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<td>From RN to Haldeman RE: meetings with Finch, Mitchell, and Dole on RN's political activities in 1971 and early 1972. 3 pgs.</td>
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MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT

I would like for you to have a discussion with Finch and Mitchell prior to the time that you, Dole, Mitchell and I meet after the State of the Union with regard to our long-range political activities.

Let us begin with the proposition that for the whole of 1971 I want to keep my own political activities to an absolute minimum. The tough question will come with regard to what we do in the primary states in 1972. For example, if we have to make a decision to enter the primaries, it will have to be made before the end of 1971 in order to handle the situation in New Hampshire. What I see ourselves being drawn into is a whole year of campaigning in 1972 in New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Oregon, Nebraska and California due to their laws which put candidates' names on the ballots whether they approve it or not. There will be a tendency for some of our people to want us to move in this direction in order to preempt the field. My own view is that if possible I ought to avoid getting involved in any of the primary states, including California, even if it meant that this might open up those states for someone else to get their votes at the Convention. Far more important than getting support in such primary states for the Convention is to allow me to conduct myself in 1972 for as long a time as possible in a way that will help us win the election.

In any event, I will under no circumstances agree to do any campaigning whatever in the primary states. What I am thinking of is going even further: avoiding becoming a candidate at all until shortly before the Convention. I am sure that you can see the great advantages of this approach. Talk this over with Finch and Mitchell and then at a later time we will talk it over in a broader group.
What led me to write this memorandum is the fact that several of those who attended the National Committee reception asked about coming in to see me about the political situation in their states. Greg Evens (sp. ?) for example said he'd like to come in to talk about the situation in South Carolina. Bill Fettridge said that he had written me a letter about Sam Witwer, and I assume that the letter dealt with either Witwer's being used in our campaign or perhaps for some other appointment. When Buz Lukens came in to see me, he talked about the situation in Ohio and his desire to work for us in Ohio.

Taking each of these individuals in order, I should under no circumstances have any discussions with Greg Evens (?) about the political situation in South Carolina and this should be a rule with regard to anybody during the year 1971. You, Mitchell and Finch should find a way, however, to follow up with a fellow like Evens (?) so that he feels that the message is getting through to me. Incidentally, in his case, you will have to determine whether or not Evens (?) and Dent get along. I am not sure that they do.

In the case of Witwer, the Illinois situation requires a very thorough examination of all the power units there. In any event, a fellow like Witwer should be used but it is important immediately as you can see that we have some one man in charge in Illinois so that when I get a question about somebody like Witwer, I will know where to refer it.

In the case of Lukens, as you know, this involves John Andrews, the Ohio political hierarchy and a lot of other wheels within wheels. My general impression of him is about what yours is but, on the other hand, he has a lot of drive, a lot of friends and could probably turn out to be quite useful to us provided it will work out in cooperation with Andrews and others in Ohio. I would like for you to see that all three of these are followed up so that they know that I have passed the information on. Lukens, incidentally, tells me that the County Chairman in Cuyahoga County, Hughes, was the real culprit in the 1970 elections and is bad news as far as we are concerned. My guess is that Andrews is our best contact in Ohio but again let's be sure that we just don't line up with one power faction against another. Lukens, incidentally, also wants to talk about political activities in other states where some of his PR people will be working. Just see that somebody responsible handles him in a proper way.
All of this, of course, points up the necessity at the earliest time possible of having our political situation put down state by state as far as the major states are concerned, in a way that we can use the people who will be helpful to us and keep them from getting me involved.
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

FROM THE PRESIDENT

Sometime ago I pointed up the importance of unmasking Muskie's moderate image and I urged that this particularly be done in the South.

In talking to Billy Graham Sunday he came at this point very strongly and said that Muskie was becoming increasingly acceptable in the South because most southerners thought that he was a moderate, both domestically and in the field of foreign policy.

The purpose of this memorandum is two-fold:

What happened to the suggestion that I made with regard to getting the true facts across in the South?

And, second, can we put somebody on this project now who will follow through on it effectively?

Dent, of course, can be helpful, but I was thinking of somebody on the PR side like Buchanan. And, of course, everything should be worked through Nofziger and Dole. The Muskie record, for example, voting against both Haynsworth and Carswell; his record of opposition on Cambodia and supporting peace groups generally; and anything else that might be helpful in getting the true picture across in the South should be developed as effectively as possible.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Memo to H

I have now had an opportunity to read all the memorandum submitted by members of the staff on the '70 campaign, and the period immediately ahead, and also to bring together some of my own thoughts on those subjects. This memorandum will deal with the problem generally, and in certain cases, quite specifically. You will note that in several instances it will require definite follow-through. Where that is the case, I would like for you to give me a report on what has or has not been accomplished. I do not expect you to follow through in every respect, in most cases it will be a matter of your delegating the project to someone you have confidence in. This brings me to my first recommendation for the next two years.

1. I can think of nothing more important than for you to have four top-notch aides of the quality of Ed Morgan and Colson, who will carry out the policies we may decide are appropriate. I am suggesting here not people who are burdened down as are the Ehrlichman staff— as will be the Ehrlichman staff with the problem of programs. This is the least difficult of our assignments, because programs in one Administration or another will always somehow be handled, sometimes better, sometimes worse, we probably will do them better. But in the final analysis, elections are not won or lost by programs. They are won or lost on how those programs are presented to the country and how all the political and public relations considerations are handled. Ed Moogan is an ideal man for one of these posts—Colson may be, to an extent, for another. Although he may be tied down with too many other assignments. It is vitally important that you get four, or preferably, even five men who are completely selfless, who will swear on a bible that they will never talk to the press under any circumstances and who will work together for our common goals. Each of them should have three or four under them of exactly the same quality with the same commitment. I cannot emphasize too strongly that the major weakness of our WH staff has been the almost unbelievable passion for giving some tidbit to the press. This would be understandable if it were in the Kennedy Administration when the press was friendly. When the press is unfriendly, it is absolutely self-defeating. The latest example of this, of course, was the leak on Romney. This could have only come from someone who had been told about it—probably not in Romney's shop.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

I know although I know that will be the excuse but you will probably hear from members of the staff who were familiar with what we were going to do. It simply wouldn't have served his interests to put it out.

In any event, I emphasize again, able men like Morgan, selfless men who are not seeking anything except to get the job done and completely anonymous men who will only show up in what they do, and not because they are trying to make points with the press by appearing to be in on the know.

This is one of the items I would like for you to report to me personally/

On perhaps within thirty or sixty days as to what men you have selected that we can depend upon for specific assignments who will meet these specifications.

With regard to the memoranda submitted by members of the staff, my first reaction which is most reassuring that - is that each of them has shown in his own way, a great deal of understanding of all the problems involved and has made some significant recommendations which we should consider. I will come next on each of them as we go along in this memorandum, but all in all I think you might well profit by bringing this group together from time to time, probably by having them submit such memoranda in advance and then having a meeting with them without my being present, in which you can distill their major recommendations and adopt a line to be followed. I couldn't agree more that having people in a meeting without forcing them to think the problem thru and putting it down in writing, is useless and a waste of everyone's time. On the other hand, once they have put it down in writing, you can then get four, five, six or maybe seven major issues clearly delineated - bring the whole group together so that they will have a feeling of participation and contribution and discuss the policy to be adopted.

As I consider the memoranda as well as the news columns which are prepared in the news summaries/ and my own reading since the campaign, these conclusions seem inescapable.

1. The rebroadcast of the Phoenix speech was inexcusable, technical error. On this score I have already discussed with you the heart of the problem - never let a speech writer have a vested interest in determining whether that speech is to be used on television. He will always make the wrong decision - even a man as experienced and as devoted to our success as Safire is. The whole press campaign with regard to "tone" and of our activities in 22 states have - has grown out of that one broadcast. For example, several of the press commentators, prior to the time that that broadcast appeared were writing that the P's campaign was very different from the V. P.'s campaign - high-level, no personalities, etc. You will recall that I urged you to get Zieg, Kl et all to emphasize
this point. I know they tried, but obviously they failed to get it across. The fault was not theirs, if the one broadcast allowed all of our enemies of the press to color the entire campaign with that one failure. Completely forgotten was the fact that in state after state I never mentioned a Democratic Senator by name, I never attacked the Democratic Party, I always distinguished on the basis of the issues, as in Utah, in the closing speech, I said over and over again that the choice was between two men who honestly disagreed on those issues. This would have been the lasting impression of the campaign had it not been for the final broadcast and in that connection the technical factor was decisive. The content of the speech that Safire wrote was actually recognized by the press who had been through the traumatic experience at San Jose as was that I had said some things that needed to be said, but as a result of all the technical imperfections our enemies in the press were able to seize on this one booboo and to color our entire campaign efforts with it.

There is a good lesson out of this - apart from the fact that we must never again allow a speech writer have anything to do with production. It is that in this age of television technical quality is probably more important than the content of what is said. We learned this from the first debate with Kennedy and now we have had to relearn it in a less decisive forum in and our handling of this particular matter. The important thing is for us not to brush it off as something that "wasn't all that bad", but to recognize that it was a mistake and to be very sure that kind of mistake is not made again. In that connection, on an urgent basis, I want a full-time television man, even if it costs $100,000 to $150,000 a year to have the best television man. This is the name of the game and it is ridiculous for us to do this on a hit and miss basis as has been the case too often over the past two years. The man from Calif seems to me to be perfectly adequate if he will do the job. If not, we could take Scott, who is unimaginative but at least modestly competent and easy to get along with. This is one of the items that I would like a report on from you as soon as you have a recommendation to make.

3. It would be well to have Ron Z read through these memoranda because he and perhaps Herb Klein as well, could get an idea as to wherewe need to do a more effective job of getting across in a public relations sense our areas of performance. For example, five of the memoranda recommended that the trips to KB and SC to Calif should be taken only when there was some indication that there was some other purpose than going for a vacation. As you know, I have had a concern about this matter for the past year and a half and have emphasized on a number of occasions the necessity for - to build up the "hardworking President. I think that the reaction of all of our staff has been colored by the fact that one booby trap he can
"the President is working too hard". On the other hand, where these people on our staff who should know better, have the impression that we need to create a working image on these trips, than we have obviously failed rather dramatically. This does not pose any particular problem to me, because as time goes on I as f l e m  more and more prefer to go to Camp David for a day or a day and a half than to go all the way down to Fla for two and a half, three days. And of course as far as Calif is concerned, I would under no circumstances consider going there unless it was for a week in which work would be the primary purpose. The problem in handling the trips to Calif and Fla is not great. In the future I simply will not go either to Calif or Fla unless I am satisfied by what Zig is going to put out that a working trip is going to be the outcome in the press. This will be easy as far as Calif is concerned, because we will always have a mtg out there - it should not be too diff as far as Fla is concerned for you can always have a staff mtg or something of that sort and perhaps run a picture with it, if necessary. It will simply mean that I will not go to Fla quite as often - something that is not particularly a problem, due to the fact that I have not found Camp David to be just as relaxing as I pointed out above. But in view of the fact that our trips to Fla and Calif, except for those few times when I fly over to Walkers Cay for 24 hours, have been primarily working trips. Our failure to get across this to the press, and even members of our own staff shows our virtually insurmountable media problem. We have to continue to work on it but the best answer is simply not to give them something to shoot at. I think one mistake we've made is Zig understandable desire to make it pleasant for them in both Calif and Fla - give them plenty of notice - let their families go, etc. In the future in the case of both places, I am going to make decisions at the last moment as to when to go and let them pack their bags and go if they want and then make it a working trip all the way.

The other side of this coin however is more fundamental. I think Zig simply has to do a more effective job of getting out my schedule in terms of its work prospects. Perhaps he should start putting out the time that I start in the morning - he could say that the P began his work day at 8 o'clock in the Residence where he either had brkfst with somebody, or if that were not the case, he worked until 8:30 and was in the office and that he left the office at 7 o'clock at night - that he had dinner for an hour and worked from 8 until midnight in the EOB. I think just putting this out and without any attempt to oversell might have a salutary effect. In any event except for your piece in U.S. News, this idea of the working P has thoroughly failed to get across and we have to take responsibility for that failure since we were aware of what the press was doing to us on this score. Th s should be our easiest public relations problem in 1971
and 1972 because it happens that the facts are 180 degrees different from the myth. It is time for us to recognize that we have completely failed in getting across the facts and have allowed a myth to be built up not only in the press but in the country at large, but one that is so effective that even members of our own staff is concerned about it.

4. The wisdom of our trying to get across our version of the campaign results is shown by the fact that over half of the staff - staff memoes understandably reflect the current mood among the columnists in Washington - that we had "lost" in 1970 - the gain of two in the Senate - the minimal loss of 9 in the House obviously failed to get through to most of the people who listened to the media, including members of our staff, except for the political sophisticates like Chot and Dent this means again emphasis needs to be given to what I have mentioned in several occasions previously, the need for staff members who work and live in Washington and who are constantly exposed to the Washington press corps and the Washington chit chat a balanced point of view. Otherwise they are going to reflect the downbeat attitude of most of Washington to everything that we are doing. We went through this same thing on a much greater scale at the time of Cambodia - not only two of the group submitted memoes on this occasion really supported what we were doing in Cambodia, that does not mean the others were wrong - it simply means that they were completely overwhelmed by the public position of opposition and it has taken them 6 months to recover from it. As a matter of fact the failure of our candidates - the great majority of our candidates to use their opponents' opposition to the Cambodian venture effectively is an indication of how we failed from a public relations standpoint to get this one across. Let me be very fair in point out that the failure is not due to a lack of trying, but to the insurmountable problems we face with the media. Again however we must recognize that our whole staff needs to be bucked up every day or they are going to buy the current media line. That is one of the reasons why I thought that a good editorial or column or some other statement that is circulated virtually daily among members of the staff, with a particular mark on it might be helpful. In addition to that, we need a holler guy on the staff who constantly speaks in an upbeat way about what we are doing - just as we need a holler guy on the Cabinet to do the same - exactly the same thing.

end of tape