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<td>From Patrick J. Buchanan to The President. RE: The month-by-month Gallup Poll figures for the 14-month time frame from October 1970 to December 1971. 6 pgs.</td>
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<td>From Patrick J. Buchanan to Haldeman. RE: The Campaign Strategy sessions, and the need to focus on theme, form, media, and approach. 4 pgs.</td>
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Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents

Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 299

Folder: [Campaign Strategy Memos from Buchanan 1 of 2]

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

Observe (page 2) the month-by-month Gallup Poll figures for the 14-month time frame from October 1970 to December 1971. Some interesting conclusions emerge; some grave political questions arise; and some thoughts on What's To Be Done follow.

1. First Conclusion: It was not the President's campaigning itself in 1970 that cost him public support -- as the media has reported. Rather, it was the media depiction of that campaign -- well after it was over -- that, subsequently, convinced the American people we had run an "un-presidential" campaign in 1970. The polls bring us proof positive. One week after the 1970 election was already over, the President still stood at 57 percent in the national poll. It was not until December -- after the national press corps had been working us over relentlessly for a month as "dirty campaigners" and "big losers" -- that the President's approval rating dipped.

Fair to conclude in my opinion that if the media had written that the returns were a "wash," and that the President conducted a vigorous, tough but fair effort on behalf of his party -- we would have taken no dip at all in the national polls following the election. It was the media construction of the President's campaign then, not the campaign itself, which cost us support.

2. Despite the tremendous pounding we took in the final months of 1970, for the campaign of that year, the President bounced back in January to a fair high level of 56 percent support -- before the State of the Union and the hoopla of the New American Revolution. Apparently the NAR and the SOTU accomplished "zero" for us -- because in the period following, we actually dropped five points, or ten percent of our support. So much for the greatest document since the Constitution.

(Possible explanation of the "dramatic drop" in February is the Laotian invasion by ARVN which received the worst media of any Administration-supported exercise since taking office. This February 19-21 poll was taken, as I recall, just about the time the ARVN was "coming out on the skids.")
NIXON'S POPULARITY SINCE
OCTOBER 1970

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<tr>
<th>(1971)</th>
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<tr>
<td>December 10 - 13</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>14%</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 29 - November 1</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 8 - 11</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>49</td>
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<td>January 9 - 10</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>33</td>
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(1970)

| December 5 - 7  | 52      | 34         | 14         |
| November 14 - 16| 57      | 30         | 13         |
| October 9 - 13  | 58      | 27         | 15         |
3. Through the spring, there seems to be no change in our position that could not be written off as simply statistical margin of error. We hovered right around 50 percent for six months.

Further, the now famous "Nixon Shocks" of July (the China trip) and August (the economic bombshell) hardly even registered on the Gallup Seismograph. There are two polls on here, taken in August after the second of the "shocks" and neither of them notes any tremor of public opinion rolling in the President's direction. Between the end of August and the first two weeks of October, the President -- I know not what the reason -- suddenly shot up five points. However, this disappeared in two weeks, and even after the President's Phase II announcement we did not rise in the polls.

4. A crucial point. At the close of a calendar year (1971) in which the President dominated all the news, put on a virtuoso performance, by most everyone's standards, and closed out the twelve months by being Time's and everybody else's Man of the Year the President could find himself between 6 and 9 points lower in public esteem than he was at the end of a year that is considered his worst.

While in the media, and among press and TV types RN may had had a banner year, in fact, during 1971 he suddenly dropped between seven and nine points (10-18%) of his support among the American people -- and had not regained it by December of 1971.

5. All the Euphoria about the President's re-election chances within the building, and all the press clippings about the President being almost unbeatable in 1972 thus, in inspection, seems to me to have been made out of thin air. Supposedly, we were frustrated at every turn in 1970, and humiliated in that election -- but in three of the four polls at the end of that year, we were seven to nine points above where we were at the end of this year.

The opening of the New Year is thus not a time for self-congratulation on our part, but a time for mild alarm and some serious soul-searching.

While these conclusions seem justified, they are surely frustrating as hell. One wonders just what it is the President has to do to nudge himself back up to, say, 60 percent approval with the American people.

It would appear "bold decisions" have no impact or at least no enduring impact on how the American people view their President. However, one cannot but wonder where we would have been in the national polls without them. Did they make any difference? From these polls, one cannot really say that they did.
A NOT UNPROBABLY SCENARIO

For some months now, PJB has been inundating the West Wing and elsewhere with a blizzard of memoranda, warning about the possibility of a Muskie sweep of the primaries and promenade to the nomination. What was possible before seems probable to me now -- and only the Florida Primary stands in the way of the unpleasant scenario outlined below:

Today, according to Harris, Muskie runs head-to-head with the President. Should Muskie roll up the primaries, defeat left, center and right opposition, remove all doubt that he is the party choice, roll into a Democratic convention, win on the first ballot, stick John Lindsay on the ticket to excite young, poor and black -- he could march out of that convention into a hailstorm of TV and press publicity that could give him a five-point lead over the President by mid-July 1972. That to me is not out of the question.

BUCHANAN'S THEORY OF POLLS

The Great Question is why -- after a year of dramatic activity on the President's part, of unrivaled success as judged by friend and foe alike, of bold new initiatives -- why the hell is RN at least half a dozen points below where he was at the end of a year, where most observers said he was frustrated and defeated at every turn.

One possibility is that the American people, like all people, get bored with their Presidents, in this day of intense media, and every President is going to suffer an inexorable decline in popularity and support year by year, no matter what the hell he does. If this is valid and I don't know that it is not, then a posture of fatalism about 1972 is justified.

But my own theory is this:

While announcements or pageantry, dramatic bold decisions, and traveling Presidents may win the approval of the people, as registered in the polls, they do not win the standing ovation; they do not win the new converts that we quite evidently need.

Perhaps what the President needs to regain lost strength in the polls is not drama (the China trip) not new initiatives (the New American Revolution), not bold decisions (the economic program), and not even "steady solid performance." Perhaps what is needed is an end to the era of calm presidential leadership and success, and the beginning of a "new era of conflict and crisis" for the President of the United States.
One recalls that the President rated highest with the American people when he was fighting for the survival of the Presidency in November of 1969, against media and demonstrators alike. The HEW veto, with the stroke of the pen, did not lose the President's support; the people hailed it. The Vice President was in deep trouble -- until he turned on his critics, and started stomping on them, instead of trying to show them he was not a bad fellow.

**THE EMBATTLED PRESIDENT**

What I am suggesting is that the President, with value added taxes and revenue sharing and welfare reform and pay boards and price commissions, may be possibly boring the American people.

While I understand that the "Professional President" is being sold to RN as the posture for the campaign, perhaps we ought to consider instead the "Embattled President."

The times when the American people truly sit up and take notice of a President is when he is in a fight, when he is under fire. On such occasions, with a President in full cry, taking after his adversaries, in a great battle, there is the kind of drama and excitement which can stir up the interest and imagination of an American people whose senses are somewhat dulled. I am not talking about a "war against inflation" or a "war against crime" or a "war against red tape or bureaucracy" -- but rather a Presidential duel in the Kennedy versus Big Steel tradition -- a political struggle against a despised enemy, who is flesh and blood opposition.

They say of the poor miserable people of the subcontinent that the only times they have been truly happy in the last decade was when they were at war with one another, butchering each other by the tens of thousands. This has provided them with the only exciting diversion from an otherwise impoverished, indeed intolerable existence.

Maybe the American people, who have made pro football the greatest spectator sport in history, are bored with revenue sharing and pay boards and price commissions and welfare reform and environmental "programs;" maybe they would like to see a good fight.

Looking back over the Presidents of the Twentieth Century, seems to me they are remembered by the common man, for the great battles they engaged in: Teddy Roosevelt, "The Trust Buster," Woodrow Wilson, fighting for the League, FDR, the scourge of "Wall Street" and the "Moneychangers in the Temple," Harry "Give 'em Hell" Truman, and the "no good, do-nothing Eightieth Congress."
This is not to suggest that the President move off the Presidential pedestal, that he engage in partisan combat, or look around for a war to start, political or otherwise.

What I am suggesting is that the avoidance of controversy, and conflict, with our primary adversaries may be politically wrong -- not politically advantageous. Had the High Court disallowed the Amchitka blast, and had the President told them twelve hours later to go to hell and fired off the bomb anyhow, that would have been the kind of dramatic institutional challenge, that would have awakened the country and gotten them on their feet cheering.

In short, while the President as President is the best posture for the coming year; we may very well need to consider Great Issues, contested questions, where the President can, as President, throw down the gauntlet to Foreign Relations, to Congress, to the Court, to some massive powerful institution, so that RN will go into 1972 as a Fighting President, not the Professional Managerial President. We might need to cast the President in a role that not only merits respect and quiet applause, but one that excites people to stand up and cheer, and excites the partisans to go out and fight, bleed and die.

This is not so much an ideological thing, as it is something within the spirit of the American people, who love a good fight. Perhaps we ought to consider the issues, where we can give them that fight, where the President can draw the line, and draw the sword, and charge into battle on behalf of the best interests of the Republic. Better a howling press and high polls, than a quiescent somnolent press and low polls.

Buchanan
Democratic friend and foe alike will admit in private that the bloom is off the rose of the Muskie candidacy. The Maine Senator has waffled on the issues great and small; his personal appearances have left them yawning in the aisles; his jokes and speech delivery make Jim Eastland seem by contrast a charismatic figure; his campaign organization has had more top-level changes in ten months than the Fourth Republic had in the ten years before DeGaulle. His clumsy and conspicuous attempts to woo and appease the ultraliberals and radicals within his own party have won him only their scorn and ridicule -- while disillusioning responsible Democrats by the millions.

His campaign efforts in 1971 could serve as a textbook example of how to go about booting away a sure thing.

Yet, conceding all this, Ed Muskie of Maine is today within an ace of winning a first ballot nomination at Miami Beach.

Only three things stand in his way: One is the Muskie penchant for the self-inflicted political wound. The second is George Corley Wallace. The third is Edward M. Kennedy.

If Muskie does not, between now and spring, commit a series of gaffes of the No-Blacks-Need-Apply-For-Vice-President variety; if George Wallace does not defeat Muskie in Florida and/or North Carolina and Tennessee; if Edward M. Kennedy does not announce his candidacy between the 14th and 23rd of March -- then Edmund Muskie is the Democratic nominee in 1972.
THE TWELVE TURKEYS

Despite a year of waffling and blundering, Muskie is yet in the catbird seat for two reasons. First, because of what happened at Chappaquiddick, Edward Kennedy cannot now step out and oppose him. Second, because, other than Kennedy, the party of FDR, HST and JFK has fielded against Muskie the largest collection of turkeys in a presidential campaign in the twentieth century.

Five of them -- Hughes, Harris, Bayh, Proxmire, and Wilbur Mills -- have already dropped out of the presidential race -- each of them with less than two percent of the national Democratic vote. Still in the race are no fewer than six candidates, -- Chisholm, McGovern, McCarthy, Jackson, Yorty and Lindsey -- not a one of whom has more than six percent of the Democratic rank-and-file behind them; and most of them with far less.

With Kennedy on the sidelines, with Hubert Humphrey on the sidelines, so far as the national Democrats are concerned, the primaries are shaping up like Joe Louis' Bum of the Month Club -- in fast time.

NEW HAMPSHIRE (March 7) -- A Muskie victory is conceded here, the only question is the margin. Should Muskie win less than fifty percent of the vote, it will not advance his candidacy, but raise serious questions about it. Should Mayor Yorty -- with the backing of William Loeb and his Union-Leader -- run second to Muskie, and ahead of McGovern, in New Hampshire, the "David of the Plains" as Senator McGovern likes to be called is going to need mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to even post in Florida.
FLORIDA (March 14) -- Coming off an assured New Hampshire victory (unless that victory is one the press is unimpressed with), Muskie should have momentum coming into this first big-state primary. Given an opposition ranging from Jackson and Yorty on the right, to Humphrey in the center, to Chisholm, McCarthy, Lindsay and McGovern on the left, Muskie should be listed the favorite to win in an inconclusive manner. If he does come off the front-runner -- not a bad bet -- he will have two victories going into Wisconsin, while his opposition will have only defeats.

The fly in the ointment is George Corley Wallace. Should he enter the Florida primary, Wallace could conceivably carry the state, and leave Muskie second, perhaps further down the list in an inconclusive primary.

ILLINOIS (March 21) -- Here, again, the Muskie candidacy should get additional encouragement and acceleration. The Maine Senator, running pledged delegates in the suburbs of Chicago and downstate, has a good chance to carry off a large fraction of the Illinois bloc Mayor Daley customarily is able to deliver to his favorite (EMK this year) at a crucial moment in the primary season for convention.

WISCONSIN (April 4) -- The most critical of the early primaries. Even today, Muskie is conceded a wide lead over all potential rivals. If he comes out of New Hampshire and Florida, with victories he should roll through Wisconsin without great difficulty -- and if that scenario is accurate, they can start printing the Super Bowl tickets April 5.
One Muskie advantage here is that all his opponents in Florida will be on hand again in Wisconsin -- some of them involuntarily -- many of them barely breathing -- all of them dragged in by the mandatory nature of the primary.

But back to Florida for a moment. One of the factors making this primary crucial is that by the time the polls close in Florida, the filing deadlines will have passed for no fewer than thirteen primary states, including Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and Ohio. If Muskie wins in Florida over his menagerie of opponents, and wins in Wisconsin, the likelihood is extremely high that he will romp through those dozen primaries piling up a record that looks like the early season won-lost record of Vida Blue. And the possibility exists that Mr. Muskie may have such momentum and so many delegates in primary and non-primary states by the end of May -- that the nomination will be his -- before the Californians go to the polls.

EMK'S POINT OF NO RETURN

For Edward Kennedy, the fail-safe point can be precisely placed between the 14th of March and the 23rd of March.

Should Kennedy announce a "GO" decision, for example, on March 7, EMK would automatically go on the ballot in Wisconsin, Tennessee and Nebraska as well as Oregon, in all of which states he could come off a loser to Muskie, and in Tennessee perhaps -- humiliation of all humiliations -- he could lose to George C. Wallace. On the other hand, should Kennedy delay a
public decision until after the 23rd of March, he will have forfeited the
chance to enter Indiana, Maryland and California and thus he will be
gambling upon someone else to stop Muskie for him, a highly unlikely
prospect at this point.

Our prediction is that Kennedy will watch closely the Florida returns
on March 14th, and if Muskie is weak, will make his go decision, and make
it public within ten days. If Muskie romps in Florida and seems headed for
victory in Wisconsin -- Kennedy may well sit the primaries out, hoping for
Wallace victories in North Carolina and Tennessee, a Humphrey victory in
Nebraska, perhaps a Lindsay victory in California -- to stop Muskie and
deadlock the convention. But, as stated, that is a most risky strategy
to follow, if EMK wants the Democratic nomination.

(Several certain indicators that Kennedy is keeping his options open
on running would be a) A request by Richard Daley that all candidates
(i.e. Muskie) stay out of Illinois b) A move in the Massachusetts legislature
to move the filing deadline for the state primary from February 8 over
beyond March 14.)

That Muskie is within an ace of winning the Democratic nomination by
the Fourteenth of March is not a thesis widely held or accepted in press or
political circles. But signs mount that this may well be what Teddy White
writes of the 1968 Democratic presidential primaries. The signs are
starting to point in that direction. Evans-Novak noted last week that in
Pennsylvania, one of those crucial primaries whose closing deadline is before March 14th, the delegate selection process is shaping up in a fashion to inhibit Kennedy and advance Muskie's ambitions.

Further, last week's endorsement of Muskie by Speaker Moretti and Senator John Tunney of California (can Cranston be far behind?) seems to be gradually closing the door to any successful primary challenge to the Maine Senator in the state that is the last, best hope of the Stop Muskie camp.

If a few more prominent left-wing Democrats, with Vice Presidential ambitions -- like Tunney and Eagleton -- start climbing aboard the Muskie bandwagon (Stevenson or Bayh or Gilligan, for example) the race may be over before they go to the polls in New Hampshire.

# # # #
MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

Within the Campaign Strategy sessions, we have begun the discussion of theme and form, media and approach. One has a sense of déjà vu, as the old dichotomy is there again between those of us who would emphasize the achievement of President Nixon and those who would focus upon the personality traits.

In the 1972 campaign, and for 1972, it seems to me imperative that the Achievement School win out over the Personality School—in terms of advertising and campaign emphasis.

These are the reasons, simply:

a) Our likely opposition—McCloskey and Muskie—will make the personality of the President, the need for a new kind of leader their battleground. And why not? If one is asked which is the more attractive personality, Pete McCloskey or Richard Nixon, McCloskey will come off infinitely better than if one posed the question—which of these two men is best qualified to be President of the United States in 1972. The area of statesmanship, competence, ability, these are the long suits for the President as they have been throughout the career.

b) Secondly, in times of domestic calm and international peace, the argument for the election of Richard Nixon is simply not to me a convincing one to the majority of the American people. In such times, millions will want to "dare" a little bit, to take a flyer with a "New Frontier," to turn to a fresh, exciting new face. Though some of the finest political minds in the nation have labored thousands of hours in the process, they have not succeeded, in candor, in making Richard Nixon a stylistic exciting "figure" in the Kennedy sense of the word.

However, what are the President's truly strong suits. As source material I give you the confidential report on the Democratic National Committee—based on in-depth research and polls provided by Louis Harris, via Charles Colson.
Eighty-five percent of the American people, and eighty percent of the Democratic Party believe that:

"There is no doubt that sympathy works to the President's advantage. Seventeen out of twenty people (85%) believe he (the President) is doing his best in a difficult situation. As shown in this table, there is not too great a difference of opinion along partisan lines. Four out of five Democrats (80%) agreed with the statement.

As long as the President can maintain this posture he rests upon a springboard that could quickly enhance his popularity."

The specific question asked which got this incredible response was:

"HE INHERITED A LOT OF TOUGH PROBLEMS AND IS TRYING TO SOLVE THEM THE BEST HE CAN. Agree or Disagree?"

Thus, any political argument which begins with this as its premise already has eighty-five percent of the American people in agreement, and four of every five Democrats agreeing — for openers.

How much better to begin our Political Argument for R.N's re-election with this wholly credible, nationally believed argument, than with an argument that deals with the President's personality which starts — according to the same analysis, with only one-half the American people in agreement.

Simply stated then, what I propose is thus — that the campaign be seen as re-electing the President to continue to take America out of the storms, the nightmares, which we were in — when he assumed the helm. This means the point of reference for 1972, is not just peace and prosperity now — but the living hell of 1968.

There in the spring, five hundred Americans were dying a week, we lived in a time of assassinations, when cities were burning, and campuses being destroyed by mobs of radical students. If we can create in the public mind "That Wonderful Year, 1968" and then point to today — the contrast is vivid, the contrast is something that tens of millions of Americans will agree with. The idea is to portray the President as having assumed the helm of the Ship of State, when it appeared that the America we knew was collapsing around us; then to move him through the times of turmoil, de-escalation, demonstration to today, where the seas are choppy, but beyond the storm. And then to point to the port that lies ahead over the horizon.
Film of the horrors of 1968, with the President campaigning in the midst of those terrible days, with something like, "He was the Man for Those Times; He is the Man for These Times. He pulled America back from the brink of disaster; he is the man to lead it now upward into brighter days."

This has roughly stated the idea. As an attack issue against Muskie, for use by others, and in footage -- we can tie him and RHK and Harriman and Clifford, and the whole gang as those responsible. The Democratic candidate is brought to you by the same people who gave you the Vietnam War, etc. etc.

As an emotionally compelling argument, this seems to me infinitely more appealing than, say, running on Revenue Sharing and Reorganization and the Welfare Reform.

We can use peace in Vietnam and prosperity -- but let us be sure to juxtapose them with 1968. Otherwise, it will be us saying we need a little more time in Vietnam and Muskie saying, Bring the Boys Home Now.

One imagines that the kind of footage you can draw on would be outstanding. Again, from the Democratic analysis, the country believes RN inherited difficult problems and is doing his best. Let's show them graphically just how incredible those problems were -- and the present by juxtaposition will seem like Happy Times are Here Again.

Which brings me to the STATE OF THE UNION:

From indirect information, one gathers that the Domestic Council is pregnant and in January plans to give birth to a bouncing New American Revolution -- in terms of programs, to be the basis for the State of the Union. I do not argue against "targeted" political appeals -- which hits groups like the aged, but let us not waste the State of the Union on "Six New Goals," when the six old ones are languishing in the nether regions of the Committee.

Rather, let the State of the Union Address be an address by the President on the State of the Union. In delivering that address, he can deftly turn the clock back three years, and talk a bit about the cooling of America, no more burning cities or destroyed campuses, the boys who have come home, the tasks of peace to which we are turning our minds, the era of confrontation which we are bringing to an end, the possible, hopeful days that lie ahead. "Though three years is short, we have come a long way, you and I." We have come from a time when Americans were calling one
another traitors or warmongers, to a time when our differences are over the proper ways to save our environment. I see the State of the Union in the terms the President saw the Acceptance Speech, his first best chance to make his case to the whole American people.

The domestic proposals can go by message; they are things that come off better in the reading than the saying anyhow.

A comment in Ken Khachigian's memo to me on the SOTU is appropriate:

"If there are policy decisions or programs of political importance, I suggest a simple message to the Hill a day or two after the SOTU address.

As for the SOTU itself, I recommend a speech that discusses the "state" of the Union in almost a literal sense -- a thoughtful analysis of where we stand as a Nation at this point in history. To an extent, this includes an examination of the American culture, morale, and future.

RN could lay the stage for the campaign -- against the chronic carpers who look for the worst in America. On the contrary, RN ought to stake out a position not only for a belief in the richness of the national patrimony but also a belief that the future is challenging not fearsome.

This is a time to lay bare RN as no bashful protector of the Nation and no skeptic of the potential in the last third of the century. Articulation of some key benchmarks of the last three years might be included; a potential for world peace; domestic calm; social problems on the way to recovery (e.g., praise for white and black in South for handling their social transition peacefully).

In that strategy session, it was interesting. When it got to specific achievements (someone raised the point that the President had increased spending for civil rights enforcement by a factor of five) there is disagreement as to whether that is something to boast about. When you talk about welfare reform, people divide. When you talk about domestic legislation, my friends start up the South Wall. When you talk about turning the Court around, my friends applaud, and the other fellows are climbing the North Wall.

But when you talk about the terrible times in 1968, and how we as a people have pulled through them, how the residue of bitterness has been diminished, how much better the new times are than those old times of rancor, and bitterness and hatred -- then you have almost the whole nation saying, "Yeah, things are a hell of a lot better today than those days, and maybe, Nixon does deserve a hell of a lot of credit; maybe he is the right guy in these times after all."

Buchanan