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<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Sears to RN RE: thoughts on the 1972 campaign, including data on key states and George Wallace's national support. 10 pgs.</td>
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<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Keogh to RN analyzing the successes and shortcomings of RN's 1968 campaign. 7 pgs.</td>
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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: John Sears

December 9, 1970

I. 1972

If a President seeking re-election has kept the peace and presided over a prosperous economy, the conventional wisdom says that he is unbeatable. The reason people have made this assertion so readily over the last 30 years is that, with the single exception of Eisenhower, we have had Democratic incumbents -- members of the majority party -- seeking re-election. All they had to do was show a certain degree of unity in their own ranks and they could carry a majority of the nation. Eisenhower's personal popularity could have won him re-election without a party designation.

1972, however, will be the first year since 1916 in which a President who is a member of the minority party will seek re-election. (Republicans were the minority by the time Hoover came up for re-election in 1932.) Although Wilson had done an excellent job of domestic reform and "keeping us out of war," he was nearly beaten and probably could have been beaten. My belief is that no matter how well the Administration is regarded nationally in 1972 and, within bounds, whoever the Democratic nominee may be, the election will be damned close.

Statistically, let us examine some possible situations:

(l) If George Wallace were to decide not to run for President in 1972 and we were able to win the 45 electoral votes he received, and also take Texas (25) away from the Democratic nominee, the Democrats could still defeat us if they merely held the states they carried in 1968 and carried four others (California, Illinois, Ohio and New Jersey.) Our present position in Ohio is anemic; we lost Senate seats in Illinois and California; we failed to pick up one in New Jersey. Also we did not carry a single one of these states comfortably in 1968. The scenarios break down as follows:
AFTER REDISTRICTING

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<tr>
<th>RN</th>
<th>Democratic Nominee</th>
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<tr>
<td>29 states (exclusive of Calif., N.J., Ill. and Ohio)</td>
<td>13 states carried by Humphrey, exclusive of Texas</td>
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<tr>
<td>191 votes</td>
<td>162</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 states carried by Wallace</td>
<td>Calif., N.J., Ill., and Ohio</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>114</td>
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<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Undecideds</td>
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(2) If Wallace enters the race, he must be conceded Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana. This would subtract 27 votes from the Nixon above total. It would then mean that RN would have to carry California, or any combination of two of the remaining three large states (Illinois, Ohio and New Jersey) -- or the election would go to the House. If Wallace repeated his performance of 1968 and carried Georgia and Arkansas in addition to Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana, then RN would have to carry California and one out of Illinois, Ohio and New Jersey, or all three of the other large states (Illinois, Ohio and New Jersey.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RN</th>
<th>Wallace</th>
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<tr>
<td>29 states, (exclusive of Calif., N.J., Ill., and Ohio)</td>
<td>Mississippi, Alabama</td>
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<tr>
<td>191</td>
<td>Louisiana</td>
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<td>Georgia and Arkansas</td>
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<td>46</td>
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<td>13 states carried by Humphrey (exclusive of Texas)</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
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<td>162</td>
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<td>California</td>
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<td>Ohio</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
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RN

29 states (exclusive of Calif., N. J., Ill., and Ohio) 191
Texas 26
Democratic Nominee 217

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<td>New Jersey</td>
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Undecideds  | 114     |

Wallace

5 states carried by Wallace in 1968 45

(3) If Wallace picks up 45 electoral votes and we fail to carry Texas, RN would have to carry California plus two out of the remaining three large states. If RN failed to carry California but did carry Ohio, Illinois, New Jersey, the election would still go to the House.

RN

29 states (exclusive of Calif., N. J., Ill., and Ohio) 191
Democratic Nominee 162

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Wallace

5 states carried by  Wallace in 1968 45

Undecideds

California  46
Ohio  25
Illinois  25
New Jersey  18
114

(4) In 1972 it may be difficult to hold either Missouri or Wisconsin. If Wallace runs and captures 45 electoral votes, the Democratic nominee wins in Texas and we lost Missouri and Wisconsin, it would then be necessary for RN to carry all four of the large States he carried in 1968. Failure to carry California plus one of the other three would result in a Democratic victory; to carry 3 out of 4 would put the election in the House.

RN

29 states 191
less Missouri and Wisconsin  -24
167

Democratic Nominee

13 states carried by Humphrey, exclusive of Texas 162
Missouri & Wisconsin  24
Texas  26
212
Wallace

5 states carried by Wallace in 1968

Undecideds

California
Ohio
Illinois
New Jersey

114

Obviously, whatever becomes of George Wallace, RN's fate is deeply tied to the outcome in 5 large states:

(1) TEXAS -- the Party is in disarray -- O'Donnell should probably step down, but won't. RN has never been able to carry the state even when there has been a split in Democratic ranks (1960, due to Kennedy's religion; 1968, due to a division between liberal and conservative Democrats.) If Ben Barnes runs for the Senate, or the Governorship, and happens to get along with the national Democratic ticket, we will be running against a unified Democratic Party for the first time. Barnes is anxious to deliver Texas to the Democrats in view of his future ambitions.

(2) OHIO -- RN carried the state twice -- but in both instances we had a unified party. Today, the party is horribly split over both philosophy and personalities. The White House should either act immediately to elect a new state chairman who will be loyal only to RN -- or prepare to organize the state independent of the party. The Democrats will be assisted considerably by control of the Governorship.

(3) ILLINOIS -- in 1968 we benefitted from a superior, unified and balanced ticket, together with a certain indifference on the part of Mayor Daley. In 1972, Percy is headed for a bitter primary; Ogilvie is growing less popular by the day (31% job approval in the latest poll) and Mayor Daley cannot be counted upon to sit on his hands again. RN must win the state by doing exceptionally well in the
downstate counties; both Percy and Ogilvie must do exceptionally well in Cook County since neither is a downstate darling. There is also a strong possibility that Ogilvie will have a primary.

We cannot allow the present disruption to get any worse. It will take two full years of sharp politicking to put Illinois back together.

(4) NEW JERSEY -- Again, there is developing factionalism in the party in the wake of Gross' defeat. The party is suffering some ill-effects from controlling the Governorship at a time when taxes must be raised, and is further hotly divided between liberals and conservatives. Clifford Case will be up in 1972 and it is too much to hope that he will be singing the Administration's praises.

(5) CALIFORNIA -- Reagen's popularity can be counted upon to wane over the next two years. As ever, the liberal-conservative split continues in the Party. The Democrats, meanwhile, having freed themselves of the yoke of Brown and Unruh, are not as factionalized as they have been in past years. Reagen would not mind seeing RN embarrassed. The President must begin immediately to look out for his own neck there or local interests will use it for a tug-of-war.

II. Democratic Situation

Our major political endeavor must be aimed at promoting a split among the Democrats. This will be difficult because:

(1) they now feel the loss of being out of the Presidency and thus will be more careful about controlling internal disputes;

(2) the out party can create a measure of unity by merely attacking the "in" President;

(3) they now have some patronage in a number of states which can be used to control local disputes and;

(4) as a result of their success in the Gubernatorial elections there is now a group of people in the Democratic Party with the power to make it easier for a prospective Presidential nominee to go through the nominating process without being cut up inside his Party.
Given these facts, I would suggest:

(1) Muskie -- Muskie is not an accomplished national politician. He will make mistakes as long as we do not make his road easier by making derogatory remarks about him. Every time we answer him or take him on, it unifies a few more Democrats behind him. Ignore him and he won't be able to hack it.

Muskie has serious difficulty in making a negative issue; he prefers to play Lincolnesque roles, the above-the-battle man who says nothing unfair or partisan. He would prefer to talk about how well everybody gets along in Maine. As long as we don't apply the missing element by responding to him he will either (a) lose his momentum or (b) -- sensing that he is not doing as well as he anticipated -- exhibit a misdirected temper at us and the press which we can use to our advantage. The game is to get him rattled; the best way to do it is to get at his monstrous ego by ignoring him.

(2) Humphrey -- we should help build Humphrey into a candidate. Shortly after the opening of the new Congressional session, he will predictably move to become spokesman for his party in Congress. He is aware of the current void there and will seek to fill it. If Humphrey wishes to attack us, we should be more than willing to hit back at him since this builds him up in the eyes of his party. We should, in effect, create a New Humphrey -- for awhile.

There is an element of danger in building up Humphrey since (1) he might be able to unify the Democrats if he got going too fast and (2) he might disdain the nomination and use the influence we create for him on behalf of another candidate. I do not believe either thing will happen since (1) he symbolizes and epitomizes the split which occurred in 1968 and thus his ascending prominence will create strong tensions in the Party among the more liberal elements and the youth; (2) Muskie and Kennedy will not wish to see him move up and will do what they can to undercut him; (3) the academics detest him; (4) he can be embarrassed in the primaries if he gets going too fast.
Given the lure by us, he will bite. As his stock rises this will put pressure on Muskie and Kennedy, as well as re-engage the Democratic split on which our fortunes depend.

(3) Kennedy -- Kennedy must wait for Muskie to fall before he can become very active. To do otherwise is to subject himself to the same kind of problem his brother encountered with McCarthy. We should not respond to Kennedy's candidacy either; our line of defense against him is a reconstructed Humphrey. If Humphrey is a viable enough candidate by the time Muskie fades, Kennedy will be unable to take full advantage of the situation. Humphrey and Kennedy will then be locked in a life or death struggle, from which we can derive great benefit.

(4) Other candidates -- McGovern, Hughes, Bayh, etc. should be totally ignored. To the extent that any of them makes a mark, they will further complicate the plans of the above three contenders. At this juncture, none of them can be nominated.

Steadfastly resist all opportunities to discuss possible Democratic opponents. Humphrey is the only individual we should mention and this should only be done artfully to the objective of building his candidacy.

III. Wallace

The important thing is to draw a clear line delineating how far we will go to fight his candidacy and then religiously adhere to it. He senses that he has us in a bind since (1) if we chase him too far in an effort to hold onto Southern votes, we lost support in the rest of the country; (2) if we don't chase him far enough he might hurt us more in the South than he did the last time. In either case there would be more of a chance that the election would wind up in the House than was true in 1968.

Look for Wallace to run a strictly Southern campaign this time since (1) it costs less money (2) he can focus his positions better and (3) he will feel this is the best way to get us to chase him.
We have gone as far as we can on the race-school-crime-law and order issue. For a fair amount of time we should keep quiet about this. A fair number of people in the Middle and Far West are beginning to wonder whether we aren't a little too Southern in our view of the "social issue" to fit local prejudices. Talk of a "Southern Strategy," appointment of Southern judges to the Supreme Court and compacts with Southern politicians in Congress only add credence to assertions made against us in the Middle and Far West.

If Wallace finds a successful issue to use against us this time, it will be populism, not race. Improving the economy as it relates to the white lower-to-middle class American will do more to defuse Wallace's impact than anything further on race.

IV. General Views

I have seen all of the books written psychoanalyzing the American voter. Suffice it to say that none offers any meaningful assistance in preparing for 1972. Only two general observations can easily be made about the electorate in 1972: (1) the growing and deeply felt confusion will be even more intensely felt and (2) the people will believe less and less about more and more.

Under these conditions political philosophies become an enigma. We have already seen what this confused cynicism has done to the former liberal movement -- making extreme radicals of some, and establishmentarians of the rest. Among conservatives, the same force is starting to erode the quantum of what conservatives have been interested in conserving.

Against this background, polls are of less and less value since they can tell a politician very little about how he can be believed even though they may adequately measure the intensity of feeling on issues. Television was proven almost useless in many campaigns this fall and probably will be even less useful in the 1972 campaign. This is mainly because television is losing its credibility as a conduit of honest impressions of a politician.
In 1972, confusion—cynicism will operate intensely against the incumbent, but the same force will operate to some degree also on the Democratic nominee. The key to victory lies in whether we can isolate and understand this force as it exists from group to group and thereby ascertain what is required to be credible. The precise stand on issues will be less relevant than ever before.

*****
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: JIM KEOGH

In answer to the request for some post-election thoughts, I would like to take the liberty of spinning out my personal reactions without necessarily trying to establish their general validity.

First, I believe that the campaign schedules of the Vice President and President were almost exactly right. It was wise to start the Vice President early and tough and -- considering the gravity of the situation -- to have the President come in with an intensive move at the end.

Looking first at the Vice President's campaigning, it seems to me that he came on as he should have -- hard and natural. But then he tended to overdo it.

First -- and perhaps a minor point -- he piled up too much alliteration. A little about pusillanimous pussyfooting and nattering nabobs of negativism was fine -- it got attention -- but then he did so much of this that it became a joke and even many of our good friends got to be a little embarrassed about it.

Beyond this, he seemed to be indulging in overshrill and overkill. Instead of landing a good hard punch and letting his target...
drop, he pounded and pounded. The media began dwelling on this and eventually many of our supporters began to feel that maybe the Vice President was hitting too hard. The Christine Jorgensen line about Goodell is an example. By then Charlie was bloody and reeling, and that line left the Vice President open to charges of cruelty and bad taste that made even some of his best fans wince.

Fairly early in the campaign, we made a hard turn -- and in my opinion, it was too hard a turn. At the meeting with the Cabinet on August 19 when political matters were discussed, the President struck what seemed to me to be a very good tone. The President said the economy would be the most important factor in the election. Above all, the President urged, spokesmen should take a positive position on what the Administration is doing and is trying to do, should also be positive about our candidates, should hit what the Congress has not done but should beware of building up opposition candidates by attacking them in a negative way.

Then, along the way, we bought Scammon and Wattenberg. And, in my judgment, we bought more of their theory than we should have. The opposition soon saw what we were up to and moved toward joining us.

In our intense concentration on the Scammon and Wattenberg thesis, we did not pay enough attention to the fact that the economic
issue -- fear of depression -- was cutting us to the bone in a broad sweep across the west. The irony of this is that the President had warned repeatedly about this issue -- the fear of what might happen in the economic situation, not necessarily what the present situation was. The opposition exploited this fear expertly. We did not pay enough attention to the issue.

Despite all this, I think the President's campaigning was in the main -- close to target. Ultimately it came through the media as too negative -- and that's a serious problem -- but anyone who was really paying attention knew there was a great deal of the positive, too. The Anaheim rally was generally fine on national television -- a bit too much of Reagan and Murphy for national consumption -- but the President was just right.

Then we made a shattering error. Putting the Phoenix rally speech on national television the night before the elections was a dreadful blunder. First of all, a taped rally speech is basically not a good piece of material for national use on TV. In this instance, the sound, the setting, the approach made the President seem angry and harsh and almost mean. The substance was unobjectionable but the effect was not Presidential. And the strategy gave the opposition an opportunity to put on Muskie who seemed very statesmanlike, even if quite dull.
It was a mistake to have the President on television at all the night before this election. By then the people had heard enough campaigning. But if the President felt it was necessary to go on, then the format should have been a quiet chat in a studio or office setting -- the kind of presentation in which the President has proven that he has no peer.

In the last analysis, I do not think that the Monday night mistake had much effect on the results. But I am concerned that it was damaging to the President's image in the longer term. It left the wrong tone and opened the way to the interpretation that the whole campaign was bitter and harsh.

Turning from the general tone to a specific area, I believe that in retrospect it was a mistake for the Administration to be wooing the leaders of organized labor. We throw a big Labor Day dinner for them and they go out and bludgeon us with rhetoric and money spent for the opposition. Besides, they are on the wrong side of a very big issue: inflationary pressure. I realize there are other factors involved here, but I fear that when the Administration cozies up to the labor bosses it only tends to alienate a lot of other people who are more likely to be on its side.

As for the future, I think the Administration must now realize that it is "the Government in Washington, D. C." From now on, there should be intense concentration on achievement and solid
It is no longer profitable to emphasize what the Administration is against; from now on, the emphasis must be on what the Administration is for -- what it has done and is doing. I fear that with our constant feeling that we do not do a good enough selling job we have come too close to the attitude that it doesn't make much difference what we do so long as we sell it right.

In terms of the Administration's relationships with the media, I can do no better than repeat what I wrote in a memo in June:

"I believe we are relying too much on what -- to use a crude term -- I can only describe as gimmicks. We would do ourselves more good by being more straightforward.

Too many people are spending too much time drawing up too many game plans. This may make us feel better and it may make a record on paper -- it seems to show action -- but I doubt that it is getting results that are worth all that effort.

Let's face a few facts. Most of the working media people are 1) against us, and 2) suspicious of us. In the main, they are hard to fool, although they often fool themselves -- and that usually gives them an even more negative
ance so far as we are concerned. It is very difficult for us to put anything over on them; it is practically impossible for us to subvert them. If they were for us we could do these things; since they are not, we can't.

When we try a gimmick they usually are waiting at the entrance to the alley and they wind up making us look more devious than we are. This gives us a credibility problem. The results more often turn out to be counter-productive. And the media wind up being more suspicious of us than ever.

I think we should do what we're going to do and present our case for it straightforwardly and not try to be quite so cute. In the long run, this could be a big plus with the media. They would be unbelieving at first, then startled when they realized that we really were playing it straight. In the end, while they might not be any more for us, I believe they would respect us.

One tactic that I believe we should use more is the honest-to-God calculated leak. I don't mean a contrived leak where we are just trying to sell a line, but a factual leak of a coming development. This is probably the best way to get a favorable first story out in a big way. The
reporter and editor who have the story are too anxious to protect it to let our opposition tear it apart before they deliver it. And a reporter or editor who knows that he is getting a big break on some important stories is a little less apt to be negative.

All this may seem too simple and too direct but I believe that in the long run it would be a better approach than trying to con a cynical media corps that has seen so many gimmicks for so many years. A straightforward approach might shock them toward straight reporting."

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