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<td>9/10/1971</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Strachan to Haldeman RE: an article on the 1972 Senate races. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>Advance copy of an article authored by Kevin P. Phillips on the 1972 Senate races. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs.</td>
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<td>From Magruder and James W. McLane to Finch RE: staffing plans for the 1972 election. List of potential campaign staffers attached. 8 pgs.</td>
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<td>Campaign</td>
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<td>From Buchanan to RN RE: an attached memo relating to the campaign. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>Report</td>
<td>Jim Connor's thoughts on important facets of the 1972 presidential race, including key voter demographics and campaign issues. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 11 pgs.</td>
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Some of the questions facing Richard Nixon as he contemplates who might be his Vice Presidential running mate next year are:
Should he keep controversial Spiro Agnew on the ticket? Should he make a move to strengthen his position on the politically ideologically right by getting Governor Ronald Reagan to run with him? Should he run the risk of a defection from his more conservative supporters by trying to get a man considered to be politically instituted, such as New York Republican Governor Nelson Rockefeller or Democrat John Connolly, his recently appointed secretary of the Treasury?

On a survey completed last month, California polls touched some measures on this subject. In California, Vice President Agnew would be more of a drag than a boost to Mr. Nixon's chances. While Agnew has strong appeal to conservative California Republicans, he has little appeal to other Republicans and Democrats. Perhaps surprisingly in California Reagan appears to be an even poorer choice for Vice President than Agnew. Reagan does not rank high as a Vice Presidential choice among Republicans and apparently repels a sizeable portion of Democrats. Of four choice Vice Presidential candidates Nelson Rockefeller appears to add the most strength to the Republican ticket in California. John Connolly appears also to be a stronger Vice Presidential candidate than either Agnew or Reagan, especially since he has gained additional visibility since this survey was made as a supporter for Nixon's new economic policy. The question on this subject put to a representative statewide, cross-section of potential voters in next year's election were:

"These men have been mentioned as possible Vice Presidential candidates to run with President Nixon next year, assuming that Nixon decides to run for re-election, which one would you be more likely to vote for if he appeared as the Vice Presidential candidate along with President Nixon on the Republican ticket?"

"Which one would you be least likely to vote for if he appeared as the Vice Presidential candidate?"

With Ronald Reagan as the Vice Presidential candidate behind Richard Nixon, 35% of all voters say they would be least likely to vote the GOP ticket where just 15% would be most likely to vote for Nixon--Reagan. By a margin of 24% to 22% potential voters say they would be least inclined rather than more inclined to vote for Mr. Nixon if Agnew were the Vice Presidential candidate. With John Connolly as the Vice Presidential
candidate, the trade off was on the plus side for the GOP ticket. 19% most likely to 14% less likely. Rockefeller as Mr. Nixon running mate would appear to gain the most voters for the GOP ticket. 32% most likely vs. 17% less likely.
**QUESTION:** GOP Vice President most likely to vote for:

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<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nelson Rockefeller</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiro Agnew</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>11%</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Connally</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ronald Reagan</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of these</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7%</td>
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</table>

**QUESTION:** GOP Vice President least likely to vote for:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ronald Reagan</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiro Agnew</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson Rockefeller</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Connally</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of these</td>
<td>2%</td>
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<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
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</table>
NOTE TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

This advance copy of Kevin Phillips column is the best summary of the Senate race situation in 1972.
If you would like to know which states are going to have the vital U.S. Senate contests of 1972, much of the information is already available.

United States Senators are powerful politicians well positioned to make a lot of friends and do a lot for their states. Once elected, they are difficult to displace. Thus, few U.S. Senators go down to defeat in November without warning. Almost invariably, new Senators win election only under the following circumstances:

1) The incumbent has retired;
2) The incumbent is so old that people believe he should have retired;
3) The incumbent is only an appointee to fill an unexpired term, not a man or woman who has actually been elected;
4) The incumbent has been badly weakened or defeated in a divisive party primary;
5) A major third party has distorted previous voting patterns.

Since 1965, in three elections for the U.S. Senate, very few U.S. Senate seats have changed hands except where one of the above criteria existed. The exception is Oklahoma's Mike Monroney, who lost in 1968 principally because he was too liberal for his state.

Obviously, these criteria can only be a general guide. They do not pinpoint the men who will lose. They simply delineate the ranks from which most of the losers will come. Therefore, it is the following seats that are most likely to have new occupants in January, 1973:

1. Seats Being Vacated: As of September, 1971, the list of expected retirees is as follows: Margaret Chase Smith (Republican of Maine); Karl Mundt (Republican of South Dakota); John Sherman Cooper (Republican of Kentucky); Lon Jordan (Republican of Idaho); Clinton Anderson (Democrat of New Mexico); Fred Harris (Democrat of Oklahoma), and possibly B. Everett Jordan (Democrat of North Carolina).

   All of these seats could conceivably change party hands, but the shift is more likely in some than in others.

   The seat of Maine's Senator Margaret Chase Smith could very well flip to the Democrats. Such a switch would be especially likely if Maine's Senator Edward M. Kennedy is the party's Presidential-nominee. In 1970, his presence helped a weak Democratic gubernatorial candidate to beat a popular Republican opponent.

(BOOK)
Kentucky Governor Louie Nunn may hold Senator Cooper's seat for the Republicans. If Kentucky elects a GOP governor in November to succeed Nunn, Cooper may resign so that Nunn can be appointed to the Senate and campaign as an incumbent.

Idaho's Senator Jordan has just announced his retirement, and the state GOP picture is unclear. The Republicans are generally expected to hold the seat.

With Senator Anderson retiring, the New Mexico Senate seat could go either way. In 1968, when President Nixon won a surprisingly large New Mexico plurality, he helped elect two new Republican Congressmen. The Presidential race could make the difference again in 1972.

Until unpopular, liberal Senator Fred Harris announced his retirement, Oklahoma was expected to replace him with a Republican in 1972. But now the likely Democratic nominee, middle-of-the-road Congressman Ed Edmondson, has a chance to hold the seat for his party.

If North Carolina's Senator Jordan retires, the probable Democratic nominee will be Governor Robert Scott. The Republicans would have a chance of defeating Scott and a better chance of defeating the aging Jordan. In any event, the race will be considerably affected by the respective strengths of President Nixon, the Democratic nominee, and George Wallace.

2. Aging Senators: Most of the older Senators likely to stand for re-election are Democrats from Southern and Border states. Besides Senator Jordan of North Carolina (who will be 76 next November), they include Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana (aged 82 next year), Senator John Sparkman of Alabama (72), Senator John McClellan of Arkansas (76), and Senator Jennings Randolph of West Virginia (70).

Senator Ellender is expected to run again, and should be an overwhelming favorite.

Senator McClellan, a conservative, faces the prospect of a primary fight with a younger, more moderate Democrat — Congressman David Pryor or perhaps even Governor Dale Bumpers. If McClellan survives the primary, he should win re-election handily. Even the primary scars of his defeat would be unlikely to create a Republican opening.

In Alabama, Senator John Sparkman is favored to defeat his probable GOP opponent, Postmaster General Winton Blount.

West Virginia's Senator Randolph, Chairman of the Senate Public Works Committee, occupies a position of no small importance to pork-barrel hungry West Virginia. However, he may confront a serious challenge from Republican Governor Arch G. Moore.

(MORE)
Democrats down to two who will be between the ages of 65 and 70 in Nov. 1978. One finds a lone Democrat -- Senator Frank Church of Idaho (67) -- and a trio of Republicans: Senator Carl Curtis of Nebraska (67), Senator Strom Thumond of South Carolina (66), and Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey (68). Eastland is not expected to have trouble at the polls, and neither is New Jersey's Case. However, Thumond is expected to face a tough fight, and Curtis, although favored, could have a rough ride in farm-troubled Nebraska.

3. Senators Who Have Been Appointed Rather Than Elected: Democratic Senator David Gambrell of Georgia is the only present member of this group. A moderate appointed in January by Governor Jimmy Carter to replace deceased Senator Richard Russell, Gambrell can expect conservative primary opposition, conceivably from the colorful Lieutenant-Governor (for Governor) Lester Maddox. Either Gambrell or another primary victor will probably face a determined Republican challenge in November.

4. Incumbents Who Have较少 Primary Sears or Candidates Who Have Defeated Incumbents in Inclusive Primaries: Besides the Arkansas and Georgia situations already mentioned, some tough primaries may be shaping up elsewhere.

First on the list is Oregon, where liberal Republican Senator Mark Hatfield leads badly in the polls and is likely to retire or be replaced -- after a primary -- by GOP Governor Tom McCall. As for general election prospects, Hatfield is rated a likely loser, while McCall, as the Republican nominee, would be a solid favorite.

Another potential primary state is Kansas, where GOP Senator James Pearson, an unpredictable moderate, may draw conservative opposition. Such a contest could help pave the way for a Democratic upset.

In Virginia, moderate Democratic Senator William Spong is likely to face primary opposition, perhaps from both ends -- conservative and liberal -- of the political spectrum. Here the Republicans may have a chance to profit from the ideological split in the Virginia Democratic Party.

Rhode Island's routinely liberal Democratic Senator Claiborne Pell is given only a 6-4 chance of re-election, and may draw opposition from another Democrat who feels better able to take advantage of the state's heavy Democratic bias. Whatever happens, there is a good chance that the next Senator from Rhode Island will be Republican Navy Secretary John Chafee.

5. Prospects of Third Party Interference: Conservative third parties are becoming a new force in U.S. Senate elections, mostly in protest against local situations where the two major parties espouse similar liberal outlooks.

In 1970, such a third party actually elected James Buckley to the Senate from New York. However, the conservative third parties that will be on the ballot this year are not well enough positioned to be able to elect anyone. Still, they may play an important role in determining major party winners.
Liberal Republican Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts faces local Conservative Party opposition, but it is not expected to endanger his re-election. Michigan GOP Senator Robert Griffin confronts a greater menace. Although Griffin is a moderate, he may be opposed -- and done in -- by a candidate of a new Conservative Party which aims at forcing the liberal-run Michigan GOP to heed conservative sentiment.

Other third party situations could develop in the South, but none of any great significance are presently on the horizon.

***

If the patterns of the recent past continue to hold, these criteria pinpoint nearly all of the states which may elect new U.S. Senators next year. The list does not include some men like Senators Lee Metcalf of Montana, John Tower of Texas, Thomas McIntyre of New Hampshire and Jack Miller of Iowa, who are generally expected to face tough races. Unless new circumstances develop, the 1966-1970 record suggests that incumbency should re-elect most of these legislators.

In partisan terms, the criteria listed above hint that the Democrats should gain a few Senate seats in 1972. The "dark horse" GOP opportunity is in the South and Border areas. Ten of the eleven Confederate states have Senate seats up this year, as do West Virginia, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and New Mexico. Whereas several years ago, the Republicans could have anticipated major Dixie gains, their opportunity has now been lessened by President Nixon's erratic stand on busing and related issues. If the GOP does not pick up several Southern seats in 1972, Northern gains should register a slight increase in the existing Democratic Senate majority.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENT

WASHINGTON

December 31, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROBERT H. FINCH

FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER

SUBJECT: Campaign '72 Planning

This memorandum summarizes our understanding of your views on the need to begin thinking about and planning for the 1972 campaign. We have outlined our understanding of the objectives to be reached, the proposed action steps to achieve these objectives, and a plan of implementation which we intend to follow. We have also attached a list of potential candidates for required positions.

Objectives

The purpose of our immediate effort is to lay the groundwork for the '72 campaign by:

. developing a small, low-visibility national organizational framework, giving priority first to primary States and then to key electoral States, and,

. developing an appropriate network of functional and logistical support for the campaign effort in 1972, including the appropriate communication networks, information systems, and computer flexibility.

Action Steps

Several action steps will have to be taken in the next few weeks to begin moving toward these objectives. These steps, in order of priority, include:

1. Recruitment of "outside" regional coordinators, with
priority given first to areas where there are early primaries and then to key electoral States. This step will include field visits to key locations to open lines of communication and show the flag.

2. Recruitment of 1 "in-house" (located either here at the White House or at the Republican National Committee) desk man.

3. Recruitment of an "in-house" computer and software specialist to develop the necessary computer capability. This individual would compliment and supplement the activities the RNC is engaged in at the present time.

4. Recruitment of an "in-house" research specialist to monitor the opposition, both Democrat and Republican, to develop the necessary statistical foundation for campaign decisions, and to pull together appropriate State-by-State analyses of issues, voter behavior, and the like.

The individuals recruited will begin:

(1) Inventorying and cataloging all existing resources for use in the '72 campaign, resources available in the White House, National Committee, Congressional Committee, State Committees, 1968 campaign records, etc.

(2) Developing a detailed "game plan" for necessary activities between now and the start of the actual campaign.

## Plan of Implementation

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<th>Activity</th>
<th>Person(s) Responsible</th>
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<tr>
<td>Recruit &quot;outside&quot; Regional coordinators</td>
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<tr>
<td>visits to key areas (up to 10)</td>
<td>Finch/McLane</td>
<td>2/15/71</td>
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<tr>
<td>screening of candidates</td>
<td>Finch/McLane/Magruder</td>
<td>3/1/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>selection of team</td>
<td>Finch</td>
<td>3/15/71</td>
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Recruit a regional desk man, a computer specialist, and a research coordinator

- identifying candidates (see Attachments A, B) Magruder/McLane 12/31/70
- initial screen of candidates Magruder/McLane 1/22/71
- final screen of top candidates Finch 2/1/71
- selection of team Finch 2/5/71

Inventory and catalogue resources Magruder/McLane 2/15/71

Develop detailed "game plans" Magruder/McLane 3/1/71

The attached lists of potential candidates for positions include Bart Porter and Mike Schrauth. Both are working now with Chapin/Walker and should be given consideration for the first two spots.
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<td>Robert Barth</td>
<td>Asst. to the Comm. IRS - Treasury</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Legal</td>
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<td>Paul R. Beach</td>
<td>Asst. to the Sec. - Treasury</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donald Bliss</td>
<td>Asst. to the Sec.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>George Carneal, Jr.</td>
<td>Chief Counsel FAA</td>
<td>Spec.</td>
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<td>Legal</td>
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<td>John Clarke</td>
<td>Exec. Asst. to the Assoc. Dir. - OEO</td>
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<td>Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. Grey Lewis</td>
<td>Exec. Asst. to Asst. AG - Justice</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Legal</td>
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<tr>
<td>William Marumoto</td>
<td>Consultant to the WH on Executive Manpower- WH</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. March Miller, II</td>
<td>Spec. Asst. to the Sec. for Personnel - HUD</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bert Rein</td>
<td>Dept. Asst. Sec. for Telecommunications - State</td>
<td>FRSI</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donald Webster</td>
<td>Deputy Asst. Sec. for International Affairs - Treasury</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Organization and Public Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vincent DeCain</td>
<td>Deputy Asst. PMG, Post Office (1968 Advanceman)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert Henry</td>
<td>Confidential Assistant to Assistant PMG, POD</td>
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<tr>
<td>T. William (Bill) Swinford</td>
<td>Director of Information, Civil Aeronautics Board (Worked for Rumsfeld in 13th District, Illinois)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Webster Todd, Jr.</td>
<td>Exec. Asst. to the Chairman, CAB (Father is former New Jersey State Chairman)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harold S. (Ted) Trimmer</td>
<td>Assistant Administrator, GSA</td>
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<td>Henry Boe</td>
<td>Post Office</td>
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<td>Lawyer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jim Holland</td>
<td>Post Office, Public Information Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bill Dunlap</td>
<td>Special Asst., Post Office</td>
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<td>Bill Rhatican</td>
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<td>Bruce Ladd</td>
<td>Fleming's office</td>
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<td>Public Relations Work</td>
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<td>Jim Lynn</td>
<td>Dept. of Commerce</td>
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<td>Gen. Counsel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mike Schrauth</td>
<td>Public Information</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>assigned to Chapin/Walker</td>
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<td>Max Friedersdorf</td>
<td>Acting Assoc, Dir. for Congressional Relations, OEO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bill Sawyer</td>
<td>Public Information Office, OEO</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>good administrator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dan Todd</td>
<td>Special Asst. to the Chairman, CAB</td>
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<td>Richard Mastrangelo</td>
<td>Asst. to Sec. HEW</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richard Dunnells</td>
<td>Acting Deputy Asst</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>Sec. Urban Renewal HUD</td>
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## POTENTIAL CANDIDATES FOR THE '72 CAMPAIGN PLANNING STAFF

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Approximate Age</th>
<th>Current Activity</th>
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<tr>
<td>J. Curtis Herge</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Lawyer-Mudge, Rose Guthrie &amp; Alexandria, N. Y. Advance work for the Pres. and First Family during Campaign '70. Strong on finances, detail, personal contact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Northcote</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Lawyer-Investment Banker (Kuhn, Loeb), N. Y. Southern Cal - Harvard Law; does special projects for us on request. Strong salesman, good organization, access to financial information, very bright.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Banks</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Lawyer (own firm), L. A. Southern Cal - on Walker's advance list; personal contacts in LA, conscientious on detail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Miller</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Lawyer-(Sullivan &amp; Cromwell John Foster Dulles), N. Y. Stanford - Harvard; N. Y; good research, writer, bright.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joel S. Wachs</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Lawyer - L.A.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charles Stevens</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>United Student Alliance, group organizer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jerry Speers</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Was campaign manager for father's Congressional race in Maine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allan Shea</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Director, National Alliance of Businessmen, New England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Richer</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Marketing Manager, New England Telephone Company</td>
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MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: TOM CHARLES HUSTON
SUBJECT: Analysis of Buckley Senate Race

I am attaching a memorandum on the New York Senate race and its implications for 1972 prepared at my request by a young fellow who was Jim Buckley's elections analyst. This fellow is quite highly regarded by Cliff White and others and I think his observations are quite interesting. I might point out that not all his conclusions are beyond dispute, but most are worthy of consideration.

Finkelstein works for the NBC unit that does the Vote Profile Analysis and, while lacking Phillips' precision, is nevertheless a promising fellow. I think he could be helpful to us in providing an additional perspective on some of the problems we will face as we move into 1972 and his grasp of voting and demographic data is quite good. Moreover, he has a feel for the New York situation which only one similarly situated could have.

Attachment
As an attempt at coherence, this report is segmented into five divisions. Segment one deals with the New York State Senate race -- assumptions made -- issues slated. The second division is simply a sketchy and not final attempt at evaluation of the election results of that Senate race. The third segment just lists some thoughts dealing with the national results and some suggestions for analysis. The fourth area is an attempt to explore the president's chances vis-à-vis the four major aspirants for the Democratic nomination. Finally, the fifth division is a summary division wherein I allow my mind to wander where it may.

New York State Senate Race

Running as a third party, and conservative third party at that, in New York State is an act of heresy. Buckley's 1968 performance suggested that there were indeed many votes to be had as a third party candidate. Unfortunately, it did not at first appear that there were enough votes to make Buckley a winner.

Several conditions were present in 1970 that were not present in 1968. Among them were:

1. Money - Jim had virtually no real dollars to spend in 1968;
2. Clif White - It cannot be overestimated the importance of truly professional leadership;
3. Goodell - Is not and was not Javits;
4. Right-ward Shift - Fully 1/3 of all New Yorkers considered themselves conservatives by July, 1970.

Rather quickly, we determined that Ottinger, not Goodell, was the one to beat, however, to win we needed the Republican votes that Goodell had by virtue of his place on the Republican ticket. Effectively then, the voters were asked to vote for James Buckley as an alternative to the liberal twins or for Richard Ottinger as an alternative to the Republican twins. Throughout the campaign we exploited our alternative more effectively than Ottinger did.

We needed to emphasize our Republican credentials and we did. Every Republican endorsement was played to the hilt from Congressmen to County Leaders. Early in the campaign, the allusion, if not the reality, of James Buckley being the Republican choice was established. To this end, Goodell's later assertions that he had a more Republican voting record than Barry Goldwater was scoffed at.
However, a simple majority of Republicans would have left us far short — we needed that middle-income traditional Democratic vote that Kevin Phillips talks about. We went after the Italian and Irish voter hard. Mario Proccacino and John Marchi were used continuously around the state. Proccacino because of his Democratic background and because of the constituency he represents was a particularly significant factor. Agnew's pronouncements here was very helpful. I, however, believe that his rhetoric was too harsh over too long a time, so that it is possible that not only Liberal Democrats moved to Goodell in sympathy, but also line-Republicans who felt that statements such as the "Christine Jorgensen" analogy were unfair. Yet on balance the Vice-President had a positive affect on the outcome of the election. Perhaps most importantly the Vice-President completely eclipsed Richard Ottinger from the media and drew to Buckley that hard-hat labor vote which we ultimately received.

Therefore, the initial strategy to ignore Black and Jewish voters and to concentrate on the middle and upper-income wasp and ethnic groupings was carried forth. Though we determined early which voters to pursue there was one major obstacle we had to deal with — that being the question of credibility. Unwillingly, I'm sure, the New York Times gave us a boost here.

Very early in the campaign, Anthony Lewis and another columnist, whose name slips my mind at the moment, wrote articles stating that Buckley could win and that he was a sincere, able man. These articles coupled with early endorsements from some papers around the state and our early sole presence on television, helped establish Buckley as viable. The Daily News poll which showed us leading toward the end, kept our voters in line.

In terms of issues, we determined from an intensity survey in Rochester that drugs, crime, inflation, environment, campus unrest, and Vietname were the major issues. We played to each of these issues through realizing early that the environment and Vietnam issues were not cutting but useful from a broadening-of-the-candidate point of view. In this regard, we did a good job. Buckley was acknowledged by the electorate as the man most able to deal with drugs, crime, etc. However, inflation and whole economics area cut against us. Fortunately, it was not until the final three days of the campaign that Ottinger began an all-out crusade on Economics. Until that point he was fighting it out with us on drugs and losing.

One issue which we did not perceive early was school-bussing. I threw a question on bussing into one of the very amateurish surveys I was taking around the state and found unusually strong and overwhelming distaste for school bussing. We needed some help in Buffalo (the Polish community is one of the few ethnic groups which unfathomably is not being moved Ala Kevin Phillips) where we determined early would be our hardest nut to crack. We knew we needed over 25% of the vote there and throughout the campaign that looked dubious. Nixon in a two-way race received only 40% in Erie county. We kept sending Jim to Buffalo and we enlarged our media campaign in that area, then we used our bussing issue. It worked. Final figures are not yet in officially...
but it looks like we received 28% of the Erie County vote. I suspect mostly from the large Italian and German population in that area. The Polish community is still not moved to a large extent.

Summing up this section, it can be said we geared the campaign to go after suburban and upstate Republicans, urban Democrats, middle-income Blue Collar Irish - Italian - German - Polish, upper-income Wasp, whites, and those individuals who in turn would be moved by the Sea-mon-Wattenberg social issue. Finally, we realized we had undoubtedly the best candidate and we were not afraid to go anywhere with him. Clif White ran an almost flawless campaign and he had the money and talent to make it all happen.

New York State Election Evaluation

Goodell received about 1/3 of the High S.E.S. group, about 1/5 of middle S.E.S., and slightly more than 1/4 of the low S.E.S. He received almost 1/3 of the Black vote but slightly less than 1/5 of the White vote. He received about 30% of the Jewish vote, 25% of the Latin American vote and a little less than 1/4 of the Italian vote. He received slightly more than 1/5 of the Blue Collar vote. He did not win a plurality of any of these groups.

Goodell received 20% of the New York City vote, 22% of the N.Y.C. suburbs and slightly less than 1/3 of the rest of the state.

Ottinger garnered about 1/4 of the High S.E.S. vote, 1/3 of the middle S.E.S., and more than 50% of the low S.E.S. vote. He received 2/3 of the Black and Latin American vote, and slightly less than 40% of the White vote. He received under 40% of the Italian vote and Blue-collar vote. He received about 55% of the Jewish vote. Ottinger won a plurality among the low S.E.S., Blacks, Latin Americans, and Jews. He and Buckley received virtually the same vote out of the Italian community.

Ottinger received 44% in the city, 32% in the suburbs, 38% in the three cities, and 31% in the rest of the state.

Buckley received about 45% of the vote from the High S.E.S., middle S.E.S., white and Blue-Collar voters. He received only slightly more than 10% of the low S.E.S. voters, about 15% among Jewish voters. He received less than 10% of the vote among Latin Americans and Blacks. Among Italians he got under 40%. Buckley won a plurality among the high S.E.S., middle S.E.S., whites and Blue-collar voters. He received about the same vote as Ottinger among Italians.

Buckley received 36% in New York City, 46% in the city's suburbs, 30% in the three cities of Rochester, Syracuse and Buffalo and 37% in the rest of the state.

The contention that Buckley won because of a Liberal split I think is clearly repudiated by these numbers. Goodell did very poorly in the city where Liberal sentiment is greatest and did best in those
sections of the state where Republican sentiment is greatest. Those numbers also give some validity to my earlier contention about the Agnew play.

Most importantly these numbers give mild hope to building a lasting Republican coalition in the state. However, since blacks and Jews constitute about 25% of the total vote in the state, and with the ever-increasing Latin American population making the dissident coalition nearly 30% of this coalition can only be described as precarious at best. If a permanent coalition is to be developed in New York State's Jews, at least, must be included to some significant degree.

Also the Polish bloc, for which I have no real break-out yet, must be catered to and harnessed. Nixon cannot win with 40% of Erie County again, which seems likely to happen if some hard work is done early in the Polish groups around Buffalo.

Surprisingly, Jim received about 5% of the Black vote and in fact ran better than Nixon did in some of our key district samplings taken election night. This is all the more surprising when one remembers Buckley was on Row C. In Black areas, even more so than elsewhere, drugs was the issue. A late endorsement from a local Black leader helped. Considering the Black strive for autonomy recently Conservative/Republican ideology perhaps can be used to wedge in. I am not suggesting that we will be able to carry Black areas in the forseeable future, but we can significantly add to that 5% with an effort to show understanding of the real social issues affecting that community.

Finally, it cannot be overstated the importance of James L. Buckley as a candidate. After watching Jim campaign, smiling - gesturing-reasoning, one is prone to disbelieve the ogre theory. He confronted the electorate as the citizen-Politician, who was concerned with those issues that concerned all citizens. He approached them with reason and moderation. More on moderation later.

National Trends

In a general sense, I agree with Scammon that elections are won by finding the political middle and moving towards it. I would, however, make one major modification to that general statement; find the cutting political middle and strive towards it. For example, environment was a middle-issue but very few voted for or against ecology. On the other hand, drugs, race, inflation cut. One should then try to polarize the election around that issue which cuts best in your direction, i.e., drugs, crime, race in New York State. When the opponent seizes the polarization initiative, then you're in trouble.

Nationally, the Republican party went overboard on the social issue and virtually ignored economics. (I must point out that our very first set of television commercials discussed inflation, taxes, etc.) The electorate must not only agree with the cutting political-middle position on stakes out they must all believe that the candidate can
provide the proper temperament to deal with the problem. Once again, moderation is called forth, and moderation is what was missing in Indiana, California, Florida and other states from what I have gathered from the media. Texas seemed to have been a major exception to this rule, but it does not negate the need for moderation.

The election results proved virtually nothing. We did witness perhaps a half-step to the right in the Senate. The Democrats surely made strides in the statehouses, elsewhere Little Movement. It seems to me that local issues moved this election more than normally (normally off-year elections tend to be locally oriented anyway) and yet some light I think can be shed.

Intuitively, I feel that this election was an election of negativism. I recommend that an analysis of referendums, bond issues, etc. be undertaken if one has not yet been done which I feel will point forth that negativism. In my opinion, only an immoderate negative campaign in Indiana could have allowed Barthe to hold his Senate seat. Stevenson's flag pin campaign seems to be the perfect campaign for a Democrat to run. A campaign that diffuses the social issue and polarizes around the economic issue is a tough parlay to beat. Most importantly it allowed Stevenson to be the anti-hero, the Messiah of negativism.

The administration's rhetoric, I felt, was too strident, particularly the rhetoric of the Vice President. However, the Vice President certainly helped move the Blue Collar ethnic vote and he should help enormously in the south and border states in 1972. Texas, for example, I believe will go G.O.P. in 1972 on the basis of the Vice President alone. If the right-ward shift of the electorate continues and the economic situation is in-land then it might be possible to play to new social issues with the stridentness of 1970 and not be immoderate but the rhetoric should not be employed solely on the basis of its academic delightfulness.

The Radical-Liberal campaign failed dismally mainly because of its disarray. You simply can't call virtually every Democrat a Radical-Liberal and be believed by large segments of the population. Smear campaign work but they must be concentrated, not universal.

Presidential 1972

The 1970 elections, if they taught anything at all, showed that the Scammon social issue is not a "tidal wave", at least not yet. Vietnam is not a negative or cutting issue any longer and economics could rule the roost.

The social issue was approached in 1970 in an umbrella attack where everything from Blacks to students, Radicals to Liberals, pornography, youth, draft dodgers, crime, drugs, and hippies were confronted. I suggest the social issue can work effectively if one concentrates on and defines for the electorate who is the culprit. On this score, I would define the culprit as those "Radical Left Extremists", not Liberals - too many people classify themselves as Liberals (old coalition) and
resent being told that they are the enemies of society. More precisely, the culprit should be limited to a maximum of three groups. At least one of those groups should be a group which "good Liberals" like Kennedy could not repudiate. One group should be bizarre (i.e. Weathermen, Yippies, etc.) which links directly to all the youth fear inherent in the social issue. The third group must be Black oriented (Panthers?) to exploit the race issue. I do not recommend attacking the A.D.A. It doesn't work and forget balancing the group with the K.K.K. The danger must be presented as coming from the left.

I suggest this group be finalized no earlier than January, 1972, but that the phrase "Radical Left Extremist" be employed as early and consistently as possible applying it to every anti-social leftist terrorist act such as shooting of policemen, campus riots, riots in general, bombings, etc. The emphasis on the social issue should be placed in inverse relationship to the economic issue.

The economic issue can only cut against us so if as is projected mid-1971 will show a drop off in unemployment numbers, the president should go on television telling the country that he has stemmed the recession in record time with the least hardship possible; thank the American people for their cooperation in this effort and announce that this again proves that when the American people are faced with a crisis they respond in great measure and that this could only have been accomplished by the president because of the people's overwhelming support of his economic policies.

This would have the triple effect of dealing with the economic issue early and diffusing it; allowing the electorate to feel that it aided the president in dealing with the problem and joining them with him; and allow the president to take credit for handling the economic situation in expert manner and mobile enough to shift the blame for the recession and inflation on the Democrats in the electorate's mind.

If there is no turn around in the recession and in the inflation until 1972, this will place the president in a precarious position. If there is no turn around at all it may place the president in a fatal position. In any event, the economic strategy must be considered of prime importance.

On Vietnam the president should be thoroughly positive on his actions. A dove opponent, or even a former dove, would be extremely vulnerable to a patriotic approach. But again, I don't think this will be cutting. Yet Vietnam and the draft show the President to be a man of peace, competency, and action. If another Cambodian-type invasion or military assault is to be attempted, it should be attempted as soon as possible, no later than January, 1972. A successful P.O.W. raid attempt would be enormously important and positive in building the president's image.

Of course, in all three issue areas mentioned and any other areas that may develop over the course of the next two years, consideration must be given to changes in circumstances which must inevitably occur.
The president, above all, must find the political middle and move towards it and with it during the next two years. The president must also continue to display himself as a man of moderation never calling forth for harsher measures beyond that which the political middle would call forth on its own.

The president's present political image is that of a moderate Conservative. This is perfect in terms of the electorate and fine in terms of his perspective political opponents - Muskie, Kennedy, Lindsay, McGovern.

Let's for a moment, assume George Wallace does not run in 1972. Also, let's assume that the economic issue develops as previously suggested. Then the president stands to lose only (in major states) New Jersey and Pennsylvania to the first three men listed, none to McGovern while picking up the South including Texas and a couple of midwestern states that Humphrey carried. If these assumptions hold then there would be little to fear.

Assume now that Wallace does run and the second assumption remains the same. Then the president would probably still hold Texas against all four. With Agnew on the ticket still hold the border states against all four. Muskie would seriously challenge the president in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois. The president would then be forced to either move right or attempt to move Muskie left. It would be far better to try to move Muskie away from the political middle then move from the political middle himself. The social issue then becomes a major tactic and consideration and should be employed.

Under the same set of assumptions, Kennedy would be a bit easier though Kennedy would have to be given an edge in New Jersey; Pennsylvania would still be up for grabs; while Ohio and Illinois would be easier for Nixon. Texas and the border states would be stronger for Nixon, while the president would find California a lot less stable.

Lindsay and McGovern (particularly McGovern) look like political misfits to me who would be so far away from the political middle that only a strange set of circumstances would a) allow them to get the nomination (i.e. it wasn't worth anything) or b) allow them to win the Presidency (i.e. depression, war, etc.). Since points a and b are mutually exclusive, the likelihood of either occurring seem problematically impossible.

If Wallace runs and there is an economic collapse, then Muskie would be virtually a shoo-in. The South and border states and perhaps even Texas would go to Wallace. Michigan, California, New Jersey, Ohio, and Illinois would go to Muskie, who would then be the anti-hero man of the middle. His style perfect for that occurrence. Kennedy would fare perhaps even better holding on to Democrat votes in the Northeast reviving the old coalition so that he could pull off some border states and maybe Texas. He would then be able to have California, Michigan, Ohio, Illinois, etc.
Lastly, if Wallace does not run and there is an economic collapse, then the president would find Kennedy easier than Muskie but would probably lose to either man.

In other words at all costs (politically) an economic collapse must be avoided. However, a total collapse seems improbable. If the economy is sour but not excessively so, then Muskie would be the most serious challenger perhaps having the edge in those areas hardest hit by the sour economy California, Ohio, Michigan, perhaps New Jersey. Kennedy would be less secure in these states under that condition.

Frankly though, the most important thing about 1972 is that it is two years away and that little can be suggested about issues or candidates at this time with any real degree of reliability. In my judgment, the president is in excellent shape, stronger now than in November, 1968 and all things being equal should be reasonable assured of being reelected in 1972. Unfortunately, all things may not be equal.

I have purposely excluded New York State from this analysis. I will discuss it below.

Random Thoughts

It appears that there has yet to be perceived in absolute terms a reliable working system to determine the future course of voting behavior. There is great truth in all the recent deluge of books but none, to my complete satisfaction, has defined a fully accurate working model.

No doubt a new coalition is forming. Yet the Polish, in New York State at least, has not followed the script. The social issue is cutting, but economics cut more deeply in 1970. So trends are emerging but the full extent of change is not yet really perceptible.

1. The economic issue looms at present as the major issue of 1972. It can only hurt national Republican chances.

2. The social issue is changing, students are no longer inherent to the social issue. Race continues to be cutting. Left wing extremists continues to be cutting. Education should be looked into more thoroughly as a grand issue rather than a narrow one.

3. Vietnam is now positive and can be used effectively against the likes of Lindsay.

4. Negativism generally is more cutting than positivism. The amendment, referendum/bond issue, etc. votes should be studied.

5. Environment is important as a broadening factor. It is not yet cutting, though it may if economics does not rear itself.
6. I do not feel that Muskie will get the nomination, rather I see a Dark Horse Shriver, Bayh, etc. getting the nod.

7. Lindsay must try to get the Democratic Vice Presidential nomination and use a fourth party play as leverage.

8. Nixon cannot be seriously challenged within the Republican party.

9. Moderation and the political middle must be synonomous.

10. Agnew must not be dropped from the ticket. He means too much in the border states and Texas. However, he has proven his Conservative credentials he must moderate his rhetoric or face a possible backlash in the North and Midwest.

11. No real effort should be made to get the Black vote.

12. New York State cannot be won against either Kennedy or Muskie. Ottinger is Jewish and thereby added nothing to his coalition, Kennedy and Muskie are not Jewish and thereby will. New York has not yet proven itself willing to move right-of-middle it has at least moved to the middle.

13. If Wallace does not run, it will be possible to move considerably to the left in campaign allusion.

14. Labor leaders should be continuously courted. Nixon will probably not get their support and will get sizable amounts of Blue-Collar support all the same.

15. The president should use television sparsely over the next 12 months; a great deal afterwards.

16. Something dramatic must be done about California vis a vis its economic plight. The president may be in trouble there.

17. Texas should be courted strongly.

18. Issues like the volunteer army should be publicized to broaden the president's image.

19. The Conservative party in New York has had its swan song, though it will certainly have some major affect in 1972.

The rapidity with which this has been assembled is my only real excuse for its lack of thoroughness. I would be extremely pleased to answer any questions you have concerning this sketchy report either by letter or in Washington, if you wish. Further, I can only hope that this is the type of report you desired, if not, I'm still rather young.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Patrick J. Buchanan

While I disagree with facets of this memo, particularly relating to issues, I strongly concur that it's going to be a hot election and the enormous importance of work in the five crucial states.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: John Sears

I. 1972

If a President seeking re-election has kept the peace and presided over a prosperous economy, the conventional wisdom says that he is unbeatable. The reason people have made this assertion so readily over the last 30 years is that, with the single exception of Eisenhower, we have had Democratic incumbents -- members of the majority party -- seeking re-election. All they had to do was show a certain degree of unity in their own ranks and they could carry a majority of the nation. Eisenhower's personal popularity could have won him re-election without a party designation.

1972, however, will be the first year since 1916 in which a President who is a member of the minority party will seek re-election. (Republicans were the minority by the time Hoover came up for re-election in 1932.) Although Wilson had done an excellent job of domestic reform and "keeping us out of war," he was nearly beaten and probably could have been beaten. My belief is that no matter how well the Administration is regarded nationally in 1972 and, within bounds, whoever the Democratic nominee may be, the election will be damned close.

Statistically, let us examine some possible situations:

(1) If George Wallace were to decide not to run for President in 1972 and we were able to win the 45 electoral votes he received, and also take Texas (25) away from the Democratic nominee, the Democrats could still defeat us if they merely held the states they carried in 1968 and carried four others (California, Illinois, Ohio and New Jersey.) Our present position in Ohio is anemic; we lost Senate seats in Illinois and California; we failed to pick up one in New Jersey. Also we did not carry a single one of these states comfortably in 1968. The scenarios break down as follows:
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<th>Democratic Nominee</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 states (exclusive of Calif., N.J., Ill., and Ohio)</td>
<td>13 states carried by Humphrey, exclusive of Texas</td>
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<tr>
<td>191 votes</td>
<td>162</td>
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<td>5 states carried by Wallace</td>
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<td>45</td>
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(2) If Wallace enters the race, he must be conceded Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana. This would subtract 27 votes from the Nixon above total. It would then mean that RN would have to carry California, or any combination of two of the remaining three large states (Illinois, Ohio and New Jersey) or the election would go to the House. If Wallace repeated his performance of 1968 and carried Georgia, and Arkansas in addition to Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana, then RN would have to carry California and one out of Illinois, Ohio and New Jersey, or all three of the other large states (Illinois, Ohio and New Jersey.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Wallace</th>
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<td>29 states, (exclusive of Calif., N.J., Ill., and Ohio)</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<td>Georgia and Arkansas</td>
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<td>Undecideds</td>
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<th>Democratic Nominee</th>
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<th>Illinois</th>
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<tr>
<td>13 states carried by Humphrey (exclusive of Texas)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>162</td>
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RN

29 states (exclusive of Calif., N. J., Ill., and Ohio) 191
Texas 26
217

Democratic Nominee

13 states carried by Humphrey, exclusive of Texas 162

Undecideds

California 46
Ohio 25
Illinois 25
New Jersey 18

Wallace

5 states carried by Wallace in 1968 45

(3) If Wallace picks up 45 electoral votes and we fail to carry Texas, RN would have to carry California plus two out of the remaining three large states. If RN failed to carry California but did carry Ohio, Illinois, New Jersey, the election would still go to the House.

RN

29 states (exclusive of Calif., N. J., Ill., and Ohio) 191

Democratic Nominee

13 states carried by Humphrey (exclusive of Texas) 162
Wallace

5 states carried by Wallace in 1968 45

Undecideds

California 46
Ohio 25
Illinois 25
New Jersey 18 114

(4) In 1972 it may be difficult to hold either Missouri or Wisconsin. If Wallace runs and captures 45 electoral votes, the Democratic nominee wins in Texas and we lost Missouri and Wisconsin, it would then be necessary for RN to carry all four of the large States he carried in 1968. Failure to carry California plus one of the other three would result in a Democratic victory; to carry 3 out of 4 would put the election in the House.

RN

29 states 191
less Missouri and Wisconsin -24
167

Democratic Nominee

13 states carried by Humphrey, exclusive of Texas 162
Missouri & Wisconsin 24
Texas 26
212
Wallace

5 states carried by
Wallace in 1968  45

Undecideds

California  46
Ohio  25
Illinois  25
New Jersey  18

114

Obviously, whatever becomes of George Wallace, RN's fate is deeply tied to the outcome in 5 large states:

(1) TEXAS -- the Party is in disarray -- O'Donnell should probably step down, but won't. RN has never been able to carry the state even when there has been a split in Democratic ranks (1960, due to Kennedy's religion; 1968, due to a division between liberal and conservative Democrats.) If Ben Barnes runs for the Senate, or the Governorship, and happens to get along with the national Democratic ticket, we will be running against a unified Democratic Party for the first time. Barnes is anxious to deliver Texas to the Democrats in view of his future ambitions.

(2) OHIO -- RN carried the state twice -- but in both instances we had a unified party. Today, the party is horribly split over both philosophy and personalities. The White House should either act immediately to elect a new state chairman who will be loyal only to RN -- or prepare to organize the state independent of the party. The Democrats will be assisted considerably by control of the Governorship.

(3) ILLINOIS -- in 1968 we benefitted from a superior, unified and balanced ticket, together with a certain indifference on the part of Mayor Daley. In 1972, Percy is headed for a bitter primary; Ogilvie is growing less popular by the day (31% job approval in the latest poll) and Mayor Daley cannot be counted upon to sit on his hands again. RN must win the state by doing exceptionally well in the
downstate counties; both Percy and Ogilvie must do exceptionally well in Cook County since neither is a downstate darling. There is also a strong possibility that Ogilvie will have a primary.

We cannot allow the present disruption to get any worse. It will take two full years of sharp politicking to put Illinois back together.

(4) NEW JERSEY -- Again, there is developing factionalism in the party in the wake of Gross' defeat. The party is suffering some ill-effects from controlling the Governorship at a time when taxes must be raised, and is further hotly divided between liberals and conservatives. Clifford Case will be up in 1972 and it is too much to hope that he will be singing the Administration's praises.

(5) CALIFORNIA -- Reagen's popularity can be counted upon to wane over the next two years. As ever, the liberal-conservative split continues in the Party. The Democrats, meanwhile, having freed themselves of the yoke of Brown and Unruh, are not as factionalized as they have been in past years. Reagen would not mind seeing RN embarrassed. The President must begin immediately to look out for his own neck there or local interests will use it for a tug-of-war.

II. Democratic Situation

Our major political endeavor must be aimed at promoting a split among the Democrats. This will be difficult because:
(1) they now feel the loss of being out of the Presidency and thus will be more careful about controlling internal disputes;
(2) the out party can create a measure of unity by merely attacking the "in" President; (3) they now have some patronage in a number of states which can be used to control local disputes and; (4) as a result of their success in the Gubernatorial elections there is now a group of people in the Democratic Party with the power to make it easier for a prospective Presidential nominee to go through the nominating process without being cut up inside his Party.
Given these facts, I would suggest:

(1) Muskie -- Muskie is not an accomplished national politician. He will make mistakes as long as we do not make his road easier by making derogatory remarks about him. Every time we answer him or take him on, it unifies a few more Democrats behind him. Ignore him and he won't be able to hack it.

Muskie has serious difficulty in making a negative issue; he prefers to play Lincolnesque roles, the above-the-battle man who says nothing unfair or partisan. He would prefer to talk about how well everybody gets along in Maine. As long as we don't apply the missing element by responding to him he will either (a) lose his momentum or (b) -- sensing that he is not doing as well as he anticipated -- exhibit a misdirected temper at us and the press which we can use to our advantage. The game is to get him rattled; the best way to do it is to get at his monstrous ego by ignoring him.

(2) Humphrey -- we should help build Humphrey into a candidate. Shortly after the opening of the new Congressional session, he will predictably move to become spokesman for his party in Congress. He is aware of the current void there and will seek to fill it. If Humphrey wishes to attack us, we should be more than willing to hit back at him since this builds him up in the eyes of his party. We should, in effect, create a New Humphrey -- for awhile.

There is an element of danger in building up Humphrey since (1) he might be able to unify the Democrats if he got going too fast and (2) he might disdain the nomination and use the influence we create for him on behalf of another candidate. I do not believe either thing will happen since (1) he symbolizes and epitomizes the split which occurred in 1968 and thus his ascending prominence will create strong tensions in the Party among the more liberal elements and the youth; (2) Muskie and Kennedy will not wish to see him move up and will do what they can to undercut him; (3) the academics detest him; (4) he can be embarrassed in the primaries if he gets going too fast.
Given the lure by us, he will bite. As his stock rises this will put pressure on Muskie and Kennedy, as well as re-engage the Democratic split on which our fortunes depend.

(3) Kennedy -- Kennedy must wait for Muskie to fall before he can become very active. To do otherwise is to subject himself to the same kind of problem his brother encountered with McCarthy. We should not respond to Kennedy's candidacy either; our line of defense against him is a reconstructed Humphrey. If Humphrey is a viable enough candidate by the time Muskie fades, Kennedy will be unable to take full advantage of the situation. Humphrey and Kennedy will then be locked in a life or death struggle, from which we can derive great benefit.

(4) Other candidates -- McGovern, Hughes, Bayh, etc. should be totally ignored. To the extent that any of them makes a mark, they will further complicate the plans of the above three contenders. At this juncture, none of them can be nominated.

Steadfastly resist all opportunities to discuss possible Democratic opponents. Humphrey is the only individual we should mention and this should only be done artfully to the objective of building his candidacy.

III. Wallace

The important thing is to draw a clear line delineating how far we will go to fight his candidacy and then religiously adhere to it. He senses that he has us in a bind since (1) if we chase him too far in an effort to hold onto Southern votes, we lost support in the rest of the country; (2) if we don't chase him far enough he might hurt us more in the South than he did the last time. In either case there would be more of a chance that the election would wind up in the House than was true in 1968.

Look for Wallace to run a strictly Southern campaign this time since (1) it costs less money (2) he can focus his positions better and (3) he will feel this is the best way to get us to chase him.
We have gone as far as we can on the race-school-crime-law and order issue. For a fair amount of time we should keep quiet about this. A fair number of people in the Middle and Far West are beginning to wonder whether we aren't a little too Southern in our view of the "social issue" to fit local prejudices. Talk of a "Southern Strategy," appointment of Southern judges to the Supreme Court and compacts with Southern politicians in Congress only add credence to assertions made against us in the Middle and Far West.

If Wallace finds a successful issue to use against us this time, it will be populism, not race. Improving the economy as it relates to the white lower-to-middle class American will do more to defuse Wallace's impact than anything further on race.

IV. General Views

I have seen all of the books written psychoanalyzing the American voter. Suffice it to say that none offers any meaningful assistance in preparing for 1972. Only two general observations can easily be made about the electorate in 1972: (1) the growing and deeply felt confusion will be even more intensely felt and (2) the people will believe less and less about more and more.

Under these conditions political philosophies become an enigma. We have already seen what this confused cynicism has done to the former liberal movement -- making extreme radicals of some, and establishmentarians of the rest. Among conservatives, the same force is starting to erode the quantum of what conservatives have been interested in conserving.

Against this background, polls are of less and less value since they can tell a politician very little about how he can be believed even though they may adequately measure the intensity of feeling on issues. Television was proven almost useless in many campaigns this fall and probably will be even less useful in the 1972 campaign. This is mainly because television is losing its credibility as a conduit of honest impressions of a politician.
In 1972, confusion—cynicism will operate intensely against the incumbent, but the same force will operate to some degree also on the Democratic nominee. The key to victory lies in whether we can isolate and understand this force as it exists from group to group and thereby ascertain what is required to be credible. The precise stand on issues will be less relevant than ever before.

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Attached is a memo which was given me shortly after the election by an individual who I brought to work at OEO. Jim Connor is a former PhD from Columbia University, Republican, and a former White House Fellow. I thought you might find it of interest.

Attachment: Copy of paper by Jim Connor
The mid-term elections of 1970 have generally been described in the media as a defeat for the Republican Party generally and the Nixon Administration in particular. Whether such assessments are fair is subject to debate. Most Republicans would agree, however, that while the 1970 results hardly constituted a defeat, in the terms normally used to describe off-year election results, the election most certainly was a disappointment. The purpose of this paper is to briefly describe and analyze the main currents of the 1970 campaign strategy and offer some suggestions as to what general strategy Republicans ought to follow in 1971 and 1972.

In the most general sense, the disappointment in the results may be traced to two strategic emphases:

1. The issues Republicans stressed to the electorate were too few in number and too narrowly drawn.

2. The Republican Party placed too great a reliance on the mechanical aspects of the political process, largely at the expense of developing campaign themes.

The Republican Party must recognize the fact that it operates from a severe disadvantage to the Democrats in terms of the basic allegiance of the voters. Republicans continue to be a distinct minority party. In addition, studies indicate that erosion in party loyalty is increasing with the parties suffering about equally from this trend. This problem is further complicated by the sad, but true, fact that a substantial and influential portion of the communications media is essentially hostile to the Republican Party and its candidates. These handicaps must be taken into account when adopting an overall campaign strategy. They were largely forgotten in 1970.

This year the Party became closely associated with one issue; law and order. Leaving aside the intrinsic merits and demerits of the issue, this single-issue strategy played into the hands of the media for it is, no matter how it is presented, essentially a negative issue with the media thus able to put it, and related issues, into a simplistic "yea" and "nay" form. The Republicans were put in the position of being the accusers with the Democrats parlaying this stance into an appeal for sympathy against those who would issue blanket indictments and "spread fear and hate across the land." The weight placed on this issue was justified, in large measure, on the premise that it was of such critical importance to certain segments of the electorate, that they would break from their traditional Democratic voting habits and vote Republican. Early analysis seems to indicate that this did not happen to any great extent.
The net effect of concentrating on one issue is that eventually the opposition will find an answer to neutralize the charge and then put the accuser on the defensive. The 1964 national election and the 1958 California election were primarily one issue campaigns and the Republicans lost heavily in both instances. The Democrats were "let off the hook" on other issues where they were distinctly vulnerable, e.g., their 1964 decision to enlarge the Vietnamese conflict and their inability to prosecute or satisfactory end the war. Most of the difficulties the nation faces today can be traced directly to policies followed by the previous Democratic Administration, yet the previous Administration was rarely discussed in the campaign. Republican accomplishment with regards to gradual withdrawal from Vietnam, reassessment of world commitments, and innovative policies in the fields of welfare, economic development, and education never enjoyed adequate exposure and explanation.

Republicans, being the minority party faced by an inhospitable press, must develop a multiple-theme strategy. The goal here is to improve the President's ability to orchestrate the thrust of the campaign at any given moment and to make him a difficult target for the inevitable media attack.

Secondly, the Republican Party placed too great a reliance on the mechanical aspects of the political process. The American electorate entertains an ambivalent attitude towards politics. While Americans have long displayed a distrust and dislike of politics and politicians in general, most of the American folk heroes have been elected political leaders. Americans tend to like their heroes to be anti-politicians who overcame great obstacles and corrupt machines to win the election and vindication. While this image is so much foolishness to most of the professionals in the business of making public policy, it nonetheless is an attractive and compelling image, one that affect peoples' attitudes about parties and politics.

In 1970 Republican Party leadership permitted its strategy to become public knowledge and through extensive intervention at the state and local level by national leaders, gave the impression of being cynical towards the issues. While the Vice President's activity in the New York State senatorial race was highly appreciated for its acuity, effect and by the professionals, the larger national impact was to paint the Republican leadership as aggressive, callous, and extremely partisan. The Republicans forgot that frequently the best politicians are those that do not act like politicians. It is no accident that many of the big names of the last twenty years; Eisenhower, Stevenson, Reagan and McCarthy, were appealing to American voters precisely because they were able to convince many people that they were not politicians. Because the Republican strategy was known in detail, and the list of Democrats to beat
was repeatedly published, the Democrats were able to feign the role of underdogs and gain a sympathetic hearing. In a word, the Republicans were severely weakened because they appeared to be too "Machiavellian" for the American taste in 1970.

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Elections tend to be retrospective in character. That is, the voters are known to think primarily in terms of evaluating the performance of the incumbents, and rather less to the promises made by the parties and candidates for the future. While there is a "swing vote" present in all elections, most of the electorate is either convinced as to which party and/or candidates it will vote for, or is predisposed toward a party and/or candidates well before the election. The campaign period itself is directed as much, if not more, toward reinforcing the fervor of the faithful than in changing the minds of the opposition.

The contest between the parties, as distinguished from the contest between candidates, is primarily over "predisposition." Since partisan membership is largely a self-perception (in most states, there are not dues or arbitrary requirements) it is extremely important that the parties have a sizeable portion of the electorate predisposed towards its messages.

It is important, of course, to win elections but over the long run, the winning of minds is probably even more critical. The Republican election campaign of 1972 will stand a much greater chance of success if the campaign for winning men's minds is successfully initiated in 1971.

The campaign for 1972 is already underway and should be based on a two year strategy. During 1971 the strategy calls for educating the public and the opinion leaders. In 1972, while not ignoring the educative process, the emphasis should shift towards developing campaign themes, patterned for appeal to certain segments of the electorate.

Four policies should be stressed to the public by the President, Administration leaders, and Republican Party leaders; (1) Peace Policy; (2) Economic Policy; (3) Social Policy; (4) Policy for the Civic Morality. The educative effort should aim at explaining the problem, the alternative policies with their inevitable drawbacks, and why the Administration has chosen to pursue one policy rather than another. The President should not shy away from intellectualizing the problems he faces. In the odd year, 1971, the President has the opportunity to gain a hearing as a spokesman for the Nation, not just the party. In this capacity as Chief of Government, he has the resources and abilities to influence, or predispose, the American people towards his position. Let us briefly survey the four policies suggested:
Peace Policy

The fact is that this Administration inherited an unpopular war. The war is being brought to a close without any precipitous actions which could make Southeast Asia a politically unstable area. The war itself was conceived as an experiment by the intellectual community, but one having convinced the Democratic leadership as to the inevitable victory, the community rejected its own case and became violently critical.

The Republican position with regard to world peace is essentially sound. Peace will remain so long as would-be aggressors find the advantages of aggression are outweighed by its disadvantages. This does not mean, however, that American troops must be engaged at all points around the globe to deter aggression. The Nixon Administration has undertaken a necessary reassessment of our political and military commitments abroad with the goal being to make them reflective of the needs of the 1970's.

President Nixon has provided for a more stable and tranquil world than did his Democratic predecessors. This accomplishment must be explained to the people and to the opinion-leaders in detail and with frequency.

Economic Policy

The President must spend the time to "talk sense to the American people" about the economy. When Mr. Nixon took office he inherited full employment, but it was full employment achieved at the cost of a war economy and inflation. The simple fact is, and this must be conveyed to the people, that you cannot have perfect price stability at the same time you pursue a policy of full employment. The goal of the Nixon Administration is to achieve a tolerable mean between the two extremes.

The President should stress the difficulties which inevitably follow during a readjustment from a "wartime" to a "peace" economy. The realignment of defense related industries is not going to be easy or cheap. The constant crying by the Democrats about an economic recession may very well result in such a recession becoming a reality. The Democrats are flouting the idea of instituting a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In addition, the President must convey to the public why wages and price controls are no answer in the short run. A solid survey must be conducted on the nature of the unemployed; there are probably some new categories of unemployed which have yet to be studied.
Social Policy

The President and his Administrative chiefs must develop a series of talks and position papers on the Administration's social policies. This Administration has an approach to solving social problems which is unique and should be explained in order to develop a constituency among the opinion leaders.

Few, if any, social problems exist in isolation from other problems. In the past we have instituted hundreds of new programs as we discovered new problems. All too often little thought was given to the impact of a particular program on related programs, with the result being that often programs exist which accomplish results contrary to the expectations of the sponsors. It was not the intent, for example, of those who sponsored the Aid for Dependent Children legislation that the funds given would actually provide an incentive for the family to disband.

The point that should be emphasized is that a number of programs do not necessarily add up to a policy. A policy is an attitude towards a problem which permits flexibility in approach. The Nixon Administration has been experimenting with new concepts of welfare in an attempt to break the cycle of poverty which infects families while at the same time not making great numbers of persons wards of the government. These experiments, e.g., Family Assistance Plan, are worth explaining to the people, the Republican faithful, and the opinion leaders.

Policy for a Civic Morality

As we approach our 200th anniversary as a Nation, the President is in a position to revive some of the notions of civic pride and morality which animated the spirit of our Founding Fathers. Acting in his role as President of all the people, the President should emphasize that adherence to law is the basis of any meaningful freedom. That the concept of citizenship is a noble value worth rethinking.

The Civic Morality is not simple "law and order," rather it is a reaffirmation of the concept of the citizen in a free Republic. We can understand and appreciate the social and economic problems which beset the nation and beget antisocial behavior while still accepting the idea that all improvement, which is not at the expense of freedom, must be gained through law.

The point here is that the President should promote law and the stable society but do so as the President of all the people, not the leader of a party. It is law which will protect our diversity and pluralism and will maintain our right to dissent. The nihilists in our midst must be met head-on with a message that disarms them through its intellectual strength.
Summary

The educative process is designed to make both the people and the opinion leaders predisposed toward the Administration and the Republican Party. The first step toward victory is to get people to listen. The actual election campaign in 1972 is aimed at simplifying the problems and answers which have been explained in some detail in 1971 and make them have political impact through the use of campaign management techniques. If the educative process has done its work, the potential audience for the electoral campaign efforts will be much greater.

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The emphasis in 1972 should shift from trying to develop favorable predisposition among the electorate and opinion leaders into an effort to gain support among certain target populations with appeals to these groups based on the policies enunciated previously. Themes should be devised which translate these rather complex policy positions into effective campaign rhetoric. The groups noted below are not exclusive in terms of constituency for it is possible that any individual may fit into one or more of the classifications. Nor are these groups to be the subject of appeals at the expense of other groups. The suggestion is that the Republican Party work to keep its present group support intact and seek to become the majority party through inroads into vulnerable populations who presently exhibit a majority of support for the Democrats.

White Ethnic Groups

White ethnic groups, descendants of 19th and 20th century immigrants, have long been the bulwark of the Democratic Party in the cities and inner suburbs. Persons in this category, largely working and middle class Catholics and Jews, have become increasingly restless as they watched the loss of their political strength in the urban areas. Themes based on the policies previously enunciated should find a receptive hearing with this increasingly independent groups. The Civic Morality policy, for instance, should have considerable impact, as it stresses the individual's contributions as citizen, their essential allegiance to the Republic, their legitimate concern for safety and tranquility, and the validity of their family, ethnic, and religious institutions. The media, however, must be thwarted in its efforts to translate this theme into a simple play on "law and order."

After a long period of decline, white ethnicity has enjoyed something of a resurgence. This resurgence is attributed, in part at least, to a down-grading in the media of the working class and its values. A return to the more obvious forms of ethnic allegiance has been an outlet for these frustrations.
Emerging Salariat

Increasingly, Americans have become salaried people. The blue collar working class and the moderate income white collar class engaged principally in the service and knowledge industries tend to no longer view themselves as part of the traditional working class. Their salaries are frequently high, particularly in the building trades, and they have become increasingly attached to their property and living standards. They tend to seek stability and tranquillity in their community life.

Middle Class and Working Class Blacks

Middle class and working class blacks are a special "ethnic" group, yet they have many of the same problems and aspirations as the white ethnic populations. The appeals based on economic and social policies should have much the same impact on this emerging group as on the whites. The essential similarities of these blacks to the white ethnics should be stressed; the appeal to the two income classes should take into account the fact that the vast majority of blacks fall within these two economic classes. The Republican campaign should stress the ways in which people are similar, not the ways in which they are different.

Suburban Reformers

The outer suburbs are increasingly dominated by the ethic of social consciousness and reform. The Republican Party's hold on the middle income and upper middle income classes in the suburbs is being eroded by the Democrat's appeal to this groups' social conscience and feelings of guilt. These feelings have been engendered through constant repetition by the academy, churches, and the media. To this group of suburban social reformers the themes of Peace and the experimental nature of some aspects of this Administration's social policy have to be emphasized.

It is especially important that a President's image of a disinterested Statesman be put forward to this group. The outer suburbs are also becoming the significant political entities of the future; stress should be paid to Federal Government attention of their local problems of governance. These suburbs are not merely outlying areas of central cities but have become increasingly self-reliant entities that must be given modern government and Federal attention. It is also this group to which the issues of environment, consumerism, what they perceive to be failures in other delivery systems (e.g., transportation), are extremely important.
Youth

The category of "youth" should be largely neglected either as a target for negative attack or as a special constituency to be appealed to. However, it should be stressed that most young people fall into a variety of categories of the citizenry, some mentioned in this report, and hence share the same concerns as their elders.

The special constituency of youth in colleges and universities should be largely ignored except for mention of the Administration's efforts to finance higher education and helping young people gain financing for college. The development of the peace theme should be broadly structured with special attention paid to the benefits which winding down Vietnam and certain changes in the draft have given young people. The President, on the other hand, while noting the impact of the elimination of the draft on certain classes of the young, should also point out what the costs of such a policy are likely to be, namely the creation of an army which is not representative cross-section of the populace. This distortion in representation will be most evident and most unfortunate in the ranks of the junior officers.

Comments on the cult of alienation and the emerging "youth culture" should be kept to a minimum. Development of a positive Civic Morality theme will indirectly criticize these phenomena, but it should be left to the media to draw that conclusion.

Intelligentsia

It is doubtful that a significant number of the intelligentsia will in the near future become vocal supporters of the Republican Party. However, there is a stable and rational group of men and women in the academy -- ranging from such conservatives as Edward Banfield to such moderates and "old-time pluralist" liberals as Alexander Bickel, Irving Kristol, Robert Nisbet, Richard Neustadt, John F. Roche, Nathan Glazer, etc. -- who should be recognized for their essential good sense and rationality. Through informal dinners and meetings with the President and others, these men and women can be developed into a lobby group for aspects of the Administration's social policy. Also low posture status recognition of this group would reinforce their efforts in fighting the ethic of irrationality in the academy and intellectual community and possible help neutralize in 1972 the typical support given in the academy for the Democratic Party.

South

Appeals to the South as a region should be more carefully handled. While status recognition of the South in e.g., appointments to the Supreme Court, is important, that region is becoming increasingly indistinguishable from the rest of the country. The appeals to the above named group can have just as much impact in the South as in the
Northeast or on the West Coast. The similarity of the South, not its
differences, should be stressed. The so-called Southern Strategy could then
be translated into terms of merely trying to develop a two party system in
the South - a "reformist" goal that the media would be hard-put to criticize.
Democratic Party compliants about the Southern Strategy could, in addition,
then be explicitly labelled for what they are - hypocritical in the
extreme, e.g., an attempt to protect their traditional regional vested
interests.

Mid-West

More attention also has to be paid to the Mid-West. To a large extent
the four policy thrusts have equal validity in that region. However, the
"national development" aspect, if more fully developed, of the social policy
can be made to have special impact in that part of the country and in the
Mountain states. Further, the Party should reassess its policies vis-a-vis
the farmers. Is what is being done enough, has it been adequately ex­
plained; should an attempt be made to "talk sense" about farm policy as
much as about the economy?

Whatever set of policies, themes and target populations are isolated
for attention, it is crucial that the overall strategy be given as little
public attention as possible. It is extremely important that the
President, his Administration, and the Party not be seen as ruthlessly and
systematically following a pre-conceived formula against which the media
can make its judgments about success and failure. The illusion of spon­
taneity should be maintained.

In addition, the President should maximize his potential image as
Chief of State and Government. In the area of foreign policy he should
come across as the disinterested statesman; in the area of domestic poli­
cy he should cultivate the image as First Citizen of the Republic who is
attempting to wrestle with extraordinarily complex problems. It is the
President who should begin to explicate the four "policies" in 1971 and
thereby educate the public into favorable predispositions towards the
Administration. The technique of live discussions with media commentators
is an especially effective vehicle. To date the President has used his
speeches to the citizenry only to explain his efforts in Indo-China.
Thought should be given to the notion that the President should do much
the same thing in order to get across his policies on the economy, social
policy and the civic morality.

Members of the cabinet and others close to the President should be
used to expand on the President's initiatory efforts in the four areas,
speaking to opinion leaders throughout the country. As the reasonably
intellectual statements of the positions of the President and the Admini­
stration in these areas evolve, the Democrats are necessarily put on the
defensive by having to respond in the terms which the President and the
Administration have determined. Further, the media is disarmed. It will have to also respond in the same predetermined terms; the more multiple and intellectual the statements of positions, the more the media is forced in communicating these positions to the public to be something more than simplistic. As 1972 begins, it then becomes necessary for the cabinet and others close to the President to participate in translating these policies into themes directed at given target populations.

Moreover, the public should be reminded, especially in the 1971 education phase, that the Democrats are largely responsible for creating the conditions which are now being corrected - The Democrats should be forced to bear their legitimate burdens of Vietnam, an inflated economy (e.g., the two year lag in passing the surtax), and a largely passive attitude in face of constant apologies for socially unacceptable behavior.

Finally, it should be noted that the Civic Morality theme provides a structure into which the themes of peace, sound economy and sound social policy can be fitted. Looking to 1976, there is no reason why the party should not begin to use a traditionalist rhetoric, evocative of the Nation's origins - phrases like the citizen and citizenry, the Republic and polity, the tranquil, decent and good life. This rhetoric need not be exclusive of noting the pluralism and diversity in the country (the richness of the various, especially ethnic, lifestyles), but positive attention should be paid to what is common: the similar values, needs and concerns which cross over regions, ethnic and racial origins, most income levels, and most life styles.
Fifth Issue

The Nixon Record of "good government" actions is a positive record of accomplishment which has been virtually ignored in the press. Relocation of the major social service agency field offices into the new ten Federal Regions with a concurrent greater delegation of decision making authority to these offices from Washington is already bringing the Federal Government into closer partnership with the States and local communities. In addition, the Administration's move toward increased multi-purpose block grants for States and local governments can be used to emphasize that President Nixon has initiated positive actions toward his stated goal of re-establishing the Federal system. Articulation of this issue reaffirms the traditional identity of the Republican Party as the Party of stabilized management and counters the splinter party (particularly in the South) appeal for States Rights.
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: DICK MOORE
SUBJECT: PR Activities

December 20, 1970

As per your request I am attaching some PR comments and suggestions. I have approached the subject with just one thought in mind: the reelection of the President. In that connection a few preliminary comments seem in order.

Substantive accomplishment, of course, is the best PR of all. If our substantive programs go well, that could be decisive to the point where the extra edge of PR becomes irrelevant. But the PR group should operate on the principle that the substantive question may be so close that many voters will make up their minds on the basis of a wholly intangible factor -- their subjective attitude toward the candidate personally.

It is in this area of subjective judgment that good PR could make the difference.

The "Who" Factor

The effectiveness of any PR effort often depends on who it is you are trying to reach, and I would like to see more attention to the "who" factor in the months ahead.
Using a marketing analogy, I seem to remember that some 20 percent of the beer drinkers drink 80 percent of the beer. The 20 percent are the brewer's most important customers, and in this particular case it is fairly easy for him to determine what kind of people they are and then tailor his advertising campaign to reach them. Moreover, he can largely determine where not to spend his money and effort.

In our case it is vital for us to reach the "movables" - that small percentage of the voters who cross the line from election to election, and often decide the result by a razor's edge in some of the key states, as in 1960 and 1968. It is within this group that we are most likely to find persons who are politically neutral enough to be susceptible to the intangible factor in reaching a decision.

If some people are moving away from us for intangible reasons, then they are susceptible to being moved back. Therefore, it is most essential that we do everything to learn who these people are - or at least what kind of people they are -- and what has affected them. In short we need a diagnosis before we prescribe the cure.

I know we will be told that this kind of research is difficult. But if we try hard enough I am sure we can make some headway and develop at least some meaningful clues. After all, Mr. Gallup achieves at least an indication of approval and disapproval every few weeks. Can't we devise a depth interview project that would go further than Gallup and identify some of the subjective factors which are affecting some people?

Such a survey should seek out persons who will acknowledge
that they voted for Nixon in 1968, but who wouldn't vote for him today, or are leaning away from him. If their reasons are substantive (e.g. unemployment) they are not necessarily a PR target. But if their reasons are subjective impressions of the President, they are PR target number one.

Climate For Change

If we are to introduce any new patterns of operation, or any changes in attitude, this is the perfect time to do so. There is something about the half way mark that creates expectancy and looks with favor on new plays and new players.

The new things which we may do now will be evidence of a positive approach and so received, whereas a few months ago they might have been looked at as admission of a mistake or a response to criticism. This is a plus which we should keep in mind in considering any suggestions for change.

The Anti-Nixon Axis (ANA)

Any memo on our PR will have occasion to refer to the combination of liberal Democrats, reporters and commentators who do such a faithful and unified job of spreading the anti-Nixon word. For easy reference I will call them the ANA.

As per your request I have read Bill Safire's excellent memo of a year ago. Before turning to some of the items which he discussed, I am setting forth some specific comments and suggestions based on recent observation.
1. The President Should Seize the Initiative on Press Communications

The President's strong performance in the December 10 press conference smothered the infrequency issue for the time being, but I think it would be dangerous to let the issue come up again. ANA had really done a massive job this time, and were undoubtedly reaching some people with the impression that the President is very reluctant to communicate with the American people.

In the next 18 months the last thing we need for an issue is an alleged communications gap.

Recommendation:

The President should begin immediately to introduce new formats, as he said he would in his answer to Kaplow. These can be of his own design and timing. They can include one-to-one TV interviews; press conferences in the Oval Office, scheduled or spontaneous, general in subject matter, or limited, with or without TV; he can do in depth TV interviews with the three networks or press interviews with the wire services, etc.

By taking this kind of initiative the President can get credit for leadership and innovation on communication, while fully controlling his own news policy -- and the press will be in the posture of their responding to him rather than vice versa.

Noting in the above recital should stand in the way of full Presidential press conferences if the President is willing to do them.

2. Don't Discount the East Room

I have assumed that one reason the President has not done more of the East Room type is that they require enormous
preparation and it is difficult for him to set aside that much time. However, in terms of effectiveness, the Presidential press conference is a magnificent campaign tool that only he has access to. Every time he does it, he gains new support throughout the country.

After the December 10 conference I made many phone calls, and all reactions were favorable, including some non-supporters. The common reaction was: "He should do these more often. He's so good at it."

Recommendation:

The Gallup Poll published today (Nixon 44, Muskie 43) was based on interviews on December 5 and 6. That was 4 days before the press conference. I suspect that the December 10 performance won back a great many movables. Do we have a before and after survey (matching samples) on this or other major press conferences? If not, isn't it important to do so for guidance during the next 18 months?

3. The President's Young Lions

"Negative themes" that have been circulated by the ANA with some effect certainly include these: The President is isolated; most of his advisors are elderly and dull; he is not sufficiently interested in the environment; he does not have enough compassion for the poor.

As we go into the second half, I have a suggestion which may help dispel all of the above, at least in some degree.

Recommendation:

That the President take a personal interest in building up two new, attractive, young stars on his team and prominently
associate himself with them and their activities:

**Bill Ruckelshaus (38)**

He is articulate, personable and able, and in charge of an exciting new agency. We could build him up as the champion of environmental control, much as General Hugh Johnson was the personification of the Blue Eagle and NRA. As the President’s “Mr. Environment” he could help the President preempt the environmental issue by action and leadership, rather than words, as Muskie and others watch helplessly.

**Don Rumsfeld (38)**

I don’t know what Don’s responsibilities are to be in his new White House role. But if Don can have strong identification as the President’s poverty specialist, we have another good example of the President working closely with an attractive lieutenant in an important and sensitive area. The ANA has been somewhat effective in selling the false impression that the President doesn’t care as much about the poor as he should and Don could certainly help here.

4. Nip Those “Little” Lies

The damage done by small lies that get quoted and widely repeated is quite a serious fact of life. But an alert PR effort could kill most of them before they get into the main bloodstream of communication, after which it is too late.

I can’t tell you how many times I heard and read the bit about the “Patton” movie. “He saw it seven times.” As I understand it, the President saw it once and then later found himself involved in a screening for staff members in the East Wing, and he
was too polite to have the movie changed. Yet many people thought that RN watched "Patton" several times and then moved into Cambodia. It hurt badly. We could have scotched this one with a factual statement as soon as it appeared.

Other examples: the motion that the President baited the protestors in San Jose and said "This is what drives them wild." If he did not say that, as I suspect is the case, we sure got clobbered. An immediate angry denial might have taken care of it.

The distortion of the "bums" remark to apply to all protesting students is still hurting. Had we counter-attacked with letters or demands for equal time on every occasion when that remark was twisted, we might have killed the impact.

Recommendation:

There may be no system that is fool proof, but responsibility should be fixed with the PR committee for a constant lookout for this kind of pernicious item which usually appears in columns, or even in the style sections. If there is a factual answer a correction should be given by Ziegler in the first available briefing. And everytime it is repeated, some one should be designated to write a correction or ask for equal time.

5. Those Young People

While it is apparently true that people under 30 don't seem to vote in such numbers as their elders, 7 million young people will nevertheless become 21 in the next 2 years. If the Supreme Court upholds the new voting law another 10 million teenagers will be eligible. If one-third of them vote, and if they should vote 60 to 40 against us, they could more than make the difference in states like California, New Jersey, Illinois, etc. where we have no votes to
spare. If it is 55 - 45, the margin would be 600,000 votes. The Nixon plurality in 1968 was 510,000.

I realize that some people suggest that the young people will vote in the same ratio as their elders. In that case the above examples are pretty far out. But the fact is we don't really know anything about the voting probabilities of kids who are now 17 or 19. But there are a great many of them and it behooves us to find out whatever we can.

I think that one of the most important new projects which we must undertake in this second half is to make an agonizing reappraisal of how we stand with the youngsters, and then do what needs to be done.

Recommendation:

We should appoint a team of young staff members to study this whole question (enlisting outside survey help if necessary).

Meanwhile, however, we should begin exploiting the very fine assets we have in terms of youth. For example, we have a very bright collection of young men in the White House staff. We must give them more exposure and more public association with the top team and even the President. The President might even spend some time with them, perhaps at Camp David in a meeting. The word would soon get out that he was taking this kind of interest.

Note: I would not announce any of this activity publicly. It will get out on its own, and will be far more effective that way. Young people are very suspicious about grandstanding.
The following is my updated comment on the Safire memo of a year ago where the topic seems relevant. The captions are his.

The President's Popularity

We do not have to accept either the Harris or Gallup Poll approval rating to know that we have had a dip. It is probably largely due to the economy, but I would like very much to know to what extent the ANA has gotten to the "movables" with all the negative themes they have been selling during the past months, particularly the allegation that the President chose to divide the country rather than to bring it together. This is the kind of information I was referring to when urging new research in my comments on Page 2 above.

Meanwhile in view of the economy and other problems, the 44 - 43 Gallup Poll does suggest that there are quite a few people who believe in Nixon, the man -- a most fundamental consideration. To cheer you up I give you Exhibit A - Miss Joan Fontana, of Astoria, Queens, a bookkeeper. Last Wednesday she was asked by the New York Daily News inquiring photographer:

"Whom do you consider to be the greatest man during your lifetime?"

Her reply was:

"Our great President, Richard Nixon. He was one of four men defeated for the Presidency who came back to win. He has the greatest of problems -- bringing the country together, and is solving it. I can't think of any other American who could do as good a job under the circumstances."
The faith which the Miss Fontanas have in the President's competence and good intentions is our most important asset. It does not derive from the issues but is a subjective judgment about Richard Nixon personally. Our job is to see to it that it doesn't get undermined by a lot of ANA crap.

Positive Themes That Have Come Through

World Leader and Statesman

There is wide agreement that he is a strong and skilled leader in foreign affairs, perhaps the number one statesman of the world. Most Americans take pride in this. His recent Mediterranean trip was particularly effective. This impression seems solid despite the fact that we have lost ground on UN votes and despite situations like Chile and possibly Italy and possibly more countries in Latin America which may go further left. I think we should prepare for possible counter attacks on these points during 1971.

We should also anticipate the possible suggestion that the President is too interested in foreign affairs to the neglect of domestic problems.

Professional Competence and Diligence

After two years in office even critics will acknowledge that the President is an extraordinarily competent person in terms of his intellect, knowledge, experience and devotion to duty. The more enthusiastic think he's the most professionally qualified President we have ever had.

I note a recent memo suggesting that we should get the word out about his work schedule, but I would caution that we not over-emphasize this angle. Somehow the average American thinks that a real executive is a fellow who delegates work to others, leaving
himself time to think big management thoughts. I am fearful that we might create the impression that the President is occupied dotting the i's and crossing the t's -- and all alone in his lonely office, at that.

Identify With Middle America

The identity with middle America and the silent majority was well established in the first year and has been strengthened. During the next year, it seems to me our job is to retain this constituency and broaden it. We must develop the idea that an even wider consensus is moving towards President Nixon -- a greater majority.

Figuratively speaking, we must keep our identification with John Wayne and Lawrence Welk, but also find ways to appeal to those less "square" and less old. Among other things this means recruiting some new celebrities and other leaders who appeal to the younger voters or others who fancy themselves as beyond the Lawrence Welk circle.

Restoration of Dignity at the White House

This was more important in the first year when people compared us to the previous Administration. The Nixon family has now done this. Pressing the point any more could only be counter productive -- maybe we should lighten things up.

Orderliness and Calm Restored

This refers to the lack of riots and assassinations. At this point I believe it would be a mistake to try to make hay on this point, lest any disruption or act of violence upset the applecart. If things stay quiet until the fall of 1972 that will be the time to hit this point.
A Firm Attitude Toward Crime

At the federal level, the story will get better and better from now on.

The District of Columbia crime rate should continue to go down, and the Department of Justice is doing well against organized crime and the drug traffic. 1971 should have good anti-crime momentum to report.

Coming to Grips With Welfare Failure

The Family Assistance Plan needs PR help, but this should be the subject of a separate study. I have the feeling that the voters, as opposed to editorialists and other informed people, do not really understand it. I would like to see the results of an opinion poll which would tell us what the average person really understands about FAP. Armed with that, we would know better how to explain and merchandise the issue and get the bill passed. In the weeks ahead I think the PR aspect of FAP should be the subject of major concern and activity by the PR group. Somewhere along the line we are not getting through.

Positive Themes That Have Not Come Through

Dealing With the Problems of the Poor

Safire said we were not getting much compassionate impact a year ago. This is probably still true. Can we utilize Don Rumfeld's new White House role to correct the mistaken impression that we don't care about the poor?

The New Federalism

Revenue sharing is becoming a critical issue even though it is not understood by most people. Every day's headlines serve to emphasize the need for getting this story out.
The Quality of Life

See earlier comments about Ruckelshaus.

Voluntarism.

Apparently dragging a year ago, and probably still is, I personally can't see much pay dirt in this issue even if we could dramatize it. I think there are more important issues to attend to.

The American Spirit

1976 is fast approaching, and it strikes me we have not zeroed in on this sufficiently. Somehow I feel that this could be a very useful item for us in 1972, if we can find a way to romanticize and dramatize it. I suspect that everyone is too occupied with short range problems to really focus on this. Is it a matter of assigning responsibility?