

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
16	22	5/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Gordan Strachan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Campaign Poll Analysis and Wave II. 1 pg.
16	22	5/11/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Robert M. Teeter To: John N. Mitchell RE: Final First Wave Analysis. 8 pgs.
16	22	5/11/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Robert M. Teeter To: John n. Mitchell RE: Second Wave Polling. 3 pgs.
16	22	5/11/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Robert M. Teeter To: Committee for the Re-election of the President RE: Wave II Polling. 1 pg.

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16	22	5/11/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Robert M. Teeter To: John N. Mitchell RE: Final First Wave Analysis. 8 pgs.
16	22	5/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Gordan Strachan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Celebrities. 1 pg.
16	22	5/5/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Jon A. Foust To: John N. Mitchell RE: Celebrities for the President American Music for the President Athletes for the President. 3 pgs.
16	22	3/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: H.R. Haldeman To: Jeb S. Magruder RE: Celebrities. 2 pgs.
16	22	5/4/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Robert M. Teeter To: John N. Mitchell RE: New York Conservatice Ballot. 8 pgs.

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16	22	5/1/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Robert H. Marik To: John N. Mitchell RE: Priority Ranking of the States for the Campaign.4 pgs.
16	22	2/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Gordon Strachan To: Fred Malek RE: RNC Research Materials. 1 pg.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

May 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Campaign Poll Analysis
and Wave II

Bob Teeter submitted his Final First Wave Analysis to you and John Mitchell today. It is attached at Tab A. The conclusions and recommendations are specific and surprising. You may want to use this memorandum as a talking paper at one of the regular political meetings, either with or without Teeter present.

Teeter also asked Mitchell for authority to conduct the second series of polls in mid-June. The cost is approximately \$250,000. Teeter is soliciting suggestions from the Campaign and White House Staffs. The final questionnaire will be submitted to you and Mitchell for final approval on June 1. Teeter's memoranda are at Tab B.

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

May 11, 1972

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

E.O. 12065, Section 6-102

By cmf Name, Date 8-24-81

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL

FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER

SUBJECT: Final First Wave Analysis

During the past several weeks we have analyzed the first wave polling results utilizing a number of the most advanced statistical techniques available. This analysis has enabled us to identify the most important independent variables which influence presidential vote and to develop a very sophisticated analysis package which can be run and interpreted rapidly on all of our subsequent polling.

While it is not necessary to have knowledge of these techniques in order to use the results, I would be happy to go over them in more detail with you anytime.

Our conclusions from this analysis are:

1. Past party voting behavior is the single most important factor which affects the presidential vote. The classification of voters into behavioral Republicans, Democrats, or Ticket-splitters accounts for almost three times as much of the variance why people vote for or against the President as is explained by any other variable. This appears to be particularly true in Wisconsin, Indiana, and California.
2. The next most important factors affecting the Presidential vote are the voters' perceptions of the President's trust and his issue handling ability. Trust is best defined by the following variables -- honesty, open minded, and just. Seemingly, these personality traits are related to perceptions of credibility. To a lesser degree the presidential vote is related to perceptions of competence -- experienced, trained, and informed.

Most voters have a general perception of how well the President handles issues and problems overall and that appears to be more important to voting than is their perception of his handling of any one or two issues. This overall issue handling ability seems to be perceived by the voters as a single personality dimension similar in many ways to the dimensions of trust, competence, etc.

The only individual issues which appear to have any significant independent effect on voting are Vietnam, inflation, and general unrest. Vietnam and inflation were also, fortunately, the issues that the President was seen as handling well, and his ability to handle the general unrest problem was rated about equally to that of his opponents:

Those issues on which the President is rated relatively poorly -- crime, drugs, and unemployment -- do not appear to affect presidential voting to any major degree. This is particularly true of crime and unemployment. Apparently the President is seen as having done a good job on those problems that the voters think have gotten better overall, while he is seen as having done a poor job on those problems which have become worse during the last few years. There also appears to be little believability that the President will make much difference in the crime or drug problems.

3. Demographic bloc voting is significantly less important than past party voting behavior, and less important than perceptions of the candidates trust, competence, and issue handling ability. Once party behavior is taken into account there is little difference in the vote for various demographic groups. In other words, differences in the rate that various demographic groups support Nixon can be explained almost entirely by party preferences rather than membership in any particular demographic group. The factors having some but small effect on the vote are age, income, and education. Generally speaking, voters who are older, have higher incomes, and have more education seem to have a greater propensity to vote for the President, primarily because of their propensity to vote Republican more than as a result of their demographic group. Bloc voting against the President is evident only with a limited number of groups -- blacks, young voters (18 to 25 year olds especially in California), and Jewish voters in New York. All appear to oppose the President to a greater degree than would be predicted by their past voting behavior or party preference.

It appears to be possible to improve the vote for the President in several demographic groups where he is weak. We have made these conclusions from our analysis of the data from the individual voting blocs:

- A. Older voters (60 years and over) are the single most important group in the election. In Missouri and Oregon, the President is especially weak. Taxes, inflation, and the economy are the important issues.
- B. The President is running very poorly with young voters (18 to 24). Heavy turnout and registration by this group could be devastating. The percentage of Republican support among youth is very small. Vietnam and the economy are the issues. We have special weakness in California and Wisconsin.

- C. The vote for Nixon among blacks varies greatly. The President is running well with this group in the south, the border states, and New Jersey and New York. There is a severe credibility problem and racial appeals to this group are unlikely to work. Pocketbook issues will be important.
- D. Spanish-Americans are supporting the President to a greater degree than expected. The support appears to be flexible. We could expect to improve our support with this group by at least 15% in California.
- E. Ethnic support in Philadelphia is very weak and seems to be causing our poor showing there.

4. The importance of each of the vote determining factors varies considerably from state to state. Generally, the relative importance of these factors in affecting the vote is listed below:

- Party
- Nixon Trust
- Comparative Issue Handling Ability
- Age
- Opponents Competence
- Income
- Religion
- Education

After party, the voters' perceptions of Nixon trust and comparative issue handling ability are the factors which have the greatest influence on the President's vote.

The factors in the individual state studies are shown in Attachment A. Attachment B graphically shows the importance of these factors.

5. While the President was in relatively good shape against any of his potential opponents in January, there was a relatively small undecided vote for that point in time and there appears to be some limits on the President's potential vote. There are relatively large groups of voters who vote for the President on all of the sample ballots and who vote against the President regardless of who his opponent is on all the sample ballots. This indicates to me that once the Democratic nominee is selected the undecided vote may be very small. This, along with the probability that the Democratic candidate will increase his support and that the ratio will get closer during September and October, means that we should attempt to build as large a lead as possible between now and the national conventions on the theory that we will lose ground after the conventions. Moreover, every point we can gain between now and the conventions will come with less effort and at less cost than those percentage points needed during the fall campaign.

6. There does not appear to be any definite ideological basis for voting on any of the ballots. That is, very few people if any are voting for the President because they feel he is particularly conservative or liberal, or that people are voting against the President because they feel he is too conservative or too liberal.

7. The Vice-President's approval rating is somewhat lower than the President's in almost all of the states but follows up and down about in line with the President's. I cannot identify any particular segment of voters with whom the Vice-President is either adding or subtracting from the ticket.

8. The net effect of a Wallace third party candidacy was very small in January and has undoubtedly changed since then. We should defer any hard conclusions as to whether we want him on or off the ballot until after the second wave of polling, but my inclination at this point is that we would do better without him on the ballot.

9. There is no question but that we have a very realistic chance to carry any or all of the big states -- New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Texas, and California and we should continue to make a maximum effort in those states. California appears to me to be the one state where we may not be doing as well as we might be at this time and where there are indications of future problems. Voters in California seem to have a more fixed perception of the President. That is, of course, logical in that California voters probably know him better than those in any other state.

Recommendations

Based on our analysis, we make the following recommendations:

1. A ticket-splitter analysis should be done in each of the priority states by precinct or ward and township. For the rest of the country, the analysis should be done by county. This is undoubtedly the most efficient way to locate ticket-splitters and to develop priority areas for both our organizational and communications efforts. Moreover, it will allow us to identify Democratic areas which have some propensity to split their ticket, and from these areas we may be able to cause ticket-splitting in favor of the President.

2. With apparently small undecided vote, a strong organizational effort will be critical. I would recommend putting a disproportionate share of our resources into organizational personnel to assure that this effort is maximized. I also think our organizational effort should be structured so that we have the flexibility to concentrate our people in a few states late in the campaign, even to the degree of assigning one to each county or congressional district for the top priority states in late September and October.

Special organizational effort should be made to improve the President's voting strength in Philadelphia (especially with ethnics), New York City (outside Manhattan), Buffalo, Los Angeles (Orange County), Baltimore suburbs, Montgomery County (Maryland), Mid-Texas (Austin), rural Missouri, and Kenosha/Racine Wisconsin.

3. As indicated before, I think the development of an overall theme or idea for the campaign is imperative and that this should be done before the Democratic convention and should center around the President's hopes and aspirations for our country. To be effective it must be positive and give people the hope that many of our problems can and will improve.

4. As the President's overall issue handling ability is more important to determining vote than his handling of any individual issue, those issues on which he is perceived as handling well should be emphasized and those he is seen as handling poorly should only be used if we have an impressive story to tell or if the appeal is designed for some particular group.

5. We should emphasize the following personal attributes in our media programs:

Trust - Just
Honest
Open Minded

Competence - Experienced
Trained
Informed
Competent

It is possible to use the President's ability to handle issues in communicating the above attributes. No special effort needs to be directed to make the President appear -- warm, relaxed, and having a sense of humor. To the extent that it is possible to convey these characteristics, we should do so, but not at the expense of the trust and competence variables.

6. Special efforts should be implemented to maximize the President's strength with specific voting blocs.

A. A campaign directed at older Americans through the voting bloc group should be given top priority. Maximum available resources should be allocated into this program. A massive turnout drive should be implemented, and a supportive direct mail effort should be considered. Because of the current high level of registration, no special effort in this regard needs to be made to register older voters. Special emphasis should be made to improve our level of support with older Americans in the following priorities:

Missouri (Primarily Rural)
Oregon
Texas
Wisconsin
Maryland
Indiana
California
Pennsylvania
New York

Taxes and inflation should be given emphasis.

- B. All registration drives among young voters should be stopped. Our primary objective with this group should be low turnout and persuasion of Democrats and swing voters to vote for the President. Areas for special emphasis to improve support among young voters should be:

Wisconsin
California
Maryland
Pennsylvania
New York

Primary issue emphasis should be made on Vietnam, jobs for youth, and pollution.

In meeting our objective of converting Democrats and independents, we must be careful not to direct our young voter campaign solely at our own voters. To keep turnout at a minimum we should attempt to keep the marijuana referenda now proposed for California and Michigan off the ballot if possible.

- C. The Jewish vote bloc should implement a program to improve the President's strength with this voter group in New York state. Careful consideration should be given to the question of parochial schools with this group. Our data indicates support of aid to parochial schools may be a negative with Jewish voters.
- D. In order to carry several critical northern states we will need to carry a greater percentage of blacks than we did in 1968. Because of our credibility problems, we must be careful in making any racial appeals so that our efforts are not counterproductive.

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

MARKET OPINION RESEARCH


ATTACHMENT A

CALIFORNIA		NEW JERSEY		OHIO		TEXAS		NEW YORK		PENNSYLVANIA		WISCONSIN		INDIANA	
Party Type	21%	Party Type	7%	Opp. Issue	11%	Nixon Trust	10%	Age	12%	Opp. Competence	9%	Party Type	29%	Party Type	14%
Opp. Trust	4	Nixon Trust	6	Party Type	6	Party Type	8	Party Type	7	Party Type	7	Opp. Issue	11	Age	8
Age	4	Opp. Competence	6	Education	5	Nixon Issue	8	Nixon Issue	7	Income	7	Income	9	Income	3
Income	4	Age	5	Age	4	Age	7	Nixon Trust	5	Age	5	Nixon Trust	4	Opp. Issue	3
Nixon Strength	3	Opp. Issue	4	Opp. Strength	3	Nixon Strength	5	Opp. Issue	4	Opp. Issue	2	Nixon Issue	4	Religion	2
Nixon Competence	3	Income	4	Nixon Issue	3	Opp. Issue	3	Income	4	Education	2	Age	4	Nixon Trust	2
Sex	3	Religion	3	Religion	2	Income	2	Education	4	Nixon Competence	1	Religion	2	Opp. Trust	1
Nixon Trust	2	Nixon Issue	2	Opp. Competence	1	Religion	2	Nixon Competence	2	Opp. Trust	1	Education	1	Nixon Strength	1
Nixon Issue	2	Sex	2	Nixon Trust	1	Opp. Strength	2	Sex	2	Nixon Trust	1	Nixon Competence	1	Education	1
Education	2	Education	1	Income	1	Opp. Trust	1	Opp. Trust	1	Nixon Issue	1	Opp. Competence	1	Nixon Issue	1
Opp. Competence	2	Nixon Competence	1	Nixon Competence	*	Nixon Competence	1	Nixon Strength	1	Religion	*	Nixon Strength	1	Nixon Competence	1
Opp. Strength	1	Nixon Strength	*	Opp. Competence	*	Opp. Competence	1	Opp. Competence	1	Sex	*	Opp. Trust	1	Opp. Strength	*
Opp. Issue	1	Opp. Strength	*	Nixon Strength	*	Education	*	Religion	1	Nixon Strength	*	Opp. Strength	*	Sex	*
Religion	1	Opp. Trust	*	Sex	*	Sex	*	Opp. Strength	*	Opp. Strength	*	Sex	*	Opp. Competence	*

* Less than 1%

Numbers following each factor indicate percentage of influence on the presidential vote.

ATTACHMENT B



Numbers under boxes indicate probability of voting for Nixon. The higher the number, the greater the probability of voting for Nixon..

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

May 11, 1972

DETERMINED TO BE AN

ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

E.O. 12065, Section 6-102

By EMP , Date 8-26-82

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL

FROM:

ROBERT M. TEETER

SUBJECT:

Second Wave Polling

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend the design of our second wave polling and to get your approval of the basic design so I can begin to work with the vendors on questionnaire design and specific cost estimates.

Purpose

The purpose of this wave of polling will be to update our polling information in the priority states after all the major Presidential Primaries are over and after perception of the potential Democratic candidates is better defined. The Primaries and national events have undoubtedly changed public opinion in several important areas since January, and we need current polling data to reevaluate our position in each of the priority states, to further define our national campaign plan, and to develop individual state campaign plans.

This set of polls will allow us to identify changes in the various candidates ballot strength or perception or in the basic issue structure since January. It will also allow us to begin to develop some trend lines on both the candidates and issues for the campaign.

Some of the major areas I think should be covered on this wave are:

Secret ballot measurement of the President vs. Humphrey, McGovern, and Kennedy with and without Wallace

Ballot effect of various potential Vice-Presidential candidates

Perception of the major candidates

Familiarity/Amount of knowledge of the candidates

Approval rating/Why

Personal perception data

Measurement of core pro and anti Nixon vote

National issue structure

Rating of intensity of issue concern

Rating of candidates ability to handle major issues

Perception of whether a problem has gotten better or worse under the Nixon administration

Attitudes toward specific national problems

Tax reform/VAT

National defense

Status and attitudes toward police

Attitudes toward Congress

Attitudes toward trade unions/George Meany

Attitudes toward Phase II

Marijuana/Drugs

Farm problems

Women's issues

This data would all be tabulated and analyzed by past voting behavior, by current voting intention, by degree of commitment for or against the President, by geographic regions, and by the various demographic groups. These are essentially the same breaks that we used in Wave I and would allow us to identify any specific changes in the President's strength since January. The data from this wave would also be run by Area of Dominate Influence (ADI) which would allow the advertising people to use the data more effectively by relating it to the major media markets.

Design

I think we should divide the states to be polled into two groups on this wave and do a fairly long interview designed to get in-depth data on the candidates and issues only in the top priority states and do a much shorter (and less expensive) interview designed to get the basic head-to-head and issue data in the other states.

The states I recommend we do in June are:

Long Interview

California

Texas

Illinois

Ohio

New Jersey

New York

Short Interview

- Alabama
- Pennsylvania
- Maryland
- Michigan
- Connecticut
- Washington
- Wisconsin
- Missouri
- Oregon
- West Virginia
- Indiana

While Indiana and Alabama are not on our list of priorities, I think we ought to check Indiana because of various state problems and we should survey Alabama to ascertain the President's voting strength in one of the deep south states. Alabama was selected simply on the basis that we can conduct the study on a shared cost basis with Red Blount.

Timing

The appropriate schedule of this wave would be:

Approval of basic design	May 15
Development of questionnaire and final design	May 16-25
Preliminary approval of questionnaire and signing of contracts with vendors	May 30
Final approval of questionnaire	June 8
Interviewing	June 15-30
Preliminary reports	July 5
Final reports	July 15

Cost

The approximate cost of this wave would be \$250,000. This cost estimate does not, however, take into consideration any shared cost studies with individual states which I will negotiate as soon as this project is approved. I now anticipate the shared cost arrangements in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Texas, and possibly Washington, and Oregon.

The final cost would be determined after the questionnaire and design is finalized and will be submitted to you for approval.

Recommendation: That you approve the second wave of polling, the list of states to be polled, and the schedule. The questionnaire and exact cost estimated will be submitted for your approval by May 30.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Comment _____

CONFIDENTIAL

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

May 11, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
MR. KENNETH R. COLE, JR.
MR. CHARLES W. COLSON
MR. PETER H. DAILEY
MR. HARRY S. DENT
MR. PETER M. FLANIGAN
MR. HARRY S. FLEMING
MR. LEONARD GARMENT
MR. ALLAN G. KAUPINEN
MR. FRED C. LA RUE
MR. JEB S. MAGRUDER
MR. FREDERIC V. MALEK
MR. CLIFFORD A. MILLER
DR. ROBERT H. MARIK
MR. ROBERT C. MARDIAN
MR. DONALD M. MOSIMAN
MR. HERBERT L. PORTER
MR. RAYMOND K. PRICE, JR.
MR. GORDON C. STRACHAN
MR. CLAYTON K. YEUTTER

FROM:

ROBERT M. TEETER

SUBJECT:

Wave II Polling

We plan to do a second wave of polling in late June with results being available in early or mid July. It will consist of personal interview studies in several of the priority states and a national oversample similar to the first wave.

If there are any specific areas or subjects you would like to have covered, I would like to have this information from you by Wednesday, May 17.

This group of polls will be somewhat shorter and more limited in scope than the January wave and while it will probably not be possible to include everything everyone would like to have included, we will make every attempt to get the data that would be of use to you.

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

May 11, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By EMP NAR, Date 8-26-81

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL

FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER

SUBJECT: Final First Wave Analysis

During the past several weeks we have analyzed the first wave polling results utilizing a number of the most advanced statistical techniques available. This analysis has enabled us to identify the most important independent variables which influence presidential vote and to develop a very sophisticated analysis package which can be run and interpreted rapidly on all of our subsequent polling.

While it is not necessary to have knowledge of these techniques in order to use the results, I would be happy to go over them in more detail with you anytime.

Our conclusions from this analysis are:

1. Past party voting behavior is the single most important factor which affects the presidential vote. The classification of voters into behavioral Republicans, Democrats, or Ticket-splitters accounts for almost three times as much of the variance why people vote for or against the President as is explained by any other variable. This appears to be particularly true in Wisconsin, Indiana, and California.
2. The next most important factors affecting the Presidential vote are the voters' perceptions of the President's trust and his issue handling ability. Trust is best defined by the following variables -- honesty, open minded, and just. Seemingly, these personality traits are related to perceptions of credibility. To a lesser degree the presidential vote is related to perceptions of competence -- experienced, trained, and informed.

Most voters have a general perception of how well the President handles issues and problems overall and that appears to be more important to voting than is their perception of his handling of any one or two issues. This overall issue handling ability seems to be perceived by the voters as a single personality dimension similar in many ways to the dimensions of trust, competence, etc.

The only individual issues which appear to have any significant independent effect on voting are Vietnam, inflation, and general unrest. Vietnam and inflation were also, fortunately, the issues that the President was seen as handling well, and his ability to handle the general unrest problem was rated about equally to that of his opponents.

Those issues on which the President is rated relatively poorly -- crime, drugs, and unemployment -- do not appear to affect presidential voting to any major degree. This is particularly true of crime and unemployment. Apparently the President is seen as having done a good job on those problems that the voters think have gotten better overall, while he is seen as having done a poor job on those problems which have become worse during the last few years. There also appears to be little believability that the President will make much difference in the crime or drug problems.

3. Demographic bloc voting is significantly less important than past party voting behavior, and less important than perceptions of the candidates trust, competence, and issue handling ability. Once party behavior is taken into account there is little difference in the vote for various demographic groups. In other words, differences in the rate that various demographic groups support Nixon can be explained almost entirely by party preferences rather than membership in any particular demographic group. The factors having some but small effect on the vote are age, income, and education. Generally speaking, voters who are older, have higher incomes, and have more education seem to have a greater propensity to vote for the President, primarily because of their propensity to vote Republican more than as a result of their demographic group. Bloc voting against the President is evident only with a limited number of groups -- blacks, young voters (18 to 25 year olds especially in California), and Jewish voters in New York. All appear to oppose the President to a greater degree than would be predicted by their past voting behavior or party preference.

It appears to be possible to improve the vote for the President in several demographic groups where he is weak. We have made these conclusions from our analysis of the data from the individual voting blocs:

- A. *Older Voters* Older voters (60 years and over) are the single most important group in the election. In Missouri and Oregon, the President is especially weak. Taxes, inflation, and the economy are the important issues.
- B. *Young Voters* The President is running very poorly with young voters (18 to 24). Heavy turnout and registration by this group could be devastating. The percentage of Republican support among youth is very small. Vietnam and the economy are the issues. We have special weakness in California and Wisconsin.

Black

- C. The vote for Nixon among blacks varies greatly. The President is running well with this group in the south, the border states, and New Jersey and New York. There is a severe credibility problem and racial appeals to this group are unlikely to work. Pocketbook issues will be important.

Spanish

- D. Spanish-Americans are supporting the President to a greater degree than expected. The support appears to be flexible. We could expect to improve our support with this group by at least 15% in California.

- E. Ethnic support in Philadelphia is very weak and seems to be causing our poor showing there.

4. The importance of each of the vote determining factors varies considerably from state to state. Generally, the relative importance of these factors in affecting the vote is listed below:

Party
Nixon Trust
Comparative Issue Handling Ability
Age
Opponents Competence
Income
Religion
Education

After party, the voters' perceptions of Nixon trust and comparative issue handling ability are the factors which have the greatest influence on the President's vote.

The factors in the individual state studies are shown in Attachment A. Attachment B graphically shows the importance of these factors.

5. While the President was in relatively good shape against any of his potential opponents in January, there was a relatively small undecided vote for that point in time and there appears to be some limits on the President's potential vote. There are relatively large groups of voters who vote for the President on all of the sample ballots and who vote against the President regardless of who his opponent is on all the sample ballots. This indicates to me that once the Democratic nominee is selected the undecided vote may be very small. This, along with the probability that the Democratic candidate will increase his support and that the ratio will get closer during September and October, means that we should attempt to build as large a lead as possible between now and the national conventions on the theory that we will lose ground after the conventions. Moreover, every point we can gain between now and the conventions will come with less effort and at less cost than those percentage points needed during the fall campaign.

6. There does not appear to be any definite ideological basis for voting on any of the ballots. That is, very few people if any are voting for the President because they feel he is particularly conservative or liberal, or that people are voting against the President because they feel he is too conservative or too liberal.

7. The Vice-President's approval rating is somewhat lower than the President's in almost all of the states but follows up and down about in line with the President's. I cannot identify any particular segment of voters with whom the Vice-President is either adding or subtracting from the ticket.

8. The net effect of a Wallace third party candidacy was very small in January and has undoubtedly changed since then. We should defer any hard conclusions as to whether we want him on or off the ballot until after the second wave of polling, but my inclination at this point is that we would do better without him on the ballot.

9. There is no question but that we have a very realistic chance to carry any or all of the big states -- New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Texas, and California and we should continue to make a maximum effort in those states. California appears to me to be the one state where we may not be doing as well as we might be at this time and where there are indications of future problems. Voters in California seem to have a more fixed perception of the President. That is, of course, logical in that California voters probably know him better than those in any other state.

Recommendations

Based on our analysis, we make the following recommendations:

1. A ticket-splitter analysis should be done in each of the priority states by precinct or ward and township. For the rest of the country, the analysis should be done by county. This is undoubtedly the most efficient way to locate ticket-splitters and to develop priority areas for both our organizational and communications efforts. Moreover, it will allow us to identify Democratic areas which have some propensity to split their ticket, and from these areas we may be able to cause ticket-splitting in favor of the President.

2. With apparently small undecided vote, a strong organizational effort will be critical. I would recommend putting a disproportionate share of our resources into organizational personnel to assure that this effort is maximized. I also think our organizational effort should be structured so that we have the flexibility to concentrate our people in a few states late in the campaign, even to the degree of assigning one to each county or congressional district for the top priority states in late September and October.

Why worry about ind

Special organizational effort should be made to improve the President's voting strength in Philadelphia (especially with ethnics), New York City (outside Manhattan), Buffalo, Los Angeles (Orange County), Baltimore suburbs, Montgomery County (Maryland), Mid-Texas (Austin), rural Missouri, and Kenosha/Racine Wisconsin.

3. As indicated before, I think the development of an overall theme or idea for the campaign is imperative and that this should be done before the Democratic convention and should center around the President's hopes and aspirations for our country. To be effective it must be positive and give people the hope that many of our problems can and will improve.

4. As the President's overall issue handling ability is more important to determining vote than his handling of any individual issue, those issues on which he is perceived as handling well should be emphasized and those he is seen as handling poorly should only be used if we have an impressive story to tell or if the appeal is designed for some particular group.

5. We should emphasize the following personal attributes in our media programs:

Trust - Just
Honest
Open Minded

Competence - Experienced
Trained
Informed
Competent

It is possible to use the President's ability to handle issues in communicating the above attributes. No special effort needs to be directed to make the President appear -- warm, relaxed, and having a sense of humor. To the extent that it is possible to convey these characteristics, we should do so, but not at the expense of the trust and competence variables.

6. Special efforts should be implemented to maximize the President's strength with specific voting blocs.

A. A campaign directed at older Americans through the voting bloc group should be given top priority. Maximum available resources should be allocated into this program. A massive turnout drive should be implemented, and a supportive direct mail effort should be considered. Because of the current high level of registration, no special effort in this regard needs to be made to register older voters. Special emphasis should be made to improve our level of support with older Americans in the following priorities:

Missouri (Primarily Rural)
 Oregon
 Texas
 Wisconsin
 Maryland — ?
 Indiana
 California
 Pennsylvania
 New York

Taxes and inflation should be given emphasis.

- B. All registration drives among young voters should be stopped. Our primary objective with this group should be low turnout, and persuasion of Democrats and swing voters to vote for the President. Areas for special emphasis to improve support among young voters should be:

Wisconsin
 California
 Maryland — ?
 Pennsylvania
 New York

Primary issue emphasis should be made on Vietnam, jobs for youth, and pollution.

In meeting our objective of converting Democrats and independents, we must be careful not to direct our young voter campaign solely at our own voters. To keep turnout at a minimum we should attempt to keep the marijuana referenda now proposed for California and Michigan off the ballot if possible.

*no what -
 there are a
 lot more Catholics
 than Jews*

- C. The Jewish vote bloc should implement a program to improve the President's strength with this voter group in New York state. Careful consideration should be given to the question of parochial schools with this group. Our data indicates support of aid to parochial schools may be a negative with Jewish voters.
- D. In order to carry several critical northern states we will need to carry a greater percentage of blacks than we did in 1968. Because of our credibility problems, we must be careful in making any racial appeals so that our efforts are not counterproductive.

MARKET OPINION RESEARCH


ATTACHMENT A

CALIFORNIA		NEW JERSEY		OHIO		TEXAS		NEW YORK		PENNSYLVANIA		WISCONSIN		INDIANA	
Party Type	21%	Party Type	7%	Opp. Issue	11%	Nixon Trust	10%	Age	12%	Opp. Competence	9%	Party Type	29%	Party Type	14%
Opp. Trust	4	Nixon Trust	6	Party Type	6	Party Type	8	Party Type	7	Party Type	7	Opp. Issue	11	Age	8
Age	4	Opp. Competence	6	Education	5	Nixon Issue	8	Nixon Issue	7	Income	7	Income	9	Income	3
Income	4	Age	5	Age	4	Age	7	Nixon Trust	5	Age	5	Nixon Trust	4	Opp. Issue	3
Nixon Strength	3	Opp. Issue	4	Opp. Strength	3	Nixon Strength	5	Opp. Issue	4	Opp. Issue	2	Nixon Issue	4	Religion	2
Nixon Competence	3	Income	4	Nixon Issue	3	Opp. Issue	3	Income	4	Education	2	Age	4	Nixon Trust	2
Sex	3	Religion	3	Religion	2	Income	2	Education	4	Nixon Competence	1	Religion	2	Opp. Trust	1
Nixon Trust	2	Nixon Issue	2	Opp. Competence	1	Religion	2	Nixon Competence	2	Opp. Trust	1	Education	1	Nixon Strength	1
Nixon Issue	2	Sex	2	Nixon Trust	1	Opp. Strength	2	Sex	2	Nixon Trust	1	Nixon Competence	1	Education	1
Education	2	Education	1	Income	1	Opp. Trust	1	Opp. Trust	1	Nixon Issue	1	Opp. Competence	1	Nixon Issue	1
Opp. Competence	2	Nixon Competence	1	Nixon Competence	*	Nixon Competence	1	Nixon Strength	1	Religion	*	Nixon Strength	1	Nixon Competence	1
Opp. Strength	1	Nixon Strength	*	Opp. Competence	*	Opp. Competence	1	Opp. Competence	1	Sex	*	Opp. Trust	1	Opp. Strength	*
Opp. Issue	1	Opp. Strength	*	Nixon Strength	*	Education	*	Religion	1	Nixon Strength	*	Opp. Strength	*	Sex	*
Religion	1	Opp. Trust	*	Sex	*	Sex	*	Opp. Strength	*	Opp. Strength	*	Sex	*	Opp. Competence	*

* Less than 1%

Numbers following each factor indicate percentage of influence on the presidential vote.

ATTACHMENT B



Numbers under boxes indicate probability of voting for Nixon. The higher the number, the greater the probability of voting for Nixon.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

May 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN **G**

SUBJECT:

Celebrities

Several developments have occurred since your March 21 memorandum to Magruder on the Celebrities program for the President:

- 1) Jon Foust replaced Bart Porter as the one man primarily responsible for the success of the Celebrities program. Foust's May 5 memorandum for Mitchell is attached at Tab A;
- 2) Mitchell has agreed to participate in a briefing for the confirmed celebrities at Richard Zanuck's home in California in June. Taft Schreiber has received tentative agreement to participate from Henry Kissinger. Mitchell strongly recommends Kissinger attend. Kissinger wants clearance from you as to the advisability and timing. A memorandum for your signature is attached at Tab B;
- 3) Mitchell met with Sammy Davis, Jr. on April 14 to re-affirm his commitment to the President's re-election;
- 4) Butterfield is meeting with mixed success with Rose Mary Woods in increasing the number of celebrities at the Mexican State Dinner;
- 5) Contrary to press reports, Glen Campbell is not going to participate in the Democratic fundraising telethon.

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

May 5, 1972

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL

THROUGH: JEB S. MAGRUDER

FROM: JON A. FOUST *Joust*

SUBJECT: Celebrities for the President
American Music for the President
Athletes for the President

1. BACKGROUND

In November, 1971, you met with studio presidents, executive and senior vice presidents, etc., and formed "The Executive Committee for Celebrities for the President" to re-elect the President with Richard Zanuck as Chairman. Taft Schreiber, a member of this Committee, is the "moving force" behind the whole celebrity operation, but with his fund raising and business responsibilities Taft does not have ample time to spend recruiting celebrities, etc. Therefore, Joe Horacek, who was replaced by Ed Crane, was appointed Executive Director to handle the day-to-day operations.

Plans were also made and approved in March and April to select Executive Directors for the "Athletes" and "American Music (Country and Western) for the President."

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of the three celebrities/athletes committees are:

1. To enlist as many celebrities/athletes as possible to publicly support the President's re-election;
2. To supply talent for events scheduled and/or created by the Scheduling Division;
3. To coordinate all details pertaining to the celebrities'/athletes' attendance of an event; and
4. To assist the Scheduling Division in producing ideas for events.

3. CURRENT STATUS

A. Celebrities

At present 130 entertainers have committed to the President. This is the largest group ever assembled for a Republican candidate. They include some of the best known names in the youth group; i.e., Mary Ann Mobley, Chad Everett, Clint Eastwood, etc. Thus far thirty-five of these celebrities have been scheduled into eleven events.

Also, the Executive Committee has been formed and publicized to promote the impression that an entertainer who commits to the President will have some friends at the top of their industry. Hopefully this would allay the fears of some of the up-and-coming stars that their career would be adversely affected by supporting the President. In recruiting talent, the Executive Committee has not accomplished the desired results although they have been very successful raising funds.

B. American Music for the President

A working Executive Committee chaired by Dr. Nat Winston has been formed with Richard Frank, an attorney representing many stars, and Frank Rogers, a prominent Nashville promoter, as members.

They have commitments from several stars at this point; i.e., Bobby Goldsborough, Arch Campbell, Chet Atkins. The Committee feels quite strongly that most of the Country and Western stars will publicly support the President, with few exceptions.

A request to appoint Harry Warner as Executive Director has been submitted.

C. Athletes for the President

Last week Tom Scott, former captain of the New York Giants, was appointed Executive Director. Tom and I have discussed specific plans and by next week he plans to establish a program for recruiting "superstar" athletes.

4. PLANS AND PROGRAMS

A. Celebrities

The Committee is working on compiling a list of all celebrities to show if they are committed and to whom, and if they are undecided and our recommended action. Also, the availability and possible participation of the stars supporting the President is being determined. These lists will tell us what we are able to do with our celebrities and also show us the direction in which to go in recruiting the uncommitted stars.

May 5, 1972

As you know, three Dolf Droge parties for the 18 to 35 year-old group have been planned on May 15, 16, and 17. The day following these parties each star will be sent a package explaining the President's program. One to two weeks following the parties, the host will make a personal pitch to each star to support the President.

These parties will be followed up with parties for other administration spokesmen. The following are likely possibilities:

June	Dwight Chapin	Russia and China
July	Donald Rumsfeld	The Economy
August	John Ehrlichman	Domestic Policy

A briefing for our committed celebrities has been planned. To help make the celebrities feel like part of the President's team, you would explain the campaign and Dr. Kissinger would talk about foreign policy. This briefing should serve to generate enthusiasm in our committed celebrities.

The Celebrities Committee plans to concentrate on recruiting young stars. By May 26 each member of the Executive Committee will be personally contacted to determine those stars that they know personally and would ask to support the President, and to ascertain other sources of contacting these stars. These personal meetings will be followed up by phone calls one week and two weeks later. If these do not produce results, Taft Schreiber will be consulted for other courses of action. In addition, our Executive Director will ask each member of the Executive Committee to appoint a staff member to handle the day-to-day operations.

The chairman of the sub-committee for the rock industry has not been too helpful up to this point. By May 26 our Executive Director will determine if another approach to rock industry should be found.

B. American Music for the President

If the Executive Director is approved to start on May 15, he will submit his plan by May 31.

C. Athletes for the President

Tom Scott will submit his plan for recruiting athletes by May 12.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

March 21, 1972

E.O. 12085, Section 6-102

By emp ----- NAME, Date 8-26-81

A
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3/26
A

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: JEB MAGRUDER
FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN
SUBJECT: Celebrities

Your report to the President from Bart Porter on the celebrities situation has been reviewed. Listed below are several points that should be followed up on.

- 1) The list of committed entertainers is of little use until they are locked in to a carefully planned series of speaking engagements, rallies, appearances, etc. This plan should assign celebrities to events where they will have the biggest impact.
- 2) Perhaps young celebrities could be recruited with special briefings, tours, or participation in Presidential events. Why weren't there some celebrities invited to either the China departure or arrival ceremonies or other special events at the White House?
- 3) What can be done to recruit Johnny Cash and Charley Pride without involving the President directly? Perhaps a one on one briefing with a top White House Staff member? The American music idea sounds great.
- 4) Drugs appears to be one of the best issues to involve celebrities with the President. Witness the success with Sammy Davis Jr. Elvis Presley had been involved with Krogh and the drug problem, yet, Presley is not on your list.

5) Alex Butterfield should work closely with Taft Schreiber and Bart Porter on strictly White House events but the campaign should assume primary responsibility for recruitment and utilization of celebrities.

6) We need to use the White House more, if possible, to recruit these people. This is our unique asset and we should utilize it to the maximum.

As to your pending items list:

1) Make sure Dave Parker and Alex Butterfield know of the importance of the White House function for movie industry people.

2) Can't we develop a method of involving the White House in the Academy Awards on April 10 even if the President cannot host the April 8 reception?

3) Please advise me as to what's being done with Jack Benny.

4) Please work with Alex Butterfield to double the number of celebrities at all White House functions.

5) What about getting a group of pro celebrities, briefing them and getting them on talk shows. This would be a natural, particularly in the drug area.

Jeb, these are some random comments -- what is obviously needed is an overall program of cultivation beginning immediately.

cc: Alex Butterfield
Chuck Colson
Dave Parker

HRH:LH:kmt

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

May 4, 1972

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By END? NAL, Date 8-26-81

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT: New York Conservative Ballot

Additional cross runs were made on the New York data to determine whether the President's name should be added to the Conservative ballot in New York.

The President is currently enjoying substantial support from the conservative end of the political spectrum.

<u>Ballot</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Conservative</u>
Nixon	25%	48%	65%
Muskie	64	43	25
Wallace	4	3	6
Undecided	7	6	4

This shows that the President's voting strength clearly increases toward the conservative end of the spectrum. Similarly, 55% of the Republican support is at the conservative end of the spectrum. With ticket-splitters, 25% are conservative compared to 33% at the liberal end.

	<u>Party Type</u>		
	<u>Republican</u>	<u>Ticket-Splitter</u>	<u>Democrat</u>
Liberal	18%	33%	47%
Neutral	23	41	31
Conservative	55	25	18

If the President's name were on the Conservative ballot, he would presumably run very well with those voter segments included with the box shown on the above chart. In other words, we would expect him to run well with the Republicans and the conservative elements of ticket-splitters and Democrats. This includes 41% of the total vote. With the balance of the New York electorate, the President should be able to attract sufficient voters to have some probability of winning the state.

By not running on the Conservative ticket the President faces a risk that the Conservatives could run some other candidate. This would undermine the President's strength from the right.

We would expect that a coalition of Republicans and Conservatives would undoubtedly alienate some liberals of the Republican Party and liberal ticket-splitters; however, our data shows that there are very few liberal Republicans. Although there are more liberal ticket-splitters, a large segment of ticket-splitters (41%) are in the middle of the spectrum and a Nixon candidacy on the Conservative ballot would be unlikely to alienate these "middle-of-the-road" ticket-splitters.

The 1970 senatorial race has shown that a conservative coalition can effectively be used to win the state. Buckley won the 39% using a coalition of the Conservative Party and the "Independent Alliance." Therefore, it seems feasible to produce more than 49% of the vote (1968 Humphrey vote) using a coalition of the Republicans and the Conservatives.

Without a candidate on the Conservative ballot in 1968, the President tallied 44% of the vote. If the Conservative Party chooses to run some candidate other than the President, the vote for the President would probably be reduced to the point where victory was impossible.

In summary, we believe that it would be to the President's advantage if he were to run on both the Republican and Conservative ballots. However, if the President is not on the Conservative ballot, we should make every effort to see that the Conservative Party does not run an opposition candidate.

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

	TOTAL/ SAMPLE	LIB ERAL	TWO	THREE	FOUR	FIVE	SIX	CONSER VATIVE
TOTAL	1007 100.	103 100.	131 100.	132 100.	329 100.	112 100.	92 100.	77 100.
BALLOT D								
NIXON	444 44.	19 18.	30 23.	44 33.	157 48.	66 59.	65 71.	53 69.
MUSKIE	453 45.	70 68.	86 66.	77 58.	142 43.	34 30.	18 20.	17 22.
WALLACE	40 4.	4 4.	4 3.	5 4.	10 3.	6 5.	7 8.	4 5.
UNDECIDED	69 7.	10 10.	11 8.	6 5.	20 6.	6 5.	2 2.	3 4.
BALLOT E								
NIXON	472 47.	18 17.	40 31.	49 37.	167 51.	69 62.	68 74.	52 68.
HUMPHREY	395 39.	68 66.	73 56.	67 51.	116 35.	30 27.	14 15.	17 22.
WALLACE	47 5.	3 3.	4 3.	5 4.	19 6.	5 4.	6 7.	5 6.
UNDECIDED	92 9.	14 14.	14 11.	11 8.	27 8.	8 7.	4 4.	3 4.
BALLOT F								
NIXON	452 45.	15 15.	30 23.	59 45.	152 46.	71 63.	64 70.	55 71.
KENNEDY	432 43.	75 73.	83 63.	61 46.	135 41.	28 25.	20 22.	17 22.
WALLACE	46 5.	6 6.	4 3.	3 2.	20 6.	4 4.	5 5.	3 4.
UNDECIDED	76 8.	7 7.	14 11.	9 7.	22 7.	9 8.	3 3.	2 3.
BALLOT G								
NIXON	417 41.	19 18.	29 22.	43 33.	144 44.	60 54.	63 68.	49 64.
MUSKIE	351 35.	34 33.	61 47.	58 44.	117 36.	35 31.	16 17.	21 27.
WALLACE	36 4.	3 3.	3 2.	5 4.	12 4.	3 3.	6 7.	4 5.
MC CARTHY	105 10.	28 27.	20 15.	19 14.	25 8.	8 7.	2 2.	1 1.
CHISHOLM	47 5.	16 16.	11 8.	2 2.	14 4.	1 1.	2 2.	1 1.
UNDECIDED	50 5.	3 3.	7 5.	5 4.	17 5.	5 4.	3 3.	1 1.

	TOTAL/ SAMPLE	LIB ERAL	TWO	THREE	FOUR	FIVE	SIX	CONSER VATIVE
TOTAL	1007 100.	103 100.	131 100.	132 100.	329 100.	112 100.	92 100.	77 100.
1968 VOTE								
NIXON	428 43.	16 16.	28 21.	42 32.	146 44.	68 61.	66 72.	54 70.
HUMPHREY	325 32.	52 50.	57 44.	58 44.	92 28.	24 21.	15 16.	15 19.
WALLACE	21 2.	1 1.		2 2.	13 4.	3 3.		2 3.
DON'T KNOW/DIDN'T VOTE	233 23.	34 33.	46 35.	30 23.	78 24.	17 15.	11 12.	6 8.
CONSIDER SELF								
REPUBLICAN	283 28.	13 13.	18 14.	20 15.	85 26.	51 46.	47 51.	41 53.
DEMOCRAT	443 44.	56 54.	82 63.	62 47.	150 46.	32 29.	24 26.	24 31.
INDEPENDENT	218 22.	26 25.	26 20.	37 28.	73 22.	25 22.	16 17.	10 13.
BEHAVIORAL								
REPUBLICAN	218 22.	8 8.	16 12.	16 12.	50 15.	44 39.	38 41.	39 51.
DEMOCRAT	353 35.	58 56.	63 48.	47 36.	110 33.	24 21.	17 18.	22 29.
TICKET-SPLITTER	320 32.	21 20.	32 24.	51 39.	130 40.	36 32.	32 35.	13 17.
MARGINAL	116 12.	16 16.	20 15.	18 14.	39 12.	8 7.	5 5.	3 4.

CONSIDER SELF-LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SCALE

	TOTAL/ SAMPLE	LIB ERAL	TWO	THREE	FOUR	FIVE	SIX	CONSER VATIVE
TOTAL	1007 100.	103 100.	131 100.	132 100.	329 100.	112 100.	92 100.	77 100.
CURRENT VOTING BY COMMITMENT								
HARD NIXON	344 34.	12 12.	22 17.	32 24.	115 35.	56 50.	57 62.	45 58.
SOFT NIXON	173 17.	9 9.	18 14.	29 22.	71 22.	20 18.	9 10.	12 16.
HARD DEMOCRAT	285 28.	61 59.	59 45.	45 34.	77 23.	17 15.	10 11.	8 10.
SOFT DEMOCRAT	252 25.	18 17.	33 25.	40 30.	96 29.	29 26.	15 16.	16 21.
HARD WALLACE	22 2.	2 2.	2 2.	2 2.	8 2.	2 2.	4 4.	2 3.
SOFT WALLACE	40 4.	3 3.	4 3.	5 4.	13 4.	6 5.	5 5.	3 4.
VOTE SWITCHING								
NIXON-WALLACE/UNDECIDED	19 2.		1 1.	1 1.	6 2.	3 3.	2 2.	6 8.
MUSKIE-WALLACE/UNDECIDED	22 2.	3 3.	2 2.	4 3.	6 2.	4 4.	1 1.	
ALL OTHERS	965 96.	100 97.	128 98.	127 96.	317 96.	105 94.	89 97.	71 92.

NEW YORK STATEWIDE STUDY

CONSIDER SELF-LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SCALE

	TOTAL/ SAMPLE	LIB ERAL	TWO	THREE	FOUR	FIVE	SIX	CONSER VATIVE
TOTAL	1007 100.	103 10.	131 13.	132 13.	329 33.	112 11.	92 9.	77 8.
BALLOT D								
NIXON	444 100.	19 4.	30 7.	44 10.	157 35.	66 15.	65 15.	53 12.
MUSKIE	453 100.	70 15.	86 19.	77 17.	142 31.	34 8.	18 4.	17 4.
WALLACE	40 100.	4 10.	4 10.	5 13.	10 25.	6 15.	7 18.	4 10.
UNDECIDED	69 100.	10 14.	11 16.	6 9.	20 29.	6 9.	2 3.	3 4.
BALLOT E								
NIXON	472 100.	18 4.	40 8.	49 10.	167 35.	69 15.	68 14.	52 11.
HUMPHREY	395 100.	68 17.	73 18.	67 17.	116 29.	30 8.	14 4.	17 4.
WALLACE	47 100.	3 6.	4 9.	5 11.	19 40.	5 11.	6 13.	5 11.
UNDECIDED	92 100.	14 15.	14 15.	11 12.	27 29.	8 9.	4 4.	3 3.
BALLOT F								
NIXON	452 100.	15 3.	30 7.	59 13.	152 34.	71 16.	64 14.	55 12.
KENNEDY	432 100.	75 17.	83 19.	61 14.	135 31.	28 6.	20 5.	17 4.
WALLACE	46 100.	6 13.	4 9.	3 7.	20 43.	4 9.	5 11.	3 7.
UNDECIDED	76 100.	7 9.	14 18.	9 12.	22 29.	9 12.	3 4.	2 3.
BALLOT G								
NIXON	417 100.	19 5.	29 7.	43 10.	144 35.	60 14.	63 15.	49 12.
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WALLACE	36 100.	3 8.	3 8.	5 14.	12 33.	3 8.	6 17.	4 11.
MC CARTHY	105 100.	28 27.	20 19.	19 18.	25 24.	8 8.	2 2.	1 1.
CHISHOLM	47 100.	16 34.	11 23.	2 4.	14 30.	1 2.	2 4.	1 2.
UNDECIDED	50 100.	3 6.	7 14.	5 10.	17 34.	5 10.	3 6.	1 2.

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INDEPENDENT	218 100.	26 12.	26 12.	37 17.	73 33.	25 11.	16 7.	10 5.
BEHAVIORAL								
REPUBLICAN	218 100.	8 4.	16 7.	16 7.	50 23.	44 20.	38 17.	39 18.
DEMOCRAT	353 100.	58 16.	63 18.	47 13.	110 31.	24 7.	17 5.	22 6.
TICKET-SPLITTER	320 100.	21 7.	32 10.	51 16.	130 41.	36 11.	32 10.	13 4.
MARGINAL	116 100.	16 14.	20 17.	18 16.	39 34.	8 7.	5 4.	3 3.

CONSIDER SELF-LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SCALE

	TOTAL/ SAMPLE	LIB ERAL	TWO	THREE	FOUR	FIVE	SIX	CONSER VATIVE
TOTAL	1007 100.	103 10.	131 13.	132 13.	329 33.	112 11.	92 9.	77 8.
CURRENT VOTING BY COMMITMENT								
HARD NIXON	344 100.	12 3.	22 6.	32 9.	115 33.	56 16.	57 17.	45 13.
SOFT NIXON	173 100.	9 5.	18 10.	29 17.	71 41.	20 12.	9 5.	12 7.
HARD DEMOCRAT	285 100.	61 21.	59 21.	45 16.	77 27.	17 6.	10 4.	8 3.
SOFT DEMOCRAT	252 100.	18 7.	33 13.	40 16.	96 38.	29 12.	15 6.	16 6.
HARD WALLACE	22 100.	2 9.	2 9.	2 9.	8 36.	2 9.	4 18.	2 9.
SOFT WALLACE	40 100.	3 8.	4 10.	5 13.	13 33.	6 15.	5 13.	3 8.
VOTE SWITCHING								
NIXON-WALLACE/UNDECIDED	19 100.		1 5.	1 5.	6 32.	3 16.	2 11.	6 32.
MUSKIE-WALLACE/UNDECIDED	22 100.	3 14.	2 9.	4 18.	6 27.	4 18.	1 5.	
ALL OTHERS	965 100.	100 10.	128 13.	127 13.	317 33.	105 11.	89 9.	71 7.

COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE N.W.
WASHINGTON D.C. 20006
(202) 333-0320

May 1, 1972

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

E.O. 12065, Section 6-102

CONFIDENTIAL

By Emp NARS, Date 8-24-81

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH: JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM: ROBERT H. MARIK
SUBJECT: Priority Ranking of the States for
the Campaign

This memorandum summarizes the decisions made in the strategy meeting of April 28, regarding current priority ranking of the states, for the purpose of developing strategy and resource allocation for the campaign. A brief rationale is presented with each state or grouping of states.

CATEGORY I - SAFE STATES - (Have supported the President by large margins in the past. Should be won in 1972.)

<u>Farm States</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>	<u>1968 Nixon Margin (%)</u>
Nebraska	5	+28
Kansas	7	+20
North Dakota	3	+18
Iowa	8	+12
South Dakota *	4	+11
	<u>27</u>	

* Would not be safe if George McGovern is on the ticket.

<u>Mountain and Western States</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>	<u>1968 Nixon Margin (%)</u>
Idaho	4	+26
Wyoming	3	+20
Arizona	6	+20
Utah	4	+19

New Mexico	4	+12
Colorado	7	+ 9
Montana	4	+ 9
Nevada *	<u>3</u>	+ 8
	35	

*Nixon lost Nevada by 2% in 1960. With a Democratic registration edge of 58%D-35%R-7%I, it is the least "safe" of these states.

Border States (Recent polls suggest the President has increased his margin from 1968, particularly if George Wallace does not run.)

<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>	<u>1968 Nixon Margin (%)</u>
Oklahoma	8	+16
Virginia	12	+10
Florida	17	+10
North Carolina	13	+ 8
Kentucky	9	+ 6
South Carolina	8	+ 6
Tennessee	<u>10</u>	+ 4
	77	

New England States (Will not be "safe" if Muskie or --Kennedy is on the ticket.)

<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>	<u>1968 Nixon Margin (%)</u>
Vermont	3	+ 9
New Hampshire	4	+ 8
Maine *	4	-12
	<u>11</u>	

* Lost in 1968 with Muskie on the ticket; won in 1960, against a New Englander, JFK, by 14%.

<u>Midwest States</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>	<u>1968 Nixon Margin (%)</u>
Indiana	13	+12

Total "safe" states: 24 (163 electoral votes)

CATEGORY II - WALLACE STATES - (States won by Wallace in 1968. The President may win some, even with Wallace in the race; if Wallace is out, they should be relatively safe.)

<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>	<u>1968 Nixon Margin (%)</u>
Arkansas	6	+ 8 (Nixon Second)
Louisiana	10	+20 (Nixon Third)
Mississippi	7	+40 (Nixon Third)
Alabama	9	+47 (Nixon Third)
Georgia	<u>12</u>	+12 (Nixon Second)
	44	

CATEGORY III - PRIORITY STATES - (Close election expected; intensive campaign must be run including maximum organizational effort within the states. These will undoubtedly be Democratic target states).

Top Priority - (Maximum allocation of resources and focus of management attention. "Must win" states.)

<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>	<u>Nixon Margin (%)</u>	
		<u>1960</u>	<u>1968</u>
California	45	+0.2	+3
Illinois	26	-0.3	+3
Texas	26	-2	-1
Ohio	25	+6	+2
New Jersey	<u>17</u>	-1	+2
	139		

Second Priority - (High allocation of resources and management attention.)

<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>	<u>Nixon Margin (%)</u>	
		<u>1960</u>	<u>1968</u>
New York *	41	-6	-5
Pennsylvania *	27	-2	-4
Maryland *	10	-8	-2

<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>	<u>Nixon Margin (%)</u>	
		<u>1960</u>	<u>1968</u>
Michigan *	21	-2	-7
Connecticut *	8	-8	-5
Washington	<u>9</u>	+3	-2
	116		

Third Priority - (Lower allocation of resources and management attention.)

<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>	<u>Nixon Margin (%)</u>	
		<u>1960</u>	<u>1968</u>
Missouri **	12	-0.5	+1
Wisconsin **	11	+4	+4
Oregon	6	+6	+6
West Virginia *	6	-6	-9
Alaska	3	+2	+3
Delaware	<u>3</u>	-2	+4
	41		

* Although past electoral behavior would indicate an uphill battle for the President, recent polls suggest he has a good chance at this time to carry these states. Ultimate strategy will depend on the Democratic nominee. These states must be watched closely during the campaign, to be sure that they are treated as target states only so long as they remain winnable.

**States with the most apparent erosion since 1968.

CATEGORY IV - PROBABLE LOSS STATES

<u>State</u>	<u>Electoral Votes</u>	<u>1968 Nixon Margin (%)</u>
Massachusetts	14	-30
Minnesota	10	-12
Hawaii	4	-21
Rhode Island	4	-32
District of Columbia	<u>3</u>	-64
	35	

Administratively Confidential

February 21, 1972 ✓

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FRED MALEK

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

RNC Research Materials

I talked with Bill Horton at some length last week regarding the volume and quality of the RNC research materials. I have attached the most recent package for your information. You may want to have Bill Horton look through these regularly for you. The crucial point is that there is plenty of research information -- the problem is the translation of this information into an effective attack against the Democrats. What formal system there is is haphazardly concentrated in Pat Buchanan's office under Ken Khachigian, as well as periodic ad hoc projects by Chuck Colson. At one point, there was discussion about having Bob Marik be the one man responsible for translating the information into attack for the 1701 operation. He became inundated with other projects for Magruder. For a few weeks Bart Porter handled many of the attack operations. Now, Gordon Liddy, as General Counsel, supervises some activities. The problem is that there is no single, effective, one man responsible for this essential function. Pat Buchanan, Ken Khachigian and Mort Allin have some helpful ideas about how to implement such a system. I can give you a more complete description over the phone.

In any event, I would appreciate your thoughts as to how such a system could be implemented.

Thank you.

GS:lm