

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
16	10	6/18/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Patrick Buchanan and Kenneth Khachigan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Response to HRH Memo of June 12, 1972. 7 pgs.
16	10	6/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: H.R. Haldeman To: Patrick Buchanan RE: Buchanan Memo of June 8th. 2 pgs.
16	10	7/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Douglas Hallett To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Addendum to Memorandum of 20 July. 1 pg.
16	10	7/22/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Kenneth W. Clawson Thru: L. Higby To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Campaign Strategy. 2 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
16	10	7/24/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Douglas Hallett To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Larry Higby's Memo of July 19. 2 pgs.
16	10	7/24/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Al Haig To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Campaign Strategy Recommendations. 4 pgs.
16	10	6/18/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Patrick Buchanan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: June 12th Memo RN Posture. 3 pgs.
16	10	6/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Kenneth L. Khachigian To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Analysis of 1960 and 1968 Campaign Polls and Surveys. 1 pg.
16	10	6/28/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Kenneth L. Khachigian To: Patrick J. Buchanan RE: Polls and the 1960, 1968 Camapigns. 7 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
16	10		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	RE: Voter Characteristics. Missing first page. 7 pgs.
16	10	7/31/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Robert M. Teeter To: Clark MacGregor RE: Panel Interview Results. 2 pgs.
16	10	7/31/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Robert M. Teeter To: Clark MacGregor RE: Inflation and Taxes. 6 pgs.
16	10	6/29/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Robert M. Teeter To: H.R. Haldeman RE: 1960 and 1968 Elections. 4 pgs.
16	10	6/21/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Johnathan C. Whitaker To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Reply to June 12 Memo. 4 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
16	10	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Letter	From: Bryce Harlow To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Political Insights. 4 pgs.
16	10	6/17/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Kenneth W. Clawson To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Presidential Posture. 5 pgs.
16	10	6/16/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Robert H. Finch To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Campaign Strategy. 4 pgs.
16	10	5/26/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Johnathan C. Whitaker To: David Parker RE: Presidential Farm Scenario (written on the assumption there is a Russian grain deal). 2 pgs.
16	10	5/26/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From: Johnathan C. Whitaker To: David Parker RE: Presidential Environment Scenario. 2 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
16	10	6/12/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haldeman to Whitaker RE: RN's role in the Republican National Convention and campaign strategies. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 1 pg.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 18, 1972

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
BY EMP DATE, Date 8-19-81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN/KEN KHACHIGIAN

SUBJECT: Response to HRH Memo of June 12, 1972

Many of the points HRH mentions were omitted in our original Assault Strategy memo for the basic reason that we were focusing exclusively upon the "negative" rather than the positive. Some recommendations in the HRH memo we would concur with -- others we do not. Let's take them point by point:

"1. The Buchanan memorandum fails to recognize the necessity to keep our strength up front and center. In other words, all of our attack lines on the opposition should end up emphasizing our strengths."

We don't agree with this. For the following reasons. First, millions of Americans vote not for, but against -- their hostility toward one candidate is the compelling motive at the voting booth, not their enthusiasm for. And a "negative" campaign -- largely directed from the positive one on RN -- would in our judgment be much more convincing to those swing voters who have never been pro-RN, but who can be "terrified" by this new phenomenon. LBJ could not conceivably have gotten his sixty per cent against RN -- he got it against Goldwater, not because of the positive LBJ "ads," but because Goldwater was portrayed as a threat to the Republic. We should, in our judgment, recognize that potentially millions of knee-jerk Democratic voters are going to come our way, if they come -- because though they are not enthusiastic about RN, they are anti-radicalism.

Secondly, when one observes that McGovern apparently lost 15 points in one week in California -- among Democrats, it is clear that there is tremendous room for movement downward by McGovern -- from a relatively small investment. On the other hand, we see that RN -- from the unprecedented China trip and attendant publicity, and from the historic

Moscow visit and SALT agreement -- has only risen seven or eight points.

The lesson is clear. The potential for movement by McGovern -- downward -- is far easier and less costly, than the potential for additional upward RN movement. In short, if it takes a Peking and Moscow summit, and a SALT agreement -- and reams of hours of heroic copy to move up up seven points -- while George can be dropped fifteen in a week by some hard-nosed Humphrey attacks -- dollar-for-dollar -- when it comes to McGovern this argues we ought to put our campaigning dollars into attacking him, rather than boosting ourselves.

Third, and related: RN is known to the nation; impressions of RN have hardened over a period of twenty-five years. There are not likely to be any sudden new perceptions of RN by the masses, in five months. On the other hand, the perceptions about McGovern have not even begun to harden with the nation as a whole. We have a far better chance of affecting a change in the present image of McGovern -- than we do in the present image of the President.

Fourth, let's look at it this way. RN cannot possibly get below 40% of the vote, and cannot probably exceed 60%. Those swing voters are more than likely Democrats, or independents somewhat lukewarm toward the President (a group that would probably split half for RN and half for JFK in 1960.) What is most likely to convince them to vote 95% for RN: Is it a major campaign convincing them of what they already know fairly well -- that RN is competent, experienced and innovative in foreign affairs. (Even many of RN's opponents would concede this.) Or is it more likely to result in greater returns if we convince them rather that the "alternative" is an utter disaster for the country. In short, anyone who can be convinced that McGovern is a disaster is automatically a vote for RN. While someone who can be persuaded that RN is an imaginative foreign policy leader is not necessarily a vote for RN -- and he can still vote for McGovern. My view is that the negative McGovern campaign need not be -- and should not necessarily be -- tied to a pro-RN pitch at the end. If there were five people in the race, I would subscribe wholly to point one -- but there are only two; and anyone whom we can convince that McGovern is a wild man is ours -- for certain -- even if he at the same time thinks RN is a conservative square.

Fifth, and finally -- not only does the pro-RN approach tend to dilute an anti-McGovern message; the President should not be twinned with McGovern on those issues where our disagreements are of degree rather than kind. For example, if we are going to say McGovern is toying with the security of our country -- whereas we, too, have cut back, but only responsibly on defense -- then we are weakening our case. Where the

President can be contrasted with McGovern is where the breach is clean as a whistle. I. e. McGovern favors abortion on demand -- RN thinks this is morally wrong; i. e. McGovern favors legalization of marijuana; RN thinks this is wrong, and a threat to the American family. We should keep in mind that what we have is a President and a statesman and what they have is a light-weight and a wild man -- and we ought not to be comparing them too much in speeches, just as we don't want any debates which would have the effect of putting them on the same plane.

Lastly, look at it this way. During the fall campaign the pro-RN news footage of RN as President will probably amount to seven times the pro-RN advertising footage. Thus, the pro-RN ad materials will only be a minor reinforcement of the RN national image -- a minor fraction of the time RN is seen. On the other hand, given the pro-McGovern disposition of the liberal media, the anti-McGovern material from our campaign is likely to be a major and crucial segment of the entire anti-McGovern materials that go out to the nation.

"2. We must not get trapped into McGovern's bog of peddling himself as a new face. If people want new ideas, this Administration has the boldest initiatives in history."

We agree with the first sentence, but not necessarily with the second. The reason is this: We have spent ∞ untless hours and unrecorded effort selling the bold dynamic "New American Revolution," -- more effort probably than we can duplicate between now and November -- and the returns are, in my judgment, not encouraging. If we took a national poll dealing with RN's domestic proposals -- and asked how many considered them bold, new, imaginative and then further, how many were going to go with RN because of them -- the returns, one assumes, would not be particularly heartened. Dollar-for-dollar, again, it is not a cost-effective investment of PR time, money or effort to attempt to portray the Nixon Administration domestic program as "exciting". We would be going against a public perception; we would be attempting to convince millions of the attractiveness of "programs" when increasing numbers have about had it with government "programs" in general.

The first sentence -- about knocking down the "new face," is right on the money. McGovern has been part and parcel of the Congress which has sat on its duff for two years; he has been a member of the Democratic majority which has controlled both houses of Congress, since McGovern came to Washington.

Who wrote the loopholes in the law; who raised the taxes; who failed to provide relief; who is now sitting on its can doing nothing for the average man -- but waste his dollars. Why who, other than the Congress of which George McGovern has been an integral part since 1956, the Congress he and the left-wing liberals have been in control of, absolutely, ever since McGovern came to Washington. Wallace hit them on this, and so can we. McGovern should rightly be portrayed as not someone with new ideas, but someone with a plan to dump new billions in tax dollars down the old ratholes, he and his friends constructed over the last 16 years.

(Both the Broder and Drummond columns hit the nail on the handling of this issue.)

"3. The Buchanan memorandum deals almost entirely with domestic matters and totally misses our big issues which are foreign policy. Who is the bold leader? Who is the fresh leader? Who is the dramatic leader in foreign policy?"

Basically, we agree that foreign policy will be a long suit for the President -- and we mentioned specifically attacks on McGovern on Israel, Europe, defense and Vietnam. But, again, the same question arises. The entire nation has seen RN in China, seen RN in Moscow, seen RN sign SALT -- the coverage has been sweeping and massive. Can we really advance that appreciably with speeches and verbal references to what the nation already knows and already believes -- that RN is an imaginative statesman.

We should -- in our positive advertising, and in RN's posture during the campaign, publicly, emphasize the Somber Statesman, the imaginative statesman, who has mastery over the issues of peace and war. But we don't need to constantly draw explicit comparisons. The implicit one is satisfactory. If we can get individuals like Rockefeller, liberals and moderates, saying that McGovern is naive and a madman, if he thinks we can gut the Sixth Fleet, without Israel going down the tubes. If George can be portrayed as something totally out of his element in questions of foreign policy, a man who is both too soft and too much of a light-weight, a foolish man whom Brezhnev would eat for breakfast -- than anyone who is convinced of that is automatically an RN voter. There is no other choice.

There are two foreign policy problems we see. One -- Vietnam. Polls show McGovern's support is tied inextricably to the desire to get out of Vietnam. In our view, the "wrong from the start" materials in the Assault Book, portraying McGovern as repeatedly duped, and misled by

Communist profession of good intentions, and his "abandoning" of our prisoners should help neutralize his potential strength here. Also, if RN pulls the rug out on McGovern, with a settlement -- we should lace into him as a "squalid nuisance" who only harassed and nit-picked and back-stabbed the President who brought America out of the war -- while McGovern and company got us into a war they could not win or could not end.

The second serious problem is that McGovern is milking the old right and the new left isolationism both. Frankly, foreign aid truly has no constituency left -- and McGovern recognized this. The argument against spending our money for exotic weapons, when we need to re-build here at home; the argument that maybe our allies should do more for themselves -- these arguments hit home far beyond the McGovern constituency. (The McGovern endorsement of that 1% of GNP foreign aid [\$11 billion] with "priority on Africa" ought thus to be hung around his neck. Like Mr. Wallace used to say, "Those fellows want to give more billions of dollars away to Hottentots.")

Given the necessity for foreign military assistance and its growing unpopularity, we may have to out-demagogue George on this one, case him in that role, and use the arguments that the only way to prevent Americans from fighting future wars is to provide the natives with the guns to defend themselves. If we don't we'll have American Marines, rather than South Vietnamese Marines defending South Vietnam, as we did when McGovern's men sat in the White House.

"4. We should attack McGovern in a way that surfaces our point, not just hit his points. We should not get trapped into putting out the enemy line."

We concur. We think this is covered in our earlier points.

"5. We have to build the foreign policy issue in terms of the question of changing horses in mid-stream. In other words, President Nixon has launched some very major, far-reaching, foreign policy initiatives. We can't afford to let an inexperienced novice come in and pick up the reins at this point. We cannot afford to have McGovern in the White House in terms of foreign policy. His inexperience and

naivety in the foreign policy field would be disastrous. Do we really want "White Flag McGovern" in the White House?"

Excellent here. This is one area where we can contradict No. 3 -- especially in a possible RN speech. How should we build RN up while tearing McGovern down. Here are several ideas:

The theme that RN has brought 500,000 boys out of Vietnam, has saved that little nation from collapse, has opened the door to China, has negotiated a truce in the Cold War, has brought into bearing the most historic arms agreement in history -- and, for God's sake, let's not throw this away by putting into the White House, some rank amateur and clown who doesn't know his fanny from first base about foreign policy.

We can build up this theme, and should. The United States today stands on the threshold of building a structure of peace that can last for the remainder of this century. There is a chance, a good chance, but not a certain chance, that if RN can finish the structure which is now half built -- that for the remainder of this century no more American boys will be dying in places like Vietnam. But for God's sake, to fire the architect when the cathedral is half finished, and replace him with an engineering student is insane. This is like firing the research physicians at NIH right at the point at which they may have a cure for cancer -- and replacing them with some hippie medical students.

This could serve as a counter to the McGovern argument that RN's initiatives in foreign policy are good -- but that job is done. We must now turn to the home front. Our argument has to be the job is not done -- and anyone who thinks it is and acts on that belief, is likely to bring down the entire structure just before it is completed. The concrete is still soft -- it has not yet hardened; now is not the time to change builders.

Further, along these lines, we should emphasize the incredible naivete of McGovern who thinks that the way you negotiate with the Soviets is to cut your fleet in half, reduce your army to pre-Pearl Harbor level, mothball half your bombers, scrap much of your nuclear deterrent -- and then negotiate. RN and the people high up around him can say -- We have been there in Peking and Moscow and candidly, they will not be impressed by a nation which strips itself naked to show its good will.

They will not treat an America that abandons its strength with respect, but with contempt. They will not then be convinced that the path of peace is best, but the path of hostility and testing. My friends, a weakened and softened and beseeching America is not the kind of America that can keep the peace. Only a strong and resolute and tough nation will be respected, and be treated with respect. If we throw our arms into the sea -- the enemy response will not be to love us, but to laugh at us -- and to treat our friends and allies as totalitarians and bullies have always treated the weak.

Lines such as, "My friends, the price of peace cannot be unilaterally reduced by the United States, or George McGovern. You cannot buy security in a nuclear world by cutting your defense budget in half -- and doubling your hopes. "

"My friends, the greatest threat to peace today is not the American defense budget; it is the mistaken and indeed naive belief that permanent peace is guaranteed -- and we need not make any great sacrifices or efforts to maintain. That is not reality. That is a dream from which Americans will awake with a terrible shock, if we believe it is reality."

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

June 12, 1972

E.O. 12065, Section 6-102

By EMP NAK, date 8-19-87

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR:

PAT BUCHANAN

FROM:

H. R. HALDEMAN

SUBJECT:

Buchanan Memo of June 8th

Some points that were raised with regard to your memorandum of June 8th that you should take another look at and answer in an addendum to your original:

1. The Buchanan memorandum fails to recognize the necessity to keep our strength up front and center. In other words, all of our attack lines on the opposition should end up emphasizing our strengths.
2. We must not get trapped into McGovern's bog of peddling himself as a new face. If people want new ideas, this Administration has the boldest initiatives in history.
3. The Buchanan memorandum deals almost entirely with domestic matters and totally misses our big issues which are in foreign policy. Who is the bold leader? Who is the fresh leader? Who is the dramatic leader in foreign policy?
4. We should attack McGovern in a way that surfaces our point, not just hit his points. We should not get trapped into putting out the enemy line.

5. We have to build the foreign policy issue in terms of the question of changing horses in mid-stream. In other words, President Nixon has launched some very major, far-reaching, foreign policy initiatives. We can't afford to let an inexperienced novice come in and pick up the reins at this point. We cannot afford to have McGovern in the White House in terms of foreign policy. His inexperience and naivety in the foreign policy field would be disastrous. Do we really want "White Flag McGovern" in the White House?

In writing your addendum, take the point of view of how we can attack McGovern in a way that builds the President's foreign policy image. This is our strong point.

HRH:LH:kb:LH:pm

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


21 July 1972

Larry

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM DOUG HALLETT



RE: Addendum to Memorandum of 20 July

I note in today's paper Clark MacGregor's recommendation that the President not campaign until the last three weeks of the campaign and then that that period be set aside for campaigning. Because my two previous memoranda have not been too specific on this point, I want to make my position clear. I think it is important that the President never appear to begin campaigning. He should phase into it after the convention. From September 1 on there should be a mix of D.C.-based substantive activities, substantive travel, and mass rally travel (5 or 6 at most for the entire fall). As September flows into October, the mix should just become more heavily weighted to substantive travel and then in the last two weeks more weighted to mass rally travel. Thus, there might be one mass rally on or about Labor Day, one in late September, one in mid-October, and two during the last two weeks -- and any rally appearance should be connected with a substantive appearance the previous or next day. On the substantive travel side, there might be three trips in September, three in the first two weeks of October, and four from mid-October on. Thus, the overwhelming weight of the President's appearances would be at least theoretically government-related -- and he would appear talking about governmental issues. There is no law that says you have to campaign with a bunch of goddamn balloons and Nixonettes and mouth a lot of partisan banalities -- the President can attract attention and dominate the airways and the issues in other, more effective -- and less destructive -- ways.

cc: Charles W. Colson

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 22, 1972

EYES ONLY/ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
THRU: L. HIGBY
FROM: KEN W. CLAWSON *KC*
SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

(1) The President has maintained a high-level, busy executive posture between the conventions with the single exception of greeting Frank Fitzsimmons and members of the Teamsters Union Executive Board at San Clemente. I think this exception to the generally high-level tone the President has set was a justifiable one and really quite valuable.

(2) I am still convinced that in general terms the high level Presidential posture is still the most valid, but it is only meaningful if all 100 plus surrogates and, for that matter, the whole government apparatus is campaigning like hell from this moment until election day.

I feel strongly that to "free" the President to comfortably maintain his image as a Presidential candidate lies in how effectively the surrogates and the government apparatus really hurl themselves into the campaign. If we are less effective than we should be, I envision it becoming necessary for the President to come off his best posture and to, in effect, take over the campaign by interjecting himself fully into the fray. I find most Cabinet Officers and high-level surrogates with whom we deal are anxious to campaign extensively, but I think it is imperative that we monitor the surrogates program extremely closely to make sure we are getting every ounce of energy into the campaign.

As far as travel is concerned, I still believe that it should be Presidential-related travel, keyed to our target states and specific voting blocs.

(3) I think we should take great pains to paint McGovern as a "minority leader of a minority constituency." I think we should give every indication that any "regular, normal" American, whether he be Republican, Democrat or Independent, can find leadership and solice under the Nixon umbrella. I think that we should use words like "elite, fringe, extremist" and even in some cases "radical" to portray the constituency of Senator McGovern. Every effort should be made to isolate McGovern's more vocal backers from the mainstream of the Democratic Party and the nation as a whole.

Whether McGovern is before his time or after his time in philosophy and in substance, he and his followers should be portrayed as a small, closely-knit cadre of over-educated, lazy, fat-of-the-land type minority. In foreign policy, where we are in my opinion, miles ahead, McGovern should be portrayed as inexperienced, rural, yokel, naive and isolationist. Personally, he should be portrayed as an individual who is not the kind of man that world leaders could respect. Indirectly, he should be portrayed as womanish, weak and a waffler. In short, a man without backbone, a candidate whose positions are never firm, who lacks courage to make the hard decisions and to stick to them in the face of adversity. For example, in Florida when he indicated he would keep a residual force in Southeast Asia on one day and then completely back away from it in the face of opposition from some of his more radical supporters in the Doral Hotel Lobby.

(4) As we were able to do in 1968, the McGovern people will have the advantage of being able to attack every little or big mistake from one end of the Executive Branch to the other and pin all of the failures and errors and foibles on the President. I personally think that Ted Kennedy will still be McGovern's most effective campaigner and that he will trumpet the health issue all over the country if we don't preempt him to the best of our ability starting now.

Kennedy, who seems bent on the '76 nomination for himself, will probably be given press coverage equal to McGovern's wherever he speaks, and I think we can count on his stumping for McGovern extensively so that he may report after McGovern loses in November that he did everything in his power to elect the Democratic ticket. We probably ought to have a team whose speciality is to monitor Kennedy and respond to him.

Larry

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 24, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

HR. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

DOUG HALLETT

RE:

Larry Higby's Memo of July 19

This is in response to the second part of Larry Higby's memorandum of July 19, asking for my thoughts on the best use of Mrs. Nixon, Tricia, and Julie, during the campaign.

I have become a great fan of Mrs. Nixon's -- I think she is a great asset and can be a very substantial addition to the campaign. She should appear with the President quite frequently. In addition, she should have her own schedule of appearances at volunteer projects, hospitals, schools, etc. -- these she does fabulously well. Like the President, her appearances should be at least theoretically governmental. Carefully-selected TV talk shows might be another possibility -- these, however, would have to be carefully selected -- obviously Liz Drew's show would not be appropriate.

I would ^{not} combine Tricia's appearances to the Deep South and joint appearances with Mr. Cox in which he is a speaker or otherwise the dominant performer. As part of this, she might do some Northern talk shows in conjunction with Mr. Cox or even alone. But these should be carefully selected. Merv Griffin's audience is appropriate -- Dick Cavett's would not be. If anybody has to waste time appearing before women's Republican lunches -- and I hope as little of this as possible can be done -- Tricia is the one.

Julie is excellent before virtually all kind of audiences except the most superheated and sophisticated liberal types. Ethnic picnics, volunteer projects, children's hospitals, schools, etc. -- these are the kinds of colorful, visual, and informal events at which I think Julie does well. Since she speaks Spanish, she should be

programmed for a lot of Spanish-type appearances in New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Texas, and especially California.

My memorandum of June 15 already suggested a Sunday evening before-the-election family show and a Monday daytime Nixon women show -- I reiterate these suggestions here.

cc: Charles W. Colson

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 24, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: AL HAIG 
SUBJECT: Campaign Strategy Recommendations

I would not substantially modify my earlier recommendations on the subject of campaign strategy but rather would reiterate the following points:

1. The President should maintain a posture of being generally above the political infighting not just because he has to conduct the business of State but, more importantly, because his overall record speaks for itself and his "stooping to conquer" will only serve to enhance the McGovern prestige and tend to equate two totally unequal contenders.

The President's greatest personal asset is both the image and reality of an experienced, thoughtful, unemotional and exceptionally competent and tough national leader. Should he succumb to classic partisan gut-fighting, the activity would detract from this optimum posture. The tactics employed by the President himself should involve a careful and continuous appraisal of the need for his personal role as November approaches. It may be that the posture I am recommending will in the natural course of events develop the need for a fighting, tub-thumping, one-time Presidential speech in which the President rolls up his sleeves and takes on McGovern head on. While such a speech should be prepared and held for contingency use, a decision to proceed should only follow a most careful assessment that there is, in fact, a demand. If it is determined that a demand does exist then the speech should be given as late as possible in the campaign to prevent gutter type rebuttals which can again only result in an escalation of this kind of activity. Under no circumstances should a "tub-thumper" of this kind be considered for the President's acceptance speech at Miami.

2. With respect to campaigning and travel, obviously others will have more refined and experienced perspectives. I still, however,

continue to believe that the President should avoid over-exposure especially in contrived purely political environments. A non-frantic, "business-of-State" schedule should insure plenty of preelection exposure but great care should be taken to develop venues which are Presidential in character and which will enable him to talk appropriately from a statesmanlike position with the full weight of the Presidency behind him, i. e., not just as another candidate. Venues should focus primarily on opportunities which can be nationally televised. These are the opportunities which get impact. In this vein, nothing is of greater importance than the timing (prime time) and substance of the President's acceptance speech.

Themes to be exploited should cover: foreign policy, National Defense and perhaps two or three domestic issues, such as law and order, philosophy of government and welfare.

3. In my view, the greatest single exploitable accomplishment of the President is foreign policy but beyond that it is his demonstrated willingness to make tough, courageous decisions in times of national crises, i. e., Jordan, Cuba, Cambodia, Laos, May 8th and South Asia. For this reason, one of the greatest single dangers between now and November would be a panicky posture on Vietnam. In my view, the issue has been largely defused since American boys are not dying as before, American youths are not being drafted and most Americans attribute this to Presidential toughness above all else. Most Americans sense an aroma of finality in the policies we are currently pursuing in Vietnam. In a political sense, the benchmark for this American confidence was the decision of May 8. The backdrop, however, is an accumulative series of courageous decisions made all along the way which have in large measure proven to be correct. Should we panic in the last five minutes by accepting a compromise solution which is obviously detrimental to American and South Vietnamese interests there is a great risk that much of our constituency will become disaffected.

4. I agree completely with the theme that we should generally posture cabinet members and advocates in the direction of not personalizing attacks on McGovern's radicalism but rather take him on, issue by issue, in a repetitive fashion and being sure they credit him with his most extreme earlier positions. A specific line should be developed and approved for each issue and be repeated and repeated until it acquires a reality of its own which the opposition must squander all of its resources to counter.

The overall image of McGovern that we should attempt to develop is one of a sincere, well-meaning but totally inadequate and unqualified Presidential candidate. We must not permit the opposition to dig out of the extreme positions which McGovern has already placed on the record. The opposition is already launching a major effort to do so. Forcing the opposition to justify or in some cases to move away from earlier stated positions will tend to alienate their own extreme constituency and keep them in a defensive posture throughout.

5. To me, the greatest weakness of the McGovern camp is also its greatest strength. His current image is one of a loner who is honest and uncompromising in his desire to shatter all preconceived political, international, defense, management and welfare patterns of the U. S. Government. Beyond this, he is viewed as favoring a fundamental shift in the very life style of the American people. Unfortunately, there are many Americans, including many well-to-do intellectuals and even bureaucrats who live in a theoretical world which permits them to savor a whole new approach. The youth and intellectuals are obviously most attracted to this kind of logic. For this reason, it is essential that we focus primarily on the impracticalities of this approach, issue by issue and theme by theme. It is also important that our own positive statements clearly portray the President as a successful innovator who has himself, through skill and experience, brought about more change than could ever be experienced by the ill-conceived and pie-in-the-sky themes which characterize the McGovern platform.

These are, of course, generalities which must be specifically tailored for specific constituents. Labor, for example, must understand that McGovern would suck away their hard-earned earnings for the welfare parasite. The establishment must understand that their hard-earned financial rewards could not be shared with their heirs.

In the international area, the theme Secretary Rogers mentioned at the Leadership Meeting is an especially good one, i. e., McGovern seems to favor an extension and continuation of the large majority of our international programs but would self defeatingly deprive the country of the assets which have thus far made these programs succeed, i. e., military strength and responsible international involvement.

6. I would again emphasize the Presidential family concept through which the President, Mrs. Nixon and the daughters be employed at every turn in the months between now and November. The President's family man image and the public attractiveness of Mrs. Nixon and the girls cannot be over-emphasized. It also contributes in an indirect way to the great theme that President Nixon represents the personification of valued American family traditions which dramatizes by example the inadequacies of an off-beat zealot whose main appeal can only be to the misfits in American society.

7. Finally, and above all, it must be recognized that the preceding merely confirms a strategy for exploiting existing assets. Written strategy of this kind and generalizations about what we have going for us are meaningless without a detailed, well organized and, above all, disciplined machine for carrying the strategy forward in an effective way. Bad strategy can be overcome by effective management. A perfect strategy implemented in an ill-disciplined, poorly timed or sloppy way can be disastrous. I am not sure that our organizational arrangements and the detailed development of themes, scheduled Presidential appearances, Advocate appearances, etc., are precisely delineated or that a manned command and control mechanism is firmly in place and properly functioning. If this has not been done, it is the overriding task of the moment. This, you are best able to assess.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 18, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

In response to your memo of June 12 re: RN Posture --

A) Have no hard feelings about what RN should be doing between Conventions. He should of course maintain the Presidential pedestal, eschew partisan activity, if not political. On this, however, we should be flexible, spending the outcome of the Democratic Convention. That is the event off which the President's activity should be keyed. If the dominant theme coming out of that convention is, say, pro-marijuana, abortion -- or pro-welfare -- then in our substantive actions, taken by the President, there might well be the drawing of the issues. Again, however, we will have to await the Democratic convention to determine this.

B) Post-convention to election, again, we should hold now to a posture of flexibility. If RN is running a lead following the GOP Convention, a good lead, his surrogates should handle the campaigning for him -- and he should only do enough to defeat the charge of the "front-porch" campaign. Since our strength is foreign policy in a world where there is a deep desire for peace -- RN should not rule out major foreign policy meetings, high visibility, which cast him in the role of Statesman, in unspoken contrast to McGovern, who one imagines will be waging a partisan argumentative campaign.

C) RN should hold off vigorous campaigning for as late as possible. Perhaps a couple of days early in the campaign -- then a testing of the effectiveness of this personal campaigning. I have a real question whether RN on the stump tends to add uncommitted votes, or whether the benefit is largely in terms of rallying troops, with the uncommitted tuned out. In any event, stump speaking should be on a high, high level. Even the drawing of differences between us and them should be on a high level.

D) Would not rule out of consideration a half-hour televised address by the President, or V. P. stating the "differences" between the candidates, in non-partisan, but ideological ways. We have so much on McGovern; we may want to take it directly to the people in a single message -- even while our surrogates are hitting the individual messages on the stump.

E) Suggest consideration be given to a series of Oval Office fifteen minute addresses, with the President using the sounding board of the White House -- to make his campaign appeal to the American people. Foreign policy, Social policy and more Government vs. less Government (and less taxes) could be the Nixon appeal. They should be candid, straightforward, and give the clear-cut differences between the two of us, rather than a blurred type thing. (This corresponds with my view that while many elections find both candidates ending up saying the same thing -- this time we want to put some air between us and McGovern, and paint him as honest, sincere, and way, way out.)

F) Let's keep his travel schedule flexible. However, the President in campaigning should not restrict himself to COP audiences at all. The idea of a giant Catholic or ethnic audience -- a kick-off address in Cadillac Square -- something symbolic to indicate the new GOP should be actively considered. It would be wrong to rule out GOP audiences -- but we have to assume that they are going to be ninety percent with us. The President should seek out massive audiences of the swing voters in this election -- who will not unlikely be the Northern Democrats who cannot abide the elitist, permissive liberalism of George McGovern.

G) One thought. Why not have the V. P. candidate, assuming that it is Mr. Agnew, and John Volpe, right at the head of the Columbus Day Parade down Fifth Avenue. From our polls, one understands that what we risk losing to McGovern are upper income moderate GOP WASPs (we have to scare them back with the "socialist" issue) and what we stand to gain are the lower and middle income ethnics and working class, many of them of immigrant origins, and many of them Catholic.

(One thing we could do for the President is to put that crazy Forest Hills integration scheme over the side; it would help up immensely with Jewish and ethnics, who don't want their neighborhood busted up by liberal bureaucrats.)

H) On strategy for attack -- my thoughts are already largely in hand. However, just some reminders:

1. Don't shoot it all out of a canon at once; dribble it out so that as soon as McGovern has spent four days answering one charge, the next one is moved from the front burner onto the serving board.

2. Avoid stridency and nastiness and partisanship -- some of this is certain to creep in late in the campaign, but the press here is intolerant of our attacks where it is indulgent of the opposition's. Keep our cool for as long as possible.
3. A late start in the campaign -- unless we are behind in the polls, would be my recommendation. I recall well how all our people, and some press were saying, "Get the hell up to New Hampshire; Romney is starting to make enormous gains." We waited to the last minute, and then campaigned sparingly and rolled up an eight-to-one margin. We ought to again, hold our fire until they are right in front of the trenches.
4. We ought to have a formal reassessment of the strategy midway in the campaign. And have what I do not feel we had in the general election of 1968 or of 1970 -- the flexibility to shift gears rapidly and move off one theme or one approach onto another.

OPPOSITION LINE OF ATTACK

Already, they are signaling what it is. They are going to use the "trust" thing, McGovern is a candid, honest man whom you can believe, while Nixon is shifty, and crafty and has a credibility gap -- and the character of our leader is important. (This partially explains their reluctance to move off their "tinkertoy proposals." They don't want their man to be in the position of being portrayed as another shifty politician. Some of them fear that worse than the radical charge.)

Our response. Wait a piece until they start up this attack; it will get harsh. And then our top surrogates should go over on the attack -- accuse McGovern and his people are using a campaign of character assassination against the President of the United States -- and demand that if they are going to whisper at rallies that the President is dishonest and untruthful, by God they should have the courage to come out and say it publicly. Accuse them of using "code words" to call the President an evil man; accuse them of a gutless refusal to debate us on the issues, and of a retreat into the politics of slander and smear. If they confront us on the issues, I don't see how --- if they are clearly and politely and consistently made -- we can lose this one.

Random thoughts of a summer afternoon. The important thing is to keep our flexibility, not lock into a Schlieffen Plan at this particular point in time. The old Eisenhower adage here is apposite. Planning is essential; plans are worthless.

Buchanan

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 29, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

FROM: KENNETH L. KHACHIGIAN 

You asked Mr. Buchanan to prepare an analysis of the 1960 and 1968 campaigns in terms of the changes in the polls and surveys. Pat asked for my thoughts on this. Because Pat was tied up with his efforts on the briefing book, he asked that I go ahead and send you my memorandum as an interim report, though not one which necessarily reflects his views.

Pat indicated that he will respond to the request as soon as he is able.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
FROM: KENNETH L. KHACHIGIAN 
SUBJECT: POLLS AND THE 1960, 1968 CAMPAIGNS

Mr. Haldeman is correct in his reading of the polls in 1960 versus those in 1968. (See attached graphs) In 1960, between June and November, the Gallup poll was virtually unchanged. RN had in November the same percentage he had in June, and JFK had only slightly more in June than he did in November. In 1968, the 16 point spread we had in August went down to the two point spread which Gallup gave us in November. It should be noted that the Harris Poll in August, 1968, taken about the same time as the Gallup, showed only a six point lead for RN over HHH compared to the larger Gallup spread.

In 1960, RN only had the lead once during the campaign, and this was immediately following the Republican National Convention -- after which he jumped 6 points over JFK. In 1968, as we all remember, the lead continued to dwindle with Humphrey taking votes right out of the hide of George Wallace and out of the undecided voter. From the polls, it is apparent that RN had a solid bloc of votes that stayed with him throughout the year while HHH steadily picked up from the switches and undecideds.

What does this all mean?

One interpretation is that RN gets a solid bloc of voters which lean to him, and this bloc is very difficult to enlarge as well as very difficult to diminish. If that is the case, then in a two-man race this year, the election will be fairly close with RN winning by about four percentage points or less. This interpretation, however, is somewhat like a doctrine of predestination, with the assumption that events between June and November will not change things. I'm not willing to accept that interpretation totally since for the first time RN will be running as an incumbent President and will be much more in command of the determining events.

The other way to interpret these phenomena, however, is in terms of the manner in which the campaign is conducted, and I lean towards this interpretation -- especially in a year where we control the levers of government.

In 1960 (and I confess I was still struggling through high school), there were two types of campaigns run -- the JFK style where you start out at virtually full steam and continue at full steam, winning by the sheer force of momentum and the RN style where you slowly build up steam and momentum in order to have the campaign "peak" on election day. I don't subscribe fully to the theory that a candidate can fully "time" his campaign to meet the standards of "game plans." On the contrary, in the heat of the campaign, there is such an intense movement of events as to require a virtually daily requirement to alter strategy -- one of the mistakes I believe we made in 1968 was to get locked in to a broad game plan from which we were unwilling to extricate ourselves until too late.

The 1960 campaign is not easily interpreted along the "game plan" lines because of all the interrupting factors -- RN's knee injury, the debates, etc. Thus, to an extent, the 1960 campaign handled the events as they came.

Moreover, the 1960 campaign was a fairly classic campaign in issues confrontation. I grant that personality played a role -- it always does -- but JFK and RN did battle hammer and tong on a lot of damned important issues. From the outset RN took the case to the country that things were pretty good in America, that there was room to improve things, but that by and large we don't need anyone knocking America around. JFK, of course, took the position that we had to mobilize the country along his suggested lines, and the debate was joined with the issues falling in line with considerable distance between RN and JFK on most of them.

Consequently, in 1960 the voters knew what the choice was -- very little was fuzzed up. Given this set of circumstances, it is not surprising that the polls changed very little. Only minor twists and turns in the campaign, plus some bizarre pieces of bad luck -- the heavy beard in the debates, the arranged release of M. L. King, Jr. by the Kennedys, the theft of votes in Texas and Illinois -- made the difference.

In 1968, we may have overreacted to the criticism that there was not enough planning in the 1960 campaign, and of course the decision was made to pick the direction in which to go and stay on course until the end. Unfortunately, this made us unable to deal sufficiently with the liberation of HHH at the time of his Vietnam speech -- and once he was liberated, a whole new strategy was needed. I will grant that the bombing halt overly distorted the campaign and inured overwhelmingly to the benefit of Hubert. Nevertheless, I do not doubt for a minute that Hubert had the momentum going for him on election day. He was on the move.

The thing about 1968 is that Hubert began beating us to death over -- issues. Medicare, the poor, a good economy, decent jobs -- these were all in the HHH attack plan, and we did not respond until too late. He damn near made it sound like we were the "ins" and they were the "outs." We had the basic issues going for us but used them insufficiently to win the greater margin which we might have.


Having said all this, I must warn against comparisons between 1960 and 1968. The Wallace candidacy made a great deal of difference, I believe. Wallace made it difficult for the lines to form early in the campaign. He was a damned nuisance who clouded things up. HHH figured this out earlier than we did and began playing RN off against Wallace, picking up the pieces as he went along. If Wallace is out of the 1972 campaign, I feel the situation will be much more like 1960 (which, as you know, has been a favorite thesis of mine for some time).

The 1972 campaign will be an important "issues" campaign with two extremely distinctive philosophies battling against each other. We are, I believe, on the right side of the preponderance of these issues, and it will be McGovern who tries to fuzz the issues in favor of personality, trust, and all the other crap. Nonetheless, if we accept the notion that issues will be fairly determinative (and by this I mean four or five big ones -- not revenue sharing or the environment), then broad planning should fall along the lines of drawing the issue differences sharply at the outset of the campaign.

Once the differences have been drawn (and I think they almost already have) the campaign is going to be one -- like 1960 -- of playing that confrontation in such a way as to keep our issues out front, not letting up on our strengths and not playing to our weaknesses. Unlike 1960, we have much more going for us in terms of differences with McGovern; i. e., in terms of what the American public wants. In 1960, there was probably a 50/50 split in terms of what the public wanted. Our task, then, is to keep this advantage by pressing those issues and pressing them in such a way as to keep McGovern away from the weak links which could bring us down.

Thus, if we start in August with a 54% to 46% edge over McGovern, my guess is that we can keep this lead right on through if we don't let the differences slide by through a skilled McGovern campaign. Every two or three days, we should look at how things are going and plan accordingly -- following a basic outline, but not being so blind as to ignore major shifts of opinion once they start to occur. If something works, let's keep using it; if it doesn't work, let's toss it aside and go with something else.

I confess that it is not easy for me to map this out with short time and space constraints, but I think the fundamental points are in here. I caution against too much comparison between 1960 and 1968; the times were different; the circumstances were different; the candidate was different. I opt more for a comparison between 1960 and 1972 and hold the belief that much is to be gained by understanding the basic similarity of conditions. The lesson of 1968 lies in campaign "technique," not in historical analogy. So let's understand what is similar between 1960 and 1972 and learn from what we did wrong in 1968, and I think we are well on the way to four more years of keeping the rascals out.




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PERCENT

POST-CONVENTION PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE

	Nixon	Humphrey	Wallace
August 24	40%	34%	17%
November 1-2	42%	40%	12%
November 3	40%	43%	13%

HARRIS POLL




POST-CONVENTION PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE

PERCENT

	Nixon	Humphrey	Wallace
August 21	45%	29%	18%
Early Sept.	43%	31%	19%
Late Sept.	43%	28%	21%
Early Oct.	44%	29%	20%
Mid Oct.	43%	31%	20%
October 27	44%	36%	15%
November 4	42%	40%	14%

GALLUP POLL



DATES Aug. 21 (1968) Early Sept. Late Sept. Early October Mid October October 27 Nov. 4

The second group are those who have only begun to split their ticket in the past few years and who have previously voted straight Democratic. Even though they are now clearly ticket-splitters and are available to us in this campaign, they will still probably vote for a majority of Democrats. Many of them split for Wallace in the last election and many switched from Wallace to Humphrey late in the campaign. This group is lower on the socio-economic scale than the first group and age is somewhat less of a factor. They are often (but not necessarily) Catholic, and in the large cities of the East and Midwest, often have ethnic backgrounds. They are essentially the blue collar working middle class.

Candidate Perception

The President is rated quite well on the three key personality dimensions -- trustworthiness, strength, and competence. He is rated higher on the trustworthy dimension now than he was in January and this is a scale on which we rarely see any movement for a well-known figure. However, there is no significant difference between the President and McGovern on the trust or strength dimensions. He gets his highest ratings by far on the competence dimension and has a large advantage over McGovern.

Several specific questions were asked concerning credibility and the results indicate that a significant number, though a minority, do not think the administration has been completely honest with them, particularly with regard to Vietnam. However, when viewed against the President's personal trustworthiness ratings I think that the problem is as much one of government not being credible as it is of the President himself not being credible. More importantly, I think this is a problem that can be at least partially solved by separating the President from it and then having him attack the problem. Although he hasn't gotten much credit for it, he appears to have done this to a degree by ordering the reviews of classification and secrecy procedures. Another possibility might be for him to attack the pork-barrelling practice of Congress adding non-related spending items to major appropriation bills if and when he vetoes some major spending bills.

The President however does get fairly low ratings on the amiability or friendliness dimensions. While he is seen as trustworthy, strong, and competent he is not seen as warm, friendly, etc. There is no indication, however, that this is detracting from his support. In contrast to 10-12 years ago, being dynamic or friendly is simply not viewed as being an important qualification for the Presidency. This is not to say, however, that higher ratings on these scales would not be of some assistance in attracting new votes.

The President is also seen to a degree as a one dimensional President. That is, in contrast to some past Presidents, he is viewed almost exclusively as one who is the chief of State, and the head of the

government rather than as the head or leader of an entire culture -- sports, the arts, life style, etc. In a sense he is viewed as a "professional" President, that is, one who is trained, experienced, competent, respected for his ability, and concerned with the official duties of his job full time. There is also no evidence that this is losing us any votes at all.

McGovern's perception is still being set at this time. Although most of the respondents could rate him on the various personality and issue scales, his various ratings were similar indicating that the knowledge of him is quite superficial.

Compared to the President, McGovern's ratings for trustworthiness, strength, and amiability were not significantly different from the President's but he was rated much less competent than the President. I would expect to see McGovern's personal image take much more definite shape in the next few weeks.

The most important issues continue to be Vietnam and the economy, particularly inflation, both in terms of general concern and of importance in voting for the President. Taxes, drugs, personal safety are also important but definitely secondary to Vietnam and inflation. The minor issues such as abortion and marijuana do not appear to be affecting Presidential vote. The tendency to lump amnesty, abortion, and marijuana all together is not supported by the data. Amnesty is viewed as part of the Vietnam issues and therefore relatively important. Abortion is not seen as a major national problem and the voters are split almost equally on this question of liberalizing abortion statutes. Liberalization of the marijuana statutes is opposed by a substantial majority, but is not seen as an important issue in the Presidential election.

Bussing is seen as a moderately important problem in those local areas where it is a reality or there is a pending decision but is not at all an important issue outside of those areas. It is not a major national issue and while we may want to use it in those areas that have been directly affected, there is no reason for us to make it a national issue.

Unemployment is a moderately important issue but not one which is currently costing us any votes at this time. Very few people who are most subject to unemployment are potential Nixon voters. This will probably remain the case as long as it continues to decline. There appears to be a threshold at which unemployment becomes a major concern of large numbers of voters whether they are unemployed or not but below that level only those who are unemployed are immediately threatened are concerned. Undoubtedly this is also related to the trend of the unemployment statistics. The issue of more and better jobs has, however, always been an effective issue and even though unemployment per se is not a major concern, I don't think we should overlook the job issue.

The general issue of national defense is also seen as a moderately important issue but with varying attitudes about the specifics. There is support for the idea that a strong national defense is a means to peace. Yet a large majority think we should cut our armed forces. The reason for this is, however, a belief that there is great waste in the defense department, not that we don't need a strong national defense.

% Mention As One of Top
Three Problems Facing U.S.

Vietnam	57
Crime	14
Inflation	13
Drugs	13
Economy	12
Race	11
Unemployment	11
Environment	11
Poverty	9
Taxes	7
Bussing	5

There is some concern on the part of a large group of voters, many of them ours, or potentially ours, with the general issue of change and of the concentration of power in large institutions -- government, labor, business. This issue does not appear to be specific or to have taken shape yet but looks like one which could become of increasing importance. Any of our questions which even hinted at the need for change or the concentration of power issue got strong responses on the side of change and more concern for the individual citizen.

This appears to be particularly true with regard to large unions. More people blame them for inflation than blame business, or the President and Congress combined and other recent data indicates a real lack of sympathy with large or crippling strikes. With regard to business, the problem seems to be one of a lack of faith in the honesty or with being adequately concerned with either the customer's or the public's welfare.

Government is seen as too expensive, distant, inefficient, and simply ineffective. The citizenry simply does not think they are getting their moneys worth for their taxes. At the same time, however, they want and expect government to solve whatever problems they presumably think are important.

With just three exceptions the President's ratings on his handling of issues have held fairly constant and positive since January. Between January and June his ratings on the change issue increased significantly and his ratings on inflation and taxes dropped markedly. His rating on Vietnam remains high with 35% more people rating him positively than negatively.

McGovern's ratings are fairly positive but not very well defined as yet. This, however, may not change for the majority of the issues in the short time between now and the election.

ISSUE HANDLING

	<u>Nixon</u>		<u>McGovern</u>	
	<u>Positive</u>	<u>Negative</u>	<u>Positive</u>	<u>Negative</u>
Vietnam	65%	30%	42%	26%
Inflation	47	46	41	42
General Unrest	57	33	43	20
Crime	56	36	46	17
Unemployment	50	43	43	20
Drugs	53	36	44	18
Taxes	46	48	40	24
Bussing	46	40	35	24
Health Care	69	21	50	12
National Defense	73	18	43	23
Environment	60	30	50	11
Racial Problems	60	31	43	20
Foreign Policy	81	11	40	22
Welfare	52	39	43	22

Conclusions

One of the unique things in this set of data is its consistency across the various states particularly with the perception of the President. His strong and weak points in terms of personal perception is very similar in all of the priority states. The major issue concerns are also fairly uniform across states but there is some significant variance in the importance of the secondary issues.

In the top priority states the President's pattern of support is very close to that which Republicans have won with before, that is to get 90-95% of the Republicans, 15-20% of the Democrats, and a large enough majority of the ticket-splitters to win.

Assuming we get 95% of the Republicans and 15% of the Democrats, the following table lists the percentages of the ticket-splitters we must get in each of the priority states to win a two-way race.

Minimum Percentage of Ticket-Splitters
Needed to Win State

California	70%
Connecticut	60
Illinois	60
Michigan	75
Missouri	75
New Jersey	60
New York	65
Ohio	55
Oregon	60
Pennsylvania	70
Washington	65
Wisconsin	70

Our first priority is to re-create what has been the proven winning coalition in those states before. This means we need to get majorities among those who have traditionally split their ticket. Our next priority should then be to go after the Democrats who have just begun to split their tickets. We also should go after those Democrats who have not yet split their tickets but are similar demographically to those who have. Past experience indicates that some campaign effort directed at these people will cause some new ticket-splitting.

In terms of issues we should concentrate on the major national issue Vietnam, the economy, taxes, drugs, and crime. These are the issues that are going to decide the most Presidential votes and it is to our advantage to keep the campaign directed to them and not on the minor issues of abortion and marijuana.

While the data on the President is generally optimistic there are two soft spots or potential problems that need attention. His ratings on inflation and taxes are poor and down sharply from January. These issues are closely related and important to Presidential vote.

We have some weakness in the general issues of change. A large majority think we need fairly drastic change and they do not see the President as being for this change. I think it is important that we show the President as an innovator and as one who is for responsible change as opposed to McGovern who is for radical and irresponsible change.

We should move as soon as possible to harden up these soft spots while they don't appear to be costing us any sizable groups of votes now, they are points at which we are vulnerable to attack. We should move before McGovern has a chance too.

There are several elements that I think should be present in the general thrust or image of the campaign. First, it should have a central idea or theme. We know from the first wave data that the President is viewed as a tactician and as one without a master plan or strategy for the country. A theme or central idea would give us the common thread with which to tie together all of his accomplishments and give the voters a reason to vote for the President.

Second, the campaign should show the breath and complexity of the President's accomplishments and proposals. One of the elements of his support is that he is doing a good job in a very difficult or impossible job. This would take advantage of that feeling.

Third, it should show the President as an innovator and for responsible change for the reasons discussed earlier.

Fourth, it should show him as being concerned about improving the lives of the citizens. We need to emphasize that the ultimate purpose behind all the President's trips, programs, and actions is to help our citizens enjoy better lives. We need to communicate how his program is going to help "you" not some special interest group or institution.

Fifth, we should emphasize those plus qualities which the President is seen as having and which are believable - knowledgeable, wise, competent - and not try to make him something he isn't.

The campaign should have the element of hope. The voters have got to believe that things are going to improve over the next four years with Richard Nixon as President or they have no reason to vote for him. They are not going to reward him for the past four years. One of the basic elements of the American attitude and of American politics has always been hope for better times. People don't like negativism.

We should work to the people's desire for a more calm, orderly, and peaceful life style. Even though we may be on the side of the majority, it does not serve our purpose to become strident or increase the acrimony in the country. One of the problems with the '70 campaign was that while people were against long hair hippies, marijuana, permissiveness, etc. what they were for was a return to a peaceful, orderly life style and while our campaign was on the majority side, we were seen as making the fight two sided but adding to the acrimony.

We now have a fairly large lead which will probably decline, at least partially. However, as long as we have a substantial lead it is to our advantage to keep things calm and on the high road. We should take as few chances as possible and not let it get close.

This is not to say, however, that we should not do anything to introduce some negatives on McGovern. We do need to have a fairly regular flow of negative material on him while his perception is being set but we should take full advantage of his own problems and let the press do as much of it as they will without our help. However, if McGovern's negative press does taper off, we should be very careful about how we attack him. We simply cannot take a chance of damaging the President's respect and trust which are not yet particularly deep or well set. Any attacks on McGovern should be directed at the extreme nature of his positions and not at him personally.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12356, Section 1.1

By AAH NARA, Date 3/12/95

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

July 31, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, Section 6-102
By Emp-----, date 8-19-81

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE CLARK MacGREGOR
FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER *RMT*
SUBJECT: Panel Interview Results

As you know, we paneled (re-interviewed) approximately 50% of the respondents from our Wave I national poll as part of our Wave II national study.

Attached is a table which shows the direction and amount of vote switching between January and June. As Muskie was the strongest Democratic candidate at that time, the most meaningful comparisons are between the January Nixon-Muskie race and the June Nixon-McGovern race. The distribution of the Wallace and Kennedy votes in the Nixon-McGovern race is also interesting.

The President retains significantly more of his January support than any of the Democrats, picks up as much or more of the undecided vote as McGovern and gets more of the Wallace vote than McGovern.

He loses 12% of his January support to McGovern but picks up 19% of the January Muskie support. Moreover, the January undecided vote splits 51% for Nixon, 23% for McGovern, with 26% remaining undecided.

The January Wallace vote now splits 40% for Nixon, 37% for McGovern, and 21% undecided on the two-way ballot. On the three-way ballot 64% stays with Wallace, 13% goes to Nixon, and 14% to McGovern.

It is also interesting that he gets 25% of the January Kennedy vote to McGovern's 58%. This is a further indication that Kennedy appeals to a unique coalition which is not transferable to any other Democrat.

During this period the President clearly gained more than he lost and he did not lose any specific group of supporters. This period was more of a shaking down period and the switching away from the President has no pattern and appears to be simply a random switching.

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

Wave II Trial Heats

				Q22			Q23				
		Un	Weight-	Nixon	McGovern	Undecided	Nixon	McGovern	Wallace	Undecided	
		weight-	ed								
		ed									
TOTAL U.S. VOTERS		508	513	50	33	17	44	28	19	9	
Wave I Ballots	A	NIXON	271	262	77	12	11	64	11	21	4
		MUSKIE	211	224	19	60	21	20	49	17	14
		UND	26	27	51	23	26	37	25	29	9
	B	NIXON	292	276	77	13	10	63	11	21	5
		HUMPHREY	194	216	18	58	24	20	49	17	14
		UND	22	21	29	40	31	22	42	27	9
	C	NIXON	286	261	74	13	13	64	13	18	5
		KENNEDY	188	220	25	58	17	20	46	22	12
		UND	34	32	29	29	42	32	29	17	22
	D	NIXON	243	228	79	10	11	73	11	12	4
		MUSKIE	192	199	21	59	20	22	52	12	14
		WALLACE	56	68	42	37	21	13	14	64	9
		UND	17	18	49	29	22	28	31	28	13
	E	NIXON	266	246	80	12	8	71	12	12	5
		HUMPHREY	175	185	16	61	23	17	52	14	17
		WALLACE	50	59	45	28	27	13	14	71	2
		UND	17	22	27	50	23	34	52	7	7
	F	NIXON	256	233	77	12	11	71	13	11	5
		KENNEDY	179	202	24	58	18	23	49	16	12
		WALLACE	45	52	42	29	29	5	11	75	9
		UND	28	27	34	35	31	33	37	14	16
G	NIXON	216	202	85	8	7	75	9	13	3	
	MUSKIE	140	151	21	58	21	24	51	14	11	
	WALLACE	42	51	41	33	26	16	16	66	2	
	McCARTHY	48	42	33	47	20	29	39	18	14	
	CHISHOLM	16	18	6	49	45	9	37	9	45	
	UND	46	50	37	44	19	29	35	19	17	

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

July 31, 1972

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By AMP NARL, Date 8-12-72

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE CLARK MacGREGOR
FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER *RMT*
SUBJECT: Inflation and Taxes

While the second wave data is generally very optimistic, two potential problems are apparent. The President's ratings on inflation and taxes have fallen sharply since January and he appears to be vulnerable on the more general issue of change against McGovern. This memorandum summarizes the data on inflation and taxes. The change issue will be covered in a subsequent memorandum.

In all states surveyed the President has experienced a substantial decline in his ratings on his handling of inflation.

<u>Selected States</u>	<u>Percentage Rating the President's Handling of Inflation as Positive</u>		
	<u>Wave I</u>	<u>Wave II</u>	<u>Change</u>
California	62%	45%	-17%
Illinois	*	47	N/A
Maryland	69	48	-21
Missouri	64	45	-19
New Jersey	65	37	-28
New York	62	43	-19
Ohio	69	47	-22
Oregon	59	40	-19
Pennsylvania	70	47	-23
Texas	68	52	-16
Wisconsin	63	49	-14

In January, approximately two-thirds of the voters gave the President positive ratings on handling inflation while today equal numbers of voters give him positive ratings as give him negative ratings. Overall the President's ability to handle inflation has dropped about 17%, across the priority states. A similar decline is also evident in the percentage approving of the way the President handled all economic matters.

* Comparable data on Wave I is not available.

This decline results from the feeling that the problem has worsened during the past six months and that his programs have not slowed rising prices. Half of all voters and more significantly half of the ticket-splitters now share this view. The problem is especially acute with respect to food prices. Seventy-two percent of the voters hold the opinion that rising food prices have not been slowed. This belief is held consistently by all demographic groups and in all geographic regions, although it is particularly pronounced in several large metropolitan areas.

Nearly two-thirds of the voters give the President negative inflation ratings in Chicago, Philadelphia, New York City, St. Louis, Detroit, Newark, Northern California, Milwaukee and Tacoma.

At the same time only 8% of the voters blame the President directly for causing inflation. The greatest mention went to unions blamed by 37% as most responsible for rising prices. Business is seen as the next greatest cause being mentioned by 36%.

In terms of solutions, 66% would favor more drastic measures such as a total freeze on food prices similar to Phase I.


Taken together the above data may indicate that although the voters do not blame the President for causing inflation, they do not think he has been effective in solving it.

Similar to the situation in inflation, the President's perceived ability to handle taxes has declined significantly in most states since the first wave.

<u>Selected States</u>	<u>Percentage Rating President's Handling of Taxes as Positive</u>		
	<u>Wave I</u>	<u>Wave II</u>	<u>Change</u>
California	53%	44%	- 9%
Illinois	*	48	N/A
Maryland	65	48	-17
Missouri	61	53	- 8
New Jersey	48	36	-12
New York	50	43	- 7
Ohio	62	50	-12
Oregon	54	39	-15
Pennsylvania	57	44	-13
Texas	68	56	-12
Wisconsin	54	42	-12

*Taxes not included on Wave I Illinois poll.

Tax reform may be especially important in the campaign because it is an issue on which McGovern's perceived position is closer to the general population's position than Nixon's and one which is related to the change issue. The data from the seven large states is almost identical to Illinois which is demonstrated below.



Need Tax Reform

Do not need Tax Reform

Self: 2.4	Total Rating Nixon: 4.4	Total Rating McGovern: 3.0
Rep.: 2.6	Rep. Rating Nixon: 3.6	Rep. Rating McGovern: 2.9
T-S: 2.4	T-S Rating Nixon: 4.2	T-S Rating McGovern: 2.9
Dem.: 2.0	Dem. Rating Nixon: 4.9	Dem. Rating McGovern: 3.2

(See Attachment for other states)

In Illinois 77% of the voters favor tax reform with only 11% opposed. The important point is not so much that a large majority favor major tax reform as it is that the President is seen as being opposed to tax reform. Although McGovern enjoys a better position overall than Nixon on tax questions, 63% of the voters specifically oppose the McGovern proposal to give direct financial aid to those with less than \$12,000 income and thereby resulting in higher taxes for those with incomes over \$12,000.

With regard to local property taxes, 51% favor continuation of it as the means to finance public education compared to 40% who are opposed. Those opposed would favor a national sales tax to replace local property taxes followed by federal income tax and sales tax as alternatives.

Conclusions

Inflation and taxes are clearly related in the minds of the voters and are the greatest potential problems evident in the data. While we do not appear to be losing any significant number of votes on these issues now, it is definitely a potential problem and one we should act to solve soon. I have seen instances where this kind of attitude shift has not immediately resulted in loss of ballot strength but later caught up with the candidate and cost him votes. Should McGovern begin to gain strength and segments of the Democratic coalition begin to come back together, inflation and taxes appear to be the issues that could be most effectively be used against us.

We should keep in mind that while inflation is related to all elements of the rising cost of living, including taxes, most voters relate it directly to food prices.

I think that the President should take some action dealing with the inflation problem immediately and that the tax reform problem should be handled some time early in the campaign before McGovern has a chance to get a hold of it. If the President can boost his rating on inflation near the January level, it should carry through the election. While I do not think tax reform is as urgent as inflation, it is an important issue and one on which we are especially vulnerable to McGovern. Tax reform seems to be related to the general issue of economic and social change and to the concentration of power issue on which McGovern appears to have an advantage.

Inflation and tax reform are problems the President should handle personally. They are important with virtually every significant group in the electorate and he should get the direct benefit of any action he takes. The key criteria of whatever action he takes should be that it be clearly seen as being in the interests of the individual worker and consumers and not for any special interest group.


The surrogate program should then continue to communicate the President's action on inflation and taxes in those geographic areas of the country where they are particularly important and where the President receives low ratings on his ability to handle these issues.

I believe that the President would gain in overall strength if he were to take strong action against rising food prices, even though there might be some temporary decline in strength from the farm belt. However, there are simply many more food purchasers than farmers, particularly in the top priority states.

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY


ATTACHMENT
(Tax Reform)

CALIFORNIA




Self: 2.2	Total Rating Nixon: 4.4	Total Rating McGovern: 2.8
Rep: 2.8	Rep. Rating Nixon: 3.5	Rep. Rating McGovern: 2.6
T-S: 2.2	T-S Rating Nixon: 4.4	T-S Rating McGovern: 2.9
Dem: 1.9	Dem. Rating Nixon: 4.9	Dem. Rating McGovern: 2.8

NEW JERSEY



Self: 2.2	Total Rating Nixon: 4.5	Total Rating McGovern: 2.7
Rep: 2.7	Rep. Rating Nixon: 4.0	Rep. Rating McGovern: 2.5
T-S: 2.1	T-S Rating Nixon: 4.4	T-S Rating McGovern: 2.9
Dem: 2.1	Dem. Rating Nixon: 4.8	Dem. Rating McGovern: 2.6


NEW YORK



Self: 2.0	Total Rating Nixon: 4.4	Total Rating McGovern: 2.7
Rep: 2.4	Rep. Rating Nixon: 3.5	Rep. Rating McGovern: 2.7
T-S: 2.1	T-S Rating Nixon: 4.2	T-S Rating McGovern: 2.6
Dem: 1.8	Dem. Rating Nixon: 5.0	Dem. Rating McGovern: 2.6


Attachment Cont'd.

OHIO




Self: 2.3	Total Rating Nixon: 4.3	Total Rating McGovern: 2.7
Rep: 2.8	Rep. Rating Nixon: 3.7	Rep. Rating McGovern: 2.4
T-S: 2.3	T-S Rating Nixon: 4.2	T-S Rating McGovern: 2.7
Dem: 2.0	Dem. Rating Nixon: 4.7	Dem. Rating McGovern: 2.9

PENNSYLVANIA



Self: 2.2	Total Rating Nixon: 4.2	Total Rating McGovern: 2.9
Rep: 2.5	Rep. Rating Nixon: 3.6	Rep. Rating McGovern: 3.1
T-S: 2.1	T-S Rating Nixon: 4.2	T-S Rating McGovern: 2.7
Dem: 2.1	Dem. Rating Nixon: 4.5	Dem. Rating McGovern: 2.9

TEXAS



Self: 2.7	Total Rating Nixon: 4.4	Total Rating McGovern: 3.4
Rep: 3.1	Rep. Rating Nixon: 4.0	Rep. Rating McGovern: 3.2
T-S: 2.6	T-S Rating Nixon: 4.4	T-S Rating McGovern: 3.4
Dem: 2.6	Dem. Rating Nixon: 4.4	Dem. Rating McGovern: 3.3

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

Committee
for the Re-election
of the President

1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 333-0920

DETERMINED TO BE AN
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June 29, 1972

E.O. 12065, Section 6-102

By ent ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 5-18-81

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

ROBERT M. TEETER

SUBJECT:

1960 and 1968 Elections

This memorandum is in reply to your request for a comparison of the 1960 and 1968 campaigns and of the changes that occurred in the survey data during the two campaigns. It is based on an analysis of public polls (largely Gallup), the University of Michigan Survey Research Center's After-Election Studies, individual Market-Opinion statewide polls and my observations of the 1968 campaign. I do not have the campaign polling for either 1960 or 1968, and I was not actively involved in the 1960 campaign.

The following campaign polls^{1/} taken during 1960 and 1968 indicate great differences between the two races:

<u>Date</u> (1960)	<u>Nixon</u>	<u>Kennedy</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
March	47%	47%	5%
June	48	46	5
Late Sept.	47	46	7
Early Oct.	45	49	6
November	48	49	3

<u>Date</u> (1968)	<u>Nixon</u>	<u>Humphrey</u>	<u>Wallace</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
April	43%	34%	9%	14%
Early May	40	36	14	10
Late May	36	42	14	8
Early June	37	42	14	7
Early Sept.	43	31	19	7
Late Sept.	44	29	20	7
Early Oct.	43	31	20	6
Late Oct.	44	36	15	6
November	42	40	14	4

^{1/} It was impossible to obtain demographic breakdowns of the Gallup vote for 1960 in the time allotted for this paper. We are, however, making arrangements to get this information.

The 1960 election was neck and neck throughout the campaign. The undecided vote was considerably less in 1960 than in 1968. The undecided vote only increased from 5% to 7% following the initial Nixon-Kennedy debates, at which time Kennedy took the lead and eventually won the election.

In April of 1968 the undecided vote was high with 14% of the voters unable to make a choice. Nixon held a substantial early lead until the North Vietnamese agreed to Paris as a negotiating site. Then Humphrey surged ahead in the polls and maintained his lead until after the conventions. Later, the Humphrey lead declined and there was a corresponding increase in the Wallace strength. Apparently, the disorder at the convention caused a swing to Wallace away from traditional Democratic vote. In the closing days of the campaign the Humphrey vote greatly increased. According to Gallup, Humphrey's dramatic gains in the last days of the campaign resulted from a decline of the Wallace strength in northern states returning to their traditional Democratic vote.

It is significant to note that the Nixon strength remained fairly constant between 42% to 48% after the convention in both years. Very little switching seemed to occur to and from Nixon.

There are several significant differences between 1960 and 1968 which would make it unwise to conclude the 1960 Nixon campaign was more effective than the 1968 campaign:

1. The 1960 election was a two-way race and the 1968 election was a three-way race. The three-way race tended to delay the final decision and increase switching simply because of more choices presented to the voter. This is a characteristic of all elections with more than two candidates and we have observed this in primary elections and in Canada. Also, this was the first time that most American voters were confronted with such a situation and Wallace's candidacy caused them to be ambivalent in their choice. In order to vote for Wallace they had to break lifelong voting traditions. This explains why more older voters returned to the Democratic column than younger voters.
2. The Catholic issue was very important in 1960 and not in 1968. It caused a large number of voters to make up their minds on that basis as soon as Kennedy was nominated.
3. Another major difference is the 1968 Democratic convention which divided the Democratic party as compared to a relatively united party in 1960. Kennedy had the support of an active and united party in 1960, while Humphrey had to contend with major splits on both left and right with McCarthy and Wallace in 1968.
4. Kennedy was also a clearly more attractive and popular personality in a time when the electorate was looking for a young and dynamic leader. He also had the advantage of representing change and running against an incumbent administration, while Humphrey had the problem of having to separate himself from a very unpopular

administration of which he was a key part. Kennedy could blame the Eisenhower/Nixon administration for all the problems of the time; but, Nixon, on the other hand, was not a beneficiary of Eisenhower's personal appeal and Eisenhower got credit for all the successes of his administration.

5. The issue structure was very different in 1960 and 1968 in terms of the general attitude of the country and the specific areas of concern. The general attitude of the country was relatively positive, optimistic, and hopeful in 1960, but extremely negative and without hope in 1968. In 1960 the country was at peace, the economy was in relatively good shape, the race, crime, drug problems had not become critical and there was no major environmental/consumer issue. In 1968, however, the electorate was frustrated over the war, personally feeling the effects of inflation, frightened over the domestic unrest, and worrying about the environment. The fact that there were more serious problems in 1968 and that each of these were becoming worse combined to give the country a very negative pessimistic attitude.

There are several reasons why I believe it would also be unwise to conclude that 1972 is similar to either 1960 or 1968. First, and most important, is that each election is to a large degree unique in terms of the perception of the candidates, the general attitude of the electorate, and the specific issues. Therefore, the 1972 election with the President running as an incumbent against McGovern will not be particularly comparable to 1960 or 1968. In fact, I suspect it may be more comparable to 1956 than 1960 or 1968. The reason for this is the incumbency. In 1956, the last time an incumbent was running for re-election, voters decided how they would vote earlier than any election in recent time. 76% of those who voted had decided how they were going to vote by the week after the convention. Studies by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan have demonstrated that in both 1960 and 1968 the percentage deciding how to vote immediately after the convention dwindled. George Gallup wrote in 1960 that the only time there was a major shift in sentiment during 1948, 1952, or 1956 came as a result of a dramatic international event. I believe we are at such a stage now, and that most people will have made up their minds how to vote by the time of the Republican convention unless there is an international event to change their minds.

There is one recurring problem for the President which is evident throughout all of this data. We have a very difficult time moving the committed vote over 50%. The job seems to become increasingly more difficult the closer we come to the election because of the declining number of voters who are undecided. This suggests that we should be actively trying to increase the President's committed vote in the next 30 to 45 days. Once voters actually decide they are going to vote for a candidate, most of them stay committed.

Every point we can gain now will come much easier than those we have to get in the Fall. This would have to be done largely through the President's policies, programs, statements, surrogates and not through the campaign. I do not think we should do anything to lengthen the period of the actual political campaign. The shorter the actual campaign, the better for us.

Overall, we would suggest that consideration be given to increasing Presidential appearances during the next 45 days and also beginning the surrogate program earlier than originally planned.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 21, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: John C. Whitaker

John C. Whitaker

SUBJECT: Reply to your memo of June 12 (Tab A)

1. Between conventions, I see no change in the President's posture -- avoid the semblance of campaigning -- particularly the temptation of large rallies, Astrodome, etc.

He is still owed a CBS head-to-head or what have you, following ABC's Howard K. Smith interview and NBC's Day in the Life of a President. I assume a format with CBS is an option up to the GOP Convention. If it is, I've always liked (1) the idea of a satellite press conference with CBS correspondents worldwide. This will tend to keep the questions in his strongest suit - foreign policy, or (2) riskier, but all the great elements of a "put down" -- students in auditoriums in London, Bonn, Tokyo, Mexico City and Washington, etc. -- the CBS moderator at each site selects the kids to ask the questions from a forest of hands. The questions will be radical, and if we are lucky, insulting. As I recall, Reagan and Bobby Kennedy did this once and Reagan came off great -- just as V.P. Agnew did on the Frost Show. Only he just had the opportunity for a few nasty kids in the same studio.

Immediately after the Democrats nominate a candidate, the President might call him and offer a briefing. There is a two-way pull here. Brief the hell out of him -- President, CIA, individual Cabinet officers -- and play the "splendid-good-sport-but, gee-we-are-competent-and-should-stay-in-office" game, versus our desire not to overexpose the candidate -- hard to have it both ways.

2. From the convention to the election. I think the key question is will COPE, labor, etc., congeal behind say McGovern or a Kennedy. If we get any early reading that they won't then by all means run a low risk campaign. If it's a HHH, Muskie type, i. e., a candidate labor can enthusiastically endorse, then a higher risk campaign is in order. Or if McGovern bows to the pressure and sponsors a mid-road platform at Miami, then COPE may pitch in and again I vote a higher risk campaign. Like you, I come from the generation that lived those awful five or six weeks when RN dropped from a 15 point lead over HHH to a near dead heat -- because the Democrats "healed" (which we can't control) and RN ran a low risk campaign (which we can control). The combination was near fatal.

a. His posture? Issue-oriented meetings. Just as he has been doing for the last three years (low risk, right on through the election).

b. When should he start campaigning? Right now as long as they are issue-oriented stops.

c. How much travel should he do? Not much. One day a week is plenty through Labor Day, but even after that, two days a week at most as long as when we are in Washington he is more active, i. e., instead of a blizzard of hand-out statements by the President (as we have done for the last three years) he walks out into Ziegler's shop and says it himself. He is on the tube three nights a week for two minutes (about what you get after a full day on the road) running the Government himself instead of some Cabinet officer that the public doesn't recognize talking for the President.

d. Where should he go? I'm tempted to say just the key 15 states, but something off beat is okay if only to throw off the press a bit. I'm even in favor of him leaving the country for a week in the middle of the campaign if it is very substantive -- but I think the surrogates should rigidly stick with the key states.

e. Activities he might engage in (see my memo to Dave Parker -- Tab B on farm events and Tab C on environment events). Beyond my own areas of substance, I'd recommend (1) regional press conferences -- let the national press scream that they are in competition with local press and let's see who asks "dumb and flabby

questions" -- we both know he will get more home run balls from local press (medium to low risk); (2) Domestic Council briefings where he comes in at the end and does the "round-the-world" speech. No risk; (3) in key states, invite editorial (TV and papers) into Washington. Start now -- he will sell the hell out of them. He would need to do one standup press conference to get the animals off Ziegler's back (high risk) and then rapid fire he could knock off 10 editorial boards before the press would call foul and do the New York Times early. Once you start playing these ground rules, see the columnists as well, two or three at a time. Libs and conservatives together, Kraft and Kirkpatrick, then a Wilson and Reston, etc.; (4) continue to use his, in my mind, most successful format from 1968, five or six radio think pieces on the years ahead -- not just the next four years -- the liberal press loves them and writes about them (no risk); (5) as his juices thirst for a good old rally, satisfy them like LBJ did -- don't go to the damn auditorium for the rally, stop the car a block from the place where the substantive meeting is to take place and just hold it -- a five minute, not a 25 minute talk -- a crowd around the car fills just as much of the TV set as a crowd in the Astrodome. I can't see him using a horn like LBJ -- there must be a better electronic answer.

3. Any thoughts on issues, timing, points of attack? No matter who the candidate is:

a. Make no tax reform until next year a virtue -- just how I don't know. Its so simple to play McGovern's line of "soak the rich." Above all, we need "one liners" to combat this - very good ones.

b. Work very hard on busing -- come with a constitutional amendment approach to busing as late in the campaign as you can, i. e., when we are credible that Congress won't pass his busing moratorium.

c. Think of the exchange visits to Russia on implementing the trade, space, health, environment, etc: agreements as picture stories. We can whack off good wire photo if we send colorful people to Russia. Secretary Butz on a grain deal. Risk turning a Wally Hickel loose in Russia on our environment negotiating team -- not

faceless technicians. Get pictures of him looking at Arctic oil pipeline technology, etc. Peterson will be drab on trade negotiations -- would Connally fit? VonBraun on the space team with Frank Borman -- I can't even recall without looking it up in a book who runs NASA. Similarly, if it is in the realm of possibility to send name people to China between now and the election, I'm for it.

d. Do more on drugs -- a great issue -- unlike the environment you don't win on one side and lose on the other with every move you make.

4. The opposition's strategy will be tax reform, the economy, too much money for defense, busing (if our timing is not careful), ties to big business (ITT, pushing consumerism, environment) -- not much unless we make a mistake. Our greatest vulnerability is tax reform. I also worry about food prices, but not enough to throw the farm belt away with a food freeze now until I know I'm in worse trouble than I think we are with the consumer. Vietnam: even without a resolution, I'm not overly concerned as long as there is not a lot of killing going on in South Vietnam during the fall.

If McGovern is the candidate, there is a real question in my mind that the President should try to personally go after him. The press is doing such a good job of undermining McGovern's proposals, I'm not sure there is anything to be gained by the President himself going after McGovern. Admittedly, HHH has been taking McGovern apart. That may die down after the nomination -- but let's look before we leap on this one. Maybe the press and our surrogates can cut up McGovern and leave the President above him and ignoring him.

Lastly, let's not be too defensive -- everything we have done doesn't have to be perfect -- certainly the economy isn't. A "well, we'll do better" posture is always disarming.

cc: John D. Ehrlichman

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1972

1533
Eyes Only

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. WHITAKER
FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN *H.*

It has been requested that you summarize your views and analysis on the following points:

1. What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?
2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican Convention to the election? When should he start campaigning? How much travel should he do, where should he go, what type of activities should he engage in?
3. Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.
4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and how we should meet it.

Please let me have your memorandum by 5:00 p. m. Friday, June 16.

cc. [unclear] →

May 26, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVE PARKER

FROM: John C. Whitaker

SUBJECT: Presidential Farm Scenario (written on
the assumption there is a Russian grain deal)

JUNE 12: Midday event after Houston. Bondurant, Iowa, farm of Ray Elson, selected as one of four outstanding young farmers by U.S. Jaycees. Secretary Dutz does farm media briefing on this farm before President arrives. Theme - farm exports and the details of the Russian grain negotiations. Governors from corn and wheat belt - both Republican and Democrat invited:

John Gilligan, D - Ohio
Richard Ogilvie, R - Illinois
William Milliken, R - Michigan
Edgar Whitcomb, R - Indiana
James Exon, D - Nebraska
Patrick Lucey, D - Wisconsin
Wendell Anderson, D - Minnesota
Robert Docking, D - Kansas
Warren Hearnes, D - Missouri
William Guy, D - North Dakota
Richard Kneip, D - South Dakota

President arrives and does "how-it-was-in-Russia" speech with moderate focus of grain negotiation and maximum focus on what the grain export means to corn and wheat belt. One option would be to also include remarks by Secretary Rogers as "bait" to get farm media to come. President does tour of farm for photo opportunity.

Republican Governors return to their states. Colson's operation programs local TV talk show featuring Governor and USDA spokesman

JUNE 15-16: When President Eisenhower is in Washington, have signing ceremony on the U.S. / Mexican agreement on eradicating the screwworm from southwest United States and Mexican cattle. Invite Senator Tower and cattle lobby -- morning news lead preferable. Press briefing by Secretary Butts on screwworm - followup Butts / Tower TV talk show in Texas the next day.

JULY 6: Bakersfield California - late afternoon (after Gateway West in L.A. for p.m. east coast news lead). Visit farm between Bakersfield airport and downtown. Color event - receive fruits, vegetables. Maybe motorcade last few blocks to downtown conference. Again, farm exports would be pushed because California benefits from our farm exports -- exclusive of a Russian deal. We will have to take a last minute reading on the Chavez picket problem before we commit.

MID-AUGUST: Farm Family of the Year from Arkansas - Oval Office photo opportunity. The Carlos Dear? Dixon family - wife and three children - Arkansas milk farmer (See tab A for details)

SEPTEMBER 26-28: Calcsburg, Illinois (40 miles from Peoria) Farm Progress Show - Would probably turn out to be about like the Springfield, Illinois event. Color photo shot - probably drop farm policy plank: white paper. A serious piece which won't say too much on purpose.

OCTOBER 11-13: National Convention of Future Farmers of America. Municipal Auditorium, Kansas City, Missouri. I think a Q&A by the President rather than a speech would be far superior. If perchance this is an overnight stop, maybe an unheralded stop at a grain elevator or river grain barge to talk to a man who works there and what farm exports mean to keep his job.

This is plenty for the President to do between now and the election. I might want to try a rural development event - depends on how the legislation turns out this summer.

May 26, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVE PARKER

FROM: John C. Whitaker *JCW*

SUBJECT: Presidential Environment Scenario

JUNE: Visit Franklin, Ohio, or St. Louis, Missouri, recycling technology demonstration (only viable if we can reach internal agreement on submission of legislation to provide a tax credit for recycling -- that decision should be made within two weeks). The event would be centered on the substantive initiative, tied in with the federal funding which has brought these demonstration programs into being. Either one would be a short event with a few remarks by the President, a substantive factual handout, and wire and TV pictures of the President inspecting the facility.

JULY 6: Visit Point Reyes, Gateway West and attend meeting of President's Citizen Advisory Committee on the Environment and perhaps others to discuss domestic and international environmental progress. The itinerary suggested by the Committee looks fine for the tour portion of the event (begin at Pt. Reyes, chopper over National Seashore, continue air tour over Gateway West area and land at Presidio). We could set up the conference to follow the tour at an appropriate place, like Ft. Point. Train would carry the ball on the domestic and international briefing, and the President would merely make an appearance or perhaps kick it off. Get film of Laurence Rockefeller, Arthur Godfrey and Charles Lindberg with the President -- three members of the Citizen's Advisory Committee on Environmental Quality.

SEPTEMBER: Visit Yellowstone for brief participation on the 100th anniversary of the National Parks celebration. Maybe an overnight with the President hosting a breakfast meeting to initiate the ceremonies -- in any event, a relatively brief appearance at an early hour to get some film for the evening news. Just use "Old Faithful" in the background -- suggest you have the advance man move the President to Old Faithful, not visa versa.

OCTOBER: Visit EPA clean car test facility at Ypsilanti, Michigan. Accompanied by Bill Ruckelshaus, brief tour of the laboratory facilities, photos with technicians in white coats and Buck Rogers test gear. Maybe drive a clean car around the test track. Trip would highlight Administration attention to developing both unconventionally powered clean cars and strict adherence to tough emission standards presently required of the internal combustion engine.

Bill signings as they come up June to September: In addition to the foregoing events, we are certain that at least a few of the President's major pieces of environmental legislation will be sent down for signature over the next few months. We would like signing ceremonies for the following probable candidates:

Water Quality Improvement Act: Probably July -- this is the biggest bill both in terms of public perception and in terms of money.

Ocean Dumping: June or July -- will probably be the first major Presidential environmental initiative sent down from the Hill.

National Land Use Policy: August -- presently the crown jewel of our environmental legislation and the most innovative initiative.

In addition, we may get bills in a number of other areas such as pesticides, noise, endangered species or others which we would like to substitute for the foregoing if our Congressional crystal ball is clouded.

EYES ONLY

June 16, 1972

Mr. H. R. Haldeman
Assistant to The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Bob:

There is no chance at all for me to offer any novel or enlightened insights in responding to your June 21 memo, because I no longer share the authoritative political intelligence that you get right along from polls and professional politicians. So I really believe that, at least at this point in time, I should not respond at all, knowing you will get really useful information from associates with access to the current state of things across the country.

But I do have some general notions and submit them for whatever they are worth.

First -- and quite obviously -- no political planning right now on image and issue can be worth much of a damn until after the Democratic Convention has picked its ticket and written its platform. After all, the Convention is only three weeks away. Between now and then any political judgments have to be no better than sheer speculation.

Second, I think just about everybody in the country, not only our people but also a large proportion of the Democrats, would have to concede that the President is doing spectacularly well, as is borne out by the polls. I see two dominant reasons for this -- first, the miracles the President has wrought abroad, which at last have convinced the nation that Richard Nixon is the most effective achiever for a stable world order that the country has had in God knows how long -- this, plus the resurging confidence throughout the economy; and, second, but not unimportant, the remarkable disarray of the Democratic Party and its superbly uninspired leadership for the upcoming campaign. The simple fact appears to be that the President has been steadily building confidence in himself across the country,

these past 18 months particularly, while national confidence in the Democratic candidates has plummeted. I think the ingredients are present in the President's achievements for a victory of landslide proportions.

Now, second, I think one of the main reasons for the President's enviable political status right now is the deepening public belief that he is preoccupied, not with political maneuvering and expediency, but with paramount national concerns. I think this public assessment is the President's political Fort Knox, because his traditional vulnerability has been the accusation over the years that he is politician first and statesman second. He is well on his way to reversing this concept, and in the process is in fact being regarded now as President of all the people rather than as a strident leader of a negativistic minority called the Republican Party. I would greatly regret any move so to elevate politicking between now and, say, October 1 as would reawaken the notion that the President would rather be a domestic party leader than a world statesman. In other words, please help fight off the pols who would pander to the President's extraordinarily refined and sensitive political instincts; let him continue to be, as long as possible, one hell of a good President determined to dispel the greatest fears of the American people. That's the best politics there could possibly be.

Third, and in keeping with the above, I suggest it is inappropriate to compartmentalize White House thinking in the manner suggested by your memo. I see no need for a change of any kind in Presidential stance from now until actual campaigning begins in late September or October 1. I see no need whatever for him to function any differently between the conventions than he is right now, nor should he do anything differently after the Republican Convention until he is forced to the hustings about October 1. And even then, when campaigning gets underway, I would pray that the shrillness and ad hominem stuff, and the direct parrying of opposition thrusts, would be left to the President's running mate and John Mitchell's minions, leaving the President as free as possible to be Presidential far more than political -- again, on the premise that a Presidential stance will prove to be the best politics. I naturally assume, in addition to the foregoing, that his campaigning will be interlarded with stints at the White House to make clear to the American people that the President is President first and only reluctantly, and temporarily, doing the domestic political thing.

Fourth, I have no way to lay out a proposed itinerary for the campaign at this time. I would assume that this would be governed by detailed political intelligence garnered from polls and political leaders in the various states and areas. Surely, however, the President will not be postured as a frantic candidate racing about the country desperately trying to corral votes -- and surely also, he will not be so scheduled as to flit wildly from coast to coast trying to visit every state.


I would anticipate a far more leisurely campaign directed at specific major voting blocs -- the ethnics, Catholics, Jews, agriculture, etc. -- and directed at specific geographical regions, using key states as the focal points of this kind of regional campaigning. I hope someone there agrees with me that we have tended of late to underestimate the enormous nationwide impact of a Presidential appearance, no matter whether he is speaking in Maine or Southern California. The national TV coverage of a Presidential appearance, wherever he speaks, makes every speech a national appearance, and I think it is awfully easy to overdo this. This is why I suggest that a short campaign will be more productive than the traditional two-month effort, and it is why I also envision a regional effort rather than a state-by-state kind of campaign of the 1960 style.

Fifth, as to the President's issues, I hardly see how these can change much from now through Election Day, though I must again confess that I lack authoritative data from polls and so on to gauge this accurately. It seems to me that we are back into the 1956 cycle, in which peace, prosperity and progress are the dominant concerns, and each of these is trending today in the President's favor. I recognize that there are sub-themes which your polls isolate, such as school busing, aid to parochial schools, environmentalism and such, but the controlling themes are now and ought to continue to be those three golden words of 1956 -- peace, prosperity and progress.

Finally, I suspect that the President has so defused most of the key issues either with actual achievements as in the foreign arena or with programs recommended to Congress that the opposition will be driven, in desperation, to a campaign of vilification that by election time will have degenerated into character assassination. I think the President should ignore all such vituperation, leaving it to his running mate and others to respond in kind; but it would be mere prudence, I should think, and as we discussed on Thursday, to conjure up a few explicit actions to demonstrate to the country

that the President and his Administration are plainly not captives of big business and that skullduggery, such as alleged about ITT, is merely a political slur and not in fact true. I am deeply convinced, especially if the opposition candidate is McGovern, that his major political overlay will be the charge of big business corruptly controlling the Administration at the expense of the average guy -- and in this time of disillusionment with government and almost everything else, that kind of campaigning can seduce lots of people.

But back to Square A. While I anticipate that this campaign will be very dirty before it is over, namely because the other side is devoid of viable issues, I believe that maintaining a Presidential stance throughout, and the conducting of a dignified and thoughtful campaign which will confirm the public judgment that the President is determined above all else to do only the right things for America, will turn out to be the road not only to victory in November, but also the road to a landslide.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Bryce Harlow". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looping initial "B".

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 17, 1972

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By Emp _____, Date 8-19-87

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: KEN W. CLAWSON
SUBJECT: '72 CAMPAIGN

BETWEEN CONVENTIONS

The President should maintain a very "Presidential, above the battle" posture during this period, focusing on his innovative and meaningful domestic programs that have met with both partisan and cavalier attitudes on behalf of this very unproductive Congress. Using the Democratic Party platform planks for ammunition -- although never publicly identified as such -- the President should focus on his compatible domestic initiatives and publicly question why they languished in Congress. At the same time, our surrogates as well as Republican Members of the House and Senate should draw the specific "copy-cat" analogies over what the Democrats have proposed and what the Democratic Congress has refused to pass.

I think the President can remain above the partisanship involved in this effort by scheduling domestic-related events around the Presidency but with our spokesmen responsible for actually focusing on a lethargic Congress during a period when the legislative body will be most vulnerable.

POST GOP CONVENTION

I am convinced that even during the prime campaign period, the President should, as much as is politically possible, maintain the posture of the professional, business-like Chief Executive going about his very important duties; and while I understand it will not be possible to sustain this posture throughout the campaign, I do believe that at no time should the President drop to the level of the contortions the challenger will be forced to perform.

I believe the axiom that an incumbent President only can lose an election; that a challenger cannot defeat him, that an incumbent President only can defeat himself.

That is why I am concerned that the dignity of the Office of the President be maintained regardless of how much or how little the President should "slug it out" with the opposition. That job, it seems to me, is for our surrogates who ought to willingly and enthusiastically perform "any" function that would be politically desirable.

After the Convention, it seems to me that the President ought to spend the next week to ten days personally meeting with key national, regional and local Party officials to give them his personal marching orders. This should be done in a closed atmosphere, but one which will stimulate the press to hover on the fringes and speculate intensely about what is going on, thereby providing for our own Party faithful an intense interest and focus on what may be in the wind.

Until an evaluation of the caliber of our campaign, I suggest that any Presidential travel be geared to bonafide events of interest and concern to the Nation as a whole. I would stick to this format until the quality of our effort is evaluated and then be flexible enough to adjust to campaign conditions. However, I still think that as much as possible, the image of the hard-working Chief of State should be maintained as long as possible.

To sum up the above, my two basic points are that (a) the President should be highly selective of the activities involving himself and that they should have a broader gauged *raison d'etre* other than partisan politics for as long as possible, and (b) the 132 Presidential surrogates and all other spokesmen aligned with us put on the most intensive campaign this country has ever witnessed.

CAMPAIGN ISSUES

Unless events go awry in Vietnam, I don't think that there is any question but that the main issue for the Democrats will be the economy and the related issue of unemployment. The Democrats have historically lived off these issues and even though McGovern is a likely candidate, I see no reason to believe the Democrats will abandon their traditional stress on the economic issue.

I think that we are in a parallel situation to the last six months of 1959 in which the economy indeed was improving although the government wasn't able to convince anyone that this was true. I think we have a major problem in selling the concept that economic conditions in this country are good and that the economy will actually be better than our ability to convince the public of this fact.

I propose that we seriously create an almost separate, well staffed, well financed internal group whose job will be solely to create an image of economic well-being in this country. I guess you can call this the merchandising of the economy, and I think that it is essential that it be done.

Remaining with the economic issue, I am disturbed that this government has itself caught in a position where mechanisms have been set to spew out economic reports on a periodic basis, with our credibility rising or falling on the output of some machine or neutral or unfriendly career civil servants. This routine economic reporting is going to hamper our efforts to convince the public that the economy is better than it seems to them.

As extensively and as loudly as we can, I think we ought to pound on the theme that individuals in this Nation are better off economically at this particular time than at any other time in their lives. I think our surrogates should ask their audiences to look inward and make their own judgments on the economic well-being. The honest answer to that question is that indeed most people are better off now than ever before.

If the Democratic nominee is McGovern, we obviously must subject him and his position to the utmost scrutiny. With the resources of this government, there is no excuse for there existing a single miniscule detail about George McGovern, his positions, his wife, his friends, his staff and/or his mistress escaping us.

I hope there exists some internal task force of investigators who have already compiled everything there is to know about George McGovern, or any other potential Democratic candidate. If there isn't, one should be established immediately.

There also has to be a counterattack mechanism throughout the campaign, which I presume would be handled by Colson in collaboration with John Mitchell. I see a great value in this although this is obviously one of the more ticklish areas -- where the President could beat himself -- and should be most carefully controlled. If McGovern is nominated, we should do everything within our power to woo the American trade union movement as well as to convince George Meany that the AFL-CIO millions would better be spent on congressional, state and local campaigns and should not be poured down the drain on a man who can't win and who is not even ideologically compatible with the principles of trade unionism.

To deny McGovern labor's money and, more importantly, its manpower, is almost a singular key to winning the election. I would pull out all the stops in our efforts to obtain support from labor on all levels. Meany cannot be expected to publicly disassociate himself from McGovern, but it would be no surprise to see him deny labor's resources.

OPPOSITION STRATEGY

It seems to me that McGovern has two very important assets: (1) A nearly unlimited supply of liberal money and (2) an instinctive support from the liberal news media.

With this in mind, we are not going to get any breaks caused by lack of campaign funds, and we had better be ready to spend it all in every area.

Addressing the media problem, it seems to me that our major effort should be to discredit and to spotlight the unworkability of almost everything McGovern proposes. The hard questions

just aren't going to be asked by the press, and therefore ultimately it will be Administration officials who are going to have to publicly ask the hard questions. In that regard, I wonder if the establishment of a GOP truth committee should be established to hold regular press conferences and take McGovern on each of his issues and utterances.

We also have an obligation to discredit the news personnel who commit documentable instances of being McGovern "sweethearts." I don't think the broad gauged attack is productive, but every time we can prove media bias or inaccuracies, we should prove it publicly. This should be done in a straight forward, calm manner that is very specific and to the point. It should not go beyond the specific error or article to which we are addressing.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: ROBERT H. FINCH
SUBJECT: Campaign Strategy

Point 1: What should be the President's posture between conventions?

In my mind, there is no question but that the President should remain "the President" not only between conventions but during the entire campaign. From now, until as late in the campaign as possible, the President should be a "working President," remain mostly in Washington attending to the business of the nation.

From a tactical standpoint, our campaign apparatus must be geared to exploit openings in the opposition and their platform as we move into the Democratic convention. The tax conscious, elderly, Jews, labor, and the South can be ripened for Administration support. Careful use of Presidential "surrogates" can be effective in setting the stage to capture these disaffected voters.

Point 2: What should be the President's posture during the campaign?

Presidential detachment from the political wars I believe should be the keystone of most of the early campaign. Particular care must be taken, however, to insure that the President's stature does not appear "stagey" or "phoney." The "non-political" non-credible, cross country jaunts that President Johnson took in 1964 and 1966 should be avoided. We can tolerate the whining of those who want the President out on the stump early, then; like FDR, when the President does move, it will have a heightened impact.

Improved use of Presidential "surrogates" can protect the President's position -- up to a point. In order to orchestrate and maximize their effectiveness they must have better communication with campaign headquarters and the White House. The "Answer Desk" for the "surrogates" must have up-to-date positions on changing issues and late-breaking world events.

As soon as the Democrats pick their ticket, the "surrogates" should mobilize and articulate the areas of our record that will appeal to the "swing" constituencies. The Democratic nominees will be formulating their strategy during that period and the Administration will have an opportunity to capture and lock-in the swing constituencies. Some groups can be appealed to particularly during the summer. The three million graduating high school seniors, for instance, will hear only anti-Administration rhetoric once they enter college. If our campaign can reach them before they begin college, however, we have a good chance of gaining a higher percentage of their votes.

These early efforts should be limited to specific constituencies. The dangers of peaking our campaign too early, especially against a fast moving Kennedy/McGovern type campaign, are all too real.

With the base already established, we should use the Republican Convention as the kick-off and build support for the President's re-election. With special mailings, highly structured organizations, vertically and horizontally, we can generate an exciting, positive, and effective campaign for the President, building in momentum, until the President himself does decide to enter the lists.

Point 3: What issues should we stress during the campaign?

To insure victory we should convey the images of (1) strong leadership, and (2) responsible change. Specific programs and issues sort out under these two broad headings.

The media would have us believe many Americans are totally dissatisfied with the "old Politics." It is now the fashion to describe this unrest in the rhetoric of the old Populists. That is only partially true; what Wallace and McGovern are exploiting is a strong ambivalence towards "The Establishment," i.e. "things as they are." In 1972 many middle class

Americans have obtained a standard of living that their parents only dreamed about during the 1930's. Yet in the midst of their success many middle class (and especially lower-middle class) voters are irritated. They are troubled by high prices, high taxes, their fear of drug abuse, busing, militant minorities, poverty, and expensive health care. For many of these voters irritation has led to frustration, a general feeling of helplessness, and a visceral reaction against the "ins."

These voters will respond to "responsible change" and/or the security of strong leadership. The President has laid the groundwork brilliantly for this case.

An aggressive campaign emphasizing substantial Administration achievements and proposals can advance the image of responsible change. By utilizing the appropriate slogans and publicity, such programs as the EPA, the Higher Education Act, FAP, and Revenue Sharing should be exploited to the fullest.

The President's record as a strong, bold leader does attract support. We should not be seduced into attempting a "charismatic, Kennedy-type" campaign. What we offer is substance. The fundamental concept here is moral strength and determination. The foreign policy initiatives of the President accurately display the courageous and bold qualities that Americans are seeking and which produce real results because the President bargains from strength.

Two major weaknesses are the "rising cost of food" and "unemployment." The food cost affects every American family and we are obviously vulnerable. There is nothing that we can do about food costs except what has been done and obviously the Democratic nominee will be equally unable to solve the problem. We must therefore concentrate on getting the voters to think about other issues.

Unemployment will be better because of the expanding economy. Otherwise, there is also little that we can do that is not already set in motion. We have offered the FAP and imaginative ideas in manpower training, but those facts offer little comfort to an unemployed worker.

Point 4: Weaknesses and strengths of opposition strategy.

A McGovern candidacy will cause divisions in his party that even an attractive running mate will not repair. The South, for instance, will be out of reach as even members of the McGovern organization in the South will admit.

A Wallace candidacy in a third party will be a disruptive element that could both hurt and help our campaign depending upon how many states he can achieve ballot position. Wallace could damage our effort by siphoning off conservative votes in industrial states where the election might be close. But some argue a physically handicapped Wallace may also help the re-election of the President where he does appear on the ballot by attracting seriously alienated voters away from McGovern. The theory behind this argument is that angry voters will go for McGovern while "really mad" voters will support Wallace.

As we saw in the televised debates during the California primary, McGovern's soft-spoken, apparently candid thoughtful manner prevents him from easily being labeled a "wild-eyed radical." Yet his simple answers to the complex problems of the world does reflect a dangerous naivete and a total lack of ability to lead this nation.

Thus, McGovern's weakness lies in the very simplicity that makes him attractive. His massive spending programs, for example, will defeat the thrust of his tax reform package. The most important tax reform is lowering taxes. McGovern's programs will require higher taxes. If the Administration can drive home the cost and froth of his proposals and push him categorically into far left field, we can turn the onslaught on the "McGovern crusade" into a landslide for the President.