

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
 Contested Materials Collection  
 Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
36	4	9/1/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: a "Washington Post" column by Evans and Novak commenting on a memo from Teeter on the subject of Jewish voters. Column in question attached. 2 pgs.
36	4	8/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Teeter to Haldeman RE: statistical information on Jewish voters. 3 pgs.
36	4	9/6/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Caspar Weinberger to George Shultz, Haldeman, Herbert Stein, Ehrlichman, Cole, Flanigan, Edwin Harper, MacGregor, Timmons, Colson, Ziegler, and Rumsfeld RE: proposed spending by McGovern. Spending proposal attached. 2 pgs.
36	4	9/6/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: campaign advertising and budgeting. 1 pg.

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36	4	8/15/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Dailey to Magruder RE: a recent decision to cut the CRP's advertising budget. Handwritten note added by Haldeman. 2 pgs.
36	4	9/4/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Magruder to Haldeman RE: press relations of the Committee for the Re-election of the President. 1 pg.
36	4	9/5/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: a "Life" magazine article on the presidential campaign. 1 pg.
36	4	8/30/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	Talking paper from Haldeman to Ziegler RE: RN's relations with the press during the campaign. 1 pg.
36	4	9/5/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Higby to Haldeman RE: Dailey's advice with respect to campaign spending and a decreased budget. 2 pgs.

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36	4	9/5/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Higby to Haldeman RE: holding national advertising while the Committee for the Re-election of the President reconsiders its budget. 1 pg.
36	4	9/2/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Magruder to Haldeman RE: the use of Senator Percy's signature for campaign material in Cook County, Illinois. Handwritten notes added by Haldeman and unknown. 1 pg.
36	4	9/6/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: a meeting to show proposed Democrats for Nixon advertisements. 1 pg.
36	4	9/5/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: a "Life" magazine article on the presidential campaign. 1 pg.
36	4	8/15/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Dailey to Malek RE: decisions to be made on the subject of a campaign fundraising dinner. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 1 pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
36	4	8/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to Haldeman and Colson RE: suggested topics for a campaign meeting. Handwritten note added by unknown. 3 pgs.
36	4	8/15/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From RN to Haldeman RE: suggested campaign "counterattacks" for use against McGovern and Shriver. 3 pgs.
36	4		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Other Document	Objectives for a meeting with Colson on campaign attacks and counterattacks. Author unknown. 2 pgs.
36	4		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Other Document	Document suggesting how to restructure the writing apparatus of the Republican presidential campaign. 1 pg.
36	4	8/10/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Higby RE: campaign issues in the polls. Statistical information on RN and McGovern's strengths and weaknesses as ranked by Republican campaigners and White House figures attached. 9 pgs.

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36	4	8/9/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Safire to Higby RE: Safire's analysis of the strong and weak points of the presidential campaigns in 1972. Duplicates attached. 6 pgs.
36	4	8/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Magruder RE: White House concerns with the Committee for the Re-election of the President's efficiency. 1 pg.
36	4	8/25/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Ehrlichman to RN RE: Shultz's meeting with George Meany. Shultz's report on the conversation attached. 5 pgs.
36	4	8/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Bill Buckley to "H" RE: problems between Mitchell and Governor Rockefeller. 1 pg.
36	4	8/17/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From "Tod" to Haldeman RE: information sent by "John." 1 pg.

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36	4	7/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Maurice Stans to Ehrlichman RE: a letter from William Loeb of the "Manchester Union Leader." 1 pg.
36	4	7/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Letter	From William Loeb to Walter J. Dilbeck, Jr. presenting an analysis of the presidential campaign, including issues and past campaigns. 4 pgs.
36	4	8/22/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Marik, through Magruder, to MacGreogor RE: Senator Percy's signature on campaign material. Handwritten note added by Haldeman. 1 pg.
36	4	8/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Higby to Haldeman RE: making the most effective use of the campaign apparatus over the next 100 days. 4 pgs.
36	4	8/30/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haldeman to Stans RE: keeping fundraising dinners low-key. 1 pg.

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36	4	8/30/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	Talking paper sent by Haldeman to Price RE: the use of Price's staff in the campaign. 2 pgs.
36	4	8/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Parker, via Chapin, to Haldeman RE: proposed schedules for PN, Julie Eisenhower, and Tricia Cox. Proposed campaign schedules attached. 6 pgs.
36	4	9/2/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Magruder to Haldeman RE: a Lou Cannon article on the use of surrogates in the 1972 Republican presidential campaign. Article in question attached. Duplicate of memo and article attached. 6 pgs.
36	4	9/2/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: alternate names for "1701." Handwritten note added by Haldeman. 1 pg.
36	4	8/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Magruder to MacGregor RE: alternate names for the Committee for the Re-election of the President. 2 pgs.

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36	4	5/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Magruder's thoughts on when to change the name of the Committee for the Re-election of the President. Handwritten note added by unknown. 1 pg.
36	4	3/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Magruder to Haldeman RE: thoughts on changing the name of RN's campaign apparatus. Handwritten notes added by Haldeman. 2 pgs.
36	4	3/17/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haldeman to Magruder RE: changing the name of the Committee for the Re-election the President. 1 pg.
36	4	8/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: suggested alternate names for the Committee for the Re-election of the President. 1 pg.
36	4		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From "Pat" to "Joan" RE: information pertaining to a previous conversation. 1 pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
36	4	8/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Magruder to MacGregor RE: proposed alternate names for the Committee for the Re-election of the President. 2 pgs.
36	4		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	"Memorandum of call" presenting information information from Bob Reisner on alternate names for the 1972 Republican campaign organization. 1 pg.
36	4	8/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Magruder to MacGregor RE: proposed alternate names for the Committee for the Re-election of the President. 2 pgs.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

September 1, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN S  
SUBJECT: Evans and Novak Column on  
Teeter's Jewish Voters  
Memorandum

The September 1 Washington Post carries an Evans and Novak column, which describes the campaign organization debate over Bob Teeter's August 8 memorandum to you on Jewish Voters.

A review of our records indicates you sent the memorandum to no one and the only copy besides the attached original is in my Teeter file.

Discussion with Fred Malek and Jeb Magruder indicates that Malek sent copies to Max Fisher and Larry Goldberg. Malek urged them to treat the memorandum as strictly confidential. Malek grilled Goldberg this morning and has reached the preliminary conclusion that he did not leak the information.

Magruder believes that Max Fisher discussed the memorandum with Rita Hauser, who leaked it to Evans and Novak. Teeter, who discussed the conclusions with Fisher when Fisher called asking questions, believes Fisher is the source.



*Rowland Evans and Robert Novak*

## Nixon's Jewish Vote Flap



THE WEEK BEFORE the Republican National Convention, top Nixon political operative Fred Malek fired off a nail-biting memorandum calling for new tactics with Jewish voters—setting off an internal debate revealing much about President Nixon's campaign organization.

Malek, operating head of the Committee for the Re-election of the President, was worried by three-month-old polls showing California and New York Jews just as liberal and Democratic as ever. So Malek recommended greater emphasis on Mr. Nixon's Israeli policy and greater use politically of the President's foreign policy adviser, Dr. Henry Kissinger.

The Nixon lieutenants who long have been plotting a better share of the Jewish vote were stunned. In heated staff conferences, they argued that political novice Malek failed to recognize the rightward drift of lower-income Jews. Moreover, a forthcoming campaign mailing to Jews disregards Malek's strictures.

Considering Mr. Nixon's monumental lead over Sen. George McGovern, such antics may not matter. Nevertheless, the flap over the

Jewish vote is another sign that, behind the facade of split-second efficiency, the Nixon campaign is overrun by amateur masterminding and loose organization.

THE FLAP BEGAN with an Aug. 8 memorandum to White House major domo H. R. (Bob) Haldeman from Detroit-based pollster Robert M. Teeter, analyzing the important Jewish vote in New York and California. Teeter's interviews in June showed that whereas Mr. Nixon against McGovern was running 8 per cent above the normal Republican presidential vote in those two states among all voters, his standing with Jewish voters was only normal in New York (27 per cent) and below normal in California (18 per cent). New York Jewish voters rated McGovern above the President on all issues except national defense and foreign policy.

Teeter's gloomy conclusion: "The Jewish vote appears to be largely a function of party affiliation and past voting behavior . . . moreover, McGovern's nomination does not appear to have had a major effect on the Jewish vote."

Jewish voting experts in the Nixon campaign complained that Teeter, though a respected pollster and analyst, had misread the Jewish vote. But Malek, the 35-year-old self-made millionaire and erstwhile White House efficiency expert, was deeply alarmed.

On Aug. 15, Malek sent off Teeter's findings (marked "confidential") to the campaign's top Jewish vote experts—retired Detroit industrialist Max Fisher and Providence business executive Lawrence Goldberg—with his own conclusions and instructions to keep the bad news quiet ("This information is for your own use and analysis and it cannot be shared with any other persons").

"THE BELIEF that McGovern is anathema to Jewish voters is apparently not true," wrote Malek. "It is clear that the support of the President and the reasons for this support on the part of Jewish leaders has (sic) not been effectively communicated to the rank and file.

"If we are going to make any inroads with Jewish voters we will have to make the differences between McGovern's and the President's positions on Israel much

better known. I would think that we should make the maximum possible use of Sen. (Jacob) Javits (of New York) and Dr. Kissinger in this regard."

Mr. Nixon's Jewish experts were incensed by the memo from Malek, running a presidential campaign as his first political undertaking.

AT STAFF meetings they argued Malek had it all wrong; McGovern is very unpopular with Jews; Mr. Nixon is stronger with rank-and-file Jews than with leaders; Javits cannot influence Jewish voters and Kissinger is barred from open politicking. Lower-middle-income Jews are no longer doctrinaire liberals and, accordingly, are attracted to Mr. Nixon not only on Israel but also on busing, welfare and other race-related questions.

The present inclination at the re-election committee is to ignore Malek's memo, with next month's mass mailing to Jewish voters oblivious to Malek's recommendations. Thus, the dangers of amateurism in high places are remedied by the absence of clear lines of authority in Mr. Nixon's campaign.

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Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

August 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER *RMT*

SUBJECT: Jewish Voters

The purpose of this memo is to summarize the Wave II data on Jewish voters. As the Jewish population does not give us a statistically significant sample of Jews in most of the states, we grouped the Jews from the priority states and paid special attention to New York and California where there is the largest concentration of Jews.

While the President has increased his support among Jewish voters since January, he is not running significantly better with them than the expected vote for a Republican presidential candidate. Using normal vote projections, the President is running 8% ahead of normal Republican vote in New York and California with all voters but only even with the normal vote in New York, and Nixon is behind the normal vote in California with Jewish voters. This is in contrast to almost every other demographic group. The President is running well ahead of normal vote projections for almost all of the other demographic groups in New York and California.

Jewish Voters Only

	Normal Rep. Vote	Wave II						Wave I		
		Nix.	McG	Und.	Nix.	Hump.	Und.	Nix.	Mus.	Und.
New York	30%	27%	63%	10%	26%	60%	14%	12%	82%	6%
California	30	18	79	4	29	64	7	13	66	22

The Jewish vote appears to be largely a function of party affiliation and past voting behavior. In terms of past voting behavior, only 7% of the Jews are behavioral Republicans, and 31% are ticket-splitters, while 62% are Democrats. Moreover, McGovern's nomination does not appear to have had a major affect on the Jewish vote. There are very small differences between the Jewish support for both McGovern and Humphrey.

The data also shows a fairly consistent pattern across demographic Jewish subgroups. Nixon does slightly better with older Jews than younger Jews; however, the margins are much more consistent than the total of all voters. The same pattern is true with income. Nixon is only somewhat better off with higher income Jews than with lower incomes.

In general, Nixon has a low approval rating on the way he handles the job of being President.

	Jewish Voters	<u>Job Approval Rating</u>		
		<u>National</u>	<u>California</u>	<u>New York</u>
Approve	41%	58%	51%	53%
Disapprove	36	30	36	35

In comparison to their handling of issues, Jewish voters give the President much lower ratings on most issues than the ratings given to McGovern.

	<u>Jewish Ratings in New York</u>			
	<u>Nixon</u>		<u>McGovern</u>	
	<u>Pos.</u>	<u>Neg.</u>	<u>Pos.</u>	<u>Neg.</u>
Drugs	24%	74%	51%	19%
Taxes	32	67	56	22
Health Care	46	53	63	13
Vietnam	41	59	63	17
Unemployment	22	77	57	18
Race	34	66	61	18
Foreign Policy	67	32	53	26
National Defense	61	34	55	22
Crime	24	75	54	22
Inflation	24	74	52	25
Environment	29	69	63	14
Bussing	36	57	55	17
General Unrest	24	74	59	18
Welfare	29	70	60	19

The only issues on which Nixon exceeds McGovern are national defense and foreign policy. Apparently, this is related to the President's position on Israel. The only other issues where the President is equal to McGovern are Vietnam and health care. On all other issues, McGovern has a sizeable edge.

Conclusions

The data leads us to several conclusions:

*not*  
*Twitter*  
*all*  
*"not"*  
*AS*  
*check Treaty*

1. The general notion that the President is making great inroads over McGovern with Jewish voters is borne out by the data at this time. *?*
2. The belief that McGovern is an anathema to Jewish voters is apparently not true. In fact McGovern actually has slightly more committed votes in both New York and California than Humphrey.
3. It is clear that the support of the President and the reasons for this support on the part of Jewish leaders has not been effectively communicated to the rank and file. If we are going to make any inroads with Jewish voters we will have to make the differences between McGovern's and the President's positions on Israel much better known. I would think that we should make the maximum possible use of Senator Javits and Dr. Kissinger in this regard.
4. Under the circumstances of having a set of low issue ratings relative to McGovern and low approval ratings, large increases in the President's support may be difficult. The only issues where we have an advantage are foreign policy and national defense. If these can be related to Israel we may be able to improve our standing. On Vietnam and health care we are equal to McGovern and these issues may also be of some use to us. No other issues hold such a promise, and our advertising and media to Jewish voters should be limited to those issues where we have the edge.
5. One of the problems in increasing the President's support among Jews is that it should be kept in mind that the great majority of Jewish voters consider themselves liberals and see the President as a conservative.

*Mrs. Strachan*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GEORGE P. SHULTZ  
H. R. HALDEMAN  
HERBERT STEIN  
JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN  
KENNETH R. COLE, JR.  
PETER M. FLANIGAN  
EDWIN L. HARPER  
CLARK MACGREGOR  
WILLIAM E. TIMMONS  
CHARLES W. COLSON  
RONALD L. ZIEGLER  
DONALD RUMSFELD

FROM:

CASPAR W. WEINBERGER *Cap*

SUBJECT:

McGovern Spending Proposals

Attached is a reconciliation and revision of estimates of McGovern spending proposals, as put forth by McGovern originally, by the Democratic Platform, and as modified by McGovern's August 29 New York speech. I think it would be useful if we decided on one set of figures to use consistently.

Attachment

COMPARISON OF HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE AND OMB  
ESTIMATES OF McGOVERN SPENDING PROPOSALS

McGovern Spending Proposals	HRC Estimates based primarily on McGovern-sponsored legislative proposals		OMB estimates based primarily on Democratic Party Platform	
	Original August 1972 (1)	Modified consistent with McGovern's 8/29/72 speech (2)	Original August 3, 1972 (3)	Modified consistent with McGovern's 8/29/72 speech (4)
Public service employment	9.0	6.0	12.0	6.0
Equalization of school spending and substantial increases in Federal share	19.0	19.0	9.2	9.2
Aid to public schools for property tax relief <u>1/</u>	--	15.0	--	15.0
National health insurance	59.0	59.0	60.0	60.0
Universal breakfast and lunch programs	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7
Higher education	3.8	3.8	1.2	1.2
Defense	-25.0	-30.0	-5.0	-30.0
Income security program <u>2/</u>	-12.6	18.0	25.0	18.0
Private sector jobs subsidy	--	(10.0)	--	(10.0)
Social security expansion	--	(3.0)	--	(3.0)
AFDC expansion and federalization	--	(5.0)	--	(5.0)
Raise social security retirement test	--	--	0.5	0.5
Lower retirement age for all government persons	--	--	5.0	5.0
Full Federal support for qualified nursing homes	--	--	3.0	3.0
Improve staffing in VA hospitals	--	--	0.5	0.5
Full funding of all programs without impounding (education full funding shown under education)	--	--	17.7	17.7
Housing	--	--	0.3	0.3
Local transit systems	--	--	0.4	0.4
Child development	7.2	7.2	--	--
Youth services	1.4	1.4	--	--
Law enforcement	1.4	1.4	--	--
Health manpower and research	1.5	1.5	--	--
Environment and energy	4.8	4.8	--	--
Rural housing	1.5	1.5	--	--
Farm prices	4.3	4.3	--	--
Urban development and transportation	6.1	6.1	--	--
Peacetime technology assistance	0.4	0.4	--	--
Youth Conservation Corps	0.2	0.2	--	--
VA unemployment benefits	0.2	0.2	--	--
Vietnam veterans education and training	3.5	3.5	--	--
Transition income maintenance	2.2	2.2	--	--
<b>Total new spending proposals</b>	<b>92.6</b>	<b>130.2</b>	<b>144.4</b>	<b>121.4</b>
New revenues from tax reforms specified in 8/29/72 speech		22.0		22.0
<b>Total unfunded spending proposals</b>		<b>108.2</b>		<b>99.4</b>

1/ Property tax relief is treated as a new proposal. If this is instead a substitution for earlier education proposals then the totals in columns (2) and (4) would be reduced to 115.2 and 106.4, respectively.

2/ The original HRC version assumed a Demogrant and thus a \$12.6 saving on traditional welfare expenditures. The new McGovern proposal calls for expanding Federal welfare expenditures by \$18.0B.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

September 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Possible Subject for  
10 a.m. Political Meeting

You indicated today that you had several political subjects to cover at the 10 a.m. meeting in Ehrlichman's office. However, there is one problem that you may want to cover in the meeting or separately with MacGregor.

Stans told MacGregor and Magruder today at 3 p.m. that he would not release any money to the November Group until they accepted the 6.3 million budget instead of the 10 million requested. You expressed your views to MacGregor regarding the advertising budget in the attached memorandum.

This budget problem may be raised Friday afternoon when Peter Dailey is prepared to present to you the final "finished" campaign newspaper and TV ads. Although Dailey plans on discussing the revised advertising strategy in light of McGovern's, this budget matter may be raised by Dailey because the matter has not been resolved.

GS/jb

Committee for the Re-election of the President

*Clark  
MacGregor*

MEMORANDUM

August 15, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE HONORABLE CLARK MacGREGOR

THROUGH: JEB S. MAGRUDER

FROM: PETER H. DAILEY

SUBJECT: Advertising Budget

*I think Pete  
is absolutely  
right and that  
deducting  
any amount from it  
we don't need*

The recent decisions to cut the Committee Advertising budget should be reviewed now to provide for sound media planning and scheduling.

For your review, we submit the following:

Considerations

1. \$14.2 million is allowable for media under the Federal Election Campaign Spending Act.
2. \$3 million has been deducted from the total for other uses, leaving a current budget of \$11.2 million.
3. We want to provide adequate reach and frequency, flexibility of message, a meaningful delivery of DFN messages (or anti-McGovern advertising), and an adequate contingency budget.
4. In 1968, the Nixon campaign spent \$22.5 million in broadcast alone, while the Democrats spent \$15.4 million. At present we have \$8.1 million allocated to broadcast, a reduction from 1968 of 268%. Thus, the allowable budget has been already reduced \$3 million and is well under 1968 expenditures.
5. The McGovern forces may well spend up to the \$14.2 million allowable if they can raise the funds.
6. We do not want to visably outspend McGovern. We do not want money to be a campaign issue.

- 7. Polling data must be a determinate of dollar planning. We must be prepared to spend all available funds to win the election and make adjustments downward later if polls indicate. *Right*
- 8. Advertising is the only communications vehicle through which we can transmit our message as the Committee wants it communicated without having the press provide its own interpretations. Also, it is the best way to communicate McGovern's radical positions to the American electorate. ✓
- 9. Current Committee plans call for a substantially reduced budget. The most recent plan shows a budget allocation of \$6.2 million dollars. *Not appropriate*

Conclusions

The \$6.2 million budget assumes an easy election and one not related to issues. We cannot operate on that assumption. *Absolutely.*

We should plan now on a close election. National and local polling data should be closely scrutinized and the plan adjusted downward later. *Right*

Recommendation

The budget for advertising should be restored to the \$11.2 million level. We can not afford to plan now on an easy win, then be put in a position of scrambling for dollars in the last weeks if the polling gap closes.

*Agree*

*Art Bailey*

Committee for the Re-election of the President



MEMORANDUM

September 4, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER  
SUBJECT: Press Relations

The press policy at 1701 has been as follows:

- 1) Mac Gregor works with the press on an on the record basis.
- 2) Abrahams, Shumway, and Moore respond to inquiries, develop lines, etc., primarily on a background not for attribution basis.
- 3) We have used other spokesmen only when the subject matter was such that Abrahams and I felt it was appropriate that someone other than the above mentioned respond (i.e. Rietz on youth, Porter on surrogates).
- 4) Malek does work with some press people, as he feels appropriate. Usually his work is on a background not for attribution basis.

As you recall, Mr. Mac Gregor wrote a memorandum in which he requested that no one have any discussions with hostile press. We discussed with him the problems this would create and the policy stated above is one he and I settled on as a workable policy for our Committee.

Abrahams and I agreed this weekend that in the future we will have no individuals other than Abrahams, Moore and Shumway work with the press on an information basis, therefore, point three no longer applies.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

September 5, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN **S**  
SUBJECT: Life Article on Campaign

Jeb Magruder called to say that the Dave Maxie article for Life magazine on the campaign will be published September 11, 1972. Maxie agreed to have Life do a story on the First Family, which appeared on August 21, 1972, in exchange for the story on the campaign.

Maxie interviewed "most of the senior 1701 staff, with some exceptions (i.e. Bob Teeter)". Magruder expects the article to be "on balance a favorable article", primarily focusing on MacGregor. There should be some negative comment on security.

**TALKING PAPER -- ZIEGLER**

You apparently discussed with the President the point that the press will not be impressed by anything we do on the campaign trail. He feels, therefore, that we should play every event to the local press, at least 75 percent.

We have to realize the difficult situation we have and should see the locals and butter them up in order to work with the problem.

You should quit worrying about the specials. For example, why did we have Sidey and Semple at the celebrities party? Why not friends?

You should set up a handshake with local press at all stops. You've been instructed many times in the past to do it and you aren't doing it. For example, in Michigan nothing was worked out on this. It must be.

**HRH**  
**August 30, 1972**

HRH:kb

September 5, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: L. HIGBY  
SUBJECT: Revised Advertising Strategy

Dailey indicated to me that he and his group were already in the process of reevaluating our advertising strategy. They see waiting until after we receive our next batch of poll data (September 16) before making any final hard decisions. Their best information indicates that McGovern's advertising will start September 12th.

Their general feeling is that now we should hold back in doing our general or national advertising. We should take a look at some of the states where we are behind and consider doing our strong Democratic advertising, hitting McGovern in those states. We would hold off on all of our other national advertising, including mailing.

The states Dailey was generally talking about are Wisconsin, California (and in the San Francisco). Ohio, in the Cleveland area.

Pete also indicated that with the tremendously high ASI ratings, one of his basic conclusions was that we're getting good coverage of Richard Nixon being President and the more we can show the documentaries, shows Nixon as President. Some of the commercials do, but either way they appeared as commercials that are contrasted directly to McGovern. Pete will have more to us on this subject this Friday.

LH:kb

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



September 5, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: L. HIGBY   
SUBJECT: Revised Advertising Strategy

Dailey and his group were already in the process of reevaluating our advertising strategy. They plan to wait until after we receive our next batch of poll data (September 16) before making any final hard decisions. McGovern's advertising will start September 12th.

We should hold for now in doing any general, national advertising, including mailings. We should take a look at some of the states where we are behind and consider doing our strong Democratic advertising, hitting McGovern in those states. - Wisconsin, California (in San Francisco), Ohio (in Cleveland area), Michigan and Oregon.

With the tremendously high ASI ratings they received, we should consider showing the documentaries early in the campaign. This is based on the premise that we are receiving good coverage of Richard Nixon as President.

COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

MEMORANDUM

September 2, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

JEB S. MAGRUDER

SUBJECT:

Illinois Direct Mail

During the Republican Convention, Clark MacGregor approved our recommendation to have Senator Percy sign letters for high and middle income voters in Cook County, Illinois. Shortly thereafter, Gordon Strachan indicated to me that you had reservations about using Senator Percy's name.

The purpose of this memo is to indicate our strong feeling that Senator Percy's name would substantially add to the effectiveness of the letter. No other public figure except the President or Vice President can approach the favorable reading among these target voters in Illinois.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you confirm that we are authorized to seek Senator Percy's agreement to sign the Cook County letter to high and middle income voters.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS \_\_\_\_\_

*No comment —*

*I still disagree —  
but leave it to  
Mac Gregor.*

*G → JSM  
9/6 - to  
cover w/CM*

*It is clear that Percy is opposed  
to the P. - I don't understand  
why we keep sucking  
around him.*

pr  
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

September 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Democrats for Nixon  
Advertisements

Peter Dailey and Phil Joanou are available to show you the final DFN advertisements before they meet with Connally at 3 p.m. All the materials (TV spots, newspaper boards, etc.) are in my office. You have seen most of the materials in "rough", non-DFN attributed form.

The DFN strategy memorandum prepared by Dailey and delivered to me this morning is attached.

Also available in my office are the re-done DFN mailings and brochures that Peter Dailey and Bob Marik prepared for Connally.

GS/jb

~~ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 5, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Life Article on Campaign

Jeb Magruder called to say that the Dave Maxie article for Life magazine on the campaign will be published September 11, 1972. Maxie agreed to have Life do a story on the First Family, which appeared on August 21, 1972, in exchange for the story on the campaign.

Maxie interviewed "most of the senior 1701 staff, with some exceptions (i.e. Bob Teeter)". Magruder expects the article to be "on balance a favorable article", primarily focusing on MacGregor. There should be some negative comment on security.

GS/jb

*Chapin*

Committee for the Re-election of the President

*Xerox to  
Gordon who  
Should we  
put in  
charge of  
this!*

MEMORANDUM

August 15, 1972

TO: FRED MALEK  
FROM: PETE DAILEY  
SUBJECT: Fund-Raising Dinner, September 26

Lang Washburn, in charge of the September 26 fund-raising dinner, is in need of help on a political format.

This dinner is the \$1,000 per plate affair which will be in approximately 32 cities. A one hour closed circuit telecast linking all of the cities is planned. The telecast is scheduled for 10 pm - 11 pm, EST. Currently, they plan for President Nixon to attend in New York, and Vice President Agnew in Chicago. Los Angeles and San Francisco will not be in the closed circuit link. They will have a live Presidential appearance at a luncheon in San Francisco on September 27, and at a dinner in Los Angeles that night. They have plans to have Bob Hope introduce the President at all of these functions. No advance publicity for this dinner is planned for obvious reasons. Nate Halpern is the producer. He also produced the 1968 fund-raising dinner, as well as the 1970 Republican National Committee fund-raising dinner. Major political decisions must be made prior to the time the one hour format is planned by Halpern. This includes:

*H+*  
*Tom  
Gandell  
per C?*

- ... Who is to be introduced?
- ... In what cities should they be introduced?
- ... Who should be shown on camera?
- ... How is the program to be opened?

Most of these decisions are political ones that fall outside the November Group. I will be happy to help in any way I can, but I suggest that someone in the White House assume the responsibility.

cc: Jeb Magruder  
Dwight Chapin  
Gordon Strachan  
Phil Joanou

*Dale*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN  
CHARLES COLSON

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

SUBJECT: Monday Morning 9:15 a. m. Meeting

*Colson*  
*What done on this?*  
*What done re POW factory?*

Have to be at the doctor's for a 9:00 a. m. appointment at Naval Medical, but the following are followup attack recommendations for today:

1. Ramsey Clark, along with the Shriver charge, this is issue number one today. Clark will have a press conference. We can piggy-back on this for tonight's TV. Suggest Mitchell Written Statement by PJB -- iterating our demand that McGovern either endorse or repudiate Clark's performance and his "perfect" choice for the FBI. Ignore McGovern charge of "treasonous allegations," and focus on McGovern once again evading re-endorsing a man whom he seems ready to dump over the side. Also, Fletcher Thompson in attacking Clark, and others should keep before the public that he is McGovern's "perfect choice" for the FBI job. Suggest that MacGregor go on TV -- this is "the" story of day, for tonight, demanding anew, along the lines of Mitchell statement that McGovern stop evading and obfuscation and answer to American people if this individual who last week was broadcasting Hanoi's propaganda is still in line to head up the FBI. Also, Mitchell statement of page and a half should contain defense of U. S. pilots slandered by McGovern yesterday. (PJB can have this by noon, by one at latest.)

2. On the Shriver story, that RN "blew it" we should get Lodge on TV; we should turn the focus of this on Shriver and McGovern's credibility; and re-issue that resignation letter from Shriver; as long as the issue turns on whether Shriver was telling the truth or not telling the truth, they can't be making ground. Further, this boiling controversy keeps the Watergate Caper off of page 1. Everything should be done, in statements and the like to portray Shriver as a) not telling the truth and b) keeping silent for three years, seeking a GOP job, and then speaking out only when it was politically profitable. Shriver was a "Silent Partner" in the escalation in Vietnam; endorsed RN's policy, and now for

crass political gain is stabbing in the back a President whose policies he endorsed wholeheartedly while in the President's employ.

3. The White Paper of McGovern's on the environment got hardly any serious coverage. We can and should elevate this -- with an EPA, and/or CEQ press conference today -- which attacks McGovern for "gross ignorance of the President's record, for "sloppy staff work" for utter lack of knowledge of the toughest environmental record ever compiled by any President. Impossible to believe Senator McGovern could have seen or signed this idiotic paper -- then a briefing listing of RN's environmental achievements. But the attack on McGovern's "incredible document" should be the lead. Once again reflecting the sloppy staff work that has plagued the McGovern campaign. Tone incredulous that McGovern could have issued such a paper.

4. Don't respond to the false allegation that we accused Clark of treason -- this is what they would like to make the issue -- our issue is that this tool of Radio Hanoi is McGovern's perfect choice for FBI Director, and this is a travesty; and that McGovern should repudiate Clark (even as Senator Proxmire did) and tell the American people in no uncertain terms that he withdraws his endorsement of Clark for FBI Chief.

5. We might need some polling in Pa. to see the damage done on this flood controversy.

6. Page 30 of Saturday News Summary -- Jesse Jackson has some negative remarks on McGovern -- we should get these out to the black press, and have Floyd McKissick use them in attack on McGovern and defense of his decision to go with RN.

7. We should have Paul Keyes working up some humorous lines of ridicule to use against McGovern; if we can get the country making him and his campaign as ridiculous, he may never be able to regain credibility and recover.

8. Within the attack book there are three or four McGovern predictions about what the NVN would do if we halted bombing, etc. All provided wrong. We should have a foreign policy spokesman who can speak to these points, and indict McGovern for having been wrong about every other opportunity, wrong about Hanoi's intentions throughout his career, and a record of misjudging the enemy, reflected anew in his endorsement of Shriver's charge.

9. Note page 18 of N. Y. Times, where McGovern is working on Hill to remove equal time requirement, in which event networks will grant free time. Can we block this?

10. Important thing -- ride the big stories of the day -- Clark, and Shriver credibility.

A.

Buchanan

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 15, 1972  
Camp David

MEMORANDUM FOR : H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM THE PRESIDENT

Following are some odds and ends with regard to the counterattack activities.

As I have emphasized, and as Connally totally agrees, it is important to continue to hammer at Clark, particularly on the point that he is McGovern's choice as Head of the FBI. Get Buchanan to get the sharpest, briefest summary of the situation with the direct quote from McGovern, the direct quote from Clark on Hanoi, or if a direct quote is not available there, the best possible summary which does not overstate the case. The charge should then be summarized in a way that it cannot be attacked as being inaccurate and should demand that McGovern confirm or deny the charge.

It might go something like this - On August \_\_\_\_, Ramsey Clark in Hanoi, speaking on Hanoi radio completely being taken in by the North Vietnamese propoganda, attacked the policy of the United States in these words (put in a very brief, sharp excerpt). It is unprecedented that any American, and particularly a former Attorney General of the United States, would attack his own country, not only while he was in a foreign country, but when he is in the capital of an enemy country responsible for the death of 55,000 Americans. On July \_\_\_\_, in an interview, Senator McGovern said, "Ramsey Clark would be a perfect FBI Director if he would take it" (get here, of course, the exact quote).

For years, J. Edgar Hoover, as head of the FBI, was the nation's number one anti-Communist and protected our institutions from Communist infiltration. This is one of the FBI's primary responsibilities.

Senator McGovern has put the country on notice that he is going to put in this highly sensitive position, not a strong anti-Communist like J. Edgar Hoover, but one who by his conduct in Hanoi, has demonstrated that he has been totally taken in by the Communists and will even unwittingly, take the Communist line over that of his own country in wartime.

We do not question the loyalty or the good intentions of Senator McGovern or Ramsey Clark, but this unbelievably soft-headed attitude toward Communism means that the election of McGovern would be an invitation for an open hunting license in the United States for the Communist subversives.

I am not wedded to any of this language or even to the way to present it. Buchanan et al can probably come up with something better, but what I am urging is that a line be developed and once it is developed, that it be distributed to major speakers, editors of papers and opinion-makers across the country. I would strongly urge that in this case it not come from MacGregor, and of course not from the White House. Perhaps if Kearnan, the head of the International Police Chiefs, or someone of that sort, or even possibly the head of the VFW organization should send it out. The main thing is to get it out and get it used so that we can make this a major issue in the campaign.

On another subject of less importance, but one which was an example of a procedure I want followed throughout the campaign, is the rather silly but on reflection, shocking statement made by Shriver that when McGovern is in the White House, the poor people would be invited to the White House, that the only people that had been invited to the White House during the Nixon Administration were the rich people and the bad people.

I realize that this is silly, and it of course, should not be elevated to a national issue. I think, however, it might well be answered by one of our women surrogates in defense of Mrs. Nixon. It also should be in the answer desk material - perhaps a little piece in MONDAY might be the way to do it. What I am suggesting here is that we never forget Dick Moore's admonition that the little lies must always be answered. It is obvious that Shriver is going to play the rich versus the poor line and so is McGovern. It is obvious too, that the public soon forgets how many generous things we have done with the use of the White House - the most unprecedented opening of the doors to underprivileged children, the aged, and others in the history of the White House. It isn't wise to let him get away with even charges so minor as this.

I would suggest that Connie by this time, since I have written at least a dozen memos to her or to you to be passed on to her, would have a chapter and verse on the parties, the Thanksgiving Dinners, the luncheons in the White House for the old folks, the parties at Christmas time for the blind and the deaf, the underprivileged and the poor, the parties on the lawn for the poor children in the Washington area, etc., etc. Direct her to get the material together in an effective package as possible, then give it to a good writer who can summarize it all and put it out on reflection, probably in something like MONDAY.

The purpose of this is not to knock down Shriver on the ridiculous charge which is really not worth responding to, the purpose is to get across the story that we have not gotten across too well - that we have really done outstanding work over these past three and a half years in opening the White House doors to thousands of people who never before could have that opportunity. Incidentally, the rides on the Sequoia might also be mentioned. This is a good assignment for somebody and when it is completed, tell them that I want to see it so that they will know that I consider it important. It would also be helpful if you would pass on a copy of it to Mrs. Nixon, Tricia, and Julie.

MEETING WITH COLSON

RE: Attack/Counter-Attack

Objective: To spell out to Colson the fact that he will be in charge of the attack/counter-attack operation and explain to him the guidelines under which he should operate.

-- Meet each morning at 8:00 a.m. with Ehrlichman, Ziegler, Haldeman in Haldeman's office. Review News Summary and strategy. This meeting followed by usual 8:15 a.m. meeting.

-- At conclusion of 8:15 a.m. meeting, Colson should hold operational meeting in Roosevelt Room to give out assignments for the day. This is an operational meeting, not an idea session. Ideas should be submitted in writing by 5:00 p.m. each day.

-- Show Colson suggested meeting list. Say that he can modify but that representatives from White House, press office, 1701, RNC, and the Domestic Council must be included.

-- Cover the way the writing operation will be set up with Buchanan as Editor-in-Chief. All writers report to Buchanan on attack/counter-attack.

-- Cover the fact that Chapin will be handling surrogate scheduling and that O'Donnell is to be assigned to him for the next 100 days.

-- Colson may want to set up his own idea group of Scali, Moore, etc., if so -- fine, but they should be a separate group.

H  
FC  
8/15  
8/25

Meeting with Colson -- re: attack/counter-attack

2

SUGGESTED MEETING GROUP

White House -- Buchanan, Khachigian (or Adm. type),  
Clawson, Warren, Howard, Strachan

Domestic Council -- Hulin

1701 -- Failor, Abrahams

RNC -- Wilke, DeBolt (or Bauer or Harroff), Lofton

LH  
August 14, 1972

LH:kb

20

H  
FU  
8/15  
\$25

RESTRUCTURING THE WRITING OPERATION/CAMPAIGN

Objective:

1. Establish a group of attack writers under Buchanan.
2. Find an appropriate administrator to work with Buchanan.

Action:

1. Meet with Ray Price to discuss concept and ask him to select those writers who could be spared from Presidential and First Family work.
2. Ask Colson for a confidential list of whom he feels would be best.
3. Once this list is established, meet with Colson and Buchanan to set up operational arrangements.
4. Suggest to MacGregor that 1701 attack writers will also be assigned to Buchanan.

Meeting with Price:

-- Need for unified sufficiently staffed attack operation. Ray can't do this -- must concentrate on highest priority which is First Family and President.

-- This is not a permanent arrangement, but for next ninety days it is not business as usual. We need a full-time effort in both areas.

-- We need to assign to Buchanan the writers who we can spare, making sure the First Family is covered.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date: August 10, 1972

**TO:** LARRY HIGBY

**FROM:** GORDON STRACHAN

The balance of isolated issues and thoughts that did not fit within the Four Best/Four Worst Issues tally are described on two additional pages.

*List all issues  
not just top 4*

PRESIDENT NIXON - SENATOR McGOVERN

Strong/Weak Issues

President Nixon's Best Issues

1. International Issues (China, Moscow, Peacemaker, Vietnam)
  - a. Listed First by: Moore, Harlow, Clawson, Sears, Cole, Dent, Buchanan, Hallett, Colson, Chapin, Garment (11 of 15)
  - b. Listed in Top 4 by everyone
2. The Economy
  - a. Listed First by: None
  - b. Listed Second by: Moore, Harlow, Cole
  - c. Listed Third by: Sears, Clawson
  - d. Listed Fourth by: Dent, Hallett, Colson
  - e. Not Listed as Positive Issue by: Teeter, Chapin, Garment, Buchanan, McLaughlin
3. Domestic Tranquility
  - a. Listed First by: None
  - b. Listed Second by: McLaughlin, Sears, Dent, Colson
  - c. Listed Third by: Cole
  - d. Listed Fourth by: Teeter, Hallett
  - e. Not Listed as Positive Issue by: Moore, Harlow, Clawson, Chapin, Garment, Buchanan, Whitaker

President Nixon - Senator McGovern

Strong/Weak Issues

4. Incumbency (competence, experience, professional)
  - a. Listed First by: McLaughlin, Whitaker, Price,  
Moore
  - b. Listed Second by: ^ Clawson, Chapin
  - c. Listed Fourth by: Garment, Harlow
  - d. Not Listed as Positive Issue by: Teeter, Cole,  
Sears, Dent, Hallett, Colson, Buchanan

PRESIDENT NIXON - SENATOR McGOVERN

Strong/Weak Issues

Senator McGovern's Worst Issues -- Our Attack

1. The Candidate Himself (Inexperienced, Indecisive, Credibility)
  - a. Listed First by: McLaughlin, Chapin, Garment, Moore, Teeter, Sears, Dent, Hallett, Price
  - b. Listed in Top Four by: Colson, Buchanan, Cole, Harlow, Clawson
  - c. Not Listed as McGovern Weak Issue by: Whitaker
  
2. McGovern's Radicalism (Non-Specific Issues)
  - a. Listed First by: Buchanan, Price, Whitaker, Harlow
  - b. Listed in Top Four by: McLaughlin, Moore, Teeter
  - c. Not Listed as McGovern Weak Issue: Colson, Hallett, Dent, Sears, Cole, Garment, Chapin
  
3. McGovern Issue Positions (National Defense, Welfare, Socialize America)
  - a. Listed First by: Colson, Sears, Cole
  - b. Listed in Top Four by: Chapin, Dent, Hallett, Buchanan, Price, Harlow, Teeter, Moore, Clawson, McLaughlin
  - c. Not Listed as McGovern Weak Issue by: Whitaker, Garment

PRESIDENT NIXON - SENATOR McGOVERN

Strong/Weak Issues

Senator McGovern's Worst Issues -- Our Attack

4. McGovern is Elitist
  - a. Listed First by: None
  - b. Listed in Top Four<sup>^</sup> by: Price, Whitaker, Garment, McLaughlin, Buchanan
  - c. Not Listed as McGovern Weak Issue by: Harlow, Teeter, Moore, Hallett, Dent, Chapin, Sears, Cole, Colson, Clawson

Senator McGovern's Best Issues

1. Vietnam
  - a. Listed First by: Garment, Cole, Hallett, Moore, Harlow
  - b. Listed in Top Four by: Clawson, Colson, Chapin, Dent, Buchanan, Whitaker, Sears, Price
  - c. Not Listed as McGovern Strong Issue by: Teeter, McLaughlin
2. Personal Character, Honesty
  - a. Listed First by: Sears, Whitaker
  - b. Listed in Top Four by: McLaughlin, Garment, Cole, Dent, Hallett, Harlow, Buchanan
  - c. Not Listed as McGovern Strong Issue by: Teeter, Clawson, Colson, Chapin, Moore

PRESIDENT NIXON - SENATOR McGOVERN

Strong/Weak Issues

Senator McGovern's Best Issues

3. The Economy

- a. Listed First by: Teeter, Buchanan, McLaughlin
- b. Listed in Top Four by: Cole, Hallett, Whitaker, Moore, Chapin, Colson, Clawson
- c. Not Listed as McGovern Strong Issue: Garment, Harlow, Sears, Price

4. The Haves and Have-Nots

- a. Listed First by: Price, Colson
- b. Listed in Top Four by: Garment, Sears, Dent, Moore, Hallett, Chapin, Whitaker, McLaughlin, Buchanan
- c. Not Listed as McGovern Strong Issue by: Teeter, Clawson, Harlow

President Nixon's Worst Issues -- McGovern Attack

1. Credibility, Trust, Ethics

- a. Listed First by: Chapin, Cole, Moore, Dent, Sears, Price
- b. Listed in Top Four by: Garment, McLaughlin, Clawson, Buchanan, Hallett, Harlow, Whitaker
- c. Not Listed as McGovern Attack Issue: Colson, Teeter

PRESIDENT NIXON - SENATOR McGovern

Strong/Weak Issues

2. The Economy

- a. Listed First by: Teeter, Whitaker, Buchanan
- b. Listed in Top Four by: Harlow, Hallett, Price, McLaughlin, Sears, Dent, Cole, Chapin, Clawson, Colson
- c. Not Listed as McGovern Attack Issue: Garment, Moore

3. Vietnam

- a. Listed First by: Harlow, Hallett, McLaughlin, Cole, Garment
- b. Listed in Top Four by: Colson, Clawson, Dent, Sears, Price, Whitaker, Buchanan
- c. Not Listed as McGovern Attack Issue: Moore, Chapin, Teeter

4. Priorities (Defense Spending, Establishment, Change)

- a. Listed First by: Colson
- b. Listed in Top Four by: Garment, McLaughlin, Hallett, Harlow, Teeter, Price, Whitaker
- c. Not Listed as McGovern Attack Issue: Chapin, Cole, Moore, Clawson, Dent, Sears, Buchanan

Miscellaneous -- General Themes, Non-Specific Issues, Isolated Support Issues

1. General moderation of President's proposals distinguished from McGovern's wild projects -- Buchanan, Dent

PRESIDENT NIXON - SENATOR McGOVERN

Strong/Weak Issues

2. The President represents what's right with traditional America and her values and culture -- Buchanan, Cole
3. The President's fight against pollution should be considered one of the President's Four Best Issues -- Sears
4. The lack of big domestic legislative achievements will be a negative issue used by McGovern against the President according to Dent.
5. The President himself should be shown as the warm, decent human being that he is according to Clawson.
6. McGovern's lack of Labor support should be emphasized according to Ken Clawson.
7. Chapin believes McGovern's Vietnam undercutting of the President risking the POW's will damage McGovern.
8. Colson and Teeter urge the use of Tax Reform as a positive issue for President Nixon.
9. Colson urges use of the theme that "we (the Administration) have only begun".
10. The fact that McGovern favors forced busing should be used in our attack according the Colson and Moore.
11. Hallett and Garment urge use of returning power to the people, anti-bureaucratic issues.

PRESIDENT NIXON - SENATOR McGOVERN

Strong/Weak Issues

12. Finch urges a continued assault on McGovern and his policies in spite of the addition of Shriver. Rumsfeld, not Agnew, should bracket Shriver's schedule and prevent Shriver from becoming the foreign policy expert.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 9, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: LARRY HIGBY  
FROM: BILL SAFIRE (dictated from London)  
RE: Campaign Issues

A. Our Best (Positive)

1. Nixon will bring peace that will last.
2. Nixon stands for the values most Americans believe in.
3. Nixon stopped the rise of crime and disorder.
4. Nixon is bringing about prosperity in peacetime.

B. Opposition's Worst (Negative)

1. That's your money they want to redistribute.
2. They would appease their way into another war
3. They represent only the extremes and not the majority.
4. Millions of investors in stock market securities would suffer if they won.

C. Opposition's Best (Positive)

1. The average man will get a better deal through tax reform.
2. The war would end right away.
3. A spirit of compassion would bring the country together.
4. They would change priorities to spend money on people and not war machines.

D. Opposition's Worst (Negative)

1. Nixon the captive of special interests and fat cats.
2. Nixon's secret war chest conceals embarrassing donations.
3. Nixon broke his promises on the war and is strictly an opportunist without principle.
4. Nixon has shown he doesn't give a damn about the cities.

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ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

August 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JEB MAGRUDER

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

McGovern's Speech

Today we had the classic example of the type of foul-up we cannot afford for the next 71 days. I talked with Al Abrahams, Van Shumway and Bob Reisner this morning at 10 a.m. regarding the importance of getting copies of the McGovern Speech and the reaction by your people at the event. Reisner committed to getting me a copy of the speech, which he did within ten minutes after it was released from McGovern Headquarters at 11:20. The copy would not dex so Van Shumway promised to send an original. It arrived 45 minutes later.

Abrahams, Reisner and you described the system where we would have someone at the New York Security Analysts' event who would call to give a report on their reaction. At 2:10, Reisner, Abrahams, Shumway, Ann Dore, you, and Bruce Miller were all unavailable. Needless to say, there was some concern in San Clemente as to the effectiveness of the 1701 organization.

Jeb, I'm not writing this to bitch and moan, but this is just the type of incident that sets up an Ehrlichman and Colson attack on 1701 to their increasing success.

I trust you will figure out some system such as a desk man, staggered lunches (or no lunch at all as many in the '68 campaign pointedly suggested to me), so that we can obtain the answers necessary for what McGovern himself characterized as his most important speech of the campaign.

cc: Bob Reisner

GS/jb

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 25, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

FROM

JOHN EHRLICHMAN

George Shultz has had a very good talk with George Meany.

Here is the substance of that conversation (quoting Shultz's report to me on the phone):

Copies to:  
✓ Bob Haldeman  
John Connally  
Bill Safire  
Chuck Colson

First of all, he thought the President's Acceptance Speech was terrific.

He thinks the President is miles ahead from his point of view but then he made all kinds of comments and gave advice and what-not.

First of all, the theme with respect to labor - labor's interested in labor issues but laborers are Americans and they're interested in everything -- foreign policy and defense and so on.

Second, he thinks the President is perfect on foreign policy.

He has now come to be an enthusiastic supporter of our busing business. We went through what he and I talked about down in Augusta before the statement came out and we went back into the President's busing program and so on, and I think he came around on that. But, at any rate, he volunteered the fact that the President is, as far as, he says, our members are concerned, the President is right on and he should use busing only to get better education. But he thinks that's a very good issue.

He thinks we have to say more about taxes. And he doesn't seem to react much to the property tax thing. He's reacting from the standpoint of his members. He says there are two things on taxes that you can do. First, make the connection even more strongly with welfare, because our guy thinks he's paying his taxes so that somebody else can get welfare so cracking down on that is tax reform. There's that connection on peoples' minds. Second, he thinks that the President has got to show that he's willing to tackle the people who don't pay a tax but are rich. And - he didn't use the word "tax shelter" - but the tax shelter business is something in that field he thinks is important to do. A suggestion to show that you're willing to take on these people who are assumed to be in the President's corner. Just like he thinks it was a good thing that we took on the ~~oil~~ industry. So he thinks we ought to have something in there about that. He doesn't presume to have any idea about what. He had heard Herb Stein give a talk about this and say there wasn't any money in it, he didn't get any contributions to the budget. He says that's a disastrous approach. Nobody cares about that. They care about the psychology of somebody getting away with something. And that's the thing the President has to hit.

On defense he thinks the President has handled that just right, emphasizing national security. Some people are talking about it in terms of jobs. He said don't do that. He said our people know that their jobs are involved - you don't have to tell them. But you just undermine the national security argument if you talk about it in terms of jobs.

Next, he thinks that we ought to make quite a little out of the merchant marine business. It's in our platform; the Democrats didn't say anything about it. One segment of labor responds to that.

Next, amnesty. He thinks the President's right on with the amnesty thing as far as the labor membership is concerned.

He thinks on the bargaining thing that the President ought to make a strong statement and he thinks that a radio Labor Day address would be a good thing to do - the best way to handle it. We ought to make a pitch for free collective bargaining and industrial peace and that he thinks the President ought to say that he's going to appoint a labor-management commission to explore this issue and to report -- or maybe it's a labor-management-government thing. Maybe it could be done by the Productivity Commission, but probably some separate thing would adhere to the principles of free collective bargaining but put a lot of emphasis on how you do it peacefully - and emphasize that.

Then he branched off from that into his recurrent theme that McGovern is such a dumb cluck. He thought McGovern was just stupid to come out for the right-to-strike for teachers. He just can't count. There are a lot more parents than there are teachers. He, Meany, has doubts about the right-to-strike for public employees although he can't say that, but he thinks that if there is too much of it you'll wind up losing Republican play to unionism in the process. But, anyway his suggestion is that it would be a mistake for the President to take up the right-to-strike for public employees as a philosophic issue and argue it out, so to speak on that ground. But as he says the President's in a poison position because of the Post Office legislation and the Executive Order on public employee collective bargaining, that he has been the first President to really recognize collective bargaining and to provide <sup>governance</sup> ~~agreements~~ procedure and to provide this impasse panel that we've set up so that you can get justice without striking. His suggestion is that rather than argue philosophically on the right-to-strike that you just go off on a different tack about a more constructive task of here is what you do to solve problems without strikes, which the President has done.

He thinks that would be another good thing to cover in the Labor Day speech. On Labor Day he should cover labor management industrial peace now, free collective bargaining and the merchant marine business. The President, Bill (Rogers) and I talked about this and we got language in the Platform on the Mexican border business. He keeps saying the President doesn't have to commit himself to some specific thing. He has to show that he's aware of the problem, that he's going to take a good look at it, and he's going to try to do something about it.

He thinks that the President ought to come out for the SST.

I told him, well, George, there's a water quality bill lounging around that maybe the President will have to veto if it gets too bad. He says, well, our members won't object to that; they don't want to be put out of jobs by environmental kooks. But so, anyway, there's that problem...thinks that's a very good idea.

On inflation, he says Joyce Rumsfeld could become the hero of the country with her little comment about prices not going up. His thought is, don't overplay our accomplishments about inflation. Say them, but don't act as though we have anything other than a continuing battle which we are waging. We're not satisfied at all, even though we've made progress. Run against it; don't run on the basis that we've solved it.

He thinks that McGovern keeps making stupid statements. The President shouldn't dignify them by taking them on. But maybe other people should take them on; the President ought to position himself above McGovern and not entangle himself with all these little ins and outs that McGovern may do other than occasional shots.

He thinks that the pitch of the President's for support of all Americans is a good thing to do but he thinks it's a mistake to emphasize Democrats. His reasoning is that this makes it seem like an attack on the Democratic Party. It sounds like you're trying to break up the Democratic Party. What the President is saying is if he's going to break up the Democratic Party, you presume he's going to break up the Republican Party, too. But he thinks that while maybe that will happen you're going too fast and you'll get more Democrats to vote for the President if you don't push breaking up the Democratic Party.

Bear in mind, nothing he said was in a critical tone. It was another one of those long sessions -- his whole perspective is helping the President and he's just pointing this out as here's the way some Democrats react to that. You get more of them by not having an implicit threat to the long-term continuance of the Democratic Party. That's the point of it.

And then he said I'll give you one thing to tell the President. Tell him, don't look at the polls. Go out and fight for your re-election. And as he walked out he saw this little picture of the President and Mrs. Nixon that I have on my table and he pointed to Mrs. Nixon and said, "There's a great gal - terrific - she comes through nice."

I talked to Colson a little bit about this. Apparently Safire is drafting the Labor Day talk and I'll do some work on it.

He's terrifically enthusiastic about the President's speech and he said if he can do that during the campaign, that's the campaign.

\* \* \*

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 28, 1972

H . . .

William Buckley's secretary left the following message from Buckley for you:

Dear Robert:

I have a most urgent message. As things now stand, the likelihood is great that at the conservative party convention next Wednesday evening, the delegates will name a separate slate of electors from those named earlier by the GOP. The impasse is a direct consequence of John Mitchell's unaccountable inaccessibility to Governor Rockefeller and O'Douthery, both of whom would be trying to telephone him. Rockefeller is taking a position that unless brother Jim publicly endorses Revenue Sharing, Rockefeller will not permit identical slates. Jim is not disposed to play a public role as victim of Rockefeller's direct expediency. In any event, the projected Bill will get through the Senate. What is needed is White House coordination with Governor Rockefeller and the conservative party to insure a joint slate of electors. I cannot be reached. Please call Don Mahoney at 516-728 3887.

All the best,

Bill Buckley

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 17, 1972

FOR BOB HALDEMAN

John asked that the attached be  
forwarded for your interest.

*Jed*

JUL 31 1972

MAURICE H. STANS  
SUITE 272  
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006  
(202) 333-8280

July 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Ehrlichman

FROM: Maurice H. Stans

Because of its source, the attached letter is worth your passing on to the President as a matter of interest.

Walter Dilbeck, a Democrat who is now helping us, received the letter from William Loeb of the MANCHESTER UNION LEADER, whom you and the President know all about.

The interesting thing is that, except for the suggestion that the President hit out strongly against the media, there is not much to fault in this letter.


Attachment

New Hampshire's Largest  
Daily Newspaper

The State's Only  
Sunday Newspaper

"There Is Nothing So Powerful As Truth"

UNION LEADER CORPORATION  
MANCHESTER, N. H. 03105  
AREA CODE 603-625-5432



WILLIAM LOEB  
PRESIDENT AND PUBLISHER

July 20, 1972

Mr. Walter J. Dilbeck, Jr.  
Upper Mt. Vernon Road  
Evansville, Indiana

Dear Mr. Dilbeck:

Thank you very much indeed for your telephone call of last Monday. It is quite evident from what you said that you and I are equally alarmed over the McGovern threat, and quite properly so. I would very much doubt that Mr. Nixon would listen to anything I had to say, but since you suggested that I write my thoughts to you on the campaign so that you can present them to the President when you lunch with him next week, I will.

I have delayed sending this letter to you because I wanted to reduce my thoughts to where they would be as compact as possible for you.

First of all, Mr. Nixon, in my opinion, almost lost the 1968 election and blew his tremendous lead which he had according to public opinion polls by being much too nice, and much too pleasant, and much too bland. Had that campaign gone on for another week, I believe Senator Humphrey would have defeated him.

Someone in Mr. Nixon's entourage or associates has somehow persuaded Mr. Nixon that he must be the new Nixon, not the old Nixon, the old Nixon having been a good political gut fighter. You might start out by telling the President he better become the old Nixon, or he isn't going to win this one.

Mr. Nixon, in spite of his origin among plain people, has somehow, it seems to me, lost touch with what is on the average American's mind today.

First of all, while the China and Russian trips make very nice background, they do not concern matters which are considered vital to the average U. S. voter. There are five principle things that bother the average U. S. voter:

1. The fact of possible unemployment.
2. The fact that when he or his wife go to the market, the things that they want to buy are constantly going up in price.
3. The matter of busing; American Voters don't want to see their children - and this applies to black voters as well as white - bused out of their neighborhood just to try to prove the unprovable theory of some arrogant sociologist.

THE STATE NEWSPAPERS COVERING THE NEW HAMPSHIRE MARKET . . . DAILY and SUNDAY

4. The average citizen is concerned over the rising crime rate and the fact that he and his wife are no longer safe on their city streets.

One might note at this point that Mr. Nixon apparently thought that he lost in 1970 by his emphasis on the law and order issue. The President and the Republicans did not lose because of their emphasis on that issue. It is a good issue. They lost because there was another issue at the time which was more on the voter's mind, and that was the matter of the state of the economy - inflation.

5. The 5th issue would be the matter of national defense. American voters are not belligerent, but they want to be assured that the money they pay in taxes will give them the armed services that will protect them against conquest.

These are the issues that the President has to fight for, and he has to fight hard.

On the matter of inflation, the President has never really come out and said, "The reason we have inflation is because I took office in this nation at a time when two Democratic administrations had been spending money like it had been going out of style, and thus forced inflation on this nation. Moreover, they haven't stopped spending. The Democratic Congress in my four years has been completely out of hand and is creating the constant rising prices."

On unemployment, he can say quite truthfully that the situation is continually becoming better and will become even better.

On busing, the President must come out for a constitutional amendment against busing. He must pound and pound away that he is going to put the Department of Justice behind action which will prevent arbitrary left-wing federal judges appointed by his Democratic predecessors from considering the notions of sociologists above common sense and the desires of the people.

The people who favor busing are all voting against the President, so the busing issue has to be used to bring to the polls those who are against busing but who, up to date, have not been sure that the President means to stop it and is not just playing politics.

McGovern is extremely vulnerable on the issue of law and order because the people around McGovern, as the President could point out, are the very people that cause much of this disorder. McGovern is being supported by every left-wing kook in the country, from Angela Davis on down. It is the permissive theories followed by McGovern and his entourage which has brought this nation it's present crime problem.

And, McGovern's program for cutting the defense of the United States is so drastic and so terrible that the President could very well say that it would inevitably lead to the conquest of this nation by a foreign nation.

Finally, the President should hit out strongly against the media who are going to do everything in this campaign to make him look bad and McGovern look good. The President can do this by making as strong as possible statements over radio and TV. The President should realize that he is in exactly the same position Franklin Roosevelt was in when he took over in 1932. At that time, 90-95% of the newspapers in the United States were against President Roosevelt because he was allegedly too liberal; now they are against President Nixon because he is too conservative.

There is nothing the President could do to win over most of these newspapers. He has to do what FDR did, by-pass them. FDR would sit back in his chair at the White House and, since obviously there was no TV, would go on the radio with his "Fireside Chats". He pulled no punches; he ridiculed the press and told the voters exactly how he felt on the issues, and, as we know, was elected time and time again.

That is the program. If the President will follow it and if his supporters will get out and really work in the same fanatic fashion that McGovern's supporters do, he will win.

There is one other possibility. He has made progress with the Teamsters Union, but it is not going to be so easy with some other unions, and I think that is where the "shock troops" are that will win this battle for him.

The problem here is that while Senator McGovern, entirely aside from his anti-labor record and his position on Vietnam, has no rapport with organized labor, Mr. Nixon hasn't had much either. It is a hard thing to describe what the problem is, but it probably could be summed up by saying that neither Senator McGovern or Mr. Nixon are the kind of people that the average labor leader would sit down and have a drink with and a frank talk. You can't do much about that now, at this late date, but Mr. Nixon had better find someone who can talk to organized labor, or, again, he is going to lose the ball game.

For whatever it is worth, those are my thoughts. I hope you are able to lay it on the line with the President. It is very hard sometimes to make people who have a certain type of personality and are surrounded by certain types of supporters, to face reality.

For instance, take the case of Thomas Dewey and his disastrous campaigning in 1948. The late Styles Bridges and I were the ones who persuaded Dewey to not only to go to the state of Oregon and challenge Stassen there, but also to stop looking like the man that Alice Longworth Roosevelt described as "the man on the wedding cake", and to get out there and fight.

The Oregon campaign was successful. Papers carried pictures of Dewey minus coat and tie, looking like a regular fellow campaigning up and down the roads of Oregon. When he came back to New York, Styles and I once again saw him, and one of the first things he said to Styles was, "Every time I saw one of those God-awful pictures of myself, I wondered whether it was messy enough to please Bill Loeb". I said, "Tom, you won". He replied, "Yes, I did."

When Styles and I left Tom Dewey that day, we were convinced that we had finally broken through and taught him how to fight and how to win, and that he would defeat Truman.

But, we didn't reckon with the power of habit. Within a week, and perhaps even less, Tom Dewey was back as "the man on the wedding cake", tiptoeing through the tulips, while Harry Truman was plugging up and down the United States, and ended up in the White House, where even he hadn't expected he would land again.

As a matter of fact, President Truman was riding down the streets of Miami in the annual American Legion parade in the back seat of a car with my friend, a former editor of our paper and former Police Chief Jim O'Neil, who at that time was National Commander of the American Legion and who now is the publisher of the American Legion magazine.

An enthusiastic supporter of the President managed to get fairly close to the car, clasped his hands over his head in the victory swing and shouted, "Three to one on you, Harry". The President went right on waving to the crowds, but out of the corner of his mouth he commented to Jim O'Neil, "A bit optimistic, don't you think, Jimmy?"

If the President will go for the gut issues and stop worrying about the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times and all the eggheads and what they think about his campaign, and just slug it out, he will be President again next year. If he does what he did in 1968, and what Dewey did in 1948, he will be just looking in from the outside.

Good luck to you. Let's keep in touch, and do let me know what happens.

Very sincerely,



William Loeb  
President

WL:Miss J. Tancrede

PRESIDENTIAL  
CAMPAIGN  
HEADQUARTERS ▶ 1972 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION

Doral on-the-Ocean

4833 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida 33140

Campaign Phone: 305/674-2121

Hotel Phone: 305/532-3600

August 22, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: CLARK MacGREGOR  
THROUGH: JEB S. MAGRUDER  
FROM: ROBERT H. MARIK  
SUBJECT: Signature for Direct Mail

One of the voter groups we will be targeting in direct mail is the high and middle income voters of Cook County, Illinois (Democrats and Republicans). We feel that the best format would be the letterhead of the Committee for the Re-election of the President (rather than Democrats for Nixon) and that the signer should be Senator Percy.

Recommendation

That you agree with the suggested letterhead and the use of Senator Percy's name to sign the letter. We will approach Senator Percy only after receiving your approval.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Comment \_\_\_\_\_

G → JSM  
8/25  
→ R. Miller  
8/30

I think that's  
ridiculous. Percy  
has opposed the R  
consistently

August 8, 1972

TO: HONORABLE SENATOR : H.H. HALEMAN  
FROM: L. LINDY  
SUBJECT: WHITE HOUSE/CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION

4

Below is my first cut at taking a look at the White House and the campaign committee as a whole and figuring out over the next 100 days how we most effectively can get it to produce for the ultimate goal of reelecting the President.

The areas of priority operation over the next 100 days break down roughly as follows:

**Campaigning** - Things are basically on track here. Dwight's campaign strategy involves the Thorns and Thursdays in contrast, and we are doing good trade on what's going to happen here. The campaign area is the reform operation that is currently under Millberger's control.

**Anti-Communist** - Bob Malley is in charge and it seems to be on track. All the anti-Democrats for Nixon approach we are taking. If we know that this is on track, we are in reasonably good shape here.

**Policy** - Once we are theoretically set. Tector has the policy, but the basic campaigning operation has been established. We need to realize the balance of the program and there are no immediate or unsolvable problems.

**Internal Campaigning** - This one is struggling to get off the ground, and once this is handled, we should be in pretty good shape. The original campaign's involvement here, there will be a need for a continued large amount of attention.

Attack and Surrogate Operation - Probably our weakest link in the campaign apparatus and I have sent you a separate memo on this.

Presidential, VP and First Family Scheduling - This area is basically in good hands with Dave Parker and with Chapin handling overall control.

DNC Break-ins - I have talked with John Dean independently about setting up some system here so that John can devote a proper amount of time to this without fouling his other duties. Basically this will be a full-time area that we are going to have to watch very closely.

Running the Store - We need to make sure that some people understand that their role over the next 100 days is going to be running the store -- not the campaign. In the domestic area, you've got Ken Cole, in foreign policy, Al Haig -- and a basic backup here of Kehrli, Butterfield, Dean, and Kingsley. This won't be the most glamorous job, but we can't let things go to hell here during the campaign.

Some general thoughts. Not just in the surrogate program but overall, there is a general lack of direction that filters down to those who actually have to do the implementing. MacGregor, while a great doer, is reported not to be much on giving Salek, Magruder, et al, regular guidance. The same could be said of Ehrlichman to his staff which is one reason we had to let Cole into the 8:15 meeting. This is a general problem that we need to be aware of and work against. It is now happening to Colson too. He considers himself a great thinker and applies a lesser amount of time to guidance.

This problem can best be illustrated by simply trying to get a line set for MacGregor to give blasting McGovern's economic policies and attacking the White Paper. Despite the large amount of work that ~~has~~ done here prior to this incident -- not much really happened.

We are long on ideas and short on implementation and the passing on of ideas. In short, we need to tighten the screw and start getting people to follow-up hard. The next hundred days must not be business as usual. A couple of suggestions on this line:

1. Let's cancel the old Tuesday/Thursday (now Friday) meeting of your staff, but consider the idea of implementing a new meeting only for the next 100 days of your "political" staff. This would be a 10:00 a.m. meeting or any other time for that matter that would involve Malek, Dailey, Teeter, Magruder, Colson, and Chapin. It would be a twice a week session purely to kick up the performance quotient in the key areas that I've outlined above. It would also keep you plugged in with those people responsible for the specific areas outlined above and allow you to hit quick and hard -- not by a memo -- some of the problems as they come up. My guess is that this would not cause a serious problem with MacGregor but you could explore that directly with him. Clark is taking a public role and your doing this would compliment his effort.

2. Start riding hard by reports. Let's start getting brief, weekly reports from Malek and Magruder as to what specifically their activities have been for the last week, and more importantly what problems are coming up. These can then be discussed at the "think" sessions on Monday and Thursday and possibly some solutions can be offered for them.

Start demanding weekly schedules of what the surrogates are doing and also taking a look at the material that is being sent out for our people to use. Essentially this means Colson should start sending us copies of all the stuff he is feeding out to his people. Whether you review them or not is to some degree immaterial. The fact that we are asking for the material will automatically increase the interest by the staff.

3. We need to put everyone to work and there is a job for everyone. We should review the staff list and make sure that we are using all our talents to the utmost of their ability.

4. Finally, and this may sound like an effort of personal diplomacy, you should have somebody with you most of the time, and I should be that person. Obviously, you can't have somebody sitting in with you when you are dealing with the President, but for almost any other meeting, I should simply be there as a standard fixture. It makes follow-up easier

and the opportunity for the old multiplier theory to have that much more of an opportunity to work. Also, I will be able to deal with that many more people on your behalf and it gives us an opportunity to accomplish that much more. I would include in this even the "think tank" meetings that you, Ehrlichman, Harlow, etc. all have. You may have some very strong reasons for this not being done, but it is worth consideration.

LH:pm

August 30, 1972

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE MAHHICE STANS

FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN

For obvious political reasons, we should make a maximum effort to low-key the story of the results of the fund-raising dinners. We should try to avoid putting out any press information regarding how much is raised at any one of the dinners and certainly at all of them together.

KMKK

HRH:kb

**TALKING PAPER -- RAY PRICE**

**We need to make some major changes in the basic assignment structure of your staff.**

**For the travelling time during the campaign, the President wants to have one man assigned permanently without change who will work directly with him on the brush up and quick material on the road. He feels this should be John Andrews, although he thinks maybe at first we should try both Andrews and Bakshian and maybe keep two of them or decide which one of them is the best.**

**You should remain in Washington and all material basically should be done prior to departure for a campaign trip and that will, of course, be your overall responsibility.**

**Dick Moore will go along to handle local color items on a current basis.**

**On all stops, the plan will be to put out a brief Presidential statement on an issue and then the President will speak extemporaneously rather than from a text.**

Within his extemporaneous remarks, however, there should be a hundred words relating to the statement that has been put out so that he can do that for the camera for the T.V. lead and we'll sew that up so we are doing that. It would be on the same basis that we would do in Washington when he films a hundred-word segment for T.V. at the time we put out a statement.

We also should assign a writer to Ehrlichman who will be responsible basically for the planning of Presidential statements; perhaps McDonald would be the right guy to handle that.

Apparently nobody is still doing anything on anecdotes.

For example, the Ran Gill story that the President used at the celebrities reception should have been an automatic and yet it wasn't put in to him. He insists continually that he needs this kind of material and that he is not getting it.

HRH  
August 30, 1972

HRH:kb

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

VIA: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN 

FROM: DAVID  PARKER

Attached are proposed schedule packages for Mrs. Nixon, Tricia and Julie, Each principal has an individual package which includes a narrative calendar, a calendar and specific Schedule Proposals.

Of the three packages, Mrs. Nixon's is reasonably well defined if we adhere to the position that she will accompany the President on many of his events. Julie's package is also reasonably well defined at this point; however, Tricia's is by far the weakest.

Accordingly, we will use these proposals and these calendars simply as guides and, henceforth, will be preparing schedule packages for two-week intervals:

September 1st through September 15th  
September 16th through September 30th  
October 1st through October 14th  
October 15th through November 6th

We will submit these packages to you on a bi-weekly basis for your approval before they are presented to the principals. Parker will do the presenting of the schedule packages to the Nixon daughters and Codus will present Mrs. Nixon's package to her.

As you review these packages, please keep in mind that we only see the present schedules as being, at the most, possibly 50% near what will really take place.

We are now undertaking an in depth analysis of what we have come up with, making sure all key areas are visited and there is no overlap of schedules.

We have also included for your use a working calendar which shows the locations of the President, Mrs. Nixon, The Vice President, Tricia and Julie, along with a copy of an analysis sheet which shows how many visits each principal will make into the Key States.

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	27	28	29	30	31	1	2
RN	San Clemente Celebrities	Personal	P. C.	Hawaii	Tanaka	Tanaka	S. C.
PN	S. C. Celeb.	S. C.	S. C.	w/RN	Hawaii	w/RN	S. C.
VP	California	S. C.	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -
JE	Jacksonville	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	- - - - -
TC	S. C. Celeb.			Dinah S. L. A.		Seattle LOP	
EC				San Diego Med.	L. A. Long Beach		
	3	4 Labor D.	5	6	7	8	Rosh Hashana
RN	RADIO S. C.	S. C.	S. F. Gtw. Return D. C.	Personal			
PN	S. C.	S. C.	w/RN				
VP	Return	S. Carolina S. Governors		Chicago Machine T.			
JE	Jacksonville	- - - - -	- - - - -	Mobile Dr. Biloxi, Age	Balt. TV Constellat.	Philadelphia N. J.	
TC	Ontario, Ca.						
EC	Ontario, Ca.						
	10	11	12	13	14	15	16 Voter Kick
RN		CIEP	Leaders RNC	Personal	Rizzo-RN Chairmen	Mass. ?	
PN	GFWC D. C.	Delaware Penn.	Marshall's D. C.			Morristown Kick-off Yonkers <b>NYC</b>	
VP		Columbus R. E. Bds.	Am. Iran RNC	Groton Conn.	NYC RN Chairm.	Quantico, Va F. B. I. ?	Kick-off ?
JE		D. C. Eye on Nixon	Cleveland Columbus	St. Louis Mo. GOP			Kick-off <b>PHILA.</b>
TC	Return D. C.						Columbus
EC							
	Cit. 17 Day.	18 Yom Kippur	19	20	21	22	23 Steuben Day
RN	RADIO	South Dakota Governors	Personal	P. C.	Chicago Texas	Atlanta	C. D.
PN		Chicago Citiz. Cere.	Mont. Wyo. Yellowst.	Idaho, L. A. Dinah Shore	L. A. Cancer	Return D. C.	C. D.
VP		Sioux Falls S. D. Govs.	Minneapolis City Mgrs.			Pittsburgh Iowa F. P. Show Louisville FR	
JE					Flint Michigan	Racine, Wis. Steuben Day	
TC	Baltimore Ita. Rest Home		N. J. Conn.	TV NYC		Rockford Evanston	Grand Rapids
EC							
	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
RN	C. D.	IMF.	Leaders RNC NYC	SF Mint LA	Return DC	Sir Home	
PN	C. D.		w/RN	w/RN	w/RN		
VP		San Antonio Nat. Def. Tra.	Fl. Worth Chicago	Galesburg Ill. Farm P.		Baltimore GOP Rally	
JE		L. A.	San Ferna. Riverside Cincinnati Dayton	Orange County	Phoenix Civic Cent.	Los Alamos New Mex.	El Paso, Texas (Mts.)
TC						Chicago YWCA S. Bend Ind.	Virginia
EC							

OPER	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
RN	RADIO	Crime Conf.	Personal	P. C.	Economic	N. J.	
PN	NYC Pulaski Day P.			Harrisburg NYC-Irish		N. J. Polish Din. Comm. To Re-Elect D. C.	Tampa-VA Hos Clearwtr, Disa
VP		D. C. UPI Editors		Reston, Va. NYC	NYC N. Maritime		Detroit, Cancer Polish
JE				Philadelphia Wheeling W Youngstown	Syracuse Va Albany, Agg Westchester	Danbury St. Fair	N. H. Mt. Ets Maine
TC		Dallas Houston	Houston		Youngstown Dear Ed. Lancaster GOP	L. A. E. Waters	San Bernadino Handicapped
EC							
	8	9 Col Day	10	11 Pulaski	12	13	14 World Ser.
RN	RADIO		Ethnic Leaders	Personal	C of LC FFA Kansas City	Iowa Cleveland	Chicago suburbs
PN				Chic. Pulaski GOP	Grand Rapids Sheldon Del		Connecticut
VP	Kansas City	S. F. BART Orange Cnty	L. A. TRW Tour	Milwaukee P. D. Springd. Lin	Batavia, Ill. Cleveland		Cinn. or Pitt's.
JE	Boston Hartford	NYC Col. Parade					
TC	S. C.	Chicago Col. Parade	D. C. Symphony	N. J. Bergen Cnty. Lunch Hospital	Pittsburgh Altoona		Moline, Ill. Quad City Airp
EC							
	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
RN	RADIO	Trade	Personal	P. C.	Hartford, NYC, A Smith Dinner		
PN		Virginia Md. suburb		NYC Maccabean	NYC, Trade Al Smith D.		
VP	Buffalo Pulaski Parade	D. C. Chicago	Salt Lake C., Police Prov. O. BYU	Seattle Portland	Northern California	Southern California	Huston, Little Rock, Ark. OKlahoma City
JE		Toledo Indianapolis	Grand Rapids Big Rapids Ferris SC			Chicago Exec. Club	NYC, Serve PR Telethon
TC				Birmingham. Louisville	Cleveland LOP		Baltimore Heart Assoc.
EC							
	22	23 Vet. Day	24	25	26	27	28
RN	RADIO	Arlington Va.	Narcotics Conf.	Baltimore NY, Rally	Ohio Michigan	Chicago St. Louis	Salt Lake City L. A.
PN				Philadelphia Gdd. Shp. RC NY, w/RN	Albany Michigan w/RN	w/RN	w/RN
VP		Kansas City Airport Flint, Mich	Akron Harrisburg	Atlanta, Ga. S. Carolina	Georgia Alabama	N. Carolina Virginia	
JE		Omaha, Neb Denver, Cd	Chula Vista Cal. M-A	L. A. Pasadena Coll.	S. C.	Laguna People-to- People	S. C.
TC		Columbus (Voc. Ed)		NYC Connecticut	Boston Buffalo		
EC							
	29	30	31 Halloween	2	3	4	
RN	Orange County Radio	L. A.	Return	Philadelphia		Dallas Astrodome	Return
PN	w/RN	w/RN	Return	w/RN	Pittsburgh Cincinnati	w/RN	West Texas
VP		Albany Rochester Buffalo	Cleveland St. Louis	Dallas, Ft. Worth Lubbock	San Diego	Orange County	Chicago
JE	S. C.	S. C.	Return	D. C. Re- Elect Hdq.	Detroit	Buffalo New Haven	Harrisburg Campus Cleveland
TC						D. C. Baltimore S. Philadelphia	NYC
EC							

MEMBER	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
RN	TV Speech	Western Stops	California				
PN		w/RN	California				
VP	Detroit Columbus	Baltimore Annapolis	D. C.				
JE	Akron Pittsburgh	w/RN	California				
TC	Albany Syracuse	w/RN	California				
EC							
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August 26, 1972

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON  
August 27, 1972

KEY STATES	<u>RN</u>	<u>PN</u>	<u>VP</u>	<u>JE</u>	<u>TC</u>
California	4	5	4	2	2
New York	3	7	4	5	6
Pennsylvania	1	4	2	4	3
New Jersey	1	1	0	1	2
Illinois	3	3	7	1	4
Ohio	2	1	5	4	4
Maryland	1	1	2	1	3
Michigan	1	2	3	3	1
Connecticut	1	1	1	3	2
Texas	2	3	3	1	1

SAFE STATES NOT COVERED:

Louisiana  
Nevada  
North Dakota  
Tennessee  
Vermont

QUESTIONABLE

Alaska

DOUBTFUL

Rhode Island

COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

T  
H  
9/2

MEMORANDUM

September 2, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER  
SUBJECT: Washington Post Article  
on the Surrogate Campaign

Earlier this week, Lou Cannon called Al Abrahams to discuss the surrogate program. Abrahams could tell from the conversation that Cannon had inaccurate information concerning the program and mentioned this to me. I felt that it was appropriate for Bart Porter to talk to Lou to prevent any incorrect information from being published. Abrahams did not feel qualified to talk on this subject.

Attached is the article as it appeared in the Post yesterday. I have circled the information which came from either Porter or Abrahams. Cannon had the idea that all information was automatically fed to the surrogates from the White House and that the White House was "orchestrating" the line. As you can see, Porter turned this around. Also, Cannon told Porter that it was his understanding that the program was going to cost "over \$2 million". Porter told Cannon that it was less than a million.

Cannon was aware of the morning scheduling meeting at the White House. Porter confirmed the meeting, but as you can see, did not name names.

It was obvious that Lou Cannon had talked to a number of our surrogates and had substantial information on the surrogate program.

# 35 Surrogates Campaign

## for Nixon

### 35 'Stand-ins' Campaign For Nixon's Re-election

FRONT PAGE

By Lou Cannon

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Nixon re-election committee is relying on the carefully scheduled use of 35 presidential stand-ins to celebrate the accomplishments of President Nixon and portray Sen. George McGovern as a man whose qualities are not truly "presidential."

With polls showing the President far ahead, the committee is banking on a heavy use of the stand-ins, officially known as presidential surrogates, to carry the Nixon re-election message to every corner of the country. But the emphasis will be on the 12 key states, including all of the 10 most populous states except Massachusetts, which are the targets of the high-powered Nixon campaign.

The surrogates are an essential part of the re-election campaign strategy, which is based on the belief that the President must perform as President rather than climb-ing down on the hustings for overt political combat with Sen. McGovern.

"The surrogates have a number of advantages," explains one White House official. "First of all, the Cabinet officers among them are the best-qualified people to explain presidential accomplishments in their areas of expertise."

Secondly, the surrogates can answer McGovern charges as they arise and the senators among them deal with McGovern as an equal. And the surrogates can be used with great flexibility, since they have been chosen to represent every faction and region of the party.

Administration sources insist that the surrogates, whose speeches reflect similar themes of presidential achievement at home and abroad, are not "orchestrated" in the sense that their speeches are written by the White House.

But the White House does provide position papers for all of the surrogates and also furnishes up-to-the-minute information on the latest administration rebuttals to McGovern positions.

Ed Fator, in the communications office of the Committee to Re-elect President Nixon, is in charge of keeping track of McGovern statements. He meets regularly with White House communications officials to discuss the administration "line" in dealing with the Democratic presidential nominee.

SEE SURROGATES, A6, Col. 3

#### SURROGATES, From A1

A key element in the Nixon administration approach—used by all administration spokesmen, not just the surrogates—is the idea that McGovern lacks the character, competence and judgment to be considered "presidential" material. This accords with the fundamental Nixon re-election strategy of attempting to convince voters that Mr. Nixon is the better man for the job rather than convincing

them that the Republican Party is better qualified than the Democratic Party.

The surrogate program, which was first tested with considerable success in the New Hampshire primary against Reps. Paul N. McCloskey and John Ashbrook, will involve more than 800 man-days of speeches and cost between \$1.5 million and \$2 million. Except where a local sponsoring organization picks up the tab, the Committee to Re-elect President Nixon foots the entire bill for the surrogate and his staff aides.

Scheduling of the surrogates is under the direction of Herbert L. (Bart) Dexter at the committee. Dexter meets at 8:30 a.m. every day with representatives of the White House, who retain control of presidential scheduling, and with scheduling representatives of the First Family and Vice President Agnew.

LOW TRAIL MILLION

Every effort is made at the meetings to match the surrogate carefully with audiences and regions of the country where the presidential stand-in is presumed to be most effective. But the surrogate has the final choice on whether he accepts the speaking assignment.

The cast of the surrogates is more carefully balanced than the composition of a military squad in an old Hollywood war movie.

The list includes two women (Consumer Affairs Director Virginia Knauer and U.S. Treasurer Romana Banuelos), a black (Sen. Edward Brooke of Massachusetts), a Spanish-speaking American (Mrs. Banuelos) and an ideological range that extends from Sen. Jacob Javits of New York to Sen. Barry Goldwater of Arizona.

The 35 stand-ins include 11 Cabinet members, four agency heads, two members of the White House staff (special counsel Harry Dent and Communications Director Herbert Klein), 10 senators, five governors (including Linwood Holton of Virginia), three House members and Indianapolis Mayor Richard Lugar.

While all of the surrogates are presumed equal in the eyes of the schedulers, some are considered definitely more equal than others.

By common consent, Secretary of Transportation John Volpe is among the most effective of the surrogates. He also has the most scheduled speaking dates during the next two months, 25, and he is considered the best administration spokesman among the ethnic audiences that are a key Nixon target in the campaign.

Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz has been widely used—"He's a great campaigner, and not only in the farm states, and he loves to speak," says one administration official. A presidential counselor Robert Finch has been a hit with urban audiences.

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The complete list of stand-ins:

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Agency heads—Mrs. Knauer, Mrs. Banuelos, Environmental Protection Agency Director William Ruckelshaus, Action Director Joseph Blatchford.

White House staff—Dent and Klein.

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COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

MEMORANDUM

September 2, 1972

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FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER  
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House members—Gerald Ford of Michigan, Jack Kemp of New York, John Rhodes of Arizona.

Mayors—Lugar.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*GS*

Date: August 14, 1972

TO: H.R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

Magruder is suggesting alternate names for 1701 to Clark MacGregor. Although the name change will not occur until after the RNC, the decision must be made soon for printing commitments.

You may want to discuss this subject with Ehrlichman's political group.

Your suggestions of March 29 are attached.

*Too late - just leave it the way it is - any change will cause an unnecessary flap.*


Committee for the Re-election of the President

AK

MEMORANDUM

August 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE CLARK MAC GREGOR

FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDE 

SUBJECT: Name for the Campaign Committee

As you know, the name, "Committee for the Re-Election of the President" was originally intended to last until the Republican Convention and the formal establishment of the party's ticket. Now that the President has indicated his choice of Mr. Agnew for Vice President, we can proceed toward a final decision on the Committee name. The time factor is important because we are close to the point where the graphics of our direct mail must be completed for the planned September mailing. Otherwise, the Committee name appears mainly on internal correspondence and communications with state committees.

In consulting with members of the Committee and the White House Staff, several points were raised:

The word "President" is very strong and should be kept in the name if possible.

An obvious name, "Nixon-Agnew Re-Election Committee" yields the acronym, "NARC", which could be counter-productive.

There is considerable sentiment that the present name is the best of the available alternatives and should be retained.

It might be better to include President Nixon's name only in the title, rather than Nixon-Agnew - both for brevity of Committee name and for broader-based appeal. The Democrats for Nixon have chosen this alternative.

\* If the Committee name started with the word "Nixon", it would be easier for local volunteers, etc., to get the telephone number of the local headquarters through information.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, the following names were suggested:

"Committee to Re-Elect President Nixon"

"Committee for the Re-Election of President Nixon"

"Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee"

"Re-Elect Nixon/Agnew Committee"

"Committee for the Re-Election of the President"

"Committee to Re-Elect Nixon/Agnew"

"Committee to Re-Elect President Nixon/Vice President Agnew"

"Nixon-Agnew Re-Election Committee"

Recommendations

If it is decided that the Vice President's name need not be included, that the Committee name be changed to "Committee to Re-Elect President Nixon".

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ L \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Comment \_\_\_\_\_

If the Vice President's name should be included, that the Committee's name be changed to "Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee".

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Comment \_\_\_\_\_

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

AS H  
FU  
7/15  
8/5

Date: 5/8

TO: H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

Magruder read your comments on his memorandum about the Committee name. He discussed your memorandum with the Campaign Strategy Group and showed Mitchell a copy with your comments but the decision was not to change until after the RNC Convention.

Did he show the

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if not ?  
said

6-7 JSM 7/27 - after  
convent

Committee for the Re-election of the President

Hxu  
5/3

MEMORANDUM

March 29, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: JER S. MAGRUDER

SUBJECT: Change of Committee Name

As you know, the Campaign Strategy Group discussed your suggestion on changing the name of the Committee and, although we all agree that the campaign should be more personal and less sterile, recommended that it not be done at this time. They felt that the addition of President Nixon's name would have a positive effect, but that the operational problems, cost and confusion to the public would more than offset the benefits. Moreover, an opportunity for a name change will come after the convention, when the Vice Presidential nominee has been chosen.

This memorandum outlines in more detail the reasons for recommending no name change at this time.

1. The earlier name change from "Citizens" to "Committee" was noted by the press, even when our profile was low. Further change could bring the charge that, in the true Madison Avenue tradition, we are more interested in style than substance. *Belonged*

2. A change would allow Larry O'Brien to gloat that he was right on our being ashamed of the President's name, and that his attacks caused us to change. *Nonsense*

3. The Finance Committee, which had originally adopted the name, "Finance Committee for the Re-election of President Nixon," subsequently dropped "Nixon" to conform to the Re-election Committee name. Now that their mailings have begun, stationary printed, and bank records opened, it would be cumbersome and expensive to ask them to change back.

*So - if it's better, we should do it*

CONFIDENTIAL

4/3 1 G handed to Magruder

4. All of the state committees have, at our direction, called themselves committees for the re-election of the President. Not only would their stationary, bank accounts, etc. have to be changed, but they would lose some confidence in our judgment and direction.

5. Our own committee has a substantial investment in stationary, envelopes and general office supplies, all bearing our current name. It would be costly to change on short notice.

6. *You'll be reordering - change as you do*  
The contested primaries on the Republican side are, for the most part, behind us. The media attention will be directed mostly toward the Democrats. Therefore, a very small segment of the voting public would be aware of any name change on our part prior to the convention.

*Right.*

For all of the reasons outlined above, it is our feeling that no change should be made at this time. The advertising group is now in the process of developing recommendations for theme lines and committee names for the post-convention change. These will be subjected to focus group interviews within the next several weeks, and will be ready for your review shortly.

*None of these reasons is, in the last, valid in any way - all are poorly contrived excuses which ignore the point. Bad ways to approach things.*

March 17, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR :

JEB MAGRUDER

FROM :

H. R. HALDEMAN

I'm sure you'll be delighted to get a creative suggestion from outside, but I offer it anyway.

The more I think about it, the more strongly I feel that your organization's name should be changed once again, and that it should now be titled, The Committee To Re-Elect President Nixon.

On the positive side, I think we gain a great deal from the repetition of President Nixon as frequently as possible so that people tend to put the title and the name together automatically.

On the negative side, I think there is some merit to the point raised by some of our opponents that we're apparently ashamed of the name Nixon and that we are trying to hide it and just get people to re-elect the President whoever he is. This, of course, is not true, but it gives them a point of attack that may have some apparent validity.

I also think bumper stickers, ads, etc., should say, Re-Elect President Nixon, instead of Re-Elect the President. As with all of my other suggestions, I'm sure this one will be ignored, but there's no charge for it.

HRH:pm

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rel  
5/19

**F**

L Oas 8/17  
To H 8/14

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date: August 14, 1972

TO: H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

Magruder is suggesting alternate names for 1701 to Clark MacGregor. Although the name change will not occur until after the RNC, the decision must be made soon for printing commitments.

You may want to discuss this subject with Ehrlichman's political group.

Your suggestions of March 29 are attached.

Joan,

per our conversation...

if there's anything else

let me know....

pat

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

August 12, 1972

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE CLARK MAC GREGOR

FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER 

SUBJECT: Name for the Campaign Committee

As you know, the name, "Committee for the Re-Election of the President" was originally intended to last until the Republican Convention and the formal establishment of the party's ticket. Now that the President has indicated his choice of Mr. Agnew for Vice President, we can proceed toward a final decision on the Committee name. The time factor is important because we are close to the point where the graphics of our direct mail must be completed for the planned September mailing. Otherwise, the Committee name appears mainly on internal correspondence and communications with state committees.

In consulting with members of the Committee and the White House Staff, several points were raised:

The word "President" is very strong and should be kept in the name if possible.

An obvious name, "Nixon-Agnew Re-Election Committee" yields the acronym, "NARC", which could be counter-productive.

There is considerable sentiment that the present name is the best of the available alternatives and should be retained.

It might be better to include President Nixon's name only in the title, rather than Nixon-Agnew - both for brevity of Committee name and for broader-based appeal. The Democrats for Nixon have chosen this alternative.

• If the Committee name started with the word "Nixon", it would be easier for local volunteers, etc., to get the telephone number of the local headquarters through information.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, the following names were suggested:

"Committee to Re-Elect President Nixon"

"Committee for the Re-Election of President Nixon"

"Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee"

"Re-Elect Nixon/Agnew Committee"

"Committee for the Re-Election of the President"

"Committee to Re-Elect Nixon/Agnew"

"Committee to Re-Elect President Nixon/Vice President Agnew"

"Nixon-Agnew Re-Election Committee"

Recommendations

If it is decided that the Vice President's name need not be included, that the Committee name be changed to "Committee to Re-Elect President Nixon".

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Comment \_\_\_\_\_

If the Vice President's name should be included, that the Committee's name be changed to "Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee".

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Comment \_\_\_\_\_



Committee for the Re-election of the President

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MEMORANDUM

August 12, 1972

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Comment \_\_\_\_\_