

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
Contested Materials Collection  
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
20	12	6/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Teeter to Haldeman RE: the 1960 and 1968 presidential campaigns and their relevance to the 1972 election. 4 pgs.
20	12	6/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Hallett to Haldeman RE: previous presidential elections involving RN. 5 pgs.
20	12	6/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Khachigian to Haldeman RE: Buchanan's response to a memorandum from Haldeman. 1 pg.
20	12	6/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Khachigian to Buchanan RE: the political relevance of the 1960 and 1968 campaigns. Graphs of election trends attached. 7 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
20	12	6/19/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Cole to Haldeman RE: RN's posture during the election and general campaign strategies. Handwritten notes added by Haldeman. 4 pgs.
20	12	6/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Timmons to Haldeman RE: campaign issues and strategies. 3 pgs.
20	12	6/20/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haig to Haldeman RE: a response to Haldeman's previous memo, including advice on presidential posture and general campaign strategies. 4 pgs.
20	12	6/14/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Chapin to Haldeman RE: detailed advice on RN's behavior during the 1972 campaign and general campaign strategies, including the role of television and key issues. 10 pgs.
20	12	6/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Ziegler to Haldeman RE: strategies for the 1972 campaign. 7 pgs.

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20	12	6/15/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Report	From Casper Weinberger to Haldeman RE: RN's role in the 1972 election. 4 pgs.
20	12	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Letter	From Harlow to Haldeman RE: thoughts on the campaign. 4 pgs.

Committee  
for the Re-election  
of the President

1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 333-0920

June 29, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER  
SUBJECT: 1960 and 1968 Elections

This memorandum is in reply to your request for a comparison of the 1960 and 1968 campaigns and of the changes that occurred in the survey data during the two campaigns. It is based on an analysis of public polls (largely Gallup), the University of Michigan Survey Research Center's After-Election Studies, individual Market-Opinion statewide polls and my observations of the 1968 campaign. I do not have the campaign polling for either 1960 or 1968, and I was not actively involved in the 1960 campaign.

The following campaign polls<sup>1/</sup> taken during 1960 and 1968 indicate great differences between the two races:

<u>Date</u> (1960)	<u>Nixon</u>	<u>Kennedy</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
March	47%	47%	5%
June	48	46	5
Late Sept.	47	46	7
Early Oct.	45	49	6
November	48	49	3

<u>Date</u> (1968)	<u>Nixon</u>	<u>Humphrey</u>	<u>Wallace</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
April	43%	34%	9%	14%
Early May	40	36	14	10
Late May	36	42	14	8
Early June	37	42	14	7
Early Sept.	43	31	19	7
Late Sept.	44	29	20	7
Early Oct.	43	31	20	6
Late Oct.	44	36	15	6
November	42	40	14	4

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<sup>1/</sup> It was impossible to obtain demographic breakdowns of the Gallup vote for 1960 in the time allotted for this paper. We are, however, making arrangements to get this information.

The 1960 election was neck and neck throughout the campaign. The undecided vote was considerably less in 1960 than in 1968. The undecided vote only increased from 5% to 7% following the initial Nixon-Kennedy debates, at which time Kennedy took the lead and eventually won the election.

In April of 1968 the undecided vote was high with 14% of the voters unable to make a choice. Nixon held a substantial early lead until the North Vietnamese agreed to Paris as a negotiating site. Then Humphrey surged ahead in the polls and maintained his lead until after the conventions. Later, the Humphrey lead declined and there was a corresponding increase in the Wallace strength. Apparently, the disorder at the convention caused a swing to Wallace away from traditional Democratic vote. In the closing days of the campaign the Humphrey vote greatly increased. According to Gallup, Humphrey's dramatic gains in the last days of the campaign resulted from a decline of the Wallace strength in northern states returning to their traditional Democratic vote.

It is significant to note that the Nixon strength remained fairly constant between 42% to 48% after the convention in both years. Very little switching seemed to occur to and from Nixon.

There are several significant differences between 1960 and 1968 which would make it unwise to conclude the 1960 Nixon campaign was more effective than the 1968 campaign:

1. The 1960 election was a two-way race and the 1968 election was a three-way race. The three-way race tended to delay the final decision and increase switching simply because of more choices presented to the voter. This is a characteristic of all elections with more than two candidates and we have observed this in primary elections and in Canada. Also, this was the first time that most American voters were confronted with such a situation and Wallace's candidacy caused them to be ambivalent in their choice. In order to vote for Wallace they had to break lifelong voting traditions. This explains why more older voters returned to the Democratic column than younger voters.
2. The Catholic issue was very important in 1960 and not in 1968. It caused a large number of voters to make up their minds on that basis as soon as Kennedy was nominated.
3. Another major difference is the 1968 Democratic convention which divided the Democratic party as compared to a relatively united party in 1960. Kennedy had the support of an active and united party in 1960, while Humphrey had to contend with major splits on both left and right with McCarthy and Wallace in 1968.
4. Kennedy was also a clearly more attractive and popular personality in a time when the electorate was looking for a young and dynamic leader. He also had the advantage of representing change and running against an incumbent administration, while Humphrey had the problem of having to separate himself from a very unpopular

administration of which he was a key part. Kennedy could blame the Eisenhower/Nixon administration for all the problems of the time; but, Nixon, on the other hand, was not a beneficiary of Eisenhower's personal appeal and Eisenhower got credit for all the successes of his administration.

5. The issue structure was very different in 1960 and 1968 in terms of the general attitude of the country and the specific areas of concern. The general attitude of the country was relatively positive, optimistic, and hopeful in 1960, but extremely negative and without hope in 1968. In 1960 the country was at peace, the economy was in relatively good shape, the race, crime, drug problems had not become critical and there was no major environmental/consumer issue. In 1968, however, the electorate was frustrated over the war, personally feeling the effects of inflation, frightened over the domestic unrest, and worrying about the environment. The fact that there were more serious problems in 1968 and that each of these were becoming worse combined to give the country a very negative pessimistic attitude.

There are several reasons why I believe it would also be unwise to conclude that 1972 is similar to either 1960 or 1968. First, and most important, is that each election is to a large degree unique in terms of the perception of the candidates, the general attitude of the electorate, and the specific issues. Therefore, the 1972 election with the President running as an incumbent against McGovern will not be particularly comparable to 1960 or 1968. In fact, I suspect it may be more comparable to 1956 than 1960 or 1968. The reason for this is the incumbency. In 1956, the last time an incumbent was running for re-election, voters decided how they would vote earlier than any election in recent time. 76% of those who voted had decided how they were going to vote by the week after the convention. Studies by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan have demonstrated that in both 1960 and 1968 the percentage deciding how to vote immediately after the convention dwindled. George Gallup wrote in 1960 that the only time there was a major shift in sentiment during 1948, 1952, or 1956 came as a result of a dramatic international event. I believe we are at such a stage now, and that most people will have made up their minds how to vote by the time of the Republican convention unless there is an international event to change their minds.

There is one recurring problem for the President which is evident throughout all of this data. We have a very difficult time moving the committed vote over 50%. The job seems to become increasingly more difficult the closer we come to the election because of the declining number of voters who are undecided. This suggests that we should be actively trying to increase the President's committed vote in the next 30 to 45 days. Once voters actually decide they are going to vote for a candidate, most of them stay committed.

Every point we can gain now will come much easier than those we have to get in the Fall. This would have to be done largely through the President's policies, programs, statements, surrogates and not through the campaign. I do not think we should do anything to lengthen the period of the actual political campaign. The shorter the actual campaign, the better for us.

Overall, we would suggest that consideration be given to increasing Presidential appearances during the next 45 days and also beginning the surrogate program earlier than originally planned.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: DOUGLAS HALLETT   
SUBJECT: Your Memo of June 27.

Your supposition that "during the 1960 campaign there was almost no change in the polls, while in 1968 there was a substantial decline during the campaign" is incorrect. In fact, just the reverse is true. In 1960, the President's base of support fluctuated more than it did in 1968 (Harris' figures reflect this better than Gallup's, but since Harris was working for Kennedy in 1960 and complete figures are unavailable, at least to me, I have used Gallup figures in the attached chart). He came out of the conventions with 50 percent support -- his first lead over Kennedy since January, declined to 47 percent with the TV debates, and rose again at the end of the campaign with Eisenhower's intervention and the Republican TV blitz. Meanwhile, except for the last two weeks or so, Kennedy was taking most of the undecided voters as they made up their minds about the election. In contrast, in 1968, the President's base of support was remarkably stable, holding around 43 percent throughout the fall. What happened in 1968 was that the remaining 57 percent of the electorate gradually coalesced behind Humphrey -- the Wallace vote declined and the undecideds moved into the Democratic camp. Whereas in 1960 the President's actions, both effective -- the TV blitz -- and ineffective -- the TV debates, had a substantial impact on the electorate, in 1968 the President's actions hardly affected his base of support at all. He might as well have not campaigned.

In fact, he really didn't campaign in 1968. From the time of the convention forward, the Nixon campaign was immobilized, continuing with the same platitudinous, wishy-washiness which had been appropriate -- and given the situation -- effective during the preconvention period. The President wandered lazily across the country. The TV-media campaign was as dull as dishwater. The radio speeches, as

usual, were vacuous. Humphrey, in contrast, recovered his momentum with the Salt Lake City speech on September 30, Harry Trumaned across the country, had better media programming when he could finally afford it, and replied extremely effectively to the President's attempt to spur his campaign forward in the final weeks; i. e. the "security gap" speech and Humphrey's same-day, magnificent, reply. Had the campaign continued another two days, Humphrey would have surely captured the White House.

Now, the conclusion from all this is not that the 1960 campaign was better designed than the 1968 effort. The 50-state, rally-to-rally, approach wasted the President's energies, spoiled him for the debates, deprived him of the advantages that should have been his with the Vice-Presidency (advantages which should have been clear to the most obtuse observer given the way the polls shot up after his Guildhall, Soviet and steel strike activities in the pre-1960 period -- why more of this was not done in early 1960 and why Kennedy was allowed to dominate the public's attention, and thus the polls, in the first six months of 1960 is beyond me) and ignored the opportunity for him to appear non-political, issue-oriented, even reflective with effective media programming and better use of his office. It was, after all, only with the beginning of the taking advantage of his office and prestige, with the public blessings of Eisenhower and the TV programming at the end, that the President began to gain. Before that, he was leaving the undecided, swing voters to Kennedy and actually losing ground within his own base. Had the President used the imaginative media ideas which were thought up for 1960, had he paused to give decent speeches, and had he not wasted his energy and his prestige on constant campaigning, he would have been much better off. Indeed, he would have probably won.

Nor do I want to imply that the 1968 campaign was poorly planned. The tone of what little I have seen of your 1967 memorandum on the importance of the tube, the columnists, and the other agents through which a candidate is mediated to the public was right on target. So was the de-emphasis of rallies and the institution of thoughtful speeches, etc. The failure in 1968 was one of execution, not design. The mechanisms through which the President was to be projected to the public were well-thought out; only the product was missing. The President had nothing to say; there were no issues; the radio speeches were generally banal and -- being radio speeches and not visual events -- poorly designed to attract attention from either the media or the public. The 1960 campaign was poorly

designed, but it was salvaged at the end by the President's happening on to good execution of what should have been his design all along; the 1968 campaign was extremely well designed, but miserably carried out, both by the President and the people around him.

What is the lesson for 1972? It is not that the President should blitz the country as he did in 1960 to avoid the complacency which almost led to Humphrey's victory in 1968. On the other hand, it is also not that he should remain above and beyond the battle -- remain Presidential is the way Ray Price would put it -- as he did in 1968. The first approach would rally the opposition in its general contempt for Nixon, the campaigner, and it would deprive him of the advantages which almost pulled it out for him in 1960 and which, as President and not just Eisenhower's Vice President, he has in even greater degree now. The second approach, in turn, would also deprive him of his advantages of access to public attention -- it would leave him victimized by whatever McGovern could manage to do, leave him vulnerable to complacency among his electorate, and fail to take advantage of 1972's unique opportunity to reach out to ethnics, Catholics, and others who could form, at last, a new Republican majority.

What is needed is a campaign approach which combines the dynamism of the 1960 campaign, particularly in the format of the closing days, with the strategy of 1968 magnified to take advantage of the President's incumbency. The President should be on center stage, but he should be on center stage as President. He should be holding down food prices, fighting inflation, taking after a big corporation or two, working on tax reform, solving pollution problems, bleeding a bit for the poor, and -- although not as importantly since it has already been accomplished P. R. wise -- bringing about a new structure of peace -- and he should be doing all these things visibly, actively and dramatically. This will involve some travel and some speechmaking, but the travel and the speechmaking should appear non-political and very substantive. Likewise, with the media operation -- our ads should be like news clips and any Presidential appearances made should be information, not rhetoric, oriented. Political rally appearances made should be few and far between -- and the rallies should be so massive that it can be claimed they evidence popular, not just Republican, support for the President. I have already made detailed suggestions and I will not repeat them here.

I suspect, from my rather distant knowledge of the President, that he is beginning to get battle-hungry -- the sight of George McGovern galavanting around the country is becoming too much to resist. He should continue to resist. Hard-charging was not what helped the President at the end of the 1960 campaign; it was not the failure to hard-charge which hurt him in 1968. And, as President, as the 1970 campaign demonstrated, hard-charging can hurt him even more than it did in the beginning of the 1960 campaign and would have had he undertaken it in 1968. As President, we have scores of ways to answer McGovern's charges without involving the President in direct confrontation. If McGovern charges we haven't done anything domestically, we can blast the Congress for inaction on our domestic program. If McGovern charges us with being in bed with business, we can sick the Anti-Trust Division and EPA on a few corporations. If McGovern charges us with a failure to care about the environment, we can print up a few thousand more leaflets to be passed out at national parks or do another hundred thousand mailing at government expense. Hard-charging wasn't beneficial in the past; with the substitute tools cited above it is clearly even less beneficial with the President now in the White House.

The opposite strategy to a hard-charge campaign is not -- and should not be taken as -- doing nothing. McGovern can't win this election and I'm not even sure this time the President can lose it. But if he can lose it -- assuming a rejection of the strident 1970 approach -- the only way he can do so is by being complacent, by failing to take advantage of his governmental tools, and by failing to reflect a sense of dynamism, motion and anti-status-quoism, all of which will turn off those Northern upper-middle class suburbanites and urban ethnics who can either give the election to McGovern or give a new majority to the President. If the President wants to go on the offensive, that is good. But let him go on the offensive with the tools and prestige of his office, not the techniques and tricks of a politician, let him go on the offensive against thirty years of liberal Democratic statism at home and abroad, not against George McGovern, and let him go on the offensive for a new sense of liberty and human possibility, not for a partisan Republican or even "ideological majority" election victory. There is a difference, and it is a difference which has cost the President public recognition of what he has accomplished so far, but which can still be turned to our advantage in the election campaign now facing us.

GALLUP POLL 1960

	<u>Nixon</u>	<u>Kennedy</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
Early June	48	52	
Late June	48	52	
July (After Convention)	50	44	6
August	47	47	6
September	47	48	5
October	48	48	4
November 6	48	49	3

GALLUP POLL 1968

	<u>Nixon</u>	<u>Humphrey</u>	<u>Wallace</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
June	35	40	16	9
July	40	38	16	6
August	45	29	18	8
September 3-7	43	31	19	7
September 20-22	43	28	21	8
September 27-30	44	29	20	7
October 3-12	43	31	20	6
October 17-21	44	36	15	5
November 1-2	42	40	14	4

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 29, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

FROM: KENNETH L. KHACHIGIAN 

You asked Mr. Buchanan to prepare an analysis of the 1960 and 1968 campaigns in terms of the changes in the polls and surveys. Pat asked for my thoughts on this. Because Pat was tied up with his efforts on the briefing book, he asked that I go ahead and send you my memorandum as an interim report, though not one which necessarily reflects his views.

Pat indicated that he will respond to the request as soon as he is able.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN  
FROM: KENNETH L. KHACHIGIAN   
SUBJECT: POLLS AND THE 1960, 1968 CAMPAIGNS

Mr. Haldeman is correct in his reading of the polls in 1960 versus those in 1968. (See attached graphs) In 1960, between June and November, the Gallup poll was virtually unchanged. RN had in November the same percentage he had in June, and JFK had only slightly more in June than he did in November. In 1968, the 16 point spread we had in August went down to the two point spread which Gallup gave us in November. It should be noted that the Harris Poll in August, 1968, taken about the same time as the Gallup, showed only a six point lead for RN over HHH compared to the larger Gallup spread.

In 1960, RN only had the lead once during the campaign, and this was immediately following the Republican National Convention -- after which he jumped 6 points over JFK. In 1968, as we all remember, the lead continued to dwindle with Humphrey taking votes right out of the hide of George Wallace and out of the undecided voter. From the polls, it is apparent that RN had a solid bloc of votes that stayed with him throughout the year while HHH steadily picked up from the switches and undecideds.

What does this all mean?

One interpretation is that RN gets a solid bloc of voters which lean to him, and this bloc is very difficult to enlarge as well as very difficult to diminish. If that is the case, then in a two-man race this year, the election will be fairly close with RN winning by about four percentage points or less. This interpretation, however, is somewhat like a doctrine of predestination, with the assumption that events between June and November will not change things. I'm not willing to accept that interpretation totally since for the first time RN will be running as an incumbent President and will be much more in command of the determining events.

The other way to interpret these phenomena, however, is in terms of the manner in which the campaign is conducted, and I lean towards this interpretation -- especially in a year where we control the levers of government.

In 1960 (and I confess I was still struggling through high school), there were two types of campaigns run -- the JFK style where you start out at virtually full steam and continue at full steam, winning by the sheer force of momentum and the RN style where you slowly build up steam and momentum in order to have the campaign "peak" on election day. I don't subscribe fully to the theory that a candidate can fully "time" his campaign to meet the standards of "game plans." On the contrary, in the heat of the campaign, there is such an intense movement of events as to require a virtually daily requirement to alter strategy -- one of the mistakes I believe we made in 1968 was to get locked in to a broad game plan from which we were unwilling to extricate ourselves until too late.

The 1960 campaign is not easily interpreted along the "game plan" lines because of all the interrupting factors -- RN's knee injury, the debates, etc. Thus, to an extent, the 1960 campaign handled the events as they came.

Moreover, the 1960 campaign was a fairly classic campaign in issues confrontation. I grant that personality played a role -- it always does -- but JFK and RN did battle hammer and tong on a lot of damned important issues. From the outset RN took the case to the country that things were pretty good in America, that there was room to improve things, but that by and large we don't need anyone knocking America around. JFK, of course, took the position that we had to mobilize the country along his suggested lines, and the debate was joined with the issues falling in line with considerable distance between RN and JFK on most of them.

Consequently, in 1960 the voters knew what the choice was -- very little was fuzzed up. Given this set of circumstances, it is not surprising that the polls changed very little. Only minor twists and turns in the campaign, plus some bizarre pieces of bad luck -- the heavy beard in the debates, the arranged release of M. L. King, Jr. by the Kennedys, the theft of votes in Texas and Illinois -- made the difference.

In 1968, we may have overreacted to the criticism that there was not enough planning in the 1960 campaign, and of course the decision was made to pick the direction in which to go and stay on course until the end. Unfortunately, this made us unable to deal sufficiently with the liberation of HHH at the time of his Vietnam speech -- and once he was liberated, a whole new strategy was needed. I will grant that the bombing halt overly distorted the campaign and inured overwhelmingly to the benefit of Hubert. Nevertheless, I do not doubt for a minute that Hubert had the momentum going for him on election day. He was on the move.

The thing about 1968 is that Hubert began beating us to death over -- issues. Medicare, the poor, a good economy, decent jobs -- these were all in the HHH attack plan, and we did not respond until too late. He damn near made it sound like we were the "ins" and they were the "outs." We had the basic issues going for us but used them insufficiently to win the greater margin which we might have.


Having said all this, I must warn against comparisons between 1960 and 1968. The Wallace candidacy made a great deal of difference, I believe. Wallace made it difficult for the lines to form early in the campaign. He was a damned nuisance who clouded things up. HHH figured this out earlier than we did and began playing RN off against Wallace, picking up the pieces as he went along. If Wallace is out of the 1972 campaign, I feel the situation will be much more like 1960 (which, as you know, has been a favorite thesis of mine for some time).

The 1972 campaign will be an important "issues" campaign with two extremely distinctive philosophies battling against each other. We are, I believe, on the right side of the preponderance of these issues, and it will be McGovern who tries to fuzz the issues in favor of personality, trust, and all the other crap. Nonetheless, if we accept the notion that issues will be fairly determinative (and by this I mean four or five big ones -- not revenue sharing or the environment), then broad planning should fall along the lines of drawing the issue differences sharply at the outset of the campaign.

Once the differences have been drawn (and I think they almost already have) the campaign is going to be one -- like 1960 -- of playing that confrontation in such a way as to keep our issues out front, not letting up on our strengths and not playing to our weaknesses. Unlike 1960, we have much more going for us in terms of differences with McGovern; i. e., in terms of what the American public wants. In 1960, there was probably a 50/50 split in terms of what the public wanted. Our task, then, is to keep this advantage by pressing those issues and pressing them in such a way as to keep McGovern away from the weak links which could bring us down.

Thus, if we start in August with a 54% to 46% edge over McGovern, my guess is that we can keep this lead right on through if we don't let the differences slide by through a skilled McGovern campaign. Every two or three days, we should look at how things are going and plan accordingly -- following a basic outline, but not being so blind as to ignore major shifts of opinion once they start to occur. If something works, let's keep using it; if it doesn't work, let's toss it aside and go with something else.


I confess that it is not easy for me to map this out with short time and space constraints, but I think the fundamental points are in here. I caution against too much comparison between 1960 and 1968; the times were different; the circumstances were different; the candidate was different. I opt more for a comparison between 1960 and 1972 and hold the belief that much is to be gained by understanding the basic similarity of conditions. The lesson of 1968 lies in campaign "technique," not in historical analogy. So let's understand what is similar between 1960 and 1972 and learn from what we did wrong in 1968, and I think we are well on the way to four more years of keeping the rascals out.



AP/WIDEWORLD

PERCENT

POST-CONVENTION PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE



	Nixon	Humphrey	Wallace
August 24	40%	34%	17%
November 1-2	42%	40%	12%
November 3	40%	43%	13%

HARRIS POLL


DATES August 24, 1968 November 1-2, 1968 November 3, 1968

POST-CONVENTION PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE

PERCENT

	Nixon	Humphrey	Wallace
August 21	45%	29%	18%
Early Sept.	43%	31%	19%
Late Sept.	43%	28%	21%
Early Oct.	44%	29%	20%
Mid Oct.	43%	31%	20%
October 27	44%	36%	15%
November 4	42%	40%	14%

GALLUP POLL



DATES Aug. 21 (1968) Early Sept. Late Sept. Early October Mid October October 27 Nov. 4

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 19, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

KEN COLE

This is in response to your memorandum of June 12 which requested my views and analysis of the following points:

1. The President's posture between the Conventions.

Most people are "down" on politicians and political campaigning. The longer the President can stay above the battle, the better off he will be. The President should keep being "President" just as long as he possibly can. Therefore, he should continue as usual at least up to the Republican Convention.

During the Convention interlude, the President should be engaged in things that reflect favorably on him - follow-up to the trip to Russia, further efforts at ending the Vietnam War, events to highlight the success of his economic program and his concern for the still unemployed. Additionally, he should make one last effort at urging the Congress to pass remaining legislation proposed by this Administration. This could best be done by a series of meetings with Senate and House Committee Chairmen and/or concerned Committee members. In addition, the President could meet with supportive special interest groups.

Meetings such as these would allow the President the opportunity to demonstrate familiarity with his domestic legislation and to articulate the principles which support his proposals. Each meeting should be followed with a press briefing by John Ehrlichman and, if desirable, the appropriate Cabinet Officer. We could,

*has  
do nothing  
appear*

if planned sufficiently in advance, arrange for network and local TV stories which demonstrate the problem the President is trying to correct and how his solution would work. For instance, on the environmental issue, we could encourage the networks and local TV stations to get film of water pollution which could be utilized in their reports of the President's meeting with Congressional representatives to encourage them to pass his water pollution legislation.

Most importantly, in the Cabinet meeting last Friday we heard the President was eloquent on foreign policy and the balance of international power. He needs to re-articulate publicly his domestic philosophy - what he stands for - what he's for and against domestically. It may be that his acceptance speech at the convention would be the best place, but he needs to set his domestic philosophy before the public, not on a programmatic basis, but in the overall sense he needs to state his goal for the nation domestically and how we are going to get there.

Price?

2. The President's posture from the Republican Convention to the Election.

Here again, the longer he can stay "President" the better off he will be. In this case, whether or not the Congress is in session will have some bearing on what the President is able to do. If the Congress is in session, the President should continue the scenario outlined for the between Conventions period. If it is not in session, then we must find graphic ways for the President to demonstrate the failure of Congress. For instance, he could make trips to problem areas and then kick Congress for allowing a problem to go on because of their failure to pass the legislation the President recommended. These trips should be "non-political".

Probably

In either event, the President should not start political campaigning until, at the earliest, the first of October. If Congress is still in session then, he should be out of Washington only on weekends. This could perhaps be stretched to include one trip during the week, although I think it is important to convey the image of the President being in Washington "running the country" while others are out campaigning.

The President's efforts should be concentrated in key states. He should not try to visit all 50 states, but he might make some regional visits which would include states otherwise missed, for instance the farm states. He should do events which provide for some kind of encounter with the "average man". Generally these should be issue oriented situations. Additionally, he should also do the standard rallies and motorcades, and although many will argue that the McGinnis book discredited the citizen TV Q&A, I think the same kind of thing which was done in 1968 could be utilized again - assuming we can figure out a way to avoid being accused of rigging the panel.

Note  
Way?

3. Thoughts as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.

The President should not attack anyone for anything during the campaign. This should be left to the surrogates. He should at all times be the statesman who has brought peace to the world and economic stability to our country. And, who has applied and intends to continue to apply these same visionary attributes to our domestic problems. The President should articulate only positive things relative to key issue areas and key interest groups.

The surrogates on the other hand should be on the attack beginning with the close of the Democratic Convention. What they should be attacking will, of course, be dependent upon the candidate as each has staked out his own positions. It seems to me though that no matter who the candidate is there are two things which we can challenge regardless. One is the failure of the Congress, and the second is the inability of the Federal Government to produce because of bureaucracy. I don't think we should have any qualms about attacking the Federal establishment, even if it means pointing the finger at ourselves, although I do believe we can be divorced from most of the goings on.

As how  
can we  
attack  
ourselves  
How?

4. The opposition's strategy and what we can do.

The Democrats will attack the President's credibility and his lack of concern for the average man. They will have absolutely no regard for the accuracy or validity of their charges and they will use the War, the economy - high food prices and high unemployment - and other people issues

such as hunger, housing, crime and taxes to demonstrate their claims. While we will be tied to specifics, the Democrats will be able to avoid them, and they will get a lot of help from the media in conveying their message.

The President should stay above all of this. He should be on the offensive with issues like peace, the economy and the failure of Congress to legislate his domestic reforms. As I said before, he should not attack the Democrats for their faulty charges. Rather, this should be left to the surrogates whose efforts should be geared, in addition to positive statements, to disclosing the fallacies of opposition proposals, pressuring the opposition for specifics and painting the opposition as extreme and irresponsible. We, like the Democrats, should not be too concerned about the substance of our charges - as long as the President is not making them. Presidential spokesmen will have far more flexibility for demagoguery than will the President.

JIM  
ask the Pop  
Request?

We should have our own plan as to how to win this election, and the development of the plan should assume that the worst charges possible are made against the President. We should then operate against this plan, and never, once, deviate from it. Just because the opposition makes some false charges, the President should not be rushing out to respond. Rather we should just let it go, or let a surrogate handle it.

My rationale for all of this is that the majority of the people of this country desire most a President who is strong in his leadership, compassionate in his judgments and courageous in the face of adversity. I think they have that kind of President in President Nixon. And I believe that this situation, thanks to the China visit, Russia, the mining of Haiphong and the President's strong action to bring the economy back in line is becoming increasingly clear to the public in general. Everything the President does between now and the election must be geared to contribute to this image.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

June 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: WILLIAM E. TIMMONS *BT*

SUBJECT: Your June 12th Memorandum

1. I believe the President's posture between the Conventions should be non-political, statesmanlike, our national leader. However, the President can use those six weeks to set the stage for election issues by taking positions which the public approves, but which contrast with the opposition. He should consider built-in appearances before national conventions and regularly scheduled meetings (Jaycees, Older Americans, Spanish-Speaking, etc.) where he can appear as President, not candidate.

For example, if busing is a campaign issue, the President might meet with school superintendents, hold legislative sessions on his busing proposals, submit a Constitutional Amendment, engage in discussions with parents and students who suffer under excessive busing, etc. In this way, in his proper role as President, the Chief Executive would be building on an issue to exploit in the campaign. The same could be applied to POWs, Vietnam, defense spending, drugs, amnesty, 6th Fleet-Israel, or other issues which may be politically attractive.

Since his opponent will come from Congress, the post DNC Convention period should see implied criticism of the Democratic controlled Senate for not acting on the President's substantial legislative recommendations. Making Congress a whipping boy is always difficult but it will at least highlight the President's initiatives.

Cabinet officers, Congressmen, Governors and other surrogates should use this time to attack the opposition: its candidates, record and platform.

Since Party behavior is the first test of voters, one of the most important activities would be the President's personal and private involvement in getting Democrats to switch parties after McGovern is nominated. I believe there is a possibility in this area and the President could negate the party issue substantially.

EYES ONLY

2. The President, I feel, should hold back from overt political action until early in October, staying above the partisan fights. Then I recommend an aggressive, concentrated campaign for the final weeks.

Earlier, the President will have developed issues and the Surrogates battered the opposition, leaving the President free to revitalize the campaign and deliver the "knock-out" in the closing days.

I think the President should schedule a number of regional addresses, rallies, parades, news conferences, telethons, etc. in major cities like New York, Atlanta, Chicago, Kansas City, Denver, Seattle. Additionally, he should concentrate his time in the target states, planning at least two appearances in each. The "quickie" swings of 1970, stopping in three or four states in one day, provide a good format for a short campaign. Each event should be built around the key campaign issues as they develop to more dramatically focus attention on the President's positions. The President should resist personal attacks on his opponent.

3. Until the Democratic Convention and its platform, specific issues are difficult to guess. Obviously, the Vietnam War will be an issue, taxes, busing, jobs, cost of living, etc. George McGovern has a record in Congress he must defend as well as his positions during the campaign. Careful research will develop his weak points. I think over-all he should be projected as an extreme radical whose wild ideas would destroy the country. With this general strategy every issue can be tailored to make the point. (McGovern is already in trouble over his welfare-taxes proposal and has been backtracking on defense spending.)

4. "Right from the Start" McGovern is considered a one-issue candidate who created a good grass-roots organization to deliver delegates. Should Vietnam be removed as an issue, McGovern would appeal only to a few and certainly not the middle-road. At any rate, we can look forward to the war issue and must publicize the President as the one who is getting us out honorably and most important will never turn his back on our POWs.

I suspect the Democrats are sitting on several potential scandals (like ITT) in the government and will try to show the Administration as corrupt, handling favors, pro-big business, etc. Unemployment and food prices surely will be Democratic issues. The opposition is certain to attempt to use the "trust" issue in an effort to show a credibility gap.

The best defense is a good offense, and several attractive issues should be constantly repeated to drive points home. For example, the surrogates can talk about the President's handling of his job, experience, ability etc.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

June 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: AL HAIG 

Here are my views and accompanying analysis on the four points raised in your memorandum of June 12:

1. What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?

Unquestionably the events between now and the Democratic Convention and most importantly events at the Convention itself will influence the ultimate strategy on the President's posture. Nevertheless at this juncture it is quite evident that the President is in a very strong position which is best retained and reinforced by maintaining a posture which is totally consistent with the achievements that have most decisively contributed to his popularity. These achievements are a solid statesman-like performance in the international area. They have been premised on flexible and progressive attitudes and the willingness to take risks in search of world peace and were masterfully combined with: (a) strength and decisiveness when U. S. interests are challenged; (b) the retention of initiative and momentum which has consistently enabled the President to stay ahead of the pessimism normally associated with stagnation, inactivity and lack of imagination; (c) the solidification of the world statesman role through which the President has captured national empathy based on his masterful performances in Peking and Moscow which were well-covered on national television; and (d) the development of a "Mr. & Mrs." team image which would not have been possible had total emphasis been on the President alone.

Based on the foregoing, the President's posture should be one of a statesman who is above the frantic gut-fighting and politicking of the campaign, whose strength and competence is taken fully for granted by a Party machine whose major task should be to engage in the cool organizational arrangements which are designed to exploit a solid posture of accomplishment.

I sense one possible distortion creeping into current assumptions about the Democratic candidate. Many of our political strategists are taking for granted that McGovern will emerge as the Democratic candidate.

EYES ONLY

This was evident in the strategy discussions held in last week's Cabinet meeting. We must be prepared for an emotional convention consensus in favor of Teddy Kennedy. It is difficult to conceive of the old Democratic Party machinery, which relies essentially on a power base of Labor, Jewish money and nouveau riche resources, merging to support a candidate of McGovern's ilk since each of these sources of power could be seriously threatened by his stated policies. For this reason our contingency planning must not overlook the possibility of a surprise popular surge in July which would settle on Kennedy as the only hope for the Democratic Party.

2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican Convention to the election? When should he start campaigning? How much travel should he do, where should he go, what type of activities should he engage in?

Following the Republican Convention in August and taking full cognizance of events between the Democratic and Republican Conventions, I think the President should pursue a strategy totally consistent with that of a self-confident, competent statesman who is above frantic political campaigning. This means that his travel and public appearances should be most carefully contrived. Above all, they should be paced to avoid over-exposure in the national media, especially television. I do not believe we should succumb to a strategy which would portray him rushing from one adulatory situation to another. Rather, these should be carefully paced and only those which can guarantee maximum effect should be undertaken. That should involve exposure situations which underline the President's attention to the affairs of state and which avoid any appearances of contrived ballyhoo. In my view the greatest danger will be over-exposure and excessive campaign energy.

3. Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.

Obviously McGovern is our most vulnerable opponent. We should therefore be very careful about adopting too strong an anti-McGovern posture between now and the Democratic Convention. The one theme which I believe is best stressed between now and the Democratic Convention is McGovern's irresponsible posture on the war in Vietnam in which we emphasize the fact that he is pushing a strategy which can only encourage the enemy not to negotiate and which in many respects is less stringent on Hanoi than even Moscow and Peking contemplate. Concurrently, we should prepare, but not use, a host of themes which attack McGovern's strategy on domestic spending, inheritance, welfare programs, busing, aid to schools, national defense, etc., that can be used following the

Republican Convention in August. The most important aspect of our anti-McGovern strategy should be to keep the homerun balls to the last phase of the campaign in a way which ensures that the President peaks off in the last three weeks of October. Television will dominate this year more than in any campaign in the past and it is conceivable that national attitudes can be influenced at the last moment in an overriding way. We should also have themes in reserve which can be used on a contingency basis to counter-balance bad news for us which is bound to occur in unforeseen patterns between now and November. A compulsive tendency to exploit McGovern vulnerability from the outset should be tightly controlled to ensure that we do not end up on a wave of criticism against the Republican Party and most importantly that we are able to quickly adjust to unforeseen setbacks which can come from scandle, setbacks in the international environment, or domestic shortcomings. To ensure this is done, a most careful analysis should be made of all McGovern vulnerabilities, a program should be tailored to exploit each of these then the exploitation program should be tightly time-phased to ensure continuing and growing momentum rather than to fire all of our shots simultaneously thus enabling the Democrats to develop compensatory neutralization programs.

4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and how we should meet it.

In the international area the Democrats will probably exploit the following:

(a) The war in Vietnam, bombing of North Vietnam, mining, etc. The only sound way to attack this is to keep constantly in the forefront Hanoi's intransigence and the solid pace of accomplishment represented by our continuing disengagement. It is obvious that we will have to get some break between now and November which will confirm the wisdom of our policy. I am somewhat optimistic that this will occur and the question will therefore become moot.

(b) The Democrats will try to exploit the inadequacy of the SALT agreement with the Soviet Union by stressing the theme that the President has favored an agreement which replaces a quantitative arms race by a qualitative arms race. This charge should be taken head on with straight factual elaboration on the provisions of the agreement.

(c) The Democrats, if McGovern is the candidate, will obviously try to exploit the President's image as a knee-jerk patriot who is hidebound by outmoded conceptions of U. S. honor and power. This attack is easily blunted by a track record of accomplishments which should focus on the

Peking and Moscow Summits and a carefully paced follow-up program of improved relations with both the Soviets and Chinese. Barring no unforeseen setbacks, this kind of momentum is definitely in the cards and should be counted as a strong continuing asset.

(d) Perhaps the most serious danger area is that of international economics, balance of payments, lack of progress in the monetary stabilization and a growing unfavorable balance of trade. This area, I believe, affords the Democrats the most fruitful grist for criticism. We will need a careful assessment in the weeks ahead of where we are going with respect to international trade and economics and to develop some new initiatives which will flesh out the initial philosophical advantage that resulted from the international monetary agreement. We have a long way to go in the area and I doubt that statistics which can be easily drawn upon by the Democrats will confirm that we have not done more than scratch the surface. We should achieve some advantages from improved US-Soviet trade but more dramatic steps have to be taken with respect to our European and Japanese allies.

(e) Accomplishments in Latin America leave room for criticism but we should not overreact to a vulnerability which does not have a particularly strong popular base.

On the whole, the President's performance and accomplishments in the international area constitute his strong suit. For this reason his statesman and world leader role should be carefully but fully exploited.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 14, 1972

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
E.O. 12066, Section 6-102  
By Ep NAB, Date 3-12-82

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN  
SUBJECT: Response to HRH June 12 Memo

1. What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?

ANSWER

- Continue non-political approach
- Schedule 3 or 4 major announcements or actions which serve to remind public of President Nixon's achievements in office.

Example:

- Tricia to China
- Speech on occasion of passage of SALT
- Trip to Midway (maybe post-Convention)
- First week after Democratic Convention, offer their candidate full briefing. Try to set it for second week.
- One or two half day trips to key states, i.e. Ohio Armstrong Museum. Make it good positive crowd event.
- Remain every bit the President.
- A sign of toughness on the war might be most appropriate. Would drive the libs crazy and solidify some of the Democratic support on our side.
- If a Vice Presidential change is made it should be structured, if this is possible, so the least amount of political brutality is expanded upon. A sloppy move here no matter how well planned will have serious consequences.

2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican Convention to the election?

ANSWER

- He should move into and out of the Convention in a way which helps to keep him on the highest Presidential level. The key is not to come off our present high until absolutely necessary. The Convention should be proclaiming their great President. He should be aloof from the political hog wash. He should avoid, as of now, everything except his visionary and emotional acceptance speech appearance, (unless he has to participate in a Vice Presidential change-- and if that is necessary maybe it can be done without his appearing before the Convention).
- After the Convention he should fight the tendency to go right to California. Proceed directly from Florida to Washington. Lock in a couple of events the week after the Convention which only the President can handle and that sets him apart from the Democratic candidate.
- In the second week of September, go to California, hold the seminar and make the kick-off speech.
- Next return to Washington making one or two stops for massive public events en route home.
- Otherwise do no politicking until the last week in September or the first of October. Then let him break loose.
- The President will want to campaign hard and should.
- The obvious which everyone will say is, the President should maintain his Presidential posture - but that does not mean he can't swing hard and be his toughest self.

- A. When should he start campaigning?
  - All out campaigning shouldn't start until, at the earliest, the last week of September. Jeb says the Surrogates will start on Labor Day.
  
- B. How much travel should he do? Where should he go?
  - This really depends on the polls. I would envision his wanting to hit at an absolute minimum each of the four regions once. Our current key state list would probably be the most logical list of locations. Where he goes in those states will have to depend on our polling data.
  
- C. What type of activities should he engage in?
  - This is probably the most important question.
  - Only the President can have "Presidential press conferences" so maybe that is a once a week or once every other week activity.
  - Some big, massive, public demonstrations or rallies are necessary. A Chicago or Atlanta parade, the Astrodome, and an Upstate New York rally.
  - Television will be key. Maybe he does regional talks on a network we put together. This would be in addition to one or two national T.V. talks.
  - Airport rallies should be kept to a minimum. Otherwise they will dominate, and they are degrading to the President.
  - Anytime possible, the President should return to overnight in the White House.
  - His schedule when in Washington should include items only the President can do-- and relate to issues or news we want to hypo.
    - Quadriad or CCEP meetings
    - Cabinet meeting on a key subject

- NSC - maybe on a pending crisis situation
- An emergency meeting with another head of state - i. e. Heath, Pompidou, Brandt, or Golda.

Special Note: As with 1968-- except even more so-- we should strictly limit his activity putting time against only what counts. Figure our news cycles-- have one national event per day and keep any other activity regional oriented. In addition we should give him plenty of time to think and realize that he is four years older than 1968.

3. Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.

ANSWER

There are three general points.

- We should not launch all of our issue attack rockets too early in the campaign. A plan should be developed which in the public's mind keeps us in what is interpreted as an offensive position. This will mean a great deal of flexibility and an ability to almost instantly react (which Pete Daily plans in the T. V. area).

Our tendency is to use the sledge hammer approach and we should have a calculated release of issue positions and attack so that halfway through October we still have something new to present the people and hit McGovern on.

- We should keep the debate on issues (if the war is not over) on the broadest range possible. A one issue campaign such as law and order became in 1970 should be avoided. It does not play to our advantage. The exception would be a foreign policy crisis.
- The one issue which everything we do and say (beginning now) should stress is the credibility of President Nixon. Our surrogates, the dialogue in the convention, our

printed materials -- everything should build credibility. Over and over in different ways the McGovern documentary infers and once again directly states, "we need a President we can believe in." The President has credibility now. We need to keep it and build on it-- once it starts to collapse under fire it will be very difficult to recover.

- Assuming the candidate will be McGovern, I am for third party persons or organizations attacking him lightly now and heavily the day the Democratic Convention ends. He should be hit not only on issues but also on his credibility, honesty and lack of experience and understanding of the institution of the Presidency. There is no reason to let the Honest George image keep floating.

4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and how we should meet it.

ANSWER

The Attack on the President

- Give him credit for the Summits and say the Hallmark for the Nixon Presidency has been made. Now we must move on.
- Say the war must end -- if it is about to end say it hasn't been soon enough. Over promise- Nixon did in 1968.
- Nixonomics haven't worked.
- Unemployment up- with analogies to Hoover. Scare people.
- Nixon is a devious President. He wins by dividing Americans. The people want to be brought together. We must unite and rededicate ourselves.
- Crime has gone up.

- The most isolated President. Makes decisions alone, doesn't consult advisors. Away from the White House constantly -- no consultation with Congress.
- And over and over again, bang Nixon's credibility. Bring up big business, ITT, the Court, his brother Don, anything that helps to point negatives.

Response to the attack

- The President never takes on McGovern by name or directly. If he does it should be during the last days of the campaign crunch and only if necessary.
- The Vice President and Surrogates can bang around McGovern striking hard on the issues and his qualifications.
- Prominent conservative Democrats who are popular in key states should be signed up under the table now by Mitchell. We can use them in the State where they're popular just at the right time. But- get them tied up today and before McGovern moves right.
- The President should talk about what he has done, that it is only the beginning of the beginning and where he is headed. Aloof and above reproach. As long as it works - under attack - he should turn the other cheek, and hold off any heavy attack by himself until mid-October.
- The best Presidential attack is in stressing what he has done. Get the public to decide he's done a tremendous amount while McGovern yells not enough.
- I am not sure on the precise attack which should be made on McGovern. Just keep him to the left if it means using some of our issue material and equity early. (Higby has given me Buchanan's memo which looks like it outlines the basis for the McGovern attack.) We must make sure our attack does not come too heavy handed, with too much PR and build him into a martyr.)

- The best point of attack now is the Convention arena. Walkouts, platform donnybrooks, anything which splits and disunites should be undertaken - on a very sophisticated level. (Jeb says this is being done - so good!)

What the opposition strategy will be and how we should meet it.

NOTE: Assuming McGovern or Kennedy - perhaps even a combination, we must realize they are what we are in spades. They are organized, have good supporting people, great merchandising talent behind them, the "Kennedy appeal," an understanding of the power and potentials an incumbent President has at Command, dedicated workers, a Government in exile, and so on. Most important neither are the President-nor are they their own man. Neither has the leadership capabilities or intellect of the President. But, we must recognize they have much going for themselves.

- The first most important strategy for the opposition out of the Convention must be to unite the Party. I would expect the Presidential candidate to either set up his own San Clemente and bring in the leader of his party from the key states, etc., or to go on a grand tour of the country holding private unity meetings and striking deals.

Response:

State by state McGovern should be hit by sign carrying mothers (on abortion, drugs), laborers (\$1000 to everyone), middle class suburban types etc. Put a truth squad with him state by state. Never let him up for air from the time he leaves the convention.

- What are the odds that McGovern or his Vice President (if Kennedy) could be dispatched on a world trip for the period of the Republican Convention? Would Chou see him, Brezhnev, Golda, Heath, Pompidou?

Response:

Watch for this to happen in some form - and let other governments know confidentially our displeasure at any such meetings.

- Summit of the Cities. Meeting of big Democratic wheels - Mayors, City Council types, etc., to discuss the urban and suburban problems and the Democratic/McGovern solutions. A united Democratic front - good media attention and forces the President into highlighting his domestic program. We would be very much on the defensive.

Response:

A PR gimmick. Use a special Vice President and Cabinet task force as the counter and denounce the effort as a stunt early in its planning.

- Major address to an evening session of Congress by the Democratic challenger. Attack the way the President has handled Congress, his inability to work with Congress, the lack of consultation regarding the war. (This is a good idea - for them!)

Response:

Then send the Vice President? Demand equal time?

- The Liberals will launch a personal attack - they always do (like the right wing).

Response:

Early on our surrogates - everyone - should say - I wonder when McGovern will sink to the personal attack. It is inevitable so we should mention it early - in a joking way.

- As the opposition I would love to see Nixon jump on a car, throw some V's, make a massive error, get mad, have his friend Mitchell or Bebe in trouble.

Response:

Pray all is o.k.

- Television is paramount. It is the single most important element in the McGovern strategy. It won them California. Television has made McGovern what he is. The workers, the kids, the "mystique of the Kennedys" - to accomplish all this T. V. has been the key.

We must assume crowds, events - everything will be staged effectively for television. It has got to be their feeling that the right television campaign keyed on a regional, or state by state basis can defeat the President.

Via television they will show:

- A Presidential candidate who listens to the public - understands their problems, is sympathetic.
- People, all kinds, black, white, Mexican American, you name it, rallying around one man. The one man who really can "bring us together again" and unite the nation.
- They will strike out for the little man. The Bobby Kennedy and George Wallace thrust. The fight against big government. The impersonalism of the Fed. As they do this Nixon will become the symbol of bigness and what is wrong.
- Issues will be fought on the emotional level and they will avoid lengthy explanations and specifics. It will be good solid T. V. Watch for their own Archie Bunker approach - after all, Liberals created Archie and look at the power Archie has with that segment now. Carroll O'Connor doing McGovern commercials is not an impossibility.

Response:

Pete Daily has this in hand. However, I think we should look very seriously at how we would run a T. V. campaign against the President. This exercise on our part might give us some specific thoughts.

- Mobilization of the key liberal lobbying forces will be a source of much irritation for us. Everyone from Common Cause to the garment unions to Operation Bread Basket will be running their own campaign against the President. I would suspect a McGovern umbrella strategy which will coordinate all of these groups. They will point Nixon as anti-humanitarian, against minorities, etc. etc.

Response:

Our best strategy is to counter via those lobbying groups who are for us. Or, we should get readings on those groups who will oppose us and assess the threat. Next we should set up front groups playing to the same constituency, using a similar name and launch some back-fires. (You have Common Cause - how about Common Course to prove the nation is headed in the right direction.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 21, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: RONALD L. ZIEGLER *RZ*

SUBJECT: Views and Analyses requested in memorandum  
of June 12, 1972

There probably is no one who would not say the President should best campaign by being President; that the most effective candidate posture is the Presidential posture. That is not so much a recommendation as it is fact.

The posture exists because it is his posture. It is present because of his accomplishments as a statesman both in his widely approved foreign initiatives and in the less appreciated domestic initiatives.

That posture cannot be split in two. The campaign is what the President wants to do for the nation and the world. So there cannot be candidate actions and Presidential actions, or a Presidential period and a campaign period. He cannot be two people or approach events or actions into two kinds.

So we can direct our attention not to what the President should be, but what opposition strategies will be used in an attempt to diminish what he is. These fall into two areas:

1. Tactics to describe statesmanship as aloofness.
2. Approaches which will grant foreign affairs accomplishments but suggest this has been a preoccupation to the expense of domestic needs.

### Taking the Offense

Both strategies should be approached by undercutting them rather than by responding to a series of charges and by taking steps to do so at once rather than waiting for the attack to surface.

1. The charge of detachment from concerns of the electorate cannot be allowed to set in; we must not lose the ability of people to relate comfortably to the man in the office. It is important that he be seen not as someone seeking power -- he already has the power others are seeking -- but that it be understood this power is being used well.
2. We cannot run the risk that people won't know our domestic achievements in the economy, health, nutrition, education, and the other areas of expansion and improvement. These must be demonstrated and greater focus placed on them, and on the unwillingness of Congress to act on many of his initiatives.

And all of this must be done from a position of self confidence and in such a way as to convey our positive posture.

### The Advocate's Role

Attention to our positions needs to be drawn not just through travel but through the President's words. What he says in forums about the nation's problems and our solutions will demonstrate action and initiative (focus on) and his words will have to be reported and those reports, coming from periodical press conferences, meetings, appearances, receptions, will get people talking about what he has to say. As the President is an advocate of his programs, his spokesmen and surrogates will gain increasing attention and copy.

In facing a Democrat attempt to portray the Presidency as unconcerned or aloof, Congressional leaders can be called in with greater frequency so that the President can be noted and quoted on what he has put forth.

Receptions for an increased variety of publics and groups can give an opportunity for him to tell them directly his concerns, and again be quoted.

### A Cumulative Effect

These need not always be page one or the television lead; they will have a cumulative effect which will force the press to report the actions he has taken and the inaction of Congress in responding in many cases. The forcing of attention should begin now, before Congress adjourns and before activities can be colored as part of the campaign.

None of this suggests that we should not organize ourselves and our statements to achieve news leads nor that activities should not be planned and organized. But they must not appear to be part of a campaign nor an attempt to gain time or space. Presidential activity is not candidate campaigning. (On this point also, it would be helpful for the party-rally and fund-raising kind of events to be started as late as possible.)

### Focus on Activism

Without discussion, for the moment, of press bias, we should be aware that the press, seeing the President in his activities, observing -- not necessarily questioning -- him will force them to focus the activism and concern taking place. We should be led to conclusions rather than being presented with them, note what we are doing rather than hear what we say we are doing, hear the President put forth his views instead of others putting them forth on his behalf.

Drawing attention to the Presidential force behind positions and people should not lead to a process of cluttering the President's schedule; periods of 3 - 4 hours, twice a week, begun soon can accomplish this.

### Painting the White House Grey

Another strategy which should be undercut is one which the opposition will use to paint the White House a shady grey.

Every appearance of conflict of interest, favoritism or misconduct will be seized upon. Because opponents will have so little to grab onto in foreign policy and domestic activity, and because there is an attitude on the part of much of the press that we are the guys in black hats, it will be extremely difficult to disassociate the President from clumsiness or failures in any of the lower forms of campaign techniques which perhaps must be used.

We should reassess our whole approach to the campaign apparatus in this light.

Do we have adequate controls and checks to prevent blotches from occurring?

Should we have in the White House and EOB the political activists who work with special interest groups or should some of these be transferred to 1701?

I am not advocating these, but I do advocate rigorous examination of these kinds of questions in light of what we can lose through inuendo and guilt by association.

We have been faced with this time and time again, being brought down from a high crest achieved through hard work and true leadership, because of clumsy efforts on matters of secondary importance. I don't know how it happens; only that it must not.

#### Avoiding Clumsiness

I am not worried about the President's posture and am not presumptuous enough to say what it is or should be. But I am concerned that as an organization, including the campaign structure, we clearly be seen as positive and aggressive, and not as negative or deceptive.

The most counter-productive activities we could undertake are those which would give the Democrats another ITT, or to have them uncover some kind of GOP intelligence operation in their convention as the nation watches.

This is not to say we should be overcautious or that we shouldn't be aggressive and tough. But there are some kinds of activities in which only minimal skill has been shown. Worse, there has been a particularly acute ineptness which invariably leads to linking these activities to the Presidency.

#### Note on Convention Period

As for the President's activities during the Democratic convention, it should be business as usual, not especially active, but not hibernating; not pre-occupied by what's happening at Miami, but at least mildly interested in the outcome.

### About the Press

On the matter of press, my experience as Press Secretary over three years of day-in and day-out dealings with the press corps gives me little doubt that on the whole the press is philosophically untuned to us, biased in their copy and approaches, and often better to work around than through.

Our success in dealing with the press has come from keeping them off balance, proving them wrong when they are, and not permitting them to feel we are on the defensive. There should be no lack of understanding of their motives or attitudes. We have not changed their views entirely nor their methods of operating at all; but they have been kept on the defensive and we have maintained a working relationship.

### Righting Wrongs

They should continue to be called when they are wrong. Prompt, fact-filled, firm responses should continue to follow every distortion. The process should be improved in view of the fast-firing developments of campaigns, and our response should not be scattered or fractionalized as has been the case too often in the past. We dilute the effect of our response to media mistakes and distortions when media get called one day by a Scali, next day a Colson, then a Ziegler, Clawson, Snyder, Klein, Shumway and virtually anybody else.

The responses should be sharpened so that the Press Secretary can deal with distortions or omissions concerning the President in the most effective way; the Director of Communications can do so for the Administration.

I am not saying that Dole or Mitchell cannot make a point now and then; I am describing what the White House posture should be for maximum results.

### Avoiding Uptightness

The scattered approach suggests to the media an uptight, overly sensitive image which is contrary to the posture of confidence required; thus we find ourselves dealing from a position of weakness rather than strength in these situations. The President is known as a man who understands the press and the realities of the media. He is not affected by their bias -- is more interested in doing a good job. This is what they say and know. That is what will affect the election.

Just as we should give the Democrats no advantage, we should not give an advantage to a press corps which is largely sympathetic to it. We could easily solidify the situation if we were to take on an overt attack on the press as a whole.

Discussing this, there seems to be broad agreement to the above point. Yet a consensus is developing among the press that discrediting the American press is a pillar of our campaign effort. It creates the thought that we are uptight about them and that we can talk about only the press and not the issues. Key advisors often focus more on press than on accomplishments of the President.

This approach would make us look anything but confident; frightened instead of bold; reluctant to be observed rather than proud of demonstrating what we are doing and have done.

We would divert energies which should be used against the opponent rather than against those writing about him. We should be aware of press failings -- weakness, vanity, selfishness, the herd instinct -- but should use these to our advantage rather than simply denouncing them. Any appearance of an organized overt anti-press campaign would help strengthen the press bias, portray ourselves poorly and draw energies off into secondary battles at the expense of the primary objective.

It would invite the press to throw off caution and give the justification it now lacks for being self-righteous.

The media now expect an offensive of this kind; we would appear weak to give it to them.

#### Who Loves Whom?

If McGovern is the Democratic candidate, I am not at all convinced that the bulk of the press will have a love-feast with him. Should this prove to be wrong, we will have to reassess our position and approach. But it is entirely possible that much of the press will not be smitten and we should be open to that possibility in our thinking and strategy.

#### SUMMARY

Summing up, we move in an atmosphere of confidence and power to dramatize real accomplishments by drawing attention to Presidential action in such a way as to undercut opposition strategies without appearing artificial

or campaign-oriented. The spotlight on what the President does and says should not be pulled away from him and his accomplishment -- onto clumsiness or appearances which permit the opposition and a largely unsympathetic press to portray whatever characteristics would be least useful to us and least attractive to voters.

Attitude toward the press should reflect the President's own concern on getting the job done rather than what's being said by media. To do otherwise would place those around him and therefore the Presidency itself in a defensive overly sensitive position. Press weaknesses are more to be used than labelled and press distortions should be responded to in a precise and effective manner. Presumptions of widespread press affection for the opposition candidate may be premature.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

EYES ONLY

June 15, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE H. R. HALDEMAN

Subject: June 12 request for views on the President's  
campaign this summer and fall

During and immediately after the Democratic Convention, the papers will naturally be filled to overflowing with news columns, analyses, background material, pictures, etc., etc., about the convention proceedings and the candidate's platform and material of that kind.

I do not believe it desirable, or for that matter even possible, to compete with that sort of coverage. Therefore, I believe the President, for the first few days after the convention, should say nothing about the results or the platform, unless there is some major surprise at the Democratic Convention, such as the nomination of some candidate other than McGovern or the adoption of some particularly wild platform planks, in which case the situation should be newly assessed.

Then, about a week after the convention and just before Congress resumes, I think the President should issue a fairly long statement, or make a talk in which he urges Congress to return and finally get to work, cleaning up the appropriation bills, calling attention to the fact that his Budget has been submitted since January, urging action on unfinished portions of his program such as reorganization and revenue sharing (but not referring to H.R. 1 again).

Another speech or statement could be devoted to the current foreign situation and perhaps prodding Congress to get on with the work of ratifying the various agreements reached abroad and calling attention to any progress made in trade negotiations at that time, etc.

He might consider holding a full-scale press conference but declining to answer questions on politics or the campaign until after the Republican Convention, as he had previously said he would.

In short, I believe the direction from the White House should be to try to pull the country's attention away from rather tiresome, noisy political matters of which the public would have had a surfeit shortly after the Democratic Convention. The President's position between conventions, I believe, should be that of a calm statesman speaking from the White House, demonstrating both domestic and foreign leadership, and chiding the Democratic congressmen with their refusal to take any action on his bills. I think he should also criticize them for big spending bills which he may have vetoed by then. The President might rather sadly comment on the disrepute which such congressional conduct brings upon the governmental process and on the legislative branch in particular.

After the Republican Convention, I believe the President should embark upon a high-level type of campaigning after Labor Day, with perhaps seven or eight half-hour set speeches (no more than one a week), including the acceptance speech from the convention hall, in which he contrasts the Administration accomplishments with the various absurdities of the Democratic platform. This may be a difficult tightrope to walk because I do not believe the President should dwell very much on the Democratic platform but should concentrate on the Republican accomplishments and subtly indicate what the Democratic proposals would have led to had the Democrats been in power. I believe some of his trips should be in connection with specific events such as dedications of public works or attendance at major group gatherings or organizational gatherings. Perhaps two or three could be at regular political dinners or afternoon outdoor rallies. I think each speech should have a dominant theme, and those on domestic issues should point out that no domestic program can be accomplished without our ability to live in a peaceful world, which the President has brought about.

I think the dominant theme throughout should be to maintain the dignity of the presidency and not to take part in more than a very few frankly political gatherings. These should be carefully organized so that the televised portion consists of the President's talk alone with short introductory shots of arriving motorcades, crowds, and very little else.

The point would be to try to make a major public event out of each of these comparatively few appearances by the President in the fall and to emphasize at all times that he is the President with all of its trappings and dignity and majesty. The tone of the talks should be equally high and, I believe, the only form of attack on the opposition should be a few contrasts of their platform and program compared with ours. I do not think the opposition candidate should ever be named by the President. The President should be against these proposals but for people. He is against Democratic proposals because they will hurt the people.

Of course, much of this is subject to the type of platform and candidate that emerge from the Democratic Convention. If it is McGovern, with a fairly wild platform, I think that the

President can well emphasize what enactment of that sort of a program would mean but always in contrast to his own accomplishments in the first four years and the hopes that he has engendered for the future.

I believe that at least one, and perhaps two, of the talks could be from Washington but I do not believe the White House should be used since I think it would be preferable to avoid any suggestion that we are attempting to capitalize on the presidency itself. It would seem to me that at least one talk might well be made from the living room or similar setting from San Clemente.

I believe the opposition will concentrate strongly on unemployment, on economic conditions, and on the desire for peace, and I believe that we can meet them on any one of these three issues with no trouble at all.

Bearing in mind how many people are employed and the fact that many of the unemployed are members of families where one or two other family members are employed, it would seem to me to be the best method for the President and his spokesmen continually to ask their audiences to examine their own economic situation and to see if, with inflation being controlled and employment generally at all-time high levels, if they themselves are not far better off than they were four years ago.

The same approach can be taken to the war, with heavy emphasis on the more than two and a quarter million men out of the Army and several hundred thousand who are home from Vietnam and the prospects for peace contrasted with the picture in January 1969.

The President should also emphasize the basic return of sanity and reasonable quietness to the country contrasted with the turmoil and the disorder of four years ago and the general feeling of hopelessness that seemed to prevail at that time.

We can well point also to the great increase in our stature and prestige abroad and no speech should be made without calling attention to the enormously enhanced prospects for peace in the future as a direct result of the President's personal initiatives.


The opposition will undoubtedly try to effect a coalition of blacks, young radicals, and middle-aged guilt-ridden liberals and I think we should try to pick away at the pieces of this coalition separately. I think we should show how the posture of youth has been improved by the strengthening of our whole

system domestically. The recognition that Negroes have been given by this Administration and the progress made in eliminating many of the causes of racial fighting (attempts to defuse the school busing issue and others that caused enormous frictions and tensions) should be emphasized. We should point out that the best thing any administration can do for Negroes or youth is to create the atmosphere and the conditions in which the economy can thrive and jobs can be obtained, and that had been preeminently the result of our economic policy.

This can be contrasted strongly with the enormous spending programs, continuation of discredited welfare, and attempts to redistribute wealth through ruinously high taxation, which will undoubtedly all be part of the Democratic platform.

I am sure the opposition will attack us for not spending enough on a lot of individual programs, most of which are already discredited and the sum of which would add up to enormously increased taxes. I think we should constantly emphasize the overall effect of the individual spending items the Democratic candidates will unquestionably be sponsoring. As long as they are allowed to talk about them on an individual basis, they are harder to dispute. What we have to do is add up the total and show where that would all lead us in taxation, loss of income, and loss of personal freedom. I am convinced that most Negroes, most youths, and most people desire a prosperous, quiet life with a minimum of government intervention and a maximum of opportunity to do what they please so long as they have good housing, good health, and good schools, and increasingly, good recreational facilities and a good environment. It seems to me that all of the things we have done are leading directly toward these goals and that we should emphasize constantly that these are things that all people want, and that when you talk about things that only small groups want, such as Negroes, radicals, activists, youths, etc., you are automatically denying the majority of the people the kind of life they want.

In short, the Democrats have nothing to offer except more divisiveness, higher taxes, more government interference with everyone's life, and worn-out proven nonsolutions for our major problems, to say nothing of policies that lead to war, either hot or cold.



Caspar W. Weinberger  
Director

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

June 16, 1972

Mr. H. R. Haldeman  
Assistant to The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Bob:

There is no chance at all for me to offer any novel or enlightened insights in responding to your June 21 memo, because I no longer share the authoritative political intelligence that you get right along from polls and professional politicians. So I really believe that, at least at this point in time, I should not respond at all, knowing you will get really useful information from associates with access to the current state of things across the country.

But I do have some general notions and submit them for whatever they are worth.

First -- and quite obviously -- no political planning right now on image and issue can be worth much of a damn until after the Democratic Convention has picked its ticket and written its platform. After all, the Convention is only three weeks away. Between now and then any political judgments have to be no better than sheer speculation.

Second, I think just about everybody in the country, not only our people but also a large proportion of the Democrats, would have to concede that the President is doing spectacularly well, as is borne out by the polls. I see two dominant reasons for this -- first, the miracles the President has wrought abroad, which at last have convinced the nation that Richard Nixon is the most effective achiever for a stable world order that the country has had in God knows how long -- this, plus the resurging confidence throughout the economy; and, second, but not unimportant, the remarkable disarray of the Democratic Party and its superbly uninspired leadership for the upcoming campaign. The simple fact appears to be that the President has been steadily building confidence in himself across the country,

these past 18 months particularly, while national confidence in the Democratic candidates has plummeted. I think the ingredients are present in the President's achievements for a victory of landslide proportions.

Now, second, I think one of the main reasons for the President's enviable political status right now is the deepening public belief that he is preoccupied, not with political maneuvering and expediency, but with paramount national concerns. I think this public assessment is the President's political Fort Knox, because his traditional vulnerability has been the accusation over the years that he is politician first and statesman second. He is well on his way to reversing this concept, and in the process is in fact being regarded now as President of all the people rather than as a strident leader of a negativistic minority called the Republican Party. I would greatly regret any move so to elevate politicking between now and, say, October 1 as would reawaken the notion that the President would rather be a domestic party leader than a world statesman. In other words, please help fight off the pols who would pander to the President's extraordinarily refined and sensitive political instincts; let him continue to be, as long as possible, one hell of a good President determined to dispel the greatest fears of the American people. That's the best politics there could possibly be.

Third, and in keeping with the above, I suggest it is inappropriate to compartmentalize White House thinking in the manner suggested by your memo. I see no need for a change of any kind in Presidential stance from now until actual campaigning begins in late September or October 1. I see no need whatever for him to function any differently between the conventions than he is right now, nor should he do anything differently after the Republican Convention until he is forced to the hustings about October 1. And even then, when campaigning gets underway, I would pray that the shrillness and ad hominem stuff, and the direct parrying of opposition thrusts, would be left to the President's running mate and John Mitchell's minions, leaving the President as free as possible to be Presidential far more than political -- again, on the premise that a Presidential stance will prove to be the best politics. I naturally assume, in addition to the foregoing, that his campaigning will be interlarded with stints at the White House to make clear to the American people that the President is President first and only reluctantly, and temporarily, doing the domestic political thing.

Fourth, I have no way to lay out a proposed itinerary for the campaign at this time. I would assume that this would be governed by detailed political intelligence garnered from polls and political leaders in the various states and areas. Surely, however, the President will not be postured as a frantic candidate racing about the country desperately trying to corral votes -- and surely also, he will not be so scheduled as to flit wildly from coast to coast trying to visit every state.

I would anticipate a far more leisurely campaign directed at specific major voting blocs -- the ethnics, Catholics, Jews, agriculture, etc. -- and directed at specific geographical regions, using key states as the focal points of this kind of regional campaigning. I hope someone there agrees with me that we have tended of late to underestimate the enormous nationwide impact of a Presidential appearance, no matter whether he is speaking in Maine or Southern California. The national TV coverage of a Presidential appearance, wherever he speaks, makes every speech a national appearance, and I think it is awfully easy to overdo this. This is why I suggest that a short campaign will be more productive than the traditional two-month effort, and it is why I also envision a regional effort rather than a state-by-state kind of campaign of the 1960 style.

Fifth, as to the President's issues, I hardly see how these can change much from now through Election Day, though I must again confess that I lack authoritative data from polls and so on to gauge this accurately. It seems to me that we are back into the 1956 cycle, in which peace, prosperity and progress are the dominant concerns, and each of these is trending today in the President's favor. I recognize that there are sub-themes which your polls isolate, such as school busing, aid to parochial schools, environmentalism and such, but the controlling themes are now and ought to continue to be those three golden words of 1956 -- peace, prosperity and progress.

Finally, I suspect that the President has so defused most of the key issues either with actual achievements as in the foreign arena or with programs recommended to Congress that the opposition will be driven, in desperation, to a campaign of vilification that by election time will have degenerated into character assassination. I think the President should ignore all such vituperation, leaving it to his running mate and others to respond in kind; but it would be mere prudence, I should think, and as we discussed on Thursday, to conjure up a few explicit actions to demonstrate to the country

that the President and his Administration are plainly not captives of big business and that skullduggery, such as alleged about ITT, is merely a political slur and not in fact true. I am deeply convinced, especially if the opposition candidate is McGovern, that his major political overlay will be the charge of big business corruptly controlling the Administration at the expense of the average guy -- and in this time of disillusionment with government and almost everything else, that kind of campaigning can seduce lots of people.

But back to Square A. While I anticipate that this campaign will be very dirty before it is over, namely because the other side is devoid of viable issues, I believe that maintaining a Presidential stance throughout, and the conducting of a dignified and thoughtful campaign which will confirm the public judgment that the President is determined above all else to do only the right things for America, will turn out to be the road not only to victory in November, but also the road to a landslide.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bruce Harlow". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large, sweeping initial "B" and a long horizontal tail stroke.