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<td>10/26/1972</td>
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<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Pat Buchanan to Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Colson. RE: Suggestions for new &quot;attack&quot; ads, both in television and in print ads. 2 pgs.</td>
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<td>From Pat Buchanan to Haldeman. RE: The strategy when dealing with state election results. The first is to &quot;keep quiet as mice while the election is on; and secondly, to start crowing the instant the returns are in.&quot; 3 pgs.</td>
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<td>9/12/1972</td>
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<td>White House Staff</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>Unknown author to H. RE: message that reads: &quot;Although you had checked the attached and it was in your outbox, I wonder if there aren't a couple of ideas to follow up on, etc.&quot; 1 pg.</td>
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<td>From Patrick Buchanan to The President. RE: McGovern, and the notion that while Nixon is 34 points ahead, it is more important to acknowledge the fact that McGovern is 34 points behind. 3 pgs.</td>
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<td>From Patrick J. Buchanan to The President. RE: Thoughts, recommendations, and problems in the presidential campaign, and how to overcome McGovern's recent attempts to move to the center. 3 pgs.</td>
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<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>An article from The Los Angeles Times Syndicate entitled, &quot;The Party of Workingmen and Women.&quot; 3 pgs.</td>
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<td>White House Staff</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Larry Higby to Gordon Strachan. RE: Message that reads, &quot;I'd be interested in your reaction to Buchanan's criticism of the Teeter briefing.&quot; 1 pg.</td>
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<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Patrick Buchanan to The President. RE: The need to avoid issues such as unemployment and economic management, as they are considered the President's &quot;weakest&quot; points. 2 pgs.</td>
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</table>
| 21         | 5             | 8/3/1972      | □       | White House Staff  | Memo          | From Bruce Kehrli to Haldeman. RE: Message that reads, "For discussion at your 10:00 A.M. political meeting."
1 pg. |
<p>| 21         | 5             | 8/2/1972      | □       | Domestic Policy    | Memo          | From Pat Buchanan to The President. RE: A grassroots effort to McGovernize the Republican Party with a type of &quot;affirmative action&quot; program that would bring more &quot;fashionable minorities&quot; to future GOP conventions. 1 pg. |
| 21         | 5             | 8/3/1972      | □       | White House Staff  | Memo          | From Bruce Kehrli to Haldeman. RE: Message that reads,&quot;For discussion at your 10:00 A.M. political meeting.&quot; 1 pg. |</p>
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<td>From Pat Buchanan to The President. RE: A grassroots movement to &quot;McGovernize the Republican Party via affirmative action programs.&quot; 1 pg.</td>
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<td>From Patrick Buchanan to The President. RE: The Vice President and the Campaign. 4 pgs.</td>
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<td>A talking paper for Buchanan regarding the Vice President's need to talk with the press, and the overall role the VP should have in the theme of reelection. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Patrick Buchanan to The President. RE: The observations made from a study of McGovern's primary ads, TV, radio and press are all worth noting. 6 pgs.</td>
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<td>From Dwight Chapin to unknown receiver. RE: A messages that reads, &quot;Eyes only to Gordon.&quot; 1 pg.</td>
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<td>From Patrick Buchanan to The President. RE: A study of McGovern's ideological liberalism, and the contrast with his attempts at &quot;cleaning up the welfare mess.&quot; 6 pgs.</td>
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<td>From Patrick Buchanan to The President. RE: Questions concerning McGovern's ideology when there exists a stark contrast between his purported liberalism, and the rather &quot;conservative&quot; messages he promotes on TV. 6 pgs.</td>
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<td>From Patrick Buchanan and Ken Khachigian to Haldeman and Clark Mac Gregor. RE: Strategy thoughts from the time period between the conventions. 4 pgs.</td>
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<td>From Charles Colson to The Staff Secretary. RE: The action memorandum #P-2105, and McGovern's position about moving closer to the center as he indicated at the Democratic Convention. 2 pgs.</td>
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<td>From Bruce Kehrli to Mr. Chuck Colson. RE: The Democratic Convention, and McGovern's conundrum of whether to stay true to his liberal base, or make himself more of a moderate. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>From Pat Buchanan to John Mitchell and Haldeman. RE: The recent news that the former Governor of Virginia, Mills Godwin, rescinded his support for McGovern, and pledged his commitment and support to Nixon. 1 pg.</td>
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</table>
MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. Haldeman
    John Ehrlichman
    Charles Colson

FROM: Pat Buchanan

With a dozen days to go, suggest the following -- even in light of the Vietnam events today:

A) Creation of new "attack" television ads, along the lines of McGovern's, using straight copy, if we can't get visuals -- though I think we should get visuals. Purpose of the attack ads is to "re-cycle" on national television all of the worst McGovern positions of the campaign. PJB willing to draft several of these this weekend -- to be run, as one-minute spots, simply as test -- we could go with amnesty, abortion, pot, surrender, etc., the same way McGovern is doing with us.

B) Strongly recommend that we not fall back on our attack ads in any event -- McGovern's stuff is now late -- but it is straight anti-RN -- his best approach.

C) The Democrats for Nixon start calling for civil war in their party -- to win our party back November 8 from the Extremists -- after we all repudiate McGovern. (This seems on the track as of Thursday afternoon.)

D) Consideration be given to asking the Vice President to deliver a Connally-like speech -- only this one defending the integrity of the President for five minutes and taking the hide off of McGovern for his horrible smears and radical positions for the next twenty-five. Given enough advance notice, I would be happy to work with Carruthers, who could get the visuals on this; and we could put it together I would think in fairly short order. President would have to approve such an approach.
In short, the essential thing now is to 1) not let ourselves be driven on the defensive the last two weeks; 2) get back in front of the public every crazy or radical or incompetent thing McGovern did or stands for -- so all those undecided Democrats and RN Democrats realize why it is that they just can't go for George McGovern.

Buchanan
MEMORANDUM TO:  H. R. HALDEMAN
   JOHN EHRLICHMAN
   CHARLES COLSON
FROM:  PAT BUCHANAN

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the Vietnam events today:

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Buchanan
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

In my judgment, it would be a serious mistake to start setting any "targets" for what we expect to do -- other than win. Predictions never help when you are right; and they are murder when you are wrong.

What we should do is what we did in New Hampshire and the other primary states. a) Keep quiet as mice while the election is on; and b) Start crowing the instant the returns are in.

Note from below that the "landslide" (a victory of 10% or more) is damn near the "rule" in the twentieth century, rather than the exception.

Also, while Eisenhower won by 15 points in 1956 -- Harding won by 26 in 1920, Coolidge by more than 25, Hoover by 18 and TR in 1904 by 19 points -- all greater margins than Ike (Coolidge of course had LaFollette drawing liberal votes).

For the Democrats, LBJ won by 22 points, FDR by 17 in 1932, by 23 points in 1936 and by 13 points in 1940.

Also, Harding won by damn near two-to-one, and Coolidge actually did (although Coolidge had a third-party candidate in the race, lending a hand).

Buchanan's Suggestion:

Let's wait until the election is over; and then if RN meets Eisenhower's margin, this is what we say:

1) Richard Nixon got the largest percentage of votes of any minority party candidate in American presidential history. (Note: TR, Harding, Coolidge, Hoover were majority party candidates.)
2) Despite the fact that Republicans are a smaller minority than 1956, and RN is not the beloved war hero, like Ike -- he swept a higher percentage of votes than Dwight David Eisenhower.

3) Conceivably we could say RN swept more states than any other Presidential candidate since the incredible Roosevelt landslide of 1936 -- or more states than any Republican candidate in the history of this nation. (All RN needs is 42 States to accomplish this.)

4) Not since the Civil War has a Republican won more states, or won a higher percentage of Southern votes than Richard Nixon -- who has achieved the historic feat of, at one stroke, changing the solid Democratic South into the solid Republican South -- and thereby building the framework of a new majority in American politics.

5) We should have in hand, by election night, also the Catholic vote totals -- from previous years, so we can show that vote; and the Jewish vote totals.

Finally, what we should do is as in New Hampshire -- that night and the next morning have all our spokesmen and interpreters putting out these lines so that they go into all the interpretive pieces and into the history books. But, for God's sake, let's not be setting any "targets" at this point in time.
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<th>GOP</th>
<th>DEM</th>
<th>3rd Party</th>
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<th>Dem States Carried</th>
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<td>Parker 37.6%</td>
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<td>WILSON 49.3%</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<td>COOLIDGE 54.0%</td>
<td>Davis 28.8%</td>
<td>16.6% (T. Roosevelt)</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Hoover 39.7%</td>
<td>ROOSEVELT 57.4%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>80.7%</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Landon 36.5%</td>
<td>ROOSEVELT 60.8%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>80.6%</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Wilkie 44.8%</td>
<td>ROOSEVELT 54.7%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>78.1%</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Dewey 45.9%</td>
<td>ROOSEVELT 53.4%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Dewey 45.1%</td>
<td>TRUMAN 49.6%</td>
<td>2.4% (Thurmond)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>EISENHOWER 55.1%</td>
<td>Stevenson 44.4%</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>51.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>EISENHOWER 57.4%</td>
<td>Stevenson 42.0%</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Nixon 49.5%</td>
<td>KENNEDY 49.7%</td>
<td>.8% (Byrd)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Goldwater 38.5%</td>
<td>JOHNSON 61.1%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>NIXON 43.4%</td>
<td>Humphrey 42.7%</td>
<td>13.5% (Wallace)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sept. 12, 1972

H . . . .

Although you had checked the attached and it was in your outbox, I wonder if there aren't a couple of ideas to follow up on. If you will put your comments in the margin, I can put them in the works.

L.  

Attachment
McGovern, as anticipated and predicted, has moved off the left, and is making for the center with all deliberate speed. No more do we hear of pot, amnesty, abortion, etc. -- as the attached column by McGovern indicates, the name of the game is the white working class. Thus, we hear now of jobs, of welfare rolls and crime rising under RN, of unemployment, of inflation -- all primary concerns of working men and women. O'Brien and others are talking of which party, Democrats or Republicans -- not which man -- can best handle the economy and the needs of working people. McGovern's campaign has become a traditional HittH-style bread-and-butter attack on the "Republicans" with the Big Business-Watergate-$10 Million issue thrown in to demonstrate our coziness with corporate power, etc.

THOUGHTS:

We should recognize that the operative political reality is not that President Nixon is 34 points ahead -- but that George McGovern is 34 points behind.

He is there because the American people perceive him to be an ultra-liberal, incompetent and somewhat radical character, surrounded by the types whom they dislike and even despise. As argued some months ago, given the Republican minority in the nation, the only way for us to get in the neighborhood of 64-30 is not only an excellent performance on our side -- but a disastrous performance on the other side which we have been given.

McGovern's present efforts to play the centrist is probably the best way to guarantee at least a partial "Return of the Natives."
RECOMMENDATIONS:

A) There is nothing we can do about McGovern's emphasis on issues, on the offensive. However, we can:

1. Make him pay a price with blacks and the left and the True Believers, and even voters generally, by portraying him as a cynical, opportunistic politician -- willing to sell out his principles for a precinct. In short, some Republican attacks should focus on the waffly, shifty character of McGovern, while we do our best to stir up trouble for him on the left, on the campuses, etc., by portraying him as a sell-out artist.

While this will not likely lose him too many votes, it can destroy the McGovern enthusiasm which has been one of his long suits.

2. At the identical time, McGovern is portrayed as a waffler, who abandons principles at the drop of a hat -- he should also be hung and re-hung with all his radical positions. This is the Big Winner for us -- it is the reason, in my judgment, that we are, or were, 34 points ahead. While some are writing in the back pages and for the children and blacks that McGovern is selling them out for the hard hats -- the hard hats, if you will, should be reminded of McGovern's ultra-leftism, his general incompetence, the radical character of his supporters, etc. Again, there is no inconsistency in hitting McGovern both as a Far Leftist and an Opportunist.

3. The attack operation should continue, using the surrogates and others, to keep attempting to get McGovern to answer, and explain and defend -- so that he does not build up the momentum, he is now working on so far as the "workingman" pitch goes. This does not argue that the President should be the one to jam the stick in McGovern's spokes -- but that it should be done, continually between now and election day. We are managing currently both an answering and tactical attack operation -- and a regular offensive strategy -- at lower levels, that should continue despite complaints about negativism at the level.

4. Just as McGovern had hoped and predicted that "Richard Nixon is the issue this fall" -- so we have succeeded in making "George McGovern the issue," and if McGovern ceases to be "the" issue this fall -- then we will do less well than we are now. Thus, again, the attack on McGovern positions rather than discussing economics and unemployment and statistics, etc., appears to me the stronger strategy.
5. Value-Added Tax. I don’t know whether we are locked in yet to this proposal -- but politically, I think it is a mistake. Any new tax, in my view, is a mistake -- even if it is one tax to relieve another, for all the folks will see or understand or hear about from McGovern is "Nixon’s new tax" while we spend several weeks explaining the concept, and several weeks after that explaining that yes, it is a new tax, but it is a trade-off.

Our strongest suit, or one of them has been the charge that McGovern will increase taxes, while we are interested in less taxes, and less government. Now McGovern is starting to focus on our new tax.

6. Watergate. This cannot help but be hurting somewhat right now, in light of the truly incredible publicity being accorded the matter. Though this has been passed along verbally, suggest that the moment the indictments come down, the President make a strong statement, condemning the operation, etc., putting this into perspective, demanding fair and just trial and punishment, and then moving it into background by stating it is not the issue -- the great issues. Something public and forthright on this. Then when McGovern continues to carp -- that is the precise and ideal time to unload on him for his role in a far more serious crime, the leaking of top secret documents, wherein he personally encouraged Ellsberg, now on trial, to take them to the Times. The Vice President would be the one, at that point, to make the charge -- and I could put together three pages on short notice. But, if possible, we should wait for the Grand Jury to hand down its indictments.

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Buchanan
THE PART OF WORKINGMEN AND WOMEN

by Senator George McGovern

Two messages from the people came clear to me as I campaigned from New Hampshire to California this year. First, the American workingman and woman are far more intelligent than President Nixon thinks. Second, the enormous political energy—shifting, imponderable, fluid—of the workingman and woman has scarcely begun to be felt in American politics.

For the last decade or so, it has been fashionable to imagine that the sources of creative political energy in America are the black, the poor and the young. Such groups have manifested great political energy. They are now far more organized than before. And they know how to define what they want and enter the political fight to get it.

But what I discovered in the textile mills of New Hampshire, and found confirmed on assembly lines from Ohio to California, is that the grievances of the workingman and woman create just as much political energy for America as the grievances of the poor, the black and the young did in the 1960s and continue to do today.

Pensions are not transferable, or sometimes entirely disappear. Insurance rates are too high, or the fine print disqualifies what the large print grants. Taxes cost the average citizen too much and deliver too little to him.

How has a worker's life improved in recent years? In his or her eyes, neighborhoods are more violent, dirtier, in greater disrepair, and you have to run harder just to stay in place.

(Note to Editor: Nick Thimmesch is on vacation. This is the first of four guest columns.)
It is not pleasant to eat cheaper meats because steaks are now priced out of the family range. How can you feel successful when the costs of education for your children make you feel poor—and yet your hard-earned salary disqualifies you for a hardship scholarship?

Let Mr. Nixon say that inflation has slowed, that prices are down and wages are up. The workingmen and women don't listen to political rhetoric or even to political theories. They listen to experience. They listen to what their eyes and ears can see and hear.

They see the prices of meat and bread and eggs. They have to pay those prices. They feel the reality of wage controls, while seeing no evidence of price controls. They don't believe Republicans ever have been or ever will be, on the side of the workingmen and women.

What they get from Richard Nixon on economics is rhetoric.

And that's also what they get on crime. They have eyes and ears. They see policemen in every school, locks on every locker, the broken vending machines, the bars on downstairs windows, the double locks. They read the daily papers. They exchange experiences with relatives and friends. Crime is not a political myth in American cities, suburbs, public or private buildings. It is a matter of everyday experience, a leaden presence, a disgrace for a civilized country.

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Workingmen and women have been in the front lines of political progress, in all the great reforms sponsored by the Democratic Party since 1932, including civil rights reforms in the middle 1960s. The party works for the people, and the people support their party. That has been the key to a better life for millions.
Mr. Nixon cannot help working people even if he wants to, for his basic constituency is corporate power and corporate interests. What can he do about insurance rates when he is beholden to huge insurance magnates like Clement Stone who has given his campaign $1 million? What can he do about tax relief for workers when his first obligation is to subsidize ITT, Lockheed and Penn Central? What can he do for union wages, when his big money contributors depend on disproportionate and often untaxed corporate profits?

The Democratic Party is not tied to these corporate interests, as our campaign chest clearly shows. Democrats have no secret $10-million campaign kitty. I have made public every penny received and spent in my campaign. But exactly because the Democratic Party is not tied to these interests, Democratic leadership will once again bring down prices. Democratic leadership will once again invest money to generate jobs, and we will generate 2.4 million new jobs by 1975.

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I'd be interested in your reaction to Buchanan's criticism of the Teeter briefing. Is it valid or is Buchanan only looking at part of the facts?
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT  (Per HRH As Requested)
FROM:  PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

Have received the poll briefing and while the findings on the issue are unexceptional, the conclusions that are drawn are wrong, I think -- if I do not mistake them. Our surrogates and the Vice President should not spend a disproportionate amount of their time defending our record on unemployment, and economic management. By most everyone's judgment, our record is not, considered as that good; this is our "weakest" point -- and a national debate over whether we managed the economy well is perhaps the one debate with McGovern we can lose.

Agreed that Vietnam, inflation, etc. are the crucial issues. We can win on these issues by not so much verbally defending our record, but by portraying McGovern as disastrous to the stock market, disastrous to the job market with his budget cuts in defense and space, disastrous to the security of the U.S., disastrous to the price situation, because of his $1000 program, or his $6500 welfare giveaway. In short, let's not so much defend our record, which is subject to criticism, as to attack McGovern with being a clear and present danger to the prosperity we now have.

The point is this: If the Democrats had nominated Harpo Marx, the Teeter polls would have said Vietnam, economy, inflation are the major issues. Would we, in a race with Harpo, talk about those issues -- or would the winning issues rather be the manifest lack of qualification of their candidate -- despite our record.

The decision in November and our rhetoric must not focus upon their issues -- i.e., "unemployment" and the unequal economic record of the last four years -- it must focus upon our issues -- i.e., the extremism, elitism, radicalism, kookism, of McGovern's person, campaign, and programs, against the solid, strong, effective leadership of the President. The first campaign described above is the only way we can lose in 1972 -- and if I am not mistaken,
this is something close to what the Teeter folks recommend, when they say we ought to talk up the economy, and spend an inordinate amount of time defending our record on unemployment.

Nor should we forget the capacity of a candidate (i.e., Kennedy and the "missile gap," Goldwater and "extremism") to create issues, on which elections turn, sometimes legitimate issues, sometimes illegitimate. When we portraying McGovern's ideas as preposterous, foolish, and even dangerous to U.S. security and the nation's economy, we are right now pushing against an open door — with the media at large, as well as the country.

The campaign should turn, we should make it turn, upon the manifest unqualification of this character and his ilk to even be in the Presidential contest -- not whether a damn referendum in our spotty economic performance, which talking, talking, talking about the economy and jobs, and unemployment would make it. So, I disagree strongly with what I view as the central thrust of recommendations of the Teeter polls.

Buchanan
TO:       H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:     BRUCE KEHR LI

For discussion at your 10:00 a.m. political meeting.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

There is both a present and future political danger in this program -- already on the tracks -- to McGovernize the Republican Party, via quotas or some "affirmative action" program to bring more of the "fashionable minorities" to future GOP conventions, at the expense of the Catholics and Jews -- where RN has made in-roads.

First, if we go this route in 1972, we will automatically surrender a strong suit -- our opposition to "quota democracy," our opposition to the fetishism of the "New Politics" which leaves the Warren Hearnes out in the cold while making room for the Shirley MacLaines.

Our political interest in 1972 dictate that we juxtapose our Party to the McGovernized quota-ridden Democratic Party -- not that we emulate them as Javits recommends.

Strongly suggest that the President pass the word along to the Rules Committee, that we are an open party, welcoming all groups, granting quotas to "none." If we call for "quotas" or "affirmative action" for blacks and Chicanos, we will be asking to forfeit four years of gains among Catholics and Jews. These "reforms" represent, in my view, a serious present political problem because of what the media might do at Miami -- and future ones as well -- because this is a prescription to forfeit the Nixon Majority, which RN has half put together already -- adding to the GOP minority, the Solid South and the Northern ethnics, Catholics and Jews. To go the route of Javits is to go backwards -- to throw away two birds in the hand for one in the bush. We should send strong signals to the Rules Committee that we want nothing to do with McGovern-type reforms.

Buchanan
Battle Over Rules?

GOP Liberals Plan
To McGovernize Party

GOP Liberals Plan To McGovernize Party

San Josestretch and Dan Tomkobuck are leaders in the fight to "reform" the Republican party along liberal lines.

The little-noticed threat to the Republican future got started at the 1968 convention, which mandated formation of a committee to study party procedures and to make recommendations to the Republican National Convention for action at the 1972 gathering. Some liberal-minded party leaders suggested the formation of a "national committee" to make these recommendations. The National Committee was thereby "built" in the party's interest, and now it is in the process of taking shape.

Meanwhile, early looks at convention procedures strongly suggest a concerted move to liberalize in influence the Rules Committee itself. Among those already awarded of Rules membership are Sen. Walter F. Mondale, D-Minn., and National Publi

In this issue...

- The Bizarre Candidacy of Thomas Eagleton
- Give McGovern a Break
- Nebraska's Sen. Carl T. Curtis
- In Advertising An Economic Wares
- Administration Should Reveal Extent of Red Chinese Drug Trade
- The NWRO Races of the Week
- Nixon's Panama Policy
- Look to State Scott vs. Spang
- Politics '72
- Owen Lattimore Returns to Testify
- A Republican Senator on '73
- President's Education Panel Makes Valid Points
- The Democrats of the Abuse of Executive Privilege
- About That Democratic Ticket
- Capital Briefs
- This Week's News
- Spotlight on Congress
- Classifieds

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The new committee, which includes Rep. National Director David Ullman, Sen. Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) and Charles Mathias (R-Md.), and Representatives Thomas Kinkaid (R-Fla.), John Vandis, (R-HI), Gilbert Gold (R-Md.), William

News Briefs

The prime targets include Rep. National Director David Ullman, Sen. Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) and Charles Mathias (R-Md.), and Representatives Thomas Kinkaid (R-Fla.), John Vandis, (R-HI), Gilbert Gold (R-Md.), William

Senior (W-I.) and Louis Frey (Fla.), is a conservative-leaning Congress whose views on issues are being.

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and submarine design in theory. They will be much more difficult to detect and attack than our Polaris submarines, and Polaris force ever since the first one went to sea 13 years ago. That said, Rickover, it is imperative to begin production of the new Trident submarines. A more powerful and advanced submarine complex is needed. 

Rickover charged that the Soviets had been increasing heavily in anti-submarine warfare. The United States had not. But if the Soviets were to make a surprise attack on our Polaris submarines, they would be much quicker than the Polaris submarines.

Continued from Page 1

ARMS CONTROL

The U.S. submarine force will be boosted by the introduction of the Trident trident force. This is the introduction of the 48-boat, containing the nuclear and the propulsion plant, by the red-sea, which contains the missile tubes and associated launching system, for two reasons: the new Trident submarines will now be more active. Therefore, it is imperative to begin production of the new Trident submarines by 1973 in order to achieve the goal.

BRIEFLY, then, the more effective forces were the day in the Senate last week, despite the best efforts of Sen. Muskie.

Following the 47-39 roll-call vote by which the Senate certified 47 indicated the Senate's approval of the Arms Control Act, this upping the acceleration of the Trident submarine force.

For the TRIDENT

DEMOCRATS: LIEBERMAN, DUNCAN, GLENN, HAGEMANN, LUNDE, MUSKIE, PAYNE, PASCHALL, RELEFORD, RUSSELL, SHAW, SMITH, SNOW, WISE.

REPUBLICANS: REED, ALLISON, BARKS, BELL, BLACKHART, BOWER, BROWN, BRISCOE, CARROLL, CROSBY, EATON, FARNS, FARR, FISHER, GIBSON, GOYRIS, HOVEN, KENNEDY, MURCH, PARKER, PEARSON, POLK, RASMUSSEN, TAYLOR, VARTANIAN, WILSON.

Against the TRIDENT

DEMOCRATS (4): BOLIVAR, BROWN, HAY, RIVERA

REPUBLICANS (2): BIERLEY, NAISKY.

Continued from Page 1

G0P Liberals Plan

To McGovernize Party

To weigh the decision-making processes of future Republicans national conventions.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date August 3, 1972

TO:  H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: BRUCE KERLH

For discussion at your 10:00 a.m. political meeting.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 2, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT (Per HRH)

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

There is both a present and future political danger in this program -- already on the tracks -- to McGovernize the Republican Party, via quotas or some "affirmative action" program to bring more of the "fashionable minorities" to future GOP conventions, at the expense of the Catholics and Jews -- where RN has made in-roads.

First, if we go this route in 1972, we will automatically surrender a strong suit -- our opposition to "quota democracy," our opposition to the fetishism of the "New Politics" which leaves the Warren Hearnes out in the cold while making room for the Shirley MacLaines.

Our political interest in 1972 dictate that we juxtapose our Party to the McGovernized quota-ridden Democratic Party -- not that we emulate them as Javits recommends.

Strongly suggest that the President pass the word along to the Rules Committee, that we are an open party, welcoming all groups, granting quotas to "none." If we call for "quotas" or "affirmative action" for blacks and Chicanos, we will be asking to forfeit four years of gains among Catholics and Jews. These "reforms" represent, in my view, a serious present political problem because of what the media might do at Miami -- and future ones as well -- because this is a prescription to forfeit the Nixon Majority, which RN has half put together already -- adding to the GOP minority, the Solid South and the Northern ethnics, Catholics and Jews. To go the route of Javits is to go backwards -- to throw away two birds in the hand for one in the bush. We should send strong signals to the Rules Committee that we want nothing to do with McGovern-type reforms.

Buchanan
Battle Over Rules?

GOP Liberals Plan To McGovernize Party

By Kevin P. Phillips

Three wonderful folk are planning to变革(gǎi biě) the Democratic Party in this year 1972.

Many liberal observers are beginning to talk of a "McGovernization" of the...
The U.S. submarine force will be bolstered by the introduction of the Trident-class submarine....

The Senate has been investigating possible procurement violations, working

In the 1976 convention, Nebraska is likely to have 16 delegates. Each state sends four representatives to each of the 16 districts in the...
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT  (As Requested)

FROM:  PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

SUBJECT: The Vice President and the Campaign

Because the Vice President remains, outside RN, the biggest gun we have, the Veep should be staffed up -- at least on the level of the 1970 campaign. Full plane, and gear and constant contact and communication with the White House and Re-Election Committee.

1. He will have to visit those states the President cannot visit, as of course the first responsibility.

2. However, as often as possible, the Vice President should be scheduled into those areas and among those groups -- that are the battleground in 1972. And that is not Republicans. We, by and large, have the South now. In the North, it is Catholic, ethnic, urban, Jewish, middle-income, working class Democrats who are the swing votes, the ones who will decide by how large a margin we will win this one, if we do win it.

Therefore, schedulers should look to Pulaski Day Parades, Columbus Day Parades (What about a WH function, along the lines of the St. Pat's Party), union halls, Knights of Columbus, Queens, PBA, and ethnic community meetings.

This is vital, in my judgment -- and we should schedule Lole and MacGregor into the GOP functions, using the Veep for those areas where he can do us the most good -- among the Wallace Democrats in the North, in places like Michigan and elsewhere.

3. The Vice President should have a set-piece speech, as the President had, and instead of an entire new text every day -- as in 1970 -- we should have a new "Ten Graphs" in each speech. This is one hell of a lot easier on speech writers, and gives us greater control of the material that the press runs.
4. The Vice President should carry the fight to the opposition ticket, by and large ignoring Eagleton -- and zeroing in on McGovern. The Veep has the Assault Book. What is needed now more than anything is co-ordination of the attack strategy so that we don't pee away everything in the first weeks, and so that our strategies can be co-ordinated.

5. Frankly, we need better press relations between the Vice President and the national and local press; this might well require a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the Veep's staff toward the traveling press. (We had good relations we thought, by and large, in the 1970 election.) Certainly, the Vice President should do something for the locals at each stop. And we ought, of course, to shelve for the campaign the broad anti-media attacks; unless a) it proves politically necessary in light of their shifting. We have the political dividends out of this -- our target is McGovern.

6. Contact on a regular basis between the President and the Vice President would be especially helpful -- not simply for morale purposes, but to review the success of failure of a given strategy and to maintain campaign flexibility.

7. We should, on the campaign trail, avoid I think, the epithet and make our charges -- based strictly on the record. So that McGovern is forced to respond to what he himself said -- not to what we called him. However, the extremism of the McGovern positions and statements, and the "elitism" of the New Left controllers of the Democratic Party remains an effective theme appealing to Democrats.

8. We should remember that the swing voters in this election are Democrats -- and strictly Republican appeals this fall are only useful for rallying the troops, nothing more. The "McGovernites" is right on the mark.

9. The situation of 1970 where the President's people were on board the Veep's plane-- at the Veep's invitation -- was a good one. Since the President is not going to be stumping, his top writing talent, or much of it, should be with the Vice President.

10. I recognize the need to defend the President and his Administration, but what the press considers "news" is usually negative news, i.e., an "attack" rather than a defense. And we must not allow McGovern to swing over onto the offensive -- i.e., I would argue that the Vice President should be carrying the struggle to their ticket, rather than waiting for them to attack, and defending the President.
In my view, whereas in 1968 it was relatively easy to scare the voters, with attacks on RN’s economics and position on medicare, etc. -- that tactic on the part of the other side won’t work today. Whether they agree with RN or not, very few Americans are "frightened" by the prospect of another RN term. The same cannot be said of McGovern; and this is the factor which opens up the possibility of a landslide. Thus, a campaign which continually raises specters about McGovern's extremism, and the crazyness of his ideas, is the only kind of campaign I think that can win us a major landslide. A defensive strategy, thus, does not commend itself to me -- especially for our biggest gun outside of the President. We ought to have other views on this.

11. We have to be wary of making George a Martyr. Mean-spiritedness has no place in this campaign; thus, it is important that the campaign staff not be tired and bitchy as the campaign heats up. The humor used should be light and needling -- not mean in character.

Again, on this score, though unfair, it is true that we have a smaller margin for error than the Democrats. The Veep can call McGovern a "fraud" and be excoriated for it -- McGovern can compare RN to Hitler and his policy in Vietnam to the "extermination of the Jews" and get away with it, without comment. Without tearing into our friends in the media, we have got to keep pointing this up.

12. Vitally important that we not allow a situation to develop, as in 1960 with RN or 1968 with the Veep, when the candidate and his traveling press were at sword's point. Even if the press is shafting us, it is not to our advantage to conduct a Cold War with them -- when they are reporting what we say and do. In the fall, on the Vice President's plane, there should be someone who will bring that "can of oil" when necessary, and will, in a good cause, eat a little crow and humble pie.

13. Essential that the Vice President, this fall, feel that he has the full confidence and support of the President, and regular backing. My view is that in 1968, when the Vice President was under attack, we would have done better by bringing him on to answer the charges against him. In 1972, we can be sure that the Vice President will be an issue -- the answer to this is to put him on the air, on national television, and to let him in his own calm way, with his own accents, answer the allegations that will be made against him. To show he does not have horns. We might even consider a visit to some campus -- or a youth confrontation on the tube -- for the campaign. As in 1952, a
harsh and strident and unfair attack on a Vice President can be made to back-fire against its perpetrators.

Considering that one of the advantages of McGovern is that he may be perceived as the underdog, the anti-Establishment candidate, it might be good to get the Vice President into this role, and come fighting back fairly, against all these elements and institutions that are out to get him.

14. Lastly, the major appearance the Vice President -- the major national impression -- will come from his acceptance speech. This speech can do a tremendous job for him, and for us, in laying out the record of the Democratic ticket, in appealing to those Democrats who have bolted, and in leaving an impression of the Vice President before the country.

PJB would like to help put some of this together for the Vice President, and if the President suggested that, would be most helpful.

15. Recognizing that there are many within the White House and the Hill who are not exactly enthusiasts of the Vice President, word should go forth that this is a "team" effort, there should be no "background" knocking the Number Two man, who will be shouldering as RN did, much of the nasty workload of the party and the campaign. Nothing is more embittering than to pull off the wire some holier-than-thou statement from a fellow Republican, when -- in the interests of the Administration -- we are throwing Goodell to the sharks. Even a word from RN to all involved that this is a team effort; that no good is served us or the Party by background back-stabbing, and that this is an all-for-one, one-for-all operation, would be beneficial in the campaign, I would think -- from the 1970 experience.

Buchanan
TALKING PAPER FOR BUSH/GAHAN

You should talk with the Vice President and tell him on your idea of the day talk with the press.

Also, we need some heavy thinking regarding the Vice President's role and how he should play it if he is the nominee for reelection. We should determine first how he can help, and second, how he can avoid hurting the prospects of the ticket.

We need your strategy views on this, but we also need you to talk with the Vice President, try to get him to stop the swipes at the NEW YORK TIMES, and so forth, and also to avoid the personal attacks on McGovern as you suggest in your latest memorandum.

HRI
July 13, 1972

HBS
Observations from a study of the McGovern primary ads, TV, radio and press -- and the interesting McGovern biography.

Points worth noting:

1. Despite the ideological liberalism of Mr. McGovern, there is a clear conservative thrust to many of his issues ads -- particularly those for "cleaning up the welfare mess," and relieving the property tax burden on the average citizen. The McGovern proposals to increase the welfare payments and rolls, and the manifest inconsistency in proposing $150 billion in new spending -- while appearing to be for a reduction in and redistribution of the tax burden are not present in these ads. Further, late in the primaries, his new "hard-line" on Israel was a major topic of his advertising. Could find nothing in the way of elitist, new left ad themes in McGovern's primary campaign. Amnesty, abortion, pot, soak-the-rich, slash defense, $1000-a-person were clearly not major themes. There are, however, several old-liberal approaches which he has pushed in his advertising. These include:

   a) Social Security benefits beginning at 62 years of age -- a straight shot appeal to old folks, along traditional liberal Democratic lines.

   b) An interesting emphasis on "occupational health and safety." For example, a number of TV spots focusing on how workers were losing life and limb in unsafe plants, and this was a serious problem. Imagine this approach to be one with great appeal where McGovern is weak -- among production workers.
c) Medical care for everyone. This is one of the positive "liberal" programs, which McGovern emphasized in the primaries. Again, it is traditional Scammon-Wattenburg economic liberalism. Again, there is hardly a trace of what one might call social liberalism, or "radical chic" politics in the McGovern advertising campaign. And, clearly, our people should never cease making references to his "elitist" "radical chic" positions -- and focus on them, rather than leaving the debate to resolve around his more traditional "liberal" approaches.

d) A relatively hard-nosed approach on drugs.

OTHER APPROACHES

The KENNEDYS -- Mr. McGovern is clearly running on the coattails of two dead men, John and Robert Kennedy; his documentary is almost a Kennedy Documentary; his TV and radio spots make extensive use of the Kennedy endorsements of George McGovern as the "most decent man in the Senate." We can expect much of this in the fall.

PERSONALITY -- McGovern's campaign consistently contrasts Mr. McGovern as an honest, open, straight-forward, candid, consistent candidate -- with Mr. Nixon's Administration, which is portrayed as deceitful, closed, secretive, distrustful. This is clearly in the McGovern campaign judgment a winner for them -- and a loser for us. They focus upon the "personality" of the two candidates and the two campaigns, as much as upon any two issues. The need for us, again, in my judgment, is to move early to get out the record of both the McGovern waffles on positions, that McGovern compromises on principles, McGovern's nasty and vindictive attacks upon the President and his political adversaries. The press, which nails Mr. Agnew to the mast for his rugged rhetoric has allowed Mr. McGovern to get away with some of the more incredible statements in American politics. We have Mr. McGovern's cruel and nasty statements recorded, but these, along with his waffles and back-downs, have to be moved into the public record. As with Mr. Muskie, one of our problems is to contradict this idea that, whether you agree or disagree with McGovern, you "know where he stands," and you know he can be trusted.
Other attributes the McGovern camp is playing up are such as "warmth, humanity, sympathy, compassion," and they are attempting to contrast them with a cold-blooded, super-efficient, rather heartless White House and President. Such as RN's visit to the flood-stricken areas of the country is most helpful as an antidote to this kind of approach. We could do more of the last.

Also, an openness, and a new accessibility to the press and public on the part of the President might, in my view, be helpful in working against this "inaccessibility" allegation that is part of the McGovern mode.

ISRAEL -- McGovern's extraordinary sensitivity on this issue is manifest in the 180-degree turnabout on the issue, and the astonishing hawkishness of his latest ads. He is vulnerable here; and the lesson is obvious that we ought to continue to focus upon his opposition to the Eisenhower Doctrine, to measures to promote Israeli security, etc. He is vulnerable here; and aware of it.

POPULISM -- While "Professor McGovern" is a representative of the "outs" against the "ins," the fighter against the "interests" for the common man who bears too much of the burden, while powerful corporations and institutions get off without paying their fair share. The clear need is, as stated in previous memos, to portray McGovern as a Candidate of the Elite, "Professor McGovern," the leader of the party of the PhDs. and limousine liberals, whose elitist shock troops took over the party of the people, the "noise-makers" and the "exotic," the tiny minority who are imposing an asinine social policy of bussing on a country, eight-five percent of whose people do not want bussing.

There are few larger imperatives in our campaign than to move McGovern into the position of the Establishment Candidate -- running against the candidate of Middle America. Crucial to our success this fall is to put McGovern in the bag with the "radical chic" and this message it seems to me, has to be impressed upon our speakers. If we allow him to be perceived as his ads, and previous campaigns portray him, we could have a serious problem.
VIETNAM -- McGovern's approach is that he is the one man in the country, who has been "right from the start," about this miserable, horrible war. This should be confronted, not ignored, and surely, not conceded. These are three basic approaches, some of them not complementary, if not consistent:

a) McGovern has been a waffler on the war; he voted for the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964, against its repeal in 1966, for appropriations for the conflict throughout the early and mid-sixties, and only voted to get out -- after a Republican had come in to clean up the mess McGovern's Presidential choices (JFK, LBJ, HHH) had made of the situation. His bitter attacks on RN thus come not from principle but from the effort to pick up partisan dividends from undercutting an American President trying to get us out of a war into which he voted us.

b) McGovern has repeatedly made predictions as to what the enemy would do if we made concessions -- and every single McGovern promise and prediction has been wrong. Nobody had a worse record on Vietnam in terms of understanding the enemy than McGovern.

c) McGovern's attacks on the President who is now honorably ending American involvement in this war are not something to be proud of -- they rank among the most shameful episodes in American history. While President Nixon sought courageously to extricate America from this conflict -- with his two objectives, American honor intact, and our commitment not defaulted -- McGovern badgered and sabotaged this courageous effort every step of the way.

Again, our people should not concede the war is immoral, should not concede that McGovern was right, but we are right too, and we are trying to end it as best we can. We should challenge him on this issue, on many grounds. We should confront his claim - not co-opt it, by saying: "Well, we are against the war, too, and we are trying to do our best to end it."

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biography, and observing the man, the following becomes clear.
McGovern's great strength and great weakness lies in his
personality; he is a minister in his own right and a minister's son;
he is a True Believer, his is the "Passionate State of Mind;'' he
sees issues in moral terms, not simply mistaken versus wise, but
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unlike Goldwater. Frankly, he bears striking similarities to our
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Thus, it is that McGovern can compare RN with Hitler and his bombing
policy with extermination of the Jews -- and still believe in his
own mind that Mr. Agnew is the "demagogue'' who says horrible
things. McGovern's self-righteousness can be a great strength --
he has a preacher's appeal; against us his is the appeal of a man
who believes deeply in a "faith'' against the man who is the
quintessence of the pragmatist.

His weakness is, again the weakness of Romney -- he is, not
unlikely to state and re-state his convictions about RN being like
Hitler, when pressed on the question, rather than backing off. In
a pressure situation, he will fall back upon the "Gospel'' of the
left, rather than frame some non-committal neutral response.
Very probably, he will be more sensitive, more likely to move to
outrage, with the suggestion that he is a waffler, a hypocrite, than
against the blanket charge he is a radical. Indeed, his campaigns
have shown that he is extremely effective in combating the charge
that he is a "radical''; he has been at his most effective against the
straight-on smear attack and his worst defeat -- to Karl Mundt --
came when his zealotry and hatred of Karl Mundt got the better of him.

This analysis of McGovern's character reinforces my belief that
our best attack against him is not the heavy-handed direct charge
that he is a radical and extremist, not a shouting denunciatory
approach -- but repeatedly elevating his wild positions, his slanderous
statements about the President, and suggesting and pointing to his
radicalism and extremism without raging against it. No meat ax;
the scalpel is to be preferred.
Keep his positions and statements in front of the public, but a posture of humor, of incredulity about the wildness of his positions, of indignation and justified anger at the character of his slanders of the President and other decent, good men will, in my view, be far more effective than for us to think up another new way to call McGovern a jackass every morning. What McGovern the radical has going for him is something which Jim Buckley had going for him -- when you look at the guy on the tube and listen to him, it is hard to accept him as a radical. We have the media which will be helping him clean up his past for this election; and our job is to consistently, and insistently, get that past on the public record -- and make McGovern defend or talk about that record and, hopefully, hysterically denounce us as SOBs, which his sense of moral worth and righteousness is fully capable of leading him to do.

WAR HERO -- Look for Guggenheim, his documentary man, and his ad campaign, and his statements, to appeal to his lost constituency by focusing heavily upon his war record as a bomber pilot; and one will find, I would think, that the national media will help out with regular reminders that George McGovern was a medal-winning bomber pilot in the war against Nazi Germany, and thus can hardly be considered a woolly-headed peacenik. McGovern has expressed consternation that the press was constantly referring to "War Hero McCloskey" and not to "War Hero McGovern." Their documentary also focuses heavily on his war record.
TO: DFOS: DWIGHT CHAPIN

FYI____ PLEASE HANDLE____

OTHER:

[Handwritten notation: Eyes only to [Signature]
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quintessence of the pragmatist.

His weakness is, again the weakness of Romney -- he is, not
unlikely to state and re-state his convictions about RN being like
Hitler, when pressed on the question, rather than backing off. In
a pressure situation, he will fall back upon the "Gospel" of the
left, rather than frame some non-committal neutral response.
Very probably, he will be more sensitive, more likely to move to
outrage, with the suggestion that he is a waffler, a hypocrite, than
against the blanket charge he is a radical. Indeed, his campaigns
have shown that he is extremely effective in combating the charge
that he is a "radical"; he has been at his most effective against the
straight-on smear attack and his worst defeat -- to Karl Mundt --
came when his zealotry and hatred of Karl Mundt got the better of him.

This analysis of McGovern's character reinforces my belief that
our best attack against him is not the heavy-handed direct charge
that he is a radical and extremist, not a shouting denunciatory
approach -- but repeatedly elevating his wild positions, his slanderous
statements about the President, and suggesting and pointing to his
radicalism and extremism without raging against it. No meat ax;
the scalpel is to be preferred.
Keep his positions and statements in front of the public, but a posture of humor, of incredulity about the wildness of his positions, of indignation and justified anger at the character of his slanders of the President and other decent, good men will, in my view, be far more effective than for us to think up another new way to call McGovern a jackass every morning. What McGovern the radical has going for him is something which Jim Buckley had going for him -- when you look at the guy on the tube and listen to him, it is hard to accept him as a radical. We have the media which will be helping him clean up his past for this election; and our job is to consistently, and insistently, get that past on the public record -- and make McGovern defend or talk about that record and, hopefully, hysterically denounce us as SOBs, which his sense of moral worth and righteousness is fully capable of leading him to do.

WAR HERO -- Look for Guggenheim, his documentary man, and his ad campaign, and his statements, to appeal to his lost constituency by focusing heavily upon his war record as a bomber pilot; and one will find, I would think, that the national media will help out with regular reminders that George McGovern was a medal-winning bomber pilot in the war against Nazi Germany, and thus can hardly be considered a woolly-headed peacenik. McGovern has expressed consternation that the press was constantly referring to "War Hero McCloskey" and not to "War Hero McGovern." Their documentary also focuses heavily on his war record.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT (THRU HRH)

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

Observations from a study of the McGovern primary ads, TV, radio and press -- and the interesting McGovern biography.

Points worth noting:

1. Despite the ideological liberalism of Mr. McGovern, there is a clear conservative thrust to many of his issues ads -- particularly those for "cleaning up the welfare mess," and relieving the property tax burden on the average citizen. The McGovern proposals to increase the welfare payments and rolls, and the manifest inconsistency in proposing $150 billion in new spending -- while appearing to be for a reduction in and redistribution of the tax burden are not present in these ads. Further, late in the primaries, his new "hard-line" on Israel was a major topic of his advertising. Could find nothing in the way of elitist, new left ad themes in McGovern's primary campaign. Amnesty, abortion, pot, soak-the-rich, slash defense, $1000-a-person were clearly not major themes. There are, however, several old-liberal approaches which he has pushed in his advertising. These include:

   a) Social Security benefits beginning at 62 years of age -- a straight shot appeal to old folks, along traditional liberal Democratic lines.

   b) An interesting emphasis on "occupational health and safety." For example, a number of TV spots focusing on how workers were losing life and limb in unsafe plants, and this was a serious problem. Imagine this approach to be one with great appeal where McGovern is weak -- among production workers.
c) Medical care for everyone. This is one of the positive "liberal" programs, which McGovern emphasized in the primaries. Again, it is traditional Scammon-Wattenburg economic liberalism. Again, there is hardly a trace of what one might call social liberalism, or "radical chic" politics in the McGovern advertising campaign. And, clearly, our people should never cease making references to his "elitist" "radical chic" positions -- and focus on them, rather than leaving the debate to resolve around his more traditional "liberal" approaches.

d) A relatively hard-nosed approach on drugs.

OTHER APPROACHES

The KENNEDYS -- Mr. McGovern is clearly running on the coattails of two dead men, John and Robert Kennedy; his documentary is almost a Kennedy Documentary; his TV and radio spots make extensive use of the Kennedy endorsements of George McGovern as the "most decent man in the Senate." We can expect much of this in the fall.

PERSONALITY -- McGovern's campaign consistently contrasts Mr. McGovern as an honest, open, straight-forward, candid, consistent candidate -- with Mr. Nixon's Administration, which is portrayed as deceitful, closed, secretive, distrustful. This is clearly in the McGovern campaign judgment a winner for them -- and a loser for us. They focus upon the "personality" of the two candidates and the two campaigns, as much as upon any two issues. The need for us, again, in my judgment, is to move early to get out the record of both the McGovern waffles on positions, that McGovern compromises on principles, McGovern's nasty and vindictive attacks upon the President and his political adversaries. The press, which nails Mr. Agnew to the mast for his rugged rhetoric has allowed Mr. McGovern to get away with some of the more incredible statements in American politics. We have Mr. McGovern's cruel and nasty statements recorded, but these, along with his waffles and back-downs, have to be moved into the public record. As with Mr. Muskie, one of our problems is to contradict this idea that, whether you agree or disagree with McGovern, you "know where he stands," and you know he can be trusted.
Other attributes the McGovern camp is playing up are such as "warmth, humanity, sympathy, compassion," and they are attempting to contrast them with a cold-blooded, super-efficient, rather heartless White House and President. Such as RN's visit to the flood-stricken areas of the country is most helpful as an antidote to this kind of approach. We could do more of the last.

Also, an openness, and a new accessibility to the press and public on the part of the President might, in my view, be helpful in working against this "inaccessibility" allegation that is part of the McGovern mode.

ISRAEL -- McGovern's extraordinary sensitivity on this issue is manifest in the 180-degree turnabout on the issue, and the astonishing hawkishness of his latest ads. He is vulnerable here; and the lesson is obvious that we ought to continue to focus upon his opposition to the Eisenhower Doctrine, to measures to promote Israeli security, etc. He is vulnerable here; and aware of it.

POPULISM -- While "Professor McGovern" is a representative of the "outs" against the "ins," the fighter against the "interests" for the common man who bears too much of the burden, while powerful corporations and institutions get off without paying their fair share. The clear need is, as stated in previous memos, to portray McGovern as a Candidate of the Elite, "Professor McGovern," the leader of the party of the Pids. and limousine liberals, whose elitist shock troops took over the party of the people, the "noise-makers" and the "exotic," the tiny minority who are imposing an asinine social policy of bussing on a country, eight-five percent of whose people do not want bussing.

There are few larger imperatives in our campaign than to move McGovern into the position of the Establishment Candidate -- running against the candidate of Middle America. Crucial to our success this fall is to put McGovern in the bag with the "radical chic" and this message it seems to me, has to be impressed upon our speakers. If we allow him to be perceived as his ads, and previous campaigns portray him, we could have a serious problem.
VIETNAM -- McGovern's approach is that he is the one man in the country, who has been "right from the start," about this miserable, horrible war. This should be confronted, not ignored, and surely, not conceded. These are three basic approaches, some of them not complementary, if not consistent:

a) McGovern has been a waffler on the war; he voted for the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964, against its repeal in 1966, for appropriations for the conflict throughout the early and mid-sixties, and only voted to get out -- after a Republican had come in to clean up the mess McGovern's Presidential choices (JFK, LBJ, HHH) had made of the situation. His bitter attacks on RN thus come not from principle but from the effort to pick up partisan dividends from undercutting an American President trying to get us out of a war into which he voted us.

b) McGovern has repeatedly made predictions as to what the enemy would do if we made concessions -- and every single McGovern promise and prediction has been wrong. Nobody had a worse record on Vietnam in terms of understanding the enemy than McGovern.

c) McGovern's attacks on the President who is now honorably ending American involvement in this war are not something to be proud of -- they rank among the most shameful episodes in American history. While President Nixon sought courageously to extricate America from this conflict -- with his two objectives, American honor intact, and our commitment not defaulted -- McGovern badgered and sabotaged this courageous effort every step of the way.

Again, our people should not concede the war is immoral, should not concede that McGovern was right, but we are right too, and we are trying to end it as best we can. We should challenge him on this issue, on many grounds. We should confront his claim - not co-opt it, by saying: "Well, we are against the war, too, and we are trying to do our best to end it."

McGovern should be conceded nothing on Vietnam. He is a back-stabber who would go "begging" to Hanoi -- and abandon our prisoners to the enemy, without any guarantee we would ever get them back. We should view his positions, not with disagreement, but with contempt.
THE STRENGTH & WEAKNESS OF GEORGE MCGOVERN THE MAN --
From reading McGovern, a most interesting and sympathetic biography, and observing the man, the following becomes clear. McGovern's great strength and great weakness lies in his personality; he is a minister in his own right and a minister's son; he is a True Believer, his is the "Passionate State of Mind;" he sees issues in moral terms, not simply mistaken versus wise, but evil versus good. At the same time he is extraordinarily ambitious -- unlike Goldwater. Frankly, he bears striking similarities to our present Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Mr. Romney. Thus it is that McGovern can both shift positions and express a righteous faith in his new position to match his faith and fanaticism in expressing his old.

Thus, it is that McGovern can compare RN with Hitler and his bombing policy with extermination of the Jews -- and still believe in his own mind that Mr. Agnew is the "demagogue" who says horrible things. McGovern's self-righteousness can be a great strength -- he has a preacher's appeal; against us his is the appeal of a man who believes deeply in a "faith" against the man who is the quintessence of the pragmatist.

His weakness is, again the weakness of Romney -- he is, not unlikely to state and re-state his convictions about RN being like Hitler, when pressed on the question, rather than backing off. In a pressure situation, he will fall back upon the "Gospel" of the left, rather than frame some non-committal neutral response. Very probably, he will be more sensitive, more likely to move to outrage, with the suggestion that he is a waffler, a hypocrite, than against the blanket charge he is a radical. Indeed, his campaigns have shown that he is extremely effective in combating the charge that he is a "radical": he has been at his most effective against the straight-on smear attack and his worst defeat -- to Karl Mundt -- came when his zealotry and hatred of Karl Mundt got the better of him.

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Buchanan
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT (Per HRH)

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

At HRH's request, some thoughts on 1968 and 1960.

First, it is imprecise to say that "in 1968 there was a substantial decline during the campaign." (If there is a single hallmark of RN's runs against both JFK and HHH it is the remarkable stability of the Nixon vote from August through November.) The President did not so much lose votes from August to November of 1968 -- as we lost a historic opportunity, the "lost landslide" as someone has referred to it. While we failed to edge upwards in the slightest, Humphrey closed a 13 point gap. What were the reasons for this?

A) Some of the HHH gains were inevitable; the Democratic candidate, if he performed reasonably well, was simply going to win back some of the traditional Democratic vote, horrified at the Chicago convention, but not a Nixon voter at heart.

B) We failed utterly to pick up the Wallace defectors in the North, who slipped away from Wallace through Nixon, back to HHH. This return to HHH is partly due to the efforts of the AFL-CIO, probably partly due to RN's "anti-union" image from the fifties, partly due to our own short-comings. (Incidentally, we are in better and the Democratic Left in worse shape with these voters than in 1968; our opportunity is renewed.)

The startling thing about the Gallup Poll, 1968, is the almost precise correlation between the Humphrey rise and the Wallace fall in the polls. Wallace, too, by holding onto Southern votes and Southern states which surely might have been ours, had a hand in preventing the "landslide" that might have been.
But, in my judgment, our own campaign had serious short-comings in 1968. Basically, they were these:

a) A lack of flexibility. We established a game plan, and followed it through, although by early October, it should have been evident that we were losing the interest of the press and the country as well. The hoopla campaign -- to demonstrate RN had the kind of enthusiasm and unity HHH did not, was ideal for September. It was not for October.

Once Humphrey made his Salt Lake City speech, the President should have, in my judgment, attacked him directly and vigorously, to force back the split in the Democratic Party between the pro-bombing and the anti-bombing forces who had fought at the convention and who were yet at sword's point. We let HHH off the hook on this. By so doing, he got off of that petard and went over onto the attack.

On the attack, he began to move, to make new and different charges, to attract interest.

b) The President in the fall campaign of 1968 was plagued by the identical problem he had in the fall campaign of 1960. A Hostile Press. Teddy White testifies to this in 1960 and Miss Efron in 1968. In addition, I have on personal knowledge that a group of 19 Washington press types who had divided 10-9 pro-RN in September, were 18-1 pro-HHH at election time.

What explains the bad press? We are partly at fault I believe. We shut down communication with them -- compared with the primaries where we got good press. We also, because of circumstances, were maneuvered into the upper-dog position. We were the more conservative of the two leading candidates. We did not deviate from the set-speech-Man-in-the-Arena-handout routine sufficiently to attract their on-going attention or interest. They were more concerned with reporting a breaking story, The Humphrey Comeback, which was exciting news, than the RN Radio Speeches, which with few exceptions only got a stick of type or two. Our personal relations with the traveling press deteriorated from the campaign, partly due to the "size" of the corps, the natural hostility of liberals, and our natural antipathy toward them which was coming through late in the game.
c) But, rather than strict comparison of 1960 and 1968, which may or may not be useful, and rather than belabor the shortcomings of the various campaign, which are many -- but which are as well countered-balanced by the right decisions, let me rather enumerate those dangers which lurk for us, in my view, in 1972 -- based on the campaigns presidential of the last 12 years. What we face in my view is:

THE DANGERS OF 1968 & THE OPPORTUNITY OF 1964

If McGovern is nominated, in my judgment:

1) We must place him on the defensive from the outset, and not let him off of it until November. In our 1968 and 1970 campaign, we did this for the first three weeks -- then either HHH "got well" on Vietnam, or the liberals "got well" on "law and order," and our issue hand had been played. Again, we have enough on McGovern to keep him on the defensive throughout the fall -- we ought not to blast it out of the cannon at once; our speakers should be on the attack.

2) We have to maintain a flexibility that I do not believe existed in 1968, and from what I read did not exist in 1960. As Ike said, "planning is essential; plans are worthless." We should have a mapped-out game plan before the campaign starts -- both for attack on the Opposition, and for presentation of the candidate, but there should be a "Review Committee" to look over that plan, and over our media at least once a week.

3) While we should rule out the President -- for the time being -- on the Attack Role; I would not rule out a Presidential address to the country, splitting RN off from McGovern on the issues, right now.

4) We should have ourselves a strategy meeting on dealing with the press and media between now and November. In my view, we have discredited them for the bias of which they are guilty for three years -- indeed, public confidence in their performance is on the decline. But should there be a "detente" between the White House and national press corps between now and November? While I am more than willing to carry my hod in a campaign to discredit the national media as pro-McGovern, would such a campaign be in our interest, at this point in time. This is something which should not be determined ad hoc -- because in my view a hostile media is one of the prime reasons why RN's presidential campaigns have never seen him rise in the national polls by a single cubit.
5) We should keep in mind that it was not LBJ’s performance and personality which won him 60% of the vote -- it was the portrayal of Goldwater as an extremist, which frightened even Republicans.

In my view, given the antipathy of the national media, and the smallness of the GOP, there is no way we could conceivably do better than a 54-46 victory over a centrist, popular Democrat with a united party. Against a divided Democratic Party, however, with a candidate who is far out on the issues, with a press that is less concerned with their antipathy toward RN than with the wild schemes of his opponent, we could go up to 58 to 60 percent.

Thus -- it will not be how wonderful we are, but how terrible McGovern is -- that will make the difference this fall between a respectable clear victory, and a Nixon landslide. Seems to me vital that we keep this in mind.

To get that good media, we should confront McGovern on the "issues," clearly; we should be almost generous to him personally; we should deliberately avoid any nasty, smear attacks. We have enough on the record to hang the guy -- what we have to avoid at all costs are such media-negatives as the 1970 "ads" and the 1972 Watergate Caper, which they are trying to hang around our necks. We should hammer the issues and his positions-- and let McGovern come off as the "name-caller."

6) One great concern of mine is the "Humphrey Phenomenon" -- of McGovern, if nominated, being case into the role of "under-dog" "anti-Establishment," "come-from-behind" candidate -- whose campaign will provide one hell of a good deal more media interest and human interest than ours.

We should have some real-life "drama" in store for this fall -- to attract national attention. We should, in a pleasant enough way, but unmistakably make this the campaign of Richard Nixon and the Average Man against the Establishment and the Radical Chic.

Goldwater was kept on the bottom through his own and his campaign shortcomings -- and through the media. Again, how the media handles this will determine much. The media could treat McGovern like Goldwater, or they could make him into an inept, but good "under-dog" like IIIH! -- in which event, they could make a run out of it.
7) As for the suggestion that RN go out and do more, a la 1960, I would say, no -- if that means "political campaigning." However Richard Nixon on the move as President, yes; and Richard Nixon in action in the White House, as President, yes; and Richard Nixon addressing the nation -- for fifteen minutes as President, to strike a contrast with McGovern, yes. But not the stump-speaking. RN as President is a far more effective campaigner than RN as campaigner.

8) Scheduling. This campaign, unlike 1968, we should schedule RN into the "undecided" arenas, union halls, Columbus Day activities, Knights of Columbus meetings, etc. We should keep in mind that there is only -- at most -- 20 percent of the electorate that will decide this, not who wins, but whether or not it is a landslide, and quite frankly, that 20 percent is not a principally Republican vote. Perhaps RN has to make appearance at GOP rallies -- but when he does, he is not going where the ducks are. In a McGovern race the ducks are suddenly in city areas of the North we never carried before.

9) Perhaps this has been repeated before -- but again, of maximum importance is that we not convince the media to make McGovern a picked-on under-dog, by name-calling. We have to massively confront him with his positions, and if we need any characterization -- we can take that from the Democrats. Regrettably, the media does not allow us the same latitude in name-calling it will give McGovern who has already charged the Administration with "racism" Hitler-like conduct and war-mongering.

Buchanan
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MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALEMAN
CLARK MAC GREGOR

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
KEN KHACHIGIAN

This memo deals with strategy thoughts strictly for the period between the conventions.

DISSAINTED DEMOCRATS

This is the first priority. No sooner should the dust have settled from the Democratic Convention (a few days following, perhaps) than a National Democrats for Nixon should be formed publicly to serve as an "umbrella" for all of the less bold fence-straddlers to join. We should move fast on the Democrats, post Miami Beach, as they will be most vulnerable immediately following the convention. If we have a number of Democrats already locked in, to either abandon their ticket, or bolt the party -- we should trickle these out, state-by-state -- not drop them all at once.

In our judgment, if we have a choice it is far better for Democrats to stay in their party, and denounce McGovern -- than to switch parties now.

Elitism and extremism in the Democratic Party should form the basis of the abandonment of McGovern -- followed by support and endorsement of RN. But, in my view, the former is the more important news story.

Also, if a figure is immensely prominent, his departure should be for national television. But someone like Mills Godwin should have done it from a platform in Richmond.
In addition, we should focus upon and publish not simply the major names, but the minor ones -- state legislators and the like -- and publish those names in ads in the "swing states" especially. The purpose is to leave the impression of massive defections, not just major ones, from the Democratic Ticket. We should be working on these people right now -- all over the various swing states.

Sometime during the campaign, this fall, we need a national press conference, and a national mailing to all political writers etc. listing the hundreds of Democratic party officials who have publicly abandoned the McGovern ticket. The idea, of course, is to create a stampede so that the fence-straddlers and others who might want to hang in there will at the least be publicly disassociating themselves from McGovern.

Also, in this time, GOPers running for State Legislature, Governor, Senator, Congressmen, should be instructed to force their opponents to take a stand for or against McGovern and his positions. (This might well involve mailing a copy of the McGovern Assault Book to every GOP candidate, with instructions on how to use it).

THE SHAFTING OF WALLACE

If this is a credible argument, it should be made intensively by our people. That Wallace who had more votes than any other candidate, before California, was stripped of delegates and dignity by the radicals at Miami. That the convention which was supposed to be "democratic" ended up stealing his delegates, and denying him the rightful claim to a voice in the platform. The Party is highly unlikely to buy the Wallace positions as announced today on national TV; we should go directly to these voters -- and the GOP Platform should mirror some of the Governor's concerns. On matters of defense, bussing, welfare, responsiveness of government, etc. this should not be difficult.

RNC should be collecting assiduously all of the negative statements by Wallace people about their treatment at Miami and about the Democratic Platform; we already have some excellent ones that will go into the Briefing Book.
CONVENTION

The theme, "If they can't unite their party, how can they unite the country; if they can't even run an orderly convention, how can they run the United States," the same one used in 1968 is a natural.

THE MCGOVERN SMEAR

Again, clearly the McGovern answer to any and all attacks will be to charge the "Old Nixon" with his "smear" tactics. The response to Stein demonstrated this. We will have five or six of the most egregious McGovern attacks listed -- and out to all speakers, with a short memo by convention's end -- if McGovern is nominated. At that point we ought to elevate all of these horrible statements, and demand to know if McGovern intends to campaign on the issues -- or to continue in this vein of comparing RN with Hitler, calling his Administration "racist" etc. McGovern is still being allowed to get away with being "the most decent man in the Senate" and his rhetoric has been the wildest of any man in recent political history.

THE ESTABLISHMENT THEME

We ought to set this early that McGovern is not the candidate of the people, but of a small elite, of New Leftists, the elitist children, etc. Again, this impression should be made early in the campaign, before many voters have made their minds up. McGovern theme is certain to be to make himself the "candidate of the people" against the "candidate of the politicians," i.e. us. We have to get in early with this elitist idea; we have to capture the anti-Establishment theme early.

Again, my great concern is that McGovern may successfully establish himself as underdog, anti-Establishment, "out" candidate. Our speaking resources, early, should be directed to thrusting us into the position of the candidate of the common man, in the titanic struggle with the power of the Eastern Establishment.
THE WAFFLER

Again, another strength of McGovern's which will necessarily be weakened post-convention is his reputation for "candor, honesty," "you know where he stands," nonsense. He will start moving, he already is moving on the issues right now -- and there is no contradiction between nailing him with his $1000 giveaway program one day, and denouncing him for "trimming" by abandoning it the next. For McGovern, movement in and of itself can be damaging -- because his whole campaign program is "Right from the Start." We should nail every shift, every movement -- and nail that "Right from the Start," right from the start.

Buchanan

Note: Have read the McGovern Book in part and analyzed his ads to a degree, and will have some followup thoughts on the "character" of McGovern -- and where he is investing his resources, what issues, what personality traits.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN
SUBJECT: McGovern Problems with Party Regulars (News Summary Note)

Cronkite is right. The McGovern camp is divided between True Believers and Pragmatists; the former of whom would be distraught with a McGovern "deal" to save the Daley delegation, for example. The True Believers are not unlike the Goldwaterites in the galleries at the Cow Palace, who gave Rocky the treatment before a national audience, while Cliff White and the others on the floor were holding their people to a respectful silence.

The Pragmatists in McGovern's camp, however, are themselves divided, essentially over the question of what course to follow:

A) Stay on his positions, with little fudging, thus running against the President as a truthful, honest, candid, far-reaching reformer, who does not back off what he believes. (By doing this, he will force some Democrats to bolt).

B) Or move to the center, right in the public glare, by "embracing" a Democratic Platform more moderate than his own on welfare, taxes, defense, etc.

Manckiewicz and some of the others who are pragmatists apparently feel that the pragmatic thing to do is to stand fast -- to try to win not on coalition politics, but win on the undiluted Prairie Populism approach, which keeps the True Believers happy.

On the challenge at the convention, however, all of McGovern's pragmatists wish they would go away. They don't want Dick Daley kicked out of the Convention; they are not supporting the challenges openly; though it is inevitably their people (Jesse Jackson & Co.) who are carrying out purges.

The point of the matter is that right now, McGovern does not control his delegates, the way Cliff White and the others could control the Goldwater delegates. They are "issues" people, many of them, who
are women's lib, pro-abortion, anti-war, etc. types first, and McGovern delegates second. They are for McGovern because of his stand on these issues, not for the issues -- because McGovern is for them. Their first loyalty is, in many cases, not to form a coalition that can win -- but to guarantee the success of the particular and independent causes in which they are working. Some of them are using McGovern as a vehicle for the advancement of their own objectives, which McGovern's best interest may or may not dictate at this point in time.

And if McGovern tries to turn them off, they will raise hell publicly; and if he does not -- and lets the purges and challenges run amok -- he risks the outrage and alienation of the party regulars, because it is his animals raising hell in the cage.

Buchanan will be astonished, and we will be in for some difficulty, if those gay lib, women's lib, black militant, etc. types -- all of them camera hogs -- do not raise hell if they do not get their way at Miami Beach. At this point, it seems to me impossible for the Democrats to quietly reconcile the basic differences they have -- and highly improbable that the resulting internecine war can be kept off the television cameras.

Some of the preliminary caucuses promise exciting events for Miami.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE STAFF SECRETARY
FROM: CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT: Action Memorandum #P-2105
Democratic Convention

Request

It was requested in Presidential Action Memorandum P-2105 to comment on a comment noted in the June 23 News Summary by Walter Cronkite as to McGovern's position on the Democratic Convention.

Response

I think Cronkite's point was absolutely accurate. It is a thesis that I have also been arguing. McGovern is in a very difficult position. The left forgives him moving to the center; the conservative regulars in the Democratic Party, the Meanys and the Daleys, etc., really do not trust him and will not believe him if he does shift positions. Moreover, he is beginning now to get some pressure from the left as he did in the Wicker column this week, challenging his credibility and in effect making it harder for him to shift.

The fact that he now controls the Platform Committee -- and that has been made public -- puts him in an extremely difficult position. If the platform comes out in moderate terms, he can be held accountable for the "sell-out"; if it comes out as a radical platform, we will call it the McGovern Platform. Either way he will try not to accept responsibility for it but he should be vulnerable to one side or the other.

Most of the press analyses that suggest that McGovern will clean himself up have been predicated on the fact that he can embrace a moderate platform and that is his excuse for moving to the center. He may no longer use that excuse, however, since he controls the Platform Committee.
Indeed, as Cronkite pointed out, the rules and credential fights also will be within his control. He can hardly avoid being held accountable for actions of the delegates and it is almost impossible for him to avoid taking sides himself. I don't think that Cronkite was simply trying to build suspense; I think he was reporting one of the toughest problems McGovern has.
The June 23 News Summary had the following note on the Democratic Convention:

-- CBS had half-hour special (4:30-5:00) on Dem pre-convention hearings. McG seems well on his way, said Cronkite, but ahead lies a booby trap -- the rules, credential, and platform hearings. If McG extremists crowd out regulars and take extreme position it'll confirm worst fears of his opposition, said Walter, and it could even drive away supporters. If he sides with his backers, he'll risk alienating center and right, but if he backs the regulars in the interest of party harmony, he'll risk alienating his supporters. --

Referring to the above, the question was raised as to whether this was really a possibility or just a way to keep interest up.

Please forward your response to the Office of the Staff Secretary by close of business, Monday, June 26.

cc: H.R. Haldeman
Alexander P. Butterfield
Patrick Buchanan
Last week or so, Mills Godwin, a respected former Governor of Virginia, announced that he could not support McGovern & Co., and was going for Nixon in November. That was good news, but terrible timing. Godwin got a nice little spread in the "metro" section of the local paper. If we have lined up, or know of, Democrats about to bolt to RN -- they should be called upon to hold until after the Convention, when it becomes major political news in terms of November, and then to do so, with Maximum Fanfare in their State Capitals. Also, this is probably being done, but we should orchestrate them, so that they fall sequentially, one or two major figures a week -- and then on a regular basis, the RNC or Re-Election Committee can send out a release listing major national Democrats who cannot support the "extremism" of McGovern. Muskie did most things badly, but one thing he did extraordinarily well was to drop the endorsements he had lined up with the kind of skill that made it appear opposition to him was hopeless. The fellow looked like he was filling up a straight, with ease, only to turn over nothing on the last card. But the buildup was impressive; and we should orchestrate similarly.