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<td>10/30/1972</td>
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<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Bill Brock and Rietz to RN RE: the reorganization of the Republican National Committee. Report on RNC relations with the White House and the organization's role in elections attached. 26 pgs.</td>
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Introduction

During the first three and one-half years of the Nixon Administration, the President's popularity with the American public has risen dramatically. From an election day 1968 backing of 43 per cent, it has grown to an autumn 1972 figure of over 60 per cent. Plus, the record of his Administration continues to be even more popular, with over 70 per cent of the public supporting specific Presidential initiatives such as in Vietnam and on the economy.

This new popularity of the President's is not only with the traditional Republican voter, but also with the "new majority" -- Independents and Democrats from the ranks of the young, Catholic, ethnic, Jew and blue collar worker. He has captured the imagination of this broad cross-section of America with dramatic trips to China and Russia and bold actions to steady the nation's economy.

Specifically with young Americans there is dramatic new attitude toward the President. It is no longer unacceptable to support him. In fact, the latest Gallup Poll shows the President running even with Senator McGovern on the college campuses, our most difficult battleground. With this change in attitude has come an even more important change in mood. Along with support for the President, it is once again acceptable to support the United States, its Flag and traditional American values. There is pride in the American experiment.
The key to the direction America will take during the next few years lies in the continuation of this mood. The new majority will stand behind the President as long as he continues the bold and courageous action that has marked his first four years. Majority status for the Republican Party can evolve from this "new majority" but only by following the creativity and pragmatism of Richard Nixon. If there is a weakness in the President's support, it lies not with his leadership but with the failure of the Republican Party to provide him with articulate and attractive elected spokesmen at the state and community level.

The image the Republican Party has built up over the last several years is an image of exclusion rather than inclusion. While an assault on the opposition may have increased the fund raising potential on selected occasions, it has decreased the election potential. In fact, the number of people that identify themselves with the Republican Party has gone steadily down until it has slipped to an incredibly low percentage. Clearly, it is the Party that must change.

But this change does not hinge on increasing party identification among the American people; no PR or advertising program can make that happen. It does hinge on elective offices. If the Republican Party can elect a majority of the House and the Senate in the next two years while holding the Presidency, it will necessarily and intrinsically
become the majority party. But, it can never be sold to the majority of Americans simply by repetition of what it has stood for in the past.

This does not mean we should abandon our essential values, but it does mean we need to adopt fresh approaches and utilize new faces. How many times have we contributed to the development of exciting young Democratic leaders by hanging on to the past in the person of our candidate? How many other times have we done so simply because of a lack of professionalism in the support of even our best potential candidates?

Good candidates do abound in every state. They can be found -- and they will run, if assured of proper support in terms of management, public relations counsel, demographic and political analysis, and the rest. Once elected, they will constitute that all-precious asset of visibility, the visibility of attractive, articulate Republican spokesmen responsive at the community level to the component parts of the "new majority".

In summation, we have simply passed the day when a candidate can be elected merely because he belongs to one party or the other. It is a time of independence among voters, and we must respond to that independence by selling our candidates, not our party. If we can elect good candidates who are Republican, then the American people will respond
naturally by increasing their identification with the party.

It is from this shifting milieu that two important tasks emerge. The first task is clearly the President's. To him falls the classic role of the leader, to clarify, develop and represent the Party before the American people. The second task is to elect our candidates to office, and this belongs clearly to the RNC. Yet, it is a role that it is not currently able to perform because of improper organization and the lack of clear definition of function.

To undertake, then, this second task, we need to act now. The Miami chant of "four more years" takes on an ironic twist when viewed from the perspective of giving the President a team capable of implementing his program. The magnitude of our endeavor warrants the plea "only four more years?". Yet, it can be done. We must begin with the National Committee.

In 1971, an off election year, the Republican National Committee, the Congressional Committee, the Senate Campaign Committee and their related organizations took in $11,251,233. The following is a list of the sources of those funds:
According to incomplete records, the initial budget requests in 1971 called for the following expenditures:

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<td>Finance Costs</td>
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<td>Congressional</td>
<td>1,953,565</td>
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<td>Boosters</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>1968 Debt Reduction</td>
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<td>1970 Campaign Expense</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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Thus, 11 million dollars was spent on an RNC staff of more than 200, a Congressional Committee staff of 50, a Senate Campaign staff of 10, and a Republican National Finance Committee staff of 20. Altogether, nearly 300 people worked in 1971 on a full-time basis -- virtually all in Washington.

Overall, the Committees were too "staff" oriented and, with the exception of the Senate Campaign Committee where only about $100,000 was committed to staff support, too "Washington" oriented. Unfortunately, the large staffs have only resulted in an extremely low level of professionalism, and shallow field support has resulted in a weak effort to recruit effective candidates.
Redefinition

The entire purpose of the RNC over the past four years has been to foster a stronger and more efficient Washington operation in which the staff has grown out of all proportion. It has taken in and spent more money than in any time in history, while the rate of Republican identification has gotten smaller and smaller. The organization is self-oriented and self perpetuating. It builds towards a stronger Republican Party while failing to realize that a strong party elects people to office. In action and image, it is fostering the party for the party's sake.

The goals of the Republican National Committee must be redefined to concentrate on the enlistment and election of candidates to office. The party structure is, of course, still important, but without office holders there can be no viable party. Again, the road to majority status for the Republican Party is through the electoral process, not the identification process.

With the movement away from parties and toward independence among the voters, particularly young voters, the RNC must begin to concentrate
its efforts on convincing people to vote for individual candidates on their merits -- not on the merits of the entire ticket. A maximum effort must be aimed at the new majority - traditional Republicans, Independents, and Republican-leaning Democrats - on behalf of individual candidates. The new majority will become the Republican Party only after the individual candidates are elected with the support of the new majority.

A two year plan should be outlined and put into operation at the RNC. The sole purpose of this plan should be to win control of the House and Senate. The efforts of the RNC should be targeted into 75 winnable House and 10 winnable Senate campaigns. All of its resources should be aimed at those 85 campaigns. It should prepare campaign plans for those races, recruit the candidates, train campaign directors and supervise the campaigns. In addition, it should concentrate its efforts on attracting the new majority to these candidates by reaching out through special interest organizations.

This objective can only find resolution through coordinated effort. That is, the Chairman of the RNC must take charge of all activities. We cannot continue Hydra-headed, with Senate campaigns, House campaigns, White House campaigns, Young Republicans, patronage, finance, etc., each raising money and competing for limited financial and managerial resources.
Reorganization

With the purpose redefined, the reorganization of the Republican National Committee staff structure becomes massive. It should be streamlined and professionalized into a campaign, field-oriented organization, rather than a PR operation. But, if done at all, this must be accomplished in a matter of weeks, not months, following November 7. A huge talent bank has again surfaced in the President's campaign. Unless identified and enlisted, it will dissipate quickly as individuals return to private employment.

The Young Voters for the President effort in 1972 had one essential strength -- it was carefully planned in advance and the plans were carefully followed. This is the secret of a winning campaign and should be the purpose of the RNC over the next two years. Again, it is essential that the RNC be reorganized and completely professionalized soon so that it is capable of planning and implementing 85 targeted campaigns.

The first step must be to combine all political activities under the RNC. This includes the Congressional and Senate Campaign Committees as well as the White House. The two campaign committees would maintain a limited staff (housed at the RNC) and would still raise money under the finance chairman. A PR account for incumbent members would be maintained at the RNC and all decision-making authority would be transferred to the
Republican National Chairman who would be guided by a steering committee. How can this be accomplished? The White House political operation should cease to exist, except as delineated on the following chart. Contact with the special groups should be centered under the Republican National Chairman and so should all political decisions resulting from White House policy. The Chairman should regularly attend Cabinet meetings and receive political input from the President, his assistants and the director of legislative liaison. He should attend all White House meetings concerning political problems.

The National Chairman should also be informed of all patronage appointments. The point here is not to clear all appointments with local Republican organizations. Rather, if the new majority is to be attracted, large numbers of Independents and Democrats will not only have to be appointed, but also made "aware" of their acceptability to the Party. If they feel this acceptability, they may be more inclined to move towards the Party. In addition, this will keep the National Chairman and local party from being completely surprised about an appointment and enable everyone to use those appointments for a maximum impact to attract the new majority on the local level.

The following is a proposed organization chart combining all political activities under the Republican National Chairman. Once again, this concept revolves around completely professionalizing the RNC.
THE CHAIRMAN

The key to a redirected and revitalized party is the chairman. He must be a full-time professional who can handle the media, but who understands his basically behind-the-scenes role. He should be a "nuts and bolts" man with enough charisma and leadership ability to inspire new confidence in the Party, not only from its followers but also from its potential members. His is a positive role and a building role. While he may speak at necessary functions -- press conferences, major TV talk shows, state conventions, fund-raising dinners, etc., he should understand that his role is principally that of the party professional.

The President is the leader of the Party and its policy setter. He carries the issues before the people. The Chairman should be his staff director. If that distinction can be maintained, millions of Americans who support the President will begin to identify with his party.

The National Chairman, then, has to be the center of the Republican Party. Because he will preside over the Congressional and Senate Campaign Chairmen and the Republican National Finance Chairman, he must have their respect. This means his should be a cabinet level job -- in salary, prestige and in every other way. He must have access to the President, for without that there will be no power, and of course, no respect.
The Chairman should represent the change in philosophy of the Party -- from a smaller, well-organized elite group to an open organization that welcomes all and questions none. He must be comfortable with people of all ideologies, races and backgrounds, and be willing to treat them in a professional sense. Finally, he must be someone with real campaign knowledge, not as a candidate but as a manager. For his role in 1974 will be to closely supervise the management of 85 individual political campaigns -- campaigns aimed at attracting the new majority.

The Chairman should attend all Cabinet meetings and maintain a constant relationship with the President, the President's Chief of Staff, the Legislative Liaison, and the White House Director of Personnel. All political decisions should be made with their consultation.

Co-Chairman, Women's Division

The Co-Chairman, Women's Division, should also be a "nuts and bolts" person. She will be charged with the 1974 get-out-the-vote effort in the 85 targeted campaigns. This will include instituting telephone banks in each of the 85 target races. She will be in charge of the entire administration of that effort including finding facilities, training personnel, and recruiting volunteers. Although many of the individual candidates may not be known until as little as six months before the '74 election, she should begin planning the centers in January of 1973.
Co-Chairman, Finance Division

The Co-Chairman, Finance Division, should work under the Republican National Chairman and be charged with all fund raising. He should supervise a combined staff from the RNFC, Congressional Committee, Boosters and Senate Campaign Committee.

The Chairman of the Senate Campaign Committee and the Congressional Campaign Committee could be used as surrogates for the President at fund-raising functions. In turn, they should each put together a team of surrogates that will be scheduled and financed out of the Finance Committee offices. Their direct function should be that of fund raisers, while also serving as principal members of the Steering Committee.

An all-out effort should be made to broaden the base of fund raising. "New Majority" dinners should be held shortly after January 1st and traditional Democrats and Independents should be solicited. Specialty items such as records, campaign pins, etc., should be used in appeals to people that have never given to the Republican Party. Mass direct mail appeals for small contributions should be tried in areas where the President receives an overwhelming percentage of the vote. Of course, in finance as in everywhere else in the new RNC, the appeal should be toward members of the New Majority not merely traditional Republicans.

Steering Committee

The function of the Steering Committee should be to review and
approve the allocation of RNC support for candidates. It will make the decision on the targeted seats based on available research, recommendations and information.

Members of the Steering Committee who will meet at least quarterly should include the Co-Chairman, the Chairman of the State Chairmen, the Congressional Campaign Committee Chairman, the Senate Campaign Committee Chairman, the Chairman of the Governors' Association, the Republican National Finance Chairman and four vice-chairmen elected at large on a regional basis by the Republican National Committee.

Administrative Assistant

The Administrative Assistant to the Chairman should supervise the Chairman's personal staff and play a liaison role with the members of the Steering Committee.

Political Coordinators

The Republican National Chairman should assist in the selection of the Departmental Political Coordinators. He should chair a regular meeting of these coordinators to discuss policy, patronage and political direction.

DEPUTY CHAIRMEN

There should be two deputy chairmen. One to be responsible for the specific campaign aspects of the RNC, including Campaign Planning,
Research, and Voter Blocs and Special Groups. The other to be responsible for RNC services, including State Services, Communications and Incumbent Services and Administration.

**Deputy Chairman - Campaign**

**Campaign Planning**

Campaign Planning should be the candidate recruitment and assistance arm of the Party. This is where the major resources of the RNC should go. Its functions should be:

1) Working with Research to select the 75 winnable House seats and 10 winnable Senate seats. This should be based on past voting history, the incumbent's record, and the size of the New Majority vote for the President.

2) Begin a search for candidates for those 85 offices. This search should include not only active Republicans but anyone who can attract a large following among independent voters.

3) Draft individual campaign plans for each of the 85 targeted races. These plans should include:
   a. A complete voting history.
   b. The voting record of the incumbent.
   c. A demographic analysis of the district.
   d. Targeting of priority precincts and voter groups.
   e. A complete campaign schedule.
   f. Initial issue development with a special emphasis on local issues.
   g. An organization chart and plan for development.
   h. A fund-raising plan.
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i. A budget and cash flow chart.
j. An initial media plan.

4) Select and train campaign managers for each of the targeted races.
5) Supervise the implementation of the individual campaign plans.

Campaign Planning should also supervise the allocation of the campaign resources by the RNC. Whereas in the past large amounts of money have been given to candidates with no strings attached, the RNC allocation under the new plan should come in the form of services -- campaign managers, media consultants, policy consultants, telephone centers, etc. Some cash should also be available for special circumstances, but its use must be more closely controlled.

All efforts of the Campaign Planning Division should be carefully targeted at the keys to victory:

1) Candidate selection.
2) Developing a plan.
3) Efficient organization.
4) Recruitment of volunteers.
5) Identifying the vote.
6) Registering favorable voters.
7) Turning out the vote.

This division should make expanded use of political consultants, particularly in analyzing races and training campaign management personnel.
Research

The Research Division must work closely with the Campaign Planning Division. It should research the incumbents' voting record in the 85 target races and do a complete voting history and demographic analysis of the targeted districts. It should also prepare a list of target precincts or areas for each campaign. There is no reason why the kind of sophisticated information that was available to the '72 campaign should not be available to each of the 85 targeted campaigns.

The Research Division should also continue to maintain its library and other resource tools. In addition, it should conduct at least two national polls yearly to determine voter attitudes and develop computer formats that can be used easily in campaigns for mailing lists and further voter analysis.

Voter Blocs and Special Groups

The Voter Bloc Division, taking advantage of the President's popularity, should be charged with building new relationships with groups of voters who have not normally been Republican -- Black, Jewish, ethnic, Catholic, labor, old, young, etc. While an effort should be made throughout the entire RNC structure to attract these people and to place them in key positions, the concentrated effort should fall under the Voter Bloc Director. He should be asked to work toward attracting large numbers of the New Majority and to be prepared to assist all 85 candidates in this effort. Of course, as in all other divisions, he should concentrate on these targeted races.
This division should also be in charge of the special groups -- YR's, CR's, TAR's, Women's Federation, etc.

Deputy Chairman - Services

State Services

State Services should encompass all the traditional RNC activities -- speakers bureau, precinct building manuals, education and training, etc. All efforts here should be aimed at making state Republican organizations more effective and efficient while attempting to broaden the base of the Republican Party.

No state should be without at least a full-time office and professional management.

It is tragic to see time and again the repetition of the same mistakes in state after state -- campaigns desperately trying to complete in October tasks which should have been finished in June, public relations and advertising programs exploiting the wrong issues and directed at the wrong groups, organizations which excel only in ineptitude, etc.

The RNC can help resolve many of these frailties, but only if the problem is attacked at its roots. Many areas have truly able and dedicated local volunteers. Few areas have a method for development of middle management, for enlistment of a future talent base.
Managerial development is a full-time job and the professionalism of state and local efforts should be the single goal of the State Services Division.

Communications and Incumbent Services

The Communications Division should publish the newsletter, conduct press conferences, produce pamphlets and other materials, draft speeches, circulate Presidential statements, and provide whatever PR support services the White House requires.

In addition, it should take over the incumbent support services previously provided by the Senate and House Campaign Committees. This includes art services, TV and radio actuality capability, and still photography. Each incumbent should be provided with a PR account which he can draw on for these services and publishing his newsletter.

Perhaps the philosophy of this entire program can best be illustrated by the change in financing incumbent senate PR accounts. Today, incumbent Senators receive $6000 in cash per year, photographic services, and, if in the last two years of term, an air travel card.

Under this proposal, funds would be disbursed on the basis of $750,000 divided equally among incumbents, and $250,000 divided on a population basis. Thus the average incumbent would receive $20,000
on account per year. Against this he could charge expenses such as newsletter, travel to the state, photographic services, radio and TV services.

Notice the difference in approach. First, far more is invested in public relations than is the case today -- because the Senator is in a position to maximize our appeal in his state at the lowest available cost. Air expressed, and newsworthy, video taped comments will be run without charge on the prime time local news. No out-of-state Senator can command this attention.

Second, far more latitude is given the individual Senator to utilize those public relation devices which have greatest impact on his particular state. This latitude is given in the form of services, thus we can focus professional advice in the areas utilized.

Finally, rather than giving a minimal boost to incumbent Senators in the final two years of their terms, overall support for each of the six years is multiplied, and population is considered in fund apportionment. In essence, the philosophy is that, from the incumbent's point of view, it is better to run for six years than just the last two. More important, from the Party's point of view, that Congressman or Senator is the front line salesman in his State. Our support of his public relations efforts benefit not only him, but the entire Party. Although the amounts of money would be smaller per member, the results of the reallocation of funds on the House side would be just as dramatic.
The Communications Division should also produce special items for the Finance Division -- special newsletter, specialty items, etc.

A major part of the Communications Division's effort should be to publicize the accomplishments of the Administration. In a positive way, it will attempt to draw the New Majority into the Party by identifying the President with the Party. Again, emphasis should be placed on involvement and activity for the broad base of people not just the traditional loyalist.

Administration

The Administration Division should be charged with the day to day operation of the RNC which includes personnel, accounting, the comptroller, the mailroom, volunteers, the convention, etc.
Summary

It is possible to win control of the House and the Senate in 1974 and thus become the majority party. This can be done, however, only if the RNC is restructured so that it is candidate-oriented rather than oriented toward self-perpetuation and if an emphasis is placed on attracting the New Majority. To accomplish this, authority should be centralized, and the total of 300 current staff people should be cut substantially.

Based on projected income of eleven million dollars in 1973 and twelve million in 1974, the following allocation is suggested:
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Income</th>
<th>RNC Staff and Travel (including minimum of 50 in the field)</th>
<th>RNFC - Fund Raising (including surrogate travel)</th>
<th>RNC - Women's Division</th>
<th>RNC - Communications</th>
<th>RNC - Research and Polling</th>
<th>Senate PR Accounts</th>
<th>House PR Accounts</th>
<th>Total Expenditures</th>
<th>1973 Surplus</th>
<th>1974 Surplus</th>
<th>Total Available to Candidates</th>
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<td>200,000</td>
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<td>9,000,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>$4,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>$12,000,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
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<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
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By putting all of the resources of the Republican National Committee to work on targeted campaigns and spreading that activity over a two year period, the impact of the Senate and Congressional Campaign Committees is increased nearly four times. During 1969 and 1970, these committees spent a total of $7,208,011. The new RNC would spend $23,000,000, all aimed at candidate election. This would include $4,000,000 in cash or services available and $1,000,000 in candidate services. This five million is more than has ever been spent in the past direct campaign activity. And all of this is in addition to the $4 million in incumbent PR accounts and $2 million in research.

The budget and allocation should be spread over a two year period. Thus, if research only spent $500,000 in 1973, it would have $1,500,000 in 1974. In the same way, if an incumbent Senator only spent 1/2 of his PR account in 1973, he could add the remainder to his account for 1974.

The key to all of this, of course, is combining all three committees, reducing the large Washington staffs, creating a two year plan, maintaining the same level of fund raising, and re-orienting the RNC to candidate enlistment and election.
Attached is the requested reorganization plan for the Republican National Committee. It includes:

1) Redefinition of the role of the RNC as one of achieving a national "New Majority" identification by:
   a) Recognizing it is only the President who has achieved a new majority, and he should be its principal spokesman.

2) Reorganization of the Republican National Committee to focus its activities solely on the election of the "New Majority" by:
   a) Specifying the role of the Chairman of the RNC as the President's full-time political staff director.
   b) Centralizing all national political activities, including the Senate and House Campaign Committees, Finance Committees, and patronage, under the Chairman of the RNC.
   c) Professionalizing both the RNC and State organizations.
   d) Professionalizing House and Senate candidate recruitment and election campaigns.

Attachment
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of 1776 and belief that the country needs and in fact can return to these goals.

The key to the direction America will take during the next few years lies in the continuation of this mood. The new majority will stand behind the President as long as he continues the bold and courageous action that has marked his first four years. Majority status for the Republican Party can evolve from this "new majority" but only by following the creativity and pragmatism of Richard Nixon. If there is a weakness in the President's support, it lies not with his leadership but with the failure of the Republican Party to provide him with articulate and attractive elected spokesmen at the state and community level.

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This does not mean we should abandon our essential values, but it does mean we need to adopt fresh approaches and utilize new faces. How many times have we contributed to the development of exciting young Democratic leaders by hanging on to the past in the person of our candidate? How many other times have we done so simply because of a lack of professionalism in the support of even our best potential candidates?

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In summation, we have simply passed the day when a candidate can be elected merely because he belongs to one party or the other. It is a time of independence among voters, and we must respond to that independence by selling our candidates, not our party. If we can elect good candidates who are Republican, then the American people will respond
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Costs</td>
<td>1,159,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total RNC</td>
<td>5,870,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senatorial</td>
<td>958,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional</td>
<td>1,953,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boosters</td>
<td>750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,532,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 Debt Reduction</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 Campaign Expense</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,732,585</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus, 11 million dollars was spent on an RNC staff of more than 200, a Congressional Committee staff of 50, a Senate Campaign staff of 10, and a Republican National Finance Committee staff of 20. Altogether, nearly 300 people worked in 1971 on a full-time basis -- virtually all in Washington.

Overall, the Committees were too "staff" oriented and, with the exception of the Senate Campaign Committee where only about $100,000 was committed to staff support, too "Washington" oriented. Unfortunately, the large staffs have only resulted in an extremely low level of professionalism, and shallow field support has resulted in a weak effort to recruit effective candidates.
Redefinition

The entire purpose of the RNC over the past four years has been to foster a stronger and more efficient Washington operation in which the staff has grown out of all proportion. It has taken in and spent more money than in any time in history, while the rate of Republican identification has gotten smaller and smaller. The organization is self-oriented and self perpetuating. It builds towards a stronger Republican Party while failing to realize that a strong party elects people to office. In action and image, it is fostering the party for the party's sake.

The goals of the Republican National Committee must be redefined to concentrate on the enlistment and election of candidates to office. The party structure is, of course, still important, but without office holders there can be no viable party. Again, the road to majority status for the Republican Party is through the electoral process, not the identification process.

With the movement away from parties and toward independence among the voters, particularly young voters, the RNC must begin to concentrate
its efforts on convincing people to vote for individual candidates on their merits -- not on the merits of the entire ticket. A maximum effort must be aimed at the new majority -- traditional Republicans, Independents, and Republican-leaning Democrats -- on behalf of individual candidates. The new majority will become the Republican Party only after the individual candidates are elected with the support of the new majority.

A two year plan should be outlined and put into operation at the RNC. The sole purpose of this plan should be to win control of the House and Senate. The efforts of the RNC should be targeted into 75 winnable House and 10 winnable Senate campaigns. All of its resources should be aimed at those 85 campaigns. It should prepare campaign plans for those races, recruit the candidates, train campaign directors and supervise the campaigns. In addition, it should concentrate its efforts on attracting the new majority to these candidates by reaching out through special interest organizations.

This objective can only find resolution through coordinated effort. That is, the Chairman of the RNC must take charge of all activities. We cannot continue Hydra-headed, with Senate campaigns, House campaigns, White House campaigns, Young Republicans, patronage, finance, etc., each raising money and competing for limited financial and managerial resources.
Reorganization

With the purpose redefined, the reorganization of the Republican National Committee staff structure becomes massive. It should be streamlined and professionalized into a campaign, field-oriented organization, rather than a PR operation. But, if done at all, this must be accomplished in a matter of weeks, not months, following November 7. A huge talent bank has again surfaced in the President's campaign. Unless identified and enlisted, it will dissipate quickly as individuals return to private employment.

The Young Voters for the President effort in 1972 had one essential strength -- it was carefully planned in advance and the plans were carefully followed. This is the secret of a winning campaign and should be the purpose of the RNC over the next two years. Again, it is essential that the RNC be reorganized and completely professionalized soon so that it is capable of planning and implementing 85 targeted campaigns.

The first step must be to combine all political activities under the RNC. This includes the Congressional and Senate Campaign Committees as well as the White House. The two campaign committees would maintain a limited staff (housed at the RNC) and would still raise money under the finance chairman. A PR account for incumbent members would be maintained at the RNC and all decision-making authority would be transferred to the
Republican National Chairman who would be guided by a steering committee.

The White House political operation should cease to exist, except as delineated on the following chart. Contact with the special groups should be centered under the Republican National Chairman and so should all political decisions resulting from White House policy. The Chairman should regularly attend Cabinet meetings and receive political input from the President, his assistants and the director of legislative liaison. He should attend all White House meetings concerning political problems.

The National Chairman should also be informed of all patronage appointments. The point here is not to clear all appointments with local Republican organizations. Rather, if the new majority is to be attracted, large numbers of Independents and Democrats will not only have to be appointed, but also made "aware" of their acceptability to the Party. If they feel this acceptability, they may be more inclined to move towards the Party. In addition, this will keep the National Chairman and local party from being completely surprised about an appointment and enable everyone to use those appointments for a maximum impact to attract the new majority on the local level.

The following is a proposed organization chart combining all political activities under the Republican National Chairman. Once again, this concept revolves around completely professionalizing the RNC.
The key to a redirected and revitalized party is the chairman. He must be a full-time professional who can handle the media, but who understands his basically behind-the-scenes role. He should be a "nuts and bolts" man with enough charisma and leadership ability to inspire new confidence in the Party, not only from its followers but also from its potential members. His is a positive role and a building role. While he may speak at necessary functions -- press conferences, major TV talk shows, state conventions, fund-raising dinners, etc., he should understand that his role is principally that of the party professional.

The President is the leader of the Party and its policy setter. He carries the issues before the people. The Chairman should be his staff director. If that distinction can be maintained, millions of Americans who support the President will begin to identify with his party.

The National Chairman, then, has to be the center of the Republican Party. Because he will preside over the Congressional and Senate Campaign Chairmen and the Republican National Finance Chairman, he must have their respect. This means his should be a cabinet level job -- in salary, prestige and in every other way. He must have access to the President, for without that there will be no power, and of course, no respect.
The Chairman should represent the change in philosophy of the Party -- from a smaller, well-organized elite group to an open organization that welcomes all and questions none. He must be comfortable with people of all ideologies, races and backgrounds, and be willing to treat them in a professional sense. Finally, he must be someone with real campaign knowledge, not as a candidate but as a manager. For his role in 1974 will be to closely supervise the management of 85 individual political campaigns -- campaigns aimed at attracting the new majority.

The Chairman should attend all Cabinet meetings and maintain a constant relationship with the President, the President's Chief of Staff, the Legislative Liaison, and the White House Director of Personnel. All political decisions should be made with their consultation.

Co-Chairman, Women's Division

The Co-Chairman, Women's Division, should also be a "nuts and bolts" person. She will be charged with the 1974 get-out-the-vote effort in the 85 targeted campaigns. This will include instituting telephone banks in each of the 85 target races. She will be in charge of the entire administration of that effort including finding facilities, training personnel, and recruiting volunteers. Although many of the individual candidates may not be known until as little as six months before the '74 election, she should begin planning the centers in January of 1973.
Co-Chairman, Finance Division

The Co-Chairman, Finance Division, should work under the Republican National Chairman and be charged with all fund raising. He should supervise a combined staff from the RNFC, Congressional Committee, Boosters and Senate Campaign Committee.

The Chairman of the Senate Campaign Committee and the Congressional Campaign Committee could be used as surrogates for the President at fund-raising functions. In turn, they should each put together a team of surrogates that will be scheduled and financed out of the Finance Committee offices. Their direct function should be that of fund raisers, while also serving as principal members of the Steering Committee.

An all-out effort should be made to broaden the base of fund raising. "New Majority" dinners should be held shortly after January 1st and traditional Democrats and Independents should be solicited. Specialty items such as records, campaign pins, etc., should be used in appeals to people that have never given to the Republican Party. Mass direct mail appeals for small contributions should be tried in areas where the President receives an overwhelming percentage of the vote. Of course, in finance as in everywhere else in the new RNC, the appeal should be toward members of the New Majority not merely traditional Republicans.

Steering Committee

The function of the Steering Committee should be to review and
approve the allocation of RNC support for candidates. It will make
the decision on the targeted seats based on available research,
recommendations and information.

Members of the Steering Committee who will meet at least
quarterly should include the Co-Chairman, the Chairman of the State
Chairmen, the Congressional Campaign Committee Chairman, the Senate
Campaign Committee Chairman, the Chairman of the Governors' Association,
the Republican National Finance Chairman and four vice-chairmen elected
at large on a regional basis by the Republican National Committee.

Administrative Assistant

The Administrative Assistant to the Chairman should supervise
the Chairman's personal staff and play a liaison role with the members
of the Steering Committee.

Political Coordinators

The Republican National Chairman should assist in the selection
of the Departmental Political Coordinators. He should chair a regular
meeting of these coordinators to discuss policy, patronage and political
direction.

Deputy Chairmen

There should be two deputy chairmen. One to be responsible for
the specific campaign aspects of the RNC, including Campaign Planning,
Research, and Voter Blocs and Special Groups. The other to be responsible for RNC services, including State Services, Communications and Incumbent Services and Administration.

Deputy Chairman - Campaign

Campaign Planning

Campaign Planning should be the candidate recruitment and assistance arm of the Party. This is where the major resources of the RNC should go. Its functions should be:

1) Working with Research to select the 75 winnable House seats and 10 winnable Senate seats. This should be based on past voting history, the incumbent's record, and the size of the New Majority vote for the President.

2) Begin a search for candidates for those 85 offices. This search should include not only active Republicans but anyone who can attract a large following among independent voters.

3) Draft individual campaign plans for each of the 85 targeted races. These plans should include:
   a. A complete voting history.
   b. The voting record of the incumbent.
   c. A demographic analysis of the district.
   d. Targeting of priority precincts and voter groups.
   e. A complete campaign schedule.
   f. Initial issue development with a special emphasis on local issues.
   g. An organization chart and plan for development.
   h. A fund-raising plan.
i. A budget and cash flow chart.

j. An initial media plan.

4) Select and train campaign managers for each of the targeted races.

5) Supervise the implementation of the individual campaign plans.

Campaign Planning should also supervise the allocation of the campaign resources by the RNC. Whereas in the past large amounts of money have been given to candidates with no strings attached, the RNC allocation under the new plan should come in the form of services -- campaign managers, media consultants, policy consultants, telephone centers, etc. Some cash should also be available for special circumstances, but its use must be more closely controlled.

All efforts of the Campaign Planning Division should be carefully targeted at the keys to victory:

1) Candidate selection.
2) Developing a plan.
3) Efficient organization.
4) Recruitment of volunteers.
5) Identifying the vote.
6) Registering favorable voters.
7) Turning out the vote.

This division should make expanded use of political consultants, particularly in analyzing races and training campaign management personnel.
Research

The Research Division must work closely with the Campaign Planning Division. It should research the incumbents' voting record in the 85 target races and do a complete voting history and demographic analysis of the targeted districts. It should also prepare a list of target precincts or areas for each campaign. There is no reason why the kind of sophisticated information that was available to the '72 campaign should not be available to each of the 85 targeted campaigns.

The Research Division should also continue to maintain its library and other resource tools. In addition, it should conduct at least two national polls yearly to determine voter attitudes and develop computer formats that can be used easily in campaigns for mailing lists and further voter analysis.

Voter Blocs and Special Groups

The Voter Bloc Division, taking advantage of the President's popularity, should be charged with building new relationships with groups of voters who have not normally been Republican -- Black, Jewish, ethnic, Catholic, labor, old, young, etc. While an effort should be made throughout the entire RNC structure to attract these people and to place them in key positions, the concentrated effort should fall under the Voter Bloc Director. He should be asked to work toward attracting large numbers of the New Majority and to be prepared to assist all 85 candidates in this effort. Of course, as in all other divisions, he should concentrate on these targeted races.
This division should also be in charge of the special groups -- YR's, CR's, TAR's, Women's Federation, etc.

Deputy Chairman - Services

State Services

State Services should encompass all the traditional RNC activities -- speakers bureau, precinct building manuals, education and training, etc. All efforts here should be aimed at making state Republican organizations more effective and efficient while attempting to broaden the base of the Republican Party.

No state should be without at least a full-time office and professional management.

It is tragic to see time and again the repetition of the same mistakes in state after state -- campaigns desperately trying to complete in October tasks which should have been finished in June, public relations and advertising programs exploiting the wrong issues and directed at the wrong groups, organizations which excel only in ineptitude, etc.

The RNC can help resolve many of these frailties, but only if the problem is attacked at its roots. Many areas have truly able and dedicated local volunteers. Few areas have a method for development of middle management, for enlistment of a future talent base.
Managerial development is a full-time job and the professionalism of state and local efforts should be the single goal of the State Services Division.

Communications and Incumbent Services

The Communications Division should publish the newsletter, conduct press conferences, produce pamphlets and other materials, draft speeches, circulate Presidential statements, and provide whatever PR support services the White House requires.

In addition, it should take over the incumbent support services previously provided by the Senate and House Campaign Committees. This includes art services, TV and radio actuality capability, and still photography. Each incumbent should be provided with a PR account which he can draw on for these services and publishing his newsletter.

Perhaps the philosophy of this entire program can best be illustrated by the change in financing incumbent senate PR accounts. Today, incumbent Senators receive $6000 in cash per year, photographic services, and, if in the last two years of term, an air travel card.

Under this proposal, funds would be disbursed on the basis of $750,000 divided equally among incumbents, and $250,000 divided on a population basis. Thus the average incumbent would receive $20,000
on account per year. Against this he could charge expenses such as newsletter, travel to the state, photographic services, radio and TV services.

Notice the difference in approach. First, far more is invested in public relations than is the case today -- because the Senator is in a position to maximize our appeal in his state at the lowest available cost. Air expressed, and newsworthy, video taped comments will be run without charge on the prime time local news. No out-of-state Senator can command this attention.

Second, far more latitude is given the individual Senator to utilize those public relation devices which have greatest impact on his particular state. This latitude is given in the form of services, thus we can focus professional advice in the areas utilized.

Finally, rather than giving a minimal boost to incumbent Senators in the final two years of their terms, overall support for each of the six years is multiplied, and population is considered in fund apportionment. In essence, the philosophy is that, from the incumbent's point of view, it is better to run for six years than just the last two. More important, from the Party's point of view, that Congressman or Senator is the front line salesman in his State. Our support of his public relations efforts benefit not only him, but the entire Party. Although the amounts of money would be smaller per member, the results of the reallocation of funds on the House side would be just as dramatic.
The Communications Division should also produce special items for the Finance Division -- special newsletter, specialty items, etc.

A major part of the Communications Division's effort should be to publicize the accomplishments of the Administration. In a positive way, it will attempt to draw the New Majority into the Party by identifying the President with the Party. Again, emphasis should be placed on involvement and activity for the broad base of people not just the traditional loyalist.

Administration

The Administration Division should be charged with the day to day operation of the RNC which includes personnel, accounting, the comptroller, the mailroom, volunteers, the convention, etc.
Summary

It is possible to win control of the House and the Senate in 1974 and thus become the majority party. This can be done, however, only if the RNC is restructured so that it is candidate-oriented rather than oriented toward self-perpetuation and if an emphasis is placed on attracting the New Majority. To accomplish this, authority should be centralized, and the total of 300 current staff people should be cut substantially.

Based on projected income of eleven million dollars in 1973 and twelve million in 1974, the following allocation is suggested:
### 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Income</td>
<td>$11,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNC Staff and Travel (including minimum of 50 in the field)</td>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNFC - Fund Raising (including surrogate travel)</td>
<td>$2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNC - Women's Division</td>
<td>$200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNC - Communications</td>
<td>$900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNC - Research and Polling</td>
<td>$900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate PR Accounts</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House PR Accounts</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Expenditures</strong></td>
<td><strong>$9,000,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1973 Surplus</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2,000,000</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Income</td>
<td>$12,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNC Staff and Travel</td>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNFC - Fund Raising</td>
<td>$2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNC - Women's Division</td>
<td>$200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNC - Communications</td>
<td>$900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNC - Research and Polling</td>
<td>$900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate PR Accounts</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>House PR Accounts</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Services</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Expenditures</strong></td>
<td><strong>$10,000,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1974 Surplus</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2,000,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1973 Surplus</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2,000,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Available to Candidates: **$4,000,000**
By putting all of the resources of the Republican National Committee to work on targeted campaigns and spreading that activity over a two year period, the impact of the Senate and Congressional Campaign Committees is increased nearly four times. During 1969 and 1970, these committees spent a total of $7,208,011. The new RNC would spend $23,000,000, all aimed at candidate election. This would include $4,000,000 in cash or services available and $1,000,000 in candidate services. This five million is more than has ever been spent in the past direct campaign activity. And all of this is in addition to the $4 million in incumbent PR accounts and $2 million in research.

The budget and allocation should be spread over a two year period. Thus, if research only spent $500,000 in 1973, it would have $1,500,000 in 1974. In the same way, if an incumbent Senator only spent 1/2 of his PR account in 1973, he could add the remainder to his account for 1974.

The key to all of this, of course, is combining all three committees, reducing the large Washington staffs, creating a two year plan, maintaining the same level of fund raising, and re-orienting the RNC to candidate enlistment and election.
18-24 vote drop due to Watergate
- not Amnesty - Bork + Reets
- pull back fl.RK not to McG
- small turnout on campus

Full Time CM - drop spokes
and but must
Star Conn as spokes

Cand Selle - BS will oppose,
eget Ford on 1/2

To Do:
Sell Conry + Sen by P
Sell Nast won by Pre - Sell + P

Men
- CEC - out per Powell, couldn’t sell
- FM - no pol pub
- Bent - out
- P Turner - OK

Must be done in 2 mos.
Need 1 to 1 pre-selling before may
- Need sales team, not H.
3 Papers by KR
- Sell Gen
- Sell HFP
- Sell RNC, use St Ann without of 1701 assets

No WH involve - I just respond.

- CM could help!

Role of VP?

Dole + Morton could sell
I could program - Riets

Rizzo's pol man? Italian.