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<td>Memo</td>
<td>From John C. Whitaker to Haldeman. RE: A response to the question, &quot;How should the President run?&quot; Whitaker argues the Nixon should run as the president and not as a candidate. 3 pgs.</td>
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MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. Haldeman
FROM: John C. Whitaker

You requested a response to the question, "How should the President run." Answer - besides the obvious - "As President and not as a candidate," my thoughts follow:

1. Resist the set speech. I know the President believes it is axiomatic that you just hit the big issues over and over again -- "Korea, Corruption, and Communism" of 1952 and in '72, "a full generation of peace."

2. I think instead, the campaign should be more about what he does than a repetition of the set speech.
   a. Motorcade (and get the wire photo shots), but not to auditoriums for the set speech, but to issue-oriented events. They are very hard to construct, but they can be done. A meeting on rural development -- a regional session with police on law enforcement -- top drug rehabilitation people with Jaffe -- with bankers on reducing interest rates -- to a home for the aged -- to inspect pollution on Lake Erie, etc., etc.
   b. Now not even the President can be smart enough to be knowledgeable at all these issue-oriented stops, so lets use the same method we have been using, i.e., drop a prepared statement on the issue. Since little is written by the press about the prepared statement, it is essential that the TV news hit (1) the crowds in the motorcade, and (2) the substance (at the conference table, looking at Lake Erie, talking to a police chief, etc.)
3. But the key to the above proposal is that the statements not all have a bragging connotation of what he has accomplished, but also we can do more -- even what he intends in the years ahead. Avoid the "if-I'm-re-elected-I'll-do/etc." lead in, but instead just "next year, I plan, etc., etc." To just brag about the record has a "he-doth-protest-too-much" connotation.

4. I sense in the '70 campaign there was a basic decision not to travel much -- then the President reversed this decision (when his private polls showed the "ideological majority Senators were going down the tube), and the result was the set speech at airports and in rally halls. The point is there was not time to consider the issue-oriented events. There is time now to make the schedule staff work with the Domestic Council staff and rack up lots of issue-oriented events in the key states, so when the President makes his decision (do I stay home and run the country or hit the road intensely), he at least has the option to hit the road with issue-oriented events.

5. With Peking and Moscow out of the way by June, it seems to me he has mid-June until the convention to be a "listening President" -- this is a very good time to have Cabinet road show meetings -- get Governors, mayors, state legislatures involved before the Labor Day campaign season starts to get so political it's hard to do this. In other words, he can use Democratic Governors, mayors, etc. as a backdrop in the summer, but they will come out of these meetings in the fall and shoot at him in front of the press and that will get the lead. I like the "listening President" style -- it implies learning more for the future after he is re-elected.

6. As to television:

   a. The same forces are at play -- in the summer, he can address state legislatures, he could do a simple Q&A at a plain old mid-America Kiwanis club and get state-wide TV -- no such luck after Labor Day. Once into the campaign, I still like the man in the arena TV format he used in '68 in the key states -- let the press call the panels fixed and phoney -- it never catches up with the TV impact.
b. What ever happened to the head-to-head with NBC and CBS after the Howard K. Smith interview? Smith was a bore -- 2/3 of his time on Vietnam. Still the President is so good if he gets an intelligent interviewer, I think he should do NBC and CBS before Labor Day.

c. I'm for avoiding a TV debate with the Democratic nominee at all cost by just using the old gambit about accidental slips on national security. Let them call him chicken.

7. I think the "think piece" radio addresses of '68 were terrific -- they give the liberal press something to write about. He should do more on what else he intends to do by 1976.

Above all -- avoid the partisan, defend-the-record, give-them-hell campaign. It's easier to get a new President than get a new Congress. There just aren't enough Republicans to ape Harry Truman and pull it off.

This strategy will probably not appeal to the President's instincts -- he will fear that it is too scattered and he must focus on peace and the economy. I guess I'm saying it a different way. We will or won't have peace and a good economy next summer and fall. There isn't much to say about it -- so you nibble at the marginal issues (besides peace and the pocket book) by concentrating on issue-oriented dropbys -- these issues are ranked in the latest Domestic Council poll by Lou Harris: (1) Race, (2) Drugs, (3) Pollution, (4) Crime and (5) Welfare and Spending. The ranking changes a bit from poll to poll, but these five hang in there.

Conclusion: The President should do issue-oriented stops repeatedly on these five issues.

cc: John D. Ehrlichman
Within the Campaign Strategy sessions, we have begun the discussion of theme and form, media and approach. One has a sense of déjà vu, as the old dichotomy is there again between those of us who would emphasize the achievement of President Nixon and those who would focus upon the personality traits.

In the 1972 campaign, and for 1972, it seems to me imperative that the Achievement School win out over the Personality School — in terms of advertising and campaign emphasis.

These are the reasons, simply:

a) Our likely opposition -- McCloskey and Muskie -- will make the personality of the President, the need for a new kind of leader their battleground. And why not? If one is asked which is the more attractive personality, Pete McCloskey or Richard Nixon, McCloskey will come off infinitely better than if one posed the question -- which of these two men is best qualified to be President of the United States in 1972. The area of statesmanship, competence, ability, these are the long suits for President as they have been throughout the career.

b) Secondly, in times of domestic calm and international peace, the argument for the election of Richard Nixon is simply not to me a convincing one to the majority of the American people. In such times, millions will want to "dare" a little bit, to take a flyer with a "New Frontier," to turn to a fresh, exciting new face. Though some of the finest political minds in the nation have labored thousands of hours in the process, they have not succeeded, in candor, in making Richard Nixon a stylistic exciting "figure" in the Kennedy sense of the word.

However, what are the President's truly strong suits. As source material I give you the confidential report on the Democratic National Committee -- based on in-depth research and polls provided by Louis Harris, via Charles Colson.
Eighty-five percent of the American people, and eighty percent of the Democratic Party believe that:

"There is no doubt that sympathy works to the President's advantage. Seventeen out of twenty people (85%) believe he (the President) is doing his best in a difficult situation. As shown in this table, there is not too great a difference of opinion along partisan lines. Four out of five Democrats (80%) agreed with the statement.

As long as the President can maintain this posture he rests upon a springboard that could quickly enhance his popularity."

The specific question asked which got this incredible response was:

"HE INHERITED A LOT OF TOUGH PROBLEMS AND IS TRYING TO SOLVE THEM THE BEST HE CAN." Agree or Disagree?

Thus, any political argument which begins with this as its premise already has eighty-five percent of the American people in agreement, and four of every five Democrats agreeing -- for openers.

How much better to begin our Political Argument for R&N's re-election with this wholly credible, nationally believed argument, than with an argument that deals with the President's personality which starts -- according to the same analysis, with only one-half the American people in agreement.

Simply stated then, what I propose is thus -- that the campaign be seen as re-electing the President to continue to take America out of the storms, the nightmares, which we were in -- when he assumed the helm. This means the point of reference for 1972, is not just peace and prosperity now -- but the living hell of 1968.

There in the spring, five hundred Americans were dying a week, we lived in a time of assassinations, when cities were burning, and campuses being destroyed by mobs of radical students. If we can create in the public mind "That Wonderful Year, 1968" and then point to today -- the contrast is vivid, the contrast is something that tens of millions of Americans will agree with. The idea is to portray the President as having assumed the helm of the Ship of State, when it appeared that the America we knew was collapsing around us; then to move him through the times of turmoil, de-escalation, demonstration to today, where the seas are choppy, but beyond the storm. And then to point to the port that lies ahead over the horizon.
Film of the horrors of 1968, with the President campaigning in the midst of those terrible days, with something like, "He was the Man for Those Times; He is the Man for These Times. He pulled America back from the brink of disaster; he is the man to lead it now upward into brighter days." Is this accurate?

This has roughly stated the idea. As an attack issue against Muskie, for use by others, and in footage -- we can tie him and HH H and Harriman and Clifford, and the whole gang as those responsible. The Democratic candidate is brought to you by the same people who gave you the Vietnam War, etc. etc.

As an emotionally compelling argument, this seems to me infinitely more appealing than, say, running on Revenue Sharing and Reorganization and the Welfare Reform.

We can use peace in Vietnam and prosperity -- but let us be sure to juxtapose them with 1968. Otherwise, it will be us saying we need a little more time in Vietnam and Muskie saying, Bring the Boys Home Now.

One imagines that the kind of footage you can draw on would be outstanding. Again, from the Democratic analysis, the country believes RN inherited difficult problems and is doing his best. Let's show them graphically just how incredible those problems were -- and the present by juxtaposition will seem like Happy Times are Here Again.

Which brings me to the STATE OF THE UNION:

From indirect information, one gathers that the Domestic Council is pregnant and in January plans to give birth to a bouncing New American Revolution -- in terms of programs, to be the basis for the State of the Union. I do not argue against "targeted" political appeals -- which hits groups like the aged, but let us not waste the State of the Union on "Six New Goals," when the six old ones are languishing in the nether regions of the Committee.

Rather, let the State of the Union Address be an address by the President on the State of the Union. In delivering that address, he can deftly turn the clock back three years, and talk a bit about the cooling of America, no more burning cities or destroyed campuses, the boys who have come home, the tasks of peace to which we are turning our minds, the era of confrontation which we are bringing to an end, the possible, hopeful days that lie ahead. "Though three years is short, we have come a long way, you and I." We have come from a time when Americans were calling one
another traitors or warmongers, to a time when our differences are over
the proper ways to save our environment. I see the State of the Union in
the terms the President saw the Acceptance Speech, his first best chance
to make his case to the whole American people.

The domestic proposals can go by message; they are things that come off
better in the reading than the saying anyhow.

A comment in Ken Khachigian’s memo to me on the SOTU is appropriate:

"If there are policy decisions or programs of political importance, I
suggest a simple message to the Hill a day or two after the SOTU address.

As for the SOTU itself, I recommend a speech that discusses the "state"
of the Union in almost a literal sense -- a thoughtful analysis of where we
stand as a Nation at this point in history. To an extent, this includes an
examination of the American culture, morale, and future.

RN could lay the stage for the campaign -- against the chronic carpers
who look for the worst in America. On the contrary, RN ought to stake
out a position not only for a belief in the richness of the national patrimony
but also a belief that the future is challenging not fearsome.

This is a time to lay bare RN as no bashful protector of the Nation and no
skeptic of the potential in the last third of the century. Articulation of
some key benchmarks of the last three years might be included: a potential
for world peace; domestic calm; social problems on the way to recovery
(e.g., praise for white and black in South for handling their social transition
peacefully.)"

In that strategy session, it was interesting. When it got to specific
achievements (someone raised the point that the President had increased
spending for civil rights enforcement by a factor of five) there is
disagreement as to whether that is something to boast about. When you
talk about welfare reform, people divide. When you talk about domestic
legislation, my friends start up the South Wall. When you talk about
turning the Court around, my friends applaud, and the other fellows are
climbing the North Wall.

But when you talk about the terrible times in 1968, and how we as a
people have pulled through them, how the residue of bitterness has been
diminished, how much better the new times are than those old times of
rancor, and bitterness and hatred -- then you have almost the whole nation
saying, "Yeah, things are a hell of a lot better today than those days, and
maybe, Nixon does deserve a hell of a lot of credit; maybe he is the right
guy in these times after all."

Buchanan
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT: The President's posture in the 1972 Campaign

The President should carry into 1972 the ground rules he laid down in 1971 about discussing politics and being involved in obvious political activities only if and when necessary. We have a great opportunity in the first six months of 1972 to portray the President as the world statesman that he is and to bring into very sharp focus the contrast with all of the Democratic candidates who will be cannibalizing one another throughout primary time. The President will be the peacemaker -- the Journey for Peace to China, the consummation of SALT, the end of the Vietnam involvement, the progress of the Nixon Doctrine and the Soviet Summit. If the economy is neutralized as an issue, then the major emphasis of the first six months should be on Nixon's world leadership.

(The unfinished agenda in foreign policy is as important as the accomplishments that he brings about next year. Winston Churchill ended World War II and the British people decided they didn't need him any more -- his job was done; hence, all of the things we do in the first six months of next year are but a prelude to the events which lie ahead, which events can create generations of peace. In short, next year should not be the culmination of the successful Nixon foreign policy; it must represent a major half-way point.)

The President probably cannot get away with refusing to answer political questions in press conferences in the coming year but, whatever he does, he should dust them off lightly and quickly. He should show a distinct lack of concern with politics. Whatever McCloskey does in New Hampshire, it is of no consequence -- the President's mind is on bigger things. If McCloskey does badly, let the Republican Party -- not the President -- do the cheering. If McCloskey does relatively well, it is of no concern to the President. There are no visible political strategy sessions at the White House; there is no political crisis involving the President's personal participation; there is no lack of confidence in the inner circle.
The President is on a very high plateau of leadership at the moment. If we are successful in sustaining it and, if the foreign policy initiatives develop as planned, he should be on that same plateau in June of next year.

Those of us within the President's political family should be fastidiously cultivating key voter blocs, promoting politically appealing programs, maximizing favorable media exposure and organizing like hell -- but it should be low profile. We shouldn't talk about it. It shouldn't be evident or in any way visible. The President and the men around him are concerned with the enormous progress that he is making in achieving a more rational, peaceful world order. In this same vein, the President should not reply to critics and should avoid any strident attacks on any one. Let the Vice President and the Cabinet do the hatchet work. We want a picture of a President who is consumed with his quest for peace, restoring a peacetime economy and pursuing vigorously and personally two or three key domestic initiatives.

This is not to suggest that we ignore subtle political opportunities. Speaking forums should be carefully selected for the greatest impact they have on key voting blocs -- veterans, aging, ethnic, Catholics, etc.

The transition next summer should be as gradual as possible. Obviously, the political fat will be in the fire after the Republican Convention at which point the President's rhetoric shifts to the great promise which the future holds for America in terms of peace in the world, a strong and competitive economy, and a government responsive to the needs of the American people (whatever our key domestic thrust is -- the value added tax and school proposal, welfare reform or whatever).

It is nearly impossible to draw a projected Presidential campaign strategy today for the period of September and October 1972. If all goes well and we are riding high, the President must remain very Presidential, self-assured and above the battle. This would be particularly true if Kennedy is the opponent. Kennedy will be strident, sharp, cutting and very divisive. He will have large, enthusiastic youthful audiences and his campaign will seem to have great exuberance but by his rhetoric and his style he will turn off one voter for every voter he turns on. We will be sorely tempted to tangle with him. We must ride above the battle to make the contrast as vivid as possible.

The polls next September could well dictate another strategy but if the nominee if Kennedy, I doubt it. Our job will be to assist him in defeating himself.
If the opponent is Muskie or another relatively non-controversial centrist, the President's campaign strategy may well have to be governed by the relative standing in the polls immediately following the Convention. If we maintain the leadership plateau all year, we should try to keep it through the campaign. If we are behind, we may have to fight and meet our opponent head on and if the opponent happens to be Muskie, then unlike the situation with Kennedy, it may be our task to sharpen the issues. We may have to score on him and force him to be fully tested in the eyes of the electorate. Depending again on the standing in the polls, we might even need to come out swinging with a Harry Truman 1948 style campaign.

My own guess at this time is that our opponent will be Kennedy. He may start out relatively high in the polls but it will be all downhill for him if we remain "above" him and demonstrate by contrast his immaturity against the President's leadership. If it is Muskie, I believe we will start out well ahead in the polls and our principal concern will be to ensure that he does not slowly creep up on us; that as the campaign ho-hums along, he doesn't gradually rebuild the traditional Democratic coalition. Muskie is the kind of candidate who could gain momentum in a campaign and we might be forced, even if we start out ahead, to take him to the mat and to sharpen the issues.

The foregoing points out how difficult it is to be specific as to Presidential campaign involvement for the months of September and October. Subject to unknown events, I feel relatively clear in my own mind as to the strategy we should pursue up until September 1st; beyond that, it all depends.

Assuming we have it our way, that we are ahead, that the President is on the plateau of leadership, that we have effectively organized, that we have developed the issues and cultivated effectively the key voting blocs then the President should maintain his high Presidential posture throughout the campaign. This would mean very few campaign stump appearances or political rallies, extensive use of radio during which the President talks about leadership, the Presidency and the goals for America in the next four years and, indeed, for the next generation, a few direct television appearances to the American people building our record, and more importantly, our hopes for the future and carefully timed Presidential news events and announcements. The President should do just enough physical campaigning to keep the spirit and enthusiasm of the party workers alive. If he is ahead and riding the leadership plateau, he should not be seen going out to the hustings. He should be seen frequently doing the job of the President and leading the Government.
One point deserves very careful advance planning. We need in the months of September and October to exploit fully the advantages of incumbency but not to be obvious in doing it. We need to carefully plan those news events which we can control, which will be positive, appealing either to the vast majority of people or to key voting blocks, and have them ready to go in September and October. In other words, we should *store up a bag of "goodies"* ready for use during the campaign. Johnson's bombing halt in 1968 was about as subtle as a sledge hammer. Obviously, it helped Humphrey but it is not the kind of thing I am thinking of because we would have trouble with something that big and major in the closing days of the campaign. The liberal press would let one of their own get away with it but they would crucify us and call it political treachery. The kind of thing I am thinking about would be *export grain shipments* (for example, like the one we have just engineered this week with the Soviets), the *release of parks* in critical areas, announcements of a major *work for welfare requirement*, a significant policy decision affecting *Indian lands*, the release of an Administration study calling for *guaranteed annual wages* for construction workers, the announcement of *increased veterans benefits*, perhaps some major *defense contract announcements*. Some of these could be done without the charge of politics. The selection process will have to be extremely judicious. We also will want to *begin saving these up through the summer*.

This is, to me, one critically important project that we must undertake regardless of our campaign style. This we can use to our advantage no matter what the Presidential posture is at that time.
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: LEE HUEBNER

SUBJECT: Campaign Approaches: 1972

First some very specific suggestions -- then some more general thoughts.

1. Until the political stage is clearly ours in August, the President should not campaign -- or rather, he should campaign by being President. Napoleon's advice is applicable: "Never interfere with the enemy when he is in the process of destroying himself."

2. After the convention, there are several things the President should not do. (A) He should not sit in Washington pretending to be above politics or apart from politics. First, it's just not plausible -- and candor is one of the most valuable characteristics for an incumbent President. Secondly, it could give the impression we are taking the voters for granted, that "we don't care enough to come." Thirdly, it could give the impression that, like LBJ, we are afraid to leave the White House. (B) He should not pretend he is dedicating parks or inspecting dams as an excuse for moving around the country. Again, the impression of candor is an extremely precious commodity. I think we have to lean over backwards to let people know that "this is a campaign trip; campaign funds are paying for the airplane;" or, "this is a political telecast; it is being sponsored by the Republican National Committee." There will be a strong temptation to schedule "issue-oriented events," to show the President "at work" and "above politics." I must admit, in fact, that I started preparing some thoughts along these lines in writing this memorandum. I have completely changed my mind on this point, however. If the people and press will not buy a "non-political" visit to a New Hampshire nursing home in the summer of '71, they won't buy it in the fall of '72. We have to go out of our way to avoid the appearance that we are playing games of any sort. The President's schedule must reflect of "legitimacy." He must tend to his business when it is time to tend to business -- and then when it is time to campaign he must say so. Meanwhile, we can generate all sorts of issue-oriented news from Washington. (C) He should not emphasize closed gatherings of the safe, the sanitized, and the faithful. Again, this could give the impression there is something fearful outside the
gates of the auditorium. Moreover, this approach invariably provokes stories about strong arm tactics, stacked audiences, and contrived spontaneity. More importantly, it tends to depict RN as the President of partisans and true believers rather than as President of all the people.

(D) Just as the President should not be seen as the advocate of any particular group within the society, neither should he be cast as the adversary of any man or group or party. He should not debate his opponent. He should avoid campaign themes which turn any groups into whipping boys. The campaign should do everything it can to downplay dissent and disagreement. I expect that the hecklers will probably be out in force again next fall -- both the far left and the far right. They are useful adversaries for some purposes, of course, but not when the charge that we are "using" them becomes louder than their screams -- as it did in 1970. Even if they could help us dramatize some themes in 1972, I fear they will cost us far more by discrediting the "peace at home" half of our "peace abroad and peace at home" appeal. Their very presence would be a reminder of what happened to LBJ and later to HH in 1968.

Even if we should be doing everything we can to draw a contrast between their incumbency and that of Richard Nixon, each Nixon appearance in 1972 should reinforce the sense that we once again assured domestic tranquility. Any combativeness should be left to surrogates.

3. What positive things does this leave for the President to do? As far as formats are concerned, the following two-tier approach might be useful. (A) Airport stops. I would suggest holding on this until the moment is right, until the country is ready and waiting. Then I would move out with a brisk (but never frantic) schedule of "prop-stops," to project the image of a dynamic President who cares about his people and to give the campaign a sense of excitement and motion. I like this particular format for several reasons. It lends itself to short speeches, in which the President can hit his main themes cleanly and clearly without cumbersome detail and yet without seeming superficial. It gives him a good excuse to repeat them over and over but minimizes the risk of boredom. It is a very efficient way of touching the most bases and covering the most territory. It allows the general public to participate, but at the same time the informal and open air setting tends to minimize the impact of any attempted disruption. Finally -- and perhaps most importantly -- there is a natural drama to this format one that comes from sheer "motion" itself -- from the number of places visited and from the color and variety of the crowds. The landing of the airplanes, the blaring of the bands, President arouse emotions in this setting. It is not so necessary, therefore, for the rhetoric of the President to set up dramatic conflicts and to arouse strong emotions, as it must when he is trying to hold an audience in an indoor setting over a longer time period. This means that the campaign can
have a more Presidential tone without giving up its flair and its energy and its drama. (B) Secondly, I would use television to focus public attention on the quality of the man and on the excellence of his record. I understand that during the last weeks of the 1964 campaign, LBJ used five half hour slots of network time -- plus an additional half hour on election eve. In this way -- through quality documentaries, through thoughtful interviews, perhaps through fireside conversations, the nuances of the "Presidential personality" and the details of the Nixon record can be filled in under carefully controlled circumstances. The advantages of incumbency include: 1) a more effective claim on people's attention (in fact, I suspect many people are insulted by overly short spot ads when it is the Presidency that is at stake); 2) four years worth of magnificent film footage which no contender could begin to match; and 3) the trappings of the White House as a setting for direct communication with the people. The campaign should capitalize on these advantages.

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What follows here are some of the general thoughts on which some of these specifics were based.

1. Thanks to television, the airplane, and his extraordinarily long career, Richard Nixon is already the best known candidate in the history of the world. (I mean that quite literally.) There is nothing RN can do in 1972 to make himself more familiar to the American people. Everybody knows him and they know what they think about him and there is a very little that can be done to change that. The only reason for campaigning, it seems to me, is to influence those whose mental pictures of Nixon, while they are complete, are still ambivalent. In the scale which sits within their heads, there are good things on one side and bad things on the other side and -- depending on which variables they focus on at any given moment -- their overall judgment shifts from one side to the other. The important task is not to write new lines or design new costumes or paint new scenery -- it's really too late for that. The important thing now is where we point the spotlights. Rather than trying to create some new image for the President, we should highlight the strengths which even his critics are willing to grant him -- experience, competence, intelligence, conscientiousness, seasoned judgment. At the same time, of course, it is important to keep the spotlight off those qualities which have created misgivings with these swing groups. For most of them that means avoiding the appearance of any excessive concern with political tactics.
A related point. In a way, the image of a tough and wily politician -- which probably hurts the President in its simple form -- has an entirely different impact when it is projected on the international stage. There is a strong element in the American character which regards all dealing with foreign countries as something mysterious and arcane and fraught with danger. From our very beginnings, diplomacy has been seen as a very tough and tangled and sophisticated "old-world" business and the impression has always been very strong that young and innocent and open America will sooner or later be taken to the cleaners. This fear is at the root of the isolationism which has dominated most of our history and which is now beginning to surge once again.

Fortunately for this country, however, the one judgment concerning Richard Nixon which now draws the greatest assent from the most Americans is that he knows how to handle himself in this difficult diplomatic arena. "They won't pull the wool over his eyes" is one of the most frequent comments I encounter -- from Republicans and Democrats -- in conversations about the President. In short, the same qualities which upset people most in the lawyer who is suing them are the very qualities they want most of all in their own lawyer. This is all the more reason, I think, for highlighting the administration's foreign policy. If public attention is focused here, then even the most familiar of all criticisms of the President begins to turn into a compliment.

2. Many social philosophers are writing these days that the most powerful emotion in modern America is the "quest for community." They mean by this that uprooted and insecure Americans are seeking above all else the climate of stability and security, the feeling of shared risks and shared values, the sense of participation and control, which characterized life in simpler times and smaller communities. This theme, of course, was a useful part of the Inaugural Address and the most recent State of the Union message. My concern at the moment, however, is not with developing this theme in positive ways but rather with avoiding anything which would defy this emotion so that it becomes a force against us. I say this because it seems to me that the hunger for community places special burdens and special restrictions on an incumbent President who is seeking re-election.

Why is this true? Simply because people cannot go back to the small town in the 1970's. They must find their sense of community instead through participation in the national family. And the responsibility for giving a sense of family-hood to this scattered and nervous nation of ours is largely that of our only potential father figure: the President.

People are reminded almost hourly of the divisions and suspicions and fears which plague our country. They depend on the President to give them
a sense of an ideal America that is united and trusting and confident. People are sick of lots of things today but most of all, I suspect, they are sick of bickering and contentiousness and antagonism. They want the President to reinforce the sense of national good will, to ease the sense of national tension. (President Nixon's success in this cause should be one of his proudest accomplishments.)

This desire, however, also creates a terrible risk for any incumbent President. For the role of the campaigner, by its very nature, is somewhat inconsistent with the role of soother and healer. The campaigner is automatically a partisan, a contender, an adversary. While all these roles are ordinarily respectable ones, I have a feeling that an awful lot of Americans harbor a strong, secret resentment whenever their leader, their father, their "king," if you will, comes down off his pedestal to engage in the very common business of politics. My point here is not simply the familiar one that a candidate can gain a great deal from being unpolitical and "Presidential." I am saying more than that. I am arguing that, for an incumbent President, there is a unique risk in being anything less than fully Presidential -- a risk which is momentous and intolerable.

In many ways, the very fact that there is an election campaign is going to hurt us. Any man -- perceived as President -- is going to be more popular than that same man perceived as candidate. (In this sense, the polls at the moment are padded in our favor.) One of the things we most definitely do not want to spotlight, therefore, is the campaign itself -- its strategy, its personnel, its mechanisms. We do not want people talking about the President's campaign. We want them talking about the President's record.

It was different for Truman in 1948. His record was hurting him and he wanted the election to be a referendum on the campaigns of the two candidates. It was and that is why he won it. The 1970 election also became a referendum on campaign styles in some parts of the country and by and large I do not think this fact helped the Republicans. Unless things go very badly at home and abroad between now and next fall, however, I expect we will very much want our record to be front and center and that means using the campaign to spotlight that record and not to upstage it.

Anything at all that is unusual about the campaign, anything that draws attention to the campaign and away from the record, will work to our disadvantage. This would include a non-campaign -- that in itself would be very distracting. I would similarly avoid anything extreme, anything with rough edges, anything contrived or cute or gimmicky. Everything should be extremely straightforward.
3. Almost any of our issues in the campaign can be discussed under a three-point organization: 1) how things were in 1968; 2) how things are today; and 3) how things will be if we are re-elected. There will be some tendency, I fear, to use only the first two points -- to say how bad things were under the Democrats and how good things are today -- and to forget the third one. This would be a mistake. For voters do not re-elect Presidents simply to reward them for jobs well done. An election is not a report card. People are not so much concerned about what has been done for them -- not even about what has been done for them lately -- as they are about what will be done for them tomorrow. The most useful thing about the successful record of the past is that it legitimizes our projections for the future. Because the President has wound down the war in Vietnam, it is reasonable to expect he will bring a full generation of peace. Because crime rates have fallen, it is reasonable to expect they will fall further. People are future-oriented and it is imperative that we give them a sense that something still better is coming. As the popular song puts it: "We've only just begun." The President has hit his stride and this is not the time to pull him out of the game. Things are "in the works." He has had some great surprises for us in the past and if we re-elect him, he will have some great surprises for us in the future. This can be a way of putting the opposition on the defensive -- not simply by contrasting the last four years with the eight years previous, but by using the record of the past four years to create a sense of momentum for the future -- a momentum which our opponents can never generate.

A Kennedy candidacy, of course, would reach back to the early 1960's to try to achieve this sense of momentum already underway for the future. All the more reason for not letting our campaign get stuck in the past and the present. Muskie would have even more difficulty matching this sense of Nixonian momentum. I recall a recent article by a former Muskie aide which contends that the Senator is most effective when he is attacked or affronted or offended -- when he is on the defensive -- but that he is not very effective when he must be on the offensive -- when he must do the attacking. He is not a natural at it. He does not feel comfortable. He often appears petulant when he takes this posture. If his opponent does him the favor of attacking him, this analysis claims, he will outmoderate that opponent to death. But if the opponent articulates his own dreams and visions, then Muskie is forced into the position of saying me too or of becoming harsh and strident.

A thoughtful new voter who is still undecided about 1972 made this comment recently about the President. "There is no denying that he's done a good job but it would be more fun to have someone who could get you more excited about what is going to happen next. If only the next four years could seem more exciting under Nixon, then I might vote for him." I believe the campaign can make the next four years look that way.

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November 5, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM: LEN GARMENT

We won't win in 1972 unless we have a well-informed, high morale operation. There were all kinds of problems in 1968, but there was camaraderie and trust, a sense of common purpose, good communication and a strong team effort. We can only get to this state of effectiveness now by thinking through the special problems that exist this time around. One in particular will be fitting together people like yourself and John Mitchell, veterans of three years work at the highest level of national power and politics, with newcomers like Pete Dailey and his staff. It is fact, not flattery, that you, John and others are now "personages" in your own right, and the changes that have taken place in your life and in the way you are viewed by your staffs, the media and the public could present problems for the campaign effort if not thought through with care. The point is of course that a campaign organization is a collaborative enterprise which loses drive and effectiveness if the personalities don't mesh or if it is infected by power games and bureaucratic trivia. Obvious things to guard against: Reluctance on the part of the newcomers to speak out (particularly if they disagree with you or John Mitchell); roundabout staffing procedures that are time-wasting and demoralizing (government is a process; a campaign is a contest); in dealing with the "everybody wants to get into the act" syndrome you must keep out the axe grinders, private agendaists, hyper-excitables, manipulators, favor-curriers and other such types. Government can "afford" them; a campaign can't.

There has to be a strong framework (i.e., organization and discipline) but its purpose must be to maximize opportunities for flexible and creative individual efforts. Everyone, yourself and John Mitchell included, must be prepared to deal "democratically" with other senior campaign staff on dirty detail as well as grand strategy if the President is to be protected and permitted to go about his business. Governing and campaigning are related but distinctly separate things and this difficult separation will have to be made quite deliberately as the campaign is planned and begins to function. The President will have to take some personal action to shape campaign staff attitude and morale. When, and how he should be involved I don't know but
probably at an early point since the effort has to be organized and pointed in the right direction from the very outset. The campaign will be extremely difficult. We will be under increasingly harsh and personal attack. Outrageous things will be said and written about the President. There will be foul-ups and leaks. Most of this will not mean a damn, unless we waste our energies on fits of suspicion and overreaction. What this adds up to is not an effort to recreate the spirit of 1968 -- the passion of outsiders trying to win the White House is an advantage that naturally falls to the Democrats. Rather the effort should be to create a campaign unit that identifies closely with the President, has a clearly-delineated set of "missions" and is given the authority and support to carry them out.

2. The next point is the general direction of the campaign, something I think should be developed now even as the activities of the campaign staff begin to take shape. You don't need more generalizations about maintaining the Presidential posture. But it's hard to be concrete or sensible about the campaign itself until we know where we're headed. Attached is a letter from Robert Nisbet which is a useful first cut at this problem. Nisbet is one of the most distinguished of all American sociologists, a major influence on men like Moynihan, Kristol, Lipset, Buckley, etc., a Republican, a conservative, a pragmatic intellectual of the first magnitude. Some of what he says I've previously discussed with you; most is pure Nisbet. I offer his observations not so much for their content as for the procedure they suggest, namely the creation of a working group of writer-intellectuals who want to re-elect the President, are willing to give time, and have the ability to synthesize information and articulate ideas, and would bring to the effort at this time a freshness and perspective that cannot be supplied by distracted insiders. Ron Berman (the new Humanities Chairman) and Pat Moynihan are other possibilities for this group. My hunch is that out of their work, supplementing the work of Ray Price, Pat Buchanan and others here, would come the story of the Nixon Presidency to date, the changes (in contrast to 1968) wrought abroad and at home, a story rooted in reality and framed in terms that the campaign staff could safely go to work on immediately. The product would be different from the bleak and fragmented hand-outs that are the limit that one can ask from a hard-pressed White House communications office. My further hunch is that in the course of explaining what a uniquely "professional" President (Ray Price's concept) has done during his first term in restoring peaceful conditions in the world and at home we would make credible what the President proposes to do to build on these conditions -- particularly at home -- during his second term. What must be avoided is a sense that all the things we've done and said somehow don't hang together.
3. The purpose of this kind of preliminary effort (plus contributions from other sources) would be to help shape the campaign philosophy and themes. Our advertising material should be factual and explanatory, not trying to sell something. Again the emphasis should be on what we've been doing, what has taken place. The Democratic staff will be personal (attacks) and promises (but what are they going to promise?) and I'd limit campaign activities by Cabinet officers to explaining what they've been doing. They're not persuasive spokesmen for the President. Through the Spring and Summer we should concentrate our campaign materials on the record; obviously the big news will be the President's trips. I don't think we will have to push the "journey for peace" theme -- it will be all over the place if things are going well. The problem will be to keep expectations down to avoid disappointments, to make clear we're not loosening up on our defense effort or getting starry-eyed. Under no circumstances do I visualize the President whistle-stopping, exhausting himself, competing head-to-head with the Democratic candidate. I don't see him in commercials at all (at this point). We may be in a position by next Summer and Fall to have some surprise visits at home that convey a sense of the focus of Presidential attention during the second term (to cooler campuses, to quieter cities, to cleaner places, etc.) Whether the "peacemaker" theme should be explicit or not, I don't know, but, if so, it should emerge from the work and research of the next six months and not be mandated at the outset. I'm not sure of any of the production details. I am sure that the pre-conditions of a high-morale staff operation and a high-level intellectual effort must be established now. The absolutely critical thing is to know we're in for a very tough fight, to be prepared for the worst, to stay loose -- to keep our tempers under control and prepare for the contest.
Mr. Leonard Garment
White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Garment:

I enjoyed our breakfast together yesterday morning, and am grateful to you and Any Price for arranging it. It is good to know both of you, and it goes without saying, I trust, that I wish President Nixon and his administration the best. Whatever I can do that falls within my talents and energies I shall be pleased to do.

You were kind enough to ask me to put down in a letter the comments I made at breakfast, and this I do—though with due sense of my highly limited perspective in governmental and political matters. If there is any note of circularity inadvertent, do, please, dismiss it as unintended. I am simply doing what you asked: putting in type-script remarks that flowed forth easily over coffee.

First, I think Professor Senan would be admirable in the post you mentioned. I've not met him, but I have followed his writings in some degree, I admire them, and I think they reflect a first rate mind. Moreover friends he and I have in common praise him highly as a person. I would be more than merely willing to endorse him should such endorsements become useful.

As discussed the forthcoming campaign, and the following remarks, for whatever they are worth, best represent my views on a highly complex matter:

1. I think it is of the utmost importance that President Nixon run against what he inherited in 1952: the heavy concentration of American troops in Viet Nam, the relations with Russia, China, and other parts of the world, the economic scene in the U.S. and the easily demonstrable cooling effect his government has had on all aspects of what he found when he came to office. No matter how plausible, how magic-ridden, how lustrious his Democratic opponent may be, no one can win out of the fact of 1952 and how much better things have become since, in just about all respects. I am sure it will be tempting, even alluring, now and then to try and take on Kennedy—or whoever is running for the Democrats—in an argument-for-argument manner. For the President, I gather, loves combatting. But I think it would be courting defeat to stray from the strategy of running against 1952. That makes a powerful case. It is hard to think of anything else that could really strengthen it.

2. I think it extremely important to support in every
possible way the black, chicanos, and other minority sectors of society. I rather doubt that many votes will come the Republican way as the result (though we can be sure!), but we do know that anything that helps achievement of middle class status for blacks and others is a long step toward creating a condition in which a two party system might eventually prevail upon them. My own experience is that nothing matters so much to the minorities as the economic facts of job, ownership of home, and the kind of dignity and respectability that go with these. You will understand that I am writing as the political conservative that I am and have been for a long, long time. Conservatism has roots only in a middle class; the history of labor in this country teaches that. So does the history of the Italians, Irish, Poles, Jews, and other minorities—all of whom clearly are becoming more and more conservative in their politics, the direct consequence of achievement of middle class status at very least. In other words, and in sum, I hope the Nixon administration will encourage every possible economic assistance to the blacks, chicanos, and others of comparable status. Neither the country nor the Republican party can possibly lose in the long run. Will there and revolutionary spirit merely blunt their edges against the wall of middle class status? You can consider that a virtually iron law of history.  

5. I think there will be any intense college student voting in the next election unless some exclusive issue has been pressed. It is hard to think what this could be. I imagine we will be, for all practical purposes, out of Viet Nam. Into the kind of local, economic, and political regard for the minorities I mentioned above, it is difficult to think that civil rights will be in any degree the kind of issue it was in the 1960s. The distance between blacks and whites widens constantly in the political sphere, and I think there is nothing the blacks want so much here as the sense of being no longer dependent upon white political allies. They seem to like to set their own goals, and their own way, and I think this is splendid. But it does mean that white students are less likely to be welcome in the future so far as political objectives are concerned.  

6. Nothing I can or hear of as I get around the academic U. S. suggests that anything explosive will take place next spring—or any other time. That one now finds is general indifference, a renewal of "suddenness", even a decline in use of drugs, and no special interest in politics. For anyone in the Nixon administration to try to make the "student revolution" or any aspect of student behavior an issue would be to create a great deal of needless trouble. Once again the American people are everywhere by intelligent thought the party affectionate in normal regard for each other, and show no sign of a good response a couple of years ago, that there is now dead and should be forgotten. The stark, unfair, historical fact is that now it is not
the student militants of the 1960s, who, in retrospect, have the image of "trouble makers" but, rather, Attorney General Mitchell and Vice President Agnew. For many reasons I regret this. But I am bound to confess that I sense clearly in the present atmosphere, A position of strong, even aggressive, "law and order" was relevant to Middle America in 1968. It isn't now. And the best thing to do is present that as an issue and to take credit for having removed it as an issue.

9. My guess is that college youth, to the degree that it votes, will vote in heavy majority for the Democrat whoever he is—-let particularly if he is Kennedy or McGovern. I would ignore the fact. Kennedy has an appeal that will be forever beyond my comprehension, but it is there, and it will grow and grow among youth. To try to attack it would be futile and probably worse. I assume Kennedy will do everything he possibly can to create the sense of a terrible crisis afflicting America, the need for "leadership", for bold and novel action, and no doubt this will go over well with college youth. But it would be asking for trouble to try to deal with it directly. It would be, frankly, impossible. For anyone to try to take an issue of Champs-speak would also be suicidal as far as the Republican party is concerned. I said two months after that event that within a couple of years it would revolve around to his actual credit among many groups. Call it the adolescence complex. Call it whatever you wish. But my one guess is that if any Republican platform publicly goes after Kennedy in terms of Champs-speak, at least a million more votes will have been garnered for Kennedy, and despite some nonesse I hear now and then, this will be just as true of women voters as men. In short, forget and give instructions to every Republican campaign to forget, Champs-speak.

6. I think, and regret the fact, that President Nixon will have a difficult time in getting re-elected. He deserves to be, but he has lots against him. Starting with the sheer number of Democratic reinforcements. To try to meet the problem through political conservatism, through shrinks, through transparent efforts to spin this or that statement public, seems to me hopeless. His best chance is to bring the anatomist, above the battle, thoroughly interested in it he say be, and to convince his appearance on TV strictly in inestimably emotional matters until the very last. And this suggests to me the following: If it is not necessary to appear on TV, it is necessary not to appear on TV. With Nixon in California it helped—-and helps. With President Nixon it does not. I am referring, of course, to ordinary speeches, announcements, and the like. Nixon is exasperatingly good, it comes to me, on a televised press conference, and I would like only to see him just a speak more clear—less acerbic, friendly (as it seems) to the press. The point is, Nixon hasn't a chance against the televised approach of Kennedy. So, how is one to keep an advantage? It is as simple as this: the potential advantage of being in the office, of being first and foremost the president, not a campaigner.
That is about what I recall of our discussion. I can't imagine that any of it will be of either illumination or use to you, but you asked for the written comments, and I find it a pleasure to obey. Again may I say that I found it a high point of my trip to Washington to meet you and Ray Price for the first time. If I can ever be of any assistance to you, I shall be pleased to try. All best wishes,

Sincerely,

Robert Misket

P. S. My best to Ray Price—and my thanks for his kindness. President Nixon is damned lucky to have you both!
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 5, 1971
10:45 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN

It is my understanding that you wanted whatever preliminary thoughts I have regarding how the President should go about campaigning in 1972 as well as suggested themes which he might follow.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNING

Undoubtedly if other people are putting together memoranda on the above subject for you, they will lead off by saying we cannot have a rehash of the 1970 Congressional election campaign. I would concur. My reason is not because of the San Jose incident or the celebrated Phoenix fiasco. Rather, it is my contention that the style of barnstorm campaigning such as the President utilized in 1970 is the opposite of what the people are looking for in President Nixon now, just as it was in 1970. Everyone knows that President Nixon is or can be a tough, gutsy political fighter. However, in the political arena the chemistry of that side of the President is not compatible with the kind of President most people want him to be. (I don't think that this is just a liberal view; conservatives feel this way, too.)

All of the above adds up to say that the posture of the President's political campaigning in 1972 should, in my mind, be done from the level of the Presidency and different from any way that the President has campaigned in any of his campaigns heretofore. He should be firm, relentless in his campaign for a Generation of Peace, calm at home, etc. He should forge vision of the America he sees ahead in his own patriotic style. But all of this at the highest of Presidential levels.

THE PRESIDENT'S CAMPAIGN SCHEDULE

If the President were to begin campaigning immediately after the convention, this would give him nine weeks of campaign time prior to Election Day. It would seem to me that after the convention which ends on Wednesday, the President would remain in Southern California through to the weekend and then return to Washington and
2.

move immediately into the official duties of running the Government in a very demonstrable way. Hopefully, other than perhaps one or two major speeches at non-political forums, he would not begin any campaigning until the very end of September. Let's have people surprised by his ability to wait it out. The Vice Presidential candidate, our surrogates, members of the Family, members of the Cabinet, etc. can move off and do their thing, but the President should hold tight if possible, using perhaps only the four weeks prior to the election for campaigning in the country.

I envision the President’s lacing the whole campaign with the necessity of continuing to run the Government. Perhaps this approach is naive and unbelievable to the American people since the Press Corps would never be willing to suggest that the President is staying away from politics and running the Government. On the other hand, a crisis situation or an event of enough magnitude to demonstrate that the President is deeply involved in handling the affairs of state and not campaigning might register on the citizens – and I think register in a positive way.

In the four or five weeks which the President spends campaigning, I would see him spending no more than four days a week at the maximum on the stump. You can tie back to several persuasive arguments in your 1968 memorandum regarding campaigning. You laid out the number of events he should have in a given day, the way to dominate the evening news, and several of the other points which you made which are apropos even now with his being President.

TELEVISION

The television for Presidential appearances and speeches (separate from the spots which will be produced as well as the use of a documentary) should fall into two categories. First, major national talks or speeches to the country or perhaps speeches to selected parts of the society such as the aged, the laborer, etc. Since through the normal coverage of the campaign, the President will virtually be on television or have the opportunity to be on the television news every evening, it seems to me that his national television appearances should be curtailed to avoid over-exposure. In the weeks between the convention and the election, it is conceivable that he should have no more than two nationally broadcast speeches. These two speeches would be basically the umbrella for the national campaign (supported by our advertising spots) in terms of the national themes which he wants to set forth. One of the speeches could come in the first week of the campaign period, perhaps the kick-off. The second speech would be immediately prior to the election.
3.

I visualize the President’s announcing that as a candidate for the Presidency, he will visit every region of the country. This can tie to an overriding national theme of a united country but also the realization of various regional problems which he can, and wants to, deal with specifically when he goes on television in these regions. I would consider breaking the country into the following regions: The Atlantic Seaboard States including New England, the South, the Midwest, the Southwest, the West, and Northwestern States. The President would do regional television in each of the five areas designated. The television could take any number of forms but the substance of the broadcasts would be to hit as hard as possible on those issues-oriented problems directly related to the particular region as well as whatever national themes he wants to continue to pound away on.

There is no reason why all of the television for the various regions must be stereotyped. It may be that in Atlanta, for the South, we would want to use a big colosseum jammed with 100,000 people whereas in the New England Eastern Seaboard States, he might go for a Nixon in the arena-type setup such as he had in 1968.

I do not think that it is important at this point to decide the form for the various television appearances. Rather, what I consider important is that the President think in terms of using television on a regional basis in order to cut down any tendency to go for over-exposure with nationally televised speeches. Over-exposure could be our worst mistake.

RHETORIC/THEMES

The rhetoric for the reelection campaign will undoubtedly be set in the President’s dramatic acceptance speech in San Diego. The tone and style of that speech will probably be more important than the "I See a Day" speech from 1968.

The President is going to have to articulate what he has done abroad as well as at home. It will be necessary to build a good case that much is left to be done which only President Nixon can accomplish. The President, as will be clear by convention time, has reordered the priorities of the world power blocs. Yet he must strongly allude or say outright that the weaving of the new international fiber has just begun and it cannot be put into the hands of amateurs or it will never be lasting.

The bomb blasts of the 1971 dramatic announcements must cease. They will have had their effect and will still be well-remembered. I feel that the President is going to want to move the public into a very settled period where they have a sense of security, serenity and a realization that peace abroad and the calm at home are not visions, but a realization made possible by President Nixon’s leadership.
The weak area will be the President's domestic programs. Between now and Convention time, a significant effort must be made to either push those programs which are in Congress so as to get a feeling by the public that the Administration did offer a revolutionary domestic program and it was Congress that failed; or we must be ready to offer, as part of the platform, some domestic programs that will be able to take the edge off of the opposition's criticism that the President has ignored the country domestically.

It seems to me that domestically we are vulnerable to the argument that much has been settled in foreign affairs and now is the time to get to our domestic work with a domestically-oriented President. If only as a security insurance, we need to be hedging against the domestic attack. (If I were Hubert Humphrey, I would announce that if elected President, I would try to talk President Nixon into becoming my Secretary of State.)

PUBLIC SUPPORT

One important realization we must have is that the President is going to want to have contact with and be overwhelmed with acclaim and demonstrations of popular support among the people. It is inconceivable that we can wage the campaign across the country from television studios. The President will want events which in some ways give him huge Presidential crowds. He is going to want crowds and we must find a way to provide him with forums and opportunities to demonstrate the popular appeal.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 5, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RAY PRICE

SUBJECT: Campaign '72

Some thoughts:

Our approach to the campaign has to center on the fact of incumbency. This makes it far different from '68, and also different from 1970 -- when the campaign was directed at turning out incumbents in Congress, and when by the nature of our campaign -- approaching it as if we were the "out" party -- we did lasting damage to ourselves.

People want their President to be Presidential. Further, I think the basic underlying political reality of 1972 (apart from whatever may be the particular issues) is that people, by and large, are fed up with politics and "politicians." Part of our strategy should be to make the other guy look "political" while we stay away from it. This, of course, is something in which the incumbent has an enormous advantage.

As I've said before, I still think the central lesson of the 1970 election was that it marked the first cresting of a massive backlash against politics and politicians, and that this sweeps across the ideological spectrum (example: Buckley and Chiles were miles apart ideologically, but both came across as essentially "non-political" types -- and conservative Buckley won an upset in liberal New York, while liberal Chiles won an upset in conservative Florida).

Therefore, I think it's vital that we resist the temptation to take cheap political shots, to engage in transparent political ploys (and most of them are transparent), and to appear overly eager in our political courtships. If we appear to be panting after every gaggle of prospective voters, we don't look Presidential -- even to the targets of our putative affections.

Closely connected with this is the element of trust, which depends heavily on voter perceptions of motive. Each thing we get caught in
that looks like a sacrifice of principle for politics affects that perception -- far beyond the issue of the moment, and far more lastingly -- and thus undermines trust. A lot of our trouble in climbing in the polls, I'm convinced, stems from our frequent efforts to make political capital out of a passing controversy, in ways that win quick plaudits from those who agree with us but that do lasting damage to the essential element of trust. When we do this, the negative is remembered long after the positive is forgotten.

Practically every political disaster we've suffered has been the result of an effort to make political points or score a short-term political coup; very few of these set-backs have not been self-inflicted.

I've often felt that if we lose in 1972 it's probably going to be because we tried too hard to win. We've got to apply to politics the same kind of long-headedness that you've applied to foreign policy -- not letting ourselves get so caught up in our concern with the next day's headlines or the next month's Gallup poll that we lose sight of the one poll that counts -- which isn't until next November.

Our aim should be to calm passions down, not to heat them up; to bring people together, not to drive them apart; to heal, not to inflame. Precisely because we are the Administration in power, our standing will rise or fall with the general index of public contents and discontents. If people are generally satisfied, they'll be generally inclined to stick with what they've got rather than take a chance on something new; if they're generally dissatisfied, they'll be more likely to gamble on a change -- regardless of whom they see as the primary architect of those discontents.

We're going to confront strong temptations to engage in scapegoating -- trying to rouse people in anger against some handy target, whether the young, the radicals, the academic-intellectual complex, the UN or whoever -- but even if our complaints are justified, if we yield to these temptations we're going to end up hurting ourselves more than we hurt our targets. Just as we did in 1970.

In part, this boomerang effect is pretty well summed up in a comment once reported by Robert Coles, author of "The Middle Americans," who
mentioned on an interview program a few months back that he'd been told by a blue collar worker: "I don't like to hear the Vice President of the United States sounding like I do after I've had a couple of beers."

But more fundamentally, the American people are tired of conflict. They're tired of cant. They've just been through the shrill Sixties; they're worried, uncertain, confused, and a lot of them are just plain scared; they can't always put their finger on just what it is, but they're nagged by a sense that things are unsettled and potentially threatening.

Four years ago I argued that we should present ourselves as the ones who best can manage change: defusing its threats and developing its opportunities, welcoming it, but directing it in an orderly way. I still think this is valid. This requires more of an "explainer's" role, helping lead people through some of the complexities they find so difficult to understand, and helping them see that they're not really so threatening after all; and by so doing, getting across the idea that even if they don't understand them, we do. We can't stuff the fears of the American people away in a closet and shut the door; it won't stay shut. We can help deal with those fears; we can reduce them, just as a child's fears are reduced when the light goes on and the dark that bred them is dispersed.

In addressing ourselves to the principal groups that will be largely against us, it's vital that we remember it's not only their votes that count. In terms of the total impact of the campaign on the others -- on the swing voters who could go either way -- their attitudes, their impressions, and the intensity of their opposition is going to be even more important. Even if we don't change the way college kids, for example, are going to vote, if we change the way they think about RN and the way they talk about RN, we can greatly change the kind of influence they're going to exert over the rest of the electorate.

In our case, this is doubly important because the groups we're talking about tend to be the articulate, the quoted, the writers and commentators and cartoonists -- and it makes an enormous difference whether they're mildly opposed or vehemently opposed. We might, by analogy, think of it in terms of knowing that a paper is going to be critical of us, but of being able to influence the way the cartoon is drawn. This has an enormous ripple effect.
It may be that there's once again an opportunity, such as the one we lost in early 1970, to turn the tables and make the 1930 liberals look silly. But we can only do it by meeting them on their own jousting-field; and only by appealing to their own peer group, for the judgment of the peer groups is the only one that really matters to them. We can't do this by jingoism: indeed, the more we indulge in jingoism the more we entrench them in their own collective sense of smug self-righteousness. We've got to drive wedges between them, and among them; as was beginning to be done until we began going off on our sporadic anti-everybody crusades, and thus restored their alliance.

Now we have a chance to capitalize on the new perceptions of RN -- or more accurately the shaking of the old perceptions -- that have followed the China and economic initiatives. We can also capitalize on the new mood on campus, recognizing that the relative quiet by no means indicates a warming toward us, but that at least it does represent a diminution of the shrill emotionalism that provided such a solid armor against reason. And we can capitalize, too, on the disenchantment with the other side that's bound to set in as the presidential contenders step up the pace and intensity of their quadrennial antics.

The onset of the political season, in fact, gives us an extraordinary opportunity: if we seize it; for in the present national mood of disgust with politics and politicians, we bask in the ultimate luxury of not having to act political. We occupy the Presidency, and by using it presidentially -- in contrast to the challengers -- we can make them look petty and RN the "statesman" by contrast.

One element of our approach, therefore, should be to come forth with a barrage of thoughtful, creative, forward-looking (which can be liberal, conservative, both or neither) analyses and discussions, and in particular, discussions that recognize and deal with the deep-seated fears and concerns that wrack not only the man in the street, but also the man in the book-lined study -- demonstrating that even though we disagree with many of his prescriptions, we do understand and appreciate the concerns, and we're doing our level best to address them in new ways consonant with the new needs and opportunities of the years just ahead.

It gives us an opportunity to posture ourselves as the serious students of government, making use of the vast resources available to the Federal
Government -- using them creatively, imaginatively, humanely, and consigning those still imprisoned by the old rhetoric and the old remedies of the New Deal and post-New Deal era to the honored but dusty shelf of the quaint and the dated.

This is an example of using incumbency: of building on our greatest strength, which is the fact of incumbency.

The election of 1972 will turn on the skill with which we use this greatest asset: incumbency. If we fail to use it skillfully, it can become our greatest liability -- fatally so, in a time of brittle discontent and wallowing uncertainty.

In terms of scheduling, etc., I'd hope that political rallies could be kept to a minimum (and that we would lock ourselves into a firm commitment to do no rallies in the final four days of the campaign). A fair amount of travel, but where possible in "non-political" settings; a number of live addresses to large groups (conventions, etc), in which the speeches would include thoughtful analyses and fresh insights; fairly extensive use of radio, and mid-level use of television; but with the heavy emphasis on doing the Presidential job, and on those initiatives at home and abroad that are going to require more years of follow-through.

###
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: DICK MOORE
SUBJECT: The President as a Candidate

When a President runs for re-election, the office itself can be his greatest asset. In a close contest, it can be the decisive factor. This memorandum deals with the "art of incumbency" as it relates to 1972.

The ultimate advantage of the office of President, of course, is substantive. The President has the opportunity to make decisions, take actions and provide the leadership which the country needs, as we have seen so dramatically in the last 90 days.

This memorandum, however, does not deal with substantive programs, but with the politics: How should the President conduct himself to achieve the maximum political advantage inherent in the office and title of President of the United States?

I realize that many say he should "run as President" rather than as a candidate. To an important degree, that is probably wise, but I rather think there is room for both, meaning that he should stand apart from political activity and concentrate on the duties of the office.
Because we are talking about an art, we might start by looking at an old master. Until now, probably no President could match FDR in his understanding of the political power of the presidency and how to use it. He knew almost intuitively how far he could go, and this helped make up politically for what he lacked in substance. On the matter of incumbency, all the FDR campaigns are worth reviewing, but the campaign of 1936 seems particularly in point for 1972.

Despite the lop-sided result in 1936, there were reasons why the Democrats were not overly confident as the year began. FDR had captured the imagination of the public, but he had not solved the problems he inherited, and some of his remedies simply weren't working. Therefore, although his campaign did not officially open until September 29, he began his "non-political" phase early in the year. In his capacity as President, he found reasons to travel extensively, making speeches at dedications and taking full advantage of his well known specialty, the "inspection trip."

The attached list of his public appearances and speeches (TAB A) is worth looking at. FDR had no airplane, but he managed to get all the way to Texas and back in June; to Virginia, New York and New England in July; in August, he made "inspection trips" to Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, Indiana, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Nebraska, Wyoming, Colorado, Missouri, Iowa and Illinois. There were a few complaints that these appearances were "political," but essentially they were accepted, and they worked.

Under the circumstances, it can be said that FDR did run for re-election "as President" rather than as a candidate at least until five weeks before election day. Then he moved directly into the home stretch with an intensive cross country campaign, complete with whistle stops.

But even in this traditional phase, he played the role of President rather than that of candidate, in the sense that he never allowed himself to set down to the same level as his opponent and never mentioned Governor Landon by name. He was always the President, and the other fellow was a job seeker.

Today, the incumbency offers even more advantages than it did a generation ago, and in that context, I would make the following suggestions:

**Presidential Trips:** RN should continue and perhaps expand his program of taking the Presidency to the people. His practice of non-political visits to all regions of the country is well established and cannot be attacked as a political contrivance in 1972, especially if he maintains a bi-partisan flavor as in the recent trips.
As one important new feature, we should try to give attention to special interest groups and constituencies. The visit to the Knights of Columbus in New York was one good example; another was the nursing home in Manchester, N.H., which got a good play among older people. The Presidential visit or drop-by could be particularly effective with young people, or, for that matter, with blue collar workers, Indians, teachers, or conventions of professional or trade associations. In short, let's target groups as well as places.

Don't Change Horses. During 1972, the President's personal leadership in our foreign relations will continue to be a matter of paramount national interest. This is one of the most valuable assets of the incumbency, and we should make a constant effort to portray the President's foreign negotiations as an ongoing program; one that requires continuity of RN's leadership over a period of several years. We may be out of the Vietnam war before the election campaign, but the road to lasting peace depends upon the China initiative, the SALT talks, and better relations with the Soviet Union. These great projects are still in the beginning stage and RN needs time to complete them.

If we can establish the need for continuity in these delicate foreign relationships, we can expect to benefit from the most powerful campaign theme of all:
Don't change horses in midstream.

In the final analysis, there seems to be little doubt that this theme was the element which overcame the third term tradition in 1940. People felt FDR had the knowledge, experience and the personal relationships; on election day many were simply reluctant to turn over the conduct of our foreign policy to a beginner. They should feel the same way about RN.

Press Conferences. As we get closer to the Campaign, we can expect the news media to grow more hostile and snide, if possible. One of the greatest advantages of the presidency is the privilege of communicating directly with the people, particularly in a campaign year. I expect RN will want to use this privilege more frequently during 1972, and I suggest that a policy be formulated soon. I recognize the problem of preparing for a full scale conference, but isn't one solution the one-subject conference in the Oval Office? In any event, the role of the press conference in 1972 is a question which should be considered carefully at this planning stage.
Public Appearances and Speeches by Franklin D. Roosevelt during 1936

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 8</td>
<td>Washington, D.C. - Address at Jackson Day Dinner, broadcast to 3,000 similar dinners</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Address at dedication of Theodore Roosevelt Memorial</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Radio address for benefit of crippled children</td>
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<td>February 22</td>
<td>Philadelphia - Address at Temple University (Honorary Degree)</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Radio address on Brotherhood Day</td>
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<td>March 23</td>
<td>Rollins College, Florida (Honorary Degree)</td>
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<td>April 16</td>
<td>Address at dedication of new Department of Interior Building, Washington</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Radio address on 3rd anniversary of CCC</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>New York City - Thomas Jefferson Dinner</td>
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<td>June 8-15</td>
<td>Trip to Centennial Celebrations in Arkansas and Texas. Speeches or informal remarks at:</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Knoxville, Tennessee - Informal talk</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Rockport, Arkansas - Informal remarks at religious services</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Little Rock, Arkansas (Major Address)</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>San Jacinto Battleground, Texas (Major Address)</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Address at Alamo, San Antonio</td>
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<td>Austin, Texas - Rear platform speech</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Ft. Worth, Texas, Fairgrounds</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Dallas, Texas - Major address at Centennial</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Dallas, Texas - Remarks at unveiling of Robert E. Lee statue</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Dallas, Texas - Luncheon Speech</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Dennison, Texas - Remarks</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Muskogee, Oklahoma - Remarks</td>
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<td>Vincennes, Indiana - Major Address</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Louisville, Kentucky - Remarks</td>
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<td>Larue (County) Kentucky - Remarks at Lincoln Birthplace</td>
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<td>Martinsburg, West Virginia - Remarks</td>
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<td>Philadelphia - Acceptance Speech Democratic Convention</td>
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<td>July 3</td>
<td>Dedication Address, Shenandoah National Park, Virginia</td>
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<td>Monticello, Virginia - Address at Jefferson's Home</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Dedication address at Triborough Bridge, New York City</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Homecoming Celebration, Hyde Park</td>
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July 15-31  
FDR vacationed in Campobello, visiting Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont and Massachusetts en route; inspecting flood areas, dams, and other sites, and conferring with the Governor and other officials in each state.

31 Quebec, Canada - Major Address

August 13-15  
Inspection trip through flood-damaged areas of Pennsylvania and Ohio

13 Altoona, Pennsylvania - Remarks  
Johnstown, Pennsylvania - Remarks

14 Erie, Pennsylvania - Remarks  
Cleveland, Ohio - Luncheon Address

Chautauqua, New York - Major Address ("I hate war")  
(Following Chautauqua speech, made flood inspection trip from Binghamton, New York, to Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania with Governor Lehman and other officials)

15 Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania - Remarks  
Mauch Chunk, Pennsylvania - Remarks

Aug 21-Sept 5  
Trip to inspect drought areas in Midwest; this included conferences with various governors and rear platform remarks or other informal speeches at:

Garrett, Indiana  
Gary, Indiana  
Bismark, North Dakota  
 Jamestown, North Dakota  
Pierre, South Dakota  
Aberdeen, South Dakota  
Huron, South Dakota  
Mount Rushmore, South Dakota  
Sidney, Nebraska  
Cheyenne, Wyoming  
Laramie, Wyoming  
Julesburg, Colorado  
North Platte, Nebraska  
Hannibal, Missouri  
Baring, Missouri  
Atlantic, Iowa  
Springfield, Illinois  
Jacksonville, Illinois  
Indianapolis, Indiana  
Connersville, Indiana
(FDR 1936 Speeches, etc. - continued)

September  
6 Fireside Chat on Drought Inspection Trip
8-10 Visit to Asheville, Charlotte, Salisbury and Greensboro, North Carolina (Speeches appear to be non-political)
18 Harvard University Tercentenary - Major Address
29 Syracuse University - Remarks at dedication of Medical College
   Syracuse, New York - Major Address at Democratic State Convention ("The Opening of the Democratic Campaign")

October
1 Campaign trip through West Virginia and Pennsylvania
2 Dedication address at Medical Center, Jersey City, NJ
   Remarks at ground-breaking Mid-Town Tunnel, New York City
8-17 Intensive campaign trip:
   Iowa
   Minnesota
   Nebraska
   Wyoming
   Colorado
   Kansas
   Missouri
   Illinois
   Michigan
   Ohio, and
   Up-state New York (This trip included major addresses at
      St. Paul
      Omaha
      Denver
      Wichita
      Kansas City
      Chicago
      Detroit
      Cleveland, and
      Rochester. (There were seemingly countless rear platform speeches)
21-22 Intensive campaign trip through:
   Rhode Island
   Massachusetts
   Connecticut
28-29 New York City
   New Jersey
   Pennsylvania, and
   Delaware
(FDR 1936 Speeches, etc. - continued)

October 30    New York City and environs
31           Madison Square Garden

November 2   Pre-Election Address from Hyde Park
MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: JOHN McLAUGHLIN
SUBJECT: The President's Presentation of Self in 1972

Presidents of the United States have customarily adopted one of three traditional styles of leadership. It may be instructive to review these.

The Father-King. This is a favorite style of leadership. Eisenhower used it. F. D. R. certainly used it. The Father-King settles all problems by simply the reassurance of his presence. "All shall be well, and there is nothing to fear."

The Father-King style appears unsuitable for the President for two principal reasons: It does not fit his manner, and the times probably would not sustain it. RN clearly has neither the temperament nor the "bulk" to successfully present himself as a Father-King. The times do not need a Father-King, because we have to face squarely the problems confronting the Nation. We need to take the immensity of our problems and their complexities, and cut them into bite-sized pieces that can be resolved. The Father-King is not cut out for this kind of style.

The Philosopher-King. This is the second mask of traditional leadership. The Philosopher-King is primarily concerned with the articulation of his people's values. Wilson used this style. The young F. D. R. to some extent successfully used it.

Although there is at present a great need for articulating national values, I frankly do not believe that the time for such an articulation is ripe. Putting it more strongly, I do not believe that anyone can
presently present any values that would receive acceptance sufficiently wide so as to make it politically desirable to do so. The cultural and ethical divisions in the country prohibit any unified philosophy from being acceptable. I personally believe that RN's own convictions that the "tried and true" values still have a lot of life left in them. I do not believe that the so-called counter-cultural revolution now taking place will force these values aside, and our bare-footed and bearded young will seize the seats of power. We are at a bend in our cultural history, not a U-turn. More time must elapse—perhaps a couple of years, perhaps a decade—before our society sorts out its tensions and competing ideologies enough so that the Philosopher-King role may be successfully used.

The No-Airs King. This is the Truman or Coolidge stance. Truman's secret, of course, was to shuck any kingly style whatsoever. His was the image of the indomitable loser, the blunt and earthy scrapper.

This style, I submit, would be unsuccessful today. It won Truman one election. I doubt that it would have won him a second. The problem with this style today is that it is too vulgarian and simplistic. The Nation's level of sophistication and education has risen to the point where it would find such a style at best diverting, but not persuasive, especially in a campaign of some duration.

The Lawyer-King. This is a new style that RN has developed himself. It consists essentially in problem solving. The Administration presents itself as a problem-solving administration. Although problem solving has not been the image of successful presidencies of the past, it appears that this style is suited to the times and suited to the President.

On merits, I believe that the most responsible role that any President could assume at our present historical juncture—even if he had the temperament and idiosyncracy to be a Father or Philosopher or Non-King King. We do not need a Daddy because we must face squarely the real conflicts of our time; we do not need a Philosopher because we are not capable in our present divisions of accepting the preachments of any philosopher, no matter how wise; we do not need a Non-King King, because he really cannot cope with the dimension and intricacy of today's vexations. We do need a Problem Solver, a level-headed, prudent, executive. If he is a lawyer at the same time, so much the better.
Characteristics of the Lawyer-King. A good Problem-Solver is unflappable, first, last, and always. Nothing perturbs him. He is unperturbable because he knows. There is nothing mythic about him. He does not radiate assurance because of some theatrical charisms; he is assured and reassuring simply because he has done his homework better than anybody else. Nothing frightens him, nothing disturbs him because his briefcase is full of the right memoranda. There is never any reason for blowing one's cool.

I believe that this style is the right style for the country and for RN's career. But it must be pursued explicitly and with some passion. Since "cool" is so much an ingredient of this style, it is somewhat difficult to build the necessary bulk for a fully realized, three-dimensional, political presence. But RN has been working at this for some time, willingly or unwittingly, and so a solid foundation already exists.

The Lawyer-King does not pretend that human mysteries and the eternal verities are his public interest or strong suit. He works out of an unshakable faith in the American destiny, and so he believes that our problems are only that -- problems. By definition, almost, problems are solvable. Any difficulty can be overcome. Even the Congress. Granted that RN wants a Republican Congress, whether he gets one or not, his problem-solving ability will not be impaired. Whatever goes wrong only adds another, but, again, a soluble dimension to any existing problem.

A second chief ingredient of the Problem-Solver is passion, a cool passion. This is the kind of emotion that suggests reserve power, an untapped source of strength and conviction whose magnitude is unlimited. J.F.K. was able to suggest this. It is characterized by a firmness, an assuredness, and it is rooted in a plenitude of knowledge and information. Again, as stressed above, the Problem-Solver owes his power to the fact that he knows more than anyone else. This must not degenerate into smugness or pedantry.

Probably the nearest approximation of the perfect embodiment of the Problem-Solver -- as a Platonic ideal -- in our time was Bob McNamara. No amount of harassment could disturb a hair of his shiny head. He presented himself uniformly as omnipotently skilled, patient, and ahead of everyone else in the room. The trouble with McNamara was that he appeared to be robotized, and this is the danger of the Problem-Solver style. It can be caricatured as Halberstam actually did to
McNamara. He treated him as being inhumanly cold, cardboard, two-dimensional, inhuman. I do not believe that RN is as vulnerable to this type of caricature as McNamara was. It is clearly established that RN has strong emotions, even though he is not generally demonstrative. Here again the foundation that he has built serves him in good stead.

Caveats. A successful presentation of the Problem-Solver style requires that there be no petulance, no anxiety, no shrillness exhibited on RN's part and on the part of any WH Staffer. If we complain about the Congress, lamenting its inertia, we may score a small political point, but at the same time in the eye of the beholder, we are suggesting that Congress has the power to hurt us, to irritate us. Whatever power the Congress or the Opposition has, is a power that we freely give to it.

This style also requires that there be no displays of hunger. Neither RN or the Administration should appear hungry for friendship, especially with the Press. Faulting the Press, again, may score political points but only at the expense of telling them and the public that the media indeed do have a measure of power over us. We cannot look hurt. We cannot sound hurt. One who can solve all problems, and knows he can solve all problems, cannot be hurt. So no pointing of fingers, no shrill assigning of blame.

This is not to say that controlled and cool criticism by some WH Staffers is undesirable. The point is that it would have to be done very professionally and very selectively.

RN has exhibited in certain public addresses a near-perfect Problem-Solving style as described here. His China Message was practically flawless. Omnicompetent, restrained, unforced. His Miami acceptance speech showed a relaxed confidence, a maturity, a full possession of himself, his Party, his objectives, and all the facts.

Administration personnel have also exhibited this style superbly, notably some appearances of Elliot Richardson, John Connally. But too often we have appeared over-earnest, wanting to be loved; "don't think it's easy to be on top," resentful of and fulminating about the Opposition. In a word, sweating it. All of this assigns power to the adversary.

Implications. The Lawyer-King, problem-solving style would have specific consequences for RN's platform and TV appearances. This can be discussed.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 6, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR
BOB Haldeman
RE: REELECTION CAMPAIGN

The tone or theme:

In spite of all the talk about this being an age of one-term Presidents, I believe it is very hard for the American people to turn out a sitting President. Therefore, obviously, the tone or theme of the campaign must be keyed to the fact that the President is the President, that he has done a professional and competent job, that he has made significant accomplishments and that there is, therefore, no reason to change.

I think people tend to vote against a candidate perhaps more frequently than they vote for him; and certainly a Presidential race always weighs a candidate against his opponent. An incumbent President has an obvious advantage and President Nixon has a very clear advantage in view of his international initiatives on the question of "compared to what?"

At the same time, the President is the national father figure, the exemplar, the leader, and the nation's champion against other nations. This is what the American people believe a President is and they want him to act out these parts. They want him to evidence compassion for the poor, even though individually they may say and do things showing callous disregard for the poor. It is alright for Mr. Voter to be indifferent to the poor but it is not alright, in his eyes and mine, for his President to be indifferent to the poor. In fact, I suspect he gets a certain amount of psychic relief from the knowledge that his President is being concerned about the less fortunate even at the time that he himself is not.
I think it is indispensable for the President to act out these roles in the course of the next year, with feeling and sincerity, to fulfill these expectations. To the extent that he does not we will find vague discontents and negative reactions expressed as "the President has no compassion, he doesn't care, he is cold and indifferent, he has no thought for the little people, he only cares about big business, etc."

Since this is role-acting, let's approach it as such. The President has a natural antipathy for doing the phony, the unnatural and the not-felt. But we are now not talking about making him comfortable to what he is doing; we are talking about getting him reelected and, in looking at that project coldly, there are some things that are going to have to be done to do the job properly that he may not totally like. But I am sure he and we would like the alternative even less. Because I think the alternative is to give exposure to an Achilles heel to which the President may be attacked mercilessly and effectively with unknown results.

And like a tennis game, as long as you can return the ball without mistake every time it doesn't really matter how hard you hit it. You keep playing for the other fellow's mistake. We occupy the high ground now since the President is the incumbent and all he has to do is go on being the incumbent. The other fellow has to figure out how to take the high ground. Therefore, we should avoid giving him handholds, avoid making mistakes, avoid acting rashly or without calculation or contemplation (e.g., the re-run of the Phoenix speech) and close as many of the doors as possible through which the enemy might enter.

In short, I would like to see the President put in situations which would act out his compassion, his fairness, his true concern for his inferiors, his leadership, etc. It does almost no good at all for those of us who know him well to tell about these things. One acting-out session will be worth ten thousand interviews with White House staffers or members of the Cabinet.

But he doesn't get coverage on C-SPAN when he does as then unless other fellow says - which they generally fail to do.
The President's part in the campaign

We had a good session with the Cabinet yesterday in the President's absence, and we told them all the things that they had to do in order to get the President reelected. But I suspect you know, and I strongly feel, that in the last analysis it isn't going to make much difference what the Cabinet says or does. The President himself is going to have to do much more than he is inclined to do, much more than he would want to do, and probably much more than his responsibilities in fact permit him safely to do. But nevertheless I think he will have to do them.

Television and Radio

I know there is a concern that the President is over-exposing himself on television. And yet the singular criticism which I hear as I go around the country talking the issues to people is that the President is not talking to them about the issues. The Cabinet is talking to them, the staff is talking to them, Bob Dole is talking to them but they want the President to talk to them. They want fireside chats. Over and over again I receive the suggestion that the President sit down and talk to the country about the issues of the time on a periodic basis, so that they may count regularly on hearing from him not just at times of crisis but under circumstances that will permit them to pull their chairs up to the television and listen to him explain to them about the problems of our aged, health problems, the problems of our youth and our cities in terms which they can understand and react to.

We have discussed the fireside chat format in the past and I gather that the ten o'clock meeting or the five o'clock meeting or the Saturday morning group or somebody doesn't think it's a very good idea. All I know is that there is considerable consumer demand out there in the field for this kind of thing.

As a variation on this, let me suggest that we think about this hunger or market demand in terms of regions. As Ed Harper pointed out to us in his analysis, the issue of support to parochial schools is a hot issue in limited areas. The issue of the problems of the aged is almost completely confined to 8 or 9 states. The farm problem is obviously localized. Perhaps there is a regional approach to this fireside chat idea that would prevent the President from becoming over-exposed nationwide and would avoid whatever disadvantages are inherent in such over-exposure.
Something like this would have to be started before campaigning begins in earnest and I know the equal time problem exists, but I also know there is a very strong pull for this among people who are thinking about the Presidency and about the nation's problems.

Personal Appearances

Aside from the fact that it prevents the press from writing that the President is ducking the people, I don't know that there's a great deal of advantage in personal appearances during the campaign. We've always been very big for rallies, crowd shots, motorcades and balloons but I really seriously question whether they are in any way important for an incumbent President. It may be that we need some bandwagon psychology but I wouldn't think so. There are obvious tolerance maximums in terms of the use of television, but I think those limitations are perhaps limitations on campaigning generally then, since I think the idea of the President getting out and whistle stopping or stump the nation is doubtful.

New Hampshire

I think I would stay completely away from New Hampshire under the circumstances. McCloskey may do better than anyone thinks at this time simply because he is effective up close and can be expected to make substantial inroads in the meager population of that state by an intensive hand-shaking and coffee hour campaign. I would think it's safer simply to take the position that New Hampshire has little or no significance in terms of the Republican nomination. It happens to be the first primary but somebody had to be first and it doesn't stand for anything. We might even play up McCloskey's obvious advantage in being able to devote unlimited time to hand-shaking in New Hampshire while the President is busy saving the world. McCloskey's absentee record might be emphasized and our chairman up there might make the point that it's more important for the President to be hard at work in the White House than up in New Hampshire trying to tilt for delegates with some unknown Congressman. If we write it off now, we don't have to apologize for any results later, assuming we can bring it off.
Trips into the Country

I would subscribe to John Whitaker's proposal for more issue-oriented trips and fewer rallies. I don't think I would go quite as far as he in degree but I think he has the right idea. He forgets to make the point that most of these issues are regional in character and we can pretty well localize our attack on an issue with some intelligent analysis. But he is certainly right that trips should be taken to discuss problems.

Running as an out

I think John Connally is right that the President has to run as an out, against the status quo, rather than as a defender of the status quo. There are simply too many unfulfilled proposals, too many unsolved problems, too many unsatisfied needs and wants as demonstrated by the Harris poll. People don't like the way the country is going and the only way to respond to that discontent is to run against the conditions which they identify. You have to advocate change under such circumstances, rather than to run on a platform of accomplishment.

If it's skillfully done, the President can attack his Senator opponent on the ground that he, the member of Congress, is the defender of the status quo since the Congress wouldn't change things even though the President wanted them to. The Senator perpetuated pollution, he perpetuated poverty, he perpetuated the conditions in the cities which might have been solved by revenue sharing, etc.

The Catholic Vote

We are operating under a set of assumptions about the Catholic vote that I suspect are totally invalid. You have seen Roy Morey's preliminary analysis and Pat Buchanan's seat-of-the-pants emotional response. I took the position with Buchanan that Morey had made the prima facie case and it was up to Buchanan to sustain his burden of proof and I am afraid Pat has not done so. He has told us with great fervor what he, Buchanan, believes but he has no answers for the statistics and polls which indicate the contrary. Because a strongly pro-Catholic position on some issues costs us votes (as shown by the polls) in the border states and the South, and we are relying on those areas as part of our base of support, we had better be very sure of the validity of our assumptions on this subject before we go much farther.
The Environment

A somewhat kindred subject is that of the electoral effect of the environmental issue. There is an instinctive distrust of this issue by the President. Yet the polls tell us very clearly that it is a highly important issue and everything that we can develop on an objective basis tells us over and over again that it is motivating and significant. If I read the Harris poll correctly (and it would seem inescapable to me on the basis of this poll) people don't want "balance" between the environment and the economy. We know that balance is right, makes good sense from the standpoint of the future of the country, has to be an important consideration in the things we do around here, but it will turn off the environmentally oriented voter. And here we are talking about broadening our base. It's the young, the women, the middle bracket wage earner who is concerned about pollution in overwhelming numbers.

Now, whether we like it or not, and whether the President agrees emotionally with the evidence or not, I think we have to be realistic about this issue and begin to act more politically about it.

On both these points, what I wish to argue is that we are making emotional responses to these two issues. Rather, we have to be cold, calculating and thoroughly political in our analysis of the issues and how to treat them.

Labor

I'm of two minds on this issue and I don't quite know what to suggest. We need to know a lot more about the situation than we do. We would like to think that we can make inroads into the labor vote; we would like to think we can even pick up some labor leaders at the margin who will help us. But we are under heavy attack by our friends at the moment for being soft on labor, for having sold out to labor on Phase II, for having tolerated wage increases and strikes to the serious damage of business and the nation and, in effect, for being "dupes" who have been taken into camp by labor, largely on a bluff.
In a minute I am going to mention credibility. We are telling people not to worry about the China trip and the Russia trip because the President is tough, he's able to handle them, he won't be taken in by them and they can't bluff him. It is being argued that our labor record makes these assertions incredible.

The President or the politician?

To be reelected the President must attract the support of people who are not party Republicans. The campaign must be inclusive rather than exclusive. It must bring to him people who are attracted by that extra ingredient rather than by the former Senator from California. In other words, everyone knows that the President is a consummate politician and frequently does things for political reasons. They often assign political reasons to things done for non-political reasons. There's a sort of rebuttable presumption that everything the President does is done for political reasons.

My thesis is that he will attract additional support if his campaign is essentially Presidential and not political. The closer we get to election day the harder it will be not to be political; not to say and do the purely political thing, to drop the Presidential mantle and wade into the fray at the level of the lowest common denominator. Yet I think that the strategy can be that of the front runner which was so successfully employed in the weeks just before the 1968 convention.

Credibility

In thinking about vulnerability, this has to be an avenue that we should be concerned about. McCloskey is already playing this tune in New Hampshire, to what effect I don't know. I think many people want to believe that their government officials are trying to pull a fast one, trying to slide one by them, trying to get away with something, etc.

I think each time Chuck Colson is caught at one of his escapades or the Defense Department is nailed on a North Vietnamese pipeline exhibit or we attempt to excuse some indefensible mistake by a subordinate we lose some people that we otherwise could have won. There's no doubt that we're going to be attacked as dishonest and incredible and I think we have to lean over backward to avoid creating grounds or even the appearance of grounds for these attacks.
I think the Bureau of Labor Statistics effort, while right, is going to cost us in the long run on this score. We're going to have the same trouble in punishing or firing those guilty of leaking. Suppression of the truth comes under the general heading of incredibility. This is a problem we're going to have to deal with on an almost daily basis, making the best judgment calls we can but always keeping in mind the overall problem.

Perhaps under this general heading comes the Justice Department and some of its activities lately.

The Law and Order Issue

The nationwide crime statistics for the last three years have not been very good. On the other hand, Washington, D.C.'s record has been excellent, given all the problems of this place. In truth, the difference is that we have poured an unbelievable amount of money into law enforcement in the District and it is governed by a dictatorship rather than an elected Mayor and City Council. We've been able to do a lot of things in the management of the city government that the electorate would never have stood for if they had had any say in it. And it's gotten results.

I'm not sure how this issue can be handled in the coming campaign. I suppose one approach would be to point with pride at the city we have responsibility for and say that big city Democrat Mayors could do the same thing if they were as good as we are. And we can say that we've been trying to send more money to the cities in the form of revenue sharing but the Congress wouldn't let us. But all in all it is not a good national record and we're going to be on the defensive in this area and we'd better start laying some plans right now for meeting the political onslaught. There is no sign that the statistics are going to get any better in the coming year.

Drugs - key concern, key opportunity - no headway.
Civil Rights

There is going to be a major political offensive against us in the civil rights area and we will have a separate report coming to the President within a couple of weeks as to the dimension of this problem and the directions that the attacks probably will take.

This memorandum started out to be general and ended up being specific on certain issues. Going back to the general, I think that the President should "declare peace" at the start of his campaign, say that the Vietnam war is at an end as he promised it would be, that the country is emerging into an era of peace and prosperity and that we have come through the dark night (please, not nightmare) with the President's firm hand on the helm. Many, many problems remain to be solved but now we're in a position to attack them with the same leadership, vision and courage that has been displayed in bringing us through the problems of war and recession.

To earn a generation of peace many international problems are yet to be tackled and it's a very bad time to be thinking about changing Administrations, particularly when such a good start has been made by the incumbent President.

We don't try and defend the domestic status quo; we urge that it be changed and we run against the failures of the Congress (the Democratic nominee almost surely coming from that body).

I apologize for the rambling nature of the memorandum but we'll try and organize this subject matter better for you in succeeding notes.

John D. Ehrlichman
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HERBERT G. KLEIN

I have been asked to give my opinion on the best tone and style of your campaign for 1972. In this memorandum I will treat both subjects, and I have added sections presenting some innovative ideas in specific areas. I have not gone into substance or issues because I understand this is not the purpose of the memorandum.

TONE

The tone must not appear phony or gimmicky in any way. It should emphasize your strength with the public and not be specifically directed towards patching up any possible areas of image weakness. Basically, the tone should bring forth the qualities which the public most admires in you: the thoughtful, intelligent, bold, forceful, and understanding President who is concerned about people individually and the world at large. This adds up to a leader who knows the people and provides strong leadership. The tone should be such that it avoids any sign of isolation or arrogance anywhere around the President. This is a President who knows the people and can and does meet them and listens to them. He is not unwilling, however, to make unpopular decisions if they are in the best interests of the Nation.

You are a man who cares -- and does something about it. The rise in the polls shows the public reacts to leadership, as particularly illustrated by Phase II. The tone should include continued emphasis on visible programs which demonstrate strong leadership.

STYLE

First, I will look at timing and then examine style more specifically.

1. Primaries and pre-convention. I would recommend carrying on the 1971 style of the Presidency, emphasizing the functions of the Nation's leader. This would mean not going into primary States to campaign, but would not exclude a few non-political appearances in key States several weeks before the elections.
This presumes the obvious—that we will have no serious primary trouble.

2. The convention. I suggest that the President arrive in San Clemente a few days before the convention. Prior to that time, he could spend time at Camp David meditating and working. During the convention, it is suggested that John Mitchell stay in the front and that I handle the Nixon Headquarters press as at past conventions, stirring interest and support and building news. This would be an operation from the Nixon Headquarters Hotel—the White House press would be in San Clemente with Ron Ziegler and working from there. After the convention, I would suggest holding sessions in San Clemente like those we held at Mission Bay, at least through Labor Day. I would recommend that the President then return to Washington to spend the next two weeks concentrating on the official burdens of the Presidency rather than the campaign.

3. The full campaign should include a combination of seeing the President in office and the President as an active campaigner. I do not believe a push-button campaign would be helpful. You need to campaign publicly so as to negate any issue of isolation and to stir up the public as only you can do in your campaign appearances. A campaign trip coupled with some well selected side trips which illustrates concern for the people can be a tower of strength.

In all of this, we should stress Richard Nixon as a man—a man of peace and a leader for peace, a man who is concerned and does something about it, a strong leader who knows when and where to act and who knows where the Nation is heading. This adds up to a unifier, a leader, a strong man with a steady hand at the helm.

SPECIFICS

I would start in January with an emphasis on domestic concerns. This, of course, includes the State of the Union, but I believe it should also feature a short television speech in which the President reports on his three years of United States leadership, his programs and their directions.

In February, or perhaps March, I presume you will probably visit Peking, and the Moscow trip will come in May. This will give foreign policy impetus. Following each visit, I would strongly urge a television report, a televised press conference, a prominent speech and possibly a reasonable
question and answer session with local people selected from communities in areas of importance.

Perhaps there should be two of these after each trip emphasizing "the President answers the people's questions."

The conventions in July and August will dominate the news.

In the Fall, as I have said earlier, I would hope that we would see a combination of an active Presidency and a strong campaign.

Throughout the year, special attention should be given to invitations to foreign visitors. The President needs to meet them, not only on a policy basis, but also on the basis of those who would do most to help with politically favorable headlines.

On a point of technique, I would opt for fewer television spots and more 5-minute visits with the President - the President at his desk, for example. All television use should be keyed to informality. Even at rallies, informality should be the rule.

In the thesis that you are a President who cares and unifies, we need to develop visible programs which bring the President together with blacks, with the young and with the "average man." In the minority community, I am not sure how many votes this will gain, but I believe the idea that you are trying will gain votes among the majority.

We know that regional impact is very important. I would include regional television and more regional press briefings, as we have done in the last two years. Further, a regional emphasis with selected vocal Cabinet officers would be good.

In our stress on the Presidency, we cannot ignore the need to also make campaign news. Certainly, your opponent will be doing this.

We must do all possible to make certain that this again will be a quiet summer because that is essential to the theme of unity. I wonder if we have special people taking soundings in the inner cities and on the campuses to ensure this.

INNOVATIONS

I believe the President will have to participate in some rallies and I think most of these should be in the area where people live, not at the airport.
Instead of the traditional daily speech, I would suggest experimenting with a format which would include a brief talk (10-15 minutes) and then feature questions from a panel of leaders for anywhere from 20-30 minutes.

If the questions are tough, (you will recall that even in appearances such as ASNE, the answers can draw cheers, as can a speech line) this informal format would make better television, would keep newsmen at a greater peak of interest and would be sensational with the audience. I believe it would also build worker enthusiasm and admiration.

If this is to be done, occasional press conferences would also be required to avoid the charge that you only answer the questions of selected people. Answers to questions at the regional briefings would serve a similar purpose.

I would renew the regional television Q & A panels such as those in 1968.

Before the campaign reaches an emotional peak, I would suggest that the President visibly meet with problem groups--farmers, blacks, etc. The gain here would be an impression of a President who cares, who seeks the answers and is willing to listen.

I would suggest that the President drop in on one or two college class-rooms during the early Spring and without prior announcement. With pool newsmen observing, the President could answer questions from the students. Something similar could be done with a group of non-College students, perhaps through an organization such as DEMOLAY or possibly even a Billy Graham youth meeting. Our opponents at that time would be too tied up with their own fights to react quickly to this technique.

We should do all possible to utilize the religious support the President has. Billy Graham, of course, is our greatest asset in this area, but I believe there should be additional church services and that perhaps we could devise a way to gain more attention for them through the selection of particular ministers. Any minister who speaks there, of course, has great regional news impact. I believe that the President should concentrate his efforts in working with opinion leaders (media groups, businessmen, industry leaders, etc.)--all should be carefully selected.

Another major point of emphasis should be human interests, such as can be generated by side trips during outside appearances by the President.
PROBLEMS

I hesitate to say this because, as you know, J. Edgar Hoover is a friend of mine and certainly is a great friend of yours. I do believe, however, that he now is in a position where he can be a political problem. He can hurt not only the President, but can damage himself and the FBI by staying on. I believe, as things stay quiet, that retirement at his birthday with an announcement made well ahead would be a fine solution. I am sure you would want him to stay on as a consultant.

With emphasis on law and order, we cannot afford to have a continuous FBI controversy. This also places great pressure on selecting a successor who would not draw Carswell-type trouble.

Other potential problem areas which could turn either way of course include most of the obvious; this summer, the economy, crime and scandals unknown at this time.

CONCLUSION

Tone -- thoughtful, strong;
Style -- bold, innovative, the Presidency at America's proud best.

cc: H. R. Haldeman