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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Patrick J. Buchanan

(1) The President already has my analysis of the election results. Would reiterate several points.

First, where our operation was far ahead of the field in assessing the impact of the mass media in the 1968 elections --- in the length and intensity of the 1970 campaign we did not take into proper account the enormously enhanced power the Vice President, but especially the President have to dominate the media as incumbents. In past years, it took weeks and months to hammer home a single issue. The same can now be accomplished in days. The 1972 campaign should be thought out on the same kind of basis the President thought out his entire 1966-1968 political profile. Now is our time for a "political moratorium". Further, the fall campaign of 1972 should be so constituted as to emphasize various and changing themes, saving the strongest pitch for possibly the last week (or two). We should not underestimate our ability to make a case, our ability to focus national attention on a single theme or the capacity of the public for being turned off by "overkill."

Second, reexamine the instruments of campaigning. Frankly, to what degree, if any, does campaigning enhance an incumbent's stature in the public mind? Is a rally with a cheering crowd and an effective cheer line by the President on night TV as good a forum for taking RN's case to the country as a nine p.m. press conference telling the nation why RN needs these men. Will the nation respond in better political terms to Nixon the campaigner, or to Nixon the President making his campaign speeches quietly and forcefully in prime time from the Oval Office? Has the day of the front-porch campaign --- or its modern counterpart --- returned?

If I were to make a shotgun judgment now as to what kind of campaign the President should run in 1972 --- I would recommend that he wrap himself in the trappings of his office --- give once a week major address on nationwide television at night --- and make not more than a handful of separate campaign appearances at noon to
show the nation, via networks, the President has the confidence of the people in the provinces -- he is their man.

But the President clearly needs an intensive analysis on the effects of campaigning per se. The team we have put together is by general judgments the best campaign team in history. Even our media adversaries say they wish we could run the government as well as we can run a campaign. The danger that lurks is that we shall become so enamoured of our success at managing the techniques of campaigning, 1968 style, that we may lose sight of the fact that they may now be irrelevant -- or worse, counter-productive -- for a sitting President in 1972.

Third, there are states such as Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio and Florida, essential to victory in 1972, where the Party has been mangled. We have to begin now to move to resolve differences and bring these parties together, or else begin almost at once organizing our own political machinery for the elections of 1972. John Sears told me that if the President were interested, he would draft a political memorandum with his thoughts on what should be done now and in the coming year, both on an organization basis and a strategy basis with regard to downgrading Muskie, and perhaps building up Humphrey as our opponent, on countering Wallace and strengthening our political machinery in the swing states. If the President is interested -- I will tell him to move on it right away.

Posture of the President through 1970 and into 1971.

The immediate necessity is to put politics and the campaign of 1970 behind us. Nothing we can do or say further is going to alter judgments, already made, about whether or not 1970 was a success or a failure. Our case has been presented -- the other side has presented its version of the results -- and the commentators and columnists have by and large already staked out their positions. Anything more is overkill.

This is consistent with my strong view that the time for Nixon the politician campaigning for his party is over -- the time is now for the President to represent himself to the nation as the elected President of the American people -- above the political wars now certain to ensue within the Democratic Party.
Through its gross distortion of the kind of campaign the President conducted, the media has driven home the impression of Nixon the partisan of the United States. We must not play into their hands with top-level White House discussions of the campaign of 1970 or the prospects for 1972 in either party. We must get back exclusively to the business of governing and leading the nation.

The election-eve impression left of RN the strident partisan -- and Muskie the national conciliator -- can be reversed in a matter of weeks. My strong recommendation is that at the President's first press conference, following the election -- which will be a bear-baiting exercise -- he demonstrate humor, a relaxed attitude, exude confidence -- and speak in terms of politics being behind us and now moving forward to work together on the nation's business at hand. Speak of the national need -- in calm reasoned terms -- for what the President has requested for the defense of friendly nations; speak of the need for action in areas where action has been delayed and people have unnecessarily suffered for that delay. (Unless I hear otherwise, this would be the kind of mood I would try to put into the Q. and A. for the next appearance.)

(With regard to Muskie, he suffers from the fact that he is not considered an outspoken leader by the ideological wing of his party -- he is likely, as McGovern is doing now, to begin taking potshots at us, which will be clearly political. We ought to simply dismiss them as political -- not engage in head-to-head -- and let him go about destroying his media image by himself, which he may well be forced to do to win the hearts of the ideologues that dominate the left wing of his party.)

Looking at further horizons, I see a need for the President to move back toward the role of national reconciliator -- symbolic gestures toward the black majority should be made (not to win votes; we can't) but to indicate to the great middle that the President is attempting to answer the crucial needs of the entire nation --- none excluded.

We also need to have something positive and appealing for the working people of this country in the way of tangible major domestic programs. Since, in any choice between a counterfeit liberal and the real McCoy, the country will take the real McCoy -- we ought to have some domestic initiatives of our own -- with the Nixon brand clearly on them. Regrettably, we are now pouring billions into programs like OEO, Model Cities, Urban Renewal, etc. for which we get no credit whatsoever.
My thought would have been to terminate or diminish as many of their programs as possible in order to shift the considerable amount of dollars into Nixon programs -- which would have a visible impact by 1972. To this degree, I concur with Phillips: To put together a new majority in American politics, we are going to have to provide the working men and women, white and blue collar, with more than rhetoric; we have to bring home the bacon; whether in the form of parochial, or what.

Finally, to counter the impression being pushed by the media that this is an Administration concerned only with cold statistics, an Administration long on public relations gimmickry and short on substance and vision -- I feel the President should seek out occasions to demonstrate "humanity" and "heart" -- spontaneous occasions, not planned meetings to demonstrate a symbolic affinity with, and concern for the unemployed and the less fortunate. The old Republican nemesis is the national image of the party of the bankers, party of business, the party that doesn't really give a damn about people. The Democrats are going to use this in 1972 as they have in every election since 1932 -- and we need to consciously consider words, deeds, symbolic acts that will give the lie to this charge before it is made by the National Democratic Party in earnest.

(3) Recommended Changes in Relations with the Media

The networks are not with us. NBC is openly hostile. The national press is in an ugly mood -- over both the lack of press conferences, and the feeling that we are B.S.ing them about the election returns. Given their natural affinity for a political fight, given their ideological pre-disposition, given their normal enthusiasm for the challenger, the underdog -- our situation here is not good.

On the plus side, it has never really been that good -- the hostility of the liberal media was always one element we had to consider. What to do.

We are never going to be loved by the national press corps -- that is a given fact. Any transparent attempts to become buddies will fool no one; will succeed nowhere. What our specific focuses should be, I believe are these:

(a) Go over the heads of the national press to the nation on more televised press conferences. Where we run into a problem of over-exposure, do them in the morning or at noon. Have the national press in for more of the Presidential, non-televised press conferences. These carry risks -- but this
instrument is among our most effective; we are extremely good at it; invariably the President scores with the people, if not with the press.

(b) While our differences with the national media remain irreconcilable we should take the initiative to ease tensions a bit. While there is much psychologically satisfying in roasting them with regularity, there is not much political profit in this. We have garnered much of that already. If we intend to take them on -- and hard -- we ought to first re-establish good relations, and wait until the fall of 1970.

Any future attacks on the media should be rifle shots -- at NBC for a specific abuse -- and not be perceived in such a way as that we are roasting the entire corps. This tends to leave some of them so browned off they make a special effort to gut us at every opportunity.

Our best hope for a fair shake lies now with the Reasoner-Smith team at ABC. We ought to give them our best leaks -- provide them with the best breaks. If we have to pick one network to do some major special on -- clearly it should be this one.

In attacking and supporting, we should as mentioned above, be selective -- a Herb Kaplow who will do something fair for us on the worst network, should not be slighted -- while Chancellors and Vanocurs should get nothing. And if we move on the attack, it should similarly be selective.

4. Use of the Vice President and the Cabinet

Like the President -- but to a far greater degree -- the Vice President should shift over from the political offensive to the policy offensive. The time for combative ness, for political in-fighting, is clearly over for now. In my view, the Vice President should be given a good slice of the domestic franchise to oversee, an issue or issues, a program or programs, to demonstrate the other side of the man -- the capable and competent executive working to get things done. His role as the President's Terrible Swift Sword should be minimized; he should be used in this assignment only when necessary; the President should utilize Cabinet Members and White House Staffers with good liberal credentials to start carrying the fight. They have capital in the bank to do it; the Vice President needs to replenish capital.
The Vice President makes an effective low-key presentation on television; when he is provided a new franchise, he should take to the networks to argue his case. He should be shown fighting for something -- not just against somebody. It would enhance his stature if he were given a foreign assignment of some duration --- this would broaden his image with the public; he might well make a campus appearance or appearances; he might well make a surprise visit for a A. and A. session with black leaders; he should be given the opportunity to demonstrate his abilities other than as simply campaigner; he should be provided the opportunity to show the many other facets to his personality other than fierce partisan.

The Veep is the most loyal of the President's soldiers; he took more wounds and scored more direct hits in the campaign than any other --- this was his job. But, to continue to do that job effectively, he needs to retire temporarily a political gladiator to show the nation that he is something other than the War Lover of American Politics.

Whenever, there is a new program to be announced that the President is not going to announce --- the Vice President should be the one before the cameras. Whenever RN is about ready to let something go of significance in the domestic arena --- the Vice President might well be the one who gets the headlines by giving an inkling of the new progressive direction of the Administration.

(The Cabinet)

Unless specifically asked, I would feel it presumptuous to recommend changes in the President's highest appointed body. But my views briefly are these: The President's commitment to clean up the Department of State has manifestly not been carried out by those given the franchise -- the President's men are not the men dominating that body -- the career service historically hostile to the President has too many positions of power -- and we are going to suffer damaging leaks in the 1972 campaign unless we do something about it. The Secretary of the Interior does this President no good and a great deal of harm with his transparent attempts to ingratiate himself with the liberal media. While I continue to admire Secretary Romney's tenacity and guts, he is a committed believer in the compulsary integration of American society --- to solve the race problem. My feeling is that this is socially dangerous at this time and politically disastrous --- and we spend too damn much time and effort trying to change peoples minds to change their policy to accord with the President. We might attempt changing the men rather than the minds. Finally, in the area of the economy, a mortal danger for 1972, we need
a man at Treasury who can articulate the President's policies, a staunch loyalist, who has both credentials and capability in the economic and political areas.

(5) Relations with Congress

With regard to the regular Republicans, we are still in good shape. As for the "Baker's dozen", they are going to make their own decisions as to what to do --- depending on their own political hides; they care as little about ours as we do about theirs. For example, Hatfield -- a True Believer -- can be expected to depart little from his former path. Percy, the Opportunist, who is up in 1972, is already making friendly noises. My view is that we ought not to wage war with them -- but to treat them in accord with the degree of support they give us -- and not lean upon them. Where we can find areas of agreement, exploit them; and see if we can convince them -- in their and the party's interests -- to minimize the degree of Goodellism that goes on.

As for the Democrats, as one of our aides put it, we are going to be "walking through a vat of acid," for the next two years. In the Senate -- half a dozen have their eye on the President -- and all their decisions, actions, statements, attacks and support are going to be on that basis. There is nothing at all we are going to be able to do with them. We should have our Cabinet and White House staffs programmed to answer their charges --- to deal with them on the political warfare level.

As for our own Congressional Relations --- in my view Bill Timmons is not only absolutely loyal -- but also the most hard-working of the President's men in the least enviable of Presidential assignments. I think he needs more manpower over there; I think he needs more visible identification as the President's man for Congressional relations; I think he needs more access to the President himself and his inner councils; I think he needs to be given more credibility for his job on the Hill --- by the President's visible demonstration that he is our man on Capitol Hill.

Finally, the President should place the onus for starting the political war on the Democratic Party in Congress --- by letting them fire the first few shots. Perhaps, when this Congress fails to act, as it will, and goes home for Christmas -- the President could, more in sorrow than anger, go on the nation's networks or lead off a press conference with a doleful recounting of its failures to act in the nation's interest -- and the President's hopes that the new Congress will serve the nation a little better.
Presidential Travel

Abroad: The exigencies of foreign policy will dictate if the President must go abroad to advance the national interest. From the standpoint of RN’s political posture, I strongly recommend against any "Grand Tour" trips ala the recent sojourn to Europe and the Mediterranean. The President is generally conceded high marks for his handling of foreign policy. The nation via television has already seen the President moving through countless cheering throngs abroad. Repeat performances will be redundant; they will be written off in the media — as the last trip was by some traveling reporters — as politically motivated. We have drawn down our balance in this account — there is not much capital left in foreign visits over the next six months. Lest we be charged, as we have been charged, of going abroad in search of crowds while the gnawing domestic problems remain unsolved, I recommend against. Also, by not going abroad in the near future, the President will have positioned himself well for a major foreign visit in early of mid-1972 — when it would be perceived as something of a far greater interest, and when it could more effectively underscore the President’s successes overseas in time for the 1972 elections.

At Home: Consistent with the view that the President must put the partisan image back of himself, reflect the "humanity and heart" of the Administration, reassume the posture of President of all the American people, I would recommend spontaneous visits, stop-offs to areas of social depression in the country — whether of unemployed whites or rural blacks.

Because of the appreciable amount of negative reportage we are receiving for "staging" events — these would necessarily have to be truly spontaneous; symbolic of the President's personal concerns for the people he leads. Democrats have consistently been superior to Republicans with this sort of communication — and given our party's hereditary image as the Party of Big Business — this is a woeful weakness. Such visits will also blunt the inevitable charge of the 1972 elections that Republicans are concerned only with cold statistics like 5.5 percent unemployment — that the President doesn't give a damn about poor people.

Similarly, however, as the nation has seen the President in cheering throngs abroad — so also, from the campaign, has it seen streets lined with cheering people at home. Though the motorcading through the crowds may serve as a rejoinder to any contention the President is not popular with the people — it also would seem redundant in the aftermath of the election.
Final Points.

First, we are getting some nasty criticism for having exploited the San Jose incident, and for alleged being an Administration more interested in image than substance -- long on P.R. and short on accomplishment. If pressed, this attack could be very damaging and I recommend we consider drawing in our horns on the P.R. operation side of things. The nation is one that is very keen to and very down on P.R. -- and the last thing we want in the world is to have the press start picking up the McGinnis theme of hucksterism. We should have a high level review of the effectiveness -- or again the word comes to mind, the possible "overkill" of this side of the operation. At all cost we should avoid any tarnishing of the President's image as President in the minds of the people -- and these attacks bother me.

Finally, at all costs we must avoid, in the wake of the election, and in the pressure the President is assuredly getting from the left, any kind of transparent public move to the left. This damaged us after Kent State and such would now be tacit admission the Restons and Sideys were right and we were wrong on the campaign. It would be disheartening to the bulk of our support. Rather than any left or right move it should be a forward move away from the partisan role of the campaign toward fulltime President again.

PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 11, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM: LEN GARMENT

1. My basic view is that the personal position of the President is stronger than generally supposed. The campaign was not a referendum on his policies or performance. Nor do I believe the President or the Presidency were affected by the campaign. The traumatic theory of politics is always overdone. The President has a unique capacity to move from combat to conciliation. Once this is done, the abrasions from the campaign will quickly pass and be forgotten.

2. Out of the mountain of comment on the election, the only original perception I've seen is in the attached editorial (Wall Street Journal, November 6) which argues that the correct measure of the President's performance is not the number or identity of candidates who won or lost on November 3, but the distance the President has carried the country since October 1969 -- when the White House was literally preparing for a siege. In this period, the authority of the Presidency has been restored, mass demonstrations have faded, near-agreement has emerged on issues such as Vietnam, law and order and campus disruption and virtually all the successful candidates -- of both parties -- ran on a platform largely fashioned by the President. Under these circumstances it would seem to me that the posture of the President, at least to begin with, should be confident, open and conciliatory, undertaking to unite all Republicans, to work with willing Democrats and to reduce liberal-moderate-conservative tensions to the extent possible.

3. In a symbolic sense we need this because we need to create a sense of a new start when the post-election interlude ends. In a practical sense we need this because we need a legislative coalition to perform effectively. In 1972 the argument that the Democrats obstructed programs will not be as effective as a record of substantial performance. In any event a record will have to be made. And whatever may be the problems with the Democrats, the failure to get Republicans behind our legislative initiatives will be even more difficult to handle. Performance is the key concept for 1971; and performance requires a strong, unified legislative team.
4. It is well to recognize that there are likely to be rough edges around the peace and prosperity issues as we move through 1971 and into 1972. Thus, the maintenance of a high level of performance in a wide range of subordinate issues could be critical to the President. Popular programs like health care and the environment will get their fair share of Presidential and senior staff attention. It is also important to press ahead -- quietly but steadily -- in support of traditional programs (Samuel Lubell points out that people who are cool toward concepts of racial "justice" want racial "peace"). And innovative initiatives which have a high political yield, like the President's arts program, should continue to be identified and supported.

5. Resources of the Administration should be organized to highlight substantive performance -- what we have done, propose doing, who is helping, who is obstructing. The Vice President might have a continuous role as spokesman on one or more major issues.

6. At the moment, I don't see any reason for major moves. I think it would be useful to organize some of the staff to think about these problems (e.g., the next campaign) on a more systematic basis. At the moment, I don't know enough to have any strong opinions.
You have already received, I am sure, far better assessments of the elections and the rest than I can furnish, in part because I was preoccupied with the Vice President's campaign and therefore didn't share in your effort or watch it as closely as I otherwise would have. So I will make my comments as brief as I can on the points raised in Bob Haldeman's November 7 memorandum.

1. Your election efforts:

   a. To all the VP's crew, it appeared that your campaigning did very excellently what the VP wasn't supposed to do and couldn't do -- stir up the general public and preempt both the national and local media. Assuming that the main objects of campaigning, aside from fund-raising, are to remind and stimulate, I believe the timing, execution and placement of your efforts are not challengeable even in hindsight.

   b. I fear we may have been guilty of overkill in such places as Texas (perhaps the only place); the heavy involvement of both the President and Vice President may have flushed out more opposition votes than supporters, and I believe it was agreed from the beginning that a small vote was desirable in Texas. Nonetheless, the Bush people have no basis for complaint; you and the VP did precisely as his campaign crowd asked.

   c. I feel a bit lame in making this point, since I was not in Washington to share in the decision-making and suspect there are considerations I am unaware of -- but I have the uncomfortable feeling that the Vice President had already driven home, powerfully and effectively, the law and order theme by the time you hit the trail and that he had already
peaked with that message to the country. So by mid-October all of us might have been better advised to swing away at least partially from this issue we may have already won (even the most radical Democrats had joined us on law and order by that time) and clobber the economic issue, plus bragging on Administration achievements. That is a gut feeling -- sheer smoke-shoveling -- but by the time you took to the road we were already in worried conferences in the VP's group on what to do about newly adverse developments in the economy and farm areas (the announcement of low parity in the closing days of the campaign was a disaster!). In other words, I vaguely sense even now (as the VP did in the last two weeks of the campaign) that we were overstressing an issue we had already won and on which the Democrats had covered themselves, and we failed then to modify course to take on escalating troubles in agriculture and the economy. Bob Haldeman may recall my distraught telephone call ten days or so before election about the economic problem -- which gave rise to Bill Safire's excellent statement for our candidates to use (and which we did use at Hartford and Tuscon) -- but I rather suspect we might well have charged on these other issues in the closing days, or at least given them greater emphasis, instead of sticking overlong to law and order.

d. Even if we had done what (c) above suggests, I must concede that local candidates would have raised pluperfect hell on the ground that you were campaigning too blandly; certainly everyplace the VP went, the local lust was for raw meat. Moreover, the press was hovering about with pencils poised, eager to charge that the campaign had been so nasty, so bitchy, that you and the VP had to confess wrong-doing and turn tail and run. So even if the country had drifted away from law and order in the closing days, had you and the VP changed subjects or muted the attack, there's no telling what the national reaction might have been. It could have been a disaster for you or the VP or both. There's no way to tell.

e. The bottom fell out in the Midwest and West. If that area had held up as I, at least, anticipated, we would have done excellently -- the 5 to 8 seat gain I personally expected in the Senate. The only constants in
that region that can explain this collapse, best I can figure, are: unemployment (spotty), high interest rates (epidemic and very basic), inflation (general), farmer surliness (a sleeper; never once even mentioned to us by any campaign manager or candidate in the entire area), and maybe a regional disinterest in law and order, inasmuch as both Democrats and Republicans are law abiding and square in that part of the country. It is easy to particularize on the races out there and conclude that oddities in each state account for the poor showing, but I can't buy that. I believe that, while state peculiarities obviously influenced every race in the western reaches, so also did they in the rest of the country where we fared far better -- so there are bound to be special troubles out west which did us in. I can't help but wonder what might have happened in North Dakota if our thrust had been not law and order, where Burdick was immune, but on the arrogance and cynicism of the Democrats' refusal to pass the farm law. But even there, as you know, both the Farm Bureau and the Farmers' Union oppose this legislation, so that, too, might have been a loser. That tends to force me back to the desirability of the economy argument - that you had wound down both inflation and war while avoiding recession, and the Democrats are plainly incompetent on both counts. It is conceivable that we might have salvaged a race or two in the mountains and plains if we had done that.

f. The fact remains, whatever happened, that the whole campaign was directed toward one goal - unshackling you in the Senate. You did precisely that -- a far better showing than the pillar of political gold, Eisenhower, made in 1954 and 1958 - indeed, the best off-year showing of any Republican Administration in memory. So liberal pundits notwithstanding, your object was achieved, and the proof will be seen in 1971 and 1972 in the performance of the Senate. That is all that matters; the rest is only hostile rationalization and yearning.

g. Finally, I reject as inane the argument that your campaigning demeaned the Presidency and will plague you through 1972. Never has this been so before, and unless the media take it upon themselves to make it so (even that won't
work, in my opinion) the whole orgy of 1970 will be dead and gone except for (1) the wholesome Senate results and (2) the gubernatorial disadvantages, by the time you deliver your State of the Union Message. It is true, of course, that the Phoenix film was a well-rounded disaster, but everybody knows that, and it too is an isolated episode that soon will pass.

2. Presidential posture for the future:

I don't think the election of 1970 influences your future posture in any significant aspect other than (1) you can now move more surely in national security affairs; (2) law and order are now politically neutralized unless you wish to test the Democratic commitment to their sudden campaign turnabout; and (3) Party regularity is enhanced a bit by the Goodell shafting. Otherwise, your posture, I believe, should be just what it would otherwise have been anyway - that of a deeply concerned President earnestly devising sensible solutions for overriding national problems, and that will automatically come to be as public and press attention turn to issues in the rump session of Congress and your programs for 1971 and 1972.

For the future, I anticipate that your removal of American ground forces from combat will be a vast political plus in 1972 -- that a healthy economic situation will be critical for success, for it will likely be the centerpiece of the 1972 campaign -- and that matters of the environment, race and the cities will be peripheral, though crucial in key spots around the country. I needn't add, I know, that the farm situation requires almost as much attention as the general economy, because so much of your strength resides there, and I would hope for tremendous emphasis on rural development plus a greater sensitivity to farm needs (such as continuation of the ACP, now scheduled for the axe). My hope remains that you will "come clean" with Congress on the economy and the fiscal situation and will brace them with the same hard alternatives that you have had to wrestle with, making them shoulder responsibility right along with you for inflation,
deficit financing, full employment troubles and high interest rates -- all versus sharply higher taxes plus a withered federal establishment. I feel the country is incredibly mixed up over all this -- insistent upon vastly costly new programs but adamantly against the high cost of government. If next year you can hit just two or three of the sexiest domestic programs with all your might and main and slough off the rest, and assure adequate financing, 1972 ought to take care of itself.

3. Changed relations with media

a. I urge only that you handle them, as you have sought to do, coolly, fairly and at arm's length, excepting your obvious friends who are entitled to special care and feeding. I would forebear severe retaliatory attempts against journalistic malactors, because I think this inevitably backfires, and anyway reporters declared off-limits are seen by your Administration people despite the ban. I do press for more frequent press conferences (once a month, on average), and far less daily concentration on this or that critical column or article or, even, leak. I have long had a feeling that we overreact to daily drivel and in the process not only consume energies and time that could be fruitfully used in other ways, but also in this way we tend to spotlight the very problems we try to smother. Said differently, I feel we ascribe too much importance to a columnist or commentator -- that we only flatter them and hurt ourselves when we spend time countering their writings and broadcasts.

I do hope your regional backgrounders with the press out in the countryside are carried forward. These, I have felt, are the most rewarding innovation with the media that you have hit upon since taking office.

4. Use of Vice President and Cabinet:

a. I have suggested to the Vice President that (a) he work really diligently with minority groups, devoting not less than two-thirds of his time on this (not only the Blacks, but also the Indians, Mexicans, etc.); (b) he spend half his remaining time on youth (which ties in with the minorities); and (c) he use such time as he has left for
intergovernmental relations, serving as your political (not operational) nexus with Republican governors and your political counter-weight against the strengthened Democratic governors. On this point, I have told him it is important to avoid operational responsibilities because the problems of governors range across the entire government and require far too elaborate a staff and too much time for him to oversee it.

None of the foregoing has his approval, and he may reject all of it. I have urged that whatever he concludes must have, first, your very clear-cut personal blessing - plus, second, hard notice to the Executive Branch and White House staff that whatever areas you agree upon are definitely made the exclusive responsibility of the Vice President.

b. I feel the Cabinet has been insufficiently used as such and that the Cabinet members feel isolated from you by layers of staff. The all-important "personal relationship with The Boss" has gone out of it. I urge at least one conventional Cabinet meeting a month (with an Administration-wide agenda, not a technical, specialized topic or program), plus one or two hours set aside weekly for Cabinet officers to visit personally and privately with you on matters of their own choosing whether official or personal. I believe the team-spirit values of the foregoing would well justify this investment of your precious time.

5. Relations with Congress:

a. I suggest that a hard decision is overdue here: either use Bill Timmons in keeping with his official status, or take on someone who will be so used. I have sensed a reluctance to use Timmons directly with you, in connection with the most important issues and members of Congress. He is often left out of meetings and breakfasts, etc., on Congressional matters in favor of others not charged with Congress -- and contacts with Congress by the White House staff increasingly bypass Timmons instead of going through him.

Preservation Copy
No Congressional man can be worth his salt if the Hill feels he is ineffectual with the President or lacks easy access to the President. Therefore, I urge that Bill be so used, but if this can't be, a more acceptable person should be installed in his place. Success in this area requires not only Bill's open and frequent identification with you, but also acceptance as a prime mover by your Staff -- for example, his inclusion in Bob's eight o'clock staff meeting on the same basis as Ehrlichman, Shultz et. al.

The Congressional function is so immensely important to you. If it is kicked around, ignored, or handled as a subordinate White House activity, the cost is excessive.

b. Some means needs also to be found to involve the Congressional group more effectively in program formulation, instead of being often used as clerks to cart bad news to the Hill. A great deal of needless trouble can be avoided by the early impact of Congressional people. While this is attempted now, I feel it is inadequately done and intensifies your Hill troubles. Involved here also is the instinctive reaction in every Executive Branch activity (it is chronic in every department as well as in the White House) that the Congressional side of things is a confounded nuisance, therefore in time it gets pushed into a corner. In my opinion, it should have at least the same attention and emphasis as the press in all areas of the White House.

6. Presidential Travel:

a. I have no competency in this area, other than to state the obvious -- that where you will need the greatest strength in 1972, you should manifest the greatest personal involvement. This would include special identification with agricultural regions over the next two years, adequate attention (with the Vice President also) to the South, continued appeal to blue collar people by open identification with them at various places in the country, an improved relationship with the business community (speeches to business organizations here and there in the country), and some overt actions making very
clear your concern for the little folk and disadvantaged in the society. Trips abroad should be, I believe, very widely spaced, because we are entering a season in which national concerns will probably rivet more on domestic problems than on foreign troubles.

All in all, I believe you are entering a period in which you will wish to keep on winding down the war as you wind up the economy, get both shipshape not later than August 1972 (earlier if at all possible), and devote your other efforts to proving to the country that you are President of all the people, whether they are for or against you and your Administration. If the country believes you are doing well with the war and the economy and are seeking selflessly for sensible progress in just a few other areas of particular concern, you will, I believe, win going away in 1972.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached are some thoughts on the 1970 election effort and possible approaches for the future. I am not satisfied that I have done enough research on either subject. I will try to come back at this subject in the next thirty days.

Donald Rumsfeld
I. Analysis of President’s Election Effort

A. The election was a draw, but the net impact of the Administration was a plus. It probably increased Republican vote totals in most states. It kept commitments to those who agreed to run.

1. Senate -- Net plus. As the primary target it got most of the resources. But it could have been better. The best opportunity of the decade to win the Senate was lost.

2. House -- A draw.

3. State races -- Net minus. Will have an impact on the House for a decade. Demonstrates the vulnerability of executives and relative invulnerability of national legislators.

B. The 1970 election was not a national referendum on much of anything. The outcome in most areas was determined by local issues and the voters’ judgment of individual candidates. The results suggest that in some instances Party did not play a large role -- witness the Reagan-Tunney, Mandel-Beall ticket-splitting.

C. Areas where the Administration’s performance can be improved (offered admittedly only with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight):

1. Quality candidates are the best insurance. Candidate selection should be more aggressive, start earlier, and extend to Congressional and Gubernatorial candidates. Efforts should begin immediately for 1972 to find candidates the President will be proud to stand beside. Incumbent GOP Governors in trouble might be offered Federal jobs to keep them from running again and to avoid a drain on the National ticket. The National Committee should select Congressional candidates. Senatorial and Gubernatorial candidates should be selected by the White House.

2. In retrospect, the linkage was never fully made between the goal (a supportive Senate) and the strategy (Democratic candidates are wrong on the social issues). The charge was not credible in Florida and Texas and was effectively countered in at
least Illinois and California by the Democratic candidates.

Efforts should be made to better identify the importance of Senatorial support for what the people want and link that to the President's goals for the Nation -- i.e., the President needs Senators of integrity and judgment to help him shape the destiny of America -- not simply because Democrats are soft on crime and permissiveness; he needs Senators who will be responsive to the people, not to the President or to the past or to the Democratic Party. In the future opportunities should be found to show Democrats as opponents of change and reform.

3. Election eve telecast quality left the impression that the President was not Presidential. Muskie came off as a Presidential-Senator.

4. Issues of personal and political integrity are gaining importance. The loss of some candidates in 1970 may be attributed in part to the appearance of a lack of personal or political ethics, (examples are Dodd, Murphy, Tydings, Powell, McKneally and the Ohio slate). The voters are increasingly harsh critics of a man's integrity and personal ethics. State and Congressional candidates for 1972 should be selected with this in mind.

Extra care should be beefed up to insure that our house is in order from an ethical standpoint.

5. Local candidates should not bill themselves as Presidential supporters to a point where they lose their distinctiveness. Support that is too fervent opens them to the charge of being puppets. The people want individualists -- men they can admire.

II. Posture for the President, 1970-1971

A. Foreign Policy -- continued emphasis on the President's role in international and foreign affairs. Greater emphasis should be placed on communicating success of Viet Nam policy. Provides maximum exposure, has been highly successful to date, offers best opportunity to garner Congressional support and the fewest opportunities for the Democrats to thwart our policies. Success in this area is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for re-election.
B. The Economy -- top domestic concern. There are two basic issues to be dealt with:

1. Substantive improvement in the economy, and
2. The perception by the public that the President was responsible for those gains. Responsible jawboning is called for to convey the impression of a President who is doing everything humanly possible to halt inflation, and to clearly identify those segments of society responsible for economic problems. We should press on the wage/prive issue and develop some formal device for an incomes' policy.

C. Domestic Tranquility -- of continuing concern. Problems of civil disorders and lawlessness must either be dealt with or Congress must be successfully shown to have been uncooperative. The pressures which turned Stevenson around in Illinois should be used to encourage Congress to act on legislation. After four years in office, the Administration will be held accountable if the nation is, or appears to be, in disarray and/or ungovernable.

D. Positive themes need to be developed and communicated. The emphasis on reform has never come through as effectively as the call for a "Generation of Peace." The nation must be made to understand the President's visions for America -- his personal dream for the future. Administration rhetoric should be forward looking, emphasizing the hopes and aspirations of all Americans on what is ahead, not on what has been. For good or ill, what has been will by then be ours. Americans think of themselves as a nation of accomplishes and achievers, not as ideologues. The President's political philosophy must come across. An Administration trademark must be developed, something that incorporates those beliefs shared by all Americans.

The major problem is that the people see and sense many problems. They want someone to solve them for them, but they don't know where to turn. The goal is, by our conduct, to help them see the President as the solver of those basic problems, or at the minimum making the best effort.

Another possibility would be for the President to put subjects in the context of individual dignity and individual rights. An affirmative statement on this is desirable and would be a useful matrix around which commentary on other subjects can be woven.
III. Relationships with the Media

We face a shallow reservoir of on-going confidence. Major Presidential speeches and travel receive public approval, but that approval can be quickly eroded by small events such as an off-hand comment or event. The Press Corps has trained the public to be generally suspicious of public officials and specifically suspect of Mr. Nixon.

Press Conferences are an opportunity to demonstrate the President's facility for crisp and informed answers. The hour long live interview by three reporters offers a better opportunity to display the desired qualities of wisdom. The one such interview did much to impress people with the President's warmth even though the reporters did a poor job. Such interviews, on a periodic basis, and not dealing solely with foreign affairs, could increase the public's knowledge and feeling for the President as a person.

IV. The Vice President and the Cabinet

The Cabinet can be used to reinforce themes sounded by the President. In many cases their backgrounds permit them to obtain a special hearing from various publics.

The Vice President builds on a widely noticed foundation. His past speeches were helpful in voicing the frustration of some and in defining the field of debate prior to the President's involvement. In his wake the President had the freedom to discuss, with balance, topics which earlier he might have been labeled "blasphemous" for even considering.

The Vice President has accomplished this goal. He should maintain visibility so that people do not think he was trotted out to do a job and then shelved. In maintaining visibility, speeches should remain bold, but the expressions should be carefully drawn and the subjects changed to positive domestic needs.
V. Relationships with Congress

Several objectives should determine our approach to Congress. The passage of legislation, the cementing of relations with Members of Congress, particularly Senators who will be important in 1972, binding up any wounds in the Republican Party, and preparation for a 1972 appeal to the people based on Congress's sluggish performance.

We should view Congress as a deliberative body composed of 535 foreign powers. Success depends on assembling successive and often different coalitions. Votes are to be picked up on a given issue, in a way that does not prejudice the ability to pick up different votes on a future issue. Few Members are permanently friends. Few permanently enemies. There are no Republican Members on whom we should declare open personal war. This is a strategy designed to secure the passage of legislation and a closeness, where possible, with Republican Members who will be important in 1972.

The Congress itself may be the object of attack in the 1972 election. Its record of inaction may justify it. On some issues we should talk not to the Congress, but over their heads to the people they represent, laying a foundation for future attacks on a sluggish, obstructionist, bickering, partisan Congress, if it proves to be such.

VI. Presidential Travel

Official foreign travel is useful in demonstrating the President's personal ability at foreign affairs. It should continue, but it should not be worn out.

Domestic travel both formal and informal can do much to communicate the President's breadth and interest.

Formal or official travel which takes a function of Government out of Washington and into the country is useful. The reception of foreign leaders might be appropriately done in several communities. It would do a great deal for the Mid-West by making it a part of the process of diplomacy, before almost exclusively the role of New York and Washington.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Lyn Nofziger

In Response to Request from H. R. Haldeman

1. The President's Election Efforts. I believe his decision to help was 100 percent correct. I believe the average American appreciates a fighter and a man who is loyal to those under him. Too often, loyalty is thought of as a one-way thing -- from the troops to the leader. The President has made loyalty a two-way street; it will pay-off in the long run.

I think there is some merit to some of the second-guessing. First, instead of making Vietnam pretty much of a nonissue, it is possible we could have made it more our issue, although, in Tennessee where Brock did it, he didn't win so big. Secondly, everyone I have talked to says Muskie won the Monday night TV presentations. The criticism of our presentation has been that our production was poor technically and that Muskie came off as the reasonable man.

Overall, however, I believe the President's campaigning was a tremendous plus. I believe the question to be asked of the critics is: Would you have had him do less? The fact is, if he had done less and if the Democrats had won more, they would have been kicking him around for not having done enough.

The image of the President now is of a fighter. That is not a bad image; it is one that breeds respect. If we equivocate, we lose that respect.

2. The President's Posture. It has to be one of continue to fight for the things and principles in which he believes. I do not think he needs any change in his modus operandi. However, a sterner public stance
toward inflationary actions by both business and labor might be helpful, for the fact remains that most employed persons are not members of unions.

His posture with Congress should be one of wanting to work with Congress, but at the same time absolutely refusing to surrender to it. I believe it is better to fight and lose than not to fight because win or lose the buck always winds up on his desk.

3. Relations With The Media. My feeling is that the President should have more televised press conferences.

1. He handles them well. Each one to date has been a plus.

2. The media is going to beat him over the head with this issue, saying he is afraid to face them and/or that he is denying the public the right to know.

3. He will eventually reach the point where, when he has a press conference, the media will say that he knuckled under to pressure.

4. All told, the scarcity of press conferences is creating an anti-Nixon issue which we don't need.

5. I don't think we need one every week, but certainly once every 4-6 weeks is not unreasonable from our point of view. It is infrequent enough to keep the press unhappy but frequent enough so they don't have an issue.

I like the idea of meeting with small groups of friendly columnists from time to time. I think it should be extended to small groups of friendly reporters who write for individual papers. For instance, Jack Jarrell from the Omaha World Herald; Ray McHugh from Copley, Lou Hiner from Pulliam, George Embrey from the Columbus Dispatch, and others. I do not believe in rewarding the President's enemies in the media; it does not make friends of them.

4. Use Of The Vice President And The Cabinet.

The Vice President. The Vice President, I think, has functioned effectively. However, recognizing always that he and we are up against a hostile media, his effectiveness can be nullified if he is used solely as a "hatchetman" because he will be labeled as such. Obviously, we
need a hatchetman, but he should not be exposed as the only one. The National Chairman should carry a much larger share of this burden in the future. At the same time, the Vice President should be given some positive assignments during the next year to year and a half, so that he will be more effective when he takes the stump in 1972. Consideration might be given to making him the major day-to-day spokesman on domestic affairs, thus taking some of this burden from the President.

The Cabinet. From p.r. and political standpoints, the Cabinet is a weak one. For instance, not one has aroused enough excitement to be considered in the press today as a possible successor to the Vice President or a possible Presidential nominee. The only one who has built any kind of a political name is Hickle, who did it in opposition to the President. It is obvious that they cannot all run around getting headlines, but we might consider arbitrarily picking two or three of them, and set out to build their political images so they can be used effectively in 1972 and thereafter. I do not believe we should leave the building of strong party spokesmen to chance. The President can build two or three Cabinet officers and half a dozen members of the Congress, but it must be a deliberately planned and executed effort. It must be a continuing thing.

Regardless, I believe all members of the Cabinet should continue to be utilized on a programmed basis, and be provided with political speaking engagements and political input. We need not only to sell the President, but also to sell the Administration. If we minimize the issues for the Democrats we minimize their chances, regardless of who their candidate is.

5. Relationships With Congress. Relationships with the Congress have gotten better as this Administration has become more familiar with the attitudes of Congressmen of both Houses. A never-ending effort is needed, however, to keep relations good. I believe the President already is accessible to members to about the maximum. However, we should assure that senior staff members and Cabinet and subcabinet should also be accessible and cooperative, especially where Republicans are involved. I cannot see any reason to do anything drastically different, but I believe our people must be kept continually aware of the need to be accessible and courteous, even if we can’t do anything for the individual Congressman at the time.

6. Presidential Travel. I believe there should be as much as possible without it appearing that the President is neglecting his duties.
1. It takes the government to the people and this should be the approach.

2. It counters the "isolation" charge which may be phony but which must be countered.

3. It builds confidence in the people when they see that the President can move about with impunity. It is good for the country, and if the President is doing something that is good for the country it is good for him.

7. The New York Election. It is apparent that the Buckley victory was a Republican victory; not a Conservative victory. The Conservative Party was poorly structured, and there was much internal bickering. As a result the Buckley campaign was staffed, organized and run largely by Republicans. The Conservative vote in New York is largely a dissident Republican vote. I would suggest wrapping Jim Buckley close to this Administration, in the hopes that we can use him to build a strong middle-of-the-road base for the New York Republican Party, with which we can wrest the Party from the liberals four years from now. I think we can do better by bringing the Conservatives back into a middle-of-the-road Republican Party then we can by creating a permanent three-party situation there.

8. The Negative Aspects Of The Next Two Years. I believe, still, that more people vote against than vote for. I believe we must, therefore, begin actively to collect and disseminate information that will give people reasons to vote against Muskie, Kennedy or whoever the Democratic nominee for President may be. I believe we must do the same thing in the key Senatorial races.

Our perennial weaknesses have been:

1. poor research
2. poor use of research
3. failure to attack on a continuing basis; people forget easily

We must say again and again and again that Muskie is a polluter, that he is already running for President, that he has no standing in the Senate, etc. We must never let the public forget Chappaquiddick, or that there is insanity in Tunney's family, or that Stevenson, McGovern and Ramsey Clark are cop-haters. We must magnify and repeat the stories of their every mistake and misstep.
This will take: 1) good research; 2) a few spokesmen who are willing to attack regardless of the cries of outrage; 3) a continuing dissemination of this stuff to the media and through the media. We must begin now in all areas.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William E. Timmons

SUBJECT: Post-election Review

1. Analysis of the President's election efforts:

The President's campaign effort was successful. Without the major involvement of the President, Republican losses would surely have been greater in the House and the GOP probably would have suffered a net loss instead of making gains in the Senate. In addition, the presidential campaign helped build stronger party loyalty -- a point not overlooked for 1972.

Attacks on permissiveness probably diverted voter attention from economic issues; however, the President's own popularity may have been better transferred to candidates through an even greater emphasis on his need for a more sympathetic Congress to carry out his programs for a better America. Unlike law and order, this issue could not have been neutralized by the opposition. While the "majority of one" issue was used in speeches, law and order came through as the principal rallying point.

In eleven states voters split their tickets between gubernatorial-senatorial candidates which shows that there was no national overriding issue.

Also, probably in no election in history has the candidate's name been so important: Tunney, Stevenson, Buckley, and Kennedy benefited from famous relatives. Taft, Beall and Byrd had fathers in the Senate; Brock had a grandfather in the upper chamber.

Names apparently had value in House races too: Louise Day Hicks, Jack Kemp, Ronald Dellums, Bella Abzug are among the freshmen who have had national publicity in the past.
The economic slowdown undoubtedly hurt many GOP candidates. So, too, did scandals (Ohio, California), unpopular governors (Pennsylvania, Nebraska), party splits (Florida, New Mexico), and a host of local issues over which the Administration had little control.

The biggest error appears, in retrospect, to have been the rebroadcast of the Phoenix speech. Most observers would have preferred an election eve personal appeal, similar to the President's successful 1966 telecast.

2. Posture the President should maintain for the period to the end of the year and in 1971:

The President should project a non-political posture for the immediate future, making an effort to cooperate with his opposition, emphasizing the positive, highlighting foreign and domestic accomplishments, and developing a meaningful domestic program for the future. Regarding the latter, the President should personally direct the Administration’s effort to increase employment and provide economic growth and stability. Political fights should be left to the Vice President, GOP National Chairman and loyal friends in Congress.

3. Recommended changes in relationship with the media:

A plan should be devised to divide the hostile working press attacks on the media as a group solidify their opposition. Consideration should be given to more informal sessions with selected reporters. Special "breaks" for friendly television and news magazine reporters might prove helpful as they seek to preserve their new favored relationships. Also a greater effort could be made by White House staff to give backrounders to the press corps and planned stories to friendly journalists.

4. Use of the Vice President and the Cabinet:

The Vice President should undertake a leadership role in those areas where he has strength: Republican Party events (fund raisers), the conservative South, Hard Hats, etc. Since he commands news, the Vice President should remain the cutting edge for the Administration, taking on controversial issues for the President. He also can cultivate better personal relationships with the Democratic Chairmen in the Senate.
The Cabinet can best be used to make certain their departments are operating effectively and their programs are in accord with the President's wishes. It is recommended that the White House continue the special campaign Speakers Bureau to channel Cabinet members into those states where appearances will do the most good.

5. Relationships with Congress:

The public looks up to their President as a leader who gets things done and feels that legislative defeats are a reflection on the President's leadership rather than a result of congressional politicking. Americans prefer accomplishment, even compromise, to recurring executive-legislative fights. Therefore, it is suggested that the President make every effort to enter the 1972 period with a significant legislative record. This requires new efforts toward White House-Capitol Hill cooperation. If the Congress is belligerent and partisan, the public may well react in favor of the statesmanship of the Chief Executive.

There will be opportunities to pass meaningful legislation if the President can hold together loyal Republicans while picking up sufficient numbers of Democratic votes. Special attention should be given to cultivating this "working majority" through greater personal contact. This office will make recommendations for selected meetings to accomplish this goal.

6. Presidential travel:

The President should consider some foreign trips in both 1971 and 1972, carefully selected to maximize advantage internationally and domestically.

There has been some criticism of the President's trips to San Clemente, Key Biscayne and Camp David. It might be well to limit these trips to established vacation periods or long weekends as well as to give more publicity to their working nature.

There is value in the President going to the people on "non-political" excursions. The fact he is not afraid to encounter demonstrators shows courage. Functions and states must be carefully selected for maximum advantage. For example, it might be worthwhile for the President to have visited all fifty states by the 1972 elections. States that cannot be covered in the campaign may be visited in 1971 (Hawaii, Alaska, etc.). Also, attention should be given to possible events in the presidential primary states, as well as those states with heavy electoral votes.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 7, 1970

TO: Larry Higby
FROM: Mort Allin
Subject: A Representative Sampling of Election Predictions by Press

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Governors

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Specific Key Senate Races - Consensus opinions

Victors: Chiles, Adlai Stevenson, III, Tunney, Brock, Symington, Williams, Prouty, Cannon, Fannin, HHH.

Toss-ups: Ohio, Texas, Indiana, Conn., Utah, New York, South Dakota, Maryland

We did better than predicted in the House, exactly as predicted in the Senate, but lost twice as many as expected in Governorships.
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Bruce Winters (11/1) Sun: At the national level, GOP chances may be better than tradition would suggest but unlikely to gain control of Senate. Dem majority "may not be changed by more than a seat or two in the House "the lineup may be favorably shifted 15 to 30 seats to the Dems." Overall "an apprehensive electorate will deny the GOP the Senate prize it thought it had won this spring, but it may hedge the bet by improving prospects for a Congressional takeover in two years.

Congressional Quarterly (11/1) Sun: 10 contests too close to call. In Md. Mandel and Tydings were favored.

Ernest Furgerson (11/1) Sun: "N.J. is about to witness 1970's most impressive political comeback by a man and a party": Williams and the Dems come back from the Cahill sweep.

Thomas O'Neill (11/1) Sun: "very critical - "The raucous mob (San Jose) probably achieved the reelection of Murphy."

Joe Kraft (11/1) Post: Republican tide, GOP to make indents putting GOP in better position for future. Way station on road to better show in '72. Failing a bad turn to economy -- or in VN -- hard to see how RN can be defeated in '72.

Broder (11/1) Post: RN unlikely to get Senate. Instead RN likely to hear he made only 'minor inroads on the supposedly vulnerable Dem majority" white Dems held or boosted margin of control in the House. Thus, ... seems likely to result as negative or nebulous, from RN's viewpoint, as the campaign itself.

Paul Hope (11/1) Star: Dems to retain Senate control, continued Dem House control by same margin. Chances are GOP will lose some governorships.

Warren Weaver (11/1) Times: House almost certainly leave unchanged relative strengths. Almost certainly RN would hail such a result because ruling party usually loses 41.
George Meany (is quoted by David Lawrence, (10/29) Times Pic: as predicting a shift of 3 or 4 House seats either way and maybe 2-3 Senate seats either way. Gaylord Nelson is quoted as seeing it possible of a net gain or loss.

Lawrence himself says "a gain by the GOP would be regarded as a surprise, and a maintenance of the present margins in both Houses is more or less expected by leaders in the two camps."

Robert Pearman (10/29) Kansas City Star: guesses the GOP would win in Conn., Ohio, Indiana, Tenn., New Mex., and California. The Dems would take Fla., N. Dakota, Texas and Utah. (Overall a net gain of 3 GOP seats.)

JDN (10/28): Holmes Alexander predicted any surprises would be of candidates to the right of center. "In this atmosphere Barry Goldwater could win national election in a walk."

Ray McHugh (Copley Wash Bureau) in the 10/29 Jackson Daily News predicted GOP wins in Ohio, Fla. Senate seats.

UPI -- Raymond Lahr in (10/28) Arizona Republic "knowledgeable political strategists of both parties agreed the GOP stands a good chance of coming close to RN's goal of seizing the Senate." Not to win political control but ideological control.

Louis Bean (In 10/31) Phil. Evening Bulletin: predicted a Dem gain of 20 seats in the House and a loss of 2-3 in the Senate.

Milton Viorst (10/29) Star: From the polls "it seems clear that enough of them (RN's favorites) will be defeated to confirm that the majority of voters in the nation have not swung to conservative Republicanism." 13 too close to call, 243-179 without the 13.

Richard Reeves (11/1) Times main forecast: More than most the elections are coming to an end in a blaze of uncertainty. Dems seem sure to pick up Governorships. Some GOP cling to belief gain party control. Dems though might add seat or 2. A bad showing for GOP -- particularly where Veep turned up -- could make RN think twice about the '72 ticket. If 1970
proves a "bust for the social issue and the Southern strategy, RN has shown he can quickly adapt himself to new realities as well as old myths."

Times: Brock in Tenn.
Burdick in N. Dakota
Taft in Ohio
Indiana - ?
Utah -- close

Roth - 10/28 Rocky by -- 17 -- according to polls.

Miami Herald poll: 61-39 Chiles.

Deakin - 10/25: "If Dems retain control Sen., add to their present House contingent and gain some gov'ships, RN's prestige will suffer a sharp blow that inevitably will increase his leg. diffs."

Deakin - 10/16: Col. Dispatch -- 48.4% -- Metz -- 43% Taft.

Doyle - 10/28: Wisc. GOP in trouble.

Thimmesch - 10/3: RN figured he could tip enough races that he'd have a GOP Senate and a friendlier House. Thus there'd be a mandate in the Nixon direction. Doubtful he succeeded and he lost some prestige on VN and Mideast -- did so well there that neither was isht.

Neil Gilbride - 11/3 (AP): Dems appeared likely to recapture governorships from the GOP in a fear of the nation's 10 most populous states. Their best chances are in Ohio, Fla., Penn., and to retain Texas. The GOP seems certain to hold Calif., probably NY, Michigan, and Massachusetts. Dems are also likely to take governorship in Ark., N. Mex. and S. Dakota -- while losing Conn. and Tenn.

(CSM) Sperling - 10/13: The GOP may lose at least one, and perhaps as many as 5 governorships. GOP losses in Ohio and Arkansas could be nearly cancelled out by a GOP victory in Conn. But GOP losses in
Ala., Fla., Nebraska, N. Mex. - would be more significant. The GOP has 2 major disadvantages -- GOP incumbents hold all but 11 of 30 seats -- thus they are vulnerable and 2, there is unhappiness over local issues. Hence if the GOP holds its governorships it would be a major GOP victory.

10/26 Columbus Dispatch: Two incumbent GOP Congressmen who represent central Ohio still hold commanding leads in the second C.D. poll. But Devine's lead over Goodrich has shrunk from 37.4% to 26.1.

10/27 Cleveland Plain-Dealer: The Ohio Senate race is as close as a poll can show with both candidates holding 40%. But a breakdown shows Taft may hold an ever-so-slight edge on Metzenbaum. The poll also showed 1.4% for Kay and 18.3% undecided.

10/28 Gallup poll (Chic. Sun-Times): Dems are holding their lead in the race for House seats: in early Oct. Dems would receive 50% of the vote for House seats, 44% for the GOP with 6% undecided.

10/25 Chic. Sun-Times: A state-wide poll shows Byrd with 42%, Rawlings 38% and Garland 20%.

10/25 Chic. Sun-Times: St. Clair county prefers Stevenson 2 to 1; 64.9% with 35.1% for Smith.

10/27 Miami Herald: Chiles 60% -- Gramer 30%. Stevenson 58% -- Smith 42%. HHH 56% -- MacGregor 43%.

10/12 L.A. Times: GOP have the odds against them in what could be their last big opportunity to capture the Senate. Bentsen is even better financed than Bush and at the moment is rated a slight favorite. The GOPers regarded as shoo-ins for re-election are Hruska, Scott, Stevens, and Roth. Va.'s Byrd is rated the favorite over his two challengers. Chances for a Gross victory are less than 50-50.
10/18 Philip Carter Wash. Post: With the help of the WH, Thurmond and a plurality of white voters Watson has a chance of winning.

10/27 J. J. Kilpatrick: Cramer will make it to the Senate.

10/26 Harry Bodine: Sen. Harold Hughes predicted a repeat of the 1958 mid-term Dem upset. During that election VP Nixon delivered a slashing attack on the opposition much the way VP Agnew has been doing. In 1958, the WH toned RN down, but it didn't help the GOP, it sustained one of the heaviest mid-term losses in US politics.

10/29 Evans & Novak: quotes a Goldberg aide who said: "Arthur's such a bad candidate that if he wins it'll be the sympathy vote that does it."

10/25 Iowa poll in Des Moines Register: RN still leads 4 possible Dem contenders by margins of 14 to 24% points.
RN 46% -- EMK 32% -- Wallace 4%.
RN 48% -- HHH 25% -- Wallace 6%.
RN 45% -- Muskie 29% -- Wallace 6%.
RN 47% -- Lindsay 23% -- Wallace 5%.
In approval ratings RN's popularity has changed little since May. Approval of RN's job handling in Sept.: 57%; May 59%. Disapproval rating in Sept.: 30%; May 32%.

10/28 Richmond News Leader, John Farmer: says in an ordinary year Metzenbaum couldn't beat Taft but this year it may be possible.

10/24 David Broder: If Minnesota voters reject HHH the candidate instead of endorsing HHH the institution it will be the upset of the year.

Kilpo 10/27 -- Texas Sen. too close to call. -- Some mild gains for conservative Republicans but not much.

Means 11/3 -- Both sides can claim victory -- GOP - 1 to 3 in Senate -- Dems upwards of dozen in House -- plus 6 State Houses -- "If GOP gains even just one Senate seat, they have won a symbolic victory in reversing the trend pattern, although this involves ignoring fact that they fell far short of their origin expectors. But if Dems add to House
numbers, they won't suffer defeat -- Local variables the key this year -- Mismatch -- no clear guidelines likely.

White 10/24: Campaign is "a national referendum on the foreign and military policy leadership of RN. ... Meaningful dove losses (4) would amount to a presidential vindication."


R. Wilson 10/24: Only w/ the greatest of luck and the presence of an as yet undetected landslide can RN win the 6 or 7 needed -- doesn't look good. Everything has to break his way. RN can't win much but could lose a lot.

Clymer, Baltimore Sun 10/24: Lowenstein leads despite leftist label -- but close.

Beckman CT 10/22: WH optimistic about Taft and Brock -- good chance for Kleppe; Rowdy close. Also feel Prouty and Weicker will do it. RN visit to California hoped to pull Murphy through.

Stanley Hinden -- in a Newsday Analysis (10/29) -- sees close Senate races, and "indications are that there will be little change." He also foresaw a net loss of 4-5 governorships.

Wm. S. White said (Oct 23, Birmingham News) that if the GOP picked up four seats, RN's efforts would have been worthwhile. If no net gain the whole campaign would have been a disaster for RN, perhaps even deeper than that suffered by Truman in 46.

Thomas O'Neill (10/28 Sun): says indicators show "only a limited shifting of party strength on each side."