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<td>4/13/1972</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>White House Staff</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Higby to Ehrlichman, Price, Chapin, Moore, and Colson RE: Haldeman's request that they read an attached item. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>White House Staff</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Haldeman to &quot;L&quot; requesting that copies of a memo be sent to various White House staffers. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>Domestic Policy</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Higby to Colson RE: helping Bruce Herschenshon. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4/10/1972</td>
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<td>Personal</td>
<td>Letter</td>
<td>From Higby to Cassidy RE: Haldeman's thanks for being invited to a performance of &quot;The Roar of the Greasepaint, the Smell of the Crowd.&quot; 1 pg.</td>
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<td>White House Staff</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Higby to Colson RE: an attached memo from John Dean. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Dean to Higby RE: contributions of ITT employees to Democratic candidates. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Higby to Dean RE: IT&amp;T contributions to Democrats in 1968 and 1972. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>From Higby to Colson RE: strategies to use against the Democratic hopefuls for the presidential nomination. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>From Higby to Dean requesting that the inquiry into the ITT contributions to Democratic candidates be sped up. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Higby to Dean ordering that an analysis of the contributions of ITT employees to Democratic candidates be completed immediately. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>From Higby to &quot;Follow-Up&quot; RE: asking Haldeman for money for a dinner. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>From Higby to &quot;Follow-Up&quot; RE: having Colson look into any connections between the Democrats and big business. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>From Higby to &quot;Follow-Up&quot; RE: making sure that he and Dolores request California absentee ballots. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>From Higby to &quot;Follow-Up&quot; RE: a dinner request by Maurice Stans for eight new people to meet with RN. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>From Higby to Haldeman RE: talking points to discuss with Ehrlichman. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>From Higby to Haldeman RE: reports on various projects and schedules during the campaign. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>White House Staff</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Higby to Haldeman RE: recommendation for various meetings. 4 pgs.</td>
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<td>White House Staff</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Higby to Kehrli asking when the next Hunt race will take place. 1 pg.</td>
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April 13, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:  

JOHN EHRLICHMAN  
RAY PRICE  
DWIGHT CHAPIN  
DICK MOORE  
CHARLES COLSON

FROM:  

LARRY HIGBY

Bob asks that the attached should be forwarded to you for your information and plan.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
FROM: ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT: Campaign Theme

As we begin to focus the campaign exclusively on the general election and as the President increases his travel schedule, I think it important that we develop a central theme or idea for the campaign. It is important that the President's campaign have one central idea -- a message that everyone knows by election day to which various statements and actions can be tied. It does not necessarily have to be a slogan, although one could emerge later. The main point is that the campaign have a central idea or message that the majority of voters find attractive and would support.

Based on my analysis of our first wave data and the other research data I have looked at, I am concerned that the President is viewed as a tactician without an overall strategy or master plan for the country. This causes voters to interpret many of his positions and programs as things done for political expediency or to appease specific special interest groups rather than as part of an overall plan to move this country toward a perceivable set of goals or objectives. A majority of voters do not apparently think the President has such a master plan. No one seems to know how the President would like to leave the country after eight years "for his children and grandchildren."

I think it is imperative for the President and for the campaign to articulate his master plan to the voters and to show how the President's positions and programs fit into the plan. This should become the campaign theme -- the idea that ties everything together.

While this is important for every campaign and every President, I think it is particularly important for this one. It is a relatively well-accepted fact that he does not have any great personal appeal and will not be re-elected on the basis of personality or personal appeal. Moreover, because of the current issue structure and the type of problems he has had to deal with, I think we would have trouble trying to fight the campaign on a series of specific issues.
As an incumbent, the President is always open to the charge that he should have done more. More importantly, the general attitude in the country toward government, and politicians is very negative. If the voters know and understand what the President is trying to do for the country and how each of his programs are a part of that plan, it should be easier to gain support for his programs.

Also, the fact that voters are concerned about more issues now than has been the case in previous campaigns and also because the solutions to many of these problems are complex, it will be difficult for the President to attract the ticket-splitter on the basis of specific issues. Rather, he is going to have to appeal to these swing voters on the basis of a set of well-articulated goals for the country and further showing that his programs are moving the country toward these goals, and that he is more capable of leading the country toward these goals than his opponent.

The essential elements of this theme are what the President believes to be the destiny of the nation and the element of hope. The President could do this well. It would be positively received in the press and it is the type of approach which the public apparently wants and would favorably receive. The President may find that a "destiny speech" is the appropriate vehicle to deliver such a theme. It would allow him to stay on the high road and elevate the level of the campaign. It would be something he could develop and use now as President and yet carry into the campaign. It would give the campaign a common thread with which to tie things together while giving many of his individual statements and positions a prospective which they currently lack, yet be general enough so that the President would not be trapped by events between now and the election.

By giving the voters the idea that he has a master plan, the President would go a long way in solving the credibility problem. If the voters could see his various positions in the context of an overall strategy the President would be less suspect of being political. This approach gives the administration more breadth and depth by tying things together such as China, Vietnam, welfare reform, bussing, economic controls, revenue sharing etc. It would also emphasize the complexity of the job and give us the benefit of being evaluated on the record as a whole.

While I recognize that the President should not get into a position of over promising, and also realizing that anything he says must be believable, I think his basic theme must restore the element of hope. I believe our data clearly shows that the people have lost hope that things can and will get better. More recently, there are indications that the public is looking for someone to restore this feeling of hope and optimism which has characteristically been the American attitude.
I have the feeling that the President has been very close to this idea several times when he has talked about the loss of the American spirit and desire to be number one, but his choice of words has left him just off the mark. Possibly a slight change of words or emphasis could make this basic idea catch hold. Also, I have the feeling that the President has used this approach to defend unpopular positions in the past, such as the SST. He has left the impression that we should strive to be number one so that we will be better than everyone else, not just for the sake of excellence itself. This is a subtle difference which has occurred in our society in the past 10-20 years.

We have the advantage of time to experiment with this approach over the next several weeks while the Democrats are involved with the primaries. The various domestic appearances which the President makes during the spring and summer present an excellent opportunity to try to find the combination of words and ideas that catch. Possibly the President needs a "new" inaugural address to be used on some occasion when people least expect it, such as during a campus appearance or before ethnics. It may be possible to tie this approach to the Bicentennial.
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April 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHUCK COLSON
FROM: L. HIGBY

The McGovern statement that was used in the North Vietnamese news agency release, provides us with a perfect opportunity to really hit McGovern and say that now there can be no question that he was, in fact, aiding and abetting the enemy.

They seemed to question Haldeman's statement when it was put out, but now perhaps they'll believe the official news agency of North Vietnam. This is one line we would probably want to use in really clobbering McGovern on this statement and how he is tied in with the North Vietnamese.

LH:pm
April 24, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHUCK COLSON
FROM: L. HIGBY

As I discussed with you Saturday on the phone, we should be making all efforts possible to assist Bruce Herschenhson into getting scheduled into appropriate forums. He is particularly big in the movie industry and has had some offers from Wolper and would be a very good prospect for us to schedule around the country.

Please contact him directly and see if we can help him out.

LH: kb
April 10, 1972

Dear Mr. Cassidy:

Mr. Haldeman asked me to thank you very much for your letter of March 30 inviting him to attend the opening of "The Roar of the Greasepaint, the Smell of the Crowd", Monday evening, April 17 at 7:30 p.m. He is very pleased to accept your invitation and asked that if possible, four (4) tickets be made available to him for this performance.

Thank you for your thoughtfulness.

Sincerely,

Lawrence M. Higby
Administrative Assistant
to H.R. Haldeman

Mr. Frank Cassidy
Executive Producer
American College Theatre Festival
The John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts
Washington, D. C.

LH:KB:kb
April 6, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL.

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. CHARLES COLSON
FROM: L. HIGBY

I received the attached memorandum from John Dean. Bob asked that we make sure that Winston Morrow's name gets out just like Robatyn's did.

Will you please have someone in your office take care of this.

Thank you.

cc: John Dean

LH:kmt
By your memorandum of March 30 you requested a list of all ITT employees who have contributed to Democratic candidates and the Democratic Party.

A review of the lists of contributors of $1,000 or more that have been released to date by Humphrey, McGovern, Muskie and Lindsay (Jackson has not yet disclosed any names and Wallace's lists are not available) discloses only two such contributors. Felix G. Rohatyn gave a well publicized $2,500 to Muskie's campaign. As you know, Rohatyn is the director of ITT and partner of Lazard, Frere and Co., who had the meetings with Kleindienst on the ITT antitrust cases and who testified at the Senate hearings on this matter. The other contribution was made by Winston Morrow, Jr., Chairman of Avis (an ITT subsidiary), who gave $1,000 to Muskie.

We are still working on your memorandum of April 3 in regard to the 1968 campaign and any further information that we can discover on the current campaign.
DATE: 4/5/72

TO: H. R. Haldeman
FROM: L. Higby

Do you want Colm to get Moreau's name out?  

Sure
April 3, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. JOHN DEAN
FROM: L. HIGBY

Will you please put together, immediately, an analysis of the contributors to the Democratic candidates for 1972 and an analysis of '68 in relationship, particularly to the officers of IT&T and all of its subsidiaries. We need this as soon as possible. As I understand it, you were originally working out the materials in this area, but I am not really sure what is happening here. Will you please give me a call.

LH:knt
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. CHARLES COLSON
FROM: L. HIGBY

Muskie should be attacked as a defeatist, saying that we should not react to the North Vietnamese attack. Senator Tower, for instance, should hit him on this.

We should not let the Muskies, et al, build the line that we should just get out of Vietnam. This shows no concern for POWs or for the protection of the 70,000 GIs who are still there.

We must point out that the President has the responsibility for these people and that our continued withdrawal can only go forward if the South Vietnamese are able to hold. It is totally irresponsible and defeatist to take any other position.

I need to know, tomorrow by noon, what we are doing on this.
Muskie should be attacked as a defeatist, saying that we should not react to the North Vietnamese attack. [Senator Tower, for instance, should hit him on this.]

We should not let the Muskies, et al, build the line that we should just get out of Vietnam. This shows no concern for POWs or for the protection of the 70,000 GIs who are still there.

We must point out that the President has the responsibility for these people and that our continued withdrawal can only go forward if the South Vietnamese are able to hold. It is totally irresponsible and defeatist to take any other position.

HRNikk
April 4, 1972
April 3, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. CHARLES COLSON
FROM: L. HIGBY

Bob asked that you make clear to your press talk contacts that on the Anheuser-Busch deal that came out regarding Humphrey, that Lyndon Johnson is with Augie Busch in the Bahamas right now and that maybe there is something the press ought to explore on the deal in the anti-trust settlement that was made by the Administration with Anheuser-Busch during the Johnson era.

Also, we should be developing some columns from Democrats pointing out that there is a grave threat to Kennedy's candidacy and that he will have a load dropped on him on Chappaquiddick. There should be some attention focused on this publicly now at this time.

LH:knt
April 12, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. JOHN DEAN
FROM: L. HIGBY

Bob has asked again for the '68 contributors, particularly in relation to the officers of ITT and all its subsidiaries to the Democratic candidates. When is this project going to be complete?

LH:kmt
April 3, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. JOHN DEAN
FROM: L. HIGBY

Will you please put together, immediately, an analysis of the contributors to the Democratic candidates for 1972 and an analysis of '68 in relationship, particularly to the officers of IT&T and all of its subsidiaries. We need this as soon as possible. As I understand it, you were originally working out the materials in this area, but I am not really sure what is happening here. Will you please give me a call.

LH:kmt
April 26, 1972

Dear Mr. Ferguson:

I want to thank you very much for your assistance during these past few months in having my name changed. Your efforts are very much appreciated and if I can ever be of any help to you here in Washington, please feel free to call.

Cordially,

Lawrence Mead Higby

Mr. Michael C. Ferguson
Attorney At Law
2000 Center Street, Suite 206
Berkeley, California 94704

bcc: Gordon Strachan

LH:kb
MEMORANDUM FOR: FOLLOW-UP
FROM: L. HIGBY

Follow-up in two weeks, April 28 asking Haldeman for $19.00 for dinner.
April 17, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: FOLLOW-UP
FROM: L. HIGBY

Follow-up with Colson on Tuesday on his project with regard to researching Democratic activities with big business, the idea of contributors to Hubert, the anti-trust projects in progress during the Johnson Administration, use of ITT airplanes.
April 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: FOLLOW-UP
FROM: L. HIGBY

Make sure Dolores and I write requesting absentee ballots for California.

LH:kmt
April 4, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: FOLLOW-UP
FROM: L. HIGBY

Follow-up at the middle of May with Maurice Stans' request for a quiet dinner for eight new people in June with the President.

LH:knt
April 17, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:       H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:                  L. HIGBY

You received a call today from Bob Ellsworth asking if you knew anything about a Mr. William Routh who is being proposed as a member of a foundation of which Ellsworth is a member. He recalls you mentioning something about the fact that Routh is not a good man, particularly in connection with Republican politics in California.

We are having Routh checked out through our apparatus, but if you know anything you care to advise Ellsworth on, please let me know.

LH:kb
April 12, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALEMAN
FROM: L. HIGBY
SUBJECT: Status Report on Bantam Book Publication "The President's Trip to China"

To date, the following items have occurred with regard to the distribution of the book:

1. A copy of the book was sent by Bantam to each of the Republican State Chairmen offering them a bulk rate price.

2. Copies have been distributed to top White House Staff.

3. Copies are being sent to the Nixon State Chairmen by Harry Flemming urging them to make use of this book as a campaign tool.

4. The "Friends of Richard Nixon", the State Youth Directors and the Youth Spokesmen are being asked to distribute the book on campuses and at young voters gatherings.

5. The "November Group" and Lee Nunn are currently considering the use of the book in connection with a thumbing effort aimed at small contributors, e.g. for every five dollar or ten dollar contribution, the donor would receive a copy of the book "The President's Trip to China."

There has not been much success in getting the Republican National Committee to help with this effort, but Colson and his office are going to push very hard here to get cooperation.
Bantam Books are more than willing to cooperate in any effort, on our part, to circulate the book. The book is currently not selling to well and they will sell them to us at 40 cents each, their cost plus shipping. The book retails for $1.50.

Obviously, these efforts aren't satisfactory and I have asked Chuck to hypo this activity considerably. He will have an additional report into you by Friday, including 15 new ideas, that you have requested, on how to move the book in the next month in very large quantities.

The man in charge of this project for Colson is Bill Ratholic and I feel he will do a very good job.

With regard to the other "basic book project", Ratholic is contacting Abplanalp, Mulcahy, and some of our other fat cats who have agreed to buy books and get them to their businessmen to buy them in quantities and mail them out to our various contact lists. He asked if Billy Graham should be included in this list.

I have asked Bill Ratholic to have a report in on the success of this project by Monday, April 17th.

LH: kmt
April 13, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALEDEMAN
FROM: L. HIGBY
SUBJECT: Talking Points/John Ehrlichman

Although you said you didn't need them, attached are a few talking points that I feel it would be useful for you to discuss with Ehrlichman prior to departure.

I don't have any first-hand information, but only a gut feeling that his transition is moving along fairly rapidly with John talking to several people and stirring things up a bit. All this is good, as we have discussed, but we need to build a reliable mechanism for getting done whatever needs to be done, rather than letting one be constructed that isn't reliable. The point made in the President's memo that Ehrlichman should be involved in planning and execution, but not responsible for, nor in charge of it, is an important distinction that I think we should try to carry through as far as possible and is essential in setting this thing up.

LH:kmnt
Introduction - I know that you will be working, during the next few days while we are gone, on the ideas the President mentioned to you in his memo. I have been giving this area some additional thought also, and would like to leave you with a couple of ideas that you might want to ponder while we are gone and that we could discuss next week.

1. I feel that we need to establish some permanent ongoing mechanism for execution and continual follow-up on the key issues that you determine.

2. I know that we tried something like this with Morgan, et al., after the 1970 State of the Union with mixed success. Perhaps, it should be tried again -- this time with a purely political emphasis, involving all our people rather than primarily those from the Domestic Council.

3. I have discussed, briefly, with Fred Malek the need for setting up some type of permanent follow-up mechanism and he tells me that he and Cole have also been giving some thought to this problem.

4. Perhaps the four of us could get together early next week and see if we can't determine a way for this to be done.
April 10, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: L. HIGBY
SUBJECT: Action Memorandum for Planning Projects

Attached are memoranda that get underway the specific areas that we agreed should be underway in the areas of planning. I recommend that you sign them so that we can get these projects moving.

1. Mrs. Nixon/Tricia-Julie Schedule - A memorandum to Chapin and Parker requesting that they submit within two weeks a detailed schedule plan for Mrs. Nixon and the girls between now and the election along the guidelines established in recent meetings and memos on this subject and an operating plan on how this area will be handled on a daily basis for this time period. (Memo attached to Tab A)

2. Vice Presidential Schedule - A memorandum to Chapin asking that he convene an appropriate group for development of a plan to be submitted to you within a week for the use of the Vice President between now and the campaign. The plan is to include the resolution of the problem of the VP's scheduling apparatus and a talking paper for you to use with the Vice President. (Memo attached to Tab B)

3. Surrogate Scheduling Operation - A memorandum to Colson, Chapin, Magruder, Higby asking these people to submit to you a proposal within one week of how surrogate operation will be handled between now and the campaign stressing the fact that it must be all in one place. (Memo attached to Tab C)

4. Hill Support Project - Higby will do talking paper on this to be submitted by Wednesday.

LH:kmt
April 5, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: L. HIGBY
SUBJECT: T.V. in Your Bedroom at Home

A T.V. in your bedroom at home will be picked up by Walker at a time convenient for Mrs. Haldeman and brought here for repairs.

They will put a new television in and also take care of getting some professional service on the television rather than just another Walker repair job.

LH:kmt
April 4, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: L. HIGBY
SUBJECT: John McLaughlin's Comments on Catholic Visits

John McLaughlin now feels that the President should not go to the NCEA event. He says it will elevate our profile with Catholics significantly, but that things will be all downhill from there. He says the President will be making promises that we have no way of fulfilling because nothing is going to happen between now and the election in this issue.

He also indicates that the poll data he has seen indicates that going this far out on a limb may not be that good of a trade-off; that this issue is not necessarily all gravy politically for us.

cc: John Ehrlichman

LH:Kmt
April 4, 1972

Dear Roger:

I was very pleased to note that you had become associated with the law firm of Grossman Smaltz Graven & Perry.

Congratulations and best wishes,

Sincerely,

Lawrence M. Higby
Administrative Assistant
to H. R. Haldeman

Roger H. Howard, Esq.
GROSSMAN SMALTZ GRAVEN & PERRY
One Wilshire Building
Suite 2420
Los Angeles, California 90017
April 3, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: L. HIGBY

SUBJECT: The Next Steps on Reorganization of Scheduling and Follow-up Procedure

Introduction:

Based on our conversation of last week, I have outlined below the strategy I feel would be most appropriate to solve the problems raised in my memorandum to you on March 29th. Obviously there is no perfect solution here, but we should get going now and iron out the details as we move ahead.

--- Planning Follow-up Apparatus. I agree with the basic query you raised about my memo that you can’t formally ordain a group to handle this project, that it must be done on the basis of assigning responsibility to certain individuals and they in turn must meet the responsibility and get the job done. With this in mind, I suggest that you call a meeting of Chapin and Malek and formally lay out for them what you see the primary problem to be; namely, the lack of a concrete and ongoing planning apparatus and the lack of appropriate follow-up mechanisms to handle the plans that come out of the planning apparatus. You would like Chapin to now consider as his primary responsibility, the development of ongoing plans in the PR area for those specific projects and for overall long-range matters and the responsibility of Malek to work out appropriate follow-up operations to make sure that these plans get accomplished. This does not mean that Fred takes over the Colson job, to the contrary, much of this work is and will continue
to be done by Colson. But, in the area of those ongoing projects where the President wants continual follow-up, i.e., bussing, drugs, "Man of Peace", and anti-inflation, it will be Fred's responsibility to set coordinated groups within the White House to make sure these projects are handled.

What I have done above, obviously, is make a division of responsibilities, one I feel is vital. Chapin is not good at follow-up, doesn't like it and won't get it done. Malek's forte is follow-up, but he is weak on PR planning, so let's take the abilities of each and put them together to get the President's work done.

There will be problems in the above, particularly with Ehrlichman. Let's get this thing started with the goal to be naming one man in the White House responsible for these key programs directly to the President and then demanding the results from him. (This is all familiar, but the fact is that it's never been done. I believe it can be, even if you refuse to take on Ehrlichman. If we could get John on board, it would be three times as effective.)

Tell Chapin and Malek you want their specific proposals for action to you by this Friday (April 7).

-- Scheduling of Mrs. Nixon and the Girls. The main problem here is beefing-up this effort, something that will be accomplished through the inclusion of the new scheduling girl, plus the additional back-up that she will be receiving. Chapin should be told that you want the planning group to take a serious look at Mrs. Nixon's, Julie's, and Tricia's schedule, and come up with a plan that is logical and feasible for increasing their activities, particularly in the key states as the President outlined, and as you have already instructed that he and Parker do in an earlier memorandum. It won't be necessary for Malek to follow-up in this area. This is something that should be assigned to Mrs. Nixon's and the girls' new schedule coordinator. The actual staff work will be done by the schedule coordinator with Chapin's group serving as a creative and review source.
-- Cabinet Activities. The planning group that Chapin is responsible for should be made responsible for the coordination of development and review of plans in this area also. However, a separate and distinct follow-up apparatus needs to be set up to get this job done. I recommend that Fred Malek be charged with setting this up. Tell Fred that it is your thinking that we should being O'Donnell in and have him set up an independent apparatus to handle creative scheduling of the Cabinet Officers, based on political necessities and realities, rather than on the concept of filling invitations as the Speaker's Bureau does. The main drawback to doing this will be the dispute that exists between 1701 and the White House on all scheduling matters. It is my feeling that these Cabinet Officers should be handled here, but Fred should review this with all the appropriate parties before making a final recommendation.

The other key change here is the idea of bringing in one or two advance men from Chapin's operation. It doesn't make sense for our people to be scheduled all over, i.e., some being scheduled from 1701 and some being scheduled from here. We should divide our scheduling on the basis of priorities, having the highest priorities handled on a first class basis with advance men, etc., probably under O'Donnell; and a secondary speaker's bureau operation maintained to fill all the other requests.

This is not something that should be handled directly by Chapin's office. The need here is for an independent agency with the responsibility for handling this specific project.

-- The Vice President. Chapin's planning group should be assigned the responsibility of producing a plan for how we use the Vice President over the next eight months and a talking paper for you to use in selling that plan for the Vice President. The talking paper should cover the point of the need for scheduling mechanisms that include a first class man in charge. How you handle this with the Vice President should be specifically covered in the talking paper. Malek
may be able to help Chaplin here in terms of finding the right man. Although, once again, I would think that one of the people that we currently have in the President's advance operation may be the best solution when viewed in the context of the next eight months.

-- Greater Hill Support -- This is one that I would like to see you handle directly with Colson and MacGregor. I could prepare a necessary talking paper if you feel it could be done. The other way to handle it is simply to give Colson the charge and tell him you want to bust it up, particularly in MacGregor's area to make sure this is done. It probably will get done in some fashion, but may not present you with a very good long-range result. Whatever your decision is here, I will prepare a talking paper accordingly.

**Conclusion**

What I have done is prepare a meeting schedule as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1       | Chapin/Malek/Higby | a. Planning and follow-up apparatus  
b. Reorganization of Cabinet scheduling  
c. Mrs. Nixon/Girls schedule |
| 2       | Vice President/Haldeman (Chapin) | a. Use of Vice President for next 6-8 months |
| 3       | Colson/MacGregor/Timmons | a. Hill Support |

This looks like the typical "have Haldeman do it" plan. What each meeting does, however, is assign clear responsibility for the solution of these problems to the people that can get the job done. I recommend that we get moving on it now. We can and will need to make alterations as we go along. The key responsibility in a sense will fall on me to hammer over and over for results until it is going right.
April 26, 1972

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL.

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRUCE KEHRLI
FROM: L. HIGBY

When is the next Hunt race?

LH:kb