

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
33	2	6/7/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Robert Odle, Jr. through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. This document discusses office space near 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue. 3 pgs.
33	2	5/24/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Robert C. Odle, Jr. through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. This document discusses direct mail, sign-up cards, leaving expansion to Finance Division, committees, and Nixon's re-election. 10 pgs.
33	2	5/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Monthly Surveys of Voter Groups. 3 pgs.
33	2	6/10/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From L. Robert Morgan through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Reassessment of the Direct Mail Operations. 3 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
33	2	6/15/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Planning Sessions. 5 pgs.
33	2	6/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Richard L. Fore through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Memo for the Committee for the Re-election of the President Campaign Organization. 5 pgs.
33	2	6/1/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Robert H. Marik to John N. Mitchell. RE: Political Coordinators Meetings, Tuesday, May 30, 1972. 1 pg.
33	2	6/4/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Political Coordinators' Meeting, June 2, 1972. 2 pgs.
33	2	6/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Training Sessions in the States. 3 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
33	2	6/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From L. Higby to Jeb Magruder. RE: Democratic National Convention Plan. This document includes an attachment. 6 pgs.
33	2	6/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Newsletter	News from the Committee for the Re-election of the President. Title: Special Assistant Named. 2 pgs.
33	2	6/26/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From E.D. Failor through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Committee for the Re-election Activities in Miami During the Democratic Convention. 3 pgs.
33	2	1/19/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Newspaper	Title: As Iowa Goes...? Democrats' New Rules For Picking Delegates Add to '72 Uncertainty: Test in Midwest Indicates That Apathy and Confusion Could Bar Effectiveness Infiltrating Local Caucus. 2 pgs.
33	2	6/27/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Other Document	Handwritten Note. This document discusses the Republican National Convention. 2 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
33	2	6/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Fred Malek to Paul Jones and Ed Sexton. RE: Black Vote Field Operation. 3 pgs.
33	2	5/25/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Fred Malek to Rob Odle. RE: Expansion of the Committee. 2 pgs.
33	2	6/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Fred Malek to Bob Haldeman. RE: Spanish Speaking Vote. This document includes analysis of influential cities with high "Spanish-American" blocs. 3 pgs.
33	2	6/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Fred Malek to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Voter Bloc Preparations for the Convention. 3 pgs.
33	2		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Other Document	Handwritten Note. This document disucsses unreturned phone calls, field operators, and organizing. 1 pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
33	2	6/2/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Bruce Kehrli to H.R. Haldeman. RE: The Attached Reports. Subjects include: Issue Management and Political Strategy. 37 pgs.
33	2	6/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From the President to Bob Haldeman. This document discusses a strategy session and recommendations. 1 pg.
33	2	6/13/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Ed Harper to John Ehrlichman. RE: Issue Publications. 2 pgs.
33	2	6/13/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From L. Higby to Gordon Strachan. This document discusses McGovern. 1 pg.
33	2	6/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From L. Higby to H.R. Haldeman. This document discusses committees and programs, includes a political strategy paper, and possible advisory group. 4 pgs.

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 313

Folder: [Campaign 22 Part I June 15-29, 1972 Folder 2]

<u>Document</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
24	Return Private/Political memo, Odle to Mitchell, 6-7-72
25	Return Private/Political & Private/Personal memo, Odle to Mitchell, 5-24-72
26	Retain Open
27	Return Private/Political memo, Marik to Mitchell, 5-29-72
28	Return Private/Political memo, Morgan to Mitchell, 6-10-72
29	Return Private/Political memo, Marik to Mitchell, 6-15-72
30	Return Private/Political memo, Fore to Mitchell, 6-12-72
31	Return Private/Political memo, Marik to Mitchell, 6-1-72
32	Return Private/Political memo, Marik to Mitchell, 6-4-72
33	Return Private/Political memo, Marik to Mitchell, 6-12-72
34	Return Private/Political memo, Higby to Magruder, 6-21-72
35	Return Private/Political memo, Shumway, Moore to Mitchell, Magruder, 6-14-72
36	Return Private/Political CREEP Press Release #6-63, 6-21-72
37	Retain Open
38	Return Private/Political memo, Failor to Mitchell, 6-26-72
39	Retain Open
40	Retain Open
41	Retain Open
42	Return Private/Political Clipping, "As Iowa Goes...?", 1-19-72
43	Retain Open
44	Retain Open
45	Return Private/Political Notes, "La Rue - Plane?", 6-27-[72]
46	Return Private/Political memo, Malek to Jones & Sexton, 6-28-72
47	Retain Open

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 313

48	Return	Private/Political	Memo, Malek to Odle, 5-25-72
49	Return	Private/Political	Note, Malek to HRH, 6-14-72
50	Retain	Open	
51	Return	Private/Political	memo, Malek to HRH, 6-12-72
52	Return	Private/Political	Notes, "Dent ..." n.d.
53	Return	Private/Political	memo, Kehrli to HRH, 6-2-72
54	Return	Private/Political	memo, President to HRH, 6-12-72
55	Return	Private/Political	memo, Harper to JDE, 6-13-72
56	Return	Private/Political	memo, Higby to Strachan, 6-13-72
57	Retain	Open	
58	Return	Private/Political	Note, Higby to HRH, 6-12-72

X

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

June 7, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL

THROUGH: JEB S. MAGRUDER

FROM: ROBERT C. ODLE, JR.

It is proposed that we lease office space across the street from this building at 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue in the new Oliver Carr building in order to (1) provide needed office space for the remaining five months of the campaign; and (2) establish a national storefront ground floor campaign headquarters.

First, we would lease the rear half of the third floor at 1730. This space consists of 10,593 square feet and through the use of temporary metal partitions we would create 25 semi-private offices and room for 45 secretaries and assistants. Tentatively, we feel the space should house all the various groups in Fred Malek's area with the exception of Agriculture, which should stay at 1701 because of its relationship to Yeutter and his relationship to the political group, Pat Hutar's women's operation which should stay here because of its dealings with the political group and Bob Marik, and Chuck Shearer's overall citizens operation which will expand to take over our small fifth floor suite here at 1701.

All the other groups would go to 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue: labor, business, blacks, ethnics, veterans, lawyers, youth, Jewish, elderly, Spanish speaking, and physicians. Any additional horizontal groups or voter bloc groups would also be housed at 1730.

The 4,327 square feet of ground floor office space opening onto Pennsylvania Avenue and G Street would be used as our national volunteer headquarters. Signs would be erected on Pennsylvania Avenue and G Street advertising the fact that this was the location of the National Committee for the Re-election of the President. In addition, it has been suggested that the headquarters of the District of Columbia Committee for the Re-election of the

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President be housed in this space on the ground floor and there would be enough room to accomplish this. We would move most of our volunteer operations to this space and all of the D.C. volunteer operations would be housed here as well. It would make a most attractive setting for our national headquarters, and from a security standpoint would also be beneficial since it would attract "citizens" and "street" traffic which otherwise would come here. In addition, should there ever be violence in the campaign, it would most likely be directed against the storefront as opposed to offices in this building at 1701. Incidentally, the building at 1730 is on the site of the two story building at 1726 Pennsylvania Avenue which was the original national headquarters of the Nixon for President Committee in 1968.

Rental for the 10,593 square feet on the third floor would be at the rate of \$8.50 per square foot per year, which would be \$37,516. This is an extremely good rate, since \$8.50 is the going rate in this area of Washington for leases of several years duration. However, we would be getting this rate for a lease of only a few short months.

It is, therefore, recommended that we lease this space immediately. The proposed lease is now being examined by Jim Eichberg, a local realtor who is helping us in the negotiations, our Committee counsel, and the Finance Committee's counsel, in addition to our friends who own 1701.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

The 4,327 square feet on the ground floor which opens on to Pennsylvania Avenue and G Street would be leased to us at the rate of \$12 per square foot per year. This is also a very favorable rate for ground floor space on Pennsylvania Avenue. However, all the space on the ground floor facing Pennsylvania Avenue was leased well over a year ago, and in order to take the space, the Carr Company will have to buy out the lease at the sum of \$30,000 which we will then have to pay. Thus, the total price for the ground floor space will be \$51,635. Although this is high, there are a number of factors which compensate for this price -- such as convenience, location, and the public image which will result from having the national headquarters of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President housed in a clean, modern office building a half block from the White House on Pennsylvania Avenue, and on the site of the original Nixon Headquarters in 1968. Therefore, it is recommended that this be approved as well.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

X

As is the case with most political committees, we would be asked to pay half of the rent at the execution of the lease and half of the rent on July 31. The Finance Division has assured me that this is no problem. Additionally, we would have to invest \$10,000 in an air conditioning system for the ground floor storefront and \$10,000 in temporary partitions on the ground floor and the third floor. However, these items would be resold at the termination of the lease, and we do not expect that we would lose but two or three thousand dollars in this area.

This new space would be totally operational by July 1 at the latest. A modern telephone system, roughly comparable to that which we have here at 1701, would be installed and functioning by July 1. Although staff members at 1730 would have different outside telephone numbers because the building is in another telephone company district, staff members at 1701 would be able to reach anyone at 1730 by dialing his four-digit extension, and vice versa. Thus, good communications would be preserved between staff members at both locations. A separate telephone operator would be on duty at 1730, however, to take outside calls coming into 1730 and to relieve the burden on our single telephone operator here at 1701.

bcc: Mr. Frederic V. Malek
~~Mr. Gordon C. Strachan~~
Mr. Fred LaRue

X

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

May 24, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL

THROUGH: JEB S. MAGRUDER

FROM: ROBERT C. ODLE, JR.

Following your request for a proposal with respect to the possible expansion of the nine-member Frank Dale committee, a number of individuals at 1701 and in government were contacted for their views as to how this might be best accomplished. A number of inputs were made by such persons as Mr. Stans, Dick Moore, Fred Malek, Chuck Shearer, Bob Mardian, Harry Flemming, Lee Nunn, and Bob Marik. We have waited until we received Mr. Stans thinking on the matter to put this paper together since an expansion of the Committee would be so closely tied in with his fund raising efforts.

We believe there are three basic courses of action open to us: (1) initiate a large scale direct mail effort aimed at recruiting members; (2) do no direct mail but place sign-up cards at GOP and Nixon offices throughout the country; and (3) leave expansion of the Committee to the Finance Division which has already undertaken programs in this connection. These alternatives will be discussed below:

1. Direct mail.

If the goal of an expanded Committee is the public relations value of being able to state that there are one or two million members of the Committee for the Re-election of the President, then the only way (we feel) to get this number is through a direct mail solicitation. Several million persons would be sent a one-page letter asking them to join the Committee in return for their membership fee of 50¢ or \$1. They would receive a wallet card similar to the one at Tab A.

The advantage of this alternative is obvious: we could quickly put together a national committee of several hundred thousand people and perhaps a million or more. There would be a great value of being able to talk about this publicly during the rest of the campaign.

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The disadvantages of this course of action are, unfortunately, just as obvious: (1) the program could not be plugged into any of Bob Morgan's programs since they will begin too late for this purpose -- consequently the program would cost us a great deal of money that might be better spent on Morgan's targeted direct mail or some other aspect of the campaign; (2) it would infringe on the Finance Division's programs which will be discussed under #3 below.

2. Sign-up cards.

Under this theory, sign-up cards would be distributed to state and local GOP and Nixon committees throughout the nation -- the cards would be given out at rallies, placed in storefronts, distributed with campaign literature, etc. The sign-up card would tell the individual about the Committee, ask him to fill out certain information on the card (name, address, phone, and a blank asking if he were willing to help by telephoning, driving, etc.), and then instruct the individual to bring the card to his local storefront or headquarters where it would be traded for the membership card found at Tab A. The sign-up card would be in duplicate and possibly triplicate: one copy would be retained locally, one possibly sent to the state committee, and one sent to 1701.

The advantage here is that we would create a very effective volunteer recruitment -- as opposed to a fund raising -- program.

The disadvantages are: (1) we would never recruit anywhere near the number of people we would reach by direct mail -- the best estimates are that sign-up cards would result in less than 50,000 members. Consequently, the program would not have the public relations value it had originally been set up for; (2) it could conflict with other and perhaps more valuable volunteer programs in the telephone operations and direct mail fields; (3) it, too, would cut into Finance's baliwick for the reasons outlined below.

3. Leave expansion to Finance.

Although it had not occurred to the writer before beginning this study, 1701 already has a very ambitious program to expand the Committee's membership and has already increased it by 60,000. In its fund-raising letter, now being mailed to 7,000,000 people, Finance says "a contribution of \$15 or more will make you a member of our Committee. The card enclosed, signed by you after you mail your check, will be a keepsake . . ." The letter, membership card, and "membership application" are attached at Tab B.

Although, technically, the appeal for membership is by the Finance Committee for the Re-election of the President, there are few recipients of the mailing who would be able to distinguish between the Finance Committee and our Committee. In addition, Finance's letter was signed by Frank Dale, chairman of the Committee, who no doubt would, as chairman, sign a letter from our Committee.

Thus, in effect, a letter has already gone and is going to 7,000,000 people asking them to join the Committee. Finance believes -- and we agree -- that to initiate a second program asking people to join the Committee would confuse everyone and make those who joined the Committee at \$15 or more upset that others could now join it for \$1 or less.

The most important objection, however, is that by making membership in the Committee free, or easily obtained at a nominal cost of \$1 (whether for PR or volunteer recruitment purposes) we would be giving away something we might later wish to sell for more than \$1 -- membership in the Committee. As Mr. Stans said in Hugh Sloan's memo to me on the subject (Tab C):

"The Finance Committee already has instituted a membership drive through its direct mail program with membership being conditioned on contributing. A second membership drive . . . would be confusing."

In view of this, it is recommended that all appeals to join the Committee be made by the Finance Committee for fund-raising purposes -- purposes which may become increasingly more important as we attempt to raise money under the new Federal legislation. Thus, if Finance wishes to use membership in the Committee to raise money, fine. But membership should not be used at this point for any other purpose. To use even the sign-up program would be in error, we believe, because by giving someone membership free it would prevent Finance later on from selling memberships.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____
 X

If this recommendation is approved, we believe it would still be a good idea to expand the Dale Committee to perhaps fifty to one hundred geographically dispersed leaders representing all professions, religions, races, etc. Members could include such persons as Billy Graham, Floyd McKissick, Lee Trevino, etc.

The original seven members of the Dale Committee -- plus Edward Nixon -- would then become the vice-chairmen. Such a Committee would take the place of both 1968's United Citizens for Nixon-Agnew and the New York based Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee.

Thus, there would be one national committee in 1972 rather than two and its structure would be along the following lines:


- A national chairman, Francis L. Dale
- Eight national vice chairmen: the original seven plus Edward Nixon
- Fifty to 100 members, all of whom would be commonly known to the public
- A Finance Committee which sells memberships through a direct mail program
- A campaign director, John N. Mitchell
- A staff based in Washington


Fred Malek, who has the responsibility for coordinating the citizens activity, agrees with this (it is his preferred concept in fact). If you approve as well, we will begin to compile a list of the 50-100 people we would propose be invited to join the membership of the Committee.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

cc: Mr. Frederic V. Malek

✓ ccc: Mr. Gordon C. Strachan





Dear Fellow American:

Now that President Nixon has announced that he will be a candidate for re-election, we need your help to make that re-election a reality!

This is why the Finance Committee for the Re-election of President Nixon invites you now to join its ranks--to help our country achieve four years of peace, prosperity, law and order, under Richard M. Nixon's continued leadership.

We need your help most urgently. We must depend on contributions from thousands of concerned individuals like yourself.

A contribution of \$15.00 or more will make you a member of our Committee. The card enclosed, signed by you after you mail your check, will be a keepsake you'll be proud to own for years to come.

Why do we believe that President Nixon should be re-elected? First, because he has brought us out of a devastating war and set us on the path to peace.

When he took office, America had more than 540,000 troops in Vietnam. Today America's orderly withdrawal from Vietnam is rapidly reaching completion. In his search for peace, the President is travelling around the globe and meeting with all major world leaders. We believe that President Nixon's re-election will help assure a whole generation of peace for America.

Second, we believe President Nixon deserves re-election because he has helped bring back law and order to America. The riots, demonstrations, killings and flaunting of the law that harried our country under the Democrats have been steadily reduced since President Nixon took office.

The courts are once more concerned about the rights of law-abiding citizens as well as accused law-breakers. He has appointed four members to the Supreme Court--Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist--who can be expected to give a strict interpretation of the Constitution, and protect the interests of the average law-abiding American.

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 FEB 18 1972
 LAW OFFICES
 1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVE. N.W. WASHINGTON D.C. 20000

Third, we believe President Nixon should be re-elected because he has halted the runaway inflation he inherited from the Democrats, and has helped return America to a sound fiscal economy, which will mean better living for all. When he came into office, soaring prices and faltering foreign trade were creating a ruinous cost of living, and a high level of unemployment. The inflation has now been reduced through his price stabilization program and the international monetary agreement, which he put through. He has been responsible for an increasing prosperity, with more and more jobs available, and will continue to foster that prosperity if re-elected.

These are some of the reasons why we are supporting President Nixon --and why we ask you to help. Membership in our Committee is open to any American citizen who makes a contribution to the Committee of \$15.00 or more. (If you can give \$25.00, \$50.00, \$100.00 or more, this is the time to do it!) Every penny that you give will be used to help re-elect President Nixon.

So please--help us set this great crusade in motion. Send in your contribution today! After you do so, be sure to sign the Membership Card enclosed with this letter--and keep it as a proud reminder that you are doing something positive to help assure President Nixon's re-election!

Cordially,

Francis L Dale

Frank Dale, Chairman
Finance Committee
for the Re-election of
President Nixon

P.S. The "1971 Tax Bill", which President Nixon signed into law in December, allows up to a \$50 tax credit on your Federal Income Tax Return (\$100 if you and your wife file a joint return) for political contributions. The money that you contribute, up to \$50 (\$100 for a joint return), is therefore tax deductible. We suggest that you consider giving either \$50 or \$100 now. We will send you a receipt for tax purposes.

MEMBERSHIP IDENTIFICATION CARD

**FINANCE COMMITTEE FOR THE
RE-ELECTION OF PRESIDENT NIXON**

1972

CONTRIBUTING MEMBER


PLEASE SIGN HERE TO VALIDATE



NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W. WASHINGTON, D. C.

TO REMOVE MEMBERSHIP CARD PLEASE TEAR ALONG PERFORATION



MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION

I want to help re-elect President Richard M. Nixon—to assure 4 years of peace, prosperity, law and order, for America.

I enclose my contribution for:

G14

☆ \$15.00

☆ \$100.00

☆ \$25.00

☆ — (OTHER)

☆ \$50.00

MR H W KALMBACH
550 NEWPORT CTR DR
SUITE 900
NEWPORT BCH CA 92660

Please send me a receipt. (No corporation checks acceptable.)

Make check payable to: Finance Committee For The
Re-Election Of President Nixon.

May 23, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. ODLE, JR.

FROM: HUGH W. SLOAN, JR. *HWS*

SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMITTEE FOR
THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

In response to your memorandum of May 9 and our conversations of yesterday and today, I have discussed the proposal for expanding the membership of the Committee for the Re-election of the President with Secretary Stans. Our conclusion is that we would recommend against such an expansion if it involves fund-raising.

The Finance Committee already has instituted a membership drive through its direct mail program with membership being conditioned on contributing. A second membership drive by the Committee for the Re-election of the President - particularly if it were conducted through the mail - would be confusing. All fund-raising should be conducted by the National and State finance committees.

cc: Maurice H. Stans

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Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

May 29, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL

THROUGH: JEB S. MAGRUDER

FROM: ROBERT H. MARIK 

SUBJECT: Monthly Surveys of Voter Groups

Per your request, this memorandum expands on the concept of monthly surveys of attitudes within important voter groups, as discussed at the last strategy group meeting.

The 1972 election will probably see substantial shifts from previous voting behavior by several segments of our population, particularly if George McGovern is the Democratic nominee. The outcome of the election may well hinge on whether the President can attract parts of the old New Deal coalition to his constituency, while avoiding any substantial breakup of the traditional Republican base. Therefore, this year, the measurement of attitude trends within voter groups will be at least as important strategically as will be the measurement of support by key states.

It is recommended that important groups be tracked on a monthly basis, much as was done in Orange and Los Angeles counties in California. Key factors to be monitored might be relative importance of key issues, perception of the candidates, head-to-head measurements of candidate support, and measurements to determine if our advertising themes are getting through.

Arthur Finkelstein has developed a detailed proposal relating to the polling of middle-income urban ethnics (Tab A). These are the Catholic Blue Collar voters who represent a major target of opportunity for the President. Another, equally important group, are the upper-income White suburbanites, who may move somewhat to McGovern. These two groups represent the most fundamental and far-reaching potential for change in the American Electorate. Their attitudes may shift as the issues are developed through the campaign, and they should be tracked very carefully.

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- 3 -

Other important groups, such as young voters and older voters, as well as Black, Spanish and Jewish voters are not under such fundamental cross-pressures in this election, and can probably be adequately tracked through sub samples of the major waves of state polls and published survey information.

Recommendation

That Bob Teeter be authorized to track, on a monthly basis, the attitudes of urban ethnics and upper-income White suburbanites during the campaign. These survey questionnaires would be designed to be consistent with the key state polling waves, so as to augment that data.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

X

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

May 24, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE JOHN M. MITCHELL
THROUGH: ROBERT H. MARIK 
FROM: ARTHUR J. FINKELSTEIN
SUBJECT: Monthly Ethnic Studies

To better understand the ethnic community on the periphery of the major metropolitan areas, a continuing monthly survey of 800 samples should be undertaken. The questionnaire should be designed to probe certain social issue attitudinal biases which exist within this Peripheral Urban Ethnic (P.U.E.) group, as well as the more general foreign affairs and economic concerns.

It is suggested that the survey itself be undertaken in Philadelphia, totally excluding the Black and Spanish populations. Further, the survey should be limited to an income spread of between \$6,000 and \$18,000 a year. The nationality should be determined by respondents' self-identification rather than by Census Bureau terminology. Geographical areas within the city should be broken down as: (1) Center city; (2) South Philadelphia; (3) West Philadelphia; (4) Northeast Philadelphia, etc. The survey should be designed to reflect past voting weights rather than true population weights among these groups.

Religious break outs should be made by Catholic, Protestant and Jewish. The Jewish group should be broken down to Orthodox, Conservative and Reformed, Athiest and other. Finally, I would suggest that the survey be kept to less than 40 minutes.

The tracking of this monthly survey will allow us to exploit the dynamics both electorally and issue-attitudinally within the P.U.E. and then to project these results upon similar P.U.E. areas throughout the country. The specific questions and demographics other than those aforementioned should be designed to interrelate with our original survey information.

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Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

June 10, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL

THROUGH: MR. JEB S. MAGRUDER

FROM: L. ROBERT MORGAN

SUBJECT: Reassessment of the Direct Mail Operations

It has been necessary for us to change the operation in order to accomplish our Direct Mail and other system-oriented goals.

On Wednesday, June 7, 1972, the representatives from the Reuben H. Donnelley Corporation asked for a meeting regarding the systems and procedures for the General Election. We had been pressing them to develop more depth of management on the taskforce. That evening we met with their Systems and Production staff and concluded they did not have the capability of satisfying our needs for all of the key states. The problem is not getting hardware to satisfy our needs, but to get seasoned and professional people to staff them. A table showing job descriptions and people requirements to accomplish the entire job is attached as TAB A.

We have two alternative courses of action: (1) continue using Donnelley for all mailing and computer letter operations and phase all of the software functions to an outside company such as SBC, Universal Computing or Perot's operations; or (2) separate the country into regions and have one facility in the state of Washington, one in California, one in Texas, one in New York and another in the east, and keep Donnelley for Michigan, Illinois, Ohio and Pennsylvania. Although it would be more difficult to control, we lean toward having four or five separate regional operations. We are simultaneously analyzing both of these alternatives but not slowing down

in the development of the data base. We expect to have a recommendation on your desk no later than June 26, 1972, for the course of action.

Either of these alternatives have an immediate need of four additional systems people. If we split the country up in regions we will also require one additional materiel expediter.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the hiring of four additional systems people, three of which would be located in three different regions of the country, and one in Washington, D.C. These four people will not cost more than \$25,000 additional in salaries, plus their travel expenses from July 1 through the election.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____ COMMENTS _____

Attachment: ^XTAB A

cc: Dr. Robert H. Marik

POLITICAL DIRECT MAIL WORKFORCE REQUIREMENTS

1972

<u>JOB DESCRIPTIONS</u>	6/5	6/12	6/19	6/26	7/3	7/10	7/17	7/24	7/31	8/7	8/14	8/21	8/28	9/4	9/11	9/18	9/25	10/2	10/9	10/16	10/23	10/30	NET INCREASE
Computer Operations Supervisor	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Computer Shift Supervisor	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	0
Lead Computer Operator	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	0
Computer Operators	5	5	5	5	11	11	11	11	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	19
Printer Operators	0	0	2	2	3	3	5	6	7	8	12	15	18	21	24	27	30	36	36	36	36	36	36
Key Punch Supervisor	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Key Punch Operator	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	6
Technical Planning	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	0
<u>OUTSIDE CONTRACTS</u>																							
Systems and Programming	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5+
Job Control Supervisor	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Quality Control Clerks	0	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
List Clerks	0	2	2	2	3	3	4	6	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Clerk Typist	0	2	2	2	3	3	4	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
List Operator	0	2	2	2	3	3	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Scheduling and JCL	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	6	6	6	6	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
Tape Librarians	1	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5
Unit Record Operator	0	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Shipping and Receiving	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
<u>TOTAL CURRENT PROFESSIONALS</u>	<u>30</u>																						
<u>TOTAL PROJECTED PROFESSIONALS</u>	<u>135</u>																						

Committee for the Re-election of the President

X

MEMORANDUM

June 15, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH: JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM: ROBERT H. MARIK
SUBJECT: Planning Sessions

It has been agreed that the State Chairmen and/or Executive Directors will be brought into Washington in small groups to discuss the various programs outlined in the recently distributed compendium. This paper (developed jointly with Fred Malek) describes a proposed format for these meetings, a schedule, and the steps that should be taken to arrange the meetings.

FORMAT

While the State Chairmen and/or Executive Directors would be brought to Washington in groups, the only planned group activity would be a short orientation session. This would be no more than a one-hour meeting. A welcome and overview of the campaign strategy would be given by the Campaign Director, followed by short presentations by Magruder (Programs), Malek/Shearer (Citizens), and perhaps a political coordinator. Following the orientation meeting, the State Chairmen and Executive Directors would have a series of individual meetings with Program Directors and Citizens Group Directors relevant to their states. These meetings would be on the order of one-hour in length for the non-key states, and an hour and one-half for the key states. They would be scheduled into the evenings if necessary.

It would not be necessary for each Citizens Group Director and Program Director to meet with each State Chairman and Executive Director (e.g.--The State Chairman from Vermont would not meet with the Director of the Black Vote Division.). To coordinate scheduling, inputs should be requested from the Citizens Group and Program Directors on which State Chairmen they would like to see, and from the states on which Citizens Group and Program Directors they feel they should see, based on their exposure to the programs in the compendium.

The outcome of this series of meetings should be an agreement between the Citizens Groups or Program Director and the State Chairman on the desirable level and extent of program activity that will take place within that state. These agreements, after review by the appropriate political coordinator, would be the basis for supplemental budget requests and would be a major input to the overall State Victory Plan.

Recommendation

That you approve the format described above.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

x

SCHEDULE

States with similar interests and comparable levels of campaign activity have been divided into groups that will meet in Washington at the same time. (Tab A) To balance the workloads, the following schedule is recommended:

- Group I: June 26, 27 and 28
- Group II: June 29 and 30
- Group III: July 6, 7 and 8
- Group IV: July 7 and 8
- Group V: July 10 and 11

Recommendation

That you approve the above schedule for inviting the various State Chairmen to Washington.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

x

NEXT STEPS

If the proposed format and schedule are satisfactory, the following next steps are suggested:

1. The political coordinators should call the State Chairmen in each of their states and invite them and/or their Executive Directors to the appropriate meetings. It is not necessary for both the State Chairmen and the Executive Director to attend, but the objective is to ensure that the functioning head of the State campaign organization attends the meetings. The political coordinators should also ask the State Chairman or Executive Director which of the programs described in the compendium appear relevant to his state. This will be needed no later than Tuesday, June 19.
2. Fred Malek should obtain from the Citizens Group Directors, and Magruder from the Program Directors, an indication of which of the states they wish to see.
3. Dick Shriver of Marik's staff should be responsible for putting together the final schedule. Differences between the requests of the State Chairmen and Program or Citizens Directors will be resolved in favor of the person requesting a meeting, if possible.

In addition to the visits with the Program and Citizens Group Directors, each State Chairman should be scheduled to see the Campaign Controller (Jerry Jones), a member of the planning staff, and his political coordinator.

Recommendation

That you approve of the above steps for contacting the states and for preparing for their visits.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

✓

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

Following the meetings, the Program and Citizens Group Directors will summarize the results of the discussions for each state and review the major items with the appropriate political coordinator for final approval and implementation.

cc: Fred Malek
Frank Herringer

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I

California
New York
Pennsylvania
Illinois
Texas
Ohio
Michigan
New Jersey

GROUP II

Indiana
Kansas
Nebraska
South Dakota
North Dakota
Minnesota
Iowa
Oklahoma
Maine
Vermont
New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Delaware
District of Columbia

GROUP III

Missouri
Wisconsin
Maryland
Washington
Connecticut
Oregon
West Virginia

GROUP IV

Montana
Wyoming
Idaho
Nevada
Utah
Colorado
New Mexico
Arizona
Hawaii
Alaska

GROUP V

Florida
Virginia
Kentucky
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Alabama
Mississippi
Louisiana
Arkansas
Tennessee

X

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

June 12, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH: JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM: RICHARD L. FORE
SUBJECT: Memo for the Committee for the Re-election
of the President Campaign Organization

In our discussion of the McGovern Campaign, you suggested that we prepare a memo that would be circulated to Nixon state, county, and precinct workers across the country. This memo would outline McGovern's activities in California in an effort to prod out troops.

Attached is the same analysis that I am submitting to you, however, it does not include the tabs that your copy contains. In addition, a memo from you is attached that asks all Nixon workers to meet the challenge of voter identification and voter turn out.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the circulation of the attached memo and analysis.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comments _____

X

CONFIDENTIAL

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

June 12, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF
THE PRESIDENT CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION

FROM: JOHN N. MITCHELL

SUBJECT: Organization for Voter Identification and
Voter Turn Out

Will you be able to implement a door-to-door voter identification and voter turn out program that will canvass over 75% of the voters in your state and turn out all of the favorables on election day?

The McGovern Campaign carried out such a program in California, a state that political pros said could never be organized. McGovern's campaign organization defied the experts when volunteers canvassed over 75% of the voters by knocking on doors in 19,000 of the 23,000 precincts in California.

If you cannot implement such a program in your state, we are facing an uphill battle in re-electing the President. Senator McGovern will use the same type of effective grassroots organization in your state if he is the Democratic nominee.

Please read the attached analysis of the California McGovern Campaign carefully. Then prepare to organize a voter identification and voter turn out program in your state comparable to or better than that used by McGovern in California.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ANALYSIS OF THE McGOVERN CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION
IN THE CALIFORNIA PRIMARY

GENERAL ORGANIZATION

Many of McGovern's national campaign staff arrived in California as early as October, 1971 to raise money, recruit volunteers, and build an organization for the June, 1972 primary. By May of this year, Senator George McGovern already had between 20,000 and 40,000 Volunteers working in the precincts of California.

The McGovern staff operated from three central headquarters in California: the Southern California Headquarters in Los Angeles, the Northern California Headquarters in San Francisco, and the State Headquarters in Los Angeles. In addition, the McGovern organization took their campaign to the people with 140 store front headquarters located over the entire state. Most of the headquarters were located on an assembly district basis with full time volunteers manning the store front operations 7 days a week, 13 hours a day including holidays.

In most areas the store front headquarters were staffed by semi-professional organizers (McGovern volunteers who had been through primaries in other states and who had a firm grasp of grassroots politics) and local California volunteers who will be the trained organizers for the general election in November. The store front headquarters' staff were articulate, bright, and extremely effective organizers who placed major emphasis on canvassing.

VOTER IDENTIFICATION

The McGovern staff began their voter identification program by securing lists of registered Democrats. These names were fed into a computer which generated a computer print out of the registered Democratic voters, with telephone numbers. The format of the computer print out was such that it could be used for door-to-door canvassing and telephoning. It was developed in precinct walking order with an area for marking a coded response: (1) strong McGovern, (2) leaning McGovern, (3) undecided, (4) anti or leaning against McGovern. Another area of the print out was reserved for issues and comments.

McGovern volunteers placed each computer print out into a McGovern '72 Precinct Campaign Kit which gave instructions for door-to-door canvassers. The general rules emphasized that all precincts should be walked, not telephoned. Specific instructions included a canvass conversation and coding procedure.

Each McGovern '72 Precinct Campaign Kit was enclosed in an envelope with a map of the precinct attached to the outside (Tab D). The envelope also contained McGovern literature, bumper stickers, and an identification badge. The kits were distributed to the appropriate assembly district store front headquarters.

For the most part, precinct captains were not designated for canvassing. Blitz teams and individual "walk-in" volunteers were assigned precincts. The McGovern Campaign found that while it was difficult to recruit a precinct captain who would take full responsibility for each precinct, it was much easier to find a volunteer who would give 4 to 6 hours to canvass a precinct.

The McGovern staff maintained strict accountability and control over all canvassers. Specific times were designated for returning the McGovern '72 Precinct Campaign Kit. Control Boards were used in store front headquarters so that the staff could determine the status of canvassing at any time.

Volunteers also used telephone banks to canvass voters. Telephoning did not substitute for door-to-door voter identification. Its purpose was to supplement and often duplicate the door-to-door canvass. Although the telephone banks were not located in the store front headquarters, close coordination existed with telephone banks reporting the results of their day's work to the staff of the store front operation.

The state level staff also used a telephone bank in the Central Headquarters to call local headquarters across the state and check on the status of canvassing. This served as both a check and prodding mechanism. In addition, state field staff made regular trips to local headquarters to assist in problem areas and provide an additional system of control and accountability.

When the volunteers completed canvassing and returned the McGovern '72 Precinct Campaign Kit, the computer print outs that had been coded were sent to the computer center so that "personalized" computer letters could be mailed to those identified in the canvass as being favorable or undecided. After all information from the canvass had been fed into the computer, the print outs were returned to the local headquarters within five days for recanvassing purposes. During the last days of the campaign, headquarters' volunteers hand addressed mailings to those who were canvassed because there was not sufficient time for computerized letters.

Most canvassing had been completed a week before election day. The last week of the campaign was used to recanvass "not at homes" and undecideds.

GET OUT THE VOTE (VOTER TURN OUT)

Computer centers generated a second print out on the Sunday before election day . These print outs of the 1, 2, and 3's - favorable, leaning favorable, and undecided, were enclosed in a Democratic Presidential Primary Election Canvass Kit.

Volunteers used these kits to go door-to-door and to call voters reminding them to vote. Volunteers offered rides to the polls and baby sitters to those at home. Volunteers left door knob hangers indicating the appropriate polling place to those not at home.

ADDITIONAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES

Although the McGovern staff and volunteers concentrated primarily on voter identification and voter turn out, the following activities were also well planned and coordinated.

RALLIES: McGovern staff and volunteers used leaflets and sound trucks to promote McGovern speaking events, headquarters openings, etc. well in advance of the day of the event. Because of the importance of their assigned task, McGovern volunteers engaged in canvassing were asked not to attend rallies.

DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIALS: McGovern volunteers followed a well planned program for saturating the entire state with bumper stickers, posters, and brochures which were brief and to the point.

VOLUNTEER RECRUITMENT: McGovern headquarters' staff was composed of volunteers of all ages who were cordial and extremely effective in recruiting other volunteers. Most prospective volunteers who entered a McGovern headquarters were recruited immediately and asked to do the most meaningful work - canvassing.

CONCLUSION

As indicated throughout this analysis, canvassing for voter identification and get-out-the-vote was the highest priority in the McGovern campaign in the California Primary. As a result, 20,000 to 40,000 volunteers effectively canvassed 4 million of the 5.1 million voters in 19,000 of the 23,000 precincts in a state that was thought to be too large to organize. Just as in other primary states, the McGovern campaign organization has left behind a residual force of trained volunteers in California for the general election.

X

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

June 1, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
FROM: ROBERT H. MARIK 
SUBJECT: Political Coordinators Meeting,
Tuesday, May 30, 1972

This meeting was devoted to a discussion of internal coordination between the citizens groups and program efforts and the Political Division activities in the states. The following decisions were made:

- Each Political Coordinator will be assigned liaison responsibility with one or more programs or citizens groups. In this role, he will act as a consultant (as opposed to line manager) to assure that the programs and activities being developed are consistent with the overall campaign efforts in the states. Each Political Coordinator will track with his four counterparts when appropriate, so that individual program managers will not need to meet with all five coordinators on matters of general interest. Each coordinator will retain direct program liaison on matters directly affecting his states. Fred LaRue will prepare a list of all programs and the recommended consultant for each.
- The field representatives of the various citizens groups should contact the appropriate political coordinator before visiting a state. He should also send the coordinator a copy of the report of his visit. In addition, there should be periodic reports from the citizens group directors to the coordinators, on the status of the programs in the various states. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of each coordinator to remain up-to-date on all important programs operating in their states.

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Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

June 4, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL

THROUGH: JEB S. MAGRUDER

FROM: ROBERT H. MARIK

SUBJECT: Political Coordinators' Meeting,
June 2, 1972

The meeting of June 2, dealt with registration in the 1972 campaign. Tom Evans and Ed DeBolt of the RNC were invited to attend.

It was generally agreed that registration efforts up to the present had been ineffective. The time has come to combine the resources of the Party and the Nixon organization in each state to achieve meaningful results over the next several months.

It was suggested that the registration drives be divided into two phases: Phase One between now and the convention, and Phase Two from the convention up to the registration cut-off thirty days before the election. We will seek to register Nixon voters, whether they are Republicans or not. Evans and DeBolt said that the state parties are prepared to accept those groundrules. During Phase One in particular, it may be effective to use spokesmen resources in a public relations program to emphasize and sell registration, and to boost the enthusiasm of volunteers on blitz days.

Although most states are having problems, Michigan was cited as an example of a state where the party organization, the Nixon organization, and in this case, the Griffin organization had merged resources to achieve an effective program. It is that type of coordination which will be necessary to achieve success in all states. Toward that end, Tom Evans has agreed that the RNC field men would be available to assist registration drives in target areas.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

As a result of this meeting, several action steps were taken. Ed DeBolt, Al Kaupinen and Bob Marik were appointed to be a task force on registration. Their first objective is to prioritize the counties within each state and to give that information to the appropriate political coordinators. At the same time, the political coordinators will be talking with their State Nixon Chairmen to identify a person in each state to be responsible for registration. They will then discuss appropriate persons to be responsible for registration in each of the priority counties. In many cases, these people may be from the party organization. Finally, the persons appointed in the counties should develop recommendations on the specific programs to be used in each location for registration.

DeBolt, Kaupinen and Marik, working with Jerry Jones, will analyze the registration programs of three states: California, Michigan, and a set of programs to be recommended for Illinois. This analysis will attempt to evaluate costs and effectiveness. This will provide the basis for further discussion by the Coordinators Group on what programs should be recommended and what expenditure should be authorized in the registration drives yet to be planned in the remaining states.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

June 12, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH: JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM: ROBERT H. MARIK
SUBJECT: Training Sessions in the States

At a recent meeting of the political coordinators, you asked for a memo on how we would propose to conduct training sessions in the states on the subjects covered in the State Chairman's Organization Manual (registration, voter identification, get-out-the-vote, etc.).

The training sessions would be held in every key state, and in other selected regions for the smaller states. A detailed recommendation of locations is given later in this memo. The attendees at the training session would be the county and state level Nixon and Republican Party leaders who will be responsible for registration, voter identification and get-out-the-vote activities during the campaign. Each training session would be led by the political coordinator(s) of the state(s) involved, the State Nixon Chairmen and the State Republican Chairmen. The responsibility for developing the content of each training session and preparation of the training staff should come under one member of the Re-election Committee in Washington. I recommend that the assignment be given to Rick Fore of the Planning Division. The necessary staff to conduct these training programs around the country might be provided from the following sources:

- ° RNC field staff (8)
- ° Ken Reitz/ Youth Staff
- ° Pat Hutar's field staff (if recruited at that time)
- ° Staff of the state Republican Party
- ° Staff of the Nixon state organization

The program would be envisioned as a one-day session. The morning session might go from 9:30 through 12 noon; lunch from noon until 1 p.m.; afternoon session from 1 p.m. through 4 p.m. In most cases, sessions would be held on a Saturday to allow attendance by the appropriate state and county people. The first half hour of the agenda would include introductory remarks by the political coordinator

and the State Nixon Party Chairmen. If possible, key spokesmen or the Campaign Director might appear at the beginning of such a session.

The programs to be covered in the working sessions would be registration, voter identification, get-out-the-vote, absentee ballots, ballot security and headquarters layout and operation. The type of instruction would be a minimum of lecturing and a maximum of demonstration of techniques with the involvement of the trainees. For example, in a voter identification canvass, the trainees might be broken down into groups of appropriate size and each group led through a mock precinct door-to-door blitz. The group would be brought into a headquarters for instruction and passing out of voter lists. The appropriate canvassing forms would be used and the group would return to the headquarters after the mock blitz to report on the results obtained. Useful techniques to achieve a successful blitz would be pointed out at each step of the way. In all cases, we would be sure to provide to the participants detailed written material on each subject covered in the training.

The timing of the training session would be on six Saturdays between the 4th of July and the convention. It is contemplated that there would be 24 training sessions--or four conducted simultaneously each week-end in different parts of the country. The recommended geographical locations would be as follows (listed by area of each political coordinator):

MARDIAN

Northern California (including Nevada)
Southern California (including New Mexico and Arizona)
Washington-Oregon
Rocky Mountain Region (Colorado, Utah, Idaho, Montana,
and Wyoming)
Missouri
Texas

FLEMMING

Florida
Virginia-West Virginia (with Maryland)
Arkansas-Louisiana-Mississippi
Kentucky-Tennessee-North Carolina
Alabama-Georgia-South Carolina
New York

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MOSIMAN

New Jersey-Delaware
Pennsylvania
Maryland (with Virginia)
Ohio
Michigan
Indiana
Wisconsin (with Minnesota)

KAUPINEN

Maine-New Hampshire-Vermont
Massachusetts-Rhode Island-Connecticut
Illinois

YEUTTER

North Dakota-South Dakota
Minnesota (with Wisconsin)
Iowa-Nebraska
Kansas-Oklahoma

For each training session, the necessary advance work would be done from Washington in conjunction with the host state. The training staff of perhaps four or five people would converge on the training site a day or so before the session in order to be sure that all preparations are made.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the general concept of training sessions within the states, as outlined above, and authorize the development of detailed recommendations and budgets by the Planning Division, working in consultation with the political coordinators.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comment _____

CONFIDENTIAL

X

June 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: JEB MAGRUDER

FROM: L. HIGBY ✓

Bob would like to review what your final plans are with regard to counter-attack operations for the Democratic National Convention. How is it going to be set up, what's been done, etc.

June 22, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: L. HIGBY

FROM: JEB MAGRUDER

Attached is our most recent plan.

**Committee
for the Re-election
of the President**

1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 333-0920

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
MR. JEB S. MAGRUDER

FROM: DEVAN L. SHUMWAY/POWELL A. MOORE

SUBJECT: Committee for the Re-election Activities
in Miami during the Democratic National
Convention

OBJECTIVE

To take advantage of the heavy concentration of news media at the Democratic Convention in Miami to promote the re-election candidacy of the President and respond to attacks by Democrats.

CONCEPT

Two or three spokesmen with a newsmaking capacity will be based in a two room suite that has been reserved at the Fountainbleu Hotel during the Democratic Convention to talk to newsmen and conduct press conferences as the circumstances and events dictate with strategic and tactical decisions coming from Mr. Mitchell in Washington or someone speaking in his behalf.

SPOKESMEN

Recommendation - Rogers Morton as the positive spokesman and Senators Gurney and Brock as the counter-attackers.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Comments:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Rejected alternatives - Butz, Romney, Volpe, Richardson, Dent, Finch, Rumsfeld, Scott, Ford, Reagan, Rockefeller, Bellman, Baker, Cook, Goldwater and Taft.

Concur _____

Comments:

PERSONNEL

Recommendation - Powell Moore as press officer; Patrick Buchanan and Art Amolsch as writers; an advanceman from Jon Foust's office; one member of the staff of each of the spokesmen; and four secretaries from CRP Convention headquarters in Miami and other Miami sources to act as receptionists and man the telephones, typewriters and telecopiers.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Comments:

Rejected alternatives - Secretarial personnel from the CRP headquarters in Washington because room accommodations are limited and the expense seems unnecessary.

Concur _____

Comments:

AUDIO

Recommendation - Tape recordings of statements by spokesmen will be fed from Miami to Washington, where they will in turn be fed to radio stations across the country.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Comments:

Rejected alternative - No one from our audio shop will be needed in Miami, since the feeding operation is comparatively simple from a technical standpoint and can be handled by personnel that will be available there with a minimum of training. Our audio personnel will be needed here to obtain statements from spokesmen in Washington, as well as feed the statements that originate in Miami.

Concur _____

Comments:

CONFIDENTIALSECURITY

Recommendation - Two security officers to be available at all times. Jim McCord indicates that he can provide this service with personnel who are already in Florida. He also said that he will arrange to have the rooms and telephones checked for electronic listening devices and the locks changed on the doors, so that no one in the hotel can gain entrance with a pass key.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Comments:

PRESS CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPTS

Recommendation - Engage a Miami-based stenographic service to provide a court reporter and instant transcripts of press conferences. The transcripts will be sent immediately to Washington by telecopier for whatever use is deemed appropriate here, and they will be available to reporters in Miami.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Comments:

Rejected alternative - A tape recording of each press conference that would be transcribed only if there is a substantial demand for transcripts.

Concur _____

Comments:

EQUIPMENT

Recommendation - Four typewriters and a Xerox machine to be obtained from the CRP Convention headquarters in Miami for the preparation of statements.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Comments:

CONFIDENTIALCOMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MIAMI

Recommendation - Two extra telephones with access to the numbers limited to key CRP personnel and the CRP switchboard and an embargo on outgoing calls from the hotel suite; and two telecopiers at each location.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Comments:

Rejected alternative - An open line between 1701 and the Miami suite is impractical in view of the limited duration of the operation.

Concur _____

Comments:

HOSPITALITY

Recommendation - A bar with a bar attendant in the suite from late afternoon until the conclusion of nightly activities and a table of substantial hors d'oeuvres as appropriate.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Comments:

PUBLICITY

Recommendation - Issue a press release in Mr. Mitchell's name that announces this operation about a week before the Convention in order to minimize the appearance of underhandedness. The release will call the operation the Forward Observation Post of the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Comments:

CONFIDENTIAL

Rejected alternative - To let the public and the press find out about this operation by chance might mean that they learn about it on Larry O'Brien's terms rather than ours. In addition, the operation will be pinned on Mr. Mitchell, and we have taken every possible step to avoid having it pinned on the President.

Concur _____

Comments:

SUPPORT

Bill Timmons has the two room suite reserved at the Fountainbleu, as well as enough room accommodations in other locations to meet our requirements. He is arranging for four cars with two drivers and office equipment from the CRP Convention headquarters in Miami will be available for our use.

CONFIDENTIAL

News from the Committee for the Re-election of the President

1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 333-0920

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE, JUNE 21, 1972

CONTACT: DeVan L. Shumway
(202) 333-7060
#6-63

SPECIAL ASSISTANT NAMED

WASHINGTON -- John N. Mitchell, Campaign Director of the Committee for the Re-election of the President, today announced the appointment of Edward D. Failor as a special assistant to work on campaign strategy.

A former resident of Dubuque, Iowa, Mr. Failor, 44, most recently served in the U.S. Bureau of Mines, where he worked on an extensive reorganization of the Bureau's health and safety operations to assure compliance with the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.

He established the Office of Assessments and Compliance Assistance within the Bureau and was cited by the Bureau director for his "outstanding" work on its health and safety program.

Prior to joining the Bureau of Mines, Mr. Failor engaged in private law practice, served as municipal court judge in Dubuque, and was vice president of the Political Division of the Fred A. Niles Communications Centers, Inc., of Chicago.

He was graduated from public schools in Marion and attended the University of Wyoming while serving in the U.S. Army. He received his undergraduate degree from the University of Dubuque and his law degree with distinction from the State University of Iowa.

(more)

2-2-2-2

SPECIAL ASSISTANT NAMED

He practiced law with the firm of O'Connor, Thomas, McDermott and Wright in Dubuque, and from 1960 through 1962 served as vice president of Page Hotels, Inc.

Mr. Failor is married to the former Miss I. Maureen Julius of Moorland, Iowa. They have three children and make their home in McLean, Virginia.

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

June 26, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL

THROUGH: JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM: E. D. FAILOR
SUBJECT: COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION ACTIVITIES IN
MIAMI DURING THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION

Memorandum to Key Participants

You have heretofore approved the preparation of a written memorandum to be given to key participants in the above event. This document would clearly set out lines of authority and reduce confusion.

Recommendation--That the following memorandum be distributed to key participants in the above activity.

"CONFIDENTIAL

TO: KEY PARTICIPANTS IN MIAMI TRUTH SQUAD
FROM: JOHN N. MITCHELL
SUBJECT: Committee for the Re-election of the President Activities in Miami during the Democratic National Convention

OBJECTIVE:

The Committee for the Re-election of the President will take advantage of the heavy concentration of news media at the Democratic Convention in Miami to promote the

re-election candidacy of the President and respond to attacks by Democrats.

CONCEPT:

Four spokesmen with newsmaking capacity will be based in a two room suite at the Fountainbleu Hotel during the Democratic Convention to talk to newsmen and conduct press conferences as circumstances and events dictate. 1701 will be in constant communication with our Miami operation.

SPOKESMEN AND STAFFS:

Rooms have been provided for each spokesman and one member of his staff. We would appreciate having our spokesmen at the Fountainbleu suite at 8 p.m. on Sunday, July 9, 1972, for an orientation meeting.

SUPPORT:

A press officer, writers, an avanceman, secretaries, receptionists, cars with drivers, telephones and necessary equipment will be made available by the Committee.

I have asked E. D. Failor of my staff to act as the coordinator of this activity.

STRATEGY:

The Committee will develop strategy for this period of the campaign. We would like the statements by our Miami spokesmen to reflect this strategy. To have a coordinated effort, we will have an open line between Miami and 1701 to discuss the contents of the statements to be made by our spokesmen."

Approve ✓ AK

Disapprove _____

Comment:

The Honorable John N. Mitchell
June 26, 1972
Page 3

News Release

Recommendation--That a release be given to the media on June 30, 1972, in the name of the Campaign Director stating that a Republican "Truth Squad" will be in Miami to try to keep the Democrats honest.

Approve ✓ JK Disapprove _____

Comment:

Reasoning

If we announce the "Truth Squad" before we go we will have less chance of being attacked for doing this under the table.

CONFIDENTIAL

As Iowa Goes . . . ? Democrats' New Rules For Picking Delegates Add to '72 Uncertainty

Test in Midwest Indicates That Apathy and Confusion Could Bar Effectiveness Infiltrating a Local Caucus

By NORMAN C. MILLER

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

DES MOINES—Next Monday night, at 2,600 precinct caucuses throughout the state, Iowa Democrats will start testing whether the national party's highly touted reform rules really will make much difference in the battle for the presidential nomination.

Under the new rules designed to thwart deals by party bosses and to expand grassroots influence, thousands of party members will then begin the process of picking Iowa's 46 delegates to the National Democratic Convention at Miami in July.

Definite judgments about the reforms' effects won't be possible until the early Iowa experience is followed in many more states. Still, it is clear at the outset that the new rules for selecting convention delegates have injected new uncertainty into the scramble for the party's nomination, particularly in the 28 states like Iowa where no primaries are held.

One reason is simply that party stalwarts are baffled by the complex rules. A few nights ago, 100 Democratic activists met here to discuss them. After hours of confused talk, the group's leader summed up: "It's really very simple. All you have to do is memorize five pages of instructions and have a Ph.D. in mathematics to understand them."

But Who Cares

A deeper problem in Iowa is voter apathy. The imminent beginning of delegate selection has attracted little interest despite mock caucuses and discussions of the rules staged by the party and various groups in several towns. The apathy persists, despite the campaign efforts of the Democratic candidates, particularly Sens. Edmund Muskie and George McGovern, the two who are giving the most attention to the state.

Most Democratic politicians expect the turnout for the precinct caucuses to be well below the 50,000 or so who showed up in 1968 when the then-lonely antiwar campaign of Eugene McCarthy stirred interest. Indeed, apathy now seems so great that some politicians anticipate that party veterans will control many lightly attended caucuses and, seeking to keep their options open, will elect a large number of uncommitted delegates to subsequent county conventions.

Thus it isn't at all clear, in Iowa or elsewhere, whether the rules changes will translate into meaningful political changes.

"The question is whether groups who weren't given adequate representation before will take advantage of the opportunities given them by the reforms," says Ken Bode, a former staff member of the party's National Reform Commission, which produced the new rules. "If they don't, we might as well not have made the changes."

A Good Testing-Ground

Iowa, although always considered a relatively "clean" state, provides a good testing-ground for the reforms. In 1968 there was considerable bitterness here among McCarthy backers who, after sweeping many precinct caucuses, charged that their opponents denied them a fair share of delegates at later county and state conventions. Now, the state party is lauded by many reformers as one that has made an outstanding effort to insure an open and fair delegate-selection system, and it will be the second state (after Mississippi) to begin selecting delegates.

The new national rules, adopted in reaction to abuses exposed during the bitter 1968 infighting, are designed to prevent candidates from locking up state delegations by making deals with a few party bosses. A battery of guidelines requires state parties to open the delegate-selection system to wider influence. Among other things, a nonprimary state can no longer have all or most of its national-convention delegates picked by a party committee or a state convention; at least 75% of them must be chosen at a level no higher than congressional-district conventions. Moreover, the rules call on state parties to take "affirmative steps" to promote the choice of more women, young people and blacks as delegates to the national convention.

The guidelines already have led to some significant changes in the nonprimary states, which control 40% of the votes at the national convention. For instance, the new rules have prevented state organizations from selecting delegates before the campaign year; one-third of the delegates to the last Democratic convention were picked before 1968, and thus these party functionaries could ignore the insurgent candidacies of Eugene McCarthy, the late Robert Kennedy and George McGovern.

If Iowa Democrats do pick a lot of uncommitted delegates at their precinct caucuses, that outcome would run against the spirit (but not the letter) of the reforms. For a major purpose of the rules is to encourage party members to make would-be delegates say in advance where they stand.

Role of Muskie and McGovern

A sizable uncommitted bloc of delegates would allow a lot of old-fashioned wheeling and dealing at the county conventions next month and perhaps at the March conventions in congressional districts as well. At those latter gatherings, the 3,687 Democrats elected at the county conventions will select 34 Iowa delegates to the national convention. The remaining 12 at-large delegates will be elected by the same 3,687 people at the state convention in May.

A big uncommitted vote in the precinct caucuses also would embarrass both Sens. Muskie and McGovern. The McGovern forces are eager to make a good showing in the early voting here, in the hope of quieting the McGovern-can't-win talk before the primaries start. The Muskie camp, for its part, is intent on showing that the Maine Senator's frontrunner image is real.

Accordingly, both the Muskie and Mc-

As Iowa Goes...? New Delegate Rules Of Democrats Add to Uncertainty

continued

Continued From Page One

Government organizations are giving Iowa more attention than its relatively few national-convention votes might otherwise warrant. Both candidates have dispatched crews of full-time organizers to help their local supporters. Sen. McGovern spent two days touring the state last week, and Sen. Muskie followed with a visit yesterday. (Eugene McCarthy also is making a late bid to rekindle his 1968 support with appearances this weekend.)

By most appraisals, Sen. McGovern has the most effective organization in Iowa, mainly as a result of an early start. And, with less than 5% of the state's Democrats expected to participate in the precinct caucuses, a well-organized effort to turn out a candidate's hard-core support is very important. "The caucus system works to the advantage of the best-organized campaign, and we think we've got it here," says Lou Lamberty, the Iowa coordinator of the McGovern campaign.

The Muskie side, seeking to offset the organizing edge they concede to the McGovern camp, countered on Monday by persuading Sen. Harold Hughes, by far the most popular Democrat in the state, to endorse Sen. Muskie. Until then, the Iowa Senator (who was briefly a presidential candidate himself last year) had been saying he was going to run as an uncommitted delegate himself—though it was widely believed he was closest philosophically to Sen. McGovern. Now, many Hughes backers may follow him into the Muskie camp.

Seeking to offset Sen. Hughes' action, Sen. McGovern promptly reminded Iowans that the new party rules are supposed to make sure that delegates are selected "free of the taint of bossism." The South Dakota Senator said yesterday that he hoped for "significant" support in Iowa "as the candidate who has chosen to take his campaign to the grass roots and to seek the support of the independent citizen."

The Theory

In theory, at least, the reform rules should help the candidates' efforts to elect committed delegates at the precinct caucuses. "If you go to a caucus and want to be elected a delegate, people are going to want to know who you're for," says Cliff Larson, the Democratic state chairman here. "So I don't think the uncommitted vote is going to be very big. I think we're going to know which candidate has won Iowa after the caucuses."

Others note, however, that many would-be delegates are honestly undecided and that some groups are urging them to stay uncommitted. The state AFL-CIO is one such group. "Our objective is to make sure that labor's interest is represented at the (later) conventions," says Don Rowen, a Des Moines AFL-CIO leader. "We're encouraging our people to remain uncommitted because if they split their votes among candidates our strength will be watered down."

Sen. Hubert Humphrey's agents also are urging his old allies to back uncommitted delegates at the precinct meetings. Having started to organize well after the McGovern and Muskie forces, the Humphrey people reason they have little chance at this point to beat their rivals in a head-to-head contest. So they're trying to keep things fluid by denying anyone a clear victory in the precinct balloting.

Some Things Never Change

An effort by some politicians to elect "draft-Kennedy" delegates also appears, in effect, to be an effort to keep a bloc of delegates uncommitted. The draft movement was genuine when it emerged several weeks ago, but the Massachusetts Senator asked that it be called off, and many of his long-time supporters in the state withheld their backing. Now, concedes one participant, "being for Kennedy is tantamount to being uncommitted, but it gives you a better chance of winning in precinct caucuses."

Finally, apathy works in favor of those who want to remain uncommitted. James Walter, a truck driver and precinct committeeman in a blue-collar Des Moines neighborhood, explains, "My wife and I are uncommitted, and we'll be elected delegates like always, because we're the only ones who are willing to do any work

and that's sure not going to change."

Whatever the outcome of precinct elections, state Democratic officials say the new rules insure that procedures will be fair. The state party is issuing five pages of step-by-step instructions that precinct committeemen are to follow in conducting caucuses. The rules attempt to insure that each candidate's backers, and any uncommitted group, will be allotted a share of the precinct's delegates in strict proportion to their representation in a caucus. Each precinct, with a population of up to 3,500, elects from one to several delegates, depending on its Democratic voting strength in past elections.

The proportional-representation rule is a change designed to eliminate past complaints, about candidates winning bare majorities in the caucuses and grabbing all the delegates. Under the new rules, the number of delegates given each camp should be automatic. Say that 20 people show up at a precinct caucus electing six delegates, and that nine are for Sen. Muskie, seven are for Sen. McGovern and four are uncommitted; the apportionment charts issued by the state party would show that Sen. Muskie's group can elect three delegates, the McGovern people can elect two and the uncommitted group can elect one.

While the formulas undoubtedly are fair, some politicians foresee a lot of wrangling among people who don't understand the mathematics. "There's going to be chaos in some of these precinct meetings," says James Brick, the Polk County (Des Moines) Democratic chairman. "With all these rules changes that nobody understands, you just know that someone is going to say he has been cheated."

"A Lot of Cheating" Expected

Suspicious of foul play already are being voiced. "I expect there's going to be a lot of cheating," says Glenn Buhr, a prominent McGovern supporter in Iowa. "I'm sure there'll be efforts in some precincts to give the leading candidate all the delegates if they can get away with it."

And, rules notwithstanding, there are ways for wily veterans to outmaneuver political innocents. A Humphrey man explains: "Suppose 20 people I've never seen before come into my caucus, and they're going to vote for McGovern. Well, I'll just take three or four of my people and join their group. Chances are they won't know each other and won't understand the rules too well. I'll let them flounder around for awhile, and then I'll get up and get things organized. And you can bet they'll end up electing me as a delegate."

The phony McGovern delegate then would be free to switch his vote to Sen. Humphrey (or anyone else) at the county convention, for no delegate elected in the precinct meetings will be bound by any commitments he makes. Seeing the possibility of such maneuvering, some people have soured on the reforms even before they've been tested.

"I was enthusiastic about the reforms at first, but I'm not any more," says Edris (Soapy) Owens, state political director of the United Auto Workers. "It appears to me that you're still going to have the same old people and the same old power plays under this system."

A good number of politicians, however, think the reforms will have a significant impact. "The rules are forcing many people who want to be delegates to declare themselves, and I think the commitments they make in caucuses will be kept even though they're not binding," says one veteran Democrat. "It's going to be very hard to switch your vote later and explain it to the people who elected you."

La Rue - plane? .

6/27

Mardian, Magruder, Faylor, Marik, Miller, La Rue

Mty Thur on Cal Budget - Mardian, Raf, 10a Stars Schuler, Steens, Firestone, here, Tuttle

Must devel sched fr now to convention, bet Conventions, post RNC convention

Decision I agreed to take gloves off on McG's positions, esp welfare be/this he will waffle

(6/23)

- Use Richardson + Javits
- Weinberger's analysis of McG's welfare position - JSM + Faylor Plan

II Dem Convention - Miami
 Truth Squad - lines, press, 2 rooms
 Morton + love spoils,
 Scott may turn down
 - use Sam Steiger? Not a bo or loose.

"Morn" - begins across bd use of RNC - Dems states ag/McG

Dems for RN - Week after Convention, Founding, could be built on HH types, etc.

Possib - Ann of Dems for RN, Tues afterline McG accep Spe Thur night -

Have labor types blast either at
Convention or short after or
thoughtful types (Conn, etc)
- Hit Comm of Dems, big double
FU.

Where P will meet w/ Dems for RNC
bet conven's.

- ① Issues - 1 per week by issue by
- ② Dems for P. + Intell's Four Suns
- ③ Nail McG on 3-4 issues

RNC Conven ends 8/24 - 9/14
P on a moratorium, P Kick Off
for S. Diego w/ 7 weeks of P.

- Must go Sep 14

- ① What to do bet 8/24 + 9/14
- ② 7 wk by wk coord of P, Suns + do
es - 1 wk Oelf - Post + Neg

8/24 - 9/14

Failer - Organize, road shows,
Picnics - Conven to Labor Day

By 4 - use P.

would work directly with the State Black Vote Chairmen in their areas and the other members of the Nixon Campaign team in setting up the organization, recruiting and training of volunteers and implementing plans, programs, and projects. The Coordinators are to be responsible to Sexton and they can employ special consultants on an as needed basis with my approval.

3. State Black Vote Chairmen and Black Advisory Committees. State Black Vote Chairmen for the key states should be selected as soon as possible by Jones, Sexton, and the Field Coordinators, with my approval. The Nixon State Campaign Managers should not be asked to do the recruiting; however, the selections should be cleared with them and report to them on a day-to-day basis. All State Black Vote Chairmen will be volunteers; however, some key states will have paid Executive Directors.

In the South, State Black Vote Chairmen should be appointed, and each should select an active committee of State Black Leaders to assist him throughout the state. The members should be highly visible and respected Black leaders and charged with the responsibility for reaching the Black voters. I visualize these committees as critically important only in the South since we have no plans, at present, to establish a formal organization below the state level.

4. City Coordinators and Black Leaders Committees. The main focus of our campaign will be in the large cities of our key states. Each key city should have a coordinator jointly selected by the State Black Vote Chairman, his Field Coordinator, and the Nixon Campaign Chairman. He would be responsible for generally supervising all activities in his city by closely coordinating with the Nixon City Chairman. Each City Coordinator must, in conjunction with his superiors, select active committees of Black leaders to assist him in each major Black area of his city. For example -- in Chicago, a committee could be established of leaders from the Southside and one from the Westside. These committees would be responsible for recruiting volunteers in their area, establishing an organization of workers throughout their area, implementing plans and programs, and generally reaching the Black voters throughout the city.

These committee members should be prime movers in their communities and would have direct responsibility for establishing credible local headquarters, reaching the voters through speakers, literature, polling and canvassing, telephoning, and all the techniques of door-to-door and people-to-people campaigning. All of the above activities must be closely coordinated with other members of the Nixon Campaign team at the State, City, and Local levels.

My preliminary analysis shows a need for twenty-three City Coordinators in the Tab B cities. This number could change as more up-to-date polling becomes available. The number of committees depends upon the Black vote concentrations in each city. In some cities, like Hartford, Connecticut, one would be sufficient. In a city like New York, perhaps we would need three or four.

5. Programs. A program should be developed that spells out exactly what will be done in each city - the type of organization needed, the activities expected, timetables, and the like. This should be the type of document that can be left with the City Chairman, and serve as a fairly precise guide for his activities.

In addition to setting up a strong functioning field organization, it is critically important that you both work closely with Bob Brown regarding Special Projects and Stan Scott for Public Relations and Speakers Bureau. As you know, Bob and Stan have been doing a lot of work in these areas but more direct and closer coordination is needed. Your detailed plans should clearly state how closer coordination is to be obtained, and I suggest you meet with Bob and Stan as soon as possible.

Finally, coordination and cooperation between all levels of the Black organization and the rest of the Nixon team is essential to success. If coordination breaks down at any level, the effectiveness of the effort will be significantly reduced.

Please have your specific plans ready for review by July 6th.

Attachments

It seems to me that something along these lines might be included in the memo to Mr. Mitchell in order to completely answer the question he has raised. As it stands now, your memo leaves open the question of whether the Dale Committee and the Finance Committee group should be one in the same, and also leaves open the question of expansion of the Dale Committee. If, on the other hand, you and Jeb prefer not to address the Dale Committee expansion in your memo, you should then at least refer to the fact that this remains an important issue to resolve and that Jeb and I will be forwarding a separate memo of recommendations in this regard.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

H
Oes
+

June 14, 1972

Note for Bob Haldeman -

The attached brief analysis of the Spanish-Speaking vote may be of interest. We have recently completed (through OEO) a comprehensive study of the Mexican Americans and we will forward a summarized analysis in about a week.



Fred Malek

Attachment

6/13
RI

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

June 12, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL

FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER

SUBJECT: Spanish-American Bloc

A question has been raised as to how we determined that there is a high potential for improving the Nixon vote among Spanish-Americans.

Our first wave polling found that while the President was not attracting a high percentage of Spanish-American voters, he did run somewhat better than Republicans in the past. More importantly, both his ratings on the issues and personality scales were quite favorable. If we accept the idea that switching a person's vote is the last step in a series of attitude changes, it would appear that a significant number of Spanish-American voters are well on their way to completing this attitude change.

Another recent study of Spanish-American voters in four cities shows a great variance in Nixon's rate of approval for his handling the job as President.

	<u>Los Angeles</u>	<u>San Antonio</u>	<u>Chicago</u>	<u>New York</u>
Approval	29%	42%	31%	25%
Disapproval	71	57	69	75

The above results would tend to indicate that the attitudes of Spanish-Americans toward the President are flexible.

All of our data would seem to suggest that the President has much to gain from any overtures made to this voter bloc. With the upcoming state dinner for President Escheveria, it might be an appropriate time for the President to accept an invitation to visit Mexico in the near future. In the meantime, however, we should make every effort to publicize the state dinner to Spanish-Americans, particularly in California and Texas. Also, a presidential appearance in an area of large Spanish-American population would be helpful.

Appearances will be more productive if made now before the Democrat nominee is selected. As with most groups, every voter we can get committed now is one less that will be available to McGovern once he gets the nomination.

While we did not attempt to measure anti-Mexican bias, I am confident we can make some positive overtures without alienating others who might otherwise vote for the President.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

X

June 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

FRED MALEK

SUBJECT:

**Voter Bloc Preparations
For the Convention**

The purpose of this memorandum is to fill you in on the preparatory work and planning now under way by the Voter Bloc Directors for their constituencies' participation at the convention.

INTRODUCTION

The convention period will provide a tremendous opportunity to show the support of the various voter bloc groups for the President. In addition, this period will afford us an opportunity to further publicize the activities of the various voter bloc groups and in that way draw additional support to their activities for the fall campaign. Stan Andersen of my staff is coordinating voter bloc convention activities, and we have been working closely with Bill Timmons on convention planning. I will personally direct all of the voter bloc activity at the convention.

CURRENT PLANNING

I have asked each Voter Bloc Director to prepare a comprehensive plan outlining the activities for their constituencies at the convention. These planning efforts divide themselves into the following areas:

- 1) Identify substantive issues which are of critical importance to each of the voter blocs. We will then prepare a memorandum for Ed Harper who has indicated that he would be very interested in the views of the Voter Bloc Directors prior to the finalization of some of his work on the Platform.

FM/SA/vo

2) Identify several loyal members of each voter bloc group to testify before the Platform Committee. We will ensure that the testimony of these voter bloc representatives will receive full publicity within the various voter bloc constituencies. This will be especially effective within the Spanish Speaking, Elderly, and Ethnic constituencies.

3) Contact each delegate or alternate who is a member of a voter bloc group before the convention by letter and, in most cases, also by telephone. The Voter Bloc Director will be responsible for ascertaining the hotel room and telephone numbers in Miami Beach of each of "his" delegates and alternates. The Voter Bloc Director will act as a supplemental liaison with these delegates and alternates and will be prepared to assist the political coordinators in dealing with these delegates or alternates as the need arises.

4) Develop a plan to use the free periods between convention sessions for campaign organizational work with the delegates and alternates. These sessions will be used to organize and train the delegates for campaign activity after the convention.

5) Develop a comprehensive press and public relations plan for the convention period. Emphasis will be placed on activities for Youth, Spanish Speaking, the Elderly and Blacks. All voter blocs will, however, have some activities during the convention period. We are planning press conferences for leading members of most of the voter bloc groups, a series of large-scale Youth events during each day and night of the convention, and a number of rallies and other "events" for most of the other voter bloc groups. The purpose of each activity will be to dramatize and draw attention to the support of that voter bloc for the President. We will also plan to identify key voter bloc delegates to be selected for spot interviews by the press on the floor of the convention during slow program periods. Our aim is to provide a maximum of activity to help draw attention away from coverage of the demonstrations outside the Hall.

FOLLOW-UP

All of this planning activity is well under way and our final plans will be complete by June 23. I will provide you with a copy of our final plans that are submitted to John Mitchell in late June. These plans and activities will then be integrated into the master convention schedule which Bill Timmons is now putting together. I will then continue to monitor the implementation of these plans to ensure that we have a top flight program in Miami.

Dent - helpless, Flem not even
return calls

- talked w/ Malek

- wonders who respons for South

- Black field operators

- worry Wren 80 + Western 80
to Flem

"Lord help us"

- Flem a disaster in Western
big charter

"a damn disaster."

- Must get someone in to grab
the organiz pol

- Worried; mumbling + guesses

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 2, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

BRUCE KEHRLI

SUBJECT:

The attached Reports

The two books attached are the reports that John Ehrlichman mentioned in his cable to you this week. The first -- Selling our line on domestic issues: An Interim Report -- contains a lot of fluff and some articles that I doubt the President needs to read. Suggest that Tabs A and B (both sets) be removed.

The report does, however, mention on page 4 that action plans will be ready for the President's review next week if he wishes. Provided you concur, we will follow up to get these for the President's review.

Recommend that the second book -- Current status of domestic issues: An Interim Report -- go in as is.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12066, SECTION 6-102
By EP , DATE 4-1-82

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN EHRLICHMAN
FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN *H.*

The President asked today where the action plans were for the key issues that he had requested in his memorandum of April 9th. In checking back, I find that he had asked for these to be ready when he returned from Canada. When we met on this subject in your office with Cole, Colson and Malek, it was my understanding that we were going to have this matter settled in a week or two. In the meantime, I asked Colson and Malek to come up with what they felt the framework should be for this project. I have attached their efforts. While I do not agree with or endorse all that they have said, their papers are a starting point and might be helpful in getting this thing pulled together.

One thing that I do agree with them on is the need to get the basic strategy settled and an apparatus set up to get activity in these areas. They are ready to go and would appreciate any guidance you could give them.

Incidentally, the President has asked that the action plans be ready for his review when he returns from Russia.

Attachments

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Handwritten notes: a circled 'F', 'Tel', 'for', and 'G' written vertically. To the left, there is a signature that appears to be 'J.R.'.

May 17, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON *cc*
SUBJECT: Issue Management

The following is intended as an appendix to Malek's memo to you regarding issue management. I have a number of quarrels with the Malek paper primarily in that the solution to the problem is not setting up new organizational structures; it is in having someone, somewhere, sometime, someplace make the decision as to the issues we need to pursue, how we are going to pursue them and then let the troops execute.

One major caveat in considering the issues: this is that this has to be the most volatile year ever in terms of issues. What looks very dynamic today may fizzle in a week. On the other hand, we have to start somewhere and begin sometime. The worst of all results would be to fight the campaign on whatever issue happens to be hot in October because it may or may not be "ours". I am also excluding from this analysis, obviously, foreign policy issues or questions which go to the P.R. aspects of the President's image. The whole issue of trust, candor and credibility is one that can't be dealt with as a separate issue; in my mind it is the "bottom line" of how well we handle the issues and how well we project the President's personal strengths in handling these issues. It also is a function of the gap between rhetoric and performance and unless we can close the gap we are, in my mind, not going to be able to do very much on the trust and credibility issue. It can't be handled by P.R. in a vacuum; it is really determined by how the public perceives the President in handling the tough issues.

The following is my analysis of the gut issues and some thoughts on the substantive follow-through we need.

A. The New Populism. Without trying to define this, I think it falls right now into three categories; 1) we are for the big guy, the Democrats are for the little man; 2) taxes and 3) disenchantment with government -- i. e., the bureaucracy. As to these three:

1. We are stuck with the big business label and it will be hard to shed. There are a number of blue collar initiatives we can take, however, many of them outlined in my memo to you of May 21, 1971 (ironically, almost a year ago). If we can start coming forward with some of these initiatives and sharpen up our P. R. in this area (for example with our pension program which we have totally neglected) then we might be able to slide away from the big business label somewhat. Obviously, from a P. R. standpoint, no visible association with big business or establishment-type events should be considered for the President.
2. There is no way politically that we can defend the present tax structure, nor should we. Either Humphrey or McGovern will attack it hard, notwithstanding the obvious hypocrisy of their position. The dissatisfaction of millions of people can be exploited very effectively by the "outs"; we are the "ins" and the fact that the Congress has created the present tax structure simply doesn't sell as a defense (see again, my memo of May 21, 1972, page 7). There are 66 million homeowners. Curbing property taxes is a natural issue. It should be ours; but we have skirted all around it. We made an unsuccessful attempt to equate revenue sharing with property tax relief and we hit the issue hard in this year's State of the Union, but there has been almost no substantive follow-up.

Bryce Harlow notwithstanding, (the business community isn't going to go with McGovern or Humphrey), we should quite candidly acknowledge that the present system is deficient, inequitable, overly complex, that the heaviest burdens are on middle-class people, that people shouldn't get away scott-free without paying any taxes and that property taxes are the most regressive and onerous of all.

We can say that we have tried in a number of ways to change the tax structure (citing our position in 1969 versus that of the Congress) and we are going to change it. We should proclaim it the number one priority of the second Nixon term. Ehrlichman got off to a good start with the briefing a week ago, but if it is not followed up by a continuous flow of substantive steps, the briefing will have proved to be counter productive or all John will be interpreted to have said is "let's wait until next year". That is not good enough. We should insist that the ACIR come in with a report in June and meet with the President. The President should adopt the recommendation that property taxes not be used for school financing purposes. He should then, by direction to the appropriate departments, order the preparation of legislative proposals to accomplish specific objectives and there should be subsequent announcements by various Cabinet officials of progress in their assigned areas of responsibility. Shultz can become highly visible as the architect of the next tax plan. By Executive Order, the President can direct a simplification of tax forms and procedures. By July 1, we will be able to announce that one essential underpinning of the new Nixon tax program will be a minimum tax on everyone regardless of tax shelters; in short the rich must pay a fair share of taxes. (We proposed this in 1969 and were defeated -- it will not hurt our "fat cats"; they aren't the ones getting off scott-free.) By September 1 the public should have gotten a very good firm understanding of four or five key elements of the tax package that we will propose to the Congress in January of 1973. By that time, the President should have been seen visibly involved in managing a major Administration effort to come up with a fresh approach. In fact, I would propose this be June's number one issue insofar as the President is concerned -- meetings with tax experts, Treasury officials, etc. etc.

What I am suggesting here is a specific program with a series of substantive actions that result in a rather well defined set of principles that will govern whatever we propose next year (and what we discuss in the campaign). We can cut the ground out from under the demagogic arguments of McGovern and Humphrey if we do this. Otherwise we will be reacting defensively through the months of September and October.

3. Particularly if McGovern is the nominee, he will campaign against the establishment and the unresponsiveness of Government. This is an issue Wallace has used very effectively. Since we run the bureaucracy, we will be tarred with that brush. A major effort should be undertaken to put some day light between the President and the bureaucracy. We have opportunity for this at least once a week if we will use it. The housing scandals in FHA give us a perfect platform to call people in, raise hell, let a few heads roll and issue strong vigorous Presidential directives. We have done this a few times, I think very effectively in the drug area but need to do it more. Within 24 hours of the next mine disaster, the President should turn on the Bureau of Mines, perhaps fire someone and once again, issue a whole set of new, tough orders. Moreover Shultz and Weinberger can be very effective for us during the campaign and in the months leading up to it in talking about reducing the federal bureaucracy. Nobody understands reorganization; they do understand cutting back on bureaucrats. Substantively we have done all the right things management-wise; now it is time to do a few demagogic things which will have high visibility and show a tough, forceful President cracking down on the bureaucracy. This goes to the heart of the issue of Government being responsive to the people.

- B. Busing. The fundamental problem with our position on busing is that it is not clearly perceived. People know the President is against busing but in the South they know they have already instituted busing plans, which the moratorium won't help, and in the North they see the courts rushing forward with new busing orders. Nowhere is the gap between rhetoric and performance any clearer than in this area and I would submit this one really fuels the credibility issue.

In part our program is not understood because the moratorium is in fact offensive in the South (they believe it will stop busing in the North, but do nothing about busing that has already begun in the South) and it is not clear in the North that it will do anything. If Congress acts on the moratorium and the courts respect the statute, then we will have something to run on in those areas affected but we still have a problem in the South. If Congress does not act, we

have got to run against the Congress, once again, with a major effort in key areas. If Congress rejects the proposal, the President should consider calling for a constitutional amendment making it very clear, especially in the South, that existing busing plans can be undone.

Our whole objective here is to simply get our position clearly understood nationally. Once it is understood, then we need not campaign on it as a national issue, but rather exploit hell out of it in key areas. I would argue that busing, unlike a lot of other issues, is clearly voter motivational. It is one of those issues in particular areas that is absolutely decisive in a voter's mind. He will put up with anything else if he feels that we not only are against busing, but can and will do something about it (witness Michigan yesterday, which I hope will lay to rest the last vestiges of doubt around here as to whether or not busing is a cutting issue).

- C. Inflation/Food Prices. Inflation as an issue probably is worthless. People do not really know what the CPI means, nor is it terribly important to them that Rumsfeld succeeded in rolling back the price of Ford Pintos by \$30 a car. What counts is the one basic commodity that people buy every day -- food. Food prices have been rising so long that people think they are rising even when they are not. They are relatively stable right now and perhaps the best that we can hope for is to simply neutralize the food price issue. On the other hand, if they begin to go up again, we know the political impact this can have. We should be prepared to take very dramatic, bold action, perhaps another freeze, before the issue gets away from us. I happen to believe the Sindlinger polls in March which showed a significant political upheaval building in the country over this one issue. I would urge that we not only be prepared for very dramatic action if food prices begin to rise again, but that we also consider possible ways to insure now that prices do not rise so that we can crow about having stabilized food prices (for example meat import quotas).

All of the other components of the economic issue are in my opinion either cosmetic or regional. Obviously we should talk about doing things to create more jobs, but at this point in time, they are either

going to be there or they are not. The President should obviously be postured against unemployment but there isn't a hell of a lot substantively that we can do. Regionally we can exploit the defense spending issue very effectively particularly if McGovern is the opponent.

In short, except for the food price issue I think that there is not much that we are substantively lacking in this area (at least that we can do anything about).

- D. Welfare. I assume that our game plan is clear -- get no bill from the Congress and then blast Congress for having failed to act. If we can pull this off, it will give us the best of both worlds. I would urge, however, that we be prepared once we are out of danger insofar as Congress acting, that we take executive action (even if it is later upset in the courts) to do something about the welfare problem. The President might consider an Executive Order cutting off funds to welfare recipients who fail to meet certain work standards, (a rigid enforcement of the Talmadge Bill with a strongly worded Presidential statement will do it). The HEW bureaucracy will revolt and everyone in this building will argue the legality of it and it's ineffectiveness. The impact could be absolutely electric if it were done under the proper circumstances in September. The President could say he has waited 4 years for the Congress to do something, the Congress hasn't acted and that he is therefore taking firm and decisive executive action to eliminate abuses in the welfare system. We can play around all we want with pilot programs in New York and California as we have done to curb excesses in the welfare program. What we need to get through to the folks, however, is a very bold action by the President which would highlight his commitment to end welfare abuses and at the same time the Congress' inability to deal with the problem. (I watched something very similar to this on the state level turn a gubernatorial election 180° around in 1970.) There will be 50 reasons why we shouldn't do this, but someone should figure out exactly how we can if we want to.
- E. Drugs and Crime. I don't know whether there are additional substantive steps that can be taken, but I would assign two or three of the very best minds we have to develop additional substantive initiatives in this area.

P. R. wise we can be helped enormously on the crime issue by building Pat Gray. He is a great subject to work with and in the final analysis this may be the best weapon we have. There is much more we can do as far as Presidential visibility is concerned -- a helicopter trip over the Rio Grande, building up Ambrose, visits to treatment centers and meetings in key cities with strike forces.

- F. Environment. If the Harris theory is correct that the election will be decided by the over \$15,000 a year, upper middle-class, white suburbanites, we should start planning carefully ways in which to promote our record in the environmental area. I have no illusions that this is a cutting issue; it is not. It is, however, a good, rather appealing little package that could be used especially with certain constituencies and we should not neglect it simply because none of us feel it will be decisive in the election. Substantively, we need do nothing but there should be a complete strategy for exploitation of the good record we have made.
- G. No Fault Automobile Insurance. I believe this is a real sleeper issue and that we should poll on it as quickly as possible, particularly in those states where it has either come into effect or has been debated in the legislature. Auto insurance is a little like property taxes, everybody feels they are being cheated. The Democrats really have not gotten out front on this one. There is still time for aggressive Presidential leadership and we can take over the issue right now. It's an excellent antidote to the big business versus little guy syndrome. At the moment, we really have no position.

Key Voter Blocs

In the last two meetings with Ehrlichman, Mitchell, you, MacGregor and Harlow, I have been emphasizing the need for analytically determining what will be the decisive voting blocs in the '72 election. I suspect we will never refine this to a scientific analysis and so perhaps we should come to some subjective consensus.

I can never get out of my mind the '48 election (see again my memo of May 21, 1972). Truman won it, among other reasons, by cultivating the

self interest of a few key voting blocs. We have precisely the same opportunity with the white ethnic, blue collar, new middle class, Catholics. In this area we are blowing it. In my opinion, we have a wider gap between promise and performance here than in any other area and with just a little substantive effort, we can do a great deal. For example:

1. We can support the Mills bill (which has strong bipartisan cosponsorship) providing tax credits for parents who have children in non-public schools. This issue can be exploited to a fare-thee-well and even if we are only talking about 7 or 8 million Catholics (which is Morey's argument) that is one hell of a powerful bloc. With the support of the Catholic hierarchy, we can undertake a very effective organizational effort in November. Humphrey is all for aid to parochial schools so at the very least we would neutralize him on this issue. McGovern is against it and here the opportunities are immense in the key states. This is like busing; if properly exploited in key areas, it is a cutting issue.
2. We can also support a form of guaranteed annual income for the building trades. All of the staff work has been done on this within the Federal Government. Almost everyone recognizes the need for something substantive in this area. It will happen in the next 2 to 3 years. All we need to do is seize the issue now, endorse it and then campaign selectively within the areas where it too can be a cutting issue.
3. Finally, we have the whole open-housing issue. Freezing Romney in place or even selectively rolling him back could pay enormous political dividends.

The second voter bloc of major concern is the aging. It can be statistically established that no Republican has been elected (or perhaps can be) without a solid majority of the over-60 voters. Our program is right now so much mush; we embraced the Kennedy nutrition program which is of concern to poverty level elderly only. This is sheer nonsense because that is not the aging group that will ever vote Republican. Our highest priority in this area should be to get an agreed upon Social Security increase so that the Democrats will not base their campaign on higher Social Security

benefits or force us to veto the increase presently contemplated in the Congress which in turn will become a highly symbolic campaign issue. Also, with some clever legislative maneuvering, we could lift the earning ceiling limitation on Social Security recipients out of H. R. 1 and attach it to another bill so that perhaps we would have this one good one to talk about with our elderly constituency. The property tax issue is also big with the old folks. We are badly treading water in this area; especially if Humphrey should be our opponent, we will be in deep trouble. His image is good with the elderly and he can really hurt us in key areas. We are not well positioned.

In my view, if we can solidify the traditional Republican vote with the over-60's and make the inroads I think possible with the Catholics (including marginal gains with the Spanish-speaking -- we are doing well in this area) these two blocs could be decisive.

As a final item, I have recommended to you before that we compile a list of goody type announcements that can be issued virtually every day in September and October -- things like maritime contracts, parks being returned to the states, special manpower grants in key states, etc. Some of these will provide excellent forums for Presidential participation, and will in any event have strong political appeal at the time of maximum impact. As best I can tell, these are being let out now as they become ready. I suggest that as many as we think judicious be held back to be used during the key months and to give us at least the option of involving the President in them. We may be overly sensitive to what appears blatantly political but I would have no hesitation in recommending that the President go to an event like the San Diego Shipyard event in September to do another major maritime award. Whether the press calls it political or not, it will get through to the people, at the very time we want to remind them very visibly of what the President is doing for them. I believe that we should brazenly exploit the advantages of incumbency while all the other side can do is promise.

May 21, 1971

SUBJECT:

Political Strategy

This is in response to the President's request for "some free thinking" on how to make our programs more meaningful to the people. This can only be done effectively in the context of the overall campaign strategy; hence this analysis attempts to broaden the question somewhat -- and to examine several ways in which the President's base of political support can be strengthened for 1972.

The primary emphasis here is on domestic issues; we obviously have the greatest control in this area and there is more certainty in the political effect of what we do. This by no means suggests that international issues may not be decisive -- they very well could be -- but with international conditions as volatile as they are it would be foolhardy to predicate a total strategy on them.

The following is an effort to identify some of the major factors that have proven decisive in prior elections, assess where we stand today in relation to those factors and suggest certain strategic considerations for 1972.

A. RECENT PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS

At the risk of oversimplifying history, successful Presidential politics in modern times have been generally built on one (or a combination) of four dominant factors.

1. Personal Image - Charisma: Kennedy is the classic example. Despite a mediocre Administration and an undistinguished record in foreign and domestic legislative tally, he might well have been elected

in 1964; if so it would probably have been largely due to the successful mystique he created (with the help of a friendly press). The fact that he was able to maintain a substantial base of political support a year before the election would suggest that even a relatively ineffectual President can support himself on personality alone.

2. Respect for Leadership: Clearly FDR was the master in this category. A large majority of the people were convinced that FDR was the Nation's only salvation; it was irrelevant that most New Deal programs didn't work and that we were so preoccupied at home that we watched the world drift into the most dangerous war in history. Roosevelt's gift was the believable promise -- setting the great goals which he would inspire the Nation (a very important point which you made in our meeting). The 1941 "Four Freedoms" speech, for example, became the national credo; young and old alike knew what the four freedoms were. (Even though it was 30 years ago I can still remember the Four Freedoms Saturday Evening Post cover.) With a few well chosen phrases he was able to rally enduring support through difficult times.¹
3. Success on the Big Issues: There were at least two elections in modern times decided principally on the grounds that times were good, the President had done a satisfactory job of running the country and there was no great public demand for a change; the big issues of the day were well in hand. The first was Coolidge's election in 1924; the second, Ike's in 1956. The Peace, Progress and Prosperity slogan clearly reflected the public mood in 1956. Ike had the big issues well under control; he had restored the country to a period of normalcy. He was obviously also greatly helped by his powerful "Father image". Ike fit the times and the times fit Ike.

¹It was all the more remarkable in that the "Four Freedoms" were enunciated by Roosevelt, after he had been in office for eight years, at the tag end of a speech in which he outlined the dismal state that the world was then in, that we were at war or would be soon, that great sacrifices were necessary, that our defense production program was a disaster, that we weren't equipped to fight the war and that all hell was breaking loose.

The Connally thesis in this respect is absolutely valid. Those who know the President and work with him as we do, recognize his brilliant, extraordinarily retentive and perceptive mind, his long-range strategic view of problems, his high purpose and we, in turn, come to have enormous confidence in him. We must try to get this across; the electorate can develop some of the same confidence if the story is told correctly. The obvious handicap in developing the Connally thesis is that it will almost invariably be filtered out, discounted and at times ridiculed by a very hostile press. The press have painted so many negative images over the years that even if we do the most superb job in the world, I doubt that we can shift enough opinion in the next 18 months to make this the decisive factor in the election. Whatever we can do, however, will help and is important.

The great goals approach is perhaps the toughest. Roosevelt's speech caught the public imagination at a time when the country was uniting in the face of a common danger. The President has used some truly great phrases -- a "Generation of Peace" etc. Maybe because of the press or because the country has become excessively biased, these haven't become national rallying themes. Between now and next year's State of the Union, we should study in depth those things the people of the Nation most desire and the way in which we can state the goals for the country that will, in fact, inspire and gain confidence. None of us should shoot from the hip in this area. We must know the public mood, not just what the polls report, but by examining it in depth. If there is any one thing peculiar to our times it is the extreme volatility of public attitudes, caused more than anything else by the constant impact of the electronic media which can cause very dramatic almost overnight shifts in attitudes.

4. The Voters' Self Interest: On certain occasions in modern times the people have been moved to vote primarily according to their own economic self-interest. 1948 is the classic example. Certainly President Truman had little charisma (at least at the time); the times were not that good and there was a strong sentiment for change in the country. Although Truman was a strong, rough individual, it can hardly be said that in 1948 there was widespread public respect for his leadership as there had been for Roosevelt's. Yet he won -- largely because he made his own re-election important to the economic interest of large segments of the voting population. In 1964 Lyndon Johnson succeeded in appealing to the economic interests of key groups and in frightening the electorate as to the economic (and international) consequences of electing his opponent.

B. WHERE WE STAND

These four categories give us some yardstick -- albeit arbitrary -- to examine where we stand and our opportunities.

1. Image-Charisma: We cannot and should not try to make the President something he isn't. (I gather this is the point of Buchanan's memo, as it was the point made in the Pierson column.) It would be foolish and counterproductive to try to build a Kennedy-type mystique -- there isn't time, the press would never let us get away with it nor is it necessarily a very reliable source of political strength. A President doesn't have to be likeable, have a sense of humor or even love children. It is important only that his personal qualities engender confidence.
2. Respect for Leadership: There is an important distinction between this and the image point above (a distinction we haven't clearly made). We can and we should make people better understand the President -- why he is the strong, determined, disciplined and self-confident leader that he is.

What people may want more than anything else is to have their confidence in the future re-established and our constituency at least wants to believe in America and in what they regard as fundamental values. They are tired of constantly being told what is wrong with society and of having their consciences wracked with continuous recrimination. We are on the right side of this issue but the real question is how to lift 200 million people out of their seats.

In short, I believe that this is a terribly important area for us. We must work to develop public confidence in the President personally, to gain respect for him as a leader and to give the nation an uplift; the obstacles are, however, very great and this, therefore, should be but one of several strategies.

3. The Big Issues: Obviously the war (foreign policy generally) and the economy are the two big ones; our domestic program next.

a. The War. Even if we are virtually out of Vietnam the Democrats will cynically argue that we could have ended it much sooner, that we dragged it out to no avail and that we got out only because the Doves in the Congress forced us out. A war weary people are likely to want to turn their attention to other things and forget Southeast Asia. What they will be more concerned with is who can best keep the peace. It is obvious to us that by remaining strong, by getting out of Vietnam on a responsible basis, by preserving the credibility of the United States we are doing a better job of building a lasting peace. On the other hand in an era of growing isolationism, people might well feel that our firmness and our resolve to do those things necessary (Laos and Cambodia) run a greater risk of getting us into another war than the head-in-the-sand Dove line. We can be vulnerable to demagoguery on this issue.

Moreover the war is, in a sense, a negative issue. We are badly hurt if we don't end it but we may not gain a great deal of credit if we do.²

Obviously if major events -- SALT, Disarmament, a summit, Vietnam, China -- go our way there could be such an overwhelming positive reaction in the foreign policy area that the President would be unbeatable regardless of anything else. While we are hoping this happens, we should not rely on it since so much of this is beyond our control.

b. The Economy. Even if the economy is back in full swing by next year, as I personally expect it will be, the Democrats will argue that we still have inflation and we had more unemployment through the Nixon years than under the Democrats. The Democrats will traffic heavily on the public's traditional suspicions about economics. In almost every issue poll the Democrats outscore us in public confidence with respect to handling of the economy and thus this is at best always an uphill issue. Whether we win on this will depend on whether we are able to allay fears about the future, convince people that unemployment will not again rise and that prices can remain relatively stable.

c. The Domestic Program. This may well be our biggest problem at the moment but, at the same time, our biggest opportunity. Our domestic programs are "managerial oriented" not "people oriented". In my view this is both a PR and a substantive problem with a much heavier emphasis on the latter. As you pointed out, there is very little "what's in it for me" in our domestic program.

²It is very much like the recent demonstrations. Had there been a disaster, we would have been hurt; we handled it beautifully and gained little -- not because the people don't associate the President with the handling of the demonstrations (because they did) -- but rather because it is a negative issue and there is little profit in what the public regards as something basically unpleasant. Two pollsters have told me that even though the public overwhelmingly agreed with our stand on the demonstrations entirely and even though people associated the President with the demonstrations, that this does not translate into a positive response with respect to the President.

Our domestic program is, on the merits, excellent; the six great goals are strong. Reform, change, local decision making -- these are our strong points but it is hard to make a plausible, understandable case of what they do for the pocketbook. Revenue sharing, for example, could be made appealing as a way to stop rising property taxes but it is not being sold that way, probably now can't be sold that way and is a very indirect and obtuse argument as long as it is structured the way it is in our proposal.

We have a fantastically good record in the area of governmental reform but this too is managerial, not economic, and once again it is what people expect of us; that is, Republicans run the Government better but Democrats do things for people.

A second deficiency in our domestic program has been our apparent vacillation. The public never gets one, clearly perceived consistent image of the Administration. There is no real substance to the allegation that we have been expedient, but from a PR standpoint, we do in fact often give legitimacy to the charge perhaps because we ourselves are still seeking that central thrust that, in fact, will capture the public imagination.

In trying to orient our efforts more to people and economic issues we may be able to develop the thrust that it seems to me we have been groping for.

It is possible -- there is time -- to reorient our domestic efforts and to capture the high ground. This leads directly into the fourth category.

4. The Voters' Self-Interest: It is not hard to draw the profile of what comprises the average individual's economic self-interest today. Obviously jobs and employment rank on the top of the list. High also on the list are taxes -- particularly real property taxes; this is now a nation of homeowners -- 66 million. Moreover, most Americans

work hard in the hopes that they will be able to educate their children. The desire for education is strongest among those adults who did not obtain a higher education themselves; and they represent perhaps our most significant political potential. Most Americans who work resent those who do not and especially resent paying higher taxes for loafers who abuse the welfare system. Finally most middle class Americans fear a catastrophic illness which can wipe out their savings and security. Middle-aged people worry about their retirement; older people worry about their ability to live on their retirement and rising prices. The farmers have a set of economic problems all their own.³ There are things we can do at this point to position ourselves and our programs on the right side of many of the pocketbook issues that such a profile suggests. For example:

a. Revenue Sharing. Most people today look at general revenue sharing as simply another "hand out" from the Federal Treasury to local politicians. If the public has a poor attitude toward Federal bureaucrats, it has a worse perception of local politicians.

Unfortunately our revenue sharing does not have any tangible, economic meaning to the individual. We haven't made the case that it could mean a reduced property tax burden.

We had the choice originally of proposing what would have been the purest form of revenue sharing, i. e. individual tax credits by individual taxpayers for a portion of local income, sales or real property taxes. After a very extensive study, the Domestic Council and the Treasury concluded that general revenue sharing involving grants from the Federal government to states and local communities was more equitable, more efficient and would

³The social issues are perhaps equally important -- race, crime in the streets and narcotics -- but these aren't economic and are essentially negative. We are also postured correctly on these.

provide the financial assistance needed more quickly. It was clearly a better solution on the merits, but it ran headlong into the opposition of Byrnes and Mills who over the years had favored the credit approach; it also ran counter to the traditional Republican philosophy of revenue sharing, first advanced by Mel Laird in the Fifties and subsequently endorsed by various Republican Policy papers through the Sixties. Most importantly it missed the political mark (a point Clark MacGregor and I vainly tried to make before the final decision was made).

A credit arrangement would give the opportunity (also the burden) to state and local communities to increase their levels of taxation. (The majority of which are now controlled by the Democrats)

It is not too late to do this, although we would need an excuse to shift our position -- perhaps if Mills scuttles our bill or perhaps whenever we propose a value added tax. With a new source of Federal revenue we could couple with it a tax credit revenue sharing arrangement arguing that the value added tax permits a much larger (and different form of) revenue sharing.

It would be ideal if we could find a way to do this in the present Congress --(it could pass since Byrnes and Mills are committed to this approach) -- so that next April 15 every taxpayer would be able to check a new box on his Form 1040 and receive a federal credit refund -- a direct abatement for local taxes. We could argue that we -- the Nixon Administration -- had brought tax relief to homeowners and taxpayers all across the country.

b. Tax Credits for Education. Perhaps coupled with revenue sharing tax credits we could include some tax credit or deduction for educational expenses. Costs of higher education are becoming nearly prohibitive for middle income families, the group which offers us the greatest opportunity

for political gain. For years there have been proposals in the Congress to provide some tax credit or deduction arrangement. The issue is there for the taking. Indeed it is expensive, but once again, if it were coupled with a substitute tax arrangement we could do it and still be fiscally responsible. This is clearly a prime "what's in it for me" issue.

c. Lifting the Ceiling of Earnings of Social Security Recipients. What is better Republican philosophy than to encourage Social Security recipients to earn more than the current \$1800 ceiling? We worry about all the little things we can do to improve upon HEW's programs to benefit the aging. These get us absolutely nothing politically and really appeal only to the professional senior citizens' lobby. The vast majority of retired citizens couldn't care less about pilot programs for feeding the elderly in Chicago. What they really care about is making ends meet when they retire. Lifting the ceiling, for example to \$3000, would be expensive and would probably also have to be tied to something like the value added tax to give us the fiscal rationale. The fact is, however, that it is a very powerful "what's in it for me" economic issue and particularly potent with a constituency whose support is vital to us (remember too that the retired vote can be decisive in California and probably is decisive in Florida).

d. Medical Program. Our present medical program is so complicated that as you point out few of us ever know what is in it, let alone the vast majority of the American people. We should seize upon one or two salient points like catastrophic health insurance, more doctors, and initiatives like the cancer cure and then demagogue these points to death.

We mainly want to neutralize this issue because we can't win on it; the Democrats can always offer more in the way of national health insurance than we can responsibly accept. The fact remains however that we can talk about it -- and continually should -- the need for curing dread diseases, better medical services and our health insurance program. The key to this one is to keep it simple and understandable and relate it always to the individual's economic (and health) interest.

5. Welfare Reform. We own this issue presently; we must keep on hitting it, constantly. People simply don't like to pay taxes to support leaders. The tougher we are in tightening the work requirements, the more the political gain. It is indirectly, therefore, a "what's in it for me" economic issue.
6. Special Interest Cultivation -- 1948 Example. In developing those issues which appeal to the voters' economic self-interest it is particularly instructive to examine the Truman election of 1948. There are some interesting political similarities with our own situation. Truman was derided and scoffed at by the sophisticated opinion makers, as we often are. He faced a hostile Congress, as we do. Based on results of the 1946 election, he could not count on his party being in the majority. He was faced with a third party threat. He had been forced to do unpopular things in the international field and he had inherited the difficult economic problems of converting from war to peace.

While Dewey went into the 1948 campaign talking about national unity, peace and the need to make government more effective, Truman devoted all of his resources to the bread and butter gut issues.

A recent column by Henry Owen (attached as Tab A) makes the very perceptive point that Truman won the election because people thought he would better protect their bread and butter interests -- "pocketbook politics had carried the day, dignity and efficiency came in a poor second." The Owen column interestingly enough makes the point that the same issues that elected Truman are perhaps even more important today.

If, indeed, there is a valid lesson from the 1948 election, it is that we can build the same kind of a political base to make the President's re-election important to the economic self-interests of large segments of the voting population -- and we

⁴According to Truman's biographer, Cabell Phillips, "Dewey and his men believed that the concepts of the managerial revolution, which had so captivated the eastern electorate in the post war years, would captivate the rest of the country as well."

must escape the Republican managerial syndrome. For example -- (these are only examples) a very comprehensive analysis should be prepared to pick our best targets and best issues):

a. Labor and Building Trades: We are on the verge of being irreparably damaged with the "hard hats" even though 6 months ago this represented one of our most fertile fields for political gain. We had to crack them hard on the wage issue and we did. We are not, however, intensifying the minority hiring campaign in the building trades. While most people view this as a racial question it is, plain and simple, a pocketbook issue with the "hard hats"; they interpret our efforts as an attempt to break down the existing union structure, to destroy the apprenticeship program and to eliminate their job security.

There are approximately 3.8 million building tradesmen in the United States; at the moment they feel that we are threatening not only wages but, more important, job security.

As with so many issues, this requires a tough political choice. Do we play to the blacks, which in my opinion will get us nothing, or do we play to the "hard hats", a large percentage of whom we got in 1968 and as to whom we had been making enormous political progress. This is a natural "new" constituency, newly emerging middle-class Americans, most of them homeowners living in the suburbs, becoming increasingly conservative on social, international and racial issues. The combination of wage stabilization, Davis-Bacon and minority hiring will make it impossible for any of their leaders to support us or to make gains with the rank and file.

We have another opportunity with the building trades. Most building tradesmen have discovered that their hourly wage increases have been largely offset by the fact that they are working less and less throughout the course of a year; the

higher their hourly wages, the greater the incentive for labor saving devices and hence the less labor hours available. Many of them are beginning to seek annual contracts, rather than hourly wage increases. It is argued that hourly wages could be significantly reduced by annual contract negotiations, thereby benefiting both the worker and the cost of construction. We don't have to endorse this; we merely have to recognize the problem which we have not done. If we were merely to announce a study of the feasibility of annual contracts in the building trades, asking the Construction Industry Collective Bargaining Council to come up with recommendations, the political impact could be huge.⁵

This is the kind of issue that we need with labor generally. One of the recommendations that the Rosow Report made was that we provide for vesting of pension plans after perhaps 10 or 15 years. Every blue collar employee has a direct economic stake in this. While it is a tough issue with business it is one that could help us make real inroads with the rank and file of labor. All we need are a couple of major items like this, which represent very direct pocketbook benefit to the individual worker and regardless of what Al Barken and Cope do next year we will make important gains with the rank and file.

b. Business Community. While the business community's political clout is minimal it is a source of support we cannot overlook; the attitude of business leaders has an impact on the white collar, professional category as to which Muskie has shown surprising strength in the polls.

This has been the most activist Administration in history in the field of anti-trust, the environment and consumer issues. We can argue that had the Democrats been in power

⁵Such studies have been conducted over the years in the Department of Labor; merely recognizing them and grabbing the issue is all that is required.

they would have been worse, but that is a tough case to make with politically naive businessmen. All we have to do to help business in the pocketbook is to begin to slow down dramatically in the anti-trust field, gradually in the other two.

c. The Farm Vote. In 1968 we kicked hell out of the Democrats on the issue of parity. It was 74; today it is slightly below 70. Hardin tells us that there is no way between now and next November to get back up to the 1968 level. (This is in the nature of the parity formula). This one fact alone tells us with certainty that this will be a 1972 issue.

We can, however, get farm prices up; farmers have been in a very severe price/cost squeeze. Farm prices have to improve by the Fall of 1972 (regardless of the impact on the wholesale price index) if we are to regain our traditional support in the farm belt. It can be done on a commodity by commodity basis as we know from our experience with milk. We can further aid the farmer by programs such as REA, home ownership loans, etc. As to these, we have been acting as good Republican managers, consistently cutting back on the farm budget; the time is now at hand to begin increasing it.

c. The Retired Vote. In addition to the obvious -- an increase in the earnings' ceiling of social security recipients and cost of living social security increases -- there are special retired groups we can appeal to: for example the 850,000 retired military personnel, a large number of whom live in Florida (62,000) and California (145,000). In 1968 we promised to support recomputation of military pay; we have not. Finally we have underway a study which will lead to some recomputation recommendations; it will be very modest but a step forward, correcting some of the gross inequities in the present military retirement

system. This is a real pocketbook issue. When the recommendations come from the study committee in July (approximate cost \$150 million a year) there will be strong opposition from OMB. If we want to practice pocketbook politics, this is a very good place to start.

e. Veterans Groups: I have had a running battle for months over cuts made by OMB in the VA hospital care budget. The amount cut was slightly in excess of \$100 million. Two months ago a head count of the Veterans Affairs Committees in the House and the Senate revealed that we would be rolled in both committees; it was clear that not only would these funds be restored but the Congress would probably add substantially to our budget requests and would, moreover, attach a mandatory spending clause. Had we been willing to restore the \$100 million cut, we could have gotten the agreement of the veterans organizations to stick with our budget figures; we would have avoided a confrontation with the Congress and we then simply could have withheld funds during FY 1972. As it is now, we will probably be forced to spend the money and will have lost on a gut economic issue with the veterans organization whose membership totals over 6 million. Their recent publications point up the ludicrous situation we find ourselves in: on one page they strongly support us for our foreign policy and on the next tear us apart for cutting health care for the veterans. What's more, we gave Teague, Hartke and Albert a marvelous issue -- you may recall two weeks ago they were all on national TV networks blasting the Administration for being "anti-veteran."

My sole point is that we can do a much better job in appealing to the economic self-interest of large groups of citizens than we have done. We have to be just a little less concerned about managerial efficiency and a little more concerned about "people politics".

In this area we cannot ascribe fault to our public relations effort; nor really can public relations help us. In some cases it is downright dangerous to make a major PR effort when substantively we have serious problems. Salute to

Agriculture is a very good case in point. The public believes that most politicians are phoney and we only give our critics an opportunity to exploit this when we launch major PR efforts in an attempt to cover up a basic economic or political problem.

The other side of this coin is equally valid. If we have made the right political decisions, the public relations effort is relatively painless. For example, if we were to do something in the building trades area, we would have no difficulty in getting our story told and getting the credit. Through mailings, trade journals and speeches every building tradesman would very soon know what we had done.

C. CONCLUSION

After two and a half years the die is fairly well cast on the big issues. Either we have or we have not done the things necessary for those issues to be working for us next year.

We do have, however, two areas which we can most effectively exploit -- and there is time to do it. Revamping our domestic program to make it more people oriented and making a major effort to cultivate the economic interest of those voting blocs that either have represented our traditional constituency or should be part of our emerging new constituency. These are identifiable. The ways to reach them politically are no mystery and we have all the equipment -- the advantage of incumbency -- with which to exploit them.

I am especially impressed, as you may have gathered, by some of the fascinating parallels with the Truman re-election in 1948. Truman rejected the advice that he try to re-form his image or that he mount a major sales effort. What he did instead, based on the Clark Clifford memo of November 1947, was to analyze cynically, coldly and shrewdly the rag-tag assortment of special interest groups and minorities that FDR had welded together into a majority coalition; he determined what political and economic favors were necessary to retain or regain their loyalties and then met them head on. As a result Truman devoted all of his resources to the subject which most Americans cared most about then (and perhaps still do): How to make a living.

17.

While I have emphasized the similarities with 1948, I, of course, recognize that the circumstances then were quite different than they are now. In April of 1948 Truman had a 36% approval rating in the Gallup Poll and for him, therefore, this was a last ditch desperate effort. We are certainly not in that condition.

Nonetheless in formulating our strategy for 1972, there is the political gain of exploiting to the fullest the advantages of incumbency -- which on the issues we have not done as well as we could.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12066, Section 6-102
By RP, Date 4-1-82

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

FRED MALEK *FJM*

SUBJECT:

Issue Management

The attached paper outlines operating procedures for management of issues. It is a revised version of the paper you approved in late January.

I have discussed the lack of action in this area with Chuck Colson, and we are in agreement that the only way we are going to get the Domestic Council moving is to have the President issue a clear directive to Ehrlichman to get this job done.

We would suggest that before leaving for Moscow, the President call John in and tell him that when he returns, he wants on his desk the following:

- (1) A refined list of the key issues, including an appropriate posture and communications theme for each.
- (2) A list of who is to be assigned responsibility for each issue.
- (3) A commitment to have completed plans for each issue by mid-June.

We also recommend the President telling John that given the President's plans for using John, Cole should be assigned day-to-day responsibility for the project. You may then want to follow up with John by going over the attached paper, saying it might be of help in getting started.

Chuck and I feel this is preferable to merely sending the paper to John as this could simply dig his heels in deeper. If the President does not want to meet with John on this, then we recommend you talk to John on the President's behalf covering the same points.

Attachment

ACTION PLAN FOR DOMESTIC ISSUE MANAGEMENT

The purpose of this paper is to outline a proposed program to ensure that the President's positions on key domestic issues are properly developed and effectively communicated.

The first priority in the issue management program should be for John Ehrlichman, our Political people and the Domestic Council to refine the list of significant issues and develop the appropriate posture and communications objective for each. Then, assignments should be made for managing each issue, a comprehensive game plan developed on each, and a means of follow-up installed.

The remainder of this paper discusses (1) a suggested organization for the issue management effort; (2) the plans that need to be developed along with follow-up procedures; and (3) implementation steps with a time table.

ORGANIZATION

Overall Direction

Since the President has asked John Ehrlichman to devote his time to overall policy and spokesman activities (which will likely increase as the campaign progresses), it might be logical to delegate day-to-day operating responsibility for this project to Ken Cole.

Project Teams

For each key issue, a project manager should be named with overall responsibility and accountability for success with that issue. In addition, a team should be formed around him consisting of individuals with substantive communications, and Congressional relations responsibilities. Suggested management and team assignments are given at Tab A. For purposes of illustration, we have selected those issues highlighted in the Domestic Council's analysis of a Harris Poll and mentioned in the President's notes on domestic issues.

Each project manager should be responsible for establishing an attainable goal for his issue and ensuring that everything possible is done to achieve that goal. The goals generally would be to gain as much voter support

approaches to communicating effectively, such as a Jaffe/Ambrose "read show" on drug abuse. The communications team member would be responsible for a program to feed favorable information on these events and other aspects of the issue to the general and special interest media, schedule Administration spokesmen into appropriate forums, work through organized groups to generate support for the President, and plan other major news events to focus public attention on Administration achievements. One prominent forum for explaining our posture would obviously be the Congress. The Congressional relations team member would be responsible for developing a legislative strategy, responding to attacks made on the floor of the Senate or House, and recruiting a strong and well-respected advocate from the Senate and the House to organize Congressional support.

When all aspects of the plan are completed, it should be reviewed by the Political Group and reviewed as necessary before being implemented.

Follow-Up

To monitor results, each project manager should submit a brief monthly memorandum to the President reporting progress against plan, evaluating the President's general position on the issue, and outlining action planned for the next month.

If an issue turns out to be particularly critical, Presidential meetings with the project team should be considered as a way of keeping the pressure on.

IMPLEMENTATION

The direct involvement of the President would help to launch this program effectively. As soon as practicable, a meeting should be held with the President, attended by Ehrlichman, Cole, MacGregor, and Colson, and the project managers. At this meeting, the President should indicate his interest in the program, ensure everyone's full cooperation, and perhaps make a few comments about each of the issues. As can be seen by the following schedule, time is short, and we must move fast if we are to have any impact before the elections.

The following schedule should be adhered to:

<u>Action</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>	<u>Date</u>
1. Identify key issues and develop appropriate posture on each	Domestic Council/Political Group	May 31
2. Presidential Review of Issues	Domestic Council/Political Group	June 7
3. Develop plans	Project Managers	June 17
4. First progress reports	Project Managers	July 1

Attachments

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

May 19, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: DELETED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE WORKING
P.C. 100-0, Section 8-102

FRED MALEK *FJM*

SUBJECT: *EP* *CONF*, Date *4-18-72* Colson Memo on Issue Management

I do not feel there is any inconsistency between Chuck's memo and my memo of May 12th on Issue Management - the two papers merely address different aspects of the subject.

In the second paragraph of my paper, I stated that:

"The first priority in the issue management program should be for John Ehrlichman and the Domestic Council to refine the list of significant issues and develop the appropriate posture and communications objective for each."

Chuck's paper is concerned solely with this "first priority" - he suggests what the issues are, and what we should be doing about them from a substantive and communications standpoint.

I, of course, did not attempt to decide what the issues should be - that is a matter for John and/or Chuck to consider. The purpose of my paper was to describe what happens after the issues are defined - what Chuck rather airily dismisses as "letting the troops execute." I think you would agree that it is in "execution" that we often seem to screw up.

I feel Chuck has suggested some highly astute and imaginative ideas on how to proceed on these issues. My only comments are:

-- Some of the trade-offs involved are terribly complex, and I feel John Ehrlichman and the Domestic Council staff would be in a better position to weigh these trade-offs before we proceed (e. g. , busing, and the tax program, and the aging proposals).

-- My own ordering of priority issues would be 1) Inflation; 2) The New Populism; 3) General Unrest; 4) Busing;

5) Drugs; and 6) Environment/Pollution. This is based on the Harris Poll, Teeter's polls and analysis, and recent election results.

In sum, I recommend that we proceed according to the plan laid down in my paper, adding only that Chuck's memo would be a good starting point for John and Ken Cole as they attempt to identify key issues and develop appropriate postures on each by the due date of May 31st.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 12, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By FR, Date 4-1-82
E.O. 12958, Section 6-102

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: FRED MALEK *FJM*

SUBJECT: Issue Management

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- (3) A commitment to have completed plans for each issue by ~~mid June~~ *Return from Moscow.*

We also recommend the President telling John that given the President's plans for using John, Cole should be assigned day-to-day responsibility for the project. You may then want to follow up with John by going over the attached paper, saying it might be of help in getting started.

Chuck and I feel this is preferable to merely sending the paper to John as this could simply dig his heels in deeper. If the President does not want to meet with John on this, then we recommend you talk to John on the President's behalf covering the same points.

Attachment


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT

Would it not be well for Mitchell to have a two-day strategy session, including not just the top four but perhaps expanding it to include various work groups like Price, Garment, etc. I think it might be well over this next weekend to have a strategy session so that recommendations could be made which I could look over as to what we do between now and the Convention and thereafter. The Buchanan memorandum is a very good document from which to start and then we could make some decisions as to where we go from here.

*Get the
written stuff first
then have Mitchell
hold strategy session
the weekend we go to
Calif. Also I could
review the written material.*

*Con
Cover with Mitchell
in your outg of him.*

JUN 14 1972

June 13, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN EHRLICHMAN

FROM: ED HARPER 
SUBJECT: Issue Publications

The following issue-oriented materials have either been produced or are in the final stages of production.

WHITE HOUSE

Issues and Answers
Speakers' Kit
 Speech Inserts
 RN Quotes
 Fact Sheets
Key Fact Sheets
Key Issue Paragraphs
Speech Inserts and Fact Sheets (Colson)
Speech Inserts and Fact Sheets (Klein)

THE COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

Campaign '72
 Fact Sheets
 RN Quotes
 3 Comprehensive Speeches
The Nixon Years ("The Lift of Richard Nixon")
Voter Bloc Materials - Youth, Blacks, Businessmen
 Speeches
 Fact Sheets
 General Purpose Speeches

1701/THE NOVEMBER GROUP INC.

Nixon Years Film
General Advertising Materials

FINANCE COMMITTEE SUBSTANTIVE DOCUMENTS (2 Brochures
for Businessmen)

THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE

1972 Campaign Factbook
Issue Chapters
Issue Brochures (individual brochures on 14 separate issues)
Promises vs. Performance
• 56-page version with pictures
• 9-page reduced size version without pictures
Facts: Election 1972
Pocket Facts: Election 1972
Q & A notebook on issues of greatest concern to youth
(to be used by the Friends of Richard Nixon)

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM COMMITTEE

The Republican Platform
Convention Program (including a major section on
"The Nixon Years")

As these and other related materials become available in final
form, they will be sent to you.

cc: Ken Cole
Lew Engman
John Evans
Bud Krogh
Ed Morgan
John Whitaker
John Lehman

ELH:PAM:arl

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 13, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: GORDON STRACHAN

FROM: L. HIGBY 

We need to work out a series of tests on what we think the *1701* Committee is doing versus what they are actually doing. This stems out of the fact that we were originally told that the Committee was having a man follow McGovern and Humphrey all the time and getting all their statements.

In fact, what was happening was that a man was following Humphrey and McGovern whenever he possibly could -- so we missed some of the McGovern statements.

There are probably other situations like this where we are being told stuff is being done over there when in fact it is not being done. You should start devising tests to periodically probe into these areas, not in a vindictive way, but merely to get these people on their toes.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 6/12/72 X

TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: L. HIGBY

- Resume*
10 days
- 1) Have Plonigin get into the contact area. Also possibly Christen. When should do more of this. Get some chairman working in this area.
 - 2) Regarding session at C.D. or Blair House. After H. mtg w/ Mitchell - House Strachan, Chapin, and Magruder work out basic program.

NO
I'll handle

POLITICAL STRATEGY PAPER

We should probably have a strategy meeting, or retreat, going for a couple of days to get down to some basic decisions, both from the standpoint of therapy and ideas.

There should be a bigger advisory group putting in some thinking time such as the Committee of 100 and the Committee of 9, who thought they were running the Campaign, and were actually helpful for ideas and in enlisting loyalty.

We may be missing some smart people, such as some key Senators and Congressmen, or some Governors.

We are overlooking some of the old hands on our staff such as Price, Garment, Safire, Finch, Dent, Buchanan, Chotiner, Rumsfeld and Weinberger.

The great danger is for two or three people to think that they are the fount of all wisdom. Of course, the other side of this coin is also worse, which is to try and run a campaign with a dozen or a hundred people. We need to get better organized on the process of touching bases, however.

We must avoid getting too ingrown in terms of political strategy decisions.

We should follow the pattern at the retreat of the August 15 Camp David meeting with sub-groups working on specific areas and then reporting to a small executive group of two or three.

HRH:pm

6/12/72

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT

PH

MS
Add to the
talking paper
of H + Mitchell
mtg
L.

You might discuss with John Mitchell some time the possibility of setting up a rather broad advisory group of maybe a dozen people or twenty, supplementing the hard-core small group which we already have. This gets more players into the act and it also may get us some ideas that we otherwise might fail to get on our own.

Cover for
mtg of Mitchell

- E, CWC, MacG,
- add G, JSM, Chapin + Malek
a 2 day program up at C D.
- *G raise later*
 - Receive G memos - analyze on 6/16
 - Open to C D on 6/24-25