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<td>From: H.R. Haldeman To: Patrick Buchanan RE: Monitoring of Democratic Activities. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>From: George T. Bell To: Charles W. Colson RE: Labor Liaison at the White House. 5 pgs.</td>
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NOTES REGARDING THE NEW MEDIA BOOK

In 1960, we had a worse job done on us than we did in 1968, but we never corrected any of it, whereas, JFK kicked them on every bad shot they gave him.

In 1962, we had the same deal in California.

In 1968, despite the overwhelming pounding we got from the media, we survived. As a matter of fact, both 1960 and 1968 were stand-offs as far as the elections were concerned, despite the pounding that the media gave Nixon.

One point that has to be gotten across is that the public distrusts a lot of the press so that the press has a credibility problem.

We need to set up a team to game plan this whole thing - get a crew of listeners, run by a pro in the key states on the local shows - not just the networks, and then decide how to get at them - have powerful people call the stations, etc. This has got to be carefully worked out for the 1972 effort. We must realize the importance of TV.

We need to work on every broadcast from now on and the jumpoff point will be the publication of the book.
We need to start people talking about the book now. Get it out to everyone who counts and kill the networks with it.

We need to get that study to all key advertisers - to the Board of Directors of the networks, to station owners around the country, and all other influential types.

Get a highly credible person to finance and mail it. Exp. get the summary if facts out.
MEMORANDUM FOR: PAT BUCHANAN
FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN
SUBJECT: Monitoring of Democratic Activities

I want to make sure you understand the responsibility for monitoring and generating response material for Democratic candidates rests squarely with your office and that you are actively involved in this process. There seems to be some confusion about where this assignment rests and in order to get rid of this confusion, let me assure you it is your responsibility.
MEMORANDUM FOR: CHARLES W. COLSON
SUBJECT: Labor Liaison at the White House

September 30, 1971

Close, personal White House liaison with labor leaders can result in political gains that cannot be accomplished by trying to perform this function solely from the Labor Department. White House liaison should be and now is apart from involvement in substantive labor problems, can operate in a freer atmosphere disengaged from these controversies, and in an atmosphere somewhat above the fray, be on a personal build-up basis.

As you know, status, recognition and personal prestige are important ingredients of the total fabric of a labor leader's wherewithal to control his constituency and maintain his position. They are sensitive to it, can exploit it, and respond to it. It is obvious that White House attention carries with it the aura of proximity to the President and has the most appeal and impact. Further, its success builds the standing of the President with labor leaders, which is the primary objective.

Listed below are 5 functions which can best be performed at the White House to serve that end:

1. Personal cultivation of labor leaders.

There are many means that can be exercised at the White House with positive results. Listed below are a number of these which have been utilized effectively and should be expanded with full-time diligence:

a. Personal visits and invitations to lunch. I have had, and will continue to have, labor leaders to lunch at the White House Staff Mess to get acquainted and exchange views. It has been very productive.
b. Arranging invitations to White House Worship Services, State Arrivals, and other social events.

c. Special mailings of items of interest with personally-signed White House transmittal letters.

d. Arranging White House tours for labor leaders and their wives. This is especially effective as an adjunct to labor meetings being held in Washington.

e. Obtaining speakers for conventions and meetings.

f. Staff telephone calls after Presidential announcements.

g. Appointments to Presidential Boards and Commissions.

h. Most important of all, generating proper opportunities for Presidential participation, consisting of:

(1) Non-substantive meetings with the President in the Oval Office.

(2) Presidential speeches or drop-bys at union events.

(3) Messages, letters and phone calls from the President.

(4) Larger Cabinet Room meetings for briefings by the President or exchanges of views.

2. Constituent service.

As a result of acquaintances developed from the above-type activities, I have been presented with many opportunities for constituent service.
When accomplished successfully, the impact is tremendous because it shows tangible results. This has included:

a. Assistance in obtaining Federal jobs for labor types, or individuals supported by labor. This does not always involve the Labor Department. Some jobs have been obtained, and in all instances constructive interviews have been arranged.

b. I have handled a number of problems some of labor leaders have had in the military establishment, to great effect.

c. Information requests have been fulfilled, expedited or properly routed which, in each case, give opportunity for affirmative White House correspondence.

3. Inter-departmental demands.

Many problems I have run across and seized upon, or which have been presented to me, do not involve the Labor Department and can be handled more expeditiously by White House liaison. These have consisted of:

a. Liaison with Justice for the Teamsters in a non-substantive way, and the pouring of oil on the waters in connection with actions by Justice.

b. Expediting and attention at HUD regarding Firefighters' problems with the Model Cities program.

c. Liaison and expediting at State relative to labor attaches, as well as arranging extra attention to foreign travels by labor leaders.

d. Being a go-between with Commerce relative to problems with the Bureau of Standards for the Firefighters, encouraging labor deposits in minority-owned banks, etc.
4. Developing White House attunement with labor.

I believe inclusion of labor leaders in every activity, briefing, discussion or function conceivably appropriate, and the taking into account of their views, is in the long-range interests of the country, the Administration and the President. This presently is not frequently done, not by conscious decision, but because the staff is not on the whole attuned to labor. Labor liaison activity at the White House can help stimulate this attunement, and find opportunities to encourage it.

5. Political development.

From the standpoint of re-election of the President, White House liaison provides a unique capability for a labor outreach to locate, develop and motivate a broad-based labor resource. Just getting lists of labor leaders is not enough, it is the actual dealing with them that reveals the motivated and effective ones and makes them real people and the President a real person.

In all of the above, state and local leaders are of key importance, and I am gravely concerned that we know of none in 33 of the 50 states. I have, therefore, instructed Jack Padrick in his direction of our 8 newly-hired young tigers in the key regions to have as their top priority, meetings with labor leaders, bringing the message of our economic plan to union gatherings and, in every way, spreading the word through the labor community as well as the business community in their regions. As a result, they will be sending us names of labor leaders who are favorably disposed and can be included in our liaison program.

Finally, when the 1701 operation gets under way very close coordination will be required to see that these resources are fully utilized, and that White House and campaign activities reinforce each other for maximum gain.
All of the above can be expanded upon and should require at least full-time attention of one man, guided by you, George Shultz and John Ehrlichman, and cooperating with Jim Hodgson and his staff. I would like to tackle it.

George T. Bell
Chapin -- My projects with Chapin are limited to occasional political or financial scheduling requests, RNC film and fund raising dinner problems, and occasional Magruder/White House projects, such as Goldwater scheduling. Chapin's staff handles most of these and he should be encouraged to release more responsibility for the day-to-day operations because his staff is competent and Chapin hates the follow-up necessary to assure implementation. Instead, Chapin should increase his involvement in the Campaign planning. He is a good idea man, is experienced, and has the stature necessary to influence the trends of the Campaign. I can handle the details of deadlines, memoranda for the Attorney General, and general political matters that flow to you. However, Chapin should review some Campaign materials and political activities and submit a weekly "thought piece" on which trends should be encouraged or halted.

Colson -- Dealing with Dick Howard on a series of follow-up items ranging from poll distribution to telephone calls to Senators Dole and Brooke indicates that Colson is spread too thin. He could more efficiently handle the routine procedural matters if he adhered to a schedule of meeting with Howard twice a day, as you used to do with Higby and Kehrli.

Beyond increased efficiency, Colson could better spend his time working on the hard Campaign questions. He heads the Attorney General's task force on Middle Americans and Ethnics but is two months late in preparing recommendations. The youth activities of Jamie McLane need the hard nosed direction of the pragmatic Colson. An attempt should be made to mend his rift with the Attorney General. This would permit Colson to get directly involved in the tough planning for the Campaign instead of harping about the poor quality of the "second stringers" at 1701. Colson, too, should be encouraged to write weekly "thought pieces" on where the Campaign is and where it should be going.
If Colson's direct involvement in the Campaign is precluded by the Attorney General's views, he should concentrate on getting politically helpful activity (speakers supporting the President, removal of disloyal aides, and control over vote oriented programs) from the Cabinet and Congress. Colson will probably need an infusion of more clout to perform this role.

Dean -- Four projects serve as examples of Dean's efforts in the wrong directions. The Presidential - top staff - NSC papers project is proceeding almost in spite of John Dean. The "political enemies" project may falter because Dean doesn't want to be followed up on "for at least one month". All political surveillance from the EMK tail to Sandwege is just where it was two months ago -- nonproductive. The reason these projects are stymied is that follow-up with Dean is counterproductive because he wastes his time in meetings and answering letters requiring the simplest legal opinions. Fred Fielding could do the leg work and drafting as well as raise the tough questions that need John Dean's consideration.

Dean should get mentally out of the clean "in house counsel" job and into the knees and elbows part of the Campaign. His security and confidentiality are not suspect. He should handle the Presidential papers project immediately, the political surveillance with vengeance, and the down and dirty tricks with dispatch. He should implement the Buchanan ideas that are too risky for Magruder. Dean should read Colson and Chapin "thought pieces" with his goal being undercover implementation.

Malek -- His excellent staff can handle the daily personnel matters which will be decreasing to virtually nothing by January 1, 1972. From now on, Malek should spend his time on the difficult management problems. Hopefully, he will now take on the "leaks" project seriously. He should also target study, and take over if necessary, faltering projects which mean votes. The Jobs for Veterans and White House Conference on the Aging are two current examples of pending public relations disasters and resultant loss of voters who have supported the President in the past.

Higby has some excellent ideas for target management use of the Malek staff during the Campaign. However, right now Malek could act as your top trouble shooter instead of the signator of well written letters rejecting job applicants.
Dear [Name],

What do you think in terms of re-election?

Now come in your own mind.

Tell me and what the period of month of it.

List early - general clean to start that state.

Dean: What are you doing.

Too much to receive facility.

M schedules: Think deeper feel that is the case.

Recruitment effort very important.

More productive another area.

Cason: All aware that you must pull back.

in too way ahead.

Then stop - everything into this automatic.

Keep confined.

Scary frightening.

[Other observation noted]

Be at point by start of November.

Thank god for help from that no let's relax.

They aren't as good by ourselves by we

shouldn't sit back and enjoy it.

Bakken can't accomplish very well we don't follow a band

Enough. with you Nov. 2 '69.