

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
20	14		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Other Document	Sheet of notes relating to various 1972 election topics. Author unknown. 1 pg.
20	14	6/10/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Garment to Haldeman RE: thoughts on campaign issues. 1 pg.
20	14	7/10/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Garment to Price RE: notes for the 1972 Republican National Convention. 3 pgs.
20	14	6/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Higby to Chapin RE: recipients of a secret memo. 1 pg.

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20	14	6/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haldeman to multiple White House officials asking for their ideas on the 1972 presidential campaign. 1 pg.
20	14	5/18/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Strachan to Haldeman RE: campaign advice from White House officials. Handwritten notes added by Higby and unknown. 1 pg.
20	14	5/18/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haldeman to unknown RE: potential political themes and campaign strategies for 1972. 1 pg.
20	14	6/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Higby to Chapin RE: recipients of a White House memo. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 1 pg.
20	14		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Other Document	List of White House officials and the progress of their responses to a Haldeman memo. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 1 pg.

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20	14	6/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haldeman to multiple White House officials asking for their ideas on the 1972 presidential campaign. 1 pg.
20	14		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Other Document	Sheet of notes on a "Suggested Order," listing numerous White House officials. 1 pg.
20	14		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Other Document	"Order of Memos" which lists numerous White House figures. Handwritten note added by unknown. 1 pg.
20	14	7/17/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Whitaker to Haldeman RE: thoughts on the campaign following McGovern's nomination, including ideas on key demographics. 2 pgs.
20	14	7/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Newspaper	A "Wall Street Journal" article titled "McGovern Won't Alter His Successful Formula As He Turns to Nixon" by Norman C. Miller. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs.

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20	14	6/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Malek to Haldeman RE: an attached memo concerning McGovern. 1 pg.
20	14	6/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Rietz to Magruder RE: McGovern's campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs.
20	14	6/23/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Dent to Haldeman RE: an Evans-Novak Forum on the election. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs.
20	14	6/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Report	From Teeter to Haldeman RE: RN's role in the 1960 and 1968 presidential elections. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs.
20	14	6/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Hallett to Haldeman RE: RN's role in the 1960 and 1968 campaigns. 5 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
20	14	6/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Khachigian to Haldeman RE: the 1960 and 1968 presidential elections. 1 pg.
20	14	6/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Khachigian to Buchanan presenting interpretations of the 1960 and 1968 campaigns. Polling figures attached. 7 pgs.
20	14	7/6/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Kehrl to Strachan RE: an attached document sent to Butterfield. 1 pg.
20	14	7/5/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Buchanan to RN RE: the political lessons of 1960 and 1968. Campaign polling graphs attached. 8 pgs.
20	14	6/22/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Chapin to Haldeman RE: thoughts on presidential posture and key campaign issues. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 10 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
20	14	6/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Chapin to Haldeman answering questions presented in a previous memorandum on the election. Handwritten note added by unknown. 10 pgs.
20	14	6/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From McLaughlin to Haldeman RE: strategies for RN to use when giving a speech. Handwritten note added by unknown. 2 pgs.

meet w/ 58M daily - 6³⁰?

Poll re McCord - all seen News

Pol - Camp '72 Memos

① This to Ad types - interface w/polls.

② What is any camp activity bet conventions?

- Work in DC-WH or travel in US - "non pol"

To each ③ FC memos f/H on "How" partic events + slugs

④ JM - cc's of memos?

⑤ C David session - this wknd?

⑥ Run on Strengths

For Pol - Runo + Price

⑦ Mention of Keep It Going, job to be done?

McG - Sen 6/18 State - Econ - main issue of camp

⑧ Any response to Big Bus charge?

J - How to get w/little guy -
Agree?

⑨ Fold memos in w/ Chapin planning sched

⑩ FC w/ Safire on Dem Oppos in "couple of weeks"

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 10, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM: LEONARD GARMENT

I wasn't around to respond to your earlier request for campaign suggestions. From the look of things my contribution wasn't missed. Attached are some rough notes on the convention that I prepared today for Ray Price (see particularly paragraph 4). I am going to try to develop the argument that there is need for a clearer exposition of the domestic payoff from the President's foreign policy initiatives - to bring areas of demonstrable Presidential strength into line with popular priorities. I also believe the weight of the convention and the campaign should be toward projecting the details of the second term, rather than mixing it up with McGovern. People should be made to feel that the very thought of repudiating the President and derailing all his meticulously-prepared work in progress is slightly silly and somewhat embarrassing (see, e.g., NEWSWEEK's article "The World Votes for Mr. Nixon").

attachment

July 10, 1972

FOR RAY PRICE

FROM: LEN GARMENT

CONVENTION NOTES

A brief summary of the points I discussed with you on the phone Saturday - plus a few others.

1. The only thing that emerges with sharpness from the collection of essays on convention themes is Bakshian's phrase: "A Better Future For All." The conventional, and correct perception, is that for the voter what's done is done and the past is relevant only as a prologue to the future. The convention themes should therefore be future-oriented, and pointedly so. While this is hardly a revolutionary idea, it's important to have it in mind when executing things like Jack McDonald's platform presentation. The function of parts 1 and 2 of his outline are to reinforce belief in the President's special capability to carry out part 3 ("The Unfinished Agenda"), and, as a general guideline, more weight should go to the last than to the first two.

2. I doubt that there's any single theme that will do a great deal for the convention or the campaign. The important thing (and this relates not only to themes, but to everything else in the convention and campaign) is to do appropriate things, and not to charge off in wrong directions, striking strident notes, overstating the case for the President ^{vs} against the Democrats, stretching credibility, straining nerves, and, in the process, alienating independent support.

3. The cross-pressured complexity of the contemporary U.S. scene not only makes it risky to put too many eggs in any one thematic basket, but peculiarly difficult to define that basket. There are very few rallying points of a positive nature these days. The "President as Peacemaker" is one, of course, but beyond that the going gets uncertain - and even the President's foreign policy accomplishments have to be tied to domestic concerns - to jobs, to inflation, to the availability of resources to deal with domestic needs, etc., and not merely to "abstract" issues (for today's U.S. electorate) like national security and the U.S. "role" in the world.

As Irving Kristol points out, one of the main qualities of populism is that it is paranoid and therefore simplistic, xenophobic, and anti-bureaucratic. McGovern is therefore building his appeal to a coalition of these feelings rather than to conventional issues and groups. The intense personal feelings Kristol identifies are the McGovern target. An understanding of these feelings and sympathy for the specific grievances they represent should be reflected in the convention and campaign themes and materials. (It occurs to me that on the whole basic subject of Presidential accomplishments the foreign policy/domestic policy dichotomy is not only a false one but a harmful one, and a deliberate effort should be made to overcome it. I think we should talk about this ^{in a} little bit of detail.)

4. A good theme (like a good slogan) should convey the feelings of an equation. It should be logical, simple, unambiguous, non-verbal in its thrust. It should not invite argument. It should have an apparent quality of inevitability, and therefore capable of producing the widest immediate concurrence. That was the value of "Nixon's The One" and "Reelect the President." Compare, "Trust Muskie" (all wrong) and McGovern's "Demand the Truth" (very sound). The problem with "Now More Than Ever" is that it is ambiguous (and on the negative side), slightly mysterious, slightly threatening, sets up a debate, etc. All of which is to say that "A Better Future For All" strikes me as ^{an} appropriate convention theme, just as "Reelect the President" strikes me as an effective campaign-slogan. But none of this is of crucial importance. In fact, it might be best - given the lack of a rallying issue - to float several slogans around the convention. They might work together in a helpful way.

5. The tone of the convention materials should be crisp rather than emotional, confident without being smug or complacent, lively and factual rather than grandiloquent and self-serving. We should demonstrate not only a grasp of the kind of concerns for the future that are widely shared, but should also make clear that there are specific programs under way to deal with each of these concerns. We've talked about a structural metaphor: The President designed the Nixon Doctrine to build a new foreign policy structure in order to create safer conditions in the world so that life will be better in the United States. Payoff examples of this comprehensive Presidential design are beginning to emerge. The Soviet Summit has produced a market for \$750 million in U.S. grain. The China meetings have led to the sale of jet transports. Trade and currency negotiations similarly translate into dollars and jobs for Americans. And so on. These links are matters best handled by explanation, not by exhortation. The role of the Republican Convention is basically to report on an Administration very much at work,

not to prepare for a political fight with the Democrats. Whatever conveys this sense of continuity, of work in progress, of a professional President assisted by a highly professional Administration, of quiet long-range planning that is now surfacing results, will serve to highlight the "better future" theme. (Max Ways has an interesting essay in FORTUNE about the new international economic complexities, i. e., a profoundly important shift has taken place from a world preoccupied with military issues to one focussing on economic competition and this promising change is the proximate result of the President's first-term diplomacy.)

6. To sum up: The McGovern strategy is to unite "the dissatisfied" across all conventional political lines and to propose fundamental change even at the risk of social and economic convulsion. But most of "the dissatisfied" want a sense of order and personal security, and are open to a program that offers "change without chaos" - and this is what the Nixon philosophy is all about. Whether the problem is an overactive Court, an omnipresent bureaucracy, the ineffective rendition of costly government services, excessive commitments and contributions to foreign countries, etc., basic change is, in fact, taking place and without wrecking the system upon which Americans depend for the cake which so many now want to eat and have as well. Getting across the details of this message is the job of the Republican Convention and the campaign which it keynotes.

#

June 12, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: DWIGHT CHAPIN
FROM: L. HIGBY

The following people received the Eyes Only memo you referred to earlier:

Safire	Harlow
Timmons	Scali
Buchanan	Moore
Ehrlichman	MacLaughlin
Hallett	Haig
MacGregor	Garment
Coison	Whitaker
Price	Cole
Dent	Ziegler
Weinberger	Chapin
Klein	Finch
Rumsfeld	Flanigan
Clawson	

cc: Bill Carruthers

LH:kb

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1972

Eric A. ...

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

H. R. HALDEMAN *H.R.*

It has been requested that you summarize your views and analysis on the following points:

1. What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?
2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican Convention to the election? When should he start campaigning? How much travel should he do, where should he go, what type of activities should he engage in?
3. Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.
4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and how we should meet it.

Please let me have your memorandum by 5:00 p. m. Friday, June 16.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 18, 1972

Y - Forget it
✓
X
H memo 6/12
NS
E shes hold this
G

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Staff Analysis of the Campaign

Last November you asked members of the staff to submit their views on the campaign. During the Russia trip would be an excellent time by certain staff members to submit their revised analyses. Those who should receive the attached memorandum from you are:

Timmons	Buchanan	McLaughlin	Weinberger
MacGregor	Colson	Dent	Hallet
Harlow	Garment	Magruder	Mitchell (C4, FY2)
Haig	Moore	Huebner	
Shultz	Whitaker	Cole	

Others asked for analyses last November but who will be on the Russia trip are Safire, Chapin, Scali, and Price

~~cc: Honorable John N. Mitchell~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 18, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN

The President has requested that during the Moscow trip you prepare a statement of your views of the key issues and what our posture should be regarding them for the upcoming campaign. The statement should include the issues, your recommendations for campaign strategy, and possible Presidential activities.

Please forward your thoughts to my office by Wednesday, May 31st.

June 12, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: DWIGHT CHAPIN

FROM: L. HIGBY

The following people received the Eyes Only memo you referred to earlier:

- ✓ Saffire - *In*
- ✓ Timmons
- ✓ Buchanan
- Ehrlichman - *just back 6/15*
- ✓ Hallett
- ✓ MacGregor - *106*
- ✓ Colson
- ✓ Price
- ✓ Dent
- ✓ Weinberger
- ✓ Klein
- ✓ Burnsfield
- ✓ Clawson
- ✓ Harlow
- ✓ Heali *285*
- ✓ Moore *Mo 2*
- ✓ MacLaughlin - *out of town 6/19*
- ✓ Hais - *pretty busy*
- ✓ Garment - *July 1*
- ✓ Whitaker - *June 19*
- ✓ Cole
- ✓ Ziegler - *talked to H.*
- ✓ Chapin *2699*
- ✓ Finch *2868*
- ✓ Flanigan *2361*
- ✓ *Connelly*

~~see SAH - 6/15/72~~

LH:kb

IN - ✓ Safire

NO PROBLEM WITH DEADLINE

- ✓ Timmons - ?
- ✓ Hallett
- ✓ MacGregor - ?
- ✓ Colson - ?
- ✓ Price - no
- ✓ Dent - ?
- ✓ Weinberger - 4/80
- ✓ Klein -
- ✓ Rumsfeld - 4/80
- ✓ Clawson +
- Scali - working on speech
- Moore - no
- ✓ Cole - ?
- ✓ Chapin - 4/80
- ✓ Finch - will try
- ✓ Carruthers
- ✓ Buchanan

OUT OF TOWN

- McLaughlin - returns 6/19
- ✓ Carment - returns 7/1
- Whitaker - returns 6/19

PROBLEMS

- ✓ Fiegler - Talked to H
- ✓ Haig - tied up w/Kissinger going to China and Echeverria visit
- Ehrlichman - just returned to Washington 6/15

NOT SURE - To call back

- ✓ Harlow - to call H
- ✓ Flanigan - ?

D - Good!

AT 5:00 ~~10:00~~ Tomorrow

(~~Friday~~) Let me have
Truly Based
on those in TD
Date.

Thanks

BR

June 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

H. R. HALDEMAN

It has been requested that you summarize your views and analysis on the following points:

1. What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?
2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican Convention to the election? When should he start campaigning? How much travel should he do, where should he go, what type of activities should he engage in?
3. Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.
4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and how we should meet it.

Please let me have your memorandum by 5:00 p. m. Friday, June 16.

HRH:LH:kb:HRH:kb

Suggested Order:

- ✓ Chapin
- ✓ Rumsfeld
- ✓ Colson
- ✓ Buchanan
- ✓ Sabers
- ✓ Price
- ✓ Finch
- ✓ Lawson
- ✓ Flanigan
- ✓ Klein
- ✓ Dent
- ✓ Hallett
- ✓ Carruthers
- ✓ Harlow

6:30

Wienberger
Cole

ORDER OF MEMOS

1. CHAPIN
2. KLEIN
- ✓3. DENT
- ✓4. HALJETT
5. CARRUTHERS
6. RUMSFELD
7. COLSON
8. "
9. BUCHANAN
- 10.
- ✓11. SAFFIRE
- ✓12. PRICE
- ✓13. FINCH
- ✓14. CLAWSON
15. FLANIGAN
- ✓16. HARLOW
17. Ziegler
18. MacGregor
19. Scali
20. Cole
- ✓21. Haig
22. Timmons
- ✓23. Whitaker

Sent to
Conn but
numbered not
by name on
7/20

24 ✓ Sears
25 ✓ Bush 60-64

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 17, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: John C. Whitaker



SUBJECT: Some Post-Convention Thoughts on McGovern

We have become the heir of the old FDR coalition -- almost -- the south, ethnic groups in the north (Jewish and Catholic in particular) and to a lesser extent, labor.

We should push Jewish and Catholic events for the President. We should push the tax credit for private schools farther -- beyond just endorsing Mills' bill.

Somehow, we need to arrange substantive meetings with labor leaders with the President:

(a) substantive so it doesn't look like the President is on the political make;

(b) not just go after the top labor leaders on a national level, but systematically find the local labor leaders in the 15 key states who might go over to the President and give them royal treatment. For example, Mayor Rizzo of Philadelphia called me about a few labor leaders in Philadelphia who are coming out for the President. He first requested a chance to have these leaders meet the President, then as we talked, we felt it would be better to find a substantive excuse to meet with the President (I passed this along to Dick Howard for Colson).

The President has won when the press was with him (1968) and lost when it wasn't (1960 and 1962). I think he needs to spend time with them -- just how, I'm not sure.

I know we shy from high risks when all is going so well, but I still like the idea of press conferences in key states -- particularly, Illinois, New York, California, Ohio and Texas. Maybe its time to do interviews with key pundits -- another TV press conference, maybe right after the GOP convention.

How to handle youth at the convention. With Tuesday the prime TV night - at least its my impression you lose considerable audience by Wednesday night - is there any possibility of the President's acceptance speech going on Tuesday night and turn Wednesday night into an address by the President in some youth forum in Miami that is clean cut. Seems to me there is an opportunity to upstage McGovern's confrontation with youth in the Doral lobby into a message that gives the TV viewers the impression there are millions of young people out there that "have short hair and are very much in the system" and pro Nixon -- very tricky to pull off, i. e. , a large, young crowd meeting somewhere in Miami that the President suddenly drops in on so the hippies don't have time to learn about it and cause a confrontation. Its possible even to put the acceptance speech on at 10:15 p. m. and have him speaking again by 11:15 p. m. to a youth group the same night.

I sure don't know what you do with Wednesday night that isn't a totally anticlimax if you move the President to Tuesday night -- but I think its worth looking into.

The idea of him hanging around Key Biscayne even for an overnight bothers me. Sure, we could block hippies at the Key Biscayne causeway or outside the compound, but that's defensive tactics. One scenario could show him leaving the south lawn Tuesday night -- maybe even a huddle with Kissinger or Ehrlichman by the chopper on last minute state business -- fly to Miami -- do acceptance speech and youth rally and right back to Washington and on Wednesday stock the TV news with a well publicized substantive event to give the impression of business as usual back at the White House "being President. " Or do the same thing Wednesday night (and forget the larger Tuesday night audience) with a business as usual scenario back at the White House Thursday.

cc: John D. Ehrlichman

Battle Plan

McGovern Won't Alter His Successful Formula As He Turns to Nixon

He'll Still Stress the Issues, Rely on Young Volunteers; Big Chore: Unifying Party Money Won't Be a Problem

By NORMAN C. MILLER

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

MIAMI BEACH — George McGovern, now certain of winning the Democratic presidential nomination tonight, is calmly confident that he can go on to defeat Richard Nixon by carrying out essentially the same battle plan that was so devastatingly effective against the regulars in his own party.

The South Dakotan and his aides recognize that they face enormous problems and are starting out as underdogs—just as they did when the primaries opened in February.

But they think the phenomenal campaign organization they developed in the primaries now can be expanded into a national machine powered by volunteers and buttressed by use of television and other conventional campaign tools.

The battle plan already is roughed out. The machinery was churning even as the Senator was smashing the desperate stop-McGovern movement here. A prime part is a massive voter-registration plan aimed at young people; since July 1, days before the McGovern nomination was wrapped up, volunteers in many states have been setting up the registration apparatus. McGovern staffers will go directly from Miami Beach to take command of these summer-long efforts in each state.

Proposals and an Image

Other ingredients of the plan:

—Mobilizing armies of volunteers for door-to-door canvassing of voters in the fall.

—Seeking reconciliation with party regulars, who tried so hard to stop Mr. McGovern at this convention, by offering to give them leadership roles within each state campaign organization.

—Combating the idea that the Senator is a radical through a TV campaign that will project his mild-mannered style and attempt to establish an image of trustworthiness.

—Financing the campaign mostly with small contributions and perhaps even refusing all gifts above \$1,000.

—Carrying on with the controversial tax-reform, welfare and other major proposals the Senator has stressed in the belief that voters want fundamental change.

At bottom, the McGovern plan for victory in November is founded on a belief that an American majority is angry with established politicians, distrustful of the standard promises, ready for a "political revolution" in its leadership, as McGovern pollster Pat Caddell puts it.

McGovern strategists think Richard Nixon epitomizes the old politics that has created the widespread alienation they find, and they believe their essential task is to contrast Sen. McGovern's "credibility" with Mr. Nixon's alleged zig-zag policies. "The average guy votes for the man, not the issues," declares Gary Hart, the Senator's 34-year-old campaign manager. "The key issue of 1972 will be: Can you believe your leaders?"

With a "suspicious electorate," the voters' lack of familiarity with Mr. McGovern relative to President Nixon is actually an advantage, Mr. Caddell contends, even though it is an initial handicap. "Starting from behind and being largely unknown is a tremendous advantage this year," he argues. "There's something to be said for being the underdog when people perceive themselves as being at the rear of the train."

The McGovern staff promises the Senator will battle Mr. Nixon in every region, including the conservative South. Mr. McGovern may make a swing through the South in August to appeal to Wallace-type voters with his own brand of anti-establishmentism. Clearly, however, the central battlegrounds will be the Northern industrial states and California. Mr. Hart talks of an electoral combination that would combine the states Hubert Humphrey carried in 1968 (which would include Texas) with additional victories in California, Illinois and either Ohio or New Jersey.

A Nixon Victory Seen

Despite these hopes in the McGovern camp, most politicians doubt the battle plan can succeed. They expect that the Democrats, badly bruised by the battle for the nomination here and in the months before, will lose in November to Richard Nixon. These prophets doubt that the McGovern forces can blunt the charges of "radicalism" that the Republicans will keep pushing in the months ahead.

Mr. McGovern and his staff will put the finishing touches on their campaign plan during a working vacation of a couple of weeks that will begin Saturday at a Black Hills, S.D., retreat. But even before their victory here, they had sketched out the essential components. Talks with McGovern intimates disclose these details:

ORGANIZATION: The voter-registration effort aimed primarily at the 18-to-21-year-old new voters is slated to reach full stride across the country by August. As much as \$3 million to \$4 million may be poured into this drive to register as many as 18 million new voters.

"The registration drive will give us an opportunity to develop a whole new electorate," says adviser Fred Dutton. "We want to increase the potential turnout from 72 million to 90 million," he says, figuring that the vast majority of the new youth vote would go to Mr. McGovern (who, incidentally, will mark his 50th birthday next week).

The registration effort also will help mobilize the army of volunteers the McGovern men hope to unleash next fall for door-to-door solicitation of votes. "We expect to have 25,000 to 50,000 volunteers working in each of the half-dozen major states," says Mr. Hart, who managed the herds that helped Mr. McGovern in the primaries. In the "secondary states," he adds, the McGovern forces will be deploying perhaps 5,000 volunteers for weekend canvassing.

Even some McGovern men doubt that the

canvassing technique, which was so successful in the primaries, can work on a broader scale. But most top McGovern aides disagree, regarding it as a vital part of the Senator's effort to reach people alienated by shortcomings of "the system."

"A lot of people think no one cares about them any more," says Mr. Hart. "It really impresses them to have a McGovern volunteer knock on their door."

ADVERTISING: The television, radio and print advertising will seek to establish the image of popular participation in the McGovern campaign. Charles Guggenheim, the campaign's media director, contends that TV ads showing Sen. McGovern "listening to the people" talk about their problems are especially effective.

Half-hour documentary films will be shown in prime TV time so that "people can get to know McGovern in depth," Mr. Guggenheim says. These will be augmented by five-minute commercials and brief spots featuring Mr. McGovern on specific issues—the war, tax reform and "trust in government." Many will show him conversing with voters.

McGovern strategists will rely on the television campaign to dispel the notion that the Senator is a radical. The Senator's low-key style will confound the anticipated GOP attack on his alleged radicalism, they think. "If there's one word to describe George McGovern's TV impact, it's 'disarming,'" says Mr. Guggenheim.

FINANCING: McGovern staffers say they don't worry about raising the money to get their message across. The new campaign-spending law, for one thing, will equalize the major candidates' broadcast spending at \$3.4 million each. Mr. Hart is confident that \$20 million to \$25 million will be raised to finance the campaign. While that may equal only half the Nixon war chest, the campaign manager declares: "It will be satisfactory. . . . I would doubt we'd lose the election on the basis of money."

Indeed, McGovern men are considering a novel plan of almost renouncing big-money backing and limiting individual contributions to \$1,000 each. A flaw in this scheme is that the McGovern men figure they'd have to accept loans of more than \$1,000 from fat cats to get the campaign off the ground. But they are discussing the idea of paying back the loans as the campaign progressed, with public disclosure, so that they could emphasize that financing was coming basically from small contributors.

They believe it's possible to do this. About 80% of the \$6 million the Senator spent in the pre-convention campaign came from "ordinary people," McGovern aides claim. The political purpose, of course, would be to promote the idea that Sen. McGovern is the candidate of the "little guy" while President Nixon is the candidate of the "big-money interests."

ISSUES: The McGovern camp vows the Senator won't back off from the basic stands he has taken in the primaries. Yet yesterday, he demonstrated some flexibility even on his long-standing pledge to totally withdraw the American military presence from Southeast Asia. He told a group of wives of prisoners of war that he would keep forces in Thailand and also deploy ships near Vietnam if Hanoi refused to return POWs and account for men missing in action. At the same time, he renewed his long-standing pledge to get out of Vietnam within 90 days of his inauguration as President.

The Senator's aides believe his call for an immediate end to the war is his biggest political plus. Similarly, they think his pledge for a phased \$32 billion cut in defense spending is basically popular. And they see no dire political risk in his call for sweeping tax reforms that would end many tax preferences and increase corporate taxes.

The Senator himself, however, acknowledges that he has a political problem with his plan for large-scale redistribution of income by revamping the welfare system. A new version of this plan probably will be outlined shortly, but McGovern men stress that the basic concept—increasing the incomes of the poor while raising taxes of the relatively well-to-do—won't be altered.

The McGovern men maintain that his willingness to take specific stands on controversial issues is one of his strengths with voters. "It's a fallacy to say that people have to agree with what a man stands for on the issues to vote for him," says Mr. Hart. "The central issue is trust."

But Mr. McGovern is entirely willing to attune his positions to the concerns of big voting blocs. Yesterday, in an apparent bid to reassure Jewish voters of his commitment to Israel's defense, he threw his support behind a toughly worded plank revising the party platform to stress that U.S. military might would remain available to deter Israel's enemies.

Of course, Mr. McGovern has fuzzed up his positions on some especially emotional issues. He has backed rapidly away from identification with liberal abortion-on-demand laws. He stresses he doesn't believe in legalization of marijuana but just in reducing criminal penalties for its possession. He stands firmly by his proposal for amnesty for draft-dodgers, but now he adds that he doesn't favor blanket forgiveness for those who deserted the armed services and became exiles in foreign countries.

McGovern men say they aren't worried by the GOP attacks they anticipate on the abortion, amnesty, marijuana and other "radical" issues, an attack that Spiro Agnew already is pressing. In fact, Mr. Hart contends the Republicans may engage in overkill and suffer a backlash. "Every minute they let Agnew on the stump will help us," he predicts.

As another counter to Republican attacks, the McGovern strategy is to identify the Senator more with traditional Democratic economic issues. Thus, he will denounce high unemployment and stress his plan for a \$10 billion job-creating program. This approach might help him win blue-collar ethnic voters susceptible to Nixon appeals on busing, crime and such issues.

PARTY UNITY: The breadbasket issue is what the McGovern men hope eventually will persuade George Meany and other reluctant AFL-CIO chieftains to get in line behind the South Dakotan. The federation leaders, however, seem certain to leave this convention still embittered by the McGovern victory. Of all his foes here, they formed the hardest-line opposition to his nomination.

"It's going to take some time to work out relationships" with the AFL-CIO leaders, concedes Carl Wagner, the Senator's aide for labor matters. And he acknowledges that some unions may never support Mr. McGovern.

An early test of the McGovern men's ability to woo labor will come during the summer voter-registration drive. The McGovernites would like to mesh their volunteers with the registration organizations that unions maintain in most states. They'll also seek to bring old-line party people into their state organizations to help manage summer registration efforts and fall campaign activities.

Most of all, the McGovernites hope that shared hostility toward the President will ultimately bring the party back together again. "There is still the great unifier—Richard Nixon," says Frank Mankiewicz, the Senator's top political strategist.

Even while smashing the stop-McGovern movement here, the Senator's forces were striving to show that they want to work with labor and old-line party leaders, not drive them out of the party. The most symbolic indication came when the McGovernites forced a vote at 4:30 a.m. yesterday on a compromise motion that would have allowed Chicago Mayor Richard Daley and his challenged group of delegates to take their seats.

To be sure, the compromise motion was defeated—because the Daley group spurned the offer—and the mayor lost his place in the convention. Nonetheless, the McGovernites hope the effort showed their real desire for reconciliation with the old-line forces. Yesterday, the Senator immediately began seeking meetings with Mayor Daley and Mr. Meany to give them assurances of his willingness to reach accommodations in the party-healing effort. And, evidently, Edmund Muskie will lend the South Dakotan a hand, as he promised in his concession announcement yesterday.

Yet the intra-party differences are deep. Not only do Mr. Meany and others disagree fundamentally with Sen. McGovern on a number of important issues, but also they are extremely antagonistic toward the new forces he now has brought to power within the party that was theirs to dominate for so long.

This may create an unbridgeable gap or else permit an alliance in name only. For, as Mr. Dutton observes, Sen. McGovern's basic appeal is to a "constituency of change." And the Daleys and the Meanys are the essence of the establishment that that constituency wants to change.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1972

Note for Bob Haldeman -

The attached memo on McGovern may be of interest - it has a slightly different flavor than what I have seen before.



Fred Malek

Attachment

Fred Mallik

b1.c
RI

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

June 8, 1972

Confidential

MEMORANDUM FOR: JEB MAGRUDER
FROM: KEN RIETZ *KR*
SUBJECT: The McGovern Campaign

With all things considered, McGovern should be a much easier candidate to run against than Humphrey. The only area he has natural support is among young people and my feeling is that he is not as strong there as many think (separate memo follows).

There is a danger in the McGovern candidacy, however, that may not be immediately apparent. That danger lies in the immediate temptation to go for the jugular. In my opinion, this would be a real danger.

McGovern does not appear to be an evil man. He looks like the man next door. He is neither handsome or ugly, is not slick, and seems to talk everyone's language. He is not well-known and that is an advantage. His biggest advantage, however, is that he appears to be straightforward, honest, and sincere. This is especially appealing to young people.

An immediate broadside attack against McGovern will definitely reduce his appeal. It will level off his present steep climb in popularity and dampen his campaign spirit. It is my feeling that this kind of a broadside (even if carefully disguised) would be a mistake. While we would slow his campaign, we would leave ourselves open to the charge of "cheap Republican trick" and the democrats would rally behind their wounded soldier. We cannot make a martyr out of McGovern or we will have real problems.

We should let McGovern's surge run its course. This will be a tough thing to do because McGovern will rise in popularity. If he is turned aside now, however, he will only rise again and then we may not be able to stop him because we have used up all our material.

Confidential

Confidential

Jeb Magruder

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June 8, 1972

The similarity between the present situation and the 1970 Brock campaign is very real. The issues against McGovern are very similar to those used against Gore. The timing we used seemed to work well and should be explored this year.

It would seem appropriate to plan the last six weeks of the campaign from election day backward. Each week a new issue should be discussed coming down hard on the inconceivable and unbelievable position of McGovern. The issues should be so drawn as to always be keeping McGovern on the defense defending his own stand. That way he will spend an entire week answering busing and we will hit him the next week with abortion, prayer in schools, etc. The key is not to destroy him but to keep him always on the defense, explaining his position.

The important point is, these issues should not be used up early. McGovern should not be attacked early. If we build a startling lead early it will only dwindle and we may have nothing in reserve. This will be a very difficult thing to accomplish because the natural tendency is to hit him now and hit him often. Everybody in the field (particularly volunteers) will call for it and most people in Washington will demand it. (In the Brock campaign, my telephone rang off the hook with advisors who said we were losing because we weren't hitting Gore, particularly in early September. Our only reply was we had it planned and it would come. And, it did.)

In addition to proper timing, style and tone are all important in this attack. The issues should be discussed but, there should be a common theme. I suggest that theme is believability and sincerity -- McGovern's. We should stress his political nature and the way he built himself into a candidate by using the people -- young, old, black, etc. In addition, we should stress the unbelievability of his position compared to the view of all Americans. Time after time he should be shown out of touch with what Americans want.

What I am saying is that the issues have a twofold purpose. The first is the issue itself, but the second and more important is painting McGovern as someone out of touch with reality and the American people, insincere, and a politician of the first order.

Confidential

~~Confidential~~

Jeb Magruder

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June 8, 1972

While this process is going on, the President and Vice President must stay above the battle. They should not get involved in name calling and should remain positive -- talking about the accomplishments of the Administration in a positive, not defensive way.

cc: Fred LaRue
Fred Malek ✓

Confidential

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 23, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. Haldeman
FROM: Harry S. Dent *HSD*
RE: Evans-Novak Forum

The E-N Forum almost sounded like a Re-elect RN Forum. At the end, of the 50 attendees, only three thought McGovern could win in November. A number of Demos were present. Invitations went to the E-N Newsletter mailing list and cost \$150 each.

Speaking were Bob Novak, Larry O'Brien, Dick Scammon, Pat Caddell (McGovern's young pollster), and Harry Dent.

Novak began by conceding the Southern and Border states to RN and the other conservative types. This got him to 241 electoral votes, adding that any one of the big ones like Ohio, California, New York, Michigan, et al, could put RN over easily. Surprisingly, O'Brien said this was tough to refute and that the election would be "very, very rough." He was very concerned about what will happen at the convention, remarking that when he bangs the gavel that may be the last semblance of order at the convention. He said winning is not as important as he once thought -- that he just wanted to restore confidence in the system.

Then O'Brien discussed the bugging incident, forecasting that beginning on Monday, it would be brought out that "elements of the government were involved." He deplored the incident and convinced those present of sincerity. Asked if he were getting cooperation from the White House, Justice, and the FBI, he said "yes" only to the FBI.

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H. R. Haldeman

O'Brien left the impression that "elements of the government" could mean the CIA or FBI, "an agency in which we have all had confidence." He said he had just talked to the head of an agency who had a former employee involved.

McGovern's brain child was not impressive or persuasive. He cited polling generalities and would refer to what one interviewee would say to prove his point. In essence, he said people will not be voting on the issues and that many who don't agree with McGovern will vote for him because of the new politics -- the feeling that McGovern is for "him" and against "them." Thus McGovern can get by with generalities and strike home on only one point such as tax reform to win "him" and set "him" against "them," the establishment. Glibness and class warfare will do the job.

Caddell said the more McGovern is exposed and campaigns, the stronger he gets. He attributed the last-minute setback in California to the Jewish switch over the Israeli concern and the departure in confidence to New Mexico. He didn't back away on ideology or the welfare and defense issues, citing Va. Lt. Gov. Howell's statement that "the middle of the road is marked by a yellow stripe, and if you stand there, you'll get hit from both sides."

However, he indicated their leaders and followers will be practical and realistic, especially on convention credential challenges. He referred several times to sugaring everyone up during and after the convention. I got the impression they will get more pragmatic, but cannot now hint at any policy compromises.

Scammon took many potshots at the McGovern policies and actions. He rated RN as a 60-40 favorite now and listed many "ifs" that must be pulled off for the election to be close. Wallace voters were pictured as

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H. R. Haldeman

holding the key to 1972. Scammon pointed out that McGovern went up after Wallace was shot, indicating he won't be getting the Wallace votes that Caddell had claimed. The Jews were described as being tortured between supporting a Democrat and protecting Israel. The Catholic Strategy is working, he said, adding that McGovern must find a way to cover the big Catholic and Southern hemorrhages.

Scammon also pointed to McGovern's cross on busing, and Caddell agreed. Any more big busing orders and McGovern is really hurt, Scammon averred. He credited McGovern with two advantages: his Democrat numerical superiority and "the fact that he's not really a true ideologue" -- he can compromise. He really lectured Caddell on the necessity of being realistic. He cited the homosexual plank forced in Minnesota by McGovernites and claimed two were dancing on TV at the convention in lavender t-shirts (let's get this).

Scammon said RN is pictured by many to represent their concern about alienation. This, he thinks, will counter those who feel alienated, particularly their idea of getting the Wallace voters.

The property tax was mentioned as a concern of the Middle American even though the young and black may not feel this concern -- another warning to McGovern.

Caddell ruled out Mills as a running mate, but did talk considerably about Askew. He said their ideal running mate would be Catholic and Southern trade unionist. Kevin White was mentioned, especially by Novak.

In concluding, Novak said McGovern will try to win an "untainted victory" and that the "old guard" will have little to do with the election. He also expects Demo defections from ethnics and labor and that McGovern can only offset this with talk of economics, which he eschews.

O'Brien is concerned about Pennsylvania because of Rizzo's possible defection.

Committee for the Re-election of the President

1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 333-0920

June 29, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT: 1960 and 1968 Elections

This memorandum is in reply to your request for a comparison of the 1960 and 1968 campaigns and of the changes that occurred in the survey data during the two campaigns. It is based on an analysis of public polls (largely Gallup), the University of Michigan Survey Research Center's After-Election Studies, individual Market-Opinion statewide polls and my observations of the 1968 campaign. I do not have the campaign polling for either 1960 or 1968, and I was not actively involved in the 1960 campaign.

The following campaign polls^{1/} taken during 1960 and 1968 indicate great differences between the two races:

<u>Date</u> (1960)	<u>Nixon</u>	<u>Kennedy</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
March	47%	47%	5%
June	48	46	5
Late Sept.	47	46	7
Early Oct.	45	49	6
November	48	49	3

<u>Date</u> (1968)	<u>Nixon</u>	<u>Humphrey</u>	<u>Wallace</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
April	43%	34%	9%	14%
Early May	40	36	14	10
Late May	36	42	14	8
Early June	37	42	14	7
Early Sept.	43	31	19	7
Late Sept.	44	29	20	7
Early Oct.	43	31	20	6
Late Oct.	44	36	15	6
November	42	40	14	4

^{1/} It was impossible to obtain demographic breakdowns of the Gallup vote for 1960 in the time allotted for this paper. We are, however, making arrangements to get this information.

The 1960 election was neck and neck throughout the campaign. The undecided vote was considerably less in 1960 than in 1968. The undecided vote only increased from 5% to 7% following the initial Nixon-Kennedy debates, at which time Kennedy took the lead and eventually won the election.

In April of 1968 the undecided vote was high with 14% of the voters unable to make a choice. Nixon held a substantial early lead until the North Vietnamese agreed to Paris as a negotiating site. Then Humphrey surged ahead in the polls and maintained his lead until after the conventions. Later, the Humphrey lead declined and there was a corresponding increase in the Wallace strength. Apparently, the disorder at the convention caused a swing to Wallace away from traditional Democratic vote. In the closing days of the campaign the Humphrey vote greatly increased. According to Gallup, Humphrey's dramatic gains in the last days of the campaign resulted from a decline of the Wallace strength in northern states returning to their traditional Democratic vote.

1 of 72
at this
time

It is significant to note that the Nixon strength remained fairly constant between 42% to 48% after the convention in both years. Very little switching seemed to occur to and from Nixon.

There are several significant differences between 1960 and 1968 which would make it unwise to conclude the 1960 Nixon campaign was more effective than the 1968 campaign:

1. The 1960 election was a two-way race and the 1968 election was a three-way race. The three-way race tended to delay the final decision and increase switching simply because of more choices presented to the voter. This is a characteristic of all elections with more than two candidates and we have observed this in primary elections and in Canada. Also, this was the first time that most American voters were confronted with such a situation and Wallace's candidacy caused them to be ambivalent in their choice. In order to vote for Wallace they had to break lifelong voting traditions. This explains why more older voters returned to the Democratic column than younger voters. ✓
2. The Catholic issue was very important in 1960 and not in 1968. It caused a large number of voters to make up their minds on that basis as soon as Kennedy was nominated.
3. Another major difference is the 1968 Democratic convention which divided the Democratic party as compared to a relatively united party in 1960. Kennedy had the support of an active and united party in 1960, while Humphrey had to contend with major splits on both left and right with McCarthy and Wallace in 1968.
4. Kennedy was also a clearly more attractive and popular personality in a time when the electorate was looking for a young and dynamic leader. He also had the advantage of representing change and running against an incumbent administration, while Humphrey had the problem of having to separate himself from a very unpopular

administration of which he was a key part. Kennedy could blame the Eisenhower/Nixon administration for all the problems of the time; but, Nixon, on the other hand, was not a beneficiary of Eisenhower's personal appeal and Eisenhower got credit for all the successes of his administration.

5. The issue structure was very different in 1960 and 1968 in terms of the general attitude of the country and the specific areas of concern. The general attitude of the country was relatively positive, optimistic, and hopeful in 1960, but extremely negative and without hope in 1968. In 1960 the country was at peace, the economy was in relatively good shape, the race, crime, drug problems had not become critical and there was no major environmental/consumer issue. In 1968, however, the electorate was frustrated over the war, personally feeling the effects of inflation, frightened over the domestic unrest, and worrying about the environment. The fact that there were more serious problems in 1968 and that each of these were becoming worse combined to give the country a very negative pessimistic attitude.

There are several reasons why I believe it would also be unwise to conclude that 1972 is similar to either 1960 or 1968. First, and most important, is that each election is to a large degree unique in terms of the perception of the candidates, the general attitude of the electorate, and the specific issues. Therefore, the 1972 election with the President running as an incumbent against McGovern will not be particularly comparable to 1960 or 1968. In fact, I suspect it may be more comparable to 1956 than 1960 or 1968. The reason for this is the incumbency. In 1956, the last time an incumbent was running for re-election, voters decided how they would vote earlier than any election in recent time. 76% of those who voted had decided how they were going to vote by the week after the convention. Studies by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan have demonstrated that in both 1960 and 1968 the percentage deciding how to vote immediately after the convention dwindled. George Gallup wrote in 1960 that the only time there was a major shift in sentiment during 1948, 1952, or 1956 came as a result of a dramatic international event. I believe we are at such a stage now, and that most people will have made up their minds how to vote by the time of the Republican convention unless there is an international event to change their minds.

There is one recurring problem for the President which is evident throughout all of this data. We have a very difficult time moving the committed vote over 50%. The job seems to become increasingly more difficult the closer we come to the election because of the declining number of voters who are undecided. This suggests that we should be actively trying to increase the President's committed vote in the next 30 to 45 days. Once voters actually decide they are going to vote for a candidate, most of them stay committed.

Every point we can gain now will come much easier than those we have to get in the Fall. This would have to be done largely through the President's policies, programs, statements, surrogates and not through the campaign. I do not think we should do anything to lengthen the period of the actual political campaign. The shorter the actual campaign, the better for us.

Overall, we would suggest that consideration be given to increasing Presidential appearances during the next 45 days and also beginning the surrogate program earlier than originally planned.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

DOUGLAS HALLETT 

SUBJECT:

Your Memo of June 27.

Your supposition that "during the 1960 campaign there was almost no change in the polls, while in 1968 there was a substantial decline during the campaign" is incorrect. In fact, just the reverse is true. In 1960, the President's base of support fluctuated more than it did in 1968 (Harris' figures reflect this better than Gallup's, but since Harris was working for Kennedy in 1960 and complete figures are unavailable, at least to me, I have used Gallup figures in the attached chart). He came out of the conventions with 50 percent support -- his first lead over Kennedy since January, declined to 47 percent with the TV debates, and rose again at the end of the campaign with Eisenhower's intervention and the Republican TV blitz. Meanwhile, except for the last two weeks or so, Kennedy was taking most of the undecided voters as they made up their minds about the election. In contrast, in 1968, the President's base of support was remarkably stable, holding around 43 percent throughout the fall. What happened in 1968 was that the remaining 57 percent of the electorate gradually coalesced behind Humphrey -- the Wallace vote declined and the undecideds moved into the Democratic camp. Whereas in 1960 the President's actions, both effective -- the TV blitz -- and ineffective -- the TV debates, had a substantial impact on the electorate, in 1968 the President's actions hardly affected his base of support at all. He might as well have not campaigned.

In fact, he really didn't campaign in 1968. From the time of the convention forward, the Nixon campaign was immobilized, continuing with the same platitudinous, wishy-washiness which had been appropriate -- and given the situation -- effective during the preconvention period. The President wandered lazily across the country. The TV-media campaign was as dull as dishwater. The radio speeches, as

usual, were vacuous. Humphrey, in contrast, recovered his momentum with the Salt Lake City speech on September 30, Harry Trumaned across the country, had better media programming when he could finally afford it, and replied extremely effectively to the President's attempt to spur his campaign forward in the final weeks; i. e. the "security gap" speech and Humphrey's same-day, magnificent, reply. Had the campaign continued another two days, Humphrey would have surely captured the White House.

Now, the conclusion from all this is not that the 1960 campaign was better designed than the 1968 effort. The 50-state, rally-to-rally, approach wasted the President's energies, spoiled him for the debates, deprived him of the advantages that should have been his with the Vice-Presidency (advantages which should have been clear to the most obtuse observer given the way the polls shot up after his Guildhall, Soviet and steel strike activities in the pre-1960 period -- why more of this was not done in early 1960 and why Kennedy was allowed to dominate the public's attention, and thus the polls, in the first six months of 1960 is beyond me) and ignored the opportunity for him to appear non-political, issue-oriented, even reflective with effective media programming and better use of his office. It was, after all, only with the beginning of the taking advantage of his office and prestige, with the public blessings of Eisenhower and the TV programming at the end, that the President began to gain. Before that, he was leaving the undecided, swing voters to Kennedy and actually losing ground within his own base. Had the President used the imaginative media ideas which were thought up for 1960, had he paused to give decent speeches, and had he not wasted his energy and his prestige on constant campaigning, he would have been much better off. Indeed, he would have probably won.

Nor do I want to imply that the 1968 campaign was poorly planned. The tone of what little I have seen of your 1967 memorandum on the importance of the tube, the columnists, and the other agents through which a candidate is mediated to the public was right on target. So was the de-emphasis of rallies and the institution of thoughtful speeches, etc. The failure in 1968 was one of execution, not design. The mechanisms through which the President was to be projected to the public were well-thought out; only the product was missing. The President had nothing to say; there were no issues; the radio speeches were generally banal and -- being radio speeches and not visual events -- poorly designed to attract attention from either the media or the public. The 1960 campaign was poorly.

designed, but it was salvaged at the end by the President's happening on to good execution of what should have been his design all along; the 1968 campaign was extremely well designed, but miserably carried out, both by the President and the people around him.

What is the lesson for 1972? It is not that the President should blitz the country as he did in 1960 to avoid the complacency which almost led to Humphrey's victory in 1968. On the other hand, it is also not that he should remain above and beyond the battle -- remain Presidential is the way Ray Price would put it -- as he did in 1968. The first approach would rally the opposition in its general contempt for Nixon, the campaigner, and it would deprive him of the advantages which almost pulled it out for him in 1960 and which, as President and not just Eisenhower's Vice President, he has in even greater degree now. The second approach, in turn, would also deprive him of his advantages of access to public attention -- it would leave him victimized by whatever McGovern could manage to do, leave him vulnerable to complacency among his electorate, and fail to take advantage of 1972's unique opportunity to reach out to ethnics, Catholics, and others who could form, at last, a new Republican majority.

What is needed is a campaign approach which combines the dynamism of the 1960 campaign, particularly in the format of the closing days, with the strategy of 1968 magnified to take advantage of the President's incumbency. The President should be on center stage, but he should be on center stage as President. He should be holding down food prices, fighting inflation, taking after a big corporation or two, working on tax reform, solving pollution problems, bleeding a bit for the poor, and -- although not as importantly since it has already been accomplished P. R. wise -- bringing about a new structure of peace -- and he should be doing all these things visibly, actively and dramatically. This will involve some travel and some speechmaking, but the travel and the speechmaking should appear non-political and very substantive. Likewise, with the media operation -- our ads should be like news clips and any Presidential appearances made should be information, not rhetoric, oriented. Political rally appearances made should be few and far between -- and the rallies should be so massive that it can be claimed they evidence popular, not just Republican, support for the President. I have already made detailed suggestions and I will not repeat them here.

I suspect, from my rather distant knowledge of the President, that he is beginning to get battle-hungry -- the sight of George McGovern galavanting around the country is becoming too much to resist. He should continue to resist. Hard-charging was not what helped the President at the end of the 1960 campaign; it was not the failure to hard-charge which hurt him in 1968. And, as President, as the 1970 campaign demonstrated, hard-charging can hurt him even more than it did in the beginning of the 1960 campaign and would have had he undertaken it in 1968. As President, we have scores of ways to answer McGovern's charges without involving the President in direct confrontation. If McGovern charges we haven't done anything domestically, we can blast the Congress for inaction on our domestic program. If McGovern charges us with being in bed with business, we can sick the Anti-Trust Division and EPA on a few corporations. If McGovern charges us with a failure to care about the environment, we can print up a few thousand more leaflets to be passed out at national parks or do another hundred thousand mailing at government expense. Hard-charging wasn't beneficial in the past; with the substitute tools cited above it is clearly even less beneficial with the President now in the White House.

The opposite strategy to a hard-charge campaign is not -- and should not be taken as -- doing nothing. McGovern can't win this election and I'm not even sure this time the President can lose it. But if he can lose it -- assuming a rejection of the strident 1970 approach -- the only way he can do so is by being complacent, by failing to take advantage of his governmental tools, and by failing to reflect a sense of dynamism, motion and anti-status-quoism, all of which will turn off those Northern upper-middle class suburbanites and urban ethnics who can either give the election to McGovern or give a new majority to the President. If the President wants to go on the offensive, that is good. But let him go on the offensive with the tools and prestige of his office, not the techniques and tricks of a politician, let him go on the offensive against thirty years of liberal Democratic statism at home and abroad, not against George McGovern, and let him go on the offensive for a new sense of liberty and human possibility, not for a partisan Republican or even "ideological majority" election victory. There is a difference, and it is a difference which has cost the President public recognition of what he has accomplished so far, but which can still be turned to our advantage in the election campaign now facing us.

GALLUP POLL 1960

	<u>Nixon</u>	<u>Kennedy</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
Early June	48	52	
Late June	48	52	
July (After Convention)	50	44	6
August	47	47	6
September	47	48	5
October	48	48	4
November 6	48	49	3

GALLUP POLL 1968

	<u>Nixon</u>	<u>Humphrey</u>	<u>Wallace</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
June	35	40	16	9
July	40	38	16	6
August	45	29	18	8
September 3-7	43	31	19	7
September 20-22	43	28	21	8
September 27-30	44	29	20	7
October 3-12	43	31	20	6
October 17-21	44	36	15	5
November 1-2	42	40	14	4

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 29, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

FROM: KENNETH L. KHACHIGIAN 

You asked Mr. Buchanan to prepare an analysis of the 1960 and 1968 campaigns in terms of the changes in the polls and surveys. Pat asked for my thoughts on this. Because Pat was tied up with his efforts on the briefing book, he asked that I go ahead and send you my memorandum as an interim report, though not one which necessarily reflects his views.

Pat indicated that he will respond to the request as soon as he is able.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
FROM: KENNETH L. KHACHIGIAN 
SUBJECT: POLLS AND THE 1960, 1968 CAMPAIGNS

Mr. Haldeman is correct in his reading of the polls in 1960 versus those in 1968. (See attached graphs) In 1960, between June and November, the Gallup poll was virtually unchanged. RN had in November the same percentage he had in June, and JFK had only slightly more in June than he did in November. In 1968, the 16 point spread we had in August went down to the two point spread which Gallup gave us in November. It should be noted that the Harris Poll in August, 1968, taken about the same time as the Gallup, showed only a six point lead for RN over HHH compared to the larger Gallup spread.

In 1960, RN only had the lead once during the campaign, and this was immediately following the Republican National Convention -- after which he jumped 6 points over JFK. In 1968, as we all remember, the lead continued to dwindle with Humphrey taking votes right out of the hide of George Wallace and out of the undecided voter. From the polls, it is apparent that RN had a solid bloc of votes that stayed with him throughout the year while HHH steadily picked up from the switches and undecideds.

What does this all mean?

One interpretation is that RN gets a solid bloc of voters which lean to him, and this bloc is very difficult to enlarge as well as very difficult to diminish. If that is the case, then in a two-man race this year, the election will be fairly close with RN winning by about four percentage points or less. This interpretation, however, is somewhat like a doctrine of predestination, with the assumption that events between June and November will not change things. I'm not willing to accept that interpretation totally since for the first time RN will be running as an incumbent President and will be much more in command of the determining events.

The other way to interpret these phenomena, however, is in terms of the manner in which the campaign is conducted, and I lean towards this interpretation -- especially in a year where we control the levers of government.

In 1960 (and I confess I was still struggling through high school), there were two types of campaigns run -- the JFK style where you start out at virtually full steam and continue at full steam, winning by the sheer force of momentum and the RN style where you slowly build up steam and momentum in order to have the campaign "peak" on election day. I don't subscribe fully to the theory that a candidate can fully "time" his campaign to meet the standards of "game plans." On the contrary, in the heat of the campaign, there is such an intense movement of events as to require a virtually daily requirement to alter strategy -- one of the mistakes I believe we made in 1968 was to get locked in to a broad game plan from which we were unwilling to extricate ourselves until too late.

The 1960 campaign is not easily interpreted along the "game plan" lines because of all the interrupting factors -- RN's knee injury, the debates, etc. Thus, to an extent, the 1960 campaign handled the events as they came.

Moreover, the 1960 campaign was a fairly classic campaign in issues confrontation. I grant that personality played a role -- it always does -- but JFK and RN did battle hammer and tong on a lot of damned important issues. From the outset RN took the case to the country that things were pretty good in America, that there was room to improve things, but that by and large we don't need anyone knocking America around. JFK, of course, took the position that we had to mobilize the country along his suggested lines, and the debate was joined with the issues falling in line with considerable distance between RN and JFK on most of them.

Consequently, in 1960 the voters knew what the choice was -- very little was fuzzed up. Given this set of circumstances, it is not surprising that the polls changed very little. Only minor twists and turns in the campaign, plus some bizarre pieces of bad luck -- the heavy beard in the debates, the arranged release of M. L. King, Jr. by the Kennedys, the theft of votes in Texas and Illinois -- made the difference.

In 1968, we may have overreacted to the criticism that there was not enough planning in the 1960 campaign, and of course the decision was made to pick the direction in which to go and stay on course until the end. Unfortunately, this made us unable to deal sufficiently with the liberation of HHHI at the time of his Vietnam speech -- and once he was liberated, a whole new strategy was needed. I will grant that the bombing halt overly distorted the campaign and inured overwhelmingly to the benefit of Hubert. Nevertheless, I do not doubt for a minute that Hubert had the momentum going for him on election day. He was on the move.

The thing about 1968 is that Hubert began beating us to death over -- issues. Medicare, the poor, a good economy, decent jobs -- these were all in the HHH attack plan, and we did not respond until too late. He damn near made it sound like we were the "ins" and they were the "outs." We had the basic issues going for us but used them insufficiently to win the greater margin which we might have.


Having said all this, I must warn against comparisons between 1960 and 1968. The Wallace candidacy made a great deal of difference, I believe. Wallace made it difficult for the lines to form early in the campaign. He was a damned nuisance who clouded things up. HHH figured this out earlier than we did and began playing RN off against Wallace, picking up the pieces as he went along. If Wallace is out of the 1972 campaign, I feel the situation will be much more like 1960 (which, as you know, has been a favorite thesis of mine for some time).

The 1972 campaign will be an important "issues" campaign with two extremely distinctive philosophies battling against each other. We are, I believe, on the right side of the preponderance of these issues, and it will be McGovern who tries to fuzz the issues in favor of personality, trust, and all the other crap. Nonetheless, if we accept the notion that issues will be fairly determinative (and by this I mean four or five big ones -- not revenue sharing or the environment), then broad planning should fall along the lines of drawing the issue differences sharply at the outset of the campaign.

Once the differences have been drawn (and I think they almost already have) the campaign is going to be one -- like 1960 -- of playing that confrontation in such a way as to keep our issues out front, not letting up on our strengths and not playing to our weaknesses. Unlike 1960, we have much more going for us in terms of differences with McGovern; i. e. , in terms of what the American public wants. In 1960, there was probably a 50/50 split in terms of what the public wanted. Our task, then, is to keep this advantage by pressing those issues and pressing them in such a way as to keep McGovern away from the weak links which could bring us down.

Thus, if we start in August with a 54% to 46% edge over McGovern, my guess is that we can keep this lead right on through if we don't let the differences slide by through a skilled McGovern campaign. Every two or three days, we should look at how things are going and plan accordingly -- following a basic outline; but not being so blind as to ignore major shifts of opinion once they start to occur. If something works, let's keep using it; if it doesn't work, let's toss it aside and go with something else.

I confess that it is not easy for me to map this out with short time and space constraints, but I think the fundamental points are in here. I caution against too much comparison between 1960 and 1968; the times were different; the circumstances were different; the candidate was different. I opt more for a comparison between 1960 and 1972 and hold the belief that much is to be gained by understanding the basic similarity of conditions. The lesson of 1968 lies in campaign "technique," not in historical analogy. So let's understand what is similar between 1960 and 1972 and learn from what we did wrong in 1968, and I think we are well on the way to four more years of keeping the rascals out.




80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0

early June late June July Aug. Sept. Oct. November 6th

JFK
RN

PERCENT

POST-CONVENTION PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE



	Nixon	Humphrey	Wallace
August 24	40%	34%	17%
November 1-2	42%	40%	12%
November 3	40%	43%	13%

HARRIS POLL

DATES

August 24,
1968

November 1-2,
1968

November 3,
1968

POST-CONVENTION PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE

PERCENT

80

70

60

50

40


30

20

10

	Nixon	Humphrey	Wallace
August 21	45%	29%	18%
Early Sept.	43%	31%	19%
Late Sept.	43%	28%	21%
Early Oct.	44%	29%	20%
Mid Oct.	43%	31%	20%
October 27	44%	36%	15%
November 4	42%	40%	14%

GALLUP POLL



DATES
(1968)

Aug. 21

Early
Sept.

Late
Sept.

Early
October

Mid
October

October
27

Nov. 4

NIXON

HUMPHREY

WALLACE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date July 6, 1972

TO: GORDON STRACHAN

FROM: BRUCE KEHRLI *BKC*

FYI. A copy was dexed to San
Clemente on July 5 to Alex Butter-
field.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 5, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT (Per HRH)

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

At HRH's request, some thoughts on 1968 and 1960.

First, it is imprecise to say that "in 1968 there was a substantial decline during the campaign." (If there is a single hallmark of RN's runs against both JFK and HHH it is the remarkable stability of the Nixon vote from August through November.) The President did not so much lose votes from August to November of 1968 -- as we lost a historic opportunity, the "lost landslide" as someone has referred to it. While we failed to edge upwards in the slightest, Humphrey closed a 13 point gap. What were the reasons for this?

A) Some of the HHH gains were inevitable; the Democratic candidate, if he performed reasonably well, was simply going to win back some of the traditional Democratic vote, horrified at the Chicago convention, but not a Nixon voter at heart.

B) We failed utterly to pick up the Wallace defectors in the North, who slipped away from Wallace through Nixon, back to HHH. This return to HHH is partly due to the efforts of the AFL-CIO, probably partly due to RN's "anti-union" image from the fifties, partly due to our own short-comings. (Incidentally, we are in better and the Democratic Left in worse shape with these voters than in 1968; our opportunity is renewed.)

The startling thing about the Gallup Poll, 1968, is the almost precise correlation between the Humphrey rise and the Wallace fall in the polls. Wallace, too, by holding onto Southern votes and Southern states which surely might have been ours, had a hand in preventing the "landslide" that might have been.

But, in my judgment, our own campaign had serious short-comings in 1968. Basically, they were these:

a) A lack of flexibility. We established a game plan, and followed it through, although by early October, it should have been evident that we were losing the interest of the press and the country as well. The hoopla campaign -- to demonstrate RN had the kind of enthusiasm and unity HHH did not, was ideal for September. It was not for October.

Once Humphrey made his Salt Lake City speech, the President should have, in my judgment, attacked him directly and vigorously, to force back the split in the Democratic Party between the pro-bombing and the anti-bombing forces who had fought at the convention and who were yet at sword's point. We let HHH off the hook on this. By so doing, he got off of that petard and went over onto the attack.

On the attack, he began to move, to make new and different charges, to attract interest.

b) The President in the fall campaign of 1968 was plagued by the identical problem he had in the fall campaign of 1960. A Hostile Press. Teddy White testifies to this in 1960 and Miss Efron in 1968. In addition, I have on personal knowledge that a group of 19 Washington press types who had divided 10-9 pro-RN in September, were 18-1 pro-HHH at election time.

What explains the bad press? We are partly at fault I believe. We shut down communication with them -- compared with the primaries where we got good press. We also, because of circumstances, were maneuvered into the upper-dog position. We were the more conservative of the two leading candidates. We did not deviate from the set-speech-Man-in-the-Arena-handout routine sufficiently to attract their on-going attention or interest. They were more concerned with reporting a breaking story, The Humphrey Comeback, which was exciting news, than the RN Radio Speeches, which with few exceptions only got a stick of type or two. Our personal relations with the traveling press deteriorated from the campaign, partly due to the "size" of the corps, the natural hostility of liberals, and our natural antipathy toward them which was coming through late in the game.

c) But, rather than strict comparison of 1960 and 1968, which may or may not be useful, and rather than belabor the shortcomings of the various campaign, which are many -- but which are as well counter-balanced by the right decisions, let me rather enumerate those dangers which lurk for us, in my view, in 1972 -- based on the campaigns presidential of the last 12 years. What we face in my view is:

THE DANGERS OF 1968 & THE OPPORTUNITY OF 1964

If McGovern is nominated, in my judgment:

- 1) We must place him on the defensive from the outset, and not let him off of it until November. In our 1968 and 1970 campaign, we did this for the first three weeks -- then either HHH "got well" on Vietnam, or the liberals "got well" on "law and order," and our issue hand had been played. Again, we have enough on McGovern to keep him on the defensive throughout the fall -- we ought not to blast it out of the cannon at once; our speakers should be on the attack.
- 2) We have to maintain a flexibility that I do not believe existed in 1968, and from what I read did not exist in 1960. As Ike said, "planning is essential; plans are worthless." We should have a mapped-out game plan before the campaign starts -- both for attack on the Opposition, and for presentation of the candidate, but there should be a "Review Committee" to look over that plan, and over our media at least once a week.
- 3) While we should rule out the President -- for the time being -- on the Attack Role; I would not rule out a Presidential address to the country, splitting RN off from McGovern on the issues, right now.
- 4) We should have ourselves a strategy meeting on dealing with the press and media between now and November. In my view, we have discredited them for the bias of which they are guilty for three years -- indeed, public confidence in their performance is on the decline. But should there be a "detente" between the White House and national press corps between now and November? While I am more than willing to carry my hod in a campaign to discredit the national media as pro-McGovern, would such a campaign be in our interest, at this point in time. This is something which should not be determined ad hoc -- because in my view a hostile media is one of the prime reasons why RN's presidential campaigns have never seen him rise in the national polls by a single cubit.

5) We should keep in mind that it was not LBJ's performance and personality which won him 60% of the vote -- it was the portrayal of Goldwater as an extremist, which frightened even Republicans.

In my view, given the antipathy of the national media, and the smallness of the GOP, there is no way we could conceivably do better than a 54-46 victory over a centrist, popular Democrat with a united party. Against a divided Democratic Party, however, with a candidate who is far out on the issues, with a press that is less concerned with their antipathy toward RN than with the wild schemes of his opponent, we could go up to 58 to 60 percent.

Thus -- it will not be how wonderful we are, but how terrible McGovern is -- that will make the difference this fall between a respectable clear victory, and a Nixon landslide. Seems to me vital that we keep this in mind.

To get that good media, we should confront McGovern on the "issues," clearly; we should be almost generous to him personally; we should deliberately avoid any nasty, smear attacks. We have enough on the record to hang the guy -- what we have to avoid at all costs are such media-negatives as the 1970 "ads" and the 1972 Watergate Capers, which they are trying to hang around our necks. We should hammer the issues and his positions-- and let McGovern come off as the "name-caller."

6) One great concern of mine is the "Humphrey Phenomenon" -- of McGovern, if nominated, being cast into the role of "under-dog" "anti-Establishment," "come-from-behind" candidate -- whose campaign will provide one hell of a good deal more media interest and human interest than ours.

We should have some real-life "drama" in store for this fall -- to attract national attention. We should, in a pleasant enough way, but unmistakably make this the campaign of Richard Nixon and the Average Man against the Establishment and the Radical Chic.


Goldwater was kept on the bottom through his own and his campaign shortcomings -- and through the media. Again, how the media handles this will determine much. The media could treat McGovern like Goldwater, or they could make him into an inept, but good "under-dog" like HHH -- in which event, they could make a run out of it.

7) As for the suggestion that RN go out and do more, a la 1960, I would say, no -- if that means "political campaigning." However Richard Nixon on the move as President, yes; and Richard Nixon in action in the White House, as President, yes, and Richard Nixon addressing the nation -- for fifteen minutes as President, to strike a contrast with McGovern, yes. But not the stump-speaking. RN as President is a far more effective campaigner than RN as campaigner.


8) Scheduling. This campaign, unlike 1968, we should schedule RN into the "undecided" arenas, union halls, Columbus Day activities, Knights of Columbus meetings, etc. We should keep in mind that there is only -- at most -- 20 percent of the electorate that will decide this, not who wins, but whether or not it is a landslide, and quite frankly, that 20 percent is not a principally Republican vote. Perhaps RN has to make appearance at GOP rallies -- but when he does, he is not going where the ducks are. In a McGovern race the ducks are suddenly in city areas of the North we never carried before.


9) Perhaps this has been repeated before -- but again, of maximum importance is that we not convince the media to make McGovern a picked-on under-dog, by name-calling. We have to massively confront him with his positions, and if we need any characterization -- we can take that from the Democrats. Regrettably, the media does not allow us the same latitude in name-calling it will give McGovern who has already charged the Administration with "racism" Hitler-like conduct and war-mongering.

Buchanan



Gallup Poll - 1960			
	Nixon	JFK	Und.
Early June	48%	52%	
Late June	48	52	
July	50	44	6
August	47	47	6
September	47	48	5
October	48	48	4
November	48	49	3





Harris Poll - 1968

RN HHH Wallace

May	36%	38%	13%
June	36	43	13
July	36	41	16
Aug.	40	34	17
Sept.	39	31	21
Nov. 1-2	42	40	12
Nov. 3	40	43	13

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 22, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
SUBJECT: 1972 Campaign Memoranda

In early June, you asked several staff members to respond to a memorandum from you concerning their views regarding the President's posture and various aspects of the campaign, as well as the opposition strategy between now and Election Day.

It is my understanding that you have read the memoranda which has been turned in. Further, it is my understanding that my assignment is to review the memoranda and give you my conclusions.

One point which I should make is that the next time I handle an assignment like this for you, I probably should not be requested to do a memorandum of my own on the same subject as those on which I am going to report. It is difficult to keep from falling into the trap of using the memoranda of other people to substantiate my own personal feelings, as well as to be unprejudiced as I read the other material.

Bryce Harlow and Bill Safire make two points which I feel should be guidelines for us. The key to both their points is naturally one of degree and also of timing. But we, especially you, should keep their thoughts in mind as guidelines as we move ahead - not that they are not already there!

BRYCE HARLOW: Through the years the President has been known as a politician first and a statesman second. The President's "Fort Knox" is deepening public belief that he is preoccupied not with political maneuverings and expediency but with paramount national concerns.

BILL SAFIRE: Nixon's greatest danger is to disappear into the high clouds. The President should not act so Presidential so as to be out of touch. Although fascinated by mystery and distance from a leader, people are warmed by attention and evidences of humanity.

Safire -
Find
Enemy

A. BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONS

1. The President is on the right track now in terms of his posture and should continue the same through the Convention period. The general conclusion of everyone and my recommendation, which I guess is an obvious fact, should be to keep the President on his pedestal and non-political. Our tendency toward too great aloofness can be tempered by meetings or events which are designed to prod Congress; make positive crowd stories via trips into the country; increase the number of official meetings – Cabinet, Domestic Council, NSC, Quadriad, etc. – all which show the President working against the problems of the people.

2. With Congress in session between the Conventions, meetings designed to highlight the President's initiatives and attempts to pressure for legislation should be highly visible. The greatest amount of time can be placed against continuing the positive aspects of his foreign policy – however, this should not only be done in closed conferences with Kissinger in the office, but in ways which can be publicly recognized. To have the public believe that the positive foreign policy aspects of the China trip, Russia, SALT, etc. is still in the process of being put together, can work to our advantage.

3. When the gavel goes down on the Democratic Convention, the orchestrated attack on McGovern and his platform should begin. The attack is best made by third party forces and some of our lesser known surrogates up until the Republican Convention. A well-orchestrated and media-oriented indictment of the McGOVERN PLATFORM (contrasted to calling it the Democratic platform) should spin out of our platform hearings the week prior to our Convention. Television coverage of the Republican platform hearings should be equal in time allocated to the Democratic platform hearings. The networks must be monitored on this and we must make sure that enough news is cranked out daily so as to justify the equal time.

Harper/Dom
Council
Analysis ✓

B. PRESIDENT - POST CONVENTION/KEY POINTS

MacG
mid-Oct.

1. | The further we move the start of the campaign from mid-September toward the first of October, the better off we will be. Obviously, we can always start earlier if Republican Convention events so dictate.
2. | Presidential campaign travel should escalate. Begin with long weekends - Friday, Saturday and perhaps Monday. Next add a half-day on a Wednesday and then at the maximum work a Wednesday evening to Saturday noon campaign with radio or TV on Sunday. When possible, always return to the White House over night.
3. | Keep the President from making a hard, direct attack on McGovern, at least until late in the campaign. Be cognizant of the fact that it will look panicky if we attack at the end of the campaign unless it is done right. Use the Vice President as well as the surrogates for the hard attack. (PROBLEM: Everyone is counting on the surrogate operation. Will it work? Is it set up right? Should Whitaker be instructed to head it?)
4. | During the campaign, attacking Congress can be one of the ways the President vents not being able to take on McGovern. The President's desire will be to attack so we will give him something to attack and that is Congress. Congress should be set up to represent much of what is wrong with McGovern.
5. | Foreign policy should be laced throughout the campaign as a positive accomplishment as well as a reason not to change horses in the middle of the stream. If the tie can be made that the President has the same visionary desires in domestic policy as has been exemplified in his foreign policy, it could be the most effective way to handle the problem of an attack on the domestic front.
6. | Serious consideration should be given to the idea of having five-minute or fifteen-minute Oval Office addresses. We might see if a five-minute live address could be a last minute substitute for one

L+H
have

of our five-minute network documentary buys. This would give us flexibility and heavy Presidential weight if needed in a crunch. It might also be a possibility on regional buys.

- 7. The hectic campaign day should be out. I agree and most others do on this point. Look at it this way. Take your 1968 memorandum – advance it a notch – and everything falls into place. Our tempo is firm, positive and rational. We can campaign four days running -- but it should be done in a new way (not like 1970). (I will work up some sample schedules to make the point on this.)

FU

- 8. The regional campaign concept, as well as concentrating on special voter blocs, is of the greatest importance. Hallett makes an argument that we need to zero in on some target groups in the Northeast since the Northeast is key to a McGovern victory. Obviously, the Catholics, certain labor groups, the Polish community and perhaps the Jewish community, are all targets. The problem here is that we have no specific recommendations on how the President personally handles corraling these voters and we will have to move to a plan on this.

PJB agrees - as where discuss

- 9. Bryce Harlow cautions on overexposure which I feel can also be a problem for us. It is his contention that virtually every appearance is a national event due to television. Again, this weighs into the structure of any given day and what events we do that are timed to make the evening news versus evening -type events. A key question here is at what point do we saturate and become overexposed? The other question would be at what point does McGovern become overexposed or is it impossible for him to become overexposed? To what extent remaining fairly unknown is McGovern helped?

1 a day

- 10. The campaign should obviously take the President to each region and probably to all of our key States. A mix must be developed for the activity so as to start off in the early campaign period by utilizing some nonpolitical event opportunities in order to get into key locations.

again Parker complete

C. GENERAL THOUGHTS ON STRATEGY, ISSUES, TIMING AND POINTS OF ATTACK

1. Realizing the credibility and wisdom in playing off our strong suit of foreign policy, I still see a need (as do several others) to engineer a play for the domestic area. There is absolutely no reason to let McGovern force us early on into a completely defense posture vis-a-vis domestic affairs. Perhaps the whole key to our domestic affairs attack is our pleading the case for getting the economy in order and stressing the merits of the President's economic policy and his courage in moving into his reordering of the economy. We can tie directly to what McGovern's policies would do to economic stability and taxation and make our charge about the "McGovern Market."
2. I like Rumsfeld's idea that we find ways to contrast Presidential actions with McGovern's rhetoric. The question becomes, "How?" We need to get some specifics here and it should be part of the follow-up to this memorandum.
3. I made a point in my original memorandum, and Buchanan made the same point (others alluded to it) of the critical timing in terms of launching our various attacks. We must make certain that by the middle of October we have some initiative left. I favor putting a lot of stock in our ability to react quickly enough to issue charges so as to have the public feel that we are actually on the offensive side and that it is McGovern who is trying to defend. As I stated before, this has got to tie in to Pete Dailey's operation, as well as with those who are monitoring the issues for you.
4. Safire makes the point about picking a villain to attack. This is the same concept that Connally expressed to the senior staff at Blair House about attacking straw enemies. We should take the straw enemies such as the bureaucracy, big spenders, perhaps Congress (I'm not sure on Congress), drug pushers, the abortionists, and others and start building them as giant enemies to the general public now. We can demagogue these enemies through our surrogates in order to insure that when the President takes them on in the heat of the campaign they represent more of a threat to our constituency than they do presently.

FU

Sears agrees -
? a day

Developing -
2 moral
systems

6.

5. Although others did not mention it specifically, I want to re-emphasize my point that we keep the debate on issues on the broadest possible range. A one-issue campaign such as law and order was in 1970 should be avoided since it does not play to our advantage. Credibility is the real danger here. The exception as stated before would be a foreign policy crisis.

How?

6. Virtually everyone is on ^{to} the "credibility or trust" attack which is expected. Everything we do beginning now should build credibility. We should have a credibility desk, people who are ginning up examples of how credible this Administration has been. We should put out front a President and an Administration that has done everything possible within our bounds. For what we have not succeeded on, we should blame Congress, the bureaucracy and people who would undermine what is in the best interests of the country. All the surrogates, in particular the Convention apparatus, our advertising, other world leaders, whatever we have should be used to build the President's credibility.

SUGGESTED FOLLOW-UP POINTS

1. Between the two Conventions, the case between the Democratic platform and the Democrats' performance in Congress should be exploited. A plan should be developed by the Congressional Liaison Staff in conjunction with the Domestic Council Staff detailing activities designed to illustrate Congress' poor performance. The activity should be designed for the period between the Conventions and should assume that there will be very little Presidential time available for his participation.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

MacGREGOR SHOULD GET THE ACTION _____

MacGREGOR AND EHRLICHMAN TO GET THE ACTION _____

HALDEMAN MEMORANDUM _____

PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM _____

2. The Domestic Council should be asked to come up with domestic related events during the period between the Conventions. These activities again should be ones which can be handled by people other than the President, as well as perhaps a couple of good recommendations for Presidential activity. These activities should concentrate on special voter bloc efforts, as well as key domestic efforts - in particular, taxation.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

DRAFT MEMO FOR HRH TO SEND EHRLICHMAN _____

SHOULD BE PRESIDENTIAL MEMO TO EHRLICHMAN _____

3. Ken Cole's memorandum states that the President "needs to rearticulate publicly his domestic philosophy - what he stands for - what he is for and against domestically." He states a little later, "...he needs to state his goals for the nation domestically and how we are going to get there." I am not sure that the President knows what his domestic philosophy is. It seems to me that we should have a paper drafted by the Domestic Council, in particular, by Ehrlichman or Cole, which does state what our domestic philosophy is at this time.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

OTHER _____

- 4. It is suggested that perhaps the President consider a trip to Midway if all the indicators are right during the post-Democratic pre-Republican Conventions. The idea would be to dramatize troop cuts and meet with President Thieu.

CHECK IDEA WITH KISSINGER _____

DROP IDEA _____

OTHER _____

*No!
Avoid raising
✓*

- 5. Colson has recommended that the President be in Washington between Conventions and do one or two highly visible domestic events, perhaps a veto or calling in some food chain retailers.

HAVE COLSON DEVELOP SPECIFIC PROPOSALS _____

DROP _____

- 6. Ken Clawson has recommended that in the post-Convention period the President spend a week to ten days personally meeting with key national, regional, and local Party officials to give them marching orders. He feels it should be kept a closed affair and that we should let the press speculate. Should this idea be checked out with other political types?

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

CHECK MITCHELL FIRST _____

*Camp
keep off
in sep*

- 7. Buchanan and Haig both make the point, as well as Chapin, that we should not shoot every one of our cannons at once. We need to dribble out our material so that McGovern is kept on the defensive. Who is in charge of developing the release schedule for the issue material? Is there any action which should be taken on this front or is it under control?

COMMENT: _____

*agree -
Buchanan
level.*

- 8. Rumsfeld says we should enhance the President's advantage of incumbency by finding ways to contrast his Presidential actions with the opponent's rhetoric. I would like to ask Rumsfeld for some specific ways of doing this - examples or techniques of how he would go about it.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

Good

9. Clawson raises a point which many others mention in terms of the problem of the economy and unemployment figures. He says historically the Democrats lived from these issues. He proposes creating an almost separate, well-staffed, well-financed internal group whose job would be to solely create an image of economic well-being in the country. He goes on to advocate a counterattack mechanism on the economy to be headed by Colson in collaboration with Mitchell. Should we put this together? Under Colson?

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

COLSON SHOULD CHECK MITCHELL _____

COLSON SHOULD COORDINATE WITH SHULTZ _____

DROP IT _____

10. Buchanan in his original memorandum on the McGovern attack, as well as Ray Price, suggested we nail McGovern early on his radicalism. I assume that you and the Attorney General are signing off on the action memorandum which Buchanan sent in.

YES _____ NO _____ OTHER _____

11. Colson's memorandum had several specific items regarding things that should be hit in the domestic area and action that the President could take or meetings which could be held, etc. It was his May 17th memorandum which was an addendum to the memorandum which I am addressing myself to. I assume that you will act independently on that memorandum.

YES _____ NO _____

12. Do you agree that we should set up some villains -- bureaucracy, big spenders, abortionists, and perhaps a couple of others and start building them as straw enemies now? We can work up speech material and other facts which the surrogates can start cranking into their talks.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

13. In regard to the credibility and trust issue, do you concur that our surrogates, our Convention apparatus, and everyone should be mobilized in order to plug continually the credibility of the President?

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

HAVE BUCHANAN DEVELOP SPECIFICS THAT CAN ACT AS SPEECH INSERTS _____

HAVE PRICE AND SPEECH WRITERS DEVELOP SPECIFICS _____

- 14. Clawson feels that with the media our strategy must be to discredit and to spotlight the unworkability of almost everything McGovern proposes. The Administration officials must ask publicly the hard questions since the media will not. Should we draft for our surrogates a series of questions which they can start asking about McGovern currently? We can update and move it along as the campaign escalates. Our first step would be to do questions which can be asked prior to the Democratic Convention.

*agree -
today*

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

HAVE BUCHANAN DO IT _____

BUCHANAN SHOULD DO IT AND MITCHELL SHOULD APPROVE _____

OTHER _____

- 15. Colson advocates our contriving adverse polls to let the American people know that this election is a real test and that Nixon does not have it won. He feels we need to clearly find a way to scare the hell out of people at the prospect of McGovern's candidacy. He also wants to start a "real hatchet operation".

Should Colson go ahead with this?:

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

WITH MITCHELL'S APPROVAL ONLY _____

OTHER _____

June 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
SUBJECT: Response to HRH June 12 Memo

1. What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?

ANSWER

- Continue non-political approach
- Schedule 3 or 4 major announcements or actions which serve to remind public of President Nixon's achievements in office.

Example:

- Tricia to China
- Speech on occasion of passage of SALT
- ? - Trip to Midway (maybe post-Convention)

*Magnanimous
brings him
to us + not as
free to criticize
d Price
not callies.
dcl*

- First week after Democratic Convention, offer their candidate full briefing. Try to set it for second week.
- One or two half day trips to key states, i.e. Ohio Armstrong Museum. Make it good positive crowd event.
- Remain every bit the President.
- A sign of toughness on the war might be most appropriate. Would drive the libs crazy and solidify some of the Democratic support on our side.

Wh?

- If a Vice Presidential change is made it should be structured, if this is possible, so the least amount of political brutality is expended upon. A sloppy move here no matter how well planned will have serious consequences.

2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican Convention to the election?

ANSWER

- He should move into and out of the Convention in a way which helps to keep him on the highest Presidential level. The key is not to come off our present high until absolutely necessary. The Convention should be proclaiming their great President. He should be aloof from the political hog wash. He should avoid, as of now, everything except his visionary and emotional acceptance speech appearance, (unless he has to participate in a Vice Presidential change-- and if that is necessary maybe it can be done without his appearing before the Convention).

good

- After the Convention he should fight the tendency to go right to California. Proceed directly from Florida to Washington. Lock in a couple of events the week after the Convention which only the President can handle and that sets him apart from the Democratic candidate.

- In the second week of September, go to California, hold the seminar and make the kick-off speech.
- Next return to Washington making one or two stops for massive public events en route home.
- Otherwise do no politicking until the last week in September or the first of October. Then let him break loose.

But is P. best at "campaigning"?

- The President will want to campaign hard and should.

- The obvious which everyone will say is, the President should maintain his Presidential posture - but that does not mean he can't swing hard and be his toughest self.

A. When should he start campaigning?

- All out campaigning shouldn't start until, at the earliest, the last week of September. Jeb says the Surrogates will start on Labor Day.

B. How much travel should he do? Where should he go?

- This really depends on the polls. I would envision his wanting to hit at an absolute minimum each of the four regions once. Our current key state list would probably be the most logical list of locations. Where he goes in those states will have to depend on our polling data.

- Do polls answer this?

C. What type of activities should he engage in?

- This is probably the most important question.

?
 - Only the President can have "Presidential press conferences" so maybe that is a once a week or once every other week activity.

may

- Some big, massive, public demonstrations or rallies are necessary. A Chicago or Atlanta parade, the Astrodome, and an Upstate New York rally.

- Television will be key. Maybe he does regional talks on a network we put together. This would be in addition to one or two national T. V. talks.

Price agree?

Airport rallies should be kept to a minimum. Otherwise they will dominate, and they are degrading to the President.

- Anytime possible, the President should return to overnight in the White House.

- His schedule when in Washington should include items only the President can do-- and relate to issues or news we want to hypo.

Exs'

✓ - Quadriad or CCEP^I meetings

✓ - Cabinet meeting on a key subject

- NSC - maybe on a pending crisis situation
- An emergency meeting with another head of state - i. e. Heath, Pompidou, Brandt, or Golda.

Special Note: As with 1968-- except even more so-- we should strictly limit his activity putting time against only what counts. Figure our news cycles-- have one national event per day and keep any other activity regional oriented. In addition we should give him plenty of time to think and realize that he is four years older than 1968.

3. Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.

ANSWER

There are three general points.

- We should not launch all of our issue-attack rockets too early in the campaign. A plan should be developed which in the public's mind keeps us in what is interpreted as an offensive position. This will mean a great deal of flexibility and an ability to almost instantly react (which Pete Daily plans in the T. V. area).

Our tendency is to use the sledge hammer approach and we should have a calculated release of issue positions and attack so that halfway through October we still have something new to present the people and hit McGovern on.

- We should keep the debate on issues (if the war is not over) on the broadest range possible. A one issue campaign such as law and order became in 1970 should be avoided. It does not play to our advantage. The exception would be a foreign policy crisis.
- The one issue which everything we do and say (beginning now) should stress is the credibility of President Nixon. Our surrogates, the dialogue in the convention, our

of "non
pol"
trips in
U.S.

printed materials -- everything should build credibility.
Over and over in different ways the McGovern documentary
infers and once again directly states, "we need a
President we can believe in." The President has
credibility now. We need to keep it and build on it--
once it starts to collapse under fire it will be very
difficult to recover.

- Assuming the candidate will be McGovern, I am
for third party persons or organizations attacking him
lightly now and heavily the day the Democratic
Convention ends. He should be hit not only on issues
but also on his credibility, honesty and lack of experience
and understanding of the institution of the Presidency.
There is no reason to let the Honest George image
keep floating.

4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be
and how we should meet it.

ANSWER

The Attack on the President

Reiter Give him credit for the Summits and say the Hallmark
for the Nixon Presidency has been made. Now we must
move on.

- Say the war must end -- if it is about to end say it
hasn't been soon enough. Over promise- Nixon did
in 1968.
- Nixonomics haven't worked.
- Unemployment up- with analogies to Hoover. Scare people.
- Nixon is a divisive President. He wins by dividing
Americans. The people want to be brought together.
We must unite and rededicate ourselves.
- Crime has gone up.

- The most isolated President. Makes decisions alone, doesn't consult advisors. Away from the White House constantly -- no consultation with Congress.
- And over and over again, bang Nixon's credibility. Bring up big business, ITT, the Court, his brother Don, anything that helps to point negatives.

Response to the attack

- ✓ - The President never takes on McGovern by name or directly. If he does it should be during the last days of the campaign crunch and only if necessary.
- The Vice President and Surrogates can bang around McGovern striking hard on the issues and his qualifications.
- Prominent conservatives Democrats who are popular in key states should be signed up under the table now by Mitchell. We can use them in the State where they're popular just at the right time. But- get them tied up today and before McGovern moves right.
- The President should talk about what he has done, that it is only the beginning of the beginning and where he is headed. Aloof and above reproach. As long as it works - under attack - he should turn the other cheek, and hold off any heavy attack by himself until mid-October.
- The best Presidential attack is in stressing what he has done. Get the public to decide he's done a tremendous amount while McGovern yells not enough.
- I am not sure on the precise attack which should be made on McGovern. Just keep him to the left if it means using some of our issue material and equity early. (Higby has given me Buchanan's memo which looks like it outlines the basis for the McGovern attack.) We must make sure our attack does not come too heavy handed, with too much PR and build him into a martyr.

- The best point of attack now is the Convention arena. Walkouts, platform donnybrooks, anything which splits and disunites should be undertaken - on a very sophisticated level. (Jeb says this is being done - so good!)

What the opposition strategy will be and how we should meet it.

NOTE: Assuming McGovern or Kennedy - perhaps even a combination, we must realize they are what we are in spades. They are organized, have good supporting people, great merchandising talent behind them, the "Kennedy appeal," an understanding of the power and potentials an incumbent President has at Command, dedicated workers, a Government in exile, and so on. Most important neither are the President-nor are they their own man. Neither has the leadership capabilities or intellect of the President. But, we must recognize they have much going for themselves.

- The first most important strategy for the opposition out of the Convention must be to unite the Party. I would expect the Presidential candidate to either set up his own San Clemente and bring in the leader of his party from the key states, etc., or to go on a grand tour of the country holding private unity meetings and striking deals.

Response:

State by state McGovern should be hit by sign-carrying mothers (on abortion, drugs), laborers (\$1000 to everyone), middle class suburban types etc. Put a truth squad with him state by state. Never let him up for air from the time he leaves the convention.

- What are the odds that McGovern or his Vice President (if Kennedy) could be dispatched on a world trip for the period of the Republican Convention? Would Chou see him, Brezhnev, Golda, Heath, Pompidou?

Wain ? |

Response:

Watch for this to happen in some form - and let other governments know confidentially our displeasure at any such meetings.

- Summit of the Cities. Meeting of big Democratic wheels - Mayors, City Council types, etc., to discuss the urban and suburban problems and the Democratic/McGovern solutions. A united Democratic front - good media attention and forces the President into highlighting his domestic program. We would be very much on the defensive.

Response:

A PR gimmick. Use a special Vice President and Cabinet task force as the counter and denounce the effort as a stunt early in its planning.

- Major address to an evening session of Congress by the Democratic challenger. Attack the way the President has handled Congress, his inability to work with Congress, the lack of consultation regarding the war. (This is a good idea - for them!)

Reps in cong scope. →

Response:

Then send the Vice President? Demand equal time?

- The Liberals will launch a personal attack - they always do (like the right wing).

Response:

Good

Early on our surrogates - everyone - should say - I wonder when McGovern will sink to the personal attack. It is inevitable so we should mention it early - in a joking way.

- *→* As the opposition I would love to see Nixon jump on a car, throw some V's, make a massive error, get mad, have his friend Mitchell or Bebe in trouble.

Response:

Pray all is o.k.

- Television is paramount. It is the single most important element in the McGovern strategy. It won them California. Television has made McGovern what he is. The workers, the kids, the "mystique of the Kennedys" - to accomplish all this T. V. has been the key.

We must assume crowds, events - everything will be staged effectively for television. It has got to be their feeling that the right television campaign keyed on a regional, or state by state basis can defeat the President.

Via television they will show:

- A Presidential candidate who listens to the public - understands their problems, is sympathetic.
- People, all kinds, black, white, Mexican American, you name it, rallying around one man. The one man who really can "bring us together again" and unite the nation.
- They will strike out for the little man. The Bobby Kennedy and George Wallace thrust. The fight against big government. The impersonalism of the Fed. As they do this Nixon will become the symbol of bigness and what is wrong.
- Issues will be fought on the emotional level and they will avoid lengthy explanations and specifics. It will be good solid T. V. Watch for their own Archie Bunker approach - after all, Liberals created Archie and look at the power Archie has with that segment now. Carroll O'Connor doing McGovern commercials is not an impossibility.

Response:

Pete Daily has this in hand. However, I think we should look very seriously at how we would run a T. V. campaign against the President. This exercise on our part might give us some specific thoughts.

- Mobilization of the key liberal lobbying forces will be a source of much irritation for us. Everyone from Common Cause to the garment unions to Operation Bread Basket will be running their own campaign against the President. I would suspect a McGovern umbrella strategy which will coordinate all of these groups. They will point Nixon as anti-humanitarian, against minorities, etc. etc.

Response:

Our best strategy is to counter via those lobbying groups who are for us. Or, we should get readings on those groups who will oppose us and assess the threat. Next we should set up front groups playing to the same constituency, using a similar name and launch some back-fires. (You have Common Cause - how about Common Course to prove the nation is headed in the right direction.)

Good

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

JOHN McLAUGHLIN *quib.*

SUBJECT:

The President's Speech
Delivery: Extemporaneous
vs. Prepared Text.

I have your memorandum of June 12, requesting views and analysis on various campaign matters. I regret the delay in responding to this request (I was away) and would ask for still more time to give more thought to these important subjects.

May I take this occasion, however, to register with you a few ideas on why the President, in the concluding days of several of his past campaigns, has "blown his lead." Doubtless, several reasons are entailed here, but one possible factor may have been overlooked, namely, the President's practice of speaking before live audiences extemporaneously.

As a political orator, the President is naturally sensitive to the live audience, even live audience-controlled. This is of course common to orators of all kinds. To galvanize the live audience, the President establishes eye contact and talks directly to the listeners. To establish this forceful contact, he is required to abandon a script and settle for extemporaneous speaking.

Now, the strain of speaking on a variety of fresh subjects extemporaneously is too great, so the President, as campaigner, develops a prepared text which he uses repeatedly - a set speech. The speech is adjusted at the beginning and the end to accommodate regional situations, with the body held intact serving as the campaign formula presentation.

The principal shortcoming of the set speech is that the press grows weary of it. Soon the press grows increasingly reluctant to give space to what the President has said so often before. The consequence of this is that exposure of the candidate slackens as the election day grows closer and momentum is lost.

My suggestion is simple: That the President's speeches during the campaign be read. These speeches should be written with an eye to

Exhibit

*PJB
Honey agrees
Honey agrees*

opening issues at certain times in the campaign, building to climax, in such a way that the closer the election day comes, the more politically powerful the issues raised. Much of this could be programmed early, if the set speech concept were dropped.

For the President to be willing to drop the set speech concept, he would have to forsake his belief that audiences can be electrified only by no-script deliveries. Live audiences can indeed be galvanized by read speeches. The President indeed himself has demonstrated that he can read a speech with passion and activate an audience. But he appears reluctant to do so. I have in mind specifically Billy Graham at the Charlotte testimonial to him. His speech on that occasion was delivered with great flourish and cadence, but also from beginning to end it was read. The President, on the other hand, chose on that occasion not to read his speech and fought his way through a fifteen-minute address, of considerable substance and heart, but one which must have drained his energies. Clearly, that type of oratory cannot be maintained throughout a campaign if one hopes to raise fresh subjects at strategic times.

Ironically, the President is driven to the psychology and rigor of a set speech because of his determination to move the live audience. The price he pays for this effect is the relentless and somewhat mechanical use of the set speech, leading to the loss of the mass audience, the loss of climax and momentum, and abets the "blowing of his lead." The other candidate, on the other hand, uses timely scripted materials, carefully worked, captures the press, and peaks his campaign.

In sum, reading a speech has built-in values: 1) It can present issues on fresh subjects to cultivate the press and to peak the campaign. 2) It takes the strain off the candidate, permitting him the control that he needs to speak about powerful and sensitive subjects without worrying about accuracy of phrase, detail or statistics.