONGRESS IN THE 34TH DISTRICT OF NEW YORK and TIMING OF THE VOTE DECISION FOR THE SECOND DISTRICT OF KANSAS) illustrate how Republican Congressman Terry, in New York, built a slight lead into a decisive victory; while Democrat Congressman Roy, in Kansas, turned a significant deficit into a solid win (certainly Congressman Roy's victory challenges the theory that campaigns serve only to reinforce ballot choices already held).

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
TIMING OF THE VOTE DECISION FOR
CONGRESS 34TH DISTRICT NEW YORK



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TIMING OF THE VOTE DECISION FOR CONGRESS SECOND DISTRICT KANSAS



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These last two tables, and the overall table as well, seem to pinpoint the second to third week in October as a critical point in 1970 campaign timing. Both the Terry and Roy campaigns appear to have reached relative plateaus during this period -- as did the campaigns of their opponents, and as did the overall table of vote choice timing. However, all three tables show a sharp increase in decisions over the next time period. The significance of this "lull" and "spurt" pattern may be well worth examining.

A third dimension of ballot-choice timing concerns voter cross-over. To what extent do voters switch allegiance during a campaign -- and if they do cross over, what implications does it have for considering campaigns as "conversion/reinforcement" activities, as opposed to mere exercise in reinforcement? Because our surveys were often conducted over time, we are able to discuss trend aspects of some campaigns. Utah's Burton/Moss U. S. Senate contest provides a fine illustrative case in point.

As of October 1, 1970, survey research indicated that Laurence Burton had the support of four out of ten Utah voters (40%), and was within striking distance of Senator Moss, who then had forty-six percent (46%) of the vote;

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
with a potentially decisive bloc of voters (14%) still uncommitted. Moreover, the post-election survey shows strong evidence that Utah's electorate was in a high state of "flux", since well over one voter in three (38%) claimed that at one time or another, he had indeed considered voting for the man he did not choose on election day.

What happened to those highly volatile Utah voters during the last month? For one thing, almost two out of three voters (64%) who were uncommitted as of October 1, 1970, ultimately voted for Senator Moss (only 34% of the undecideds came into the Burton column). Furthermore, the voters already committed to one candidate or another showed a marked tendency to shift allegiance. Mr. Burton actually lost one of four (26%) of his previously committed voters to Senator Moss, while the Senator's support was far more solid -- only thirteen percent (13%) switching to Burton (see table: UTAH SENATE RACE CROSS-OVER ANALYSIS: OCTOBER 1 THROUGH NOVEMBER 3).

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UTAH SENATE RACE CROSS-OVER ANALYSIS
OCTOBER 1 THROUGH NOVEMBER 3:
Distribution of October 1 Votes
Against Final Votes Cast



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The question of why these changes occurred cannot be fully answered from our preliminary findings. However, the post-election survey does shed valuable light on this matter. Over half (56%) of Utah's voters claim to have learned the most important facts about the candidates after October 1, 1970.

Interestingly, almost four out of ten voters (39%) indicated that the most important things they discovered concerned "something about the campaigns" themselves. What more than three fourths of these voters learned (31% of all voters in Utah) related to: "Too much mud slinging"; "Smear campaign"; "Name calling"; "Illegal tactics"; etc. Most of the remaining voters who found out something about the campaigns (5% of all Utah voters) spoke of "Out-side help".

Although a closer examination of the surveys is required, it is certainly possible that these findings go far toward explaining the deterioration of Mr. Burton's position between the beginning of October and election day. Moreover, these facts prompt further questions regarding the volatility of the electorate in other races, and point up the value of analyzing the "switching patterns" that can be seen as a result of having surveyed so many campaigns at more than one point in time.

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Obviously, we have not yet scratched the surface on this critical factor of ballot choice timing. It is equally obvious that the post-election surveys represent a rich vein of information in this area. We might profitably use this information to investigate questions such as:

1. Is ballot choice timing similar in U. S. Senate races, in Congressional races, in Gubernatorial races -- or is it totally dependent upon the specific situation?
2. What kinds of voters decide at what times? Are there differences between Republicans and Democrats, young and old, union and non-union, urban - suburban - rural, etc?
3. Is there a relationship between issue concern and ballot choice timing?
4. Is there a relationship between advertising recall, or important facts learned about candidates, and ballot choice timing?
5. Is there a relationship between ballot choice timing in a statewide race, and the timing in a Congressional contest within the state?
6. Given the large bloc of voters who had still not committed immediately prior to the election, can we assess the effects of President Nixon's and

Senator Muskie's "election eve" television presentations (the post-election surveys contain a good deal of information here that can be quite startling if surface indications hold up under close examination -- we will touch upon this later in the report).

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DIRECT MAIL AND TELEPHONE CAMPAIGN CONTACT

We have already noted that almost two out of three voters (63%) recall receiving direct mail from campaigns in 1970, and that almost three out of four of these voters claim to have read that literature.

However, this pattern is not a uniform pattern (see table: DID YOU RECEIVE/READ DIRECT MAIL). Of the campaigns examined in the table: the Senate races in Utah, Wyoming and North Dakota; and, the Congressional race in New Mexico's Second District; appear to have resorted to direct mail to a noticeably greater extent than did their more Eastern neighbors. (Although, even in relatively urban New York State there are strong indications of urban - suburban - rural differences in direct mail readership.)

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	<u>DID YOU RECEIVE PAMPHLET ... IN THE MAIL?</u>	<u>(IF YES) DID YOU READ IT?</u>
CALIFORNIA 38	66.0%	65.0%
MINNESOTA 6	56.0%	57.0%
MINNESOTA GOVERNOR	43.0%	72.0%
NEW MEXICO 2	70.0%	73.0%
NEW YORK GOVERNOR	46.0%	72.0%
NEW YORK 34	56.0%	74.0%
NORTH DAKOTA SENATE	72.0%	67.0%
UTAH SENATE	87.0%	81.0%
WYOMING SENATE	75.0%	73.0%

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On the whole, Republicans were either more prone to use direct mail, or Republican mail was recalled better than was Democrat mail.

RECALL OF WHICH CANDIDATE SENT DIRECT MAIL

	<u>% of Voters Contacted</u>	<u>% of Voters Contacted</u>
Only the Republicans	27%	---
Only the Democrats	---	13%
Both Candidates	<u>45%</u>	<u>45%</u>
	Republican Total	Democrat Total
	72%	58%

The Republican Party was also more likely to have contacted voters by telephone, and urged them to the polls. However, the overall pattern points to a comparable effort on the part of both Democrats and Republicans! Such a pattern is contrary to normal expectations in many areas.

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WHICH PARTY TELEPHONED TO GET OUT THE VOTE?


	<u>% of Voters Contacted</u>	<u>% of Voters Contacted</u>
Only the Republicans	32%	---
Only the Democrats	---	27%
Both Parties	<u>21%</u>	<u>21%</u>
	Republican Total	Democrat Total
	53%	48%

. Again, there are extreme variations when one examines each race individually. Republicans appear to have done far the better job in most Congressional races, and in the California Gubernatorial and Texas Senate contests. However, in statewide races in areas such as: Utah, Wyoming, Minnesota and New York; Democrats seemed able to more than hold their own (see table: DURING THE LAST WEEK OF THE CAMPAIGN, DID ANYONE TELEPHONE YOU OR SEE YOU ABOUT GETTING TO THE POLLS TO VOTE? (IF YES, ASK) WHICH PARTY?).

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DURING THE LAST WEEK OF THE CAMPAIGN, DID ANYONE TELEPHONE YOU OR SEE YOU ABOUT GETTING TO THE POLLS TO VOTE? (IF YES, ASK) WHICH PARTY.



Cope Boiler Room

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Both the direct mail and telephone contact portions of the post-election surveys offer somewhat unique fields for detailed analysis:

1. Was direct mail -- and more important, telephone contact -- targeted properly? How often did voters contacted by the Republican party vote Democrat? How often did the reverse occur? How did voters who were not contacted cast their ballots?
2. Were the direct mail and telephone contacts timed properly? To what extent did they reach voters who had not yet made up their minds?
3. What issues were important to the voters that received direct mail?
4. What kinds of voters do not recall receiving direct mail? Did either party "miss a good prospect?"
5. What kinds of voters did not read their direct mail? What kinds of voters did read it? Is there a greater tendency for rural voters to read their direct mail?
6. Is readership of direct mail linked to any pattern of campaign advertising recall via mass media? In other words, are campaigns reaching the same type of voter through all channels of communication?

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7. Is direct mail readership at all related to learning something important about a candidate, but not being able to recall the source of that information? [Readers will recall that a very sizable bloc of voters could not recall the source of their most important candidate facts.]

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THE ROLE OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S AND SENATOR MUSKIE'S
"ELECTION EVE" TELEVISION PRESENTATIONS

In assessing the role of the President's "election eve" campaign effort, and that of Senator Muskie, three things must be borne in mind:

1. We have not yet had the opportunity to delve deeply into this area of the post-election surveys.
2. It is quite possible that these speeches played a powerful role in the campaigns, since as much as seventeen percent (17%) of the electorate had not chosen its candidates at the time of the presentations.
 - a. Ten percent (10%) of the electorate chose one or two days prior to election day.
 - b. Seven percent (7%) of the electorate chose on election day itself.
3. President Nixon's speech appears to have reached twice as many voters (40% of the eligible voters), as did Senator Muskie's speech (20% of the eligible voters).

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Perhaps the clearest method of illustrating the potential of fully detailed analysis in this area, is to excerpt what should be considered a moderately detailed analysis of the effect of the President's address in New York's 34th Congressional District (one of the few areas in which such an analysis was attempted -- though even here, the excerpt is part of a larger analysis whose thrust is not directed primarily at assessing Presidential impact).

EXCERPT FROM NEW YORK'S 34TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT POST-ELECTION ANALYSIS

The Role of the President

"On the surface, it would not appear that President Nixon's "last minute" campaign effort could have had much affect on the Congressional contest. Less than one out of three (32.5%) voters in the district remember seeing the President's presentation -- and only one out of ten voters (11.9%) saw all of it. However, most interestingly, over ninety percent (94.5%) of our sample do not remember seeing any of Senator Muskie's speech!

"Despite these findings, the President's role cannot be dismissed lightly. For one thing, there were a great many voters who were in a position to be influenced. One

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voter in five (19.5%) had still not made his congressional choice by election day, and another twelve percent (12.1%) claim to have been uncommitted as late as one or two days prior to the election. Consequently, there was certainly room for last minute influence, as almost one voter in three (31.6%) was still undecided in those last few days.

"However, these voters were Democrats (47.6% of whom were uncommitted as late as one or two days prior to the election) far more often than they were Republicans (19.5% of whom were still uncommitted in those last days). Further, although both Congressional candidates apparently made great and successful efforts to solidify their vote during this period, McCurn's campaign (the Democrat campaign) picked up real steam for the first time (though he could not close the gap or halt the progress of the Terry drive).

"Given these facts: with thirty-two percent (31.6%) uncommitted at the time of the Nixon/Muskie speeches, and thirty-three percent (32.5%) in the Nixon viewing audience (though obviously not a direct match); it is important to note that a bit more than half the voters (52.3%) who viewed the President's address voted for Congressman Terry.

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However, fully forty-one percent (41.5%) of the President's viewers cast their ballots for Mr. McCurn. The true significance of this result becomes apparent as one traces each campaign's progress -- on the basis of when voters made their congressional choice (it is important to remember, here, that we are working with small cell sizes and voter recall, though the results are impressive).

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<u>When Voters Made Up Their Minds</u>	<u>% Committed Vote</u>		
	<u>Terry Vote</u>	<u>McCurn Vote</u>	<u>Terry Lead</u>
Before August	7.8%	3.3%	+4.5%
During August	10.6%	4.4%	+6.1%
During September	15.7%	8.9%	+6.8%
First Half of October	25.2%	15.7%	+9.5%
Third Week of October	28.6%	19.1%	+9.5%
	(No dramatic increase in Terry's lead in three months)		
<u>FOURTH WEEK OF OCTOBER</u>	41.5%	25.8%	+15.7%
	(Note the spurt by Terry)		
One or Two Days Before The Election	48.3%	31.4%	+16.9%
<u>ELECTION DAY*</u>	57.8%	39.8%	+18.0%

*Note that both men move strongly in the period of the President's speech, with Terry actually moving a bit more powerfully (in terms of proportional movement). In the period of the Nixon speech, Terry gains 9.5%, while McCurn gains 8.4%. Recalling the fact that 52.3% of those seeing the President's speech voted for Terry, while 41.5% voted McCurn, it is highly coincidental, that of the voters who were still uncommitted when the

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President spoke, 53.1% voted Terry and 46.8% voted McCurn! In other words, when Nixon viewers are cross-tabulated with Congressional vote, the percentages are almost identical to those that one finds when voters still uncommitted at that time, are cross-tabulated with Congressional vote! A potential coincidence, but one well worth investigating.

"If one attributes the slightly disproportionate McCurn share to the Muskie speech, assuming that most of the small Muskie audience voted for McCurn, then one can suggest that:

PRESIDENT NIXON'S SPEECH WAS A DECISIVE FACTOR AMONG THE 19.5% WHO WERE UNDECIDED UNTIL ELECTION DAY. THE PRESIDENT WAS EFFECTIVE WITH THESE VOTERS IN VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL PROPORTION TO THE WAY THEY CAST THEIR BALLOTS ON ELECTION DAY. IT MAY WELL BE THAT THE PRESIDENT DID CAUSE THESE VOTERS TO FINALLY COMMIT -- ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. SENATOR MUSKIE'S PRESENTATION RECEIVED FAR FEWER VIEWERS THAN HAD PRESIDENT NIXON'S; BUT WAS EVIDENTLY CONVINCING ENOUGH TO ACCOUNT FOR THE FACT THAT McCURN'S SHARE OF THE "ELECTION DAY COMMITMENT" WAS SLIGHTLY GREATER THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN PREDICTED BY THE NIXON SPEECH ALONE."

DECISION MAKING INFORMATION

DMi

It must be emphasized that this excerpt may only represent one isolated instance -- and even here, a more detailed examination is mandatory if definite conclusions are to be drawn. In any event, there is no lack of vital questions on the matter of Presidential versus Muskie effectiveness in 1970:

1. Was the President's power to amass a viewing audience always greater than was Senator Muskie's? In what areas/campaigns were the differences most apparent?
2. What kinds of voters were most likely to be exposed to the President's address?
 - a. Republicans versus Democrats.
 - b. Old versus young, union versus non-union, urban versus suburban versus rural, etc.
 - c. Had these voters committed to candidates yet? If so, to what candidates?
 - d. Had they ever considered voting for the "other" candidate -- if so, can the "conversion power" of the speeches be evaluated?
 - e. How did the speeches affect voters who were still uncommitted?
3. If the Muskie presentation were examined from a standpoint similar to that just described for the President's speech, what would be learned?

DECISION MAKING INFORMATION

DMi

4. What kinds of voters were not reached by the presentations? How did they vote? Additionally, what about those voters who saw the presentation(s), but did not go to the polls?
5. What issue concerns characterized the viewing audience?
6. How many (and what kinds of) voters watched all of the President's address -- as opposed to three fourths, half, or one fourth of it? Does this bear any relationship to vote?
7. Is there anything that can be said about the advantages/disadvantages of the President's having spoken "first", with Senator Muskie speaking "last". [There are preliminary indications in New York's 34th Congressional District that the longer a voter watched the President, the more likely he was to vote Democrat. Could it be that the President was responsible for the vast majority of the Republican/Democrat effect of both speeches -- and was this more to Republican advantage than if Senator Muskie had been the one to "push" the electorate one way or the other, with very few voters, then, bothering to listen to President Nixon?]

DECISION MAKING INFORMATION

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CONCLUSION


As we noted in the introduction to this report, the points we have summarized and the questions we have posed do not begin to exhaust the worthwhile areas of investigation available from these post-election surveys. It is important that readers use this report, not as a definitive statement or listing of alternatives, but as a springboard to an in-depth, highly focused attempt to learn from the 1970 campaigns.

To our knowledge, the post-election surveys represent the most extensive (and certainly the most recent) empirical body of knowledge concerning what happened in a single election year. While they will not always allow us to establish solid causal relationships, this will certainly permit analysis at a less speculative level.

DECISION MAKING INFORMATION

DMI

File -
Polls -
California



Republican
National
Committee.

Thomas C. Reed Member for California

4/13/71

Bob -

Thanks for your call.

Enclosed is the material we
discussed in L.A. It is probably
not news to you, as I understand
the raw data came from a
package submitted to the White
House some months ago.

Talk to you in May.

Tom

HIGHLIGHTS OF POST-ELECTION DMI STATEWIDE CALIFORNIA SURVEY

Date: November 5-8, 1970 (Thursday-Sunday after election)

Sample: 225 Telephone interviews of those previously interviewed in August. Sample is small, error is $\pm 7\%$.

1. ISSUES: What issue was most important in making the voting decision?


1. Pollution
2. Taxes
3. Unemployment
- ...
8. Campus protest

These priorities correspond with the final week of tracking. Use of August benchmark poll figures (showing campus demonstrations to be much more of an issue) during the close of the campaign could have led to inappropriate strategy.

2. DECISION TIME: One political rule of thumb says that in a major race, when each major party has nominated its candidate by some rational, open procedure, then the two candidates each start out with about one third of the vote. The campaign is then fought for the support of the remaining one third.

This appears to have been the case in the 1970 governor's race. People were asked when they made their decision. The chart at the right plots percentage of the electorate who have made up their mind vs. time. On Labor Day, exactly two thirds have made up their minds.

The survey also asked if the voter had considered voting for other than his final voting-booth choice.



15% said yes. Therefore, on Labor Day, the stability of the electorate was as follows:

- 66% has made up their minds.
- 29% were not committed, but were leaning and never really changed their minds. Given some major new issue, evidence, or scandal, however, they were available.
- 15% were truly undecided.

It would appear that 9% made up their minds on election day and the three days preceding.

Reagan won re-election with a margin of 8 points.

3. PARTY LINE VOTE: Reagan held the Republican Party together very well, losing only 7% to Unruh. The Kuchel endorsement at Labor Day was probably the key event in this drive. On the other hand, Murphy did not have this kind of support. He lost 19% of the Republicans to Tunney. The Norton Simon primary probably was the lightning rod for this disaffection.

Reagan made good inroads into the Democrats, getting 26% of their votes. Murphy got only 14% of the Democrats.

Democrats were evenly split on the question of whether Reagan's endorsing Murphy did Reagan any harm. Half thought it helped Reagan. Republicans, of course, thought it was helpful to all concerned.

4. WHY VOTE FOR/AGAINST REAGAN, MURPHY:

People voted for Reagan because:

- 29% his record
- 28% liked him personally, trusted him
- 20% disliked Unruh

People voted for Unruh because:

- 50% disliked Reagan
- 16% liked Unruh personally
- 0% his record

Unruh was totally unsuccessful in selling his "record" as an outstanding legislator. (Or, the Reagan-Monagan campaign was able

to totally destroy that would-be image.) Therefore, half his vote was straight anti-Reagan vote.

People voted for Tunney because:

- 39% liked him personally
- 27% disliked Murphy
- 0% his record

People voted for Murphy because:

- 27% liked him personally
- 23% party loyalty
- 16% disliked Tunney
- 15% his record

Murphy was only half as successful as Reagan in selling his record. Even his own supporters had to fall back on party loyalty to explain their vote.

Tunney came across as a nice young man with no record at all who took advantage of an anti-Murphy sentiment no doubt centered around the Technicolor episode.

5. SOURCES OF INFORMATION:

- A. Voters get twice as much information about an incumbent from "news" as from paid political advertising. The ratio is 1.5:1 for a non-incumbent.
- B. Television, in either the news or paid ad context, gets through twice as much information as all other media. Newspapers come in second.

This suggests that paid TV ads are best used either for simple name identification (Team for the 70's ads) or to drive home a simple, unforgettable picture of a major issue already under discussion. An incumbent should take full advantage of the "news" coverage of his activities -- before a campaign ever begins -- to implant major quantities of favorable information in the voter's mind.

6. SPECIFIC GROUPS:

The sample is too small to be very definitive about subgroups of the

electorate, but the following might be true:

Sub-Group	Sample Size	Reagan/Unruh percent	Murphy/Tunney percent
"New Left Coalition"			
Young (under 35)	93	43/57	32/68
Poor (under \$3M p.a.)	22	47/53	33/67
Black	25	8/92	8/92
"Working Man"			
"Hardhats"*	34	47/53	24/76
Union families (i.e., one union member in respondent's house- hold	116	43/57	24/76

*"Hardhats" were all those meeting 3 criteria:

1. Employed in a semi-skilled or skilled manual job.
2. Earning more than \$8M p.a.
3. White

The vote among those under 35 should serve notice for the future.

Reagan was able to make his case and almost hold his own in union families. Given the tremendous anti-Reagan propaganda barrage in union publications, it ranks as quite an achievement. Murphy's inability to do likewise was probably key to his defeat.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



Date May 26, 1971

NOTE TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

Polls from Minnesota and
California are attached with
interesting sections marked.

File
 Polls -
 Minn -
 182-
 Cal

"President Nixon has said that if we leave South Vietnam in a position to defend herself we will have peace in the next generation. Do you agree or disagree?"

Agree	17%
Disagree	72
No opinion	11

"President Nixon has said that all U.S. troops will be withdrawn from Vietnam as soon as the South Vietnamese have a good chance to defend themselves and U.S. prisoners are returned. When do you think this time is likely to come?"

Two years or longer, never	44%
Before end of 1972	19
Other responses, no opinion	37

"When do you think all U.S. troops WILL be out of Vietnam?"

By end of current year	9%
By end of 1972	15
Two years or more, never	51
Other responses, no opinion	25

MINNESOTA POLL - Vietnam

In late April, 1971, 600 Minnesotans 18 years of age or older were asked:

"When it comes to ending the war in Vietnam, do you think the administration is making a great deal of progress, a little progress, or no progress at all?"

The trend since the beginning of the year:

	<u>Jan.</u>	<u>Feb.</u>	<u>Mid March</u>	<u>Late April</u>
A great deal	19%	12%	13%	17%
A little	61	55	57	61
No progress	17	30	28	20
No opinion	3	3	2	2

"President Nixon has said that he has kept every promise he has made on removing U.S. troops from Vietnam, and that the invasions into Cambodia and Laos have served to weaken the enemy and hasten the end to United States involvement in the war. Do you agree with Mr. Nixon's summary or disagree?"

	<u>All adults</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Agree with summary	42%	50%	35%
Disagree	49	45	53
Other answers or no opinion	9	5	12

"The 49 percent who feel the assessment is not valid also were asked where they disagree. Of this group, 30 percent question the statement on troop withdrawal, another 30 percent feel the Cambodian and Laotian invasions did not weaken the enemy, and 21 percent doubt that the invasions will hasten the end of U.S. involvement.

"Seventeen percent believe the Cambodian and Laotian operations achieved the opposite of what the President claimed -- that they deepened U.S. involvement in the war.

"Nineteen percent disagree with the assessment completely or feel there is a credibility gap.

"Six percent mentioned general disapproval of the war, 9 percent gave other answers and 2 percent were indefinite."

The next question asked of all respondents in the survey:

"Between May 1 and Dec. 1, American troop withdrawal will be 100,000 men, or about 1,800 a month more than now. Are you satisfied or not with this rate of withdrawal?"

	<u>All Adults</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Satisfied by withdrawal rate	58%	62%	55%
Not satisfied	35	33	36
Other answers or no opinion	7	5	9

"Some people were disappointed because the President made no promises about cutting back air attacks or about withdrawing all American troops. Do you agree or disagree that his announcement was disappointing for those reasons?"

	<u>All Adults</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Agree, announcement was disappointing	53%	47%	58%
Disagree	40	49	33
Other answers or no opinion	7	4	9

CALIFORNIA POLL - Vietnam

A representative cross-section of 1,050 Californians were asked between April 25 - May 3, 1971 questions pertaining to the Vietnam war. The questions asked were:

Credibility Gap

"There has been so many shifts in our government's statements about the Vietnam war in the past that I find it hard to believe the President is giving us the whole story now."

	<u>May 1971</u>	<u>May 1970</u>
Agree strongly	39%	34%
Agree somewhat	30	30
No opinion	12	8
Disagree somewhat	10	16
Disagree strongly	9	12

"We should pull out of Vietnam and Southeast Asia as soon as possible even if this step is seen by the rest of the world as a political and military defeat for the United States?"

	<u>May 1971</u>	<u>May 1970</u>
Agree strongly	41%	33%
Agree somewhat	18	13
No opinion	9	9
Disagree somewhat	15	16
Disagree strongly	17	29

"Losing the war in Vietnam is something that this country should avoid at all costs."

	<u>May 1971</u>	<u>May 1970</u>
Agree strongly	16%	23%
Agree somewhat	10	14
No opinion	14	9
Disagree somewhat	24	22
Disagree strongly	36	32

"Some people have said that if the United States withdraws from Vietnam the Communists will eventually gain control of the South Vietnamese people and government. How concerned would you be about this happening in respect to the security of the United States? Would you be greatly concerned, somewhat concerned, or not too concerned?"

	<u>Statewide</u>	
	<u>May 1971</u>	<u>May 1970</u>
Greatly concerned	38%	46%
Somewhat concerned	33	28
Not too concerned	25	24
No opinion	4	2

"President Nixon's schedule of withdrawals from Vietnam should be speeded up so that all ground troops are out by the end of this year."

	<u>Agree</u>		<u>Disagree</u>		<u>No Opinion</u>
	<u>Strongly</u>	<u>Somewhat</u>	<u>Somewhat</u>	<u>Strongly</u>	
	50%	20%	12%	8%	10%
<u>Statewide</u>					
<u>By age</u>					
18-20	62%	16	10	6	6
21-29	52	24	10	8	6
30-49	48	19	13	9	11
50-69	49	18	11	11	11
70 & over	50	16	11	14	9
<u>By Income</u>					
Under \$4,999	57	17	8	9	9
\$5,000-\$9,999	50	21	11	9	9
\$10,000-14,999	48	22	13	8	9
\$15,000-19,999	42	22	16	13	7
\$20,000 & over	47	17	11	10	15

CALIFORNIA POLL - Trial Heat

Between April 26 - May 1, 1971, a representative cross-section of 1,050 Californians were asked:

"I know that the 1972 presidential election is more than a year away, but let's assume it was being held this month. If you were voting today, who would you vote for?"

NIXON - MUSKIE - WALLACE

	<u>May 1971</u>	<u>November 1970</u>
Nixon	44%	47%
Muskie	45	41
Wallace	4	4
Undecided	7	8

NIXON - KENNEDY - WALLACE

Nixon	43	47
Kennedy	46	41
Wallace	3	4
Undecided	8	8

NIXON - HUMPHREY - WALLACE

Nixon	45	52
Humphrey	41	36
Wallace	5	5
Undecided	9	7

"Should Nixon not be the candidate for any reason, present prospects for a Republican victory next year become even dimmer. Two other Republicans considered to be leading contenders in the event Nixon is not the nominee, California Governor Ronald Reagan and Vice President Spiro Agnew, fare quite poorly in current tests of strength against Muskie, Kennedy, and Humphrey."

Reagan	33%
Muskie	53
Wallace	6
Undecided	8

Reagan	34%
Kennedy	54
Wallace	5
Undecided	7

Reagan	38%
Humphrey	46
Wallace	6
Undecided	10

Agnew	23%
Muskie	58
Wallace	6
Undecided	13

Agnew	28%
Kennedy	56
Wallace	5
Undecided	11

Agnew	28%
Humphrey	49
Wallace	7
Undecided	16

The same sample was asked:

"Let's assume that in addition to the two major parties - Democrat and Republican - there was also a George Wallace ticket and a fourth ticket called 'Common Cause' headed by John Gardner. If you were voting today, who would you vote for?"

FOUR PARTY RACE

All voters - Statewide

Nixon	42%
Muskie	36
Wallace	7
Gardner	9
Undecided	6
Nixon	44%
Kennedy	34
Wallace	4
Gardner	9
Undecided	9
Nixon	43%
Humphrey	32
Wallace	5
Gardner	9
Undecided	11