

Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
Contested Materials Collection  
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
11	5	6/29/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: 1972 Convention Site. 1 pg.
11	5	6/25/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Dent Office Analyses of States. 2 pgs.
11	5		<input type="checkbox"/>			
11	5	6/28/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Kalmbach Meeting of June 29, 1971. 1 pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
11	5	6/23/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Lee Nunn Organization of Ex-Senators and Ex-Governors for Nixon. 1 pg.
11	5	6/23/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: 1972 Convention Site; specifically, the RNC Site Committee's visit to San Diego. 2 pgs.
11	5	6/23/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Magruder Meeting with the Attorney General-June 23. 2 pgs.
11	5	6/17/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Gavin Memorandum on Political Moods. 2 pgs.
11	5	6/17/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: RNC Delaware Study. 4 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
11	5	6/17/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan and Larry Higby to Haldeman. RE: Alabama/Indiana Polls; specifically, suggested questionnaires. 7 pgs.
11	5	6/15/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Indiana: Gene Pulliam. 3 pgs.
11	5	6/14/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Dent Office Analyses of States. 7 pgs.
11	5	6/15/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: McCarthy Plans for 1972. 1 pg.
11	5	6/15/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Magruder's Projects. 2 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
11	5	6/14/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: American Association of Political Consultants. 3 pgs.
11	5	6/14/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Kalmbach Telephone Call of June 14. 2 pgs.
11	5	6/10/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The use of Gregg Petersmeyer at "Citizens". 1 pg.
11	5	6/9/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Update of Lee Nunn Memorandum. 1 pg.
11	5	6/8/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Developed questions for the Alabama/Indiana Polls. 3 pgs.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
11	5	6/8/1972	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: In-Depth Poll on the public's psychological attitudes. 2 pgs.
11	5	6/2/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Manuel Giberga: Cuban Refugee Contributions. 1 pg.
11	5	6/1/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: The City Council of San Diego's vote to make a dollar bid for the 1972 Republican National Convention. 1 pg.
11	5	6/10/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Harry Dent to Chuck Colson. RE: The making of former Senator Bourke Hickenlooper the chairman of the Committee of Ex-Senators for the President. 1 pg.
11	5		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Letter	From Bruce Kehrli to G.S. Undecipherable note. 1 pg.

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11	5	6/16/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Lee Nunn to John Mitchell. RE: Former Senators, Former Governors for the President. 1 pg.
11	5	6/23/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. Re: Lee Nunn Organization of Ex-Senators and Ex-Governors for Nixon. 3 pgs.
11	5	6/22/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Robert C. Odle, Jr. To Jeb S. Magruder. RE: 1972 Convention Site. 3 pgs.
11	5	6/21/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From William E. Timmons to Haldeman. RE: 1972 Convention, and how many White House staff members will require accomodations. 1 pg.
11	5		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Letter	From Bruce Kehrli to G.S. RE: Undecipherable message. 1 pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
11	5	6/23/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>		Memo	From Robert C. Odle to Jeb S. Magruder. RE: 1972 Convention Site and the results of the bid. 2 pgs.
11	5	6/23/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Lists and information on Key States. 3 pgs.
11	5	6/17/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From W. Richard Howard to Gordon Strachan. RE: Selection of Key States. 2 pgs.
11	5	6/17/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Lewis Dale to Gordon Strachan. RE: Target States, which are subject to change as relevent data becomes apparent. 4 pgs.
11	5	6/16/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Ed Debolt to Tom Evans. RE: States not included in the previous memo. 1 pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
11	5	6/16/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	White House Staff	Memo	From Frank Shakespeare to Haldeman. RE: Observations on political moods by Bill Gavin. 7 pgs.
11	5	6/9/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Rose Mary Woods to Haldeman. RE: An enclosed copy of John Bucci's booklet concerning the survey in Delaware. 3 pgs.
11	5	6/17/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haldeman to Rose Mary Woods. RE: The RNC's involvement in a Delaware survey research project. 1 pg.
11	5	6/8/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Rita E. Hauser to John. N. Mitchell. RE: McCarthy Plans for 1972. 2 pgs.
11	5	6/10/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Bob Marik to Jeb S. Magruder. RE: Simulation for 1972 with the voters chategorized into a matrix, or groupings. 3 pgs.

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: H. R. Haldeman  
Box Number: 231

Folder: Gordon Strachan-Chron (Memos to HRH only) June 1971

<u>Document</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
358	Retain Open
359	Retain Open
360	Retain Open
361	Retain Close Invasion of Privacy Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-29-71
362	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-29-71
363	Retain Open
364	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-25-71
365	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-28-71
366	Retain Open
367	Retain Open
368	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-25-71
369	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-23-71
370	Retain Open
371	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-23-71
372	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-23-71
373	Retain Open
374	Retain Open
375	Retain Open
376	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-17-71
377	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-17-71
378	Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan & Higby to HRH, 6-17-71
379	Retain Open
380	Retain Open
381	Retain Open

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

Collection: H. R. Haldeman  
Box Number: 231

382	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-15-71
383	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-14-71
384	Retain	Open
385	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-15-71
386	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-15-71
387	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-14-71
388	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-14-71
389	Retain	Open
390	Retain	Open
391	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-10-71
392	Retain	Close Invasion of Privacy Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-10-71
393	Retain	Open
394	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-9-71
395	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-8-71
396	Retain	Open
397	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-8-71
398	Retain	Open
399	Retain	Open
400	Retain	Open
401	Retain	Open
402	Retain	Open
403	Retain	Open
404	Retain	Close Invasion of Privacy Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-4-71
405	Retain	Open
406	Retain	Open
407	Retain	Open

Presidential Materials Review Board

Review on Contested Documents

**Collection:** H. R. Haldeman  
**Box Number:** 231

408	Retain	Open
409	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-2-71
410	Retain	Open
411	Return	Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-1-71

BACK UP & ATTACHMENTS  
ARE IN "RNC CONVENTION  
June 29, 1971 File"

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

1972 Convention Site

Magruder delivered the 1972 Convention Site decision paper to the Attorney General today. Your copy is attached.

As you know, Magruder and Timmons have developed a scenario that the Attorney General told you on June 23rd he would slow down until the President has had an opportunity to give serious thought to San Diego.

The decision paper offers the facts for the President's consideration and recommends that San Diego be selected as the site for a three day convention beginning August 21, 1972.

To summarize:

1. The Democrats announced today that their convention will be held in Miami Beach beginning July 9, 1972. Miami Beach bid \$950,000 for the honor.
2. Bids for the Republican Convention have been received from cities which are listed in the order of preference: San Diego, Miami Beach, Houston, Louisville, Chicago, and San Francisco.
3. The Summer Olympics will be held in Munich beginning the last week of August. Therefore, the 1972 Convention should begin on August 21, 1972 and continue for three days.

GS:lm

June 25, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Dent Office Analyses  
of States

Dent forwarded analyses of Idaho, North Dakota, Arizona, Indiana, Illinois, and Kansas. To summarize:

Idaho: The President should carry Idaho; Senator Jordan should be re-elected, and the two Republican incumbents will probably not have a strong challenge because the Democrats will concentrate on the state legislature to capitalize on their gubernatorial victory in 1970; the Republican Party is faction-ridden, so Lt. Governor Jack Murphy seems to be our best political information contact.

North Dakota: The party believes the President would lose North Dakota because the farmers feel they have a Madison Avenue salute to agriculture instead of a "Kissinger of Agriculture". Republican Lt. Governor Dick Larsen could win the gubernatorial race if the current Democrat, William Gay, does not seek re-election. Presidential visits to the heartland are suggested. One possibility is the Midwest Republican Conference in October in Indianapolis.

Arizona: The President should carry Arizona. There is neither a gubernatorial nor a Senate race in 1972. The only House seat in question should go Republican. Rosenzweig, the State Chairman, asks to be consulted before any Citizens leaders for Arizona are chosen.

Indiana: The economy has cost the President some support. The farm issue is not that strong, though Wallace still is. Two House seats can be gained without losing the current six seats. Governor Whitcomb cannot run for re-election and would lose anyway because of the party feuds. Most factions seek a meeting with the Attorney General without Whitcomb.

Illinois: The farm situation and unemployment would make the race for the 26 electoral votes very close. Percy should be re-elected and would run stronger than the President. Governor Ogilvie faces a very tough race for re-election. The party is weak and in debt.

Kansas: The President would carry Kansas in spite of the farm issue (DOA is considered antagonistic) and unemployment. Democratic Governor Docking would be re-elected if he chooses to run as would Senator Jim Pearson. GOP Lt. Governor Reynolds Schultz is considering a challenge to the one Democratic incumbent. The party organization is weak though Senator Dole is frequently in Kansas defending the President.

GS:lm

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DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

By Emp Use NARS, Date 1-15-80  
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102

June 28, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Kalmbach Meeting of  
June 29, 1971

You suggested that a meeting with Herb Kalmbach and John Dean be arranged tomorrow, June 29th. The President meets with the NSC at 3:00 p.m., so that time for a meeting in your office is suggested. Two questions remain:

1. Ehrlichman's office (Jana Hruska) called and asked that Ehrlichman "sit in because it would avoid two separate meetings, and that is the way it was done before".

Advise Ehrlichman to attend \_\_\_\_\_

Advise Ehrlichman not to attend \_\_\_\_\_

2. John Dean wonders whether Jack Caulfield should attend the meeting at any point or should all requests flow through Dean.

Caulfield not to attend \_\_\_\_\_

Caulfield to attend when called \_\_\_\_\_

Caulfield to attend entire meeting \_\_\_\_\_

Concerning the Citizens Committee and RNC financial situation, you mentioned that the entire budget and control procedures should be discussed "when Kalmbach here next".

Upon completion of the Kalmbach, Dean (and Ehrlichman?) meeting, do you want the Attorney General to arrive to discuss the financial situation?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ Arrange 4:00 p.m. meeting \_\_\_\_\_

Set different time \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

GS:lm

June 25, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

1972 Convention Site

Technically the RNC will decide on the site for the 1972 Convention on July 22-23, based on the last Site Committee meeting and recommendation of July 21; so the specific, technical answer to your question as to the final date for a decision on the 1972 Convention site is July 21.

However, Timmons, who as Chairman of the Attorney General's task force on the Convention has developed scenario that requires a firm decision earlier:

1. Late today, Timmons will submit his analysis of Chicago;
2. Next week, Timmons will meet with Dole to determine the Site Committee's preferences; and will submit to you and the Attorney General a formal decision paper. This paper will attach the formal bid by San Diego, which is expected to be \$500,000 in cash and \$1,000,000 in inflated price services;
3. Upon decision by the President on the location of the Convention, Timmons hopes to relay this to Dole, who will in turn have the Site Committee decide on the same location;
4. If the location is San Diego, Timmons suggests that Dole, during the San Clemente trip, formally advise the President and then immediately make the announcement to the media;
5. If San Diego is not chosen, the same scenario would be followed except that there is no need to make the announcement from San Clemente.

GS:lm

June 23, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Lee Nunn Organization  
of Ex-Senators and  
Ex-Governors for Nixon

Colson asked Dent to consider developing a list of ex-Senators and ex-Governors who support the President.

Dent asked Lee Nunn to take over the project and sent a report to Colson, attached at Tab A.

Lee Nunn welcomed the task and is advising the Attorney General by the memorandum attached at Tab B. Nunn suggests that Bourke Hickenlooper and Fred Rhodes (number two man at the Veterans Administration) should head up the ex-Senators group.

Lee Nunn has not begun working on the group of ex-Governors but has asked the Attorney General for his thoughts on timing and organization.

GS:lm

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

CHUCK COLSON

FROM:

HARRY DENT

*BD*

Lee Nunn is taking over the project of organizing a committee of ex-senators for the President. He would like to make former Senator Bourke Hickenlooper the chairman. He says he has plenty of time on his hands and is in the Washington area all the time.

He also suggests we get together a committee of former governors.

Also, he is going to increase the list of former senators to include a number of others not mentioned in the memo.

If we want the ex-governors committee formed, we need to let him know that also.

✓ cc: Bob Haldeman

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Good Post  
Nem

Date \_\_\_\_\_

TO: G. S.

FROM: BRUCE KEHRLI

H has not seen yet.

are all of  
these efforts  
coordinated by  
someone? or, are  
we duplicating?

B

Personal & Confidential

June 16, 1971

MEMORANDUM

FOR: THE HONORABLE JOHN MITCHELL  
FROM: LEE NUNN  
SUBJECT: FORMER SENATORS, FORMER GOVERNORS FOR THE PRESIDENT

It has been suggested by the White House that the political apparatus should be visiting with former senators who could perhaps form a Senators for Nixon Re-election Committee. This could be done if you feel it advisable. It should be possible to form a similar committee of ex-governors.

Senator Hickenlooper would be a prospective organizer of the senators. Then, too, his former Director of the Republican Policy Committee, Fred Rhodes, No. 2 man at the Veterans Administration, might be helpful to such a project.

If you approve, what would be your thoughts on timing and organization?

---

June 23, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Lee Nunn Organization  
of Ex-Senators and  
Ex-Governors for Nixon

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Lee Nunn has not begun working on the group of ex-Governors but has asked the Attorney General for his thoughts on timing and organization.

GS:lm

June 23, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

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of Ex-Senators and  
Ex-Governors for Nixon

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GS:lm

June 23, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Lee Nunn Organization  
of Ex-Senators and  
Ex-Governors for Nixon

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GS:lm

June 23, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

1972 Convention Site

Magruder will meet the Attorney General today and discuss memorandum attached at Tab A concerning the RNC Site Committee's visit to San Diego.

To summarize:

1. The Site Committee found the same faults Bill Timmons' noted in his May 6 memorandum (limited office space at the convention hall and barely adequate hotel accommodations);
2. The local politicians are indifferent, but the State officials, especially Ed Reinecke, are enthusiastic.
3. The San Diego bid is \$500,000 in cash and \$1,000,000 in inflated price services. This excellent bid is considered primarily the work of Reinecke and Magruder will suggest that the Attorney General call Reinecke and thank him.
4. San Diego is the favored site of the Attorney General's task force, though Chicago, Miami, and Louisville are still under serious consideration by the Site Committee.
5. Dole, Timmons, and Magruder believe the Convention Site Committee's request to see the President should be denied. Rather, Timmons should see the President, get his decision, relay it to Dole, and have Dole program the Site Committee to recommend formally to the President and announce to the media the location of the 1972 RNC Convention.
6. A formal decision paper will be presented to you and the Attorney General when San Diego submits its formal bid, hopefully this week.

On a related matter, Timmons submitted the memorandum attached at Tab B concerning the number of White House Staff who would be attending the convention. Timmons believes all commissioned personnel (approximately 50) are "entitled to be present whether or not they are actively engaged in the Convention.

The following are the options of which I recommend number two.

1. All commissioned personnel attend \_\_\_\_\_
2. Only those Staff who are contributing, whether commissioned or not \_\_\_\_\_
3. All male Staff down through Staff assistant level (150) \_\_\_\_\_

GS:lm

CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

SUITE 272  
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006  
(202) 333-0920

June 22, 1971

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

H.O. 12065. Section 6-102

By Empire NARS, Date 1-15-80

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. JEB S. MAGRUDER

FROM: ROBERT C. ODLE, JR.

SUBJECT: 1972 CONVENTION SITE

The RNC's Convention Site Committee has now returned from San Diego, thus completing its series of visits to all the cities which have bid for the 1972 Republican National Convention. The Committee was not as impressed with San Diego as we hoped it would be, citing the lack of office space for the media and the RNC at the convention hall as the main drawback. Also, some political officials in the city, chief among them the mayor, either suggested that the city did not want the convention, or were at best indifferent to the prospect of getting it. On the other hand, business leaders and state officials, led by Lieutenant Governor Ed Reineke of California, were very enthusiastic and members of the Site Committee reacted favorably to these people.

Bill Timmons reports that his contacts in California tell him the city is now offering \$400,000 in cash and approximately \$600,000 in services bringing the total offer to approximately \$1,000,000. However, the city is putting very high pricetags on the services, so in reality the figure might be more like \$800,000. The final bid is being prepared this week in San Diego and should be received by the National Committee at the end of the week -- we will obtain a copy of it. It is our understanding that in this bid, the city will offer to construct a building adjacent to the convention hall which can house offices for the media and also for the RNC. San Diego will donate the use of the convention hall for as long a time as is needed to ready it for the convention, and also for the convention sessions.

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Incidentally, San Diego Democrats are reported to be upset that the city did not bid for the Democratic convention and therefore San Diego has decided to put in a pro forma bid for the Democratic convention.

It also should be noted that the Site Committee believes the list of cities under serious contention is now down to San Diego, Miami, Louisville, and Chicago. The committee has ruled out Houston because it has not expressed a real interest in the convention and has refused to make a firm offer of cash and services. San Francisco was ruled out because the committee fears possible problems with the nearby campuses and does not feel the convention hall and hotel situation is as good as it is in other cities.

In the meeting of our convention strategy task force on Friday, San Diego emerged as the very clear favorite, followed by Houston. There was no support for any of the other cities. Those attending that meeting were Pat Buchanan, Bill Safire, Dick Moore, Harry Dent, Len Garment, Don Rumsfeld, and Bill Timmons. Dwight Chapin, Fred La Rue, and Frank Shakespeare were out of town. In addition to favoring San Diego, the task force agreed that the convention should begin the week of August 21, 1972, and should be a three day convention.

Jo Good told me today that members of the Convention Site Committee are in Washington this week and that she would like Chairman Dole, Fred Scribner, and the vice-chairman of the committee to meet with the President later this week or next week to review with him the thoughts of the Site Committee, so that the President might be informed of everyone's views before making up his mind. I have advised Bill Timmons and Gordon Strachan of this, and the three of us have agreed that the following strategy should be employed rather than having the committee see the President. Also, Timmons tells me that Dole agrees with him that we should pursue the following scenario:

As soon as the bid from San Diego comes in, we (Timmons, Magruder, Odle) will examine it. If our inclination is still to go with San Diego, I will prepare a decision paper for the Attorney General and Mr. Haldeman. Assuming their concurrence, we will then request that Timmons discuss with the President his views on all the cities in contention for the convention site and our recommendation that we go to San Diego. Assuming the President concurs with this choice, Timmons would then talk with Dole and communicate the President's decision to him. Dole would talk with the members of the Site Committee regarding this and at some future point in time (next

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week or the week after), either Dole by himself or Dole with the other members of the Site Committee would meet with the President and announce to him their decision that the convention go to San Diego. The President would tell the Site Committee that he concurs with their recommendation that the convention be held there. Members of the Site Committee could then go into the Briefing Room and announce to the media that they had recommended to the President that the convention be held in San Diego, that the President had approved their recommendation, and that they hoped the Republican National Committee would approve the recommendation in Denver on July 23. This would put us publicly on record as having chosen a convention site before the Democrats.

If the general strategy as outlined above is approved, we will proceed as suggested with the initial decision paper.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Comments \_\_\_\_\_

✓ bcc: Mr. Gordon C. Strachan (for Mr. Haldeman's approval and concurrence if necessary)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 21, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: WILLIAM E. TIMMONS *WT*  
SUBJECT: '72 Convention

In preparing my preliminary plan for next year's convention, I need to know how many White House staff we may be required to accommodate with rooms, transportation, tickets, etc.

No doubt a number of key staffers will be involved in the convention campaign and, of course, those will be included in our early plans.

I personally feel that all commissioned personnel are entitled to be present whether or not they are actively engaged in the convention. ~~or not~~. This would be a morale booster, give staff a greater insight into politics, and serve as "crowd fillers" for selected events.

RECOMMENDATION:

That I include plans for having all commissioned White House staff attend the '72 Convention.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

OPTIONS:

If the recommendation is disapproved, then

1. Only those staff who can make a contribution to the Convention \_\_\_\_\_

If the recommendation is approved, then

1. Include male staff down through staff assistant level \_\_\_\_\_

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date \_\_\_\_\_

TO: G-S.

FROM: BRUCE KEHRLI

Any thoughts on TALS?

Commissioned 45  
Down thru staff as about 150

Total  
possible.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date: 6/23

TO: LR

FROM: GORDON STRACHAN

Put this with the  
back up to my  
memo to H on the  
72 convention. This  
attached Ode memo  
does not go to H however

CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

memo  
form H  
6/23

SUITE 272  
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006  
(202) 333-0920

June 23, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. JEB S. MAGRUDER  
FROM: ROBERT C. ODLE, JR.  
SUBJECT: 1972 CONVENTION SITE

The San Diego City Council met last night and in conjunction with the county and the state authorized the following bid for the 1972 Republican National Convention:

\$600,000 in city services  
\$200,000 in county services  
\$200,000 in state services  
\$500,000 in cash

\$1,500,000 total in cash and services

This came as a very pleasant surprise and far exceeded the \$800,000 which we had asked and which was bid by Chicago. Miami had bid \$400,000.

Included in San Diego's offer of \$600,000 of services are enough funds to construct a building adjacent to the convention hall which will house offices for the media and the RNC. The lack of such a building was the Convention Site Committee's main objection to San Diego, and this defect is now cured.

We can now expect to receive the bid within the next few days and at that point move ahead along the lines outlined in my convention memo of yesterday's date.

California's Lieutenant Governor Ed Reineke and the GOP State Vice Chairman, Gordon Luce, are the two men who put this all together for us, and Bill Timmons feels it would be very appropriate and most helpful if the Attorney General could call Governor Reineke and express to him our appreciation for getting the city, county and state governments to cooperate in making such a bid. The Attorney General could say something to the effect ". . . I understand, Ed, that you are to a large degree responsible and I just wanted you to know that we appreciate your efforts . . ."

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Comment \_\_\_\_\_

Secondly, Bill Timmons wants the state GOP Vice Chairman, Gordon Luce, to be "our man" in San Diego now that the convention is virtually certain to go there. Luce is a San Diego resident and the number two man in the California party -- he has been of great help to Bill in putting this all together and Bill feels that before very long he will be asked by the GOP to serve as local host for the convention, i.e., making him responsible to the national party for all convention arrangements which must be made locally. Before this happens, Bill wants permission to name him (not publicly at this point necessarily) the Nixon host so that he would be available to make all the arrangements which must be made locally for the President's campaign committee, rather than for the RNC and the national party. In other words, this guy is so good that Bill wants him for us before he's taken by someone else.

Luce, incidentally, is one leader in the California party who is respected by supporters of Governor Reagan and Mr. Finch alike.

Therefore, we request permission at this time to informally designate Gordon Luce as the campaign committee's local host.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Comment \_\_\_\_\_

One last point: it occurred to me that California Democrats might force a similar bid for the Democrat convention. While the city will make a pro forma bid, as was stated in the memo of yesterday's date, Timmons feels that the size of the Democrat convention makes it impossible for San Diego to be seriously considered for the site of the Democrat convention. There simply are not enough hotel rooms.

✓ ccc: Mr. Gordon C. Strachan (For Mr. Haldeman's approval and concurrence if necessary.)

June 23, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Magruder Meeting with  
the Attorney General -  
June 23

Today Magruder discussed the following subjects with the Attorney General:

1. RNC Budget Problems:

Pursuant to the Attorney General's request, Magruder examined the RNC cash flow, payroll, and organization chart. Magruder's report, which the Attorney General reviewed quickly, is attached. To summarize:

a) The RNC will have a deficit of \$2,000,000 by December, 1971; this results from \$1,000,000 less income and \$1,000,000 more in expenses;

b) The RNC asserts that \$900,000 is solely for the support for the re-election of the President. This is an overstatement;

c) The RNC is asking Citizens for \$1,000,000. The other \$1,000,000 of the deficit will be raised by the RNC. Magruder offers several options assuming the decision is made to assume \$1,000,000 of the RNC deficit. The options include: Have Kalmbach, Nunn and Sloan re-direct their efforts to acquire \$1,000,000; Citizens assume financial responsibility for some of the functions that may be related to the re-election of the President; fund the RNC with Citizens funds on hand; or cut back RNC programs to fit the budget.

The options involving the fundraisers or funds on hand will result in formidable difficulties, including the possibility of resignation by Lee Nunn and Hugh Sloan.

2. Ken Rietz

Senator Brock urged the Attorney General to hire Ken Rietz to be Executive Director of Young Voters for Nixon. Rietz

will sever all relationships with Treleaven, Allison and Rietz and begin working at Citizens on July 1st at a total salary of \$36,000. Brock argued that Rietz should receive \$48,000, and the Attorney General finally approved \$28,000 from the Citizens budget and \$8,000 from a discretionary account (see below #3).

3. The Attorney General has authorized a "limited discretionary account" for Magruder. Only Hank Buchanan, who is not yet doing the accounting work, will know of the account at Citizens.

The amount of the account as well as Rietz's salary might be an appropriate subject to raise in the general finance review session to be held next week with the Attorney General and Herb Kalmbach.

4. The Attorney General reacted very favorably to the polling plan prepared by Higby and Magruder. The Attorney General believes the polling structure suggested will be an excellent solution to the current confusion. He would like to meet with you and Flanigan next week to review the system.

5. Apparently, a personality clash is developing between Lee Nunn and Tom Evans. This has been aggravated by the recent interest in RNC financial problems. The Attorney General is concerned but has not decided upon a solution.

GS:lm

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Key States

Ken Cole asked you for a list of key states. Independent contact with Colson, Dent, Evans, and Flemming developed the recommendations attached at Tabs A, B, and C respectively. The chart at Tab D depicts 18 possible key states with notations as to who suggested which states.

Each of the individuals contacted indicated that lists are sterile and offered the following information:

1. To the five that everyone agrees on, Dent added New Hampshire, Oregon, Wisconsin, and North Carolina, primarily because of primaries and electoral votes. Dent does not believe that New York, Michigan, and Pennsylvania can be carried. Indiana is not on his list because if we can't carry it, we cannot win the election.
2. Tom Evans' suggestions are the result of his directing the RNC to do an extensive "statistical, socio-economic and survey data analysis" that developed a list of 39 states broken into four priority groups. The explanation of the selection process appears with the Evans list at Tab C. Magruder's recommendation of key states will attach the Tom Evans' list.
3. Flemming argues that any selection of key states must be separated on the basis of pre and post-Convention considerations. On the chart attached at Tab D, only the big nine states that Flemming thinks will be crucial after the Convention are listed.

Flemming's pre-Convention states include the seven that have laws which may require the President to enter the primaries as well as those states which he may have to enter for other reasons - New Hampshire, California, etc.

Of course, Flemming's concern about pre-Convention states indicates that others are thinking about the subject of your request of the Attorney General that a "formal recommendation . . . to the President covering strategy, timing, and surrogate candidates" in primary states be prepared.

Recommendation:

That Ken Cole be advised that the Colson 10 key states represents the current consensus of opinion.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Comment \_\_\_\_\_

GS:lm

KEY STATES

CALIFORNIA	Colson	Dent	Evans	Flemming
FLORIDA	Colson	Dent	Evans	Flemming
ILLINOIS	Colson	Dent	Evans	Flemming
NEW JERSEY	Colson	Dent	Evans	Flemming
OHIO	Colson	Dent	Evans	Flemming
TEXAS	Colson	Dent		Flemming
INDIANA	Colson	Dent		
MISSOURI	Colson	Dent		
NEW YORK	Colson			Flemming
PENNSYLVANIA	Colson			Flemming
IOWA			Evans	
NEW HAMPSHIRE		Dent		
NORTH CAROLINA		Dent		
OREGON		Dent		
TENNESSEE			Evans	
VIRGINIA			Evans	
WISCONSIN		Dent		
MICHIGAN				Flemming

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 17, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR GORDON STRACHAN

Mr. Colson considers the following to be the key states:

- California
- Texas
- New York
- Pennsylvania
- Ohio
- Illinois
- Missouri
- Florida
- Indiana
- New Jersey

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Dick".

W. Richard Howard

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Harry Dent called and left the following message:

THE KEY STATES:

California  
Illinois  
Ohio  
Texas  
Missouri  
New Jersey

The following are included primarily because of the primaries and electoral votes:

Florida  
-Wisconsin  
-North Carolina  
-New Hampshire  
-Oregon

The following were left off because he does not feel we can get them:

New York  
Michigan  
Pennsylvania

-----  
Indiana - Because if we cannot take it we cannot win the election.



Republican  
National  
Committee.

June 17, 1971

Thomas B. Evans, Jr., Co-Chairman

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
E.O. 12065, Section 8-102  
By Empire NARS, Date 1-15-80

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM TO:

Gordon Strachan

FROM:

Lewis Dale 

RE: Target States

Enclosed is the material you requested. Tom asked that I emphasize to you that this material must be held in the strictest confidence. If such information finds its way into the press, the President's chances of re-election will be badly damaged.

Another point to remember is that this list is continuously updated and is subject to change, based on analyses of relevant data constantly being gathered here.

Enclosure

June 16, 1971

MUST

13 Indiana ✓  
8 Iowa  
12 Virginia  
17 Florida ✓  
10 Tennessee  
45 California ✓  
26 Illinois ✓  
17 New Jersey ✓  
25 Ohio ✓  
173

2nd PRIORITY MUST

26 Texas ✓  
12 Missouri ✓  
10 Maryland  
13 North Carolina ✓  
27 Pennsylvania ✓  
41 New York ✓  
11 Wisconsin ✓  
8 Connecticut  
10 Minnesota  
158

RECEIVED  
JUN 16 1971

3rd PRIORITY MUST

8 South Carolina  
9 Washington  
4 New Mexico  
3 Vermont  
4 Montana  
3 Nevada  
7 Colorado  
4 New Hampshire  
6 Oregon  
9 Kentucky  
3 Delaware  
4 Maine  
64

PLUS

5 Nebraska  
4 Idaho  
6 Arizona  
3 Wyoming  
7 Kansas  
4 Utah  
3 North Dakota  
8 Oklahoma  
4 South Dakota  
44

June 15, 1971

The following target states are the result of analysis of current statistical, socio-economic and survey data. The electoral vote totals of each section are noted and followed by a brief description of the reasons for their selections.

#### PLUS STATES

The Plus States are defined as those areas that traditionally support the Republican Party and Nixon. In 1972, given a favorable national atmosphere towards the President, we should do well in these states. They are also states that tend to be more single issue oriented. For example, if farmers are feeling fairly comfortable about Nixon and the agriculture policy of the Administration, the chances are that these areas will be in our column. If, on the other hand, the attitude toward Nixon and the agriculture policy is negative, there is very little that could outweigh this attitude.

#### MUST STATES

The Must States are defined as areas that statistically and historically support Nixon/Republican nominees. It appears that without all these states in our column, Nixon has little or no chance of being re-elected. Ohio and California, for instance, have never failed to be in the winning column if a Republican was victorious. The reasoning behind the statement, "If Nixon doesn't carry all of the Must States, he won't be elected President," is that if one of these states is not carried, there is little chance of finding a second or third priority state which would make up this loss more easily.

#### SECOND PRIORITY MUST STATES

The Second Priority Must States represent those states that statistically have less chance of moving over to Nixon, but, none the less, are within striking distance. These states represent the next best opportunities in the large electoral category. It is necessary that some of these be moved into the win column for Nixon.

#### THIRD PRIORITY MUST STATES

The Third Priority Must States represent those areas that statistically Nixon can win. These are areas with smaller electoral vote totals, but about the same odds, as the Second Priority Must States. Nixon must win some of these.

The method of arriving at these target states included a ten year analysis of Presidential elections, an analysis of 1966, 1968 and 1970 Congressional, Senatorial, and Gubernatorial races, an analysis of polling trends of various regions in the country and state polls where available, RNC state issue files of the past year to see if there have been any major trends or shifts in public opinion that have been evidenced in newspapers or other publications, as well as the reports of the RNC field staff.


It should be reiterated that this is the status of state priority selection as of June 15. This is not meant to be definitive, but only a device to serve the needs of those who must make early resource allocations on behalf of the effort to re-elect the President.

CONFIDENTIAL

June 16, 1971

MEMORANDUM TO: Tom Evans

FROM: Ed DeBolt



States not included in previous memo:

9	Alabama
3	Alaska
6	Arkansas
3	District of Columbia
12	Georgia
4	Hawaii
10	Louisiana
14	Massachusetts
21	Michigan
7	Mississippi
4	Rhode Island
6	West Virginia
<u>99</u>	

June 17, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN  
SUBJECT: Gavin Memorandum on  
Political Moods

Frank Shakespeare forwarded Bill Gavin's very interesting memorandum on political moods. To summarize:

- 1) The New York Times - McNamara papers controversy will hurt the Nixon Administration because the public doesn't distinguish LBJ's duplicity from the wheeling and dealing of any Administration.
- 2) A politician has three things to work with: reason, passion, and imagination.
- 3) In the public's mind Nixon is eminently reasonable and reasoning; only Muskie among the Democrats is close in this, our strongest attribute. Although the public wants things to be thought through reason is politically dull.
- 4) Agnew represents passion (energy, comment, waves-making regardless of content). With Agnew, no one (including Wallace) can "out-passion" us. The problem is that the public is confused by Agnew as passion and Nixon as reason. The result is that the Administration doesn't project a definite image. This is to be contrasted with 1968 when the Republicans were a bit dull but solid. This confused image is a bad sign.
- 5) This Administration is wholly without imagination. There is no Peace Corps or Great Society, and even the six great goals of the New American Revolution are solid, reasonable, and prudent, but ~~im~~imaginative. Only Kennedy has imagination.
- 6) Nixon will be re-elected if Kennedy doesn't run. Agnew shouldn't be replaced because his passion pluses and minuses are already engraved on the public's mind.

- 7) The Administration should not try to build an image that appeals to the imagination because no one will believe it. Rather the Nixon Administration should run on stark, statistical appeals to reason. Television and other media appeals to reason. Television and other media should not be exciting as in 1968 or arty, "cinema-verite." Charts and figures not gimmicky media should be the Campaign 72 approach (Shakespeare agrees with this Gavin argument).
- 8) Approach youth as Americans not young Americans, because the Democrats already have the "youth issues" locked.
- 9) Gavin concludes: "Wouldn't it be ironic if the Nixon Administration was defeated because the Democrats were able to state that while they were for sane defense spending, they never meant we should be in second place as far as missile defense is concerned?"

Recommendation:

That Bill Gavin's memorandum be forwarded by you to:

The Attorney General 6/28 - ~~Hullin~~ Magruder

John Ehrlichman 6/28 - Hullin

✓ Dwight Chapin 6/28

Pat Buchanan 6/28

Ray Price 6/28

GS:elr



DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable  
H. R. Haldeman  
The White House

These observations by Bill Gavin on political moods  
in the United States are worth noting.

I am inclined to agree with Bill's thoughts on  
television spot advertising in the 1972 campaign.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Frank Shakespeare".

Frank Shakespeare

EYES ONLY

June 15, 1971

Covering Note

I wrote this memo before the disclosures in the Times. My feeling is that in the final analysis, the President will not benefit from these disclosures. I think the public will identify any Administration with the kind of wheeling-dealing that has been disclosed. I think Teddy will benefit, not because of any rational reason, but because people can project their fantasies of 1000% purity in government and a thousand-year peace unto Teddy. Our Administration and all respect for authority has been terribly damaged by these disclosures. Anyone who thinks this will be a partisan issue ("see what LBJ did?") is missing the point: the Times wants Americans to think that anyone connected with this war in any way is bad.

I know there is an argument that says we look better than the Democrats because LBJ has been caught in a lie. I don't agree. The public won't make the distinction. If I were LBJ, I'd go on nationwide television and make my case.



Bill Gavin

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

June 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Shakespeare

Some Thoughts on 1972

What, ultimately, does any politician have to work with? Three things: reason, passion and imagination. Even if he successfully mixes these three it won't assure him political success because events might go against him. But without these qualities, even events can't save him.

Looking coldbloodedly at 1972, how will the President appear to the voters insofar as these three qualities are concerned? And how will his opponent shape up?

1. Reason. It seems to me that this is our strong point. Nixon is in the public mind an eminently reasonable and reasoning man (two different attributes). There is not a Democrat who can match Nixon's reputation for thinking things through, sorting things out, balancing all things. Muskie comes close but there is nothing in his record that shows he can appeal to the voters as the candidate of pure reason.

Now this is all to the good. Contrary to what the pundits say, there is great comfort to be taken by the electorate from knowing that they can count on a certain kind of familiar--if dull--rational process in decision making. Nixon is perhaps the best example of the "reason-candidate." LBJ had everyone on the point of a nervous breakdown because no one knew what he was going to do next, i. e. , everyone began to doubt his capacity for thinking things through.

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

But reason, politically speaking, is dull. It is good, but good only in that way that medicine is good. Reason is appreciated only when things are going wrong (JFK's much publicized discussions with wise men during the missile crisis proved to be as much help to him as the ultimate decision did; people knew things were "being thought through" and had confidence in Kennedy.)

The Nixon Administration has been marked by this: we are reasonable (we set reasonable goals--reorganization--and go about them in reasonable ways) but dull. Yet no one quite knows whether this is good or bad, as far as sizing up our chances for 1972. For the moment let's content ourselves with the facts: we are the first Administration in ten years to be almost universally thought of as one in which "thinking things through" is taken for granted. This quality of course works against us also: we are accused of balancing too many things, of trying to be too rational, of attempting to avoid needed risks, etc. But in any event, we are associated in the public mind with reason.

2. Passion. Passion, in this Administration means Agnew and Agnew means passion. The documentation of his arguments, the precise nature of his claims, the moderate speaking style with which he made them--all of these are as dust compared to the one single fact about the Vice President: he represents passion in this Administration.

Like all passion, the passion represented by Agnew is pure energy, i. e., in the public mind the content of his passion has become almost unimportant (even to his friends); what counts is that he is what he is, breaking the rules of political decorum, saying things, making waves, in short, making a passionate appeal to the passions of the public. Not to put too fine an edge on this thing, it can be said in a very real sense that Agnew's appeal is the appeal of the lover: it is direct, forceful, open, full of energy and rather unfocused.

Does anyone "out-passion" us? I think not. No one running for President can afford to take the chances Agnew has. He is the single most passionately discussed, admired, hated politician alive today, including Old George Corley Wallace.

But passion is too much for most people. Most of us can take it only in bits and pieces and Agnew has in three years made a mini-career out of it. He has, as they say, enflamed the hearts of the faithful.

Many questions arise: does the public distinguish the passionate politics of Agnew from the rational politics of Nixon? Does Agnew's style hurt or help or really have no affect on Nixon's image? It is difficult to say but my guess is that something entirely unexpected has happened: the public has become confused by the Agnew style in contrast with Nixon's style. The public simply doesn't know what to think. I'm not saying the public disagrees with his content; I'm saying it has completely forgotten his content. All they'll remember in 1972 about Agnew is a big cliché in which sound and fury make up the greatest part.

Thus, I think we are going into 1972 (no matter who is on the ticket as Vice President for us) with a paradoxical, but very real problem: the very quality lacked by Nixon in the eyes of most people is precisely that which Agnew has, but in such a way that people are not certain what to make of it all. Is Agnew, Nixon? Is Nixon, Agnew? This uncertainty about the image of the ticket is, in my mind, a danger. In 1968 everyone knew what the Republican ticket was: a bit dull, but solid. But now? Solidity of image (I'm not talking about programs) is gone. A bad sign.

3. Imagination. Here we have an Administration that has called for a revolution, that has called for revolutionary new systems of welfare, revenue sharing, etc. But in the public's mind it is an Administration wholly without imagination. I don't know why this should be so but I'm positive it is so. And here is where the danger lies. In order to win in 1972 a candidate is going to have to be reasonable, have mini-passion but also appeal to the imagination of the voters. We simply don't do that and we never have. Voters voted for us in 1968 not because they imagined what we were going to do but because they knew what we are going to do. After five years of LBJ, intellectual certainty became almost politically sexy. But now after four years of dull reason with eruptions of (Agnevian) passion ~~and~~ few if any appeals to the imagination (the Peace Corps was such an appeal, so in it's way was the Great Society) have been made. Even the six great goals have been sold as well-thought-out goals that can be reached through reason and prudence.

We are going into 1972 with absolutely no appeal to the imagination and there is, as far as I can see, no way out of it. No gimmick will suffice. Either you have it or you don't and we don't as far as imaginative appeal goes.

Now what does all this add up to? It means that we are in very big trouble as far as image is concerned. We will be the party of peace--but people expect peace.

The great strength we have, however, is that there is only one possible candidate who could appeal to the imagination of the voters, sweep through the words, add the logic and the record and hit them in the gut: Teddy. And he ain't running. If he does run, we are in a fight for our political future. No other Democrat has even the slightest chance of appealing to the fancies and fantasies of the public as does Teddy. We will win if he doesn't run. \* Not because we are going to overwhelm the voters with our record or our charm (they are not really interested in either) but because we can out-reason all of them and none of them has that much more going for him as far as imagination is concerned. Passion could well be our undoing. But if this is so, it is already a political fact simply waiting to be recorded in November 1972. Thus, any attempt to remove Agnew in order to "clean-up" the ticket is fruitless. His pluses and minuses have already been engraved on the public's mind and have been associated with the entire "Administration-image." Replacing Agnew would, I think, solve nothing and probably harm our chances on the right.

What does this all add up to?

1. We should not attempt to build some kind of image that appeals to the imagination for the simple reason that no one will believe it. Any energy used during the campaign to make us look "exciting" is, to me, a waste. Thus television and other media should be used in a different way from 1968. Instead of the fast-moving, exciting "cinema-verite" technique in spots, we should make stark, statistical appeals based on documented facts. At first glance this seems to be disastrous, but I think our hope lies in sticking to what we do best (reason) and what we are identified with in the public mind. We can't turn our back on four years of reasoned, prudent progress and try to excite people with dreams of grandeur or majestic sweeping visions. An explanation of what I mean: the numbers of Americans that were in Vietnam when we came

\*We can, of course, win if he does run, providing two things occur: (1) Chappaquiddick is engraved in the hearts of the voters and (2) the voters don't want fantasies. Both seem unlikely to occur.

in and numbers of how many there are when the campaign takes place: stark, unadorned, repeated over and over and over--this kind of thing will do more than a thousand arty camera angles.

2. Quite literally everything depends on the public mood. If the public is looking for excitement after four years of reasoned progress, than it is my feeling we are in big trouble and that there is little if anything we can do about it as far as a media campaign is concerned. They voted for us because they thought we were solid; we have been solid; we must run once more as the solid party.

3. Gimmicky media appeals to the youth vote simply are a waste of time. Our appeal to youth must be an appeal to their concerns as Americans, not as young Americans and I think the President should say this. The Democrats are starting out with a wide spread in youth registration and we can't get them by appealing to the "youth issues" that the Democrats already have tied up. Let the Democrats cozy up to "youth"; we will treat the new voters as Americans first, i. e., we will take them as seriously as they take themselves.

A final--and to me, frightening--point. History has been known to deal in ironies before. Wouldn't it be ironic if the Nixon Administration was defted because the Democrats were able to state that while they were for sane defense spending, they never meant we should be in second place as far as missile defense is concerned? And wouldn't it be ironic if the Democrats said that they could do better than we could in our own programs vis-a-vis China?

Ghastly thoughts.

*Bill*

Bill Gavin

June 17, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN  
SUBJECT: RNC Delaware Study

Tom Evans has directed Ed DeBolt to spend \$35-40,000 studying the effect of selective media and campaign devices on voters. Canvass polling of test and control precincts will attempt to assess the impact of targeted approaches to voters by direct mail, telephone, and door-to-door personal persuasion. The test is described in some detail in the Draft Memorandum attached at Tab A. Magruder will advise the Attorney General of this project sometime next week.

Rose Woods sent you a memorandum on June 9 suggesting that a survey be conducted in Delaware. Her memorandum with backup is attached at Tab B. A suggested response to Rose Woods for your signature is attached at Tab C.

**Attachments:** Draft memorandum.  
Memorandum from Rose Woods, dated June 9.  
Suggested response to Rose Woods.

GS:elr

## DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Marik  
FROM: Ed DeBolt  
SUBJECT: Delaware Test

### PURPOSE

The purpose of the RNC's Delaware Test is to prove that voter perception of President Nixon can be changed or fortified by utilization of selective media and campaign devices. Delaware's modest size and proximity to Washington makes for ease of supervision, low expenses, and relatively inexpensive computer utilization. The test sample is a microcosim of the Northeast, in that it has an urban area (Wilmington), a suburban ring and two rural counties.

### TIMETABLE

June 28: Precinct-by-precinct vote profile analysis will be completed. From this analysis areas of Republicans, Democrats, and "ambivalents" will be identified and displayed visually. The RNC will complete a precinct socio-economic analysis that will locate areas of voters with a potential to support the President based on Census data (1st and 4th count) such as: income, race, housing, education, etc. A state-wide survey commissioned by a Delaware group will be completed and the results will be made available to the RNC.

July 8: An in-depth precinct canvass will commence. Utilizing the precinct and socio-economic analyses and the state-wide survey results, approximately five weathervane, thirty test and thirty control precincts will be canvassed. Approximately one hundred interviews will be conducted in each precinct. The test questions will be developed and the technical supervision will be conducted by Market Opinion Research.

July 20: Utilizing the results of the target precinct canvasses, the first of twenty to thirty tests will be put into the field. The RNC is currently developing the methodology for these tests which will include direct mail techniques, utilization of telephone banks, door - to - door programs, printed flyers and other communication techniques professionally designed to present the President and his programs in a way to favorably stimulate a prospective voter.

September: The test, control, and weathervane precincts will be recanvassed to assess the impact of the twenty to thirty media and campaign tests.

### MANAGEMENT

The RNC will be responsible for all aspects of the Delaware test including management and recruitment of personnel to carry out the test goals.



Bob Dole, Chairman Republican National Committee 310 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Permission to reprint this pamphlet is granted—and encouraged.



### **CANCER CURE CAMPAIGN**


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## **PRESIDENT NIXON'S GOALS FOR A GREATER AMERICA**

... Frontal Attack on the Deadliest Disease



# Cancer Cure Campaign . . .

## The Healthiest Nation in the World

I. On May 11, 1971, President Nixon launched a major frontal attack against cancer, a disease which claims one out of every four Americans and strikes two out of every three American families.

This however is only *one of many* health battles which have been waged throughout the Nixon Administration.

Almost two years ago, President Nixon said there would be a massive crisis in health unless something were done within the next two or three years.

Anticipating the crisis the Administration launched a study into cancer-linked products.

In 1969 cigarettes (June), cyclamates (October) and DDT (November) were put under surveillance. In December, a White House Conference on Food, Nutrition and Health was held.

In March 1970, radio and TV advertisements of cigarettes were banned. In May, at the Tenth International Cancer Congress, Vice President Agnew declared a "Decade Against Disease." In August a panel on pollution was formed, and in December predictions were made concerning a National Health Policy being formulated for early 1971.

In January, 1971, Mr. Nixon, in his State of the Union message, declared war on cancer. By February, a national health strategy was

issued; in March, herbicides were under investigation. May marked the presentation of the President's Cancer Cure Campaign.

II. What makes the Cancer Cure Campaign different from any other federally funded project?

*First*, it is financed with an independent budget.

*Second*, it's administrator will be directly responsible to the President.

*Third*, it is based at the National Institutes of Health for the purpose of co-ordinated research.

*Fourth*, it will have an advisory committee (Cancer Cure Advisory Committee).

In 1970, the American Cancer Society said "Today's research will determine the length of tomorrow's death list."

President Nixon's program is a constructive approach to basic problems through research. It is revolutionary. It has both commitment and resource.

"No other administration," said the *Washington Star*, "has sought to come to grips with (the U.S. health problem), let alone offer solutions on so broad a scale."

In his January State of the Union message, Mr. Nixon said:

"America has long been the wealthiest nation in the world. Now it is time we became the healthiest nation in the world."

He is moving to turn those words into reality.

June 9, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM: ROSE MARY WOODS



John Bucci who, you will recall, is with the Pennsylvania Opinion Poll, has written me as per the attached letter.

I am enclosing the copy of his booklet which he sent to the President and call your attention to his remarks concerning a survey in Delaware, since I do not know what, if any, plans are made for this type program at this time.

Attachments

copy of handwritten letter ,

Dear Miss Woods:

I thought the President & you would like to have copies of  
our newly issued booklet.

We feel it can be very helpful.

Best wishes - also tell the President it would be very  
valuable to conduct a survey in Delaware at this time.

Mr. Rollins usually arranges for this.

Sincerely,

s/ E. JOHN BUCCI

June 9, 1971

Dear Mr. Bucci:

Many thanks for sending along a copy of your newly issued booklet, "What Really Decides An Election." As you requested, I have passed along to the President the copy which you enclosed for him. I will also pass my copy and your comments about the importance of conducting a survey in Delaware along to the appropriate people.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

Rose Mary Woods  
Secretary to the President

Mr. E. John Bucci  
Pennsylvania Opinion Poll  
P. O. Box 266  
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania 19081

bc: Bob Haldeman w/incoming.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 17, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROSE MARY WOODS

FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN

Your memorandum of June 9 described John Bucci's suggestion that a survey be conducted in Delaware.

The RNC is currently involved in a rather massive Delaware survey research project. The initial work has been completed and the questionnaire should go into the field in July.

I will see that you receive the results upon completion of the project in September.

June 17, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H.R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN  
LARRY HIGBY

SUBJECT:

Alabama/Indiana Polls

Attached are revised suggested questionnaires for state wide polls in Alabama and Indiana. Additional emphasis has been put on state wide issues in each case. These questionnaires include suggestions by ORC, Dave Derge, and Harry Dent.

You raised the question of the price for these polls versus the number of questions on each poll, as compared to the price for national telephone polls. In response to this, ORC has offered the following explanation:

There are ten (10) questions, including trial heats, for state wide surveys because of ORC telephone line limitations. In nationwide surveys, all the lines that ORC has available may be used and the longer interview (15 questions) is possible while still meeting the deadline of a 2 day interview.

The price for a ten (10) question state wide survey of 500 interviews is between \$3,500 and \$4,000. Slight increases or decreases in the number of questions has no effect on that cost.

In summation, the optimum number of questions for a state wide 2 day poll or a nationwide 1 day poll is ten (10) questions. The optimum number for a 2 day nationwide poll is fifteen (15) questions.

LH:lm

**SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR ALABAMA**

1. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Richard Nixon is handling his job as President?
2. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Spiro Agnew is handling his job as Vice President?
3. How would you rate the job George Wallace is doing as Governor of Alabama - excellent, good, fair, or poor?
4. Has George Wallace done anything about the Supreme Court's bussing decision?
5. Between Richard Nixon and George Wallace, who can you count on to minimize bussing?
6. Is the Supreme Court or Richard Nixon responsible for the desegregation decision?
7. Do you believe President Nixon has handled the race question correctly?
8. Have President Nixon's Supreme Court appointments been helpful to the South?
9. Aside from the War, what do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?

10. Trial Heats - with and without Wallace:

Muskie, Kennedy, Humphrey, Jackson

11. Most people believe that if George Wallace was a candidate for President of the United States in 1972 he would have little chance of being elected, yet you indicated you would vote for him. Why is that?

**ALTERNATE QUESTIONS FOR ALABAMA**

1. Do you believe George Wallace should run for President?
2. If Richard Nixon were the Republican candidate for President, and if George Wallace ran as a third party candidate, would Hubert Humphrey have a better chance to be elected?
3. Why does Wallace continue to run for President if he has no chance of winning?
4. What are some of the things you like the most about Governor Wallace?
5. If the election for Governor of Alabama were being held today, would you vote for George Wallace if he were one of the candidates?
6. In general, do you approve or disapprove of Governor Wallace's position on Civil Rights?

7. If a candidate for President of the United States was supported by Governor Wallace, would you be more likely to vote for him, more likely to vote against him, or wouldn't it make any difference?

8. Which one of these two statements is the better description of Governor Wallace - he is opposed to equal rights for all people regardless of race, or he is opposed to the federal government interfering in the affairs of a state?

9. Favorability - Wallace, Bayh, Nixon, Kennedy

**SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR INDIANA**

1. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Richard Nixon is handling his job as President?
2. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Spiro Agnew is handling his job as Vice President?
3. Do you approve or disapprove of the President's farm program?
4. Do you believe the Indiana Republican Party has served Indiana well?
5. Has Governor Whitcomb helped or hurt the Republican Party in Indiana?
6. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Whitcomb is handling his job as Governor?
7. Which party would best serve the interests of Indiana - Democrats or Republicans?
8. If a candidate for President of the United States was supported by Governor Wallace, would you be more likely to vote for him, more likely to vote against him, or wouldn't it make any difference?
9. Favorability - Nixon, Kennedy, Wallace, Bayh, Muskie, Jackson

10. Trial Heats - with and without Wallace:

Bayh, Muskie, Humphrey, Kennedy

11. Most people believe that if George Wallace was a candidate for President of the United States in 1972 he would have little chance of being elected, yet you indicated you would vote for him. Why is that?

**ALTERNATE QUESTIONS FOR INDIANA**

1. Do you believe Senator Birch Bayh should run for President?

2. Why does George Wallace of Alabama continue to run for President if he has no chance of winning?

3. To which of these two should government policy give the highest priority - ending the Vietnam War or fighting unemployment?

4. Do you believe President Nixon is too Republican Party oriented?

5. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Dick Lugar is handling his job as Mayor of Indianapolis?

6. Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Republican Party has handled the government of Indiana?

7. How would you rate the job George Wallace is doing as Governor of Alabama - excellent, good, fair, or poor?

8. What are some of the things you like the most about Governor Wallace?

9. If the election for Governor of Alabama were being held today, would you vote for George Wallace if he were one of the candidates?

10. In general, do you approve or disapprove of Governor Wallace's position on Civil Rights?

11. Which one of these two statements is the better description of Governor Wallace - he is opposed to equal rights for all people regardless of race, or he is opposed to the federal government interfering in the affairs of a state?

June 15, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN  
SUBJECT: Indiana: Gene Pulliam

Your May 28 memorandum (attached) to Herb Klein asked him to contact Gene Pulliam about the Roger Ailes' report that Pulliam is about to support Scoop Jackson.

Klein talked with Pulliam for an hour recently and reported to me yesterday that:

- 1) Pulliam is quite upset about a Romney-HUD housing project. Klein has talked to Romney and will call Pulliam back when he has the facts;
- 2) Pulliam believes Keith Bulen and Roger Ailes lost the Roudebush race. Pulliam would be very angry if Bulen received a top post in Indiana. In Pulliam's mind Ailes adds little to White House understanding of Indiana when Ailes visits Indiana;
- 3) Pulliam might support Scoop Jackson, but he would be the only Democrat he could consider supporting. Otherwise he will support the President .

This information should probably be transmitted to the Attorney General by Magruder.

GS:elr

May 28, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:           HERB KLEIN  
FROM:                        H. R. HALDEMAN

My most recent letter to Roger Ailes is attached.  
Would you contact Gene Pulliam and see what is  
really bothering him?

HRH:GS:dg

June 2, 1971

Dear Roger:

Thank you for the information on the Indiana situation. I have asked Herb Klein to contact Herb Kessler to see if he is really as unhappy as some of the rumors indicate.

As you know now we did not make a trip to Indianapolis, but your information is certainly appreciated.

Congratulations and best of luck with your expanding business.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

R. D. Waldman  
Assistant to the President

Mr. Roger Allen  
403 Oak Valley Road  
Nash, Pennsylvania 19153

bcc: Honorable John N. Mitchell  
Herb Klein

HRH:GS:lm:BK:dg:LH:elr

June 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN  
SUBJECT: Dent Office Analyses of States

Dent forwarded the first two state analyses prepared by Tom Davis, David Eisenhower's best friend. The discussions of Delaware and Georgia are well done. To summarize:

**Delaware:** The war is the issue; Nixon is not blamed for the economic situation; and the Wallace appeal is down. Senator Boggs has not decided whether to run for re-election in 1972. Tom Evans argues that the President personally encourage Boggs to run because his candidacy is considered crucial in carrying the state for the President. The Republican Party is in shape and will be an asset.

**Georgia:** The President could carry Georgia if Wallace doesn't run. (Bo Calloway thinks Wallace will not run.) The Republican Party is faction-ridden and would be little help especially if Calloway enters the Republican primary for Senator Grambell's seat.

Attachment

GS:elr

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
BOB HALDEMAN ✓

FROM:

HARRY DENT 

Attached is the first in a series of state political reports prepared by a summer intern in my office named Tom Davis. Davis is a very sharp political science graduate who is David Eisenhower's best friend.

I asked him for PR purposes and also to provide us with a political analysis of each state, that he call key GOP leaders in all of the states and put together a political summary on a state by state basis.

I told him to record exactly what the people say, whether it be gripes, praise, their analysis of our potential for 1972 and what other races there may be and the effect these races may have on our race in 1972.

## DELAWARE

1968 Presidential:	Nixon	96,714
	Humphrey	89,194
	Wallace	28,459

### Presidential prospects:

Both the State Chairman and Tom Evans agree that the President would face a very close race for re-election here if the election were held today. The war is not popular, but as an issue does not seem to hurt us as much as in other states. Lay-offs at DuPont have brought the economic picture close to the minds of the state's voters, but the Wilmington area faces such cutbacks periodically and not so likely to "blame Nixon." Nevertheless, a unanimity persists among Party leaders that the President has gained little ground since 1968. The Wallace appeal is also perceived to be on the wane.

The leading Democrat appears to be Senator Muskie, at present. He has been into the state a couple of times during the past year and Party leaders seem to like him. Humphrey also has some appeal here.

The State Chairman feels that we are hurting ourselves by not using trade associations to help boost the Administration's agricultural policies and that we have lost ground among the farmers in the southern end of the state. He feels that the "Salute to Agriculture" day was pathetic in terms of utilizing the resources we have available.

### The Senate picture:

The great concern here is whether Senator J. Caleb Boggs will seek a third term or not. If the Senator runs again, everyone seems to agree that he will be unbeatable (he polled 59% in 1966). If he does not run, a bitter primary may develop over who is to replace him. The leading contenders for the nomination would be Congressman Pete DuPont and Wilmington Mayor Hal Haskell. Tom Evans fears a divisive primary could cost us the seat. He suggests that the President personally intervene and ask Boggs to seek another term. He believes the Senator's presence on the ballot would help the rest of the ticket as well as hold the seat for us.

Delaware

Page 2

Governor's race:

Governor Russell Peterson is thought to be in excellent shape for a second term. He will probably be opposed by Democrat Sherman Tribbetts, a former Lt. Governor.

House race:

If Pete DuPont doesn't seek the Senate seat, he should be in good shape for re-election. However, if he vacates this seat it could go Democratic.

Comments:

The key to a strong state ticket would seem to be Caleb Boggs. If he retires, we could lose the Senate and House seats. If he seeks re-election, we are virtually assured victory in the top races - which would help the President along, too. Reed thinks that the Senator is inclined not to run at present, but that every effort should be made to keep him in the race.

The Party organization seems strong and well oiled. No Democrat has managed a statewide victory for major office since 1964. The State Chairman is already pulling together the organization for 1972. The Party should be an asset to the President here.

## GEORGIA

1968 Presidential race:	Wallace	535,550
	Nixon	380,111
	Humphrey	334,440

### Presidential prospects:

Both the State Chairman and Bo Callaway agree that Wallace would win in a three-way race today by sweeping rural Georgia. The President is not unpopular, "no one is cussin' him", Bo Callaway says, but he doesn't seem to evoke much enthusiasm either. Bussing has hurt us a great deal. However, with Wallace out of the race the President should be able to win handily, sweeping rural Georgia and breaking even in the metropolitan areas. Muskie appears to have some support here and our leaders seem to agree that he has a moderate image. Governor Carter and a lot of the Court House crowd can be expected to line up behind him in a two-way race, but this shouldn't stop a Nixon victory. Jackson and Mills are, of course, very formidable Democrats if they could get a nomination.

### Senate race:

The Democratic Senate picture looks very crowded at present. Maddox is a heavy favorite if he runs, but he has not yet decided whether or not to make the race. Senator Gambrell is probably too liberal for the state, but he has been campaigning hard ever since he was appointed and will get a big Negro vote. He will probably make the run-off. Carl Sanders and Ernest Vandiver are making noises about running, but both would have tough races. State Labor Commissioner Sam Caldwell is also running and may pull some votes. Congressman Stuckey is also running and could be the winner if Maddox doesn't run. Stuckey is attractive, conservative and has lots of money. Bo Callaway discounts him but the State Chairman feels that this is the man to beat if Maddox doesn't run.

The Republican Party is unsure of its nominee as well. Congressman Thompson is committed to making the race, according

to Callaway, and could run a strong race. Bo has not made up his mind yet whether he will run or not. He says it is too early for that, but he knows he can win against Thompson in a primary.

Our chances for this seat depend on a couple of things. Most importantly, it will be hard to win if the President doesn't run well. Secondly, Gambrell or some other liberal would be the most vulnerable in the opinion of our people. Gambrell has moved steadily left since taking his seat and Bo thinks he may have gone too far on SST and the European troop cut. Another key factor in this race might be to keep a unified Party together for the general election effort. The State Chairman fears that a blood-letting Callaway-Thompson primary would seriously jeopardize any chance we might have for the seat.

#### House of Representatives:

The Congressional districts are supposed to be reapportioned sometime this summer. Population shifting within the state gives the Atlanta area more Congressional clout. This could result in a one seat gain for us, but more likely we will be fortunate to hold what we have. Ben Blackburn is solid no matter what the Legislature gives him. Thompson's seat, if the black vote is consolidated, could go to a Negro. Thompson may be forced into the Senate race simply because of a 40% Negro district, according to Callaway. Cobb County will be in a third district and will furnish a strong GOP base for a House district.

There is an outside chance we could win Stuckey's seat (Way Cross, Brunswick, southeast Georgia), but only in a GOP sweep. Bo says that if Jack Brinkley goes for the Senate and vacates the third district, we may be able to reclaim it -- but he bets Brinkley will stay where he is.

#### Outlook:

The actions of George Wallace (Callaway doesn't think he will run) and Lester Maddox will determine what happens to the

Georgia  
Page 3

Republican ticket in Georgia in 1972. With both of them out of the race, we have a real chance to make inroads. At present, both look very strong if they decide to run.

The Party organization is badly faction-ridden. Our best bet here seems to be to pay lip service to the Party and work through the Citizens Committee. We need Democratic support to win here, much as in South Carolina, so Party labels should be played down.

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June 15, 1971

**MEMORANDUM FOR:**

**H. R. HALDEMAN**

**FROM:**

**GORDON STRACHAN**

**SUBJECT:**

**McCarthy Plans for 1972**

Rita Hauser (a member of the Citizens for the Re-Election of the President), sent the attached memorandum to the Attorney General. She met with Howard Stein of Dreyfus Fund about Gene McCarthy's plans for 1972. The following points are made:

- 1) McCarthy is disenchanted with the Democratic Party and he would be the philosopher, but not the organizer, of a third party;
- 2) McCloskey, Lindsay, and Common Cause have not captured McCarthy;
- 3) McCarthy could be brought into "the Nixon Administration only if he could indicate satisfaction on Vietnam, but this may not be too difficult to get."

Rita Hauser suggests that the Attorney General approach the President about this intriguing possibility.

GS:elr

June 8, 1971

MEMORANDUM

To: John N. Mitchell  
From: Rita E. Hauser *REH*  
Re: McCarthy Plans for 1972

Howard Stein asked me to breakfast with him today at the Dreyfus Fund Offices. We spent two hours in quiet talk about the political scene, and I derived the following of interest to you:

1. McCarthy has absolutely no intention of doing anything concrete for 1972. He plans to speak out to push the Democratic Party in the "right" direction, and will suggest frequently that if the Democratic contenders do not change their views, only a third party can save the Nation. He, McCarthy, will not organize such a party. Rather, he hopes to be the philosopher of such a movement which, if it did develop, will naturally choose him as its leader. Under no circumstances will he enter any primaries.

Dick Goodwin, who is on consultative status and payroll of the Dreyfus Fund, is writing McCarthy's major speeches. He wrote the one in Minneapolis which got wide interest. It is planned that McCarthy will announce a series of positions on major issues sometime in the fall. Goodwin is drawing them up over the summer.

2. Stein is not impressed with McCloskey (this derives from the fact that McCarthy is very down on McCloskey), and has no interest in Lindsay, who he thinks has done a bad job in New York. Common Cause is all talk and no action. Consequently, Stein has not committed himself to anyone other than McCarthy.

3. Stein repeated to me several times that he had voted for Nixon in 1968. He is satisfied, but not totally, as to the Nixon record on Vietnam. Here, too, his line is strictly McCarthy's.

- 2 -

I would react to the thought of the President "putting McCarthy to use" in the negotiations on Vietnam in Paris. McCarthy feels a coalition government can be negotiated, and that he has the general formula.

I told Stein I would get back to him later on this matter, and he obviously understood that I would talk it over with various people.

I have the firm impression that McCarthy can be grabbed by the President, as he is totally down on all the Democratic contenders. This would take nursing. It might be worthwhile to discuss with the President the possibility of an informal talk between him and McCarthy as a first step.

Nothing would be more sensational than our taking him over. He has no particular employment, other than lecturing, and I got a clear message from Stein that he would like to do something for his country as the next step. McCarthy could come into the Nixon Administration only if he could indicate satisfaction on Vietnam, but this may not be too difficult to get.

4. Stein asked me to keep him posted on things of interest and that I meet with him every now and then. I agreed.

SUGGESTION: Would you sound this out with the President and give me a general feeler? Played right, I think McCarthy can be more or less with us or, at the least, neutralized in 1972.

June 15, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN  
SUBJECT: Magruder's Projects

The Attorney General is finally pressing Jeb Magruder for action by his Task Forces. Magruder is responding and discussion this morning disclosed the following:

- 1) Magruder will draft the recommendation on Advertising by Friday. He reports that he discussed the subject with you and the Attorney General and is confident that all necessary background work has been completed;
- 2) The Youth Task Force, of which Counsellor Finch is Chairman, has not moved towards its recommendation stage as quickly as hoped. To solve this problem T. Harding Jones from Finch's staff and Tom Bell from Senator Brock's staff will work entirely on youth questions for the next ten days. Bart Porter, the Youth project manager, will submit the recommendation to the Attorney General by June 25;
- 3) Two week recommendation completion deadlines have also been placed on the farm vote, (Whitaker), Middle America, Ethnic and Labor (Colson), Primaries and Field Organizations (Fleming), the Convention (Timmons), Spokesman Resources (Rumsfeld), and Democratic and Republican Contenders (Buchanan);
- 4) Three week recommendation completion deadlines have been placed also on the Citizens activities (Magruder), the Black and Elderly Vote (Garment), and the Women's Vote (Hauser);
- 5) The Attorney General asked Magruder to review the RNC cash flow, payroll, and organization chart. He will receive these materials from Tom Evans on June 18. The question will then be whether the Citizens should help fund the RNC. Apparently there has been no discussion of what source of Citizens funds will go to the RNC.


- 6) The question of whether we should proceed with Simulation will be considered on June 24. Dr. Derge and John Lindstrom, the IBM simulation man from California, will make a presentation to Flanigan (as Chairman of the Polling, Computers, and Research Task Force), Magruder, Martin Anderson, Ed DeBolt (RNC), Lance Torrance (Census), and possibly Robert Finch. Flanigan will prepare a recommendation for you and the Attorney General. The question will be whether to proceed with the \$35,000 pilot project.

At Magruder's request, Bob Marik prepared a summary of the Kennedy simulation system of 1960. A copy of the memorandum is attached with interesting sections marked.

GS:elr

June 10, 1971


MEMORANDUM FOR: JEB S. MAGRUDER

FROM: BOB MARIK 

SUBJECT: SIMULATION

As we approach a decision on simulation for 1972, I thought it might be helpful to summarize the techniques used by Pool and associates for Kennedy in 1960. <sup>1</sup>

At the outset, the voters are categorized into a matrix, or groupings, according to demographics and past voting behavior. For example,



(\*Democrat, Republican, Independent)

Figure 1

The matrix in Figure 1 establishes 135 categories: 3 ethnic/religious categories x 3 political affiliations x 3 demographic patterns x 5 geographic regions.

For each voter category, attitudes on a wide range of issues are determined from past public opinion polls. For example, in the limited matrix of Figure 1, Northeastern urban Catholic Republicans may favor a hard line toward Moscow by 55% to 30%, with 15% undecided. That may have been determined from the results of fifteen different but related questions on several different polls carried out over the past few years. Basic attitudes do not seem to change drastically over time unless some polarizing event has occurred which puts the issue into new perspective.

The behavior of the voting population for a given campaign is determined by an analysis of cross-pressures on voters. That is, the ambivalent voter is defined as the one whose normal voting loyalties are in conflict with the perceived issues or candidate images of the particular campaign. It is the behavior of this voter who decides the outcome.

<sup>1</sup>Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P. Abelson and Samuel Popkin, Candidates, Issues and Strategies: A Computer Simulation of the 1960 and 1964 Presidential Elections, (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1965)

For example, in 1960, assuming that the religious issue was second to party affiliation in determining the vote, a Catholic Democrat had no trouble deciding which candidate to support. A Catholic Republican, on the other hand, felt some cross-pressures and would have been expected to break his traditional voting pattern in some proportion of cases. On the other hand, if a Protestant Democrat had run, instead of JFK, entirely different groups would have become the voters under cross-pressure.

It is possible, by the use of the high-speed capabilities of the computer, to estimate by calculation what the election outcome would be under a certain set of assumptions concerning the sensitive issues. The interesting capability of simulation, according to the 1960 experience, is that it can project reasonably well what the ambivalent voter will do, based on past patterns of attitude and behavior. Head-to-head polls early in the campaign merely measure this voter at various stages of indecision, and therefore only converge upon the eventual outcome as the election nears. They do not project, and do not claim to do so. Neither do they indicate the number of voters under cross-pressures.

In 1960, the simulation "synthesized" individual states by assigning appropriate proportions of various voter categories from regional samples. This was done because there were not enough individuals polled in any one state to yield a sample of adequate size for statistical reliability. Thus, it was assumed that an upper-income Jewish urban Democrat in Boston was statistically similar in attitude and voter behavior to his counterpart in New York City, Philadelphia, Buffalo, etc. That assumption was good enough to allow the simulation model to predict electoral vote outcome about as accurately as it predicted total national popular vote, which was close enough to be useful.

In 1960, the simulation model told Kennedy that the religious issue would not hurt him; that the pro-JFK effect in the close industrial states would more than offset the anti-JFK effect in the Bible Belt and Deep South, where the Democrats frequently had a large margin to begin with. That turned out to be the case. Post-election analysis suggests that the net effect of the religious issue was to give Nixon 1.5 million added votes, but to give Kennedy 10 additional electoral votes.

Another interesting application, done after the election, showed a very different result if the campaign had centered on foreign policy rather than religion. Polls showed that the voters had substantially higher confidence in Nixon than in Kennedy for the conduct of foreign affairs. If Nixon had advocated a tough line toward Moscow, and if Kennedy had advocated a more conciliatory, negotiation-oriented approach (which was essentially the case with Quemoy-Matsu), and if foreign policy had become the dominant issue, the simulation showed Nixon receiving 54% of the popular vote, and winning every state outside of the South.

In 1964, the Democrats did not use the simulation group, but the group ran an election prediction on their own. On the basis of three key issues: civil rights, nuclear responsibility and social welfare, they predicted the LBJ landslide quite well, both nationally and state-by-state.

Application to the 1972 Republican Campaign

I feel strongly that simulation deserves very careful evaluation in our 1972 planning because it can serve so well to re-enforce the techniques we are contemplating for targeting the ambivalent voter. Simulation can be effective at two levels: at the top-level Strategy Committee as one measure of the sensitivity of given issues, and at the operating-level research and field effort to more sharply determine who the target voter is, and on what issues he should be approached. The sophistication of simulation is far greater for the latter purpose than anything we now have, and it might be justifiable on that basis alone - greater dollar effectiveness of target communications. It should be remembered that the value of simulation is not to predict electoral votes, but to suggest what changes might occur and who becomes the ambivalent voter, if given issues become dominant. It can be an effective instrument contributing to action decisions during the campaign.

We currently are thinking in terms of defining the ambivalent voter in terms of past ticket-splitters, or other manifestations of voting behavior. In 1960, however, Republican Catholics probably broke ranks for the first time in any number. In 1964, Republican elderly voters probably become ambivalent for the first time on the conflict between their party's candidate and social security. A data bank that can give us this second-order capability to determine target voters on the basis of issues that actually do become dominant in the campaign would be invaluable. Today, the 1972 issues and the Democratic candidate are not known, so we must design in a maximum of flexibility.

June 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN  
SUBJECT: American Association of  
Political Consultants

This bipartisan group, led by Cliff White and Joseph Napolitan, met for two days to discuss "Surveys--Validity: Are they Being Effectively Used?" Five of the ten presentations deserve brief mention:

1. Burns Roper, who, in spite of his age is quite impressive, made the following points:
  - a. Most candidates mistakenly assume their election is a mandate for all their programs. Instead, polling should be used to indicate which issues should be de-emphasized while in office to assure an accurate mandate for re-election;
  - b. Favorable polls do not have a bandwagon effect; concern for the underdog offsets the bandwagon - Roper's argument is that the polls would always underestimate the lead of the beneficiary of the bandwagon. He cites the 1968 election; if the bandwagon had really been working the polls which showed Humphrey gaining would have underestimated his actual lead in the voters' minds. Roper argues that the bandwagon effect on Humphrey was offset by concern in the closing days for Nixon the underdog.
  - c. The press is remarkably naive in its assessment of polls; the press does not carefully distinguish questions asked, sample size, percentage screened, and other controlling factors;
  - d. Polls always over estimate a splinter candidate's strength because in the polling booth the voter is faced with wasting his vote;
  - e. All polls should be done as part of a series to show trends.

2. Joseph Napolitan, Humphrey's media consultant in 1968, argued that public polls should be relied on to show who is ahead; private polls should be used for issue information for the staff. He criticizes the "locked drawer syndrome" of campaign managers whereby private issue polls are not made available to the campaign staff;
3. Walter DeVries, Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, is very impressive. Cliff Miller has been asked to contact and assess DeVries. His presentation covered:
  - a. Polls can do much more than determine who's ahead. New methods have been developed to assess the public's perception of candidates and voter reliance on media.
  - b. In depth attitude studies show that TV (both news and advertising) is more effective in September and early October because the public is not yet tired of campaign ads. Late October is best for a direct mail effort because lower-middle class voters are impressed with first class letters that appear to be hand typed and signed. Voters above the middle class consider direct mail, however carefully done, "junk mail."
  - c. Today 30% of the population is "independent" and 57% of the population are "ticket splitters." The result is that party labels, organizational affiliation (union, church, occupation, etc.), and demographic characteristics are of decreasing utility in predicting voter behavior.
  - d. Interviews with panel of undecided voters is particularly helpful in assessing media markets. These panel interviews, coupled with daily telephone polling, enabled DeVries to identify the shift from the "social issues" to the economy in early October 1970.
  - e. Young people do not trust the media but believe TV over print.
  - f. TV advertisements are useful in primaries to build an identity, but in the general election the standard "spot" may even be counterproductive. "Documentaries" with the appearance of "news" are more effective when the candidate is known by the public.

4. General Kline, from The Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, discussed the youth vote. He concludes that the 18-20 year old vote "will have very little effect on the 1972 elections." This conclusion is based on their low registration, antipathy among the better educated youths and apathy among the low income, less educated youth voter. However, image is more influential with youth because they tend to be romantic about individuals and dogmatic about issues.
5. Vince Barabba, the Chairman of the Board of Decision Making Information, discussed his substantial involvement with Reagan and his limited involvement with Rockefeller in the 1970 campaign. He also discussed the post 1970 election telephone surveys DMI did for the American Medical Association. California, New York and Minnesota gubernatorial and North Dakota, Texas, Vermont and Wyoming senatorial races were analyzed. Barabba's presentation was very impressive. His points included:
  - a. 72% of the voters saw TV spot ads but only 35% received information which influenced their decision from this source;
  - b. In spite of the criticisms of direct mail, 45% who received it read it;
  - c. A pilot simulation project where DMI created a computer model for the Reagan campaign did not prove particularly useful. Daily telephone interviews over the fifteen months up to the election supplied more believable information;
  - d. DMI is currently analyzing when the voter makes up his mind and will try to correlate this with the timing of media. Colson's office is trying to get this study.
  - e. DMI believes that the better known the candidate the less effective advertising is. From this premise Barabba alluded, in the general meeting, to some "very interesting ideas about how the President should run and which advertising he could use."

GS:elr

**CONFIDENTIAL**

June 14, 1971

**MEMORANDUM FOR:**

**H. R. HALDEMAN**

**FROM:**

**GORDON STRACHAN**

**SUBJECT:**

**Kalmbach Telephone Call**  
**of June 14**

After your meeting Friday with the Attorney General and Herb Kalmbach, several items remained unresolved. Discussion with Mr. Kalmbach today focused on the following:

1) Contributors/ Dinners:

- a) The Camp David Dinner, which was scheduled for this Spring but cancelled, should be reconsidered. The suggested invitees were Clem Stone, Jack Mulcahy, Dick Scaife, Kent Smith, Leonard Firestone, Al Rockwell, John Olin, and DeWitt Wallace.

Dave Parker is submitting a proposal for June 26 at Camp David.

- b) A "B" group contributors' dinner could be held in the last two weeks of July. Kalmbach is preparing a suggested list.

- 2) The Attorney General was going to develop a series of dinners for each state's "Nixon men." Sus Morrison advised Dave Parker today that such a list had not been developed. She suggested that Magruder develop the list for the Attorney General.

Kalmbach is reluctant to get involved unless asked by the Attorney General.

**Recommendation:**

If this subject was not covered in your meetings with the Attorney General on Friday and Monday, Magruder should develop the proposal by June 18.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Comment \_\_\_\_\_

- 3) Kalmbach wonders if the timing of the C. V. Whitney move to Spain was discussed when Bob Hill met with the President on Friday. Nunn has asked Kalmbach to contact Whitney, who is interested in going to Spain in September/October

Whitney can be advised September set \_\_\_\_\_.

Hill's departure date not discussed \_\_\_\_\_.

- 4) Raymond Guest, formerly Ambassador to Ireland, is interested in Bob Ellsworth's position at NATO. Kalmbach wonders whether he should get involved in this transfer. Kalmbach has no reading on Guest's ability or Ellsworth's departure.

Kalmbach approach Guest \_\_\_\_\_.

Kalmbach avoid discussion of NATO with Guest \_\_\_\_\_.

- 5) Kalmbach requests authority to contact Fred Russell (who wants to be Ambassador to Denmark). Colson suggested Kalmbach approach Bill Foley of CBS, and Kalmbach wants your approval.

Approve Russell \_\_\_\_\_.

Approve Foley \_\_\_\_\_.

Other \_\_\_\_\_.

- 6) He has talked to Flanigan about Roche, Townsend, and Ford and will contact them this week.

- 7) Instead of any written description, Kalmbach plans to call weekly and itemize the status of pledges and banked funds. He will begin this Friday and you will receive a memorandum summarizing his description.

GS:elr

June 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Gregg Petersmeyer

You wanted to discuss with the Attorney General the use of Gregg Petersmeyer at Citizens this summer.

Magruder is in favor, but doesn't want to offer him a job without you mentioning it to the Attorney General. Gregg Petersmeyer will be available on June 20.

GS:elr

June 9, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

SUBJECT:

Update of Lee Nunn Memorandum

Concerning the RNC financial situation, Magruder talked to the Attorney General late yesterday and received the following instructions:

- 1) Obtain and review RNC organizational charts and all payroll information;
- 2) Work with Tom Evans in evaluating the RNC's severe cash flow problems;
- 3) Prepare a proposal for the Attorney General regarding Citizens funding of some RNC projects (e.g. film on RN computer work, brochure preparation).

GS:elr

June 8, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN  
SUBJECT: Alabama/Indiana Polls

Discussion with Tom Benham and Harry O'Neill of ORC and Harry Dent and Lyn Nofziger about questions for Alabama and Indiana Polls developed the following questions:

ALABAMA

- 1) Do you approve or disapprove of the way Richard Nixon is handling his job as President?
- 2) Do you believe George Wallace should run for President?
- 3) Has George Wallace done anything about the bussing decision?
- 4) Is the Supreme Court or Richard Nixon responsible for the desegregation decision?
- 5) Between Richard Nixon and George Wallace, who can you count on to minimize bussing?
- 6) If Richard Nixon were the Republican candidate for President, and if George Wallace ran as a third party candidate would Hubert Humphrey have a better chance to be elected?
- 7) Do you believe President Nixon has handled the race question correctly?

- 8) Have President Nixon's Supreme Court appointments been helpful to the South?
- 9) Why does Wallace continue to run for President if he has no chance of winning?
- 10) Trial Heats - with and without:  
Wallace  
Muskie  
Kennedy  
Humphrey

INDIANA

- 1) Do you approve or disapprove of the way Richard Nixon is handling his job as President?
- 2) Do you approve or disapprove of the President's farm program?
- 3) Do you believe the Indiana Republican Party has served Indiana well?
- 4) Has Governor Whitcomb helped or hurt the Republican Party in Indiana?
- 5) Do you believe Senator Birch Bayh should run for President?
- 6) Why does George Wallace of Alabama continue to run for President if he has no chance of winning?
- 7) To which of these two should government policy give the highest priority - ending the Vietnam War or fighting unemployment?

- 8) Do you approve or disapprove of the way Spiro Agnew is handling his job as Vice President?
- 9) Do you believe President Nixon is too Republican Party oriented?
- 10) Trial Heats - with and without Wallace  
Bayh  
Muskie  
Humphrey  
Kennedy

There are ten (10) questions including Trial Heats for State surveys because of ORC telephone line limitations. In nationwide surveys, all lines may be used and the longer interview (15 questions) can be used and still meet the two day interview. The price for a ten (10) question state-wide survey of 500 interviews is between \$3,500-4,000. Slight increases or decreases in the number of questions has no effect on the cost. The optimum number for statewide two (2) day poll or a nationwide one (1) day poll is 10, while the optimum number for a two (2) day nationwide poll is fifteen (15).

GS:elr

June 8, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN  
SUBJECT: In-Depth Poll

A series of discussions with Chuck Colson, Cliff Miller, Larry Higby, and Bob Marik indicate that we should consider an in-depth poll on the public's attitudes. The poll would go after what is really bothering people, what is on their minds, what motivates them, what their concerns and fears are, etc. The poll would emphasize the psychological attitudes rather than a statistical assessment of the peoples reaction to programs or policies.

The results of this survey would be used to correcty position the Administration in the year before the election. Together with the Image Poll and the Domestic Issues Poll this study would serve as the benchmark research for the campaign.

Miller makes the agyument that if we are to spend \$20 million, we can hardly afford not to probe this area in some fashion.

Colson and Miller are so convinced that this study is vital that the following steps have been taken:

- 1) Miller has surveyed hhe consultants and pollsters who could handle this project;
- 2) Colson, Miller, Marik and I met with Lloyd Free, the individual Miller believes to be the best qualified to act as supervising consultant;
- 3) Timing, cost, and feasibility matters have been considered. The project could be completed in 6-8 weeks, and the cost would be \$25-50,000 depending on whether a 750 or 1,500 interview sample were used. As to the feasibility Miller emphasizes that the project has some obvious risks, but he is nevertheless convinced that the project could be successfully completed.

The project could be handled as a Citizens Committee or RNC project to avoid any publicity problem, but would clearly be controlled and directed from this office.

The preliminary survey of the consultants and polling firms indicates that Lloyd Free could be particularly helpful. He served as a polling consultant to Eisenhower and Rockefeller. Free would like to use Political Surveys and Analysts, a Princeton-based outfit that draws on some Gallup resources. This group is headed by Charles Roll, who has worked with Lloyd Free and has his confidence. Free believes he would be useful in developing the questionnaire.

ORC could also be used as the vendor though Miller argues that we have received a great deal of information from them and now would be an appropriate time to get an independent look.

Before proceeding with final checks of vendors and drafts of questionnaires, Colson, Miller, and Higby believe you should consider whether the project deserves the resources.

Recommendation:

The project should be broken down into two stages - the development of a questionnaire and the actual poll. If at the end of the questionnaire development it becomes apparent that the results would be negligible the project would be turned off.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Comment \_\_\_\_\_

GS:elr

June 2, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN  
FROM: GORDON STRACHAN  
SUBJECT: Manuel Giberga: Cuban Refugee Contributions

Lee Nunn called and asked whether it would be appropriate for him to use Manuel Giberga as the financial contact with the Cuban refugees in Florida. Most of the Cubans are concentrated in Dade County (Miami). Both Dent and the RNC have talked to Giberga about non-related subjects and were favorably impressed.

Nunn's question is whether his use of Manuel Giberga should be cleared with Bebe Rebozo, who may already have assumed control of the financial operation among the Cubans.

Herb Kalmbach could not be contacted for his suggestions.

Recommendation:

If Rebozo has established an independent fund-raising operation among the Cubans, it should be brought within the Kalmbach/Lee Nunn structure. Nunn should be given authority to contact Rebozo to cover fund-raising among Cubans and whether Manuel Giberga is the right man to use.

Agree \_\_\_\_\_ Disagree \_\_\_\_\_

Comment \_\_\_\_\_

GS:elr

June 1, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

GORDON STRACHAN

The City Council of San Diego voted this morning to make a dollar bid for the 1972 Republican National Convention. The date offered will be the third week in August.

Bob Dole will approach the Site Selection Committee about journeying to San Diego. Timmons is aware of this bid.

GS:dg