

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
Contested Materials Collection  
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
12	6	10/29/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Bob McDermott. RE: Dr. David Derge's release from his consultants with the RNC. 1 pg.
12	6	10/28/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The approval to remove Dr. David Derge as a consultant to the RNC. 1 pg.
12	6	10/21/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Personal	Letter	From Gordon Strachan to Carlo Neal. RE: Strachan's appreciation to Mr. Neal for taking care of his parents-in-law while they are staying at the Watergate Hotel. 1 pg.
12	6	10/27/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Dave Parker. RE: Two attachments detailing "surrogate candidates" and "spokesmen resources." 1 pg.

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12	6	10/26/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From David Parker to Gordon Strachan. RE: Mr. Parker's inquiry into whether Strachan has forwarded the copy of a memo concerning the "spokesmen resources." 1 pg.
12	6	9/21/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Other Document	A note from Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The consensus plan for all surrogate candidates, and the possible aid from Senator Goldwater. 1 pg.
12	6	9/16/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Stephen Bull to Dwight L. Chapin. RE: The scheduling of Senator Goldwater and other surrogate candidates. 16 pgs.
12	6	10/26/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Dave Parker. RE: The President's decision not to do television shorts for the Senate or House candidates next year. 1 pg.
12	6	10/26/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Dave Parker. RE: The organization plan for the Key State Dinners beginning in January. 1 pg.

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12	6	10/13/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Dave Parker. RE: A request for the President to meet with Governor Frank Sargent of Massachusetts. 1 pg.
12	6	10/8/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From John N. Mitchell to Dwight Chapin. RE: Governor Sargent of Massachusetts' offer of assistance to the President, and the need for a meeting between the two to solidify mutual support. 1 pg.
12	6	10/6/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Harry Flemming to Attorney General, John Mitchell. RE: Governor Frank Sargent, and the importance of his ability to raise money for the Presidential campaign of 1972. 1 pg.
12	6	10/30/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to The Record. RE: Haldeman, Cliff Miller, the meeting with Peter Dailey, and strategies for campaign advertising. 4 pgs.
12	6		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Personal	Other Document	Indecipherable handwritten notes. 7 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
12	6	10/14/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to The Record. RE: Haldeman-Colson meeting with Lyn Nofziger of October 8. 2 pgs.
12	6	10/13/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Larry Higby to Gordon Strachan. RE: Inquiry into the typed notes regarding the meeting with Nofziger. 1 pg.
12	6	10/22/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Letter	Unknown author to Alan Strachan. RE: Appreciation for the letter of suggestions and concepts for the President to employ in his campaign for re-election. 1 pg.
12	6	10/13/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Report	Alan Strachan's report which illustrates the "up front" concept and several suggestions to help aid the President in his campaign for re-election. 2 pgs.
12	6	10/26/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Bill Timmons. RE: Possible Senators Meetings with the President. 1 pg.

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12	6	10/21/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Personal	Letter	From Gordon Strachan to Carol Wilson. RE: Appreciation for Ms. Wilson's "thoughtful attention" during Kristine's visit at Sibley. 1 pg.

October 29, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB McDERMOTT  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN  
SUBJECT: Dr. David Derge

The man Peter Flanigan hired to be the Polling Consultant for 1968 is currently on the RNC payroll. His services are no longer used by the RNC, the Domestic Council, OMB or the Committee for the Re-Election of the President. In fact, Mr. Flanigan has recently recommended to the Attorney General that Bob Teeter of MOR be the Polling Consultant for the Campaign. Mr. Teeter has been hired.

In light of these developments, would you inform Mr. Flanigan that there is no longer a need for Derge's services and that unless the RNC wants to keep him, they can go ahead and terminate his consultantship. Mr. Flanigan may want to inform Dr. Derge personally.

Concurrently, Mr. Flanigan may also want to inform Dr. Derge that Fred Malek will have responsibility for picking up and using Dr. Derge elsewhere.

Would you advise Mr. Flanigan of these developments and tell me whether he prefers to tell Derge directly or he would rather have the RNC or Fred Malek do it.

GS:elr

*cc: Fred Malek*

G.S.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 28, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN **G**

SUBJECT: Dr. David Derge

Dr. David Derge is currently listed as a Consultant to the RNC at \$1,200 per month. A check with the RNC (Ed DeBolt), Domestic Council (Ed Harper), OMB (Bill Gifford), and the Committee for the Re-Election of the President (Jeb Magruder) indicates that Derge is no longer being used as a consultant on polling or research matters.

Peter Flanigan recommended to the Attorney General in the research memorandum that Bob Teeter of MOR be the polling consultant for the Campaign. The Attorney General met with Bob Teeter and was favorably impressed. After you indicated that you did not need to see Teeter, Magruder offered him the job of Polling Consultant. Teeter accepted at the per diem equivalent of \$38,000 per year.

Jeb Magruder believes that Dave Derge "sees the handwriting on the wall" (e.g., he will not be the polling consultant for 1972).

Recommendation:

That we inform the RNC that we no longer need Derge's services and that unless they want to keep him they can go ahead and terminate his consultantship.

Approve       H - ✓       Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Comment \_\_\_\_\_

If you approve, we'll inform Peter Flanigan of this decision - he may prefer to tell Derge directly.

*But have Walsh pick up on using Derge elsewhere*

October 21, 1971

Dear Mr. Neal:

I want to thank you for the thoughtful attention you have given my parents-in-law, John and Rosemary Freiburg. They are enjoying their stay at the Watergate very much indeed. Your kind assistance is certainly appreciated.

With best regards,

Most sincerely,

Gordon C. Strachan

Mr. Carlo Neal  
Assistant Manager  
to the Front Desk  
The Watergate Hotel  
2650 Virginia Avenue, NW.  
Washington, D. C. 20037

GCS:nm

October 27, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:                   DAVE PARKER  
FROM:                               GORDON STRACHAN  
SUBJECT:                           Spokesmen Resources

Pursuant to your request, I have attached a copy of Steve Bullis's memorandum to Bob Haldeman on surrogate candidates and Jeb Magruder's memorandum to the Attorney General on spokesmen resources. The two memoranda are consistent and both Chapin and Magruder have received copies.

GS:elr

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 26, 1971  
1:23 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR: GORDON STRACHAN

FROM: ~~DAVID PARKER~~

Gordon, you were going to provide me with a copy of a memo regarding spokesmen recourses. Have you let that go yet?

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 21, 1971

NOTE FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN  
SUBJECT: Surrogate Candidates -  
Senator Goldwater

Steve Bull prepared this consensus plan for all surrogate candidates after you asked Dwight Chapin to schedule and advance Senator Goldwater.

I have initialed the recommendations from Colson, Magruder, and Chapin which require final decisions by you.

Senator Goldwater has not yet sent his schedule to Chapin's office. Chapin is reluctant to follow-up with the Senator. Should I call his Administrative Assistant?

Yes, Strachan call Goldwater's office.

No, wait another week.

Other *Call Goldwater.*

*Chapin deal up Goldwater's  
Att as per to my up  
P.*

CONFIDENTIAL

September 16, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

VIA: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN

FROM: STEPHEN BULL

RE: Scheduling of Senator Goldwater and  
Other Surrogate Candidates

A memorandum dated September 2nd from Mr. Haldeman to Mr. Chapin directed the establishment of a procedure for working with Senator Goldwater's schedule and assigning advance support to him. The implementation of such a program immediately introduces a much broader subject with which we will have to deal in the very near future, namely, the total program for surrogate candidates. In fact, since the September 2nd memorandum, Secretary Connally has been added to the list of those who should be supported by an advancement. Therefore, the subject of this memorandum is intended to be:

1. General discussion of the manner in which Administration speakers (i. e., surrogates) are currently handled.
2. What the various recommendations are from staff members as well as officers at the Citizens Committee headquarters.
3. A consensus recommendation for the establishment of a surrogate program.

Present Speakers' Program

Currently all turndowns of invitations to the President that have any significance or potential are referred to Pat O'Donnell in Chuck Colson's office by Dave Parker. Pat O'Donnell subsequently evaluates the invitation and considers an appropriate Administration spokesman to fill the speaking engagement. The evaluation is done pretty much solely by Pat and, according to him, his criteria include many elements such as whether the event is in a key State, type of event, the media area, etc. At this point Al Snyder and Van Shumway become involved, Al arranging for appearances on TV shows in the area where the event is to be held, and Van arranging for newspaper interviews with the Administration official.

The Administration spokesmen are limited to members of the White House staff (approx. 8), OMB (approx. 3), members of the Cabinet (approx. 12), members of the Sub-Cabinet (approx. 20), occasionally Senator Dole, and occasionally some outsiders, e.g., Pat Moynihan.

Pat O'Donnell is the scheduler and head of the Speakers' Bureau program, and reports to Dick Howard and Chuck Colson. The Speakers' Bureau program is now running fairly effectively, but the job of making use of Administration spokesmen, even now during this "non-political" and relatively inactive time, can and should be done better. When we get into the campaign situation which is rapidly approaching, the amount of activity will be multiplied manifold.

Currently I discern a lack of overall strategy to the manner in which the speakers' program is operated, particularly as it relates to campaign strategy. Specifically, there is no guiding philosophy that seems to dictate who should go where and why except for where the President is concerned. There are certain guidelines that have been laid out such as designating Sec. Volpe as the Administration spokesman to address labor groups, but there does not yet seem to be an understanding of the overall strategy that would place Administration spokesmen in regional areas where they could do the most good for the President politically.

#### Possible Approaches to a Surrogate Program

In 1968 John Whitaker, who scheduled Candidate Nixon, also scheduled the surrogates. An individual was assigned the task of actually running the surrogate candidates, and second and third string advancements were used to serve these surrogates. In 1970 Nick Ruwe operated the surrogate program which was less complex than that of 1968 and depended more on Administration spokesmen.

In a discussion of a surrogates program, John Whitaker laid forth the basic philosophy that the principal objective should be to find an event for the appropriate spokesman for an appropriate area, and let that event be the vehicle to get him into the area. Once in the area, however, the event becomes secondary to a more important operation which would be to give the surrogate the widest exposure which can usually be obtained by getting him on TV talk shows, special interviews with the newspapers, and all of the things that we are supposedly doing now with our current speakers' program.

John Dean has expressed to Colson and others that the campaign be kept out of the White House and that only the President and Vice President be scheduled politically from here. He has even suggested the possibility that the First Family be scheduled out of 1701. This plan would go into effect after the official kickoff of the campaign, presumably after the first of the year, or maybe as late as August.

Chuck Colson recommends that for a period of time, possibly up to the Convention, we continue to handle through the Speakers' Bureau all Administration representatives they currently handle for all official, non-political events. In order to avoid placing campaign or political activities in the White House, a parallel operation should be established at 1701 to handle all political activities, including fund-raisers. A representative, to be determined, from 1701, would work directly with Pat O'Donnell to coordinate political and non-political events. This would provide the capability for including a political event in conjunction with the Administration spokesman's attendance at the official non-political event. 1701 would be directly responsible for the scheduling and handling of all Administration spokesmen for political events, as well as all non-Administration spokesmen specifically designated as surrogates, including Senator Goldwater and other Congressional spokesmen, Governors, and selected outside speakers such as Mrs. Mitchell. Jeb Magruder has put forth this recommendation, and concurs with the above.

On July 28 Jeb Magruder submitted a memorandum from Don Rumsfeld and a task force which studied surrogates, to the Attorney General, a copy of which was submitted to Mr. Haldeman, setting forth a preliminary recommendation for "SPOKESMEN RESOURCES", which is, in effect, the 1972 surrogate program. The recommendations in that memorandum are summarized as follows:

1. Cabinet, selected agency heads and White House staff members be scheduled in the Colson/O'Donnell operation for the remainder of 1971.
2. The President and Vice President continue to be handled separately.
3. Magruder will designate a staff man to operate Spokesmen Resources from 1701. He will coordinate his activities with the Speakers' Bureau.

4. RNC handle Congressmen until the end of 1971.

Note: Subsequent verbal modification from Jeb would give the RNC the routine Congressmen. The designated surrogates would be handled through 1701.

#### Recommendation for a Surrogate Program

This is where I may be overstepping my bounds and getting myself into trouble, but it appears to me that the overall campaign strategy is still obscure to the operatives, i. e., the Howards, the Porters and the O'Donnells who have been charged with the responsibility for implementing some of the specific tactics for campaign '72. A surrogate program should be one of the major tactics directly related to the overall strategy. By the end of 1971 the President will probably have visited all 50 States and, from what little I have learned about what will be the President's posture during the campaign, there will be emphasis on major TV appearances, much less personal campaigning than in 1968, and much of the campaign period will be spent being the President as opposed to being the candidate. This means that the personal appearances will be through the surrogates in the key States.

#### Considerations for Surrogate Program

1. "Key States" is a fluid entity that will probably be readjusted as the campaign develops. For planning purposes in the formulation of the surrogate program, those States, and perhaps specific areas within the somewhat larger States, need to be specified to those who will operate the program. The Magruder memo to the Attorney General lists 21 States as "key States". This figure includes primary States. I have also heard other figures. One of the questions is--where should be the area of emphasis.
2. The aforementioned memorandum provides a listing of potential surrogates, utilizing four categories: "Cabinet", "White House Staff", "Agency Heads", "Others". There is no category for Congressmen or Governors. The list that is submitted will undoubtedly be modified and is probably intended as a first draft. Jeb Magruder advises verbally that a tentative list of Governors and Congressmen is currently being prepared. At some point in the near future, however, we need to get a firm list of Governors and Congressmen who can fill the role of surrogate for the President.

3. Scheduling - there appear to be two major types of scheduling for surrogates:
  - (a) Opportunity Scheduling - an event for which a specific man is appropriate for a specific function (e.g., Senator Goldwater to the YAF Convention).
  - (b) Creative Scheduling - finding an event that acts as a vehicle to get the proper spokesman into the right area so that he, with the support of the Snyders, Shumways, and the advance operation, can maximize his exposure through the regional media as well as our established techniques of promotion and communication.
4. That individual or group responsible for scheduling the surrogate must be fully familiar with the overall strategy, the points of strength and weakness in the various areas, and the availability of the surrogate so that maximum benefit from the event of the surrogate visit can be realized.
5. Right now the talent and resources are in the White House and 1701 is incapable of providing the necessary support to operate a full-fledged surrogate program.

Specific Recommendations for Surrogate Program

A meeting was held in Dwight Chapin's office on Tuesday, September 14, which was attended by Messrs. Chapin, Colson, Magruder, Strachan and Bull. Following are recommendations for a surrogate program resulting from that meeting:

1971

1. Between now and mid 1972, Chuck Colson continue to operate the Administration spokesmen for official, non-political events, through the existing Speakers' Bureau program.

Approve            Disapprove           

②

2. Senator Goldwater, other Congressional spokesmen designated as surrogates, selected Governors, and all Administration spokesmen participating in strictly political events will be scheduled, coordinated, and handled through 1701. 1701 would be responsible for providing full support for these political activities, including arrangements for TV appearances, newspaper interviews, and essentially the same support that the Speakers' Bureau provides Administration spokesmen for official functions.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

3. Coordination between activities of the Speakers' Bureau for official functions and 1701 for political functions will be accomplished through Pat O'Donnell, and the 1701 representative, who will work together in this effort.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

4. Ron Walker has a sizeable list of advancements, some of whom are untested, others who are not ready to be lead advancements. Ron would make these advancements available to the Speakers' Bureau and 1701 for their respective activities. This would provide training for the new advancements and better results on the road for the spokesmen.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

5. Progress reports and evaluations of appearances by political surrogates would be submitted by Jeb Magruder to the Attorney General and Mr. Haldeman ~~upon request.~~ monthly.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

1972

1. The Speakers' Bureau will continue to schedule and operate the official spokesmen for official non-political functions up through the Convention and perhaps even afterwards. 1701 will develop its political surrogate program, staffing up appropriately and commensurate to the development of the campaign.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. The decision on who schedules and advances Mrs. Nixon and the First Family will be made as the Convention approaches.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove ✓

*We will handle this  
at WH.*

COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT


September 30, 1971

1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006  
(202) 333-0920

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SUBJECT: Spokesmen Resources

This paper is the product of the Rumsfeld task force on Spokesmen Resources. Members who have attended meetings on the subject include Rumsfeld, MacGregor, Klein, Bart Porter, Dick Cheney, Ron Walker, Ernie Minor, Dick Howard, Henry Cashen, John Whitaker, and Pat O'Donnell.

  
JEE S. MAGRUDER

SPOKESMEN RESOURCES

The assignment of the task force is to develop, by October 31, a proposed operating plan for making maximum use of available spokesmen resources for the President in the 1972 campaign. The proposed function of the Spokesmen Resources operation will be to 1) react swiftly to incoming invitations, 2) be aware of events/meetings coming up and be able to see that our "spokesmen" are invited, and 3) be able to create opportunities for speakers in cases where we think it is to our advantage to create them. This paper proposes recommendations to enable work to begin immediately in certain areas.

At this time, the task force is not prepared to make final recommendations for 1972. The proposals below, if approved, will apply to the remainder of 1971 and are subject to change as the final document is prepared. In addition, assignments are made for work which needs to be done prior to completing the plan for 1972.

SPOKESMEN

The number of individuals considered "key" campaign spokesmen for the Presidential campaign will be kept relatively small (25-35) to enable the operation to provide adequate support (TV, media, scheduling, etc.) avoid confusion, and enhance their status and effectiveness for the President. Presidential and Vice Presidential scheduling will continue to be handled separately, although their calendars will be coordinated with the spokesmen resources operation. "Spokesmen Resources" for the purpose of the campaign effort should include: 1) Cabinet members (Rogers and Laird to be handled in non-political manner), 2) select agency heads (i.e., Jaffe, Ruckelshaus, etc.), 3) select White House staff (Klein, Ehrlichman, MacGregor), 4) select Members of Congress, 5) selected governors (Reagan, Rockefeller, etc.) and, 6) Celebrities.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS \_\_\_\_\_

*pending further consideration*

SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REMAINDER OF 1971

The White House Speakers Bureau, under the direction of Chuck Colson, will continue to function in handling Administration spokesmen for official, non-political events, ~~at all times through the Convention~~. This will include Cabinet members, selected agency heads and certain White House staff members.

(See Tab "A" for those recommended as "spokesmen".)

These individuals will be considered "spokesmen" during the remainder of 1971 and available for scheduling suggestions by the White House speakers operation. The scheduling operation will take into account the fact that each speaker will also be accepting invitations from other sources, but each speaker will be asked to inform the White House on the acceptance of any political or non-political out of D.C. invitation. In addition, it is recognized that certain individuals have to honor certain restrictions (such as no partisan appearances).

Each individual designated as a "spokesman" will be asked to submit detailed schedules of appearances and related events for record keeping purposes. These schedules will be reviewed periodically to ascertain the extent to which our resources are focused on priority areas and groups and the utilization of support services such as TV scheduling, etc.

*By W.H. Resources Committee*

APPROVE

*X*

DISAPPROVE

COMMENTS

No additional person is required at this time to augment the White House speakers bureau. Instead, we would recommend that Bart Porter be designated head of the entire Spokesmen Resources function at Committee Headquarters. Should there be a need to schedule surrogates prior to January 1, 1972, Porter would need an additional person sometime in November. If not, we would recommend that Porter be allowed to hire someone to function as master scheduler no later than January 1, 1972. This person would assist in getting advancement trained, coordinate TV appearances, set up press interviews, and ferret out private aircraft when the need develops.

APPROVE

*X*

DISAPPROVE

COMMENTS

At present, Ernie Minor at the RNC is scheduling Chairman Dole and, occasionally, selected members of Congress. As surrogate candidates for the President are selected, Minor could continue to handle these surrogates or they could be scheduled out of Porter's operation at Campaign Headquarters. However, it should be noted that the RNC assumes that they will handle all Senators and Congressmen for the campaign. It is our recommendation to wait until the surrogates are designated before a decision is made on where they will be scheduled.

*For  
Covers*

Senator Dole and Clark MacGregor should be asked to develop with Jeb Magruder a list of recommended Congressional spokesmen who will be able to devote considerable time to the national effort between now and November of 1972.

Henry Cashen will be designated to develop a talent bank of celebrities who are willing to work on the President's behalf this year and next in political and non-political activities, and a plan for their utilization (including staffing requirements).

*7*

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS \_\_\_\_\_

In general, the following guidelines will be adhered to in filling incoming requests for speakers during the remainder of the year. The White House will schedule "speakers" from the Executive Branch at non-political events deemed of sufficient importance to merit a "key" spokesman. Political events which cannot or should not be filled by a "key" spokesman will be referred to the RNC. Non-political events which cannot or should not be filled by a "spokesman" will be referred to the appropriate agency or department to be filled by a sub-cabinet member or assistant secretary.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS \_\_\_\_\_

FUNDRAISERS -- TODAY THROUGH MARCH 1, 1972  
(THROUGH LINCOLN DAY SPEECHES)

At the present time there appears to be no set policy with respect to fundraising appearances by members of the Administration. The Vice President, governors and members of Congress all have their own special requirements, but policy has not been determined for Cabinet members, etc.

We recommend that the sponsoring organization of any statewide fundraiser should not be required to contribute X% of its (gross, net) receipts to the RNC for spokesmen resources other than for the Vice President and Members of Congress.

Elected office holders (the Vice President, governors, and Members of Congress) should continue to make their dollar formula arrangements in conjunction with the RNC through March 1, 1972 (through Lincoln Day speeches).

APPROVE           

DISAPPROVE           

COMMENTS           

STAFF SUPPORT THROUGH 1971

The overall success of our efforts will depend in large part on our ability to provide adequate support services to those individuals designated as spokesmen. This will include advance work, arranging for maximum media exposure, etc.

Ron Walker has agreed to: 1) prepare a short course manual and/or checklist for use by individuals advancing "spokesmen." 2) train two staffers designated by each "spokesman" in the "art" of advance work, and, 3) make available the names of individuals in the field who can be used to advance spokesmen.

Herb Klein's shop (Al Snyder and Van Shumway) should be asked to be available to be utilized to ensure maximum exposure (talk shows, interviews, editorial board meetings) in conjunction with any scheduled appearance by a "spokesman." This will require additional staff in 1972.

Through the end of 1971, each spokesman will be responsible for arranging his own transportation in connection with non-political events. Transportation to and from political events will be handled on a case by case basis, with the sponsoring organization responsible for picking up the costs of any related expenses. No special transportation arrangements will be made by the White House speakers operation for the remainder of this calendar year.

APPROVE X

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS \_\_\_\_\_

Transportation will be an important problem during 1972, especially in the later stages of the campaign. Our ability to develop tight, effective schedules, making maximum use of the speaker's time, will depend upon the availability of non-commercial air transportation. The cost could be prohibitive, and it may be necessary to restrict most spokesmen (during the campaign) to regular commercial airline schedules.

John Whitaker and Dick Howard, based upon their 1968 and 1970 experience, should be asked to explore the possibility of developing a long-term leasing arrangement with one of the executive carriers for a few aircraft to be used in 1972. There should be no commitments at the present time, but realistic cost estimates should be developed so that judgments can be made regarding the level of expenditure which would be necessary if a decision was made to lease aircraft for "spokesmen" in 1972.

APPROVE ✓

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS \_\_\_\_\_

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

A memorandum should be prepared for the President recommending that he discuss the subject of "spokesmen resources" at a Cabinet meeting in October or November, emphasizing the importance of their efforts and his personal interest in their cooperation.

Each individual designated as a "spokesman" (See Tab "A") will be contacted to explain the details of the operation, priority invitations, availability of training for advancement, assistance in arranging TV appearances, etc., and to solicit guidance regarding the kinds of invitations (groups and areas) they would like to accept.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE           

COMMENTS           

In order to obtain maximum impact with available resources, certain priority states should be identified to guide the White House and the RNC in scheduling speakers. Below is a list of 21 suggested states for such a priority list. In developing the priority list it should be kept in mind that it should be based on an assessment of where we can best use this particular resource. This list is, of course, subject to change.

- |                 |                    |
|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1. California   | 12. North Carolina |
| 2. New York     | 13. Virginia       |
| 3. Pennsylvania | 14. Georgia        |
| 4. Texas        | 15. Wisconsin      |
| 5. Illinois     | 16. Tennessee      |
| 6. Ohio         | 17. Maryland       |
| 7. Michigan     | 18. Minnesota      |
| 8. New Jersey   | 19. Kentucky       |
| 9. Florida      | 20. Oregon         |
| 10. Indiana     | 21. New Hampshire  |
| 11. Missouri    |                    |

APPROVE           

DISAPPROVE           

COMMENTS

A continuing problem, (and a potential problem throughout 1972) is providing adequate notification to state party officials and Members of Congress of the appearance of speakers in their areas. In conjunction with setting up the spokesmen resources operation, each speaker will be informed of the importance of prior notification to Republican officials, and procedures will be established to ensure effective communication.

In addition, a brief set of guidelines should be developed by John Dean for Administration personnel which sets forth the legal and administrative prohibitions which apply to individuals likely to be involved in the campaign. It is important to avoid even the appearance of any impropriety in conjunction with the 1972 efforts.

APPROVE   ✓  

DISAPPROVE           

COMMENTS

TAB A

CABINET

Mitchell  
Hardin  
Stans  
Volpe  
Romney  
Richardson

Morton  
Hodgson  
Connally  
Rumsfeld  
Finch

NON-POLITICAL

Rogers  
Laird  
Kennedy  
Shultz  
Bush

WHITE HOUSE STAFF

Klein  
MacGregor  
Ehrlichman  
Flanigan

Garment  
Knauer  
Train

NON-POLITICAL

Weinberger

AGENCY HEADS

Ruckelshaus  
Jaffe  
Kunzig

OTHER

Harlow  
Fletcher  
Moynihan  
Pat Hitt  
H.C. Lodge

October 26, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:                   DAVE PARKER  
FROM:                               GORDON STRACHAN

Further on Haldeman's memo to you of October 6 regarding the fact that the President "does not intend to do television shorts for the Senate or House candidates next year." He advised that the President will not do live telephone calls either.

GS:elr

October 26, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: DAVE PARKER  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN  
SUBJECT: Key State Dinners

As further guidance for your planning for the key state dinners to begin in January, Mr. Haldeman suggested that the approximate size of the group from each state would be 20. The preparation of the guest lists will be very difficult because in some states Congressman and Senators might be included (example Ohio - Taft), whereas in other states no Congressman or even some Democrats (in Florida) would be included. Clark MacGregor and Bill Timmons have been advised of these dinners and the probable difficulty in preparing a guest list including some Congressmen, while excluding others.

The probable schedule for these key state dinners will include 1) an afternoon political meeting; 2) an issue briefing by Ehrlichman and Kissinger; 3) quiet dinner with the President which would not be the business session or discussion of fundraising.

GS:elr

Administratively Confidential

October 13, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DAVE PARKER

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Request for President to Meet  
with Governor Frank Sargent  
of Massachusetts

Harry Flemming talked to Dwight about the President meeting Governor Sargent recently. Dwight asked for a memorandum from the Attorney General. The October 8 memorandum signed with notations by the Attorney General is attached.

Would you keep me posted as to the status of this request?

Thank you.

GS:lm

October 8, 1971

TO Dwight Chapin

FROM John N. Hitchcock,  
Attorney General

SUBJECT Request the President to meet with Governor Frank Sargent  
of Massachusetts

The political situation in Massachusetts would indicate that, to be realistic, our ambitions there should emphasize putting together a good delegation for the convention and raising campaign funds.

Governor Sargent has indicated his willingness to assist us in both these areas, however, he strongly feels that in order to be most effective he should have the support of the President. I feel it would be very helpful to Governor Sargent if, in his efforts, he could indicate to our potential contributors that he had discussed these matters with the President. Therefore, would you please see what you can do to arrange such a meeting between the President and Governor Sargent.

*Any appropriate time.  
Official subject to be written down*

October 6, 1971

TO Attorney General John Mitchell  
FROM Harry Flemming

Last week I met with Governor Frank Sargent in Boston to discuss what role he would like to play in the '72 campaign. As he had previously indicated to you, he believes that he can be of real assistance in raising money for the Presidential campaign in '72. He elaborated on this thought at some length with me and I suspect he could, in fact, be of some assistance. He also indicated that he would be of help to us in putting together a good delegation for the convention. In reality this is probably all we can expect from Massachusetts.

Sargent would like to have a meeting with the President prior to engaging in any fund raising activities. The meeting would not have to center on the role he would play in the campaign, but rather would give him the opportunity to say that he had spoken with the President recently when contacting potential contributors. What it boils down to is simply a stroking session.

I would like to strongly recommend that the President do this as it would have the effect of committing Sargent to the President's re-election campaign. This would undoubtedly save us a great deal of time and money as it will dry up a potential source of support for McCloskey in Massachusetts. In fact, Sargent has indicated he will do everything he can to keep McCloskey out of the state. The secondary benefit is that it could conceivably turn Sargent on to be of assistance in raising money for the Presidential campaign.

Attached is a memorandum from you to Dwight Chapin requesting such an appointment.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

October 30, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT: Haldeman, Cliff Miller,  
Peter Dailey meeting -  
Campaign Advertising

On October 26, Peter Dailey, who had just been hired by the Attorney General to be the Advertising Director for the Campaign, and Cliff Miller met with Mr. Haldeman for one hour to review difficulties in advertising from the '68 Campaign and Bob Haldeman's views about advertising for the 1972 Campaign.

Cliff Miller opened the meeting by saying that his purpose was to introduce Peter Dailey to all the "players" in the middle level strategy group (Dick Moore, Harry Dent, Len Garment, Jeb Magruder, Bob Marik, hopefully Dwight Chapin and definitely Pat Buchanan).

Haldeman reviewed his understanding of the current status - that there will be a "house agency; that it is Peter Dailey's primary responsibility to build a working agency; that the agency will be funded out of Committee funds for the time being but that eventually the Agency will be fully funded from "earned commissions."

Dailey raised the point about the AAA attitude toward the house agency rebates to clients, but both agreed that after discussion with John Crichton that there would be no AAA opposition to this arrangement by the Campaign though there would be some minor legal problems. Miller mentioned the Ahmanson/Galaxie-IRS problems but Haldeman discounted that as an obvious ploy and reaffirmed his view that we would not flout the law.

Haldeman discussed Dailey's biggest job, that of staffing the in house agency. He indicated that Dailey must establish rapport with the AAAs and draw on specific talent pools. It is Haldeman's understanding, confirmed by Peter Dailey, that the agencies would "make persons available at the out of pocket cost" from the donating agency. Dailey reviewed the anchor and loan program that 1) establishes a list of agencies that really want to

make people available, and 2) that the AAAAs can send a letter asking for people who are interested.

Haldeman emphasized that it would be Dailey's responsibility to "look for who you want not for who wants to help us." He emphasized that the three top jobs that Dailey should get are 1) a creative director; 2) a media director and 3) a TV director. Each would then begin work on recruiting their own staffs. Haldeman re-emphasized the importance of recruiting quality people, so that even Doyle Dane - though generally against us - may have an individual that we want and will use.

Haldeman went on to say that the two qualifications for the individuals would be a philosophical and political commitment to our cause and then top quality individuals.

Haldeman said that we would have to avoid automatically the turning to the people that have worked in previous Campaigns, such as Ruth Jones to be media buyer and Newton to be a consultant. He did not rule these people out but just urged Dailey to be careful.

Haldeman directed Dailey to contact Len Garment about who should be visited by Dailey at Fuller, Smith as well as all other people involved in advertising in 1968.

Dailey said he is basically pursuing people which will give him group security and good flexibility. Dailey also suggested that he may keep the key spot as our people, but go outside to contract individually for certain creative groups at approximately 2-3%. He suggested going outside for these groups because he is concerned about obtaining operational level people who have worked together before. Dailey would retain creative control at the top but use operational people outside.

Haldeman agreed and suggested that it would probably be best to have very few people in Washington. Only Dailey's immediate group - not most of the advertising staff - would be located here. This would not only be cheaper but would enable Dailey to retain more effective control, by being the man in Washington.

Dailey emphasized his five goals: security, tight control, fiscal responsibility, maximum flexibility, and return of commissions.

Haldeman said the first thing we should get is a number one business man to ride herd on money. This individual would be Washington based and tough.

Miller suggested that "Campaign Associates" be revitalized but Haldeman and Dailey urged the setting up of a separate corporation independent from the Committee for the Re-Election of the President which would incorporate in Washington or Delaware depending on Dean's advice. It should be an innocuous name such as "Communication Counsellors." The agency should not be closely associated with the President; the association can be done privately by momentos, tours, etc.

Haldeman emphasized that the biggest problem beside financial control would be creative in-put. Other problems that Haldeman emphasized Dailey would face include: the President is the ultimate client who will develop a clear basic strategy, and then as Dailey moves toward implementation he (The President) will change his mind. However, there is a strong feeling in the President's mind that certain themes should be used in the Campaign.

Haldeman made the point that the President feels strongly that he should not use TV spot ads at all. He might do 5 minute mini documentaries, but as opposed to 20, 30 or 60 second spots. He basically thinks that we should do very little advertising.

Haldeman suggested the possibility of a conspicuous non-advertising campaign. Miller emphasized this might correspond with the basic strategy of having a non-campaign.

Haldeman, Dailey and Miller are all agreed that too much "ad work" demeans the Office of the Presidency. Any advertising should be non-Campaign, low key, though informative. What is required is a subtle use of money.

Haldeman emphasized that the worst thing that we can do is to put the President on a par with the other candidates. Miller raised the problem that the thing that is falling into the cement of the bumper stickers/button syndrome. Haldeman said that only the RNC should be involved in this classic women - political troops - distribution of political junk aspect of the campaign. The campaign must be kept separate from the Office of the Presidency. Miller said this will take real muscle.

Haldeman said that he would prefer to get people to wear flag lapel pins instead of Nixon buttons so that the emphasis would be upon the Committee for the Re-Election of our President, rather than the President. The emphasis in the campaign will be peace, progress and prosperity and this should be personally associated with our President. We have to stay away from the "Old Dick Nixon" the campaigner.

Dailey emphasized that we can make the President a hero, but Haldeman said that the people around the President can't see him as a hero. These people must be made to realize that millions of Americans have never seen any President of the United States and he can appropriately become a hero.

Haldeman said that there is hero potential in the trips to China and Moscow, because the networks are more interested in these trips than in the moon landing, and now the Chinese have agreed to ground station and satellite coverage so that color events in the morning from 9-11 will be a prime time, 7 o'clock on the West coast and 10 o'clock on the East coast. In the meantime, the Democrats will be sloshing around in New Hampshire which is such an incredibly degrading place to have to campaign.

Haldeman said that most of the campaign money should be put into organizational work in precinct, stuffing mail boxes, dragging voters to the polls rather than buying media time.

Dailey said what we need, however, is an instantaneous controlled response to current events.

Dailey will join the staff full-time on December 1. He will leave his family in Los Angeles, though take an apartment here.

Haldeman said that when you (Peter Dailey) get back here it is "terribly important that you be included in everything - all strategy stuff - and political meetings."

Miller said that advertising, research and PR would all be included in the middle level strategy session.

Haldeman turned to GS and said that Peter Dailey should attend any political meeting regardless of what it is and what it relates to both at the Committee and here at the White House.

GS:elr

FU - Dec. 1 - Peter Dailey with cc of this memo.

Revo

10/26

H, Bailey - Miller absent  
Disney World - Fri night  
w/ Bailey's sister

Bob Jam - 27,000 acres etc <sup>Disneyland 200</sup>

Roy Sr. -> P's box, etc.

Bus: Cliff arrives 10<sup>10</sup>

Campaign -

Miller -> meet players. Strategy Bus

Buchanan Moore, Dent, Miller, Garment, Magruder, Maulk - hopefully Chapin

Mon dinner mtg - no agenda, then Wed. Sa -> recomms -> AG/H.

- AG limited up to this size,
- Words of Wisdom for H?

G to raise  
Research  
w/ H -  
esp Fam  
Is Poll

H - "house agency" - to build a working agency - Bailey's basic respon; funded out of Commis even the new Camp funds; hopefully can return earned

Camp/AAAA - opposed  
financ to house age  
rebate to client

Commis; agency liquidat end of Camp  
John Cuelter + 4 A - no oppos.

the some legal prob's

Miller - Almanson/Galaxy - IRS

H -> no prob beef not tax deduc  
-> to contril <sup>we</sup> won't flout law

H - Staffing - biggest job, Bailey  
must estab rapport w/4A +  
specific talent pools + tie them  
on basis - "make person avail  
at out of ppc costs" fr/donating agency  
P.D. anchor + loan - list of  
agencies "really make avail"

② 4A letter asking for

H - Look for who you want  
not who wants to help us.

3 copies }  
H. Believes }  
P.D. whdys }  
① - Creative Dir } Each work  
② - Media Dir } or recruiting  
③ - TV Dir } Dir best  
- Even Boyle done - the genilly  
ag/ us, may have an individual unit

H - ① must have Philost + Poli  
committed to the cause, then  
② get top quality

H - avoid autom - Ruth Jones -  
media + Newton ← not  
relied out but careful

P.D. - will touch base w/all guys

H - Fuller, Sm (Bob Allen, → then Sam)

- a sour taste, so adverse reac.

- our agency is the anchor, then loan

P.D. - good security + good flexibility

PD - fund in house + refunnel, keep  
key spots our people + maybe  
go outside to buy creative  
grps for ex (2-3%)

- concerned about operational  
level - not worked together
- Creative + Control on top +  
then operational outside?

cm } Very few people in DC  
H } but only his little grp  
not - most of Ade staff;  
cheaper to bring in just  
couple of days - have  
hotel rooms donated for  
hot pillow

- So Peter Bailey has complete  
control as the - man in Wash
- maybe units in Chi + LA.  
been getting around no prob.

PD - Security

Tight control

(goals)

Fiscal Resp

max. Flexibility

Return of Comm

- get just planner, not  
too deeply in staff

H - Get #1 Bus Manager to  
ride herd on H what would  
so Fin people

CAM - Camp Co - used in '60,  
legally still alive?

H/PD - must set up separate  
corp indep fr/ Comm  
- incorp in Wash DC?  
or Deen → Del? +

"Communication  
Counselors" - get name Bailey dont  
- innocuous name

PD - Schacte, Cummings, etc.  
(Posey article) - people  
working removed.

- GP "Communications Counselors"

H → No → too close to P +

CAM - momentos, tours, etc

H - coin 5 letter word -

CAM - 68, 60 - Errors?

H - Creative ← biggest beside  
fin control

P's view ← the ultimate client  
need clearly devel  
basic strategy + then  
to w/implem + he (P)  
changes his mind

- strong feeling by P on  
certain themes like  
right - P out of it  
(Camp) now

- P feels strongly shld not use TV spot ads at all, might go for 5 min

- basically thinks we shld do very little advertising

H - a strategy of conspicuously not advertising?

CAM - basic strategy - non camp.

H/PD/M - de means office yet can inform.

Non camp, low key tho informative

- subtle use of \$

H - worse thing we can do is to get P on a par w/other candidates

m - prob at 1701 break thru

H → RNC cement of bumper stickers/only } button syndrome.

women, troops, etc -

H - the Camp must be separate

m - will need real muscle.

D - local camp must have something on hand (bumper stickers)

H - get people to wear flags instead of Nixon buttons

Reasonable - Peace | use "our P" not the P  
Progress + Prosper Comm for Re-Ele of our P

H - Stay away from "old Dick Nixon" - the campaigners

D - our heroes →

Orlando  
Front page

H - people around P can't see him as hero, must remember millions never seen any P of U.S.

m - Pur + appr Use of P.

H - Hero potential can't shld be built esp w/ enhance of Qinas Moscow. →

Nets more interested than moon landing  
Chinese agreed to give station + satellite coverage  
9-11 morning in Qina on our prime time 7 a coast 10 on East coast, mtgs in afternoon

- NH so degrading, slosh around at corners be/rtv

m - NH -

H - most money in organization work present, stuff mail boxes than the buying of media.

PD - need an instantaneous controlled response to current events.

Dec 1 - Bailey - fulltime, lv family in LA + apt here in + out until Dec.

H - when you (PD) get back here, terribly imp that PD be included in everything - all strategy stuff -

m - adv, Res, PR - all included in strategy sessions

H → G - any pol mtg PD attend.  
Comm+ regardless of what it  
WH relates to

Administratively Confidential

October 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE RECORD

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Haldeman--Colson Meeting  
with Lyn Nofziger of  
October 8

Colson initiated this meeting of October the 8th between Haldeman, Nofziger, and Colson. No talking paper was prepared for Mr. Haldeman.

Colson opened with "I detect a 'little resentment' when I ask for staff from you (Lyn Nofziger)." Nofziger's response was that he tries "to put the White House first" but that he must maintain the "credibility" of Monday.

Haldeman said "it frosts me that the RNC charges the White House account" for projects. If it weren't for the White House the RNC would have no money.

Nofziger said "you guys brought me in to make a case", as Colson continued through his file of Nofziger "nos" to Dick Howard memos. Nofziger's response was that Monday is not a "reprent journal".

Haldeman said "only a funeral home would use a black cover". He went on to discuss the format of Monday and First Monday. They perform two goals -- to build the President and attack his enemies. The attack is fine and consistent, but we must now push the positive with laudatory adjectives and verbs. Nofziger agreed to make Monday very positive.

Nofziger does not want Monday to push previously written laudatory stories, but Mr. Haldeman couldn't disagree more. Repetition is essential.

Haldeman and Nofziger agree that it might be helpful for there to be two publications. Monday would remain as it is but more positive. The second publication would be more like First Monday with specials similar to "The Lift of Leadership". The second publication will not become too classy because

then the problems of The Republican will emerge again.

Colson and Nofziger reviewed Nofziger's "bitch" with Colson which they agreed was "attitude". Colson agreed to separate the orders he receives to give to Nofziger from his (Colson's) own ideas.

Nofziger reports there is a very serious problem with Chairman Dole -- he is tired, poorly scheduled, demoralized, and ineffective. Colson agrees. Haldeman directed Nofziger to convince the Chairman that he should only accept the big schedule events, get off the road, and make three to four news making items each week.

Colson suggested that we need another partisan spokesman if Dole isn't up to it. He suggested Tom Evans. Nofziger said this would even further exacerbate the deteriorating relationship between Dole and Evans. All agreed that Nofziger should try to turn Dole's attitude around before the approach was made to Evans.

GS:lm

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 13, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: GORDON STRACHAN  
FROM: L. HIGBY   
SUBJECT: Nofziger Meeting Notes

You were going to have some notes typed up on the Nofziger meeting. Where are they?

October 22, 1971

Dear "Uncle Al - the Kiddies Pal":

Thanks for your letter and "up front" concept. Your suggested "talk" for the President is fair. I had my secretary type it and I circulated it, anonymously, to those on the Staff who are involved in this area. Some reactions were favorable.

Your idea of considering "issues rather than images" and hitting them with the accomplishments seems apt. The only criticism that I can come up with is a softening on the negative aspect, for psychological reasons, in the line "... you are not Republican, and may not vote for me." At any rate, the paper is very good -- not just the "talk" but your presentation and follow-up ideas as well.

Kristine and I thoroughly enjoy being "parents." The whole experience has been an unbelievable high.

Mr. Alan Strachan  
218 Jean Drive  
Santa Rosa, California

GS:elr

October 13, 1971

A buzz word which actually carries some meaning in the counter culture is "up front". In essence this is what the President must do to capitalize on the particular accomplishments of his Administration which are popular with the 18-21 year old voters. In a short two or three minute tape to be played on the major rock and roll FM stations across the country, the President should give the following talk:

"I am asking for support from young voters. I am aware that most of you are not Republican, and may not vote for me. However, I ask that you evaluate me only on the basis of what I have actually done in my three and one-half years of office. I realize that many of you do not like the style of my administration, so I ask that you consider issues rather than images.

Briefly, these are the accomplishments of my administration which I feel are important to young voters:

- 1) The 18-21 year old vote was secured during my administration, as I promised in the 1968 campaign.
- 2) This is the first Administration in \_\_\_\_ years to spend more on HEW than on Defense.
- 3) The Environmental Protection Agency was established and given authority which has resulted in \_\_\_\_ number of suits against polluters.
- 4) Formal relations with Mainland China have been opened for the first time since the Communists came to power in 1949.
- 5) The SALT talks were begun and have produced two significant nuclear arms limitations agreements.

(Continue with additional accomplishments such as recommended reduction of marijuana penalties, etc., which you know to be popular with young voters.)

I am fully aware that my administration has also put programs into effect which are strongly disapproved of by young voters. However, I will never expect to please all of the people all of the time. I have taken action based on what I felt was right and good for our people as often as possible. Obviously, I have also taken some actions based on the necessities of the political arena.

This is waht I have done, and it is a good deal of what I am. I am not asking that you love me; I am only asking that you evaluate me fairly on the basis of the actions of my administration, and the issues at hand."

\*\*\*\*\*

The above is to be given as a talk, not a speech. The tone should be matter of fact, straight forward, with feeling. In short, I am saying that the President must be "up front" with the young voters. No attempt at a change in image should be made. If the President is himself, open about his lack of charisma with the young, he stands a good chance of gaining the confidence of many in the counter culture.

The three minute radio talk should be aired well before campaign time, or perhaps just after the New Hampshire primary. Polls should be taken of the 18-21 year olds before and after nationwide airing. The polling questionnaires should concern themselves only with Nixon. The following is a sample:

- 1) Will you vote for Nixon?
- 2) Would you have voted for Nixon in 1968 had you been eligible?
- 3) Do you respect Nixon?
- 4) Do you detest Nixon?
- 5) Do you feel you can trust Nixon?

Obviously, too, a particular locale, such as Los Angeles or the San Francisco Bay area could be used as a test site.

October 26, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: BILL TIMMONS  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN  
SUBJECT: Possible Senators Meetings  
with the President

Pursuant to our discussion could you prepare a list of the Senators up for re-election in 1972 who should probably see the President. Mr. Haldeman asks that the list be prepared on a priority basis so that those the President definitely should see would be at the top while those the President might not want to see (Hatfield) would be at the bottom.

Since Mr. Haldeman may discuss this project with the Attorney General this week, it is respectfully requested that you submit the list at your earliest convenience.

Thank you.

cc: Clark MacGregor

GS:elr

FU 10-27-71

October 21, 1971

Dear Miss Wilson:

Kristine and I want to thank you for your thoughtful attention during her stay at Sibley. Your assistance during this very special time was invaluable.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Gordon C. Strahan

Miss Carol Wilson, R.N.  
Staff Nurses  
Sibley Memorial Hospital  
5255 Loughboro Road, NW.  
Washington, D. C. 20016

GCS:nm