

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

| <u>Box Number</u> | <u>Folder Number</u> | <u>Document Date</u> | <u>No Date</u> | <u>Subject</u> | <u>Document Type</u> | <u>Document Description</u> |
|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---|
| 13 | 18 | 6/20/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The New York Primary Returns. 1 pg. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/20/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Tested campaign slogan for Nixon's campaign, "President Nixon-Now More Than Ever." 1 pg |
| 13 | 18 | 6/20/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Robert Teeter to Haldeman. RE: Continuous study of the slogan, "President Nixon, Now More Than Ever." 3 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/20/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Domestic Policy | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Videotape Capability and McGovern's Documentary. 1 pg. |

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|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---|
| 13 | 18 | 6/16/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Domestic Policy | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: McGovern's Documentary and Spots. 1 pg. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/15/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The Humphrey-McGovern Debates, and the Democratic Primary Results in California. 2 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/10/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The Humphrey-McGovern Debates and the Democratic Primary Results in California. 7 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | White House Staff | Memo | From L. Higby to GS. RE: Indecipherable message. 1 pg. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/8/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Pat Buchanan to Haldeman. RE: Reasons behind McGovern's drop of fifteen points. 1 pg. |

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| 13 | 18 | 6/8/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Newspaper | Article in the Evening Star entitled, "McGovern 'Weakness' Located in Voter Poll." 1 pg. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/8/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Bill Safire to Haldeman. RE: Some lessons concerning the California Primary. 3 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/8/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Harry Dent to The President. RE: Analysis of the California Primary, and the Field Poll's results that say Nixon is up by twenty points. 3 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/8/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Ed DeBolt to Harry Dent. RE: Survey on Effect of Humphrey-McGovern Debates on the California Primary. 4 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/8/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Robert Teeter to Haldeman. RE: The effects of the Humphrey-McGovern debates on the supposed shift of voters to Humphrey, and what this will mean for California voters. 2 pgs. |

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| 13 | 18 | 6/8/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Charles Colson to Haldeman. RE: The Humphrey-McGovern debates, and the images conveyed by both during the debates. 2 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/8/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Jeb Magruder to Haldeman. RE: The impact of the California debates, and the impressions given by the two candidates. 3 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/8/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Richard Moore to H. RE: The recent debates, and whether or not they were a factor in the difference between the field poll and final results. 2 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/8/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Roy D. Morey to Ed Harper. RE: The predictions vs. results in the California Democratic Primary. 4 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/8/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Robert H. Finch to The President. RE: Humphreys's improved showing in California thanks in part to the previous three debates. 3 pgs. |

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|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---|
| 13 | 18 | 6/8/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Newspaper | Article from The Washington Post entitled, "A Survey of California Voting: McGovern: New Constituency." 4 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/9/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Newspaper | Article from The Washington Post entitled, "A Survey of California Voting: McGovern: New Constituency." 4 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/15/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Personal | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Dinner reservations at the Kennedy Center, and their strict "no reservations" rule. 1 pg. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/13/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Domestic Policy | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Gallup Surveys, and the availability of the results. 2 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/13/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Personal | Other Document | RE: The transcript of the phone conversation with John Davies. 6 pgs. |

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|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|--|
| 13 | 18 | 6/9/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Other Document | Gallup Poll entitled, "McGovern's Dramatic Gains Due to Independents; Wallace Seen Winning Strong Sympathy Vote." 1 pg. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/11/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Other Document | Gallup Poll entitled, "Nixon Holds Widest Lead to Date Over McGovern and Humphrey." 1 pg. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/8/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Domestic Policy | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Gallup Surveys, and a discussion with John Davies concerning the results. 2 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/8/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Other Document | RE: The Phone Conversation with John Davies that discusses issues such as, "Wallaces' lead among Independents." 4 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/2/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Betty to Gordon. RE: The enclosed letter that was sent to Tom Wicker, the man who supposedly squashed unfavorable news regarding Kennedy. 1 pg. |

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|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--|
| 13 | 18 | 6/2/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Letter | From Roger W. Eisinger to Tom Wicker. RE: The impact of the Chappaquiddick accident on a possible Kennedy presidential candidacy. 2 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/2/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | White House Staff | Letter | From Roger W. Eisinger to John B. Oakes. RE: The attached letter sent to Tom Wicker. 1 pg. |
| 13 | 18 | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Report | An AP report that highlights the idea that "If Wallace accomplishes nothing else this year, he has succeeded in making a shambles of the once-formidable labor-union vote. 1 pg. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/13/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | White House Staff | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Fred LaRue's information concerning Kennedy. 1 pg. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/12/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Campaign Surveys-Wave it-New York. 1 pg. |

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|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---|
| 13 | 18 | 6/10/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Domestic Policy | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The RNC Convention, and the set up of specific arrangements. 3 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/10/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Malek's analysis of the campaign organization. 1 pg. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/8/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Domestic Policy | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Celebrities briefing-Kissinger's participation-California, June 17, 1972. 2 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/8/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Domestic Policy | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Gallup Surveys, and a discussion with John Davies to disclose the results. 3 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/7/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The Campaign Survey-Wave II. 2 pgs. |

| <u>Box Number</u> | <u>Folder Number</u> | <u>Document Date</u> | <u>No Date</u> | <u>Subject</u> | <u>Document Type</u> | <u>Document Description</u> |
|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---|
| 13 | 18 | 6/6/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Domestic Policy | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The attachment of the latest draft of the Wave II survey. 2 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/6/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Campaign Survey-Wave II. 1 pg. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/3/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The drafted questionnaire of Bob Teeter's proposed Wave II polls in Russia. 17 pgs. |
| 13 | 18 | 6/1/1972 | <input type="checkbox"/> | Campaign | Memo | From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Meeting with Peter Dailey to discuss the campaign advertising. 1 pg. |

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------|---------------|---------------------------------|------|-------------|
| | | NO WITHDRAWN ITEMS | | |

FILE GROUP TITLE

H. R. HALDEMAN

BOX NUMBER

238

FOLDER TITLE

STRACHAN CHRON - NR4 ONLY JUNE 1972

RESTRICTION CODES

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. B. National security classified information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes. G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. |
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Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 238

Folder: Strachan Chron-HRH only June 1972

| <u>Document</u> | <u>Disposition</u> | |
|-----------------|--------------------|--|
| 160 | Retain | Open |
| 161 | Retain | Open |
| 162 | Retain | Open |
| 163 | Return | Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/20/72 |
| 164 | Return | Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/20/72 |
| 165 | Return | Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/20/72 |
| 166 | Retain | Open |
| 167 | Return | Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/16/72 |
| 168 | Return | Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/15/72 |
| 169 | Return | Private/Personal MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/15/72 |
| 170 | Return | Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/15/72 |
| 171 | Retain | Open |
| 172 | Retain | Open |
| 173 | Return | Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/13/72 |
| 174 | Return | Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/13/72 |
| 175 | Return | Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/12/72 |
| 176 | Return | Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/10/72 |
| 177 | Return | Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/10/72 |
| 178 | Retain | Open |
| 179 | Return | Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/8/72 |
| 180 | Return | Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/8/72 |
| 181 | Return | Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/7/72 |
| 182 | Return | Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/6/72 |
| 183 | Return | Private/Political MEMO, STRACHAN TO HRH, 6/6/72 |

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 238

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| 185 | Return | Private/Political memo, STRAKHAN TO HRA, 6/3/72 |
| 186 | Retain | Open |
| 187 | Retain | Open |
| 188 | Return | Private/Political memo, STRAKHAN TO HRA, 6/1/72 |
| 189 | Retain | Open |

**RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD**

| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------|---------------|---|------------|-------------|
| 1 | Memo | Strachan to Haldeman re: Don Nixon. 2 pgs | 06/15/1972 | G |

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| COLLECTION TITLE Contested Documents | BOX NUMBER 10 |
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| FOLDER TITLE WHSF: SMOF: H.R. Haldeman: Strachan Chron – HRH Box 238 |
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| PRMPA RESTRICTION CODES: | |
| <p>A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. B. National security classified information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.</p> | <p>E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes. G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.</p> |

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| DEED OF GIFT RESTRICTION CODES: D-DOG Personal privacy under deed of gift |
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ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: New York Primary Returns

The President's name is not on the New York ballot.

Democratic candidates' names do not appear on the New York ballot. Instead, delegates which are not legally bound to a particular candidate are selected. McGovern's delegates are expected to win over 200 of the 248 delegates available today. An additional 30 will be selected this weekend by the State Democratic Committee.

The New York City polls are open from 3 p.m. to 10 p.m.; polls are open in the rest of the state between 12 noon and 9 p.m. CBS and NBC will not have announced shows on the results. Only spot announcements are scheduled on NBC.

Harry Dent Will prepare a one page summary of the results for the President. This summary will be on your desk at 7:45 a.m. for you to decide whether it should go to the President.

GS/jb

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

On June 7 you asked that the suggested campaign slogan (President Nixon - Now More Than Ever) be tested to determine if Dent's concern -- it may be too sophisticated for the average man -- was correct.

The results of the group sessions conducted by Teeter's Market Opinion Research is attached. The research concludes that the slogan is understandable and not too sophisticated.

Dailey hopes to review the results with Mitchell today and receive final approval for the slogan.

GS/jb

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

June 20, 1972

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12356, Section 1.1

By PHH NARA, Date 4/6/95

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER *Robert M. Teeter*
SUBJECT: Further Study of Slogan "President Nixon. Now more than ever."

We were requested to conduct further research on the slogan, "President Nixon. Now more than ever." to determine whether the slogan was understandable and not too sophisticated in the context of other competing slogans. To study this question two group sessions were conducted in Detroit with ticket-splitters, over 35 years of age, with middle incomes, and non-college. At each session we discussed several slogans including those used by McGovern and Wallace in the primaries. This memorandum will outline the results of the research.

In both of the groups the slogan was understood to refer to unfinished work in progress. The groups pictured the President's past record and looked to the future. This slogan embodied the concept of "help him finish the job." The slogan was not interpreted by anyone as anti-McGovern.

The statement also contained a sense of urgency not perceived with the other slogans. The use of the word "now" seemed to express this urgency. Also, the slogan had a certain emotional appeal which the other slogans did not seem to possess. In discussing the slogans, both groups stated that the words "we need" Nixon were mentally added to the phrase "Now more than ever."

Each group responded favorably to the various ways the slogan was presented for banners, buttons, and bumper stickers except the groups did not like the manner of execution for the outdoor billboard proposal. With regard to the materials, the groups readily understood the connection between the contraction "Nixon. Now" with the longer version. The shortness of "Nixon. Now" has very strong appeal to lower middle class ticket-splitters. They view it as simple, direct, and easy to understand. Regarding the outdoor proposal, the groups did not like the use of a black background and the reproduction of the President's picture. Apparently because of the color and the picture the groups felt the outdoor proposal portrayed the President as sinister. Nevertheless, the concept of using the slogan in the outdoor medium was readily accepted.

In general, the groups responded well to the slogan, "Now more than ever." Every person in the group seemed to be able to give the statement some personal meaning. The slogan did clearly communicate its message. It is important to note that the participants generally ranked the slogan between the other alternatives studied. Our earlier study showed that "Now more than ever." ranked behind the statement, "Help him finish the job." Comparatively, however, the slogan under consideration expressed more urgency and emotional appeal and also clearly embodied the concept of "finish the job." If other ideas which convey the unfinished job are merged with "Now more than ever," the result should be a powerful communication device. To answer the original question raised, we see no reason to reject the slogan as not being understandable and too sophisticated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SELECTED VERBATIM COMMENTS

It has emotional appeal.

We need him more than ever.

He's done a good job before and things aren't getting any better, so we still need him.

He's been good and we still need him to finish the job.

We need him more now than we needed him before.

He's started so many things and he would like to follow through.

It's perfectly clear. It's not a complete thought, but its clear.

It starts you thinking more. Starts your imagination thinking over things he has done, has not done, will do, or will not do . . . of his past record.

I like the word "now" because we need to take action now.

It means we need him more than ever. He ain't going to do anything in the next four years anyway.

I think there's more in it than "now more than ever" because there are the things . . . that he's planning for the future and why change horses in the middle of the stream when the trouble's still there.

We do need him if he will finish the job he started.

I think that's assuring. Its saying stick with what you know. You don't know what you're going to get if you don't have Nixon. I think its reassuring in that way, -- that we know what we have and can go from there.

Really, it doesn't matter too much to me what the slogan is. The name -- when I see the name I conjure up my own thoughts about what the man is, what he has done, what he stands for. Any slogan that's put after his name or any other name, really doesn't mean that much to me because the old saying "paper lies still, you can put anything on it."

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Videotape Capability and
McGovern Documentary

At Peter Dailey's suggestion we now have a cassette videotape machine for you to view the three documentaries, 1701 spot advertisements when they are developed, and the 23-minute McGovern biography. By having this cassette facility in our office, the Signal videotape system (Channels 2 and 6) will not have to be used, assuring security.

Your television has been prepared to use the system and you might want to try it on the McGovern biography, which Chapin, Higby and I believe you should watch.

The McGovern biography was prepared by Guggenheim. Buchanan does refer to the biography in his McGovern memoranda. Buchanan is anxious to see the biography.

GS/jb

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

McGovern Documentary and Spots

The 23-minute McGovern documentary and spots used in California are on the Signal videotape system. Chapin, Higby and I have watched the documentary and recommend that you also watch it.

At 1701 Magruder and Dailey's November Group saw the documentary yesterday in New York. Mitchell will see the McGovern documentary next week when he returns from California.

GS/jb

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 15, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Humphrey-McGovern Debates
and the Democratic Primary
Results In California

Question:

The question is whether the three debates between Humphrey and McGovern accounted for the 14-20% point increase from the pollsters' projection to Humphrey's final vote.

Conclusion:

The Hart Survey in the Post found that 53% of the Democrats saw at least one debate; 17% thought McGovern won while 16% thought Humphrey won; 20% felt neither won; 30% of Humphrey's voters thought he won and 30% of McGovern's voters thought he won.

Finch, Colson, Dent, Magruder/La Rée, Safire, Tester, Buchanan, and Harper/Morey believe the debates increased Humphrey's vote total. Moore disagrees.

Analysis:

Humphrey increased his position from 26 to 40% because the debates enabled him to drive home his points on jobs and McGovern's fuzzy welfare proposals and Defense cuts (Finch, Dent, Buchanan).

The debates and resultant media coverage "scared hell out of Jews" (Safire). Although the debates may not have had a large audience, the California media began emphasizing Humphrey's attack (Magruder, Dent, Buchanan).

The debates enabled Humphrey to shift the undecideds to his column by hitting McGovern on his "extreme" positions. However, the debates did not cut into McGovern's fairly constant 45% total (Agree: Teeter, Buchanan, Safire, Yankelovich; Disagree: Finch, Hart).

Whether the Field poll was wrong to start with was also considered. Finch, Colson, and Moore believe Field was wrong. Buchanan says the Field poll was not wrong and he has reason to believe McGovern's lead may have been larger.

A more detailed analysis is attached as well as the original memoranda from Finch, Dent, Magruder/La Rue, Safire, Teeter, Buchanan, and Harper/Morey. Also attached are newspaper reports of the Hart and Yankelovich surveys.

GS/jb

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN **G**

SUBJECT: Humphrey-McGovern
Debates and the Democratic
Primary Results in California

The question is whether the three debates between Humphrey and McGovern accounted for the 14-20% point increase from the pollsters' projection to Humphrey's final vote. Finch, Dent, Magruder/La Rue, Safire, Buchanan, Teeter and Harper/Morey submitted analyses (attached). Their summarized comments should be considered in light of the Hart Survey which found that 53% of the Democrats saw at least one debate; 17% thought McGovern won while 16% thought Humphrey won; 20% felt neither won; 30% of Humphrey's voters thought he won and 30% of McGovern's voters thought he won. The Hart and Yankelovich surveys are also attached.

Finch believes:

1. The Field poll showing McGovern with a 20 point lead was patently wrong, if not dishonest. In the past, Field has traditionally "over sampled" in the northern part of the state. But, there is no question that approximately two weeks prior to the election, McGovern had a clear lead probably -- 10 points -- over Humphrey and this was fortified by unlimited money and a superb organization. Even if the Field poll was taken at face value, it would have to be argued that the 13% undecided went over enmasse to Humphrey -- an unheard of phenomena.
2. While Humphrey was clearly "up tight and on edge" in the first debate, talking too much and reaffirming the prevalent impression that most voters have of him, he did drive home

his points with regard to jobs, the high or uncertain costs of various McGovern proposals and other extreme positions taken by the South Dakota Senator.

3. In the second debate, Humphrey was much more appealing and plausible, kept his answers more brief, did not have to be interrupted to close his sentences and had a more confident air. He did separate himself from McGovern on the Prisoner of War issue and was clearly appealing to the orthodox Democratic New Deal constituencies of labor, the farmer, the old and the minorities.

4. The third discussion, with the five participants, had its impact on the election in a peculiar way. Yorty tended to buttress Humphrey on his strong defense position (and, of course endorsed HHH the day before the election), and Chisholm improved her visibility picking up 4% out of the vote of the Black Community on which Humphrey had been relying.

5. Humphrey's showing in Los Angeles, San Diego and Orange Counties, as well as in the San Joaquin Valley, showed that he "wrang" the most out of the orthodox New Deal appeal and leaned heavily on his arguments on Defense levels and California jobs. He also appears to have scored well with Catholics, although he probably did not exploit sufficiently McGovern's vulnerability in the "Three A's" -- Abortion, Acid and Amnesty.

Dent believes:

1. Humphrey's attacks on McGovern's extremist positions, especially welfare and Defense spending, made the Democrat primary closer in California than expected.
2. Dent notes that the Hart Survey minimized the impact of the HHH attacks but pointed out that undecideds were influenced more by HHH in the closing days.

3. Yankelovich supports the view that McGovern's positions on Defense and welfare cost him votes. One in five found the debates important in voting, the majority of these going to HHH. The most damaging position of McGovern was his plan to drastically reduce Defense spending. Among all voters, more than 1/3 expressed disapproval here.

4. An interesting point is that McGovern edged HHH out of the black vote and did even better with the chicanos. This could mean they learned more of McGovern's "handout" views through the debates and ads. If so, this could also mean that the more affluent voters moved away as they became better informed, since McGovern barely won, even with a bigger than ever black and brown vote.

Safire believes:

1. The media has not emphasized the fact that McGovern won by far less than had been expected. They clobbered Muskie after New Hampshire because he got "only" 48% -- no such bad luck for McGovern. Lesson here is that we should expect less tear-down-the-frontrunner help than usual, since McGovern is better attuned to most reporters than say, Muskie (too careful) or even Lindsay (too obviously charismatic) or Humphrey (old story, no news). Why? Oddly, McGovern is now enjoying much of what we had in 1966 and 1967 -- the man who came out of nowhere, who worked hard and long, who deserves recognition. Also, Frank Mankiewicz is a pro with the press. Also, most reporters who mold or follow liberal opinion (Wicker, Appel, Haynes Johnson) are ideologically in his camp. In the news backwash, however -- newsmags and columnists -- we can do a lot to slow his momentum by pointing to his fade-out at the end.

2. Humphrey's last two weeks must have scared hell out of Jews who had been leaning toward McGovern. The switcher issue here probably was Israel, and the threat of McGovern's softness in the Middle East. I have a hunch that Jews will not vote for a candidate because he is for aid to Israel (they all say they are) but will vote against one whom they think is against Israel, or more accurately would be weak in a showdown.

3. Disenchantment should now become the anti-McGovern keyword. Fifteen percent of the California Democratic voters became disenchanted with McGovern in the final two weeks, when they had their first close look at him. Why? My guess: Four-fifths became frightened at his positions because of the Humphrey attack. A radical in sheep's clothing, and all that. One fifth may have been disaffected because he backed off his positions -- that is, he's not the purist he used to be; no longer a virgin.

Buchanan believes:

1. The Field poll was not wrong. He has it from a source that the Field poll actually played down the McGovern spread, which was larger than twenty points.

2. Humphrey attacks begin to pay off -- his attacks primarily on Defense cuts and jobs in California, on the welfare give aways of McGovern, on Israel and POWs. Despite the Humphrey stridency and panicky approach -- he must have sufficiently frightened many people to convince 300,000 to come his way. This I believe explains it coupled with:

- (a) The Jackson and Yorty endorsements of HHH, which tended to reinforce the Humphrey attacks on McGovern as a radical; and
- (b) The surfacing in the California press of increasing numbers of national Democrats calling McGovern an extremist, a guy who will sink the whole ticket, etc.

3. What seems interesting is that McGovern who was 46-26 over Humphrey got just about that: 46%. But Humphrey was who went from 26% to 40% in a week -- so, did McGovern really lose any votes? Or, did HHH simply pick up from all the other Democrats and pick up all the undecideds as well -- by scaring the hell out of them?

Teeter believes:

1. There was not a major shift from McGovern to Humphrey, rather, there were a large number of voters who were originally predisposed to Humphrey prior to the Campaign and temporarily moved into the undecided column by the McGovern Campaign. When they actually voted they voted their basic predisposition to Humphrey. The fact that McGovern was a new, unique and relatively unknown commodity and the fact this Campaign was a much larger, more obvious and better financed effort than Humphrey's would have contributed to the shift to the undecided category. The fact McGovern actually got about the same percentage in the election as he did in the Field poll and also the fact that the undecided voters in the Field poll were demographically similar to the Humphrey voters would support this conclusion.
2. The debates seemed to sharpen the focus on several of McGovern's extreme positions and locked him into those positions. This contributed to a movement of undecided voters back to Humphrey.

Colson believes:

1. The debates had a very significant effect, but both candidates lost. Humphrey because he looked mean and vicious as the attacker and McGovern because he lost debating points on the issues to Humphrey. In retrospect, while Colson had thought McGovern came out better because of his "good guy" image, Colson now believes Humphrey scored significantly on McGovern with his attacks.
2. The Field Poll was off, as was the ABC poll. McGovern did not have a twenty point lead a week before the Primary. He peaked early plus the fact that the debates did expose some extreme positions. Particularly, in the third debate, McGovern looked very weak on the POW issues and Colson suspects that to anyone who was not a confirmed partisan for either candidate, the debates had a significant effect.

Magruder and LaRue believe:

1. Although neither the public nor the media ever declared Humphrey the winner of the debate, substantial damage was done to McGovern. The media began to emphasize the attack by Humphrey. McGovern then occupied the least advantageous position in the political arena -- that of being on the defense. He spent the next several days trying to explain his programs while Humphrey kept up the attack. This was all news to Californians. Humphrey had little, if any, paid commercials at this point while McGovern had begun saturation.
2. The second debate in prime time, presented Humphrey in a much more conciliatory light. However, he kept questioning the economic impact the McGovern Défense cut would have on the working man of California. Again the results of the debate were a toss-up, but the media still gave maximum coverage to Humphrey's attack.
3. The Yankelovich survey reveals that one out of five voters considered the debates important in deciding for whom to vote. The majority of those who relied on the debates favored Humphrey. More voters voted against McGovern than against Humphrey. One-fourth of the voters preferred their candidate because they disliked their opponent. Senator Humphrey received one-half of these votes while Senator McGovern received one-third. The survey also states that 40% of Humphrey's vote would go to the President on November 7, while 40% would shift to McGovern and 20% is undecided.

Moore believes:

1. The debates by themselves were not a major factor accounting for the difference between the Field poll and the final results.
2. Other reasons for the Humphrey increase include:
 - (a) The Field poll itself generated over-confidence by McGovern workers and greater effort by Humphrey workers.
 - (b) McGovern's refusal of a final debate and his departure for New Mexico and Texas on Monday hurt him seriously

indicating over-confidence and taking California for granted.

- (c) As Teddy White told David Wolper, Humphrey has a knack for a strong finish. On the last two days, Humphrey campaigned strenuously up and down the state with good T. V. coverage, while McGovern was absent.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

All believe the debates increased Humphrey's vote total. The old rule -- if ahead, don't debate -- applies. As to specific recommendations:

1. Finch urges no attempt to label McGovern a "flaming radical", rather argue he's naive, otherwise his soft-spoken T. V. manner will destroy the label;
2. Dent suggests a "drip, drip" campaign on McGovern's stands without Presidential involvement;
3. Safire suggests a general appeal to Jews and a specific attack on McGovern's honesty by distributing his WALL STREET JOURNAL ad to students;
4. Buchanan implies we should follow Humphrey's example and scare the hell out of the voters;

In addition to the debates, the other reasons for the Humphrey/McGovern results are:

1. McGovern peaked too soon and left California for New Mexico and Houston indicating he took California for granted;
2. Polls gave Humphrey sympathy and hard-working labor types;
3. Proposition 9's (environment) two-one loss brought out Humphrey voters.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 6/12

To: AS

From: L. Higby

The name should be done
on the basis of ideas or
theories, not people —
How many brain trusts
are there?

L.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

From my knowledge only these can explain the precipitate McGovern drop of fifteen points:

a) The Field Poll was wrong; I discount this -- as I have it from a source that the Field Poll actually played down the McGovern spread, which was larger than twenty points.

b) Humphrey attacks begin to pay off -- his attacks primarily on defense cuts and jobs in California, on the welfare giveaways of McGovern, on Israel and POWs. Despite the Humphrey stridency, and panicky approach -- he must have sufficiently frightened many people to convince 300,000 to come his way. This I believe explains it coupled with:

1. The Jackson and Yorty endorsements of HHH, which tended to reinforce the Humphrey attacks on McGovern as a radical; and
2. The surfacing in the California press of increasing numbers of national Democrats calling GM an extremist, a guy who will sink the whole ticket, etc.

What needs to be remembered is that for most of the nation, George McGovern is someone they have become aware of for two weeks at least, two months at most. First impressions are favorable -- but they are not firm impressions.

What seems interesting is that McGovern who was 46-26 over Humphrey got just about that: 46%. But Humphrey was who went from 26% to 40% in a week -- So, did McGovern really lose any votes? Or did HHH simply pick up from all the other Democrats, and pick up all the undecideds as well -- by scaring the hell out of them.

Buchanan

McGovern 'Weakness' Located in Voter Poll

By JACK ROSENTHAL
New York Times News Service

LOS ANGELES—Substantial voter displeasure with his positions on defense spending reductions and welfare reform appeared to have cut deeply into Sen. George McGovern's margin of victory in Tuesday's California presidential primary.

This was the major conclusion of a survey of 570 Democratic voters as they left the polls in 11 counties. The survey was conducted by the New York Times and Daniel Yankelovich, Inc., a major social and market research concern.

The McGovern positions became a focus of attack from his principal rival, Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, notably in three nationally televised debates before the election.

Proposal Ridiculed

In those debates, Humphrey sharply assailed his South Dakota opponent's call for a reduction in defense spending to \$55 billion and ridiculed his proposal to grant a \$1,000 allowance to every needy American.

As the debates began, the statewide California poll conducted by Mervin D. Field reported that McGovern held a 20-point margin over Humphrey. In the final election returns, McGovern came out 5 points ahead, totaling 45 percent of the Democratic vote.

Field blamed "voter volatility" yesterday for the discrepancy. He told United Press International the undecided voters, who were listed at 13 percent in the poll a week before the primary, probably had decided on Humphrey.

Field also said the poll, taken a week before the primary, "created an unprecedented impact on the campaign itself. We have not witnessed in the 26 years we have been polling in this state anything like the attention it received in the media."

One in Five

The Times-Yankelovich survey suggested that one voter in five found the debates important in deciding which candidate to vote for. The majority of these voters turned to Humphrey. This appears to have raised the Minnesotan's proportion of the vote by several percentage points.

The debates appeared to be unimportant, however, compared with the substance. And the single most damaging substantive point for McGovern, according to the survey, was his proposal to recalculate—and sharply reduce—the nation's defense budget.

Among all voters, more than a third expressed strong disagreement with this proposal. Among those who voted for candidates other than McGovern, the disapproval rate rose to two-thirds.

EVENING STAR -- 6/8/72

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: BILL SAFIRE
SUBJECT: Some Lessons of the California Primary

1. The media has not emphasized the fact that McGovern won by far less than had been expected. They clobbered Muskie after New Hampshire because he got "only" 48% -- no such bad luck for McGovern. Lesson here is that we should expect less tear-down-the-frontrunner help than usual, since McGovern is better attuned to most reporters than, say, Muskie (too careful) or even Lindsay (too obviously charismatic) or Humphrey (old story, no news). Why? Oddly, McGovern is now enjoying much of what we had in 1966 and 1967 -- the man who came out of nowhere, who worked hard and long, who deserves recognition. Also, Frank Mankiewicz is a pro with the press. Also, most reporters who mold or follow liberal opinion (Wicker, Appel, Haynes Johnson) are ideologically in his camp. In the news backwash, however -- newsmags and columnists -- we can do a lot to slow his momentum by pointing to his fade-out at the end.

2. Shirley Chisholm turned out to be Humphrey's spoiler. Her 5% could have made the difference for Humphrey. HHH broke even with the blacks who did not vote for Shirley, but I think he would have gotten most of hers.

3. Humphrey's last two weeks must have scared hell out of Jews who had been leaning toward McGovern. The switcher issue here probably was Israel, and the threat of McGovern's softness in the Mideast. We should study closely what HHH did with the Jews in California the last two weeks; I have a hunch that Jews will not vote for a candidate because he is for aid to Israel (they all say they are) but will vote against one whom they think is against Israel, or more accurately would be weak in a showdown. This could be enormously significant in New York, Illinois and California, not only in fundraising but in vote patterns, and is a subject we should do a lot of thinking about. **A**

survey of the Jewish vote in the California primary -- depth stuff -- would be money well spent.

4. Disenchantment should now become the anti-McGovern keyword. Fifteen per cent of the California Democratic voters became disenchanted with McGovern in the final two weeks, when they had their first close look at him. Why?

My guess: Four-fifths became frightened at his positions because of the Humphrey attack. A radical in sheep's clothing, and all that. One fifth may have been disaffected because he backed off his positions -- that is, he's not the purist he used to be. No longer a virgin.

I would like us to exploit both these leads. Our tendency will be to neglect the latter, figuring the radicals will never vote for us, and concentrate on showing the centrist Democrat that he's in the hands of leftists. This would be missing a good bet, because a large part of his enthusiasm comes from the kids, and a large part of his basic appeal comes from "honesty" -- if we can dramatize and ridicule the McGovern Shift, we can erode both enthusiasm and honesty.

One specific way right now: Have the Youth Division of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President prepare this cheap flyer: a full-sized reprint of the May 22 Wall Street Journal McGovern ad, in which he shows he's not really a threat to free enterprise and says that besides, Congress would never pass his proposals. Fold it in quarters and headline it: "Here is McGovern's Special Message to Wall Street: Not to Worry." Then, in the margins around the reprinted ad, write in the McGovern quotes that sharply conflict with what is said in the ad, complete with red arrows between the two. Message on the back: "Maybe now Wall Street will trust McGovern -- but now, can you trust him?" Distribute heavily on campus and in areas where the Democratic left is strongest. Best, of course, would be to have some other Democratic candidate do this, but that is unlikely to happen, and it is too good a shot to miss.

Then we could use something like this to illustrate the point about "disenchantment" (that's a liberal vogue word, associated with F. Scott Fitzgerald, and can hang around McGovern's neck like an

albatross) -- with something to peg it to, the media will go for it in a big way, because it is perfect for the next swing of the pendulum: the story about maybe George ain't the man he's cracked up to be. We could help that along, taking the offensive on "credibility."

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HARRY S. DENT *ASD*

SUBJECT: Analysis of California Primary

Humphrey's attacks on McGovern's extremist positions, especially welfare and defense spending, appear to have made the Democrat primary results closer in California than projected by polls and writers. This conclusion is based on contacts with California leaders, newsmen, and a review of polls in The New York Times (Yankelovich) and the Washington Post (Hart) and a telephone poll (attached) taken by the RNC.

Most feel the Field Poll has never been too accurate. It showed a 20-point lead. McGovern claimed his poll showed 16.

Field himself told UPI his poll caused HHH to "get off his dime and hit harder." He thinks the 13% undecided went for HHH.

The RNC poll of 112 Democrats concluded the debates had a minimal impact for HHH, but those who were undecided tended to go more for HHH.

The Hart poll minimized the impact of the HHH attacks but pointed out that undecideds were influenced more by HHH in the closing days. One of 3 voters said they decided on their candidate in the last 3 weeks. HHH carried these 5-4.

Some 53% of the Demo voters said they watched 1 of 3 debates. They split on who won--16% HHH, 17% McGovern, and 20% said even. The rest didn't watch. Of HHH voters, 30% said he won and of McGovern's, 30% said he won.

Yankelovich supports the view that McGovern's positions on defense and welfare cost him votes. One in 5 found the debates important

in voting, the majority of these going for HHH. Yankelovich says this raised HHH's vote by several points.

The most damaging position of McGovern was his plan to drastically reduce defense spending. Among all voters, more than 1/3 expressed disapproval here. Among those voting for someone other than McGovern, the disapproval rate rose to 2/3.

HHH hit heavy with full page newspaper ads the last week. Put Livermore thought these attacks were effective. Tom Reed and Lyn Nofziger agree, especially Nofziger.

Newsmen who feel HHH hurt McGovern are Kevin Phillips, Bob Novak, and Bob Semple.

An interesting point is that McGovern edged HHH out on the black vote and did even better with the chicanos. This could mean they learned more of McGovern's "handout" views through the debates and ads. If so, this could also mean that the more affluent voters moved away as they became better informed, since McGovern barely won, even with a bigger than ever black and brown vote.

Novak suggested at the Governors' Conference that the GOP begin a steady "drip, drip" campaign against McGovern's extremism and keep it going til election day.

Contacts with other Californians confirm the view that HHH's attacks helped.

The HHH attacks were not alone in closing the reported big gap. Here are other factors:

- 1) McGovern peaked too soon.
- 2) Polls gave sympathy to HHH and caused labor and others to work harder. They did a better "get out the vote" job than McGovern's people, who did a good canvas job.
- 3) The President's trips hurt McGovern, and HHH acted and

talked like the President.

4) Proposition 9's 2-1 loss brought out people opposed to leftist extremism.

5) California isn't as liberal overall as McGovern.

6) McGovern left for trips to New Mexico and Houston on Monday.

RECOMMENDATION: That we begin to have surrogates, et al, begin the "drip, drip" plan suggested by Novak, without Presidential involvement. The first TV debate film should be properly edited and used.

Republican
National
Committee.

June 8, 1972

To: Harry Dent
From: Ed DeBolt
Re: Survey on Effect of Humphrey-McGovern
Debates on the California Primary

As you requested this morning, the RNC Political/Research Division has attempted to measure the effect of the tactics employed by Hubert Humphrey in the televised McGovern-Humphrey debates.

During the day several hundred homes in the San Gabriel, San Fernando Valley area around Los Angeles were selected at random and contacted. The results were as follows:

| | |
|--|-----|
| Number of registered Democrats contacted | 112 |
| Number voting | 77 |
| Number that did not view at least one debate | 51 |
| Number influenced by debates | 3 |

Due to the time factor the questionnaire had to be brief and the sample selected at random. However, in general our survey indicated that most voters had made their decisions prior to the debates and that the debates by themselves had little impact on the outcomes.

Undertaking a project of this magnitude required the virtual shutdown of the Research/Political Division for the entire workday.

The results of the survey and an analysis follow.

DEBATE SURVEY: ANALYSIS

A special telephone survey of Los Angeles County voters conducted on June 8, 1972, revealed the Humphrey-McGovern debates had a minimal effect upon the vote preferences of those surveyed. Results of the poll indicated that only 6% of those surveyed even watched any of the debates and of those that did only 3% said these debates influenced their final choice. (These results are hardly surprising considering that Nielsen ratings showed that a Marcus Welby rerun and Cannon outdrew the second debate among television viewers. As a campaign worker stated after one of the debates, "The loudest noise in California tonight was the clicking of television sets to other channels.")

In a survey taken by the Field Corporation at the end of May, Humphrey was trailing McGovern by 20% (McGovern had 46% to Humphrey's 26%). If the debates did not significantly contribute to Humphrey's gain in the last week of the campaign, then one must ask what factors did contribute to the Minnesota Senator's late surge. First, some overconfidence among the McGovern forces was evident during the latter days of the campaign. McGovern left California for two days during this period to make visits to New Mexico (which held its primary on the same day as California) and Houston, Texas, where he met with several Democratic governors. Second, Humphrey probably picked up approximately an additional 2% of the vote through Mayor Yorty's endorsement (whose final vote was about 2% below his showing in the Field poll). HHH may also have been aided by the complicated write-in procedure of the California primary, thus driving a few Wallace voters into the Humphrey camp.

Finally, if the Field poll is accurate, the bulk of Humphrey's gain in the final days of the campaign must have come from undecided voters. According to the Field survey, many of these undecideds were elderly and black -- groups where Humphrey has traditionally enjoyed strong support. Their final decision to vote for Humphrey appears to be more a product of their traditional loyalties than of the influence of Humphrey's campaign, particularly his strong attacks against George McGovern. (Nor does our survey indicate that Humphrey's blasts at McGovern played a decisive role in securing the votes of our respondents who voted for Humphrey, since many of them (29) had decided to vote for him early in the campaign before the initiation of Humphrey's attack strategy). As is so often the case, many of the undecided voters appear to have gone with their traditional favorite (Humphrey) on election day, after having experienced some doubt over their choice when confronted with McGovern's relatively "new" face and, perhaps, Humphrey's aggressive attacks upon the South Dakota Senator.

CONCLUSION

The television debates were viewed by a relatively small percentage of the Democrat voters in the state and even fewer have cited it as a decisive factor in their final decision. It is more likely that other factors i.e. overconfidence by McGovern forces, a cut-back on spending in the closing days by the McGovern campaign, etc., resulted in Humphrey gaining ground while McGovern held the 45% attributed to him by the Field Corporation poll a week before the election.

DEBATE SURVEY RESULT

Date of Survey: June 8, 1972
 Actual Democratic turnout: 72%
 True percentage of Democrats in L.A. County (excluding city) = 57%

I. Question: Are you a registered Democrat?

| | <u>Yes</u> | <u>No</u> |
|-------|------------|-----------|
| Total | 112 (53%) | 98 (47%) |

(If a registered Democrat, ask following question)

II. Question: Did you vote in the recent California Democratic primary?

| | <u>Yes</u> | <u>No</u> |
|-------|------------|-----------|
| Total | 77 (68%) | 35 (32%) |

(If answer is yes, ask following questions)

III. Question: For whom did you vote in the Democratic primary?

| | <u>Total</u> |
|----------|--------------|
| Humphrey | 33 |
| McGovern | 29 |
| Wallace | 5 |
| Other | 10 |

IV. Question: When did you make up your mind to vote for the Democrat candidate of your choice ... a month or more ago; two weeks ago; or one week ago?

| | <u>Humphrey</u> <u>Supporters</u> | <u>McGovern</u> <u>Supporters</u> | <u>Wallace</u> <u>Supporters</u> |
|-------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| One month or more | 25 | 14 | 4 |
| Two weeks | 4 | 11 | 1 |
| One week or less | 4 | 3 | 0 |

V. Question: Did you watch all, some, or none of the debates between the Democrat candidates?

| | <u>Total</u> |
|-------|--------------|
| All 3 | 9 |
| 1 - 2 | 33 |
| None | 35 |

VI. Question: Did the debates between the Democratic candidates affect your decision in voting in the California primary?

| | <u>Humphrey Voters</u> | <u>McGovern Voters</u> |
|-----|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Yes | 1 | 2 |
| No | 32 | 27 |

Total registered voters in L.A. county (excluding city): 3,223,825

Total registered Democrats - 1,863,216

Republicans-1,145,172

Unidentified- 215,437

Sample

N = 210 Women = (D) = 73

D = 112 Men = (D) = 49

R = 75

I = 23

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

June 8, 1972

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD
E.O. 12958, Section 1.1

By ~~ADL~~ NARA, Date 4/6/95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT: California Primary

This memorandum will outline my observations with regard to the effect of the Humphrey-McGovern debates on the apparent shift of voters to Humphrey late in the campaign. My thoughts are largely based on what I have gleaned from the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the CBS polls and not on any data which I have collected or had a chance to analyze. The following are the important points:

1. I doubt that there was a major shift from McGovern to Humphrey, rather I suspect there were a large number of voters who were originally predisposed to Humphrey prior to the campaign and temporarily moved into the undecided column by the McGovern campaign. When they actually voted they voted their basic predisposition to Humphrey. The fact that McGovern was a new, unique, and relatively unknown commodity and the fact his campaign was a much larger, more obvious and better financed effort than Humphrey's would have contributed to the shift to the undecided category. This is a phenomenon I have seen in other elections where a new "rising star" was running against an older, well-known established political figure. The fact McGovern actually got about the same percentage in the election as he did in the Field poll and also the fact that the undecided voters in the Field poll were demographically similar to the Humphrey voters would support this conclusion.
2. The debates also seemed to sharpen the focus on several of McGovern's extreme positions and locked him into those positions. Apparently many of these views were unpopular with the Humphrey voters (older voters, blue collar workers, and Jews). This probably contributed to a movement of undecided voters back to Humphrey.
3. McGovern outspent Humphrey in the media by a considerable margin, while the debates and subsequent reporting of them probably comprised a large proportion of Humphrey's total media exposure. This exposure came shortly after the Field poll was conducted and at the time when the shift back to Humphrey was occurring.

4. While I have not had a chance to study the turnout figures, the active business-labor campaign against the environmental proposition may have caused some disproportionate turnout of people who were against the proposition and who were largely Humphrey voters. This is supported by the Yankelovich survey which found that a large majority of Humphrey's total vote voted against the proposition while a large majority of McGovern supporters voted for it.

5. The Field poll may have had some effect itself in giving Humphrey some underdog votes while causing some apathy among McGovern supporters, although I doubt that this effect was very great.

We will, of course, pick up primary vote on the California study which we are starting next week which should give us some insight into the nature of the Humphrey and McGovern support.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT: California Primary

I believe the debates had a very significant effect. As I indicated in earlier memoranda, both candidates lost. Humphrey because he looked mean and vicious as the attacker and McGovern because he lost debating points on the issues to Humphrey. In retrospect, while I had thought McGovern came out the better because of his "good guy" image, it is now apparent to me that Humphrey scored significantly on McGovern with his attacks.

I am sure that the Field poll was off, as was the ABC poll and that McGovern did not have a 20 point lead a week before the primary. On the other hand, I suspect he had better than the 5 point margin by which he won. He peaked early plus the fact the debates did expose some extreme positions. Particularly in the 3rd debate, McGovern looked very weak on the POW issue and I would suspect that to anyone who was not a confirmed partisan for either candidate that that would have had a significant effect. I think Humphrey also scored very well not only in the debates but in his general campaign on the aerospace and jobs issue. My reports from labor sources indicate Humphrey was finally beginning to gain momentum in the closing days on that issue with the blue collar workers.

The New York Times' Yankelovich survey today is very revealing on this point (attached).

Mr. Field said that the
polls showed that the
majority of voters
wanted a change in
policy. He said that
the polls also showed
that the majority of
voters wanted a
change in leadership.
He said that the
polls showed that the
majority of voters
wanted a change in
policy and leadership.

Mr. Field said that the
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Mr. Field said that the
polls showed that the
majority of voters
wanted a change in
policy and leadership.

Field Blamed 'Voter Volatility'

In those debates, Mr. Field
said that the
polls showed that the
majority of voters
wanted a change in
policy and leadership.

As the debates began, the
statewide California poll
conducted by the U. S. F. I.
reported that Mr. Field had
a 5-point margin over
Mr. Humphrey. In the final
debates, Mr. Field won
5 points more, totaling 45
percent of the Democratic
vote.

Field blamed "voter volatility"
yesterday for the discrepancy.
He told United Press
International the undecided
votes, which were listed at 10
percent in the poll a week
before the debate, probably
had shifted on his side.

Field also said the poll
taken a week before the
primary, had seen an unprecedented
shift in opinion on the
campaign. "We have not
witnessed in 40 years we have
been in California any-
thing like the reaction it
received in the poll."

Field's Strategy

The New York Times poll
surveyed the voter
opinion on the
debates. The poll
showed that the
majority of voters
wanted a change in
policy and leadership.

Committee for the Re-election of the President

MEMORANDUM

DATE: 6/8/72
ADMINISTRATIVE: [unclear]
BY: ADH
DATE: 4/6/95

June 8, 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER
SUBJECT: Impact of California Debates

Background

The California debate between McGovern and Humphrey served as a much needed forum for Humphrey to sharpen the issues between the two candidates. Although the first debate did not have a large viewing audience, it served as an opportunity for Humphrey to put McGovern on the defensive concerning his stand on reducing defense spending to \$55 million and welfare reform to grant a \$1000 allowance to all needy Americans. Although neither the public nor the media ever declared Humphrey the winner of the debate, substantial damage was done to McGovern. The media began to emphasize the attack by Humphrey. McGovern then occupied the least advantageous position in the political arena - that of being on the defensive. He spent the next several days trying to explain his programs while Humphrey kept up the attack. This was all news to Californians. Humphrey had little if any paid commercials at this point while McGovern had begun saturation.

The second debate, viewed in prime time, presented Humphrey in a much more conciliatory light. However, he kept questioning the economic impact the McGovern defense cut would have on the working man of California. In order to dramatize his point, Humphrey asked McGovern "What do you plan to do with the air bases in California - make them into golf links?" Again the results of the debate were a toss-up. But the media still gave maximum coverage to Humphrey's attack. Humphrey continued to campaign furiously throughout California receiving good press coverage with the attacks.

The third debate was generally a wash-out because, with five participants, neither major candidate was allowed enough time to hit the issues. Yorty may have offered an added dimension by attacking McGovern. Humphrey once again surprised McGovern by challenging him alone to a fourth debate.

Analysis

The Hart Survey shows that 53% of the Democratic voters watched at least one debate. As previously stated, the public on the surface did not perceive either candidate as the clear cut winner. The Hart Survey pointed out that 17% thought McGovern won, 16% thought Humphrey won, 20% felt that it was a stand off, and the remainder had no opinion. 30% of the Humphrey voters thought that Humphrey had won the debates while 30% of the McGovern voters thought that McGovern had won the debates.

The most revealing clue of the Hart Survey was one out of three voters decided for whom they would vote during the last three weeks (many during the debates). Of those voters, 5 to 4 voted for Humphrey.

The Yanklevich Survey revealed that 1 out of 5 voters considered the debates important in deciding for whom to vote. The majority of those who relied on the debates favored Humphrey.

The Yanklevich Survey also indicated that more voters voted against McGovern than against Humphrey. One fourth of the voters preferred their candidate because they disliked their opponent. Senator Humphrey received one half of these votes while Senator McGovern received one third. It is very probable that the debates triggered many of these negative opinions because Humphrey for the first time was able to show the weaknesses in McGovern's programs.

Conclusion

It is our feeling that the debates served to put McGovern on the defensive and to dampen the momentum of his well-organized and well-financed campaign. McGovern probably peaked several days before the election. It is difficult however, to determine how much they contributed to Humphrey's surge on Election Day. Other important factors were present:

1. The impact of the California poll may have spurred Humphrey workers and caused complacency in the McGovern camp.
2. McGovern's get-out-the-vote activity was not as well coordinated as the voter identification canvass.
3. Proposition 9 on the California ballot was a pro-ecology issue. Most McGovern supporters were pro-9 and Humphrey supporters anti-9. Whitaker and Baxter spent over one million dollars in an anti Proposition 9 P.R. campaign. This may have brought much of the latent Humphrey support to the polls.
4. Humphrey campaigned much harder in the last days, while McGovern went to New Mexico and to Houston to the Governor's conference.

THE WHITE HOUSE

(Dictated by phone
from Los Angeles)

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

~~GORDON STRACHAN~~ 41

FROM:

RICHARD MOORE

Seems unlikely that debates by themselves were major factor in difference between field poll and final results. Field poll was taken May 30 and 31 and released June 1. Poll consisted of 857 completed phone calls to self-identified Democratic voters.

Note, however, that first debate where Humphrey was on the attack and generally considered most effective had already taken place when poll was taken and second debate took place May 30 when poll was half completed. Only the third debate which included Yorty and Shirley Chissom took place completely after poll. Incidentally, Los Angeles audience ratings were 12% for first debate, 13% for second and only 6% for third debate. Ratings in other California cities probably somewhat higher but still each debate was probably not seen by 80% of the voters. Reasons given by various observers here for difference between the 20% McGovern lead and actual difference of only 5% include the following:

1. Poll itself generated over confidence by McGovern workers and greater effort by Humphrey workers.
2. McGovern's refusal of a final debate and his departure for New Mexico and Texas on Monday hurt him seriously indicating over confidence and taking California for granted.
3. As Teddy White told David Wolper, Humphrey has a knack for a strong finish. On last two days, Humphrey campaigned strenuously up and down State with good TV coverage while McGovern was absent.

4. Nofziger reports that Al Barkan, political person from COPE, came into State during last two weeks and the labor effort appears to have been effective in closing days particularly in Los Angeles County which Humphrey carried.

Proposition 9 which lost by 2 to 1, attracted non-liberal voters who might not otherwise have voted.

Finally, many suggest that although field poll may be defective in commercial marketing, it has spotty record in political poll and was probably wrong to begin with.

My total impression is that debates did help by generating word of mouth of Humphrey's hard hitting attack and the important factor was McGovern's departure.

Incidentally, Los Angeles Times attributes Congressman Schmitz' defeat entirely to his opposition to the President's China and Russia initiatives which is very encouraging news from Orange County.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: ED HARPER

FROM: ROY D. MOREY *RM*

SUBJECT: Predictions vs. Results in
the California Democratic
Primary

Five days prior to the election, Mervin Field, Director of the syndicated California poll, found that as of May 30 - 31 McGovern was favored by 46 percent of the state's Democrats to Humphrey's 26 percent. The final vote in the California primary indicates McGovern with 44.2 percent, Humphrey with 39.2 percent, Wallace with a 6.0 percent write-in and Chisolm with 4.4 percent. Before analyzing reasons for Humphrey's better than predicted showing, lets first look at the primary results.

The Results

Counties in which McGovern was particularly strong included (results in thousands) Alameda (120-69), Marin (24-9), Sacramento (62-48), San Diego (90-74), San Francisco (82-49), San Mateo (52-38) and Santa Clara (95-60).

Humphrey's major strength was in Los Angeles County (553-472) but he made a respectable showing in districts including Orange (83-70), San Bernadeno (43-35), and Ventura (25-20).

Significant sources of McGovern's strength were identified by Hart Research Associates. Their figures show that while Humphrey had been running as a two to one favorite among blue collar workers in previous primaries, McGovern captured their vote by 46% to 38%. In addition, Humphrey showed a decline among Black voters from 72% in the April Pennsylvania primary to 34% in California. McGovern's popularity among the Blacks increased over the same period from 13% to 36%.

The data also demonstrates that urban voters feel that McGovern is a better candidate by a margin of more than two to one; less than two months ago, Humphrey held the advantage by similar margin. Humphrey seems to have increased his suburban strength (29% up to 43%) at the expense of core city support.

Humphrey did well among the elderly (taking California's senior set by a two to one margin) slightly less than half his voters classify themselves as conservatives, accounting perhaps in part for his strength in suburban Los Angeles County.

McGovern on the other hand captured more than 70% of the 18 to 24 year old vote, and among liberals and professionals - executives he ran two to one ahead of Humphrey. In previous primaries, McGovern had been finding consistently stronger support among women; in California he did 15% better among the men than did Humphrey, and only 3% better among the women.

A Last Minute Shift?

There have been a number of explanations advanced for the better than predicted Humphrey showing: The McGovern decision to leave the state the day before the election; a last minute sympathy vote for Humphrey; McGovern's position on the issues as exposed in the television debates and elsewhere finally caught up with him. While there is insufficient data to assess each of these theories, there is some evidence which should cast doubt on the significance of the television debates in influencing voter decisions.

It may be argued that the debates and issues and positions exposed in the debates account for the diminution of McGovern strength during the final days of the campaign. This is a plausible theory, but difficult to support. Only a little over half of the California Democrats (53%) watched any of the three debates. Among those three watched, there was a mixed reaction on the outcome -- 16% thought Humphrey came out ahead, 17% said McGovern was the winner, and 20% thought the debate produced a stand-off. In short, there does not seem to be much evidence to suggest that the debate played an important role in either insuring a McGovern victory or in decreasing his winning margin.

There are several factors which are useful in attempting to account for the better than predicted Humphrey showing. First is the matter of voter volatility in primary elections in general, and the California

primary in particular. It has been demonstrated elsewhere that public opinion polling is a more risky enterprise in primary rather than general elections.

More important, however, in explaining the apparent shift toward Humphrey in the final days is the undecided vote. A week before the election, the undecided vote was 13% in the Mervin Field poll and most of this went to Humphrey on election day. This was especially true among older voters who made up a majority of the undecided group. The Hart poll conducted for the Washington Post indicates that as much as a third of the voters did not make up their minds until the last three weeks of the campaign and that Humphrey picked up most of these late deciders.

In addition, there were early Wallace supporters who eventually decided to forego a write-in and vote for either McGovern or Humphrey. Humphrey picked up more of these nominal Wallace supporters than did McGovern.

Weighing the Results

In assessing the results of the California Democratic primary, one should keep in mind the size and composition of the electorate. Only 67% of California's 5.1 million Democrats turned out for this election as compared with the 73% turn out in the 1968 contest between Kennedy and Hartke.

We cannot assume that the 67% who turned out constitute a representative microcosm of the entire California Democratic electorate. As Austin Ranney reports in the current issue of the American Political Science Review, the make up of the electorate in primary elections differs from the voters who turn out for general elections. The Ranney data indicates that the primary voters tend to be more affluent, better educated, with an over all higher socio-economic background. They also tend to be more ideologically committed. Although there were a few voter group reversals for McGovern from his experience in other states, the fact remains that his support in California tended to be from those who are more likely to turn out for a primary election.

Among voters with incomes over \$15,000 he did as well as he has in other states. McGovern out polled Humphrey among the better educated and professional groups and he gained two out of three votes among those who classified themselves as liberals.

The VN war and the state of the economy (including unemployment) were the major issues on the minds of both McGovern and Humphrey supporters. Hence, it is difficult to draw a sharp distinction between the two based upon positions taken on the issues. Humphrey supporters felt he is committed to ending the war and favor his stand on equality for Blacks and tax reform. McGovern supporters tended to mention withdrawal from VN, a guaranteed minimal income for the poor and his stand on tax reform. The distinction drawn in voter's minds seem to be more a matter of style than substance.

Judging from the success McGovern had with the more affluent and professional groups, there does not seem to be much evidence to support the contention that those with incomes above \$15,000 were scared into the Humphrey camp by talk of McGovern's income redistribution scheme.

This year, the primaries have given voters an opportunity to express their feelings of discontent and concern. This is reflected in the successes of both McGovern and Wallace. However, the voter will have to make a considerably different kind of decision in the general election. In the final analysis he is called upon to pass judgment on whom he thinks should be entrusted with the responsibility of the Presidency.

cc: Bradford Rich

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT H. FINCH 

SUBJECT: Impact of the "Debates" on the Democratic Presidential Primary in California

The question has been raised as to whether the three "debates" were in large part responsible for Humphrey's highly improved showing on June 6 in California.

Having watched all three "exercises" and having been in California on and off throughout the period involved, the answer is unequivocally: Yes!

Two points need to be made before a discussion of the debates themselves. First, the Field poll showing McGovern with a 20 point lead was patently wrong, if not dishonest. As you know, in the past Field has traditionally "over-sampled" in the northern part of the state. But there is no question but that at a point approximately two weeks prior to the election McGovern had a clear lead probably somewhere in the magnitude of 10 percentage points over Humphrey,* and this was fortified by unlimited money and a superb organization. Even if you accepted the Field poll at face value, it would have to be argued that the 13% undecided went over enmasse to Humphrey--an unheard phenomena.

The following comments relate only to the first two debates since the third discussion, which included Yorty, Chisholm, and a Wallace representative, must be treated separately.

While Humphrey was clearly "up-tight and on edge" in the first debate, talking too much and reaffirming the prevalent impression that most voters have of him, he did drive home his points with regard to jobs, the high or uncertain costs of various McGovern proposals and other extreme positions taken by the South Dakota Senator.

In the second debate, Humphrey was much more appealing and plausible, kept his answers more brief, did not have to be interrupted to close his sentences and had a more confident air. He did separate himself from McGovern on the Prisoner-of-War issue and was clearly appealing to the orthodox Democratic New Deal constituencies of labor, the farmer, the old and the minorities.

In my opinion, the third discussion, with the five participants, had its impact on the election in a peculiar way. Yorty tended to buttress Humphrey on his strong defense position (and, of course, endorsed HHH the day before the election), and Chisholm improved her visibility, picking up 4% out of the vote of the Black community on which Humphrey had been relying.

It seems to me that Humphrey's showing in Los Angeles, San Diego and Orange Counties, as well as in the San Joaquin Valley, showed that he wrang the most out of the orthodox New Deal appeal and leaned heavily on his arguments on defense levels and California jobs. He also appears to have scored well with Catholics although he probably did not exploit sufficiently McGovern's vulnerability in the "Three A's" -- Abortion, Acid and Amnesty.

As the Los Angeles Times reported:

McGovern ran up big margins in San Francisco, Alameda and Santa Clara counties, among others, and this more than made up for the beating he took from Humphrey in Los Angeles, Orange and San Bernardino counties.

McGovern cut into Humphrey's strength in the black communities but preliminary figures showed he did not do as well as expected with Mexican-Americans nor with some suburban voters.

A check of three predominantly Jewish precincts -- No. 2236 on Beverly Blvd., No. 2230 on N. Crescent Heights and No. 2226 on Stanley Ave. -- covering different economic groups showed Humphrey winning by a comfortable 20 percentage points -- 58% to 38%.

A check of blue-collar precincts in South Gate, Bell Gardens and Bellflower showed Humphrey beating McGovern 54% to 33%.

McGovern staffers said the decision to go into the three televised "debates" with Humphrey cut into campaign time which had been allocated to the blue-collar areas.

As for the black vote, a check of four key precincts -- two in the Watts area and two in Willowbrook -- showed almost a dead-even split between the candidates.

The final point to me would be that care must be utilized in not having our people attempt to characterize McGovern as a "flaming radical." Rather, it can be argued that he is terribly naive (i.e., his position on hoping that North Vietnam would release our Prisoners-of-War once we left), and totally unrealistic about fiscal matters. In other words, his positions are "extreme" or "far out." The reason this is important is that he does come across on television as a plausible, soft-spoken, trustworthy sort of a man from the mid-West and this appearance belies the gross stupidity of some of his statements and programs.

| <u>* Charles Kerch prediction</u> <u>(week of May 28)</u> | <u>Actual results</u> | <u>Field Poll</u> <u>(May 30-31)</u> |
|--|-----------------------|---|
| McGovern | 54% | 46% |
| Humphrey | 26% | 26% |
| Wallace | 9% | 8% |
| Muskie | 4% | 1% |
| Chisholm | 3% | 2% |
| Yorty | 2% | 1% |
| Jackson | 2% | 1% |

Survey of California Voting

McGovern: New Constituency

By Haynes Johnson

Washington Post Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES, June 7 — Although George McGovern did not win the California primary by the landslide the pollsters had projected, Democratic voters in the nation's largest state handed him another kind of victory: for the first time this year he has emerged as the candidate with the most broadly based constituency.

In other primaries his strength was concentrated among young voters, affluent suburbanites and liberals. McGovern basically held that constituency yesterday, and ran significantly better among voters who previously had been the strongest supporters of his opponent, Hubert Humphrey.

Those voters who had formed the

nucleus of the Humphrey strength in other contests—the blacks, the poor, the urban dwellers, the blue-collar workers, the ethnics—deserted him in California.

The most striking evidence of McGovern's broader appeal came in two voting groups, the blacks and the blue-collar workers. In previous primaries Humphrey had been getting anywhere from 70 to 80 per cent of the black vote.

Humphrey also had been running about 2-to-1 ahead of McGovern among blue-collar workers.

A survey by Hart Research Associates conducted for The Washington Post showed Humphrey actually losing the black vote by 2 percentage points in California and running behind Mc-

Govern among blue-collar workers by a 46 per cent to 38 per cent margin.

(McGovern's principal pollster, Pat Caddell, estimated that McGovern took 47 or 48 per cent of the state's black vote to 43 per cent for Humphrey and that he picked up 57 per cent of the Chicano vote, 20 points ahead of Humphrey. But Caddell said Humphrey seemed to have won the Jewish vote by 18 to 20 per cent and to have won the blue-collar vote by 2 or 3 per cent.)

The Hart survey, of 347 voters in 26 counties throughout the state, also turned up other evidence of McGovern's increasing acceptance among diverse elements of registered Democrats. Mexican-Americans voted for Mc-

MCGOVERN BROADENS CONSTITUENCY

Govern by 61 to 31 per cent for Humphrey.

At the same time, with family incomes under \$7,500 a year, the 1970 voters were evenly divided between the two candidates. In the 1960 election, Ohio and Maryland were states he beat Post, but they showed Humphrey winning anywhere from 2 to 1 to 100-1 over McGovern in that category.

Finally, Humphrey's standing among urban voters plummeted in California. In California the urban vote represents much of the potential Democratic electorate. Yesterday Humphrey took only 27 per cent of that vote. In Pennsylvania, by contrast, he had won 45 per cent of the urban vote and in Ohio he took 51 per cent.

McGovern's margin rose from 23 per cent of the urban vote in Pennsylvania to 52 per cent in California.

Suburban Vote Divided

The key to the closeness of the California vote especially lies in the one area that had been the lion's share for George McGovern—the suburbs. The two candidates divided that vote yesterday. In California that vote makes up nearly half of the Democratic electorate.

In Pennsylvania, Humphrey had carried 24 per cent of the suburban vote to McGovern's 53. In California, Humphrey captured 43 per cent of the suburban vote while McGovern won 41 per cent.

Humphrey's strength was concentrated in one major area—sprawling Los Angeles County.

A reading of the California returns thus clearly shows how successful McGovern had been in establishing himself as a candidate with wide national appeal. His chief standing has been to campaign against the time-worn three months ago, when he was widely regarded as the only candidate who could not rise above 7 per cent in the national polls.

What is intriguing about California—and unanswerable at this stage—is how the polls erred so badly here.

McGovern came into election day seemingly headed for a landslide victory. The respected California Poll conducted by Mervin Field showed him ahead by 20 percentage points. But as they have demonstrated all year in the privacy of the voting booth, citizens refused to be catalogued in advance of the election.

Various Theories Offered

There are any number of theories being advanced to explain the far-better Humphrey final vote: that the intensely personal nature of his campaigning against the odds spurred a last-minute sympathy vote; that McGovern's position on specific issues, including income redistribution and cuts in defense spending, cast new doubt on his candidacy; that the television debates caused a significant switch to Humphrey.

None of these can be verified with any accuracy. They remain theories.

The Hart survey data does, however, give clues to what was taking place as the election approached. Voters were asked when they made up their minds to support either Humphrey or McGovern. One out of three voters said they decided on their candidate within the last three weeks. Of those voters, Humphrey beat McGovern by a 5-to-4 margin.

In other words, people who were undecided tended to be more influenced by Humphrey than McGovern in the closing days of the election.

The television debates are less conclusive.

Some 53 per cent of all Democratic voters in the state, representing well over a million persons, said they had watched at least one of the three TV encounters. But despite such wide exposure, neither candidate received a clear signal of support based on the way he came over the set.

When asked which candidate was the winner, the citizens responded this way:

Sixteen per cent of all Democratic voters thought Humphrey came out ahead.

Seventeen per cent said McGovern.

Twenty per cent thought the debates were a stand-off.

And the remainder didn't watch.

The same kind of inconclusive breakdown came among those who voted for either McGovern or Humphrey.

Of those who backed Humphrey on Tuesday, only 20 per cent thought he was a clear-cut winner in the debates. Of those who voted for McGovern, the same figure of 30 per cent gave their man the clear edge.

Marked by Bitterness

The Hart results do cast light on another element of critical importance to not only Humphrey and McGovern, but to their party's chances against Richard Nixon in the fall. This campaign was marked by a current of bitterness, sometimes muted, sometimes flaring into the open between the two senators who have been in time for trials in Washington.

On election day, that bitterness was most notably expressed by the Humphrey voters. Almost half of those who voted for Humphrey said they would support Mr. Nixon if McGovern is the Democratic nominee in November. Among McGovern's supporters, however, two out of three said they would back Humphrey in the final Democratic nomination next month in New Haven.

But a full 19 per cent of the McGovern voters said they would not participate at all in the presidential election if the choices are the same as four years ago — another Humphrey-Nixon match.

Implicit in these findings is a potentially perilous situation facing the Democratic Party. They raise the prospect of a party so badly divided that the Republicans could be returned to office as a result.

On the surface that is enough news for the President and his party. But a careful qualification has to be added to that equation.

In trial heats among Democrats yesterday, McGovern and Humphrey had McGovern scored substantial victories when pitted face-to-face against Mr. Nixon. The figure for Humphrey was 19 per cent to Mr. Nixon's 21 per cent. McGovern polled the President by 36 to 23 per cent.

Elects Confirmed

These confirm the findings of other published polls this week that showed McGovern beating Mr. Nixon among all California voters. So far, this means that the Democrat has no doubts about California, the first state to vote that he would win in 1969 and 1972.

Another way of looking at the relative strength of the Democrat in his native state may be seen in the fact that the issues cited with the exception of California, as in other states, the war, plus as the greatest concern of most voters. But even the issue of inflation, the most serious problem, is less such about the economy as with inflation and interest rates being of paramount importance.

In other states, the issues of inflation or taxes ranked high, but the California voters were saying yesterday that their economic problems are more acute and more demanding of solution.

These two concerns, the war and the economy, will probably dominate the actual presidential campaign.

When it comes to distinguishing between the two leading Democratic candidates, there is little in voter responses to distinguish them. A majority of the Humphrey voters said they thought he would honorably end the war. Only two other issues were strongly associated with Humphrey in their minds. These were his positions on full equality for blacks and on tax reform.

For McGovern, two out of three of his supporters mentioned his call for immediate withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. And almost half cited his stand on guaranteed a minimum income for the poor. About 40 per cent mentioned his tax reform proposals.

The voters seemed to perceive the men in different ways. McGovern supporters were more inclined to stress his stand on specific issues than his personal qualities, while the Humphrey backers spoke more about their man's personality, his speaking ability, his warmth and sincerity.

Support of Elderly

In only one segment of the voting population did Humphrey maintain the strength he has demonstrated in other primaries. Voters aged 65 and over, and those who are retired, gave him a lopsided 2-to-1 margin over McGovern.

His California constituency was mirrored by another segment. Slightly less than half of the voters classified themselves as conservatives. But, perhaps, especially his stand showing for the Los Angeles County suburban voters in California, and even more so, southern California, the top up of the suburbs voters from those in other sections of the country, he is substantially more conservative.

McGovern maintained his position among young voters, liberals, the more affluent and among professional groups.

In California, as in other primaries, he took better than 70 per cent of voters between the ages of 18 and 24. With voters earning more than \$12,000 a year, he did as well in California as in other states.

Among voters classifying themselves as liberals, McGovern received two out of three of the ballots cast. In the professional-executive category of voters, McGovern received a clear-cut majority, running more than 2-to-1 ahead of Humphrey.

In a political season of contradictions and confusion, these elements among the voters remained constant factors. There was one group in the California electorate, though, that defied the standards set in other primaries.

McGovern had been doing consistently better among women voters all across the country. The Hart survey yesterday turned up yet another contradiction to the political norm.

In California George McGovern ran significantly better among men than women, holding a 15-point spread over Humphrey among men but only 3 per cent among women.

Whether that is an indication of further change in a changing electorate or merely a quirk of California no one can say. Even the pollsters won't venture an opinion of why that is so.

This story is based on interviews conducted for The Washington Post by Dick Research Associates of Washington. The company interviewed 847 California voters in 26 of the state's 58 counties. These voters represent 67 per cent of the potential Democratic electorate in California. The voters were contacted by random dial after they completed ballots. To avoid possible bias, the pollsters were not permitted to see the ballots until they were counted. The pollsters were not permitted to discuss the results of the primary election.

4-Primary Record of Rivals' Strength

By a Washington Post Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES, June 7—The changing nature of the McGovern-Humphrey constituencies is shown in the following table, based on voter surveys conducted in four presidential primaries by Hart Research Associates for The Washington Post.

| | Pennsylvania May 23 | Ore. May 2 | Maryland May 14 | California June 4 |
|----------------------------|------------------------|---------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| Urban Voters | | | | |
| Humphrey | 47 | 53 | 48 | 27 |
| McGovern | 23 | 34 | 13 | 52 |
| Suburban Voters | | | | |
| Humphrey | 29 | 33 | 22 | 43 |
| McGovern | 45 | 49 | 37 | 41 |
| Blue-Collar Workers | | | | |
| Humphrey | 43 | 54 | 33 | 38 |
| McGovern | 19 | 35 | 16 | 46 |
| Blacks | | | | |
| Humphrey | 72 | 60 | 67 | 34 |
| McGovern | 13 | 16 | 12 | 36 |
| Low-Income Voters | | | | |
| Humphrey | 44 | 59 | 34 | 42 |
| McGovern | 20 | 32 | 12 | 42 |

Times Survey: Defections In Party Face McGovern

By JACK ROSENTHAL

Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, June 8 — A one out of every six California voters, a portion of voters Democrats (Mr. Humphrey got 16.7 per cent of the vote in the Democratic primary Tuesday). A survey of a Senator Hubert 49 per cent of the vote in the Democratic primary Tuesday. In a survey that if Senator H. is significantly higher than George McGovern won the tie rate measured in any of the Democratic nomination, the four previous primary elections would abandon their party and surges conducted by The Times and the Yankelovich research concern.

According to a cross-section. The California survey was of such a size and a primary a scientific sampling of 370,000 voters in New York voters in 11 counties who were interviewed as they left the polls. The total included an 89 percent of Humphrey. They voters say they would overruling of 59 percent defect to the President in a voters.

Nixon-McGovern race. The Humphrey defection rate

Another 49 per cent say they contrasted markedly with that would stand by Mr. McGovern among McGovern voters. If as the Democratic nomination, Senator Humphrey should win remainder of the nomination, fewer than 20 percent of the McGovern voters would defect.

The 49 per cent defection rate is equivalent to the loss of Continued on Page 18, Column 4

Final Study: Defections Help McGovern

Continued from Page 1. Col. G. ... ers say they would defect to the President.

The final Humphrey defection rate reflected a steady stream of voters who had been among the McGovern-Sullivan supporters. The survey indicated they were less concerned about the Vietnam war and more sympathetic to Gov. George C. Wallace of Alabama than were McGovern voters.

And, the survey indicated Senator Humphrey's conservative reasons won him growing support as the California campaign drew to a close.

Young Support McGovern

Senator McGovern won nothing more from young voters in the closing days of the campaign. His support among first-time voters, 18 to 24, fell to its lowest level of all in the five surveys.

The California survey showed that the South Dakotan won about 40 per cent of this vote. It indicated that 100,000 votes that would mean a total of about 47 per cent of an estimated 550,000 first-time voters. His lead margin in victory over Senator Humphrey in California was about 177,000.

McGovern, however, Senator Humphrey, seemed to have a lead in the young voters' survey. The survey indicated that 100,000 votes that would mean a total of about 47 per cent of an estimated 550,000 first-time voters. His lead margin in victory over Senator Humphrey in California was about 177,000.

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the statewide California Primary. McGovern's Wisconsin victory, the two men appeared to divide about evenly.

For example, slightly more voters expressed concern about inflation. However, Senator McGovern was more concerned about high property taxes favored Senator Humphrey. On economic issues, which played an important role in Senator McGovern's Wisconsin victory, the two men appeared to divide about evenly. For example, slightly more voters expressed concern about inflation favored Senator McGovern. Slightly more voters were concerned about high property taxes favored Senator Humphrey.

An almost exactly equal proportion—two-thirds—of the voters surveyed said they would support either Senator McGovern or Senator Humphrey against President Nixon in the November general election. If Senator Humphrey were nominated, however, one young voter in 10 said he would decide not to vote at all. About one voter in six was a young first-time voter.

California Democrats appeared polarized when it came to Governor Wallace, a write-in candidate who about half thought his views should at least be given a place in the Democratic platform. At the same time, the other half favored Humphrey—or even defected.

Senator McGovern's support among voters who had not voted in the 1968 election was 21 per cent; in California, 44 per cent, and in other areas, 30 per cent.

Other Survey Findings

Among other findings of the California survey were the following:

Senator McGovern's support among voters who had not voted in the 1968 election was 21 per cent; in California, 44 per cent, and in other areas, 30 per cent.

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Times Study: Defections Face McGovern

Continued From Page 1, Col. 6
ers say they would defect to the President.

The high Humphrey defection rate mirrored a series of shifts of opinion conservatism among the Minnesota Senator's supporters. The survey indicated they were less concerned about the Vietnam war and more sympathetic to Gov. George C. Wallace of Alabama than were McGovern voters.

And, the survey indicated, Senator Humphrey's comparatively conservative positions won him growing support as the California campaign drew to a close.

Young Support McGovern

Senator McGovern won gathering support from younger voters in the closing days of the campaign. His support among first-time voters, aged 18 to 24, jumped to its highest level of any of the five surveys.

The California survey showed that the South Dakotan won about three-fourths of this larrikin. Translated into total votes, that would mean he won about 425,000 of an estimated 580,000 youth votes. His total margin of victory over Senator Humphrey in California was about 178,000.

Meanwhile, however, Senator Humphrey appeared to make offsetting gains among voters who were not present. His net gain of about 20 per cent in this category was twice that of Senator McGovern.

These gains among more conservative and older voters appear to reflect Senator Humphrey's snipe attacks on McGovern proposals as veering on the left and radical.

Further, the survey of late Humphrey voters parallels previous findings of the Times study. In the Florida primary, for example, Senator Humphrey did better among voters who had served in the Vietnam war than his opponent. Late voters made up for the nationally televised debates which the McGovern campaign had lost.

A week before the election,

the statewide California Poll reported a 20-point McGovern lead in the final returns. Senator McGovern won by a 45-to-20 per cent margin.

Another sign of the comparative conservatism of Humphrey voters was the finding that less than half think any Democrat can defeat President Nixon. By contrast, two-thirds of McGovern voters think so. Among all California Democratic voters, only a little over half are optimistic about November.

The rise from primary to primary in the number of Humphrey voters who would not support Senator McGovern parallels the increasing attention paid to the South Dakotan's proposals.

These include restructuring the defense budget and reducing it substantially to \$55-billion, and replacing the present welfare system with a \$1,000-per-person allowance for the poor.

In the Florida primary, 25 per cent of Humphrey voters said they would prefer Mr. Nixon to Senator McGovern in November. In Wisconsin the figure was 29 per cent; in Pennsylvania, 34 per cent, and in Michigan, 22 per cent.

Other Survey Findings

Among other findings of the California survey were the following:

Senator McGovern strongly approved his showing among voters blacks formerly dominated by Senator Humphrey—black, older adults and blue-collar voters. But these McGovern gains were somewhat offset by Humphrey gains among younger adults and white-collar workers.

The two men appeared to divide the black and the Mexican-American vote about evenly.

Other findings: Senator McGovern was the most popular choice of most voters who served in the Vietnam war. Senator Humphrey was the choice of most voters who served in the Vietnam war. As a result, Senator McGovern won heavy support from those concerned about the

played an important role in Senator McGovern's Wisconsin victory, the two men appeared to divide about evenly.

For example, slightly more voters concerned about inflation favored Senator McGovern. Slightly more concerned about high property taxes favored Senator Humphrey.

On economic issues, which played an important role in Senator McGovern's Wisconsin victory, the two men appeared to divide about evenly. For example, slightly more voters concerned about inflation favored Senator McGovern. Slightly more concerned about high property taxes favored Senator Humphrey.

An almost exactly equal proportion—two-thirds—of the voters surveyed said they would support either Senator McGovern or Senator Humphrey against President Nixon in the November general election.

If Senator Humphrey were nominated, however, one young voter in 10 said he would decide not to vote at all. About one voter in six was a young first-time voter, aged 18 to 24.

California Democrats appeared polarized when it came to Governor Wallace, a write-in candidate here. About half thought his views should at least be given a place in the Democratic platform. At the same time, the other half favored ignoring—or even denouncing—him.

If Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts been a candidate, he might have narrowly won the California primary, drawing almost equal numbers away from Senators McGovern and Humphrey. Allowing for statistical error the three men would have run within three percentage points of each other, according to the survey.

California, as in previous years, the most important factor was the Vietnam war. It was the issue that drew the most voters to Senator McGovern. As a result, Senator McGovern won heavy support from those concerned about the

On economic issues, which war,

Times Survey: Defections In Party Face McGovern

By JACK ROSENTHAL

Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, June 8 — A one out of every six California striking proportion of voters Democrats (Mr. Humphrey got who supported Senator Hubert 40 per cent of the vote in the 19. Humphrey in California said Democratic primary Tuesday). in a survey that if Senator it is significantly higher than George McGovern won the the rate measured in any of the Democratic nomination, they four previous primary election would abandon their party and surveys conducted by The vote for President Nixon in Times and the Yankelevich re-November.

According to a cross-section The California survey was of survey conducted on primary a scientific sampling of 570 day here by The New York voters in 11 counties who were Times and Daniel Yankelevich, interviewed as they left the Inc., about 40 per cent of Hum-polls. The total included an phrey voters say they would over-sampling of 56 black defect to the President in a voters.

Nixon-McGovern race. The Humphrey defection rate Another 40 per cent say they contrasted markedly with that would stand by Mr. McGovern among McGovern voters. If as the Democratic nominee. The Senator Humphrey should win remainder are undecided or say the nomination, fewer than 20 they would not vote. per cent of the McGovern vot-

The 40 per cent defection rate is equivalent to the loss of, Continued on Page 18, Column 4

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 15, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Dinner Reservations at
the Kennedy Center

I regret to report that dinner reservations cannot be made for either the Gallery or the Promenade. Discussion with Gilles Savin, who runs the restaurants at the Kennedy Center for Canteen, and others at the Center disclose that there is a very firm "no reservations" rule. These two restaurants are strictly first come, first serve. Mr. Savin emphasized that whatever the rule, there was no side or back entrance to preclude standing in line. He cannot hold a table either. According to Savin, the number of Trustee and VIP requests for "special service" at these two restaurants has been very high. He claims the rule has not been violated in spite of all the requests.

To stand in line at the Gallery at 6:30 or 7:00 would take 15-30 minutes according to Savin. At the Promenade, which is a self-service, cafeteria-style restaurant, the line will be 15-20 minutes at least.

To say that the food at the Promenade is undistinguished would be charitable. At the Gallery it is fair -- the Quiche Lorraine and House Wine are acceptable.

If you want to eat at La Grande Scene, Pascal, the new maitre'd has a reservation for you for 4 at 6:30-7:00. Pascal has served you before and will have a good table.

GS/jb

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 13, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Gallup Surveys

Discussion with John Davies developed these interesting points:

1) The next Presidential popularity figures will be available June 25th based on field interviewing June 16-18;

2) The Gallup Survey for Friday, June 16, will show that "the public does regard George McGovern as rather liberal, but he's not a radical among the public in the same sense as the columnists have painted his image". The Republican Party has not been successful in pinning the radical label on McGovern. Davies says that "in a sense they (the Republican organization) are hitting a nerve there (painting McGovern radical) and it is a successful campaign ploy, but at the same time, McGovern isn't seen by the public to be radical";

3) The Gallup Survey for release Sunday, June 18 will show that the Republican share of the Catholic vote today is higher than it has been since 1956. Davies says that, "and a lot of that can be directly pinpointed to the President's strong positions on aid to private education and also abortion";

4) In asking Davies for more detailed information on Wallace's vote as reflected in the June 9 release (McGovern's Dramatic Gains Due to Independents), he mentioned that Wallace's strengths were among Independents in the South, the South generally, and among the younger non-college segment of the population. Davies said the sample was too small to permit more detailed cross-breaks;

5) Finally, Davies confirmed again that Gallup would not conduct their annual Kennedy-Chappaquiddick poll in spite of the recent Quayle poll in Harper's, and "independent" letters to the New York Times, Apple and Wicker. Davies said that the Wall Street Journal survey on Kennedy was the only Kennedy/Chappaquiddick poll that would be done unless Kennedy became the Democratic nominee.

GS/jb

PHONE CONVERSATION WITH JOHN DAVIES -- JUNE 13, 1972

D - Gordon, how are you?

G - Pretty good.

D - We've been having a little problem touching base here.

G - Oh yeah, back and forth. That happens.

D - I'm in and out of this place.

G - I wanted to thank you for letting us know about those releases last weekend. They came as a very pleasant surprise to us.

D - Well, I wouldn't think it would be that much of a surprise.

G - Well, it's always a surprise to do that well. On a sort of a further question on that, were popularity questions also taken on that, Presidential popularity?

D - No, sir.

G - Nothing, huh? On either of those polls that were released, either the May 26th or the

D - Right. The most recent popularity figure of course was the 61%.

G - 61%. Nothing since then?

D - There'll be a popularity figure, we just sent a questionnaire out as a matter of fact this morning that will be maturing, let's see, on June 16, 17, 18. It will mature sometime about the 23rd.

G - I see.

D - If you're desperately interested in the figures, be sure you contact me before the 26th, because the 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th and the 1st of July I'll probably be in Memphis and Los Angeles ...

G - So you're out from the 26th to the 30th, huh? OK.

What are we releasing this week of interest?

D - We are releasing, let me check into those, we didn't send one out yesterday. It's going out later today. I'll have to check. I'll be right with you.

G - OK.

D - In strictly public relations form, the story for Friday will answer the question: "Has the Republican Party been successful in pinning the Radical label on McGovern?" The answer is yes and no. I don't have all the data in front of me so I can't give you a specific reading on it, but yes the public does regard George McGovern as rather liberal, but he's not as radical as the columnists have, I mean, he's not known as radical among the public in the same sense as the columnists have painted his image.

G - I see. But the title is not "Has the Republican Party been successful, is it?"

D - You know, the Republican organization obviously in the last 2 or 3 months in the newsletters so on and so forth has tried to paint George McGovern as a wild-eyed radical. In a sense they are hitting a nerve there and it is a successful campaign ploy, but at the same time, McGovern isn't seen by the public to be as radical ...

G - I see, I see.

D - And the story for Sunday, I think, will be very interesting to the President, particularly, because it shows that the Republican share of the Catholic vote today is higher than it has been since 1956.

G - That is interesting.

D - And a lot of that can be directly pinpointed to the President's strong positions on aid ~~to public~~, aid to private education and also abortion.

G - Any regional breaks on that, I mean, is that abortion issue

D - Yes.

G - I see.

D - But I don't have anything yet. I probably won't until midday tomorrow.

G - OK. We'd be very interested in that because as you know Catholics are of considerable interest to us.

D - Absolutely.

G - One last question, if you've got another moment, John. On the release for Friday, last Friday, June 9, it says, "McGovern's dramatic gains due to Independents?"

D - Right.

G - In that last column, it says, "Wallace leads among Independent voters"

D - That's correct.

G - And our question is, do you have some crossbreaks on where those Independents are, are they in the South, or are they ?

D - They are primarily in the South, yes, but also among the younger segment of the, the younger non-college segment of the population.

G - I see. Any further geographic break on those Independents that are for Wallace?

D - Not at this point, no, no. The sample is rather small to permit that kind of an analysis, but we can say that it is primarily in the South and also among the Independents, particularly the young Independents. Those of course non-college educated and mostly the young people.

G - That is interesting for support level. One final question, we have noticed that in Harpers ran a story on Chappaquidick recently based on a Quail poll. Did you see that?

D - No, I didn't.

G - Yes, the most recent issue of Harpers has a whole series of questions on the Chappaquidick incident done by a pollster named Quail. I don't know how good he is.

D - He's terrible.

G - Is he?

D - Just between us, he's awful.

G - Well, whatever. It shows a sort of an interesting change. They use something called a Trust Index, and slightly different questions than the usual.

D - How do spell that Gordon? Truss?

G - No joke intended, huh?

D - OK.

- G - Anyway, I thought you might be interested in that.
- D - Great, I sure would be and I presume you saw copies of the Wall Street Journal survey on Kennedy.
- G - Yes, I did.
- D - That was also done by our organization.
- G - Right, I know that.
- D - How does that compare with what Quail found?
- G - Oh well, Quail asked some different questions that indicate that Kennedy's trust is up some. That sort of screwy questioning, I don't know if that's your criticism of him as a pollster, but ..
- D - No, just the way
- G - He asked some really crazy questions, like "44% agree that in my opinion EMK behaved immorally before his car went off the bridge", "He has redeemed himself enough", while, you know, he goes on and on. "70% were sure he didn't tell the whole truth about what happened"
- D - The one thing I don't think anyone has touched on and maybe they did, maybe in the article, but many people now say that you know that he has redeemed himself and that he didn't give the whole story, well nobody has gone farther and asked "Well, does that make any difference to you?"
- G - Yes, right.
- D - Now that's the important thing, the fact that they didn't think he told the whole truth. I'm inclined to believe that the public

D - is a very forgiving people ...

G - I think so too. If you guys do run down on that, we'd be fascinated of course.

D - I don't think we will. Of course if Kennedy should by some chance get the nomination, then there'll be a lot of that ..

G - Sure.

D - There really is no license for it at this point. There is no sense in kicking a dead horse.

G - No, No, OK. Well, I'll call you tomorrow afternoon if you have some more breaks.

D - Very excellent. And I said, I'll probably be in Washington on the 22nd ...

G - Look forward to seeing you.

D - I just may have those data at that particular point in time.

G - Good.

D - Maybe I'll stop by for a minute. I won't be able to stay long, though.

G - Understand.

D - OK, sir.

G - Good, John.

D - Righto, bye, bye.

Now Leads Among Democrats, Independents Combined

McGovern's Dramatic Gains Due to Independents; Wallace Seen Winning Strong Sympathy Vote

By George Gallup
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Field Enterprises, Inc.

WASHINGTON, June 9 (AP) — McGovern's dramatic gains in the latest survey among Democrats and Independents combined are due to a sharp upturn in support among Independents, the survey shows. For the first time since the California primary, McGovern leads Humphrey among Democrats and Independents combined. The survey also shows that Wallace is winning a strong sympathy vote among Independents.

Independents than among Democrats. Even during the early period of the primaries, McGovern ran virtually even with Humphrey among this group. Following the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania primaries, however, McGovern recorded a surge of popularity with Independents — from 18 per cent to 26 per cent.

This sharp upturn for McGovern among Independents occurred roughly one month after a similar jump among Democrats — from 5 per cent to 17 per cent following the Wisconsin primary.

Waller's advanced, high-income voters. McGovern holds an advantage over Humphrey and Wallace in that, among both Democrats and Independents, he appeals far more to college-educated and higher income persons. These groups vote in greater proportions in the primaries and work harder to get supporters to the polls. Among Democrats and Independents with a college background, for example, McGovern is preferred over Humphrey by a 51-to-31 margin.

McGovern Leads HHH By Seven Points

When the choices of Democrats and Independents in the latest survey are combined, McGovern emerges ahead of Humphrey for the first time. He leads Humphrey by the margin of seven percentage points, 26 per cent to 19 per cent.

Wallace, however, is ahead of both men, winning the support of 31 per cent of Democrats and Independents combined.

A total of 661 Democrats and 489 Independents, out of a total sample of 1,540 adults, 18 and older, were interviewed in person in the latest survey which was conducted May 26 to May 29. This question was asked:

Here is a list of people who have been mentioned as possible presidential candidates for the Democratic party in 1972. Which ONE would you like to see nominated as the Democratic candidate for President in 1972?

The following tables show the trend in support for Humphrey, McGovern and Wallace among Independents and Democrats. Both survey dates and primary are given:

Table with 3 columns: Survey Dates, HHH McGovern, Wallace. Rows include Choice of Democrats For 1972 Nomination and Choice of Independents For 1972 Nomination.

Table with 3 columns: Survey Dates, HHH McGovern, Wallace. Rows include March 24-27, Ill. Primary: March 21, Fla. Primary: March 14, N. H. Primary: March 7.

Table with 3 columns: Survey Dates, HHH McGovern, Wallace. Row includes March 3-6.

Choices of Independents For 1972 Nomination (from a list)

Table with 3 columns: Survey Dates, HHH McGovern, Wallace. Rows include May 26-29, Oregon Primary: May 23, April 28, May 1, Mass., Pa. Primaries: April 25, April 21-24, Wis. Primary: April 4, March 24-27, Ill. Primary: March 21, Fla. Primary: March 14, N. H. Primary: March 7, March 3-6.

Trial Heats Show McGovern's Strength with Independents

McGovern's greater appeal than Humphrey with Independents is seen not only in his support among this group for the nomination, but in test races against President Nixon and Governor Wallace.

A survey completed in early May is consistent with earlier findings to show McGovern leading Humphrey among Democrats and Independents combined. McGovern's survey showed McGovern with the support of 31 per cent of Independent voters, when matched against Nixon and Wallace combined to 31 per cent for Humphrey.

Wallace Leads Among Independent Voters

Surveys in California and April 24-May 19, respectively, indicate that George Wallace of Alabama strongly suggests the presence of a "sympathy vote" ahead of Humphrey but behind McGovern with Independents in early May. Wallace started to catch up with Humphrey in the California primary among the voters of that state. In the latest pre-convention survey, however, Wallace chose 28 per cent of Independents in this survey, to 25 per cent for McGovern and 16 per cent for Humphrey.

Wallace has also registered gains among Democrats during this same period of time, going from 18 per cent in early May to 26 per cent in the latest survey and is now in a virtual tie with Humphrey and McGovern.

A national survey now underway will determine what changes have occurred in the nationwide candidate standings since the California primary.

Location 807

McGovern Seen as Stronger Challenger than HHH

Nixon Holds Widest Lead to Date Over McGovern and Humphrey

By George Gallup
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Field Enterprises, Inc.

WASHINGTON, N. J., June 11—Gov. George Wallace has registered sharp gains in support since he was at the top of the Sept. 11, 1968 Gallup Poll. His support has risen to 26 per cent, while Sen. George McGovern's has produced President Nixon's widest lead to date over both Humphrey and McGovern. Also, the fact that the size of Nixon's lead has increased since the previous survey is a notable sign in early May.

McGovern also is better showing than HHH in previous trial heats, according to a May 11 trial. He trails Nixon by 21 points, 43 to 22 per cent, while Humphrey lags behind Nixon by 27 points, 43 to 16 per cent.

In a previous (early May) trial against McGovern, Nixon by only 11 points, 45 to 34 per cent, while HHH by 11 points, 45 to 34 per cent.

The HHH lead was cut in two in the trial runs since mid-April with McGovern and Wallace included as a third party candidate.

| Nixon - McGovern - Wallace Trend | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-------|--------|-------|-------------|
| | Nixon | McGov. | Wall. | Un- dec. |
| Sept. 11, 1968 | 45 | 39 | 19 | 8 |
| May 11, 1972 | 43 | 35 | 15 | 7 |
| April 21-24, 1972 | 45 | 32 | 16 | 7 |

| Nixon - Humphrey - Wallace Trend Match Today's | | | | |
|--|-------|----------|-------|-------------|
| | Nixon | Humphrey | Wall. | Un- dec. |
| Sept. 11, 1968 | 43 | 26 | 22 | 9 |
| April 28 | 45 | 34 | 15 | 6 |
| May 11, 1972 | 43 | 37 | 16 | 9 |

Wallace Vote Hits New High
The latest findings indicate that a "sympathy vote" may be operating for Wallace following the May 15 attempt on his life.

Wallace's current vote of 22 per cent in a match up with Nixon and Humphrey represents his highest score yet recorded. His previous high of 21 per cent was recorded during the presidential campaign in late September, 1968. His support steadily fell off from then until the election when he won 13.6 per cent of the vote to 43.0 per cent for Humphrey and 43.4 per cent for Nixon.

Sept. '68 Results
Remarkably, the September, 1968 trial heat figures almost exactly match those recorded in the latest Nixon-Humphrey-Wallace trial heat. Nixon won the support of 43 per cent in the earlier survey, compared to 28 per cent for Humphrey and 21 per cent for Wallace, with 8 per cent undecided.

From that time, however, the Wallace vote started to fade, with his losses translating into gains for Humphrey. By election eve, the Gallup Poll indicated, Nixon had only a slim margin over Humphrey.

Wallace Also Gains As Nomination Choice
Wallace's gains in the latest trial heats (up seven points from the previous test against Humphrey, up four versus McGovern) reinforce survey findings reported Friday. These showed Wallace now tied with Humphrey and McGovern as the top choice of the nation's Democrats for the nomination, and far ahead of his two rivals among Independents, winning 36 per cent of

their support to 25 per cent for McGovern and 11 per cent for Humphrey.

If Wallace Does Not Run
With many political observers of the opinion that Wallace will not run as a third party candidate this year, it is important to see where his vote would go in the event he does not enter the race.

To determine this, registered voters choosing Wallace were asked to select between just the two major party candidates in each of the two trial heats.

Nixon Gains Most With Wallace Out
The national findings show Nixon benefitting over each of his two leading rivals, if Wallace is not in the picture. Nixon would gain 10 points with Wallace out, while McGovern would pick up only four points. The President would gain nine points to only six for Humphrey.

The following tables show the vote in the latest test runs, with and without Wallace:

| Nixon - Humphrey - Wallace Trend | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-------|----------|-------|-------------|
| | Nixon | Humphrey | Wall. | Un- dec. |
| Sept. 11, 1968 | 43 | 26 | 22 | 9 |
| May 11, 1972 | 43 | 37 | 16 | 9 |
| April 21-24, 1972 | 45 | 34 | 15 | 6 |

The latest trial heats are based on in-person interviews with a total of 1,185 registered voters out of a total sample of 15,522 adults interviewed May 11-13, 1972. In each of the trials, across the nation, these questions were asked:

Suppose the presidential election were being held today. If both Richard Nixon and the Republican candidate, Sen. George McGovern, were still in the race, and George Wallace were again not a third party candidate, which candidate would you prefer?

— and —
Suppose Wallace were not in the race, which candidate would you prefer? — Nixon or McGovern, Nixon or Humphrey?

Davies

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Gallup Surveys

Discussion with John Davies this morning disclosed that the Gallup release for Sunday, June 11 will contain trial heats with these results:

| | <u>RN</u> | <u>McG</u> | <u>Wal</u> | <u>Und.</u> |
|----------------------|-----------|------------|------------|-------------|
| G - May 26-29 | 43 | 30 | 19 | 8 |
| G | | | | |
| G - Apr 28- May 1 | 43 | 35 | 15 | 7 |

| | <u>RN</u> | <u>HHH</u> | <u>Wal</u> | <u>Und.</u> |
|----------------------|-----------|------------|------------|-------------|
| G - May 26-29 | 43 | 26 | 22 | 9 |
| G - Apr 28- May 1 | 45 | 34 | 15 | 6 |

The trend page on trial heats from your poll book is attached.

In addition, Sunday's Gallup release will refute the assertion in the June 8 New York Times editorial: "At best the party must face the possibility that Governor Wallace, the other prime beneficiary of the politics of disaffection in this strange primary campaign, will seek to rally his followers behind a third-party bid. Whether such a bid would, on balance, take more electoral votes away from the Democratic nominee or from President Nixon is an open question. But whatever chances a Democrat

might have to triumph in the face of a Wallace defection would plummet to near-zero if a convention gang-up on McGovern sparked a fourth-party challenge led by the army of young activists so prominent in his dramatic spurt to the top." The Gallup release will say: "Many political observers are of the opinion that Wallace will not run as a third party candidate this year. It is important to see where his vote would go in the event that he does not enter the race. The national findings show Nixon benefitting over each of his two leading rivals if Wallace is not in the picture. Nixon would gain 10 points with Wallace out while McGovern would pick up only 4."

Other interesting comments by John Davies include: "The Wallace vote obviously is considerably stronger in the South and therefore what help Nixon will get in the South will be greater than any help that the Democratic candidate could possibly get outside the South. We find that the Wallace vote goes about 2 to 1 to Nixon in the South, and it goes to the Democratic candidate by about 3 to 2 outside the South. Which would indicate that since the Wallace vote is up in the neighborhood of 30% in the South and only about 7-10% outside the South, and that, on balance, the President stands to benefit the greatest."

I will meet with John Davies when he is in Washington again on June 22, 1972.

GS/jb
F/U every ~~XXXX~~ Tuesday

PHONE CONVERSATION WITH JOHN DAVIES -- THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 1972

G - on the last column of the release the survey alluded to was in early May and it seems to indicate that you ran a trial heat poll. We would be very interested in the figures.

D - Now that was the last column - I'm trying to find that now. Is that under subhead "Wallace Leads Among Independents"?

G - No, that's just above that. The paragraph just above that.

D - OK.

G - When matched against Nixon and Wallace.

D - That's the one on Independent voters. It wasn't in the index was it?

G - No.

D - Well, you would want the national figures, right?

G - Yeah, if you have them. That would be great.

D - I think that's in the --- let's see that's in the -- let me have those stories for Sunday, please. That's in the one that's coming out now. The new trial heats show Nixon just murdering everybody now. If you'll excuse the expression.

G - That'll be the Sunday release?

D - And here it is right here. OK. Now. Nixon-McGovern-Wallace. In a survey taken May 26-29, which is the most recent ...

G - May 26-29 -- RN-McGovern

D - Right. Which shows Nixon 43%, McGovern 30%, Wallace 19% and 8% undecided. Now the April 28 through May 1, that's the one that started the first two. Shows 43% for Nixon, 35% for McGovern, Wallace 15%, undecided 7%.

G - Does it have some of the other contenders also.

D - There's Humphrey in there too.

G - Oh, what's Humphrey?

D - Uh, Humphrey is. Nixon is 43%, believe it ^{or} not 26% for Humphrey, Wallace 22%, undecided 9%. And the April 28th through May 1 it was Nixon 45%, 34% for Humphrey, 15% for Wallace and 6% undecided.

G - That's -- that will be Sunday's release?

D - Right. You'll probably get that today.

G - OK. Anything else of interest?

D - Yes. There was an editorial this morning in the New York Times.

I don't know if you've had a chance to see it or not. But the story, I mean the text read as follows and I shall read it for you here: " At best the Party must face the possibility that Governor Wallace, the other prime beneficiary of the politics of disaffection in a strange primary campaign, will seek to rally his followers behind a third party bid. Whether such a bid would on balance take more electoral votes away from the Democratic nominee or from President Nixon is an open question."

Now I claim it is not an open question. But since the New York Times sees fit to print what it sees fit to print, we will put in here in this story: ^(b) ~~The national findings~~ " Many political

observers are of the opinion that Wallace will not run as a third party candidate this year. It is important to see where his vote would go in the event that he does not enter the race. ^(b) ~~Now here's~~

~~the interesting part.~~ ^(b) "The National findings show Nixon benefitting over each of his two leading rivals if Wallace is not in the picture.

D
D
D

D (cont) - Nixon would gain 10 points with Wallace out while McGovern
D \ would pick up only 4.

G - Now do you have those broken by region or is that just nationwide?

D - That's just nationwide.

G - I wonder what it is in the South vs, you know, the Northern industrial states? Because that's always the way the argument goes too.

D - We're probably going to tab that for the next index.

G - Gee, that would be fascinating. There are some who say that although Wallace would help the President in the South by dropping out, he hurts us in the North. Especially in the ...

D - That is true. We have shown that all along, but Gordon I think you have to put it in its proper, the Wallace vote, in its proper proportion. The Wallace vote obviously is considerably stronger in
C / the South and therefore what help Nixon will get in the South will be a greater than any help that the Democratic candidate could
C / possibly get outside the South.

G - Yeah.

D / We find that the Wallace vote goes about two to one to Nixon in
d / the South and it goes to the Democratic candidate by a about 3 to 2 outside the South. Which would indicate that since the Wallace vote is up in the neighborhood of 30% in the South and only about
d / 7-10% outside the South, that on balance the President stands to benefit the greatest.

G - I see. That's amazing. OK. What else of interest is there around?

D - Not too much.

G - Coming down here again soon?

D - The 22nd of this month.

G - Oh great.

D - I will be down at the Department of HEW hearing a seminar on the "Mood of America".

G - Oh, excellent.

D - The Public Affairs officers. We're going to be there with Albert Kantzel, Dr. Kantzel, the fellow who wrote "Hopes and Fears".

G - "Hopes and Fears" - right. Feel free to stop in.

D - I sure will if I get a free moment, well I'll call you well in advance, so you know.

G - Oh, good.

D - Very good.

G - All right, John, I'll be talking with you.

D - Good enough, Gordon.

G - Thanks a lot. Bye.

June 2, 1972

Gordon --

The enclosed letter was sent to Tom Wicker, and a copy to the Times editorial page editor. It was fairly difficult to get someone to sign the Wicker letter, and I had a couple false tries. People seem to get nervous when the Great and Grand Times is mentioned!

Also, a very good woman out in Montgomery County knows William Shannon through family connections and sees him socially. She has written to him -- an informal but concerned note -- indicating that she has heard the rumor about Wicker squashing news unfavorable to a Kennedy and is concerned that it might be true.

Will send any answers on to you.

Betty

4538 Cathedral Avenue, NW
Washington, D. C. 20016
June 2, 1972

Mr. Tom Wicker
c/o New York Times
1920 L Street, NW
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Wicker,

I heard something recently -- one of those nothing political comments so common in this city. But as I thought about it, I realized that, if true, it is a very serious matter. The comment concerned George Gallup's annual July poll to measure the impact of the Chappaquiddick accident on a possible Kennedy presidential candidacy. According to the rumor Gallup is being pressured, by yourself and others of the Times staff, to drop the Chappaquiddick poll, as not of public interest.

Washington is a rumor-filled city, and this may be just another false potshot. But, considering your personal attitudes and your belief that these rightly belong in your professional writings, it is not difficult to believe that you could be working to eliminate the Chappaquiddick poll. If true, your attempt to deny people an opportunity to express and know public opinion would appear to conflict with your often-stated commitment to the public's right to know. Or does the public perhaps have a right to know only what you approve?

Senator Kennedy cannot evade Chappaquiddick by striking it from public print, regardless of the cooperation of his friends, or the media or even the judiciary. (I am still incredulous that nobody in the media has done anything about the people's "right to know" about the Edgartown inquest hearing.) But more important than Senator Kennedy, or Chappaquiddick, or even a public

poll, is the danger implicit in any covert liaison between a politician and a major news source. Mr. Wicker, are you attempting to prevent a new Gallup poll on Senator Kennedy, and how does this square with your responsibility to public truth?

Sincerely,

Roger W. Eisinger, Sr.

cc: Mr. John B. Oakes
Editorial Page Editor
The New York Times

4538 Cathedral Avenue, NW
Washington, D. C. 20016
June 2, 1972

Mr. John B. Oakes
Editorial Page Editor
The New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, N. Y. 10036

Dear Mr. Oakes:

The attached is a carbon of a letter sent to Tom Wicker. I thought perhaps it would be of interest to you also, as editorial page editor.

Sincerely,

Roger W. Eisinger, Sr.

An AP report leads: "If Wallace accomplishes nothing else this year, he has succeeded in making a shambles of the once-formidable labor-union vote. Organized labor has fought Wallace at every turn in the primaries and, except in W. Va, has come away beaten or bloodied each time."

Tagge of the Trib quotes Tommy Corcoran and an unnamed top Ill Dem MC who feels Connally would be the best choice their party could make. . . . A Quayle poll conducted in Ill. for Harper's indicated "the stigma of Chappaquiddick" still persists for EMK and it may be getting worse. Using a "trust index," EMK scored 47, down 1% from last Nov., while RN rose 6 to 66 in Ill. The national "trust index" in April was 53 for EMK to 59 for RN. The Ill. poll showed RN preferred 60-40 over EMK, compared with 55-45 last Oct. 44% agreed; "in my opinion, EMK behaved immorally before his car went off the bridge." 60% believed he "has redeemed himself enough," while 75% said "the matter should be dropped." However, 70% were sure he "didn't tell the whole truth about what happened." 36% were willing to say, "I trust EMK more than RN," while 60% agreed that "I trust RN more."

NBC film of EMK speaking at a fundraiser after Utley noted the alternative to McG is not brought among the candidates but that leaves EMK. Reporter said EMK is not a candidate but whatever he is doing he did more of it last night. EMK on film saying the nation faces a crisis of faith in gov't that has failed the people. The dinner was all politics as he insisted he's not running. He said it so many times, concluded reporter, that many are beginning to believe it altho they wish it weren't true.

"EMK brought excitement to the Pitts. Platform hearings," leads Trib. account. Pa. Dems stood along the streets to watch his car. They crowded around him with one idea -- to shake his hand to touch him or to be spoken to by him." This account also tells how EMK's staff culled out the inarticulate and unattractive who wanted to testify. . . . The Post report on the hearings leads: "If applause means anything, the economic issue that matters the most to the average man is tax reform that makes the rich pay their fair share and cases the burden on the poor." Tho the session was called to hear mainly from the people, the Post says "it developed mainly into a recitation of EMK's views."

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 13, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Fred LaRue

Fred LaRue called today with some information on Kennedy. LaRue said he could only discuss it with you or Mitchell, who is out of the city today. LaRue would not discuss the Kennedy matter with me, even though we have covered many sensitive items in the past.

I think you should give him a call.

GS/jb

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Campaign Surveys -
Wave II - New York

Rockefeller's assistant in New York, Mr. Bixby, appealed directly to John Mitchell over the weekend and convinced him to delay the survey interviewing in New York until after the New York primary on June 20. Mitchell directed Teeter to have the New York interviewing begin on June 22 instead of June 14 as originally planned. The New York results will not be available until eight days after the other states have been submitted to you.

~~XXXX~~
GS/jb

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 10, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. ~~WALDEMAN~~

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

RNC Convention

Bill Timmons returned from Miami Beach, June 8, 1972. Extended discussions with him June 1 and yesterday covered several follow-up matters from your May 19 meeting with Mitchell, Ehrlichman and Timmons.

Many very specific aspects of the Convention arrangements have been set. These included: redesigning the podium; fanned seating for 13,600; using three sculptured projection screens (12' x 25') for the documentaries and slides; and the office and command post locations. The Doral is set as the Headquarters Hotel for which separate non-White House passes will be required for admission. Timmons has "cut deals" on rooms, food, security, etc. Rietz' 3000 youth will be housed in 20 inexpensive hotels. Staging areas for concerts, etc. are near. There chartered planes are set for the Campaign and White House Staff. Dean has ruled the Cabinet can take their own cars.

The Host Committee has been cleared by Bebe Rebozo (list at Tab A) but not yet announced.

There have been several interesting substantive developments involving security arrangements. Miami Beach Police Chief Pomerance has agreed there will be no demonstrations up Collins Avenue. There will be no march on the Doral; however, isolated longhairs may be able to trash on Collins Avenue which the police may not have the capability to stop. Timmons believes Pomerance is a pretty good man caught in a tough bind because the Mayor and certain members of the City Council have been encouraging demonstrators to come to Miami Beach by offering camping and other facilities. The prime political security contact with Pomerance is Deputy Assistant Attorney General Harlington "Woody" Wood. Mitchell and Kleindienst chose him. Wood will be

in the hardened underground command post with the FBI, USSSS (Paul Rundell), Army (Ken Belieu or direct designee), local and state police leaders. There will be a direct line from this command post to John Dean's room where he, Fred Fielding and Dave Wilson and secretaries will prepare hourly reports for Mitchell. There will be no political types (Dean or Timmons) in the command post because if something goes wrong, Mitchell doesn't want us to get blamed.

Timmons faces several problems and needs some answers from you. The first concerns the handling of the President's family and special friends. Timmons needs guidance on the Ryans, Drowns, Billy Graham, etc. Timmons asked Rose Mary Woods when he gave her the 1968 list of VIP's. She has not responded and Timmons wants you to prod her. (a memorandum for your signature is attached at Tab B).

The program is being developed and a more detailed version than the one you reviewed on May 19 will be submitted early next week. However, Timmons asks for your reaction to using the U.S. Marine Band on the evening the President delivers his acceptance speech. Brennan discreetly approached the Marines and discovered reluctance because a "political function." Their use could be criticized as militaristic and as an incorrect use of a government unit. Timmons and his program committee would meet the "political" argument by offering the band to the Democrats and believes the patriotic benefits outweigh the negatives.

RECOMMENDATION

That a commercial, non-military band be obtained for the acceptance speech evening. Chapin and Butterfield agree - not to use military band.

_____ AGREE

_____ DISAGREE

_____ COMMENTS

Housing arrangements for VIP's and the White House Staff continue to cause Timmons problems but he believes they are solvable. He has not located a private home for the Vice President that meets his requirements. Other private homes are much harder to acquire than in San Diego.

Concerning the White House personnel and the Presidential party in Miami Beach, Timmons submitted three memoranda (attached Tab C). Timmons philosophy on who should be invited and where they stay is 2) include as many political types as possible to preclude numerous appeals, jockeying, and

private arrangements as possible; b) discourage staff members from taking wives by not offering free transportation or food; c) put the great bulk of White House Staff in the Doral with a limited Presidential Party at the Key Biscayne Hotel, which would be treated as a regular Presidential trip outside Timmons' control.

One of the problems with Timmons' plan is that it suggests Kehrli and Hoopes go to the Convention to run a "government information" office for the White House Staff and Cabinet. Kehrli recommends that he stay here to handle regular Presidential and Haldeman matters just as if there were a trip but no Convention. I would suggest that we let the Cabinet members continue their current system of information gathering rather than try to set up a special office. Another problem with Timmons' White House list to the Convention is that it doesn't include most Staff Assistants from the Domestic Council. In spite of Ehrlichman's agreement to the number of Domestic Council members on May 19, this may become a problem when Cole learns who else is attending the Convention. Finally, there may be appeals from Flanigan, Colson and Malek since they have the lowest portion of their staffs attending. The best stance is to give Timmons the final word and concentrate the resultant flak away from you.

To summarize, Timmons requests that 1) you relinquish three of the twelve villas at Key Biscayne for the Ehrlichmans, Magruders and Maleks; 2) that you approve the staff list; and 3) that you approve the President's travelling party. Higby's comments appear in pencil.

GS/car

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 10, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Malek's Analysis of the
Campaign Organization

Malek discusses the campaign's serious organizational problems in tough, readable language. His comments on the disastrous field organization (Flemming, Mardian, et al) will not come as a surprise to you. Nor will the criticism of the surrogate operation be a surprise. I agree with Malek that the direct mail, telephone and canvassing problems may be solvable because Bob Marik and Bob Morgan are basically capable managers.

The real problem, which Malek discusses at length in the Overall Direction and Priorities sections, is for a tough, hard-driving, ass-licking manager. This may be the role Flanigan served in 1968. Colson is filling this void in some way on particular projects, but this is a structurally unsound arrangement. If there is a plan to shift Flanigan or equally senior, tough manager to the campaign, it should be done quickly. If there is no such plan, consider Malek. The Voter Bloc groups have been planned, staffed and can be run with little of Malek's time by Chuck Shearer. Occasional revisions (e.g. older voters) can be handled directly by Malek. I believe Malek has developed Mitchell's confidence and has the respect of the rest of the campaign organization. There will be obvious positioning problems by Magruder, Mardian, La Rue and others, but these problems will be nothing compared to the country's if McGovern wins.

Malek wants the job.

GS:car

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Celebrities Briefing -
Kissinger's Participation-
California, June 17, 1972

There are conflicting views about whether Kissinger will attend the briefing for celebrities, arranged by Taft Schreiber in California on June 17, 1972. The facts are:

- 1) Taft Schreiber issued invitations to a party featuring John Mitchell and Henry Kissinger;
- 2) Kissinger "committed" (word confirmed) to Schreiber (source: Porter) the June 17, 1972 date;
- 3) Kissinger "committed" (word confirmed) to Mitchell (source: Magruder);
- 4) The date of the event had been changed 3 times at Kissinger's behest. Mitchell accommodated each time;
- 5) Rumor had it that Kissinger did not want to do the event because Martha Mitchell would be there. Magruder checked with Haig, who said this was not the case;
- 6) Campbell, Kissinger's aide, believes the chances are 40-60 that Kissinger will do the event.

Magruder believes Kissinger wants to do the event but alone, without Mitchell, because of an ego problem.

All feel the event is crucial to the success of the President's celebrities program.

If possible, you should talk with Kissinger and ask him to

stand by the commitment to attend the celebrities
briefing on June 17 in California.

GS:car

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Gallup Surveys

Discussion with John Davies this morning disclosed that the Gallup release for Sunday, June 11 will contain trial heats with these results:

| | <u>RN</u> | <u>McG</u> | <u>Wal</u> | <u>Und.</u> |
|----------------------|-----------|------------|------------|-------------|
| G - May 26-29 | 43 | 30 | 19 | 8 |
| G | | | | |
| G - Apr 28- May 1 | 43 | 35 | 15 | 7 |

| | <u>RN</u> | <u>HHH</u> | <u>Wal</u> | <u>Und.</u> |
|----------------------|-----------|------------|------------|-------------|
| G - May 26-29 | 43 | 26 | 22 | 9 |
| G - Apr 28- May 1 | 45 | 34 | 15 | 6 |

The trend page on trial heats from your poll book is attached.

In addition, Sunday's Gallup release will refute the assertion in the June 8 New York Times editorial: "At best the party must face the possibility that Governor Wallace, the other prime beneficiary of the politics of disaffection in this strange primary campaign, will seek to rally his followers behind a third-party bid. Whether such a bid would, on balance, take more electoral votes away from the Democratic nominee or from President Nixon is an open question. But whatever chances a Democrat

might have to triumph in the face of a Wallace defection would plummet to near-zero if a convention gang-up on McGovern sparked a fourth-party challenge led by the army of young activists so prominent in his dramatic spurt to the top." The Gallup release will say: "Many political observers are of the opinion that Wallace will not run as a third party candidate this year. It is important to see where his vote would go in the event that he does not enter the race. The national findings show Nixon benefitting over each of his two leading rivals if Wallace is not in the picture. Nixon would gain 10 points with Wallace out while McGovern would pick up only 4."

Other interesting comments by John Davies include: "The Wallace vote obviously is considerably stronger in the South and therefore what help Nixon will get in the South will be greater than any help that the Democratic candidate could possibly get outside the South. We find that the Wallace vote goes about 2 to 1 to Nixon in the South, and it goes to the Democratic candidate by about 3 to 2 outside the South. Which would indicate that since the Wallace vote is up in the neighborhood of 30% in the South and only about 7-10% outside the South, and that, on balance, the President stands to benefit the greatest."

I will meet with John Davies when he is in Washington again on June 22, 1972.

GS/jb
F/U every ~~XXXX~~ Tuesday

6/8/72

TRIAL HEATS

1972

| Poll Dates | MUSKIE | KENNEDY | HHH | McGOV | WALLACE |
|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|----------|
| H - Jan. | 45-48-7 42-42-11-5 | | 46-37-12-5 | | |
| T - Jan. 3-20 | 52-42-6 46-37-11-6 | 51-40-9 46-37-10-7 | 54-40-6 48-35-12-5 | | |
| G - Jan. 7-10 | 43-42-12-3 | | 47-37 | | |
| O - Jan. 26-27 | 52-36-12 46-32-13-9 | 52-41-7 45-37-12-6 | 58-33-9 50-30-12-8 | | |
| G - Feb. 4-7 | 43-42-10-5 | 47-39-9-5 | 46-39-10-5 | 49-34-11-6 | |
| H - Feb. 8-14 | 47-45-8 44-40-11-5 | | 51-41-8 47-36-12-5 | | |
| H - Feb. 28- Mar. 7 | 50-37-13 47-35-12-6 | | 53-37-10 48-35-12-5 | 59-32-9 53-28-13-6 | |
| O - Mar. 18-19 | 52-37-11 44-30-17-9 | 49-43-8 41-38-15-6 | 55-37-8 44-32-17-7 | | 66-24-10 |
| G - Mar. 24-27 | 46-36-14-4 | | 46-35-15-4 | | 69-23-8 |
| H - Apr. 1-7 | 44-33-15-8 | 45-35-14-6 | 50-42-8 42-36-16-6 | 54-34-12 47-29-16-8 | |
| G - Apr. 15-16 | | 46-36-12-6 | | 46-31-15-8 | |
| G - Apr. 21-24 | | | 44-31-16-9 | 45-32-16-7 | |
| G - Apr. 28- May 1 | | | 50-38-12 45-34-15-6 | 49-39-12 43-35-15-7 | |
| H - May 9-10 | | | 50-42-8 41-37-16-6 | 48-41-11 40-35-17-8 | |
| G - May 26-29 | | | 43-26-22-9 | 43-30-19-8 | |

June 7, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Campaign Survey - Wave II

John Mitchell decided to meet with Bob Teeter privately at 10 a.m. today instead of at 3 p.m. with his political group as scheduled. The questionnaire will not be discussed at 3 p.m.

Mitchell directed Teeter to make the following changes in the Wave II Survey:

1) Develop and add two follow-up questions on national defense. The first question would cover whether those who believe the government should spend less on national defense believe that because the U.S. does not need such arms or because there is too much waste;

2) Develop and add a welfare question which asks whether those with over 12,000 income should be taxed to assist those with less than 12,000 income. Then a series of welfare proposal questions including the President's and McGovern's would be tested;

3) Develop and add a question on "change" - whether people believe the country needs a radical reorganization;

4) Develop and add a question on the nature of campaigning. The question would be something to the effect that "in light of the Wallace shooting, should the President not campaign in public";

5) Drop the Humphrey's handling of the issues sections;

6) Drop the Richard Nixon-Edward Kennedy trial heats.

The reason the Humphrey section is dropped is because Mitchell wants a Richard Nixon-McGovern poll. The Edward Kennedy trial heats are dropped because Mitchell and Teeter believe people are taking Kennedy at his word that he will not be a candidate and so their answer to trial heat questions are inaccurate. Also, Mitchell believes both Harris and Gallup will supply adequate trial heat results on Kennedy.

GS/jb

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR : H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM : GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT : Campaign Survey - Wave II

Attached is the latest draft of the Wave II survey. John Mitchell reviewed the questionnaire and met with Teeter on May 30 to discuss his suggested changes. They are indicated. The questionnaire attached at Tab A has been pre-tested in Detroit.

Teeter needs a commitment from you and John Mitchell on the final questionnaire on June 7. Mitchell has agreed to have all his changes in by then. The vendors -- ORC, Decision Making Information and Market Opinion Research -- will begin field interviewing June 13 and 14. After 10-14 days of interviewing, the vendors will tabulate the results. Teeter hopes to have the trial heat figures on July 3 but has told Mitchell they may not be ready until July 5. The complete reports on each of the states from the vendors is due to Teeter on July 15. You should receive your copies July 16. The suggested form for reporting the results is attached at Tab B. Mitchell is not particularly interested in the format of the results. Teeter will change the format in any way to suit your requirements.

You may want to discuss with Mitchell whether to have a final review of the questionnaire with Ehrlichman's political group -- Colson, Harlow, and MacGregor. Due to the length of the questionnaire, many of the suggested questions prepared by the Domestic Council (Cole, Harper, and Morey) were not included. After the first series of campaign surveys in January, the Domestic Council complained that they had not had sufficient input and therefore the issue materials were not very helpful. In light of your comment yesterday on the advertising -- that you and Mitchell would tell Ehrlichman's group what you were planning to do to protect against a gross oversight -- you may want to do the same with this Wave II survey questionnaire. Mr. Ehrlichman will not be back until Thursday evening so he could not review the questionnaire until Friday. This would cause a delay in the results.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Campaign Survey - Wave II

Bob Teeter called regarding approval of the questionnaire for the Wave II series of campaign surveys. Mitchell has agreed to give Teeter a commitment tomorrow afternoon, so that Teeter can meet with the vendors in Detroit Wednesday night. This change in the time frame somewhat modifies the recommendations in my June 3 memorandum to you on the Campaign Surveys. First, it precludes a final review of the questionnaire with Ehrlichman's political group. Ehrlichman's office advises that his plans now call for his return from Stockholm late Thursday, June 8, 1972, and that he does not plan on having a political meeting until Monday, June 12. Second, Teeter may have to substantially revise the questionnaire if you and Mitchell believe there should be less emphasis on Humphrey in light of the projected California results. If Humphrey does as poorly as most now suggest, the sections on Humphrey's ability to handle the issues could be partially replaced with substantive issue questions. Teeter recommends against dropping any Humphrey questions because he is a bland, middle-of-the-road representative of a possible compromise Democratic nominee.

After Teeter meets with Mitchell and his political group at 3 p.m. on June 7, I will prepare a written description of the proposed changes for your review. If you have a chance to review the changes and give final approval by tomorrow evening, Teeter will be pleased. If not, I will ask Teeter to delay the Wave II schedule.

GS/jb

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 3, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Campaign Survey - Wave II

You reviewed the first draft questionnaire of Bob Teeter's proposed Wave II polls in Russia. John Mitchell also reviewed the questionnaire and met with Teeter on May 30 to discuss his suggested changes. The questionnaire attached at Tab A has been pre-tested in Detroit.

Teeter needs a commitment from you and John Mitchell on the final questionnaire on June 8. The vendors -- ORC, Decision Making Information and Market Opinion Research -- will begin field interviewing June 13 and 14. After 10-14 days of interviewing, the vendors will tabulate the results. Teeter hopes to have the trial heat figures on July 3 but has told Mitchell they may not be ready until July 5. The complete reports on each of the states from the vendors is due to Teeter on July 15. You should receive your copies July 16. The suggested form for reporting the results is attached at Tab B. Mitchell is not particularly interested in the format of the results. Teeter will change the format in any way to suit your requirements.

Concerning the June 8 deadline for the final questionnaire, Teeter will meet on June 7 with Mitchell's political group -- Magruder, Malek, Marek, Finkelstein, LaRue, Miller, and Flemming -- to make "final" changes in the questionnaire. After that group makes its suggestions you may want to discuss the questionnaire with Mitchell and Teeter. You may want to discuss with Mitchell whether to have a final review of the questionnaire with Ehrlichman's political group -- Colson, Harlow, and MacGregor -- on Thursday, June 8. Due to the length of the questionnaire, many of the suggested questions prepared by the Domestic Council (Cole, Harper, and Morey) were not included. After the first series of

campaign surveys in January, the Domestic Council complained that they had not had sufficient input and therefore the issue materials were not very helpful. In light of your comment yesterday on the advertising -- that you and Mitchell would tell Ehrlichman's group what you were planning to do to protect against a gross oversight -- you may want to do the same with this Wave II survey questionnaire.

Recommendation

That Haldeman and Mitchell tell Ehrlichman's group about the Wave II survey questionnaire on June 8. Strachan will have Magruder advise Mitchell.

_____ Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comments

As to the substantive aspects of questionnaire, the three areas Mitchell added on May 30 were amnesty (Question 22); marijuana (Question 24); and abortion (Question 24).-- Pursuant to your decision on May 19, there are no Vice Presidential trial heats on this questionnaire.

The standard trend questions on Presidential and Vice Presidential popularity, Vietnam, and the economy are included. However, the President's credibility on Vietnam question -- "As far as the War in Vietnam is concerned, do you think that President Nixon has been frank and straightforward about the War or do you think that he has not told the American people the real truth about the situation there?" -- is not included. Mitchell believes "Catholics and credibility" will be crucial in this election so the credibility question should be included. This question could be added or substituted for Question 27 -- "How much do you care who wins the Presidential election this fall?"

Recommendation

That Strachan instruct Teeter to include the "credibility" question.

_____ Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comments

The alternate green pages in the questionnaire assure that one-half of the interviewees will be asked questions about Hubert Humphrey while the other half will be asked questions about George McGovern.

On a related polling matter, ORC has conducted seven private telephone surveys for us. The amount of their latest invoice is 44. Dean and Kalmbach believe that unacceptable risks of violating the campaign spending law would be incurred if ORC were paid in green -- either from your 300 fund or from 1701. However, ORC received a prepayment of 50 before the April 7 deadline. This was to be applied toward Wave II polling expenses. Instead, the 50 could cover the private telephone polls and ORC would receive a full payment for its share of the Wave II surveys (approximately 123). The payments to the three polling vendors -- ORC, DMI, and MOR -- will appear on the September 10 public disclosure statement. ORC's figure will be 50 higher, which can be explained as "additional campaign surveys and analyses".

Recommendation

That Strachan instruct Hugh Sloan to pay the full Wave II cost to ORC and apply the 50 prepayment to our pending ORC bill.

_____ Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Comments

GS/jb

State
Dates
No. of Interviews

Trial Heats 1968: +0

| McGovern | | | | Humphrey | | | | Kennedy | | | |
|----------|---|---|---|----------|-------|-------|-------|---------|-------|-------|-------|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| | | | | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | | | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | (+ 0) |

| | Rep. | | | T-S | | | Dem. | | |
|--------|------|-------|-------|-----|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|
| N | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | | (+ 0) | (+ 0) |
| Mc-H-K | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | | (+ 0) | (+ 0) |
| W | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | | (+ 0) | (+ 0) |
| U | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | | (+ 0) | (+ 0) |

Approval

| | A. | | D. | | N.O. | |
|-----------|----|-------|----|-------|------|-------|
| Job | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) |
| Economy | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) |
| Vietnam | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) |
| Job/Agnew | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) |

Issues

| | State | | National | |
|---|-------|-------|----------|-------|
| 1 | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) |
| 2 | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) |
| 3 | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) |
| 4 | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) |
| 5 | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) |

Issue Handling

| | N | | Mc | | H | |
|----------------|-------|-------|----|---|---|---|
| | + | - | + | - | + | - |
| Vietnam | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | | | | |
| Inflation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | | | | |
| General Unrest | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | | | | |
| Crime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | | | | |
| Unemployment | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | | | | |
| Drugs | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | (+ 0) | (+ 0) | | | | |

State

| | A. | | D. | | N.O. | |
|------|----|-------|----|-------|------|-------|
| Gov. | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) |
| Sen. | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) |
| Sen. | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) | 0 | (+ 0) |

State Ballots

| | | Sen. | |
|-------------|---|-------------|---|
| Gov. | | Candidate A | 0 |
| Candidate A | 0 | Candidate B | 0 |
| Candidate B | 0 | Undecided | 0 |
| Undecided | 0 | | |

A

BALLOTS

| | <u>Total</u> | <u>Republican</u> | <u>Ticket-Splitter</u> | <u>Democrat</u> |
|-----------|--------------|-------------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| Nixon | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| McGovern | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Wallace | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Undecided | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Nixon | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) |
| Humphrey | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) |
| Wallace | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) |
| Undecided | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) |
| Nixon | | | | |
| Kennedy | | | | |
| Wallace | | | | |
| Undecided | | | | |
| Nixon | | | | |
| McGovern | | | | |
| Undecided | | | | |
| Nixon | | | | |
| Humphrey | | | | |
| Undecided | | | | |
| Nixon | | | | |
| Kennedy | | | | |
| Undecided | | | | |

State
Dates
No. of Interviews

A (i)

BALLOTS

| | Media Markets (ADI) | | | | |
|-----------|---------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | <u>Total</u> | <u>Area 1*</u> | <u>Area 2*</u> | <u>Area 3*</u> | <u>Area 4*</u> |
| Nixon | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| McGovern | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Wallace | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Undecided | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Nixon
Humphrey
Wallace
Undecided

Nixon
Kennedy
Wallace
Undecided

Nixon
McGovern
Undecided

Nixon
Humphrey
Undecided

Nixon
Kennedy
Undecided

* Use descriptive words

B

| | <u>Nixon</u> | <u>McGovern</u> | <u>Wallace</u> | <u>Undecided</u> | <u>Number</u> |
|-------------------------------|--------------|-----------------|----------------|------------------|---------------|
| Total - 100% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| <u>Age</u> | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 25-34 years | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 35-44 years | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 45-54 years | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 55-64 years | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 65 years + | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| <u>Education</u> | | | | | |
| Less than High School | | | | | |
| High School Graduate | | | | | |
| College | | | | | |
| <u>Religion</u> | | | | | |
| Catholic | | | | | |
| Protestant | | | | | |
| Jewish | | | | | |
| Other | | | | | |
| <u>Race</u> | | | | | |
| White | | | | | |
| Black | | | | | |
| Yellow | | | | | |
| Brown | | | | | |
| <u>Union</u> | | | | | |
| Yes | | | | | |
| No | | | | | |
| <u>Income</u> | | | | | |
| Under \$5,000 | | | | | |
| \$5,000-9,999 | | | | | |
| \$10,000-14,999 | | | | | |
| \$15,000 + | | | | | |
| <u>Sex</u> | | | | | |
| Male | | | | | |
| Female | | | | | |
| <u>Geographic (Political)</u> | | | | | |
| Area 1* | | | | | |
| Area 2* | | | | | |
| Area 3* | | | | | |

* Use descriptive words.

B (i)

| | <u>Nixon</u> | <u>Humphrey</u> | <u>Wallace</u> | <u>Undecided</u> | <u>Number</u> |
|-------------------------------|--------------|-----------------|----------------|------------------|---------------|
| Total - 100% | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 |
| <u>Age</u> | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 |
| 25-34 years | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 |
| 35-44 years | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 |
| 45-54 years | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 |
| 55-64 years | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 |
| 65 years + | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 |
| <u>Education</u> | | | | | |
| Less than High School | | | | | |
| High School Graduate | | | | | |
| College | | | | | |
| <u>Religion</u> | | | | | |
| Catholic | | | | | |
| Protestant | | | | | |
| Jewish | | | | | |
| Other | | | | | |
| <u>Race</u> | | | | | |
| White | | | | | |
| Black | | | | | |
| Yellow | | | | | |
| Brown | | | | | |
| <u>Union</u> | | | | | |
| Yes | | | | | |
| No | | | | | |
| <u>Income</u> | | | | | |
| Under \$5,000 | | | | | |
| \$5,000-9,999 | | | | | |
| \$10,000-14,999 | | | | | |
| \$15,000 + | | | | | |
| <u>Sex</u> | | | | | |
| Male | | | | | |
| Female | | | | | |
| <u>Geographic (Political)</u> | | | | | |
| Area 1* | | | | | |
| Area 2* | | | | | |
| Area 3* | | | | | |

* Use descriptive words

B (ii)

| | <u>Nixon</u> | <u>Kennedy</u> | <u>Wallace</u> | <u>Undecided</u> | <u>Number</u> |
|-------------------------------|--------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|---------------|
| Total - 100% | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 |
| <u>Age</u> | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 |
| 25-34 years | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 |
| 35-44 years | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 |
| 45-54 years | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 |
| 55-64 years | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 |
| 65 years + | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 |
| <u>Education</u> | | | | | |
| Less than High School | | | | | |
| High School Graduate | | | | | |
| College | | | | | |
| <u>Religion</u> | | | | | |
| Catholic | | | | | |
| Protestant | | | | | |
| Jewish | | | | | |
| Other | | | | | |
| <u>Race</u> | | | | | |
| White | | | | | |
| Black | | | | | |
| Yellow | | | | | |
| Brown | | | | | |
| <u>Union</u> | | | | | |
| Yes | | | | | |
| No | | | | | |
| <u>Income</u> | | | | | |
| Under \$5,000 | | | | | |
| \$5,000-9,999 | | | | | |
| \$10,000-14,999 | | | | | |
| \$15,000 + | | | | | |
| <u>Sex</u> | | | | | |
| Male | | | | | |
| Female | | | | | |
| <u>Geographic (Political)</u> | | | | | |
| Area 1* | | | | | |
| Area 2* | | | | | |
| Area 3* | | | | | |

* Use descriptive words

State
Dates
No. of Interviews

C

RATINGS ON ABILITY
TO HANDLE ISSUES

| | <u>Total Rating Nixon</u> | | <u>Total Rating McGovern</u> | | <u>Total Rating Humphrey</u> | |
|------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|----------------------------------|-------------|----------------------------------|-------------|
| | <u>Pos.</u> | <u>Neg.</u> | <u>Pos.</u> | <u>Neg.</u> | <u>Pos.</u> | <u>Neg.</u> |
| Vietnam | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Inflation | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| General Unrest | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Crime | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unemployment | 0 (+ 0) | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Drugs | | | | | | |
| Education | | | | | | |
| Taxes | | | | | | |
| Bussing | | | | | | |
| Health Care | | | | | | |
| National Defense | | | | | | |
| Environment | | | | | | |
| Race Relations | | | | | | |

State
 Dates
 No. of Interviews

C (1)

RATINGS ON ABILITY
 TO HANDLE ISSUES

| <u>Issue</u> | <u>Current Voting</u> | <u>Rating Nixon</u> | | <u>Rating McGovern</u> | | <u>Rating Humphrey</u> | |
|----------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|----------------------------|-------------|----------------------------|-------------|
| | | <u>Pos.</u> | <u>Neg.</u> | <u>Pos.</u> | <u>Neg.</u> | <u>Pos.</u> | <u>Neg.</u> |
| Vietnam | Total | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Hard Nixon | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Soft Nixon | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Soft Dem. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Hard Dem. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Hard Wallace | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Soft Wallace | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Inflation | Total | | | | | | |
| | Hard Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Wallace | | | | | | |
| | Soft Wallace | | | | | | |
| General Unrest | Total | | | | | | |
| | Hard Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Wallace | | | | | | |
| | Soft Wallace | | | | | | |
| Crime | Total | | | | | | |
| | Hard Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Wallace | | | | | | |
| | Soft Wallace | | | | | | |
| Unemployment | Total | | | | | | |
| | Hard Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Wallace | | | | | | |
| | Soft Wallace | | | | | | |
| Drugs | Total | | | | | | |
| | Hard Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Wallace | | | | | | |
| | Soft Wallace | | | | | | |

C (i) Cont'd.

State
Dates
No. of Interviews

| Issue | Current Voting | Rating Nixon | | Rating McGovern | | Rating Humphrey | |
|------------------|-------------------|-----------------|------|--------------------|------|--------------------|------|
| | | Pos. | Neg. | Pos. | Neg. | Pos. | Neg. |
| Education | Total | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Hard Nixon | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Soft Nixon | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Soft Dem. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Hard Dem. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Hard Wallace | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Soft Wallace | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Taxes | Total | | | | | | |
| | Hard Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Wallace | | | | | | |
| Bussing | Total | | | | | | |
| | Hard Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Wallace | | | | | | |
| Health Care | Total | | | | | | |
| | Hard Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Wallace | | | | | | |
| National Defense | Total | | | | | | |
| | Hard Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Wallace | | | | | | |
| Environment | Total | | | | | | |
| | Hard Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Wallace | | | | | | |
| Race Relations | Total | | | | | | |
| | Hard Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Nixon | | | | | | |
| | Soft Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Dem. | | | | | | |
| | Hard Wallace | | | | | | |

PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTES

| | <u>Total Rating</u> <u>Nixon</u> | <u>Total Rating</u> <u>McGovern</u> | <u>Total Rating</u> <u>Humphrey</u> |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------|--|--|
| Trust | | | |
| Close Minded | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 |
| Neutral | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 |
| Open Minded | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 |
| | | | |
| Dishonest | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 |
| Neutral | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 |
| Honest | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 |
| | | | |
| Unjust | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 |
| Neutral | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 |
| Just | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 |
| Competence | | | |
| | | | |
| Inexperienced | | | |
| Neutral | | | |
| Experienced | | | |
| | | | |
| Untrained | | | |
| Neutral | | | |
| Trained | | | |
| | | | |
| Uninformed | | | |
| Neutral | | | |
| Informed | | | |
| | | | |
| Incompetent | | | |
| Neutral | | | |
| Competent | | | |
| Strength | | | |
| | | | |
| Timid | | | |
| Neutral | | | |
| Bold | | | |
| | | | |
| Dangerous | | | |
| Neutral | | | |
| Safe | | | |
| | | | |
| Meek | | | |
| Neutral | | | |
| Aggressive | | | |
| | | | |
| Soft | | | |
| Neutral | | | |
| Tough | | | |

D (i)

NIXON PERSONALITY ATTRIBUTES

| | Current Voting | | | | | |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | <u>Hard Nixon</u> | <u>Soft Nixon</u> | <u>Soft Dem.</u> | <u>Hard Dem.</u> | <u>Hard Wallace</u> | <u>Soft Wallace</u> |
| Trust | | | | | | |
| Close Minded | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| Neutral | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Open Minded | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | | | | 0 | 0 |
| Dishonest | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| Neutral | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Honest | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | | | | 0 | 0 |
| Unjust | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| Neutral | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Just | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | | | | 0 | 0 |
| Competence | | | | | | |
| Inexperienced | | | | | | |
| Neutral | | | | | | |
| Experienced | | | | | | |
| Untrained | | | | | | |
| Neutral | | | | | | |
| Trained | | | | | | |
| Uninformed | | | | | | |
| Neutral | | | | | | |
| Informed | | | | | | |
| Incompetent | | | | | | |
| Neutral | | | | | | |
| Competent | | | | | | |
| Strength | | | | | | |
| Timid | | | | | | |
| Neutral | | | | | | |
| Bold | | | | | | |
| Dangerous | | | | | | |
| Neutral | | | | | | |
| Safe | | | | | | |
| Meek | | | | | | |
| Neutral | | | | | | |
| Aggressive | | | | | | |
| Soft | | | | | | |
| Neutral | | | | | | |
| Tough | | | | | | |

NIXON JOB APPROVAL DEMOGRAPHICS

| | Approve | | | Disapprove | | | No Opinion |
|-------------|---------|-----------------|--------------------|------------|-----------------|--------------------|---------------|
| | Total | Nixon Voters | McGovern Voters | Total | Nixon Voters | McGovern Voters | |
| <u>Age</u> | | | | | | | |
| 18-24 years | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 25-34 years | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 35-44 years | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 45-54 years | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 55-64 years | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 65 years + | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 | 0 (+ 0) | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Education

Less than H.S.
 High School Grad.
 College

Religion

Catholic
 Protestant
 Jewish
 Other

Race

White
 Black
 Yellow
 Brown

Union

Yes
 No

Income

Under \$5,000
 \$5,000-9,999
 \$10,000-14,999
 \$15,000 +

Sex

Male
 Female

Geographic (Political)

Area 1*
 Area 2*
 Area 3*

* Use descriptive words

State
Dates
No. of Interviews

SUMMARY

Three pages of conclusions highlighting differences from traditional patterns and significant changes from first wave.

State
Dates
No. of Interviews

CAMPAIGN IMPLICATIONS

Three pages of recommendations and suggestions for campaign
action.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

June 1, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Campaign Advertising

You last met with Peter Dailey to discuss the campaign advertising on January 12, 1972. In the last four months Dailey has assembled the campaign advertising staff (November Group) in New York and Washington. The staff prepared three presentations for the Campaign Strategy Group (Chapin, Buchanan, Garment, Magruder, Chotiner, Dent, LaRue, Moore, and Teeter). These materials have been summarized in the attached binder.

Peter Dailey is anxious to have you review the materials. Dailey can give you an abbreviated presentation with his two top men (Phil Joanou and Bill Taylor) in 45 minutes based on his attached agenda. In addition, Dailey would like to discuss the documentary situation with you. That would take 15 minutes.

John Mitchell has seen some but not all of the advertising strategy and materials in informal sessions with Magruder and Dailey. Mitchell is very interested in your suggestions on the advertising. However, according to Magruder, Mitchell might not be very anxious to have all the advertising reviewed and commented on by the Ehrlichman political group of Harlow, MacGregor and Colson. You may want to cover with Mitchell whether it would be appropriate for Peter Dailey to present the campaign advertising materials to this group.

Recommendation

That Dailey and his two top men present the campaign advertising materials to you at 10 a.m. tomorrow for your comments. Chapin should sit in the meeting due to his responsibility for his documentary.

_____ Approval, set meeting at 10 a.m.

_____ Disapproval, re-schedule meeting.

_____ Comments.

GS/jb
H-FU-6/2