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8	7	10/26/1971	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Finch to RN RE: ramifications of the 1970 midterms for the next presidential election, as well as in-depth breakdowns of voter trends. 22 pgs.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 26, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT H. FINCH *RF*

SUBJECT: What the 1970 Election Response  
Now Means for 1972

<u>Contents:</u>	<u>Page</u>
I. Trends, highlights, and results related to the 1972 framework	2
II. The 1970 returns, in votes for Congress by states, and in past support of Nixon for President	4
III. In the 1970 election, support of which by whom? Breakdown of House and Senate support, based on a November-December 1970 voting behavior study	5
male-female	
black-white	
age	
education	
income	
union/non-union	
party	
religion	
IV. Voter attitude comparisons on Presidential and Vice Presidential principals, November-December, 1968 and November-December, 1970	7
V. Which groups showed what support (intensity of like or dislike) for which principals in November-December, 1970?	9
VI. Suggestions for action	11
VII. Tabs	

I. MEANING OF THE 1970 ELECTION FOR 1972

The 1970 election does not afford an overall basis for the planning of the 1972 campaign. The usual number of claims and counterclaims followed within a month after the election and were of concern then. They may be again when individual states and their electoral prospects are examined. But these peculiarities, and those news commentaries about which senator or governor was elected and who was defeated should not obscure the basic national trends that apparently will be present in 1972.

In this memo, there is little consideration of campaign funding or campaign organization -- two other important parts of the whole campaign process. These data refer only to voter reaction and returns. The other sides of the triangle should get full attention too, of course, using other information sources.

Looming over all is the voting population explosion, and the thought that the turnout may be eighty million in 1972, and forty-one million or more of these must be Nixon voters (Tab A).

Highlights in this report are:

- The 1970 House and Senate elections reverted to party proportions. While many GOP governors were defeated, the gubernatorial returns were somewhat more favorable. Here is further evidence that in the 1972 Presidential campaign, the emphasis must be on the Nixon record, leadership, and on issues; and not on the party.
- The hardening of the Black vote. Evidence indicates that it is heavily non-Republican and non-Nixon in the North, but less non-Nixon in the South.
- The Jewish vote remained heavily Democrat.
- The union vote remained heavily Democrat.

- In 1972, unless there are significant changes in issues and policies, a Wallace candidacy can hardly get off the ground. There are only small pockets of strong support for him. Wallace now has nuisance value, and that's about all.
- The educational revolution increases voter concern with issues and policies. Voters are increasingly informed, and opinionated. Appeal to their individuality can be effective.
- Because the President is now so well known, and because only a few voters remain neutral on him as a person, his campaign efforts should be at an absolute minimum, at least until October of 1972. Having already covered fifty states puts "a" lot of hay in the barn."
- Presidential emphasis can be on issues, on conduct of the Office of the Presidency, and on the handling of economic and foreign affairs.
- The opposition will need to catch the President (not the party), and to carry its campaign to him.
- The ingredients are there for considerable Nixon gains, in the South. These may not be party gains, but "issue" and President Nixon gains.

## II. THE 1970 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION RETURNS (Tab B)

Altogether the House returns came out about 45% Republican and 53% Democratic. In the Senate races, the Republican plus the conservative (Buckley) vote came to 46.5% and the Democrat plus Independent (Byrd of Virginia and Dodd) votes total 53.5%.

Slightly more favorable to the GOP, the combined Republican/Conservative vote for gubernatorial candidates came to 52.7% compared to 47.3% Democrat.

In Congressional voting, then, the Democrats had a plurality of about four and a half million votes.

Converted into electoral college results, for 1972, the 1970 House vote gave the Republicans thirteen states, and the Democrats thirty-seven plus the District of Columbia. The thirteen states can cast 83 electoral votes in 1972 (Tab C). It should be noted that the best electoral college showing produced by this method of tabulation (247 votes based on 1966 House results) fell quite short of the 270 needed for a bare electoral college majority.

To assist in 1972 planning, the states have been ranked according to the number of times they have given a plurality of their votes to House candidates (Tab D). The number of 1972 electoral votes for each state also appears, as does each state's electoral college record in the Nixon (1960 and 1968) Presidential elections. (The lower House tallies are used because they are regular and recur nationwide every two years. They do not vary as do gubernatorial and senatorial contests, and they are not usually affected by heavy media or other outside efforts.)

In 1970 only one of the thirteen states that had a plurality of GOP congressional votes was a large state. Ohio, which will have 25 electoral votes in 1972, stood alone. The other twelve were small states with Iowa (8 votes) the largest of these (Tab D).

All thirteen of these states voted for Nixon in 1960 and 1968, and all but two of them (Delaware and New Mexico) did so in 1960. Only one of them (Arizona) voted for Goldwater in 1964.

For planning purposes it can also be remembered that eleven states have not voted Republican in the last four House elections, and did not vote for Nixon in 1960 or 1968 (Tab E). They appear to lack party bases which can cope with the opposition on national or federal matters, and they also appear to lack an affinity with the President.

III. IN 1970, SUPPORT BY WHICH GROUPS?

A reliable voting behavior study that went into the field in November and December 1970 produced these results: (Tab F)\*

- A. Women continued to vote a bit more Democrat than did men. They also did so in 1968 (Dem. 45%, Rep. 43%, Wallace 12% according to Gallup). For women there was no change in '70. For men, return to party was more pronounced in 1970.
- B. In 1970 the national black vote for Congress stayed rigidly just where that vote was in the 1968 Presidential election.

	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Wallace</u>	<u>Cons.</u>
1968 Pres.	85%	12%	3%	--
1970 House	87	13	--	--

The 1970 black vote for senator was almost all Democrat.

The black vote continues to be Democratic property. Given this complete commitment, reduced black turnout or neutralization of black issues must be considered.

- C. Among the age groups, only those 65 and over gave a majority to the Republicans, and that in the House only. For the Senate, this age group followed all the others in showing preference for Democrat candidates. This decision by those over 65 may have been issue oriented.

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\*The next eight paragraphs are supported by Tab F.

D. As usual, those with more education tended to vote Republican a bit more. But not as much in 1970 (college graduates and post graduate were Dem. 49%, Rep. 51%) as in 1968 (college educated were Dem. 37%, Rep. 54% and Wallace 9% -- Gallup). Significant here are results for the 1970 "some college education" category, which includes junior and community colleges as well as two-year technical schools. For this group the returns were 55% - 45% Republican in House returns. This was not matched in 1970 Senate results which were 54% - 39% Democrat with Conservative 7%, but a like tally of 1970 gubernatorial voting showed the "some college education" group at 60% - 40% Republican. There is support here for cultivating the junior college--community college--state teachers college groups, including their alumni.

Among those with just grade school and some high school education, Republicans did not do well. Blacks and Spanish speaking, the early dropouts, appear to be included in these returns.

- E. In terms of 1970 family income, the House results for those who earned \$4,000 to \$7,400 for the year were identical with the results for those who completed high school (52% - 48% Democrat). The lower income group, below \$4,000, and the higher income group, \$7,500 to \$14,900, were each heavily Democrat. Only in the \$15,000 per year and over bracket did the House returns favor the Republicans. The returns for Senate seats remained Democrat (Dem. 51%, Rep. 44%, Cons. 4%) for this high income group, however.
- F. Union membership explains itself. Union households went heavily Democrat, 65% - 35%, while non-union households went but slightly so, 52% - 48%. It should be remembered here that non-union households are three to one in the majority.
- G. Voting responses are tied directly to party identification. Strong Democrats voted 91% Democrat while strong Republicans voted 96% GOP. In the middle came the Independent. Their return of

Dem. 52%, Rep. 48% in House elections and Dem. 56%, Rep. 42%, Cons. 2% for the Senate gave Republicans too little support. Figures in the Party Identification category also show that party cohesion was stronger for the Republicans in House voting, but stronger for the Democrats in Senate voting. Republicans tended more to cross party lines in Senate races. The relationships shown here do emphasize the importance of party affiliation in a mid-term election.

H. The Republicans did not win favor in any "religion" category, in either the congressional or the senatorial races. Should these figures be a true representation, the party is embarrassed. In particular, the Catholic and Jewish tallies should be noted, particularly for the Senate.

	<u>Congressional Vote</u>		<u>Senatorial Vote</u>		
	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Cons.</u>
Protestant	52%	48%	53%	45%	2%
Catholic	58	42	68	25	7
Jewish	86	14	87	13	0
Other or None	68	32	72	28	0

Catholics did vote Conservative in greater proportion than did those of other faiths, but the total shift had little electoral significance, because over two-thirds of the Catholics remained in the Democrat column in the Senate races. In proportions, the Catholic vote is not quite 30% of the size of the Protestant vote. The Jewish vote is about 5% as large as the Protestant vote.

IV. ATTITUDES ON PRESIDENTIAL PRINCIPALS, 1968 and 1970

National surveys of intensity of feeling for or against each principal or candidate were conducted after the 1968 election and after the 1970 election. On a 0-100 degree scale (thermometer) each interviewee indicated his feeling toward each candidate. A mark at fifty or thereabouts indicated neutrality. A mark above or below showed, respectively, like or dislike and the degree thereof. The results are shown on Tab G.

They show:

- A. The President in first place in average (mean score) with Muskie slightly behind. But both declined from 1968 to 1970. In fact, most mean scores declined from 1968 to 1970.
- B. First choices are significant here because a first choice translates into a vote. The President has confirmed his position of leadership, and Senator Kennedy, according to this approach, is his closest competitor. Muskie and Humphrey lack the hard core support a strong first choice showing will indicate.

Except for Wallace, Senator Kennedy has a high score in "last choice" mentions, while Muskie is not greatly disliked. For the President, last choice mentions increased slightly, as they did for Humphrey from 1968 to 1970.

The neutral score combined with the "don't know" score will indicate, roughly, just how much of the electorate remains undecided on a candidate and is therefore "persuadable" through campaigning. The lower the total (17% for the President) the less effect campaigning may have. Presently Muskie can win people to his side, and he is apparently following that strategy. For Ted Kennedy, however, there are few "neutrals" or "don't knows" to win. Instead he must attack the President and the Administration. He is doing that with help from McGovern.

The results here again indicate that the President can gain little from aggressive campaigning at this time or in the immediate future, all things remaining equal. He may best serve political purposes by stressing leadership and administration at home and particularly abroad.

The Democratic contenders and the eventual Democratic candidate will need to carry the campaign to the people and against the Administration.

V. PARTISAN AND DEMOGRAPHIC SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENTIAL PRINCIPALS, NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1970 -- includes 18-22 year olds

The sources of candidate strength, or weakness, appear in these columns (Tab H). The President leads because of his strength with Republicans and Independents. In contrast to the Congressional results, 52% to 48% Democrat, the President led the field of candidates in Independent support at the end of 1970. The rank order is as follows:

Rank Order According to Partisan Support

	<u>Republicans</u>	<u>Independents</u>	<u>Democrats</u>
	Nixon 81	Nixon 58	Kennedy, E. 64
LIKE	Reagan 65	Muskie 54	Muskie 64
	Agnew 60	Reagan 52	Humphrey 61
	Lindsay 51	Lindsay 51	Lindsay 53
50%			McGovern 51
	Muskie 48	Agnew 47	McCarthy 48
	McCarthy 39	Humphrey 45	Nixon 47
DISLIKE	Humphrey 37	Kennedy, E. 45	Reagan 44
	McGovern 37	McGovern 45	Agnew 37
	Kennedy, E. 33	McCarthy 44	Wallace 30
	Wallace 30	Wallace 35	

It is noteworthy that Lindsay had slightly more appeal to Democrats in late 1970 than to either Independents or Republicans.

Among the potential very young voters, Edward Kennedy ranks high, but Muskie and the President are not that far behind, nor is Lindsay in this tabulation.

18-22 year olds (candidate rank order)

	E. Kennedy	64
	Muskie	57
LIKE	Nixon	56
	Lindsay	55
	McCarthy	54
50%	McGovern	51
	Humphrey	48
	Reagan	47
DISLIKE	Agnew	38
	Wallace	35

To reopen the question of the President's strength in the North and in the South, these figures apply:

	<u>Northern Whites</u>		<u>Northern Blacks</u>
	Nixon 60		Kennedy, E. 87
	Muskie 60		Humphrey 72
	Lindsay 53		Muskie 67
	Reagan 52		Lindsay 61
	Humphrey 50		McGovern 53
50%			McCarthy 52
	Kennedy, E. 49		Reagan 37
	McGovern 47		Nixon 35
	Agnew 46		Agnew 22
	McCarthy 46		Wallace 9
	Wallace 28		

The attitude distance between whites and blacks in the Northern areas on the President is considerable. So is the distance between whites and blacks on Senator Kennedy, but the blacks are highly favorable to him and the whites are reserved.

In the South, however, the profiles change. While the black support for Kennedy increases slightly, the black antagonism to the President disappears. Simultaneously his support from whites increases, while white favor for Muskie, Humphrey and Kennedy declines.

	<u>Southern Whites</u>		<u>Southern Blacks</u>
	Nixon 61		Kennedy, E. 92
	Reagan 53		Humphrey 81
	Agnew 50		Muskie 61
			Lindsay 53
50%			Nixon 50
	Muskie 48		McCarthy 49
	Lindsay 48		McGovern 46
	Wallace 47		Reagan 45
	Humphrey 41		Agnew 34
	McCarthy 40		Wallace 12
	McGovern 40		
	Kennedy, E. 39		

In these rankings, the nuisance effect of a Wallace candidacy is clear. His support at the end of 1970 is about identical with what it was in 1968. His candidacy in 1972 would draw from the President, and probably more so than from Kennedy, Muskie, or Humphrey. This would be particularly true in the South, of course.

VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTION

All of the studies alluded to here and others as well indicate increased volatility in the electorate. The disparities between House and Senate election returns may be sought in this discerning judgment. The coming of age of the post World War II youngsters, most of whom are better educated has an effect, and so now may the 18 year old vote to a limited extent. Alongside this is the decline in party membership, loyalty and association. Increasingly voters, particularly young voters, are declaring themselves as Independents (Tab I).

More to the Republican point, there is statistical evidence which relates an increased feeling of "personal competence" to increased turnout and increased Republican voting. Emphasis on the individual as a voter who can comprehend government issues and who can make a difference can increase 1972 electoral support for the President.

The current postures of the Democrats who seek nomination are in line with the results shown in these tabulations. For example, Senator Muskie needs to convince the many who are uncommitted on him, and to prove he is in command. He probably will not make an all-out attack on the Administration itself until late. In contrast Senator Kennedy needs to hold his large dedicated group, to avoid antagonizing further those who dislike him and to establish himself as the Administration-killer. Because Lindsay has few enemies outside New York, apparently his only strategy is to try to establish himself as a compromise candidate.

The President needs to maintain his position with the Independents and increase his hold there. Large gains in the Black vote cannot be expected. Low Black turnout should be sought -- perhaps by defusing Black issues.

Obviously, if the Wallace campaign can be minimized, the President may make key gains in the South, particularly if the Democratic nominee is not appreciated there.

The need to overcome the numerical advantage of the Democrat Party is clear. The appeals which will be based on the role and achievements of the President should be accompanied by an emphasis on the ability of each voter, as an individual, to think and choose for himself because he, as a citizen, can make a difference.

The President's high order of stewardship for the nation should be the keystone for the coming campaign. No other theme should be allowed to replace the primary emphasis on that stewardship at home and abroad.

The secondary theme (carried by others for the time being) should be to lay a solid foundation of irresponsibility on the part of the Democrats in Congress for failing to respond to the President's leadership.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: RETURNS AND FORECAST 1960-1972

1960 ELECTION			68.3 million votes
49.9%	Nixon	34,108,546	
50.1	Democrats	34,227,096	(J. Kennedy & H. F. Byrd)
1964 ELECTION			70.3 million votes
38.6	Goldwater	27,176,799	
61.4	Johnson	43,126,506	
1968 ELECTION			73.0 million votes
43.6	Nixon	31,783,783	
42.9	Humphrey	31,271,839	
13.5	Wallace	9,899,557	
1972 ELECTION (estimates)			80.0 million votes (est.)
51.25	Nixon	41,000,000	76 million aged 21 and over plus 4 million
48.75	Democrat	39,000,000	aged 18 to 21 (36.3% of 11 million eligible)
<u>With Wallace Running Strong</u>			
47.5	Nixon	38,000,000	
46.25	Democrat	37,000,000	
6.25	Wallace	5,000,000	

1970 NATIONAL VOTE BY PARTY  
FOR CONGRESS, SENATE, AND GOVERNOR

		<u>Per cent</u>	<u>Plurality</u>
CONGRESS			
Republican	24,339,240	45.1	
Democrat	28,841,106	53.4	4,501,866 (D)
Other	<u>832,500</u>	1.5	
TOTAL	54,012,846		
SENATE			
Republican	19,471,069	41.6	
Democrat	24,276,217	51.8	4,805,148 (D)
Conservative	2,276,321	04.9	
Independent	<u>809,294</u>	01.7	
TOTAL	46,832,901		
GOVERNOR			
Republican	20,479,892	51.6	1,734,061 (R)
Democrat	18,745,831	47.3	
Conservative	<u>424,476</u>	01.1	
TOTAL	39,650,199		

PER CENT REPUBLICAN OF TOTAL VOTE FOR HOUSE CANDIDATES, 1960-1970

1960	45.0%
1962	47.7
1964	42.5
1966	48.7
1968	48.9
1970	45.6

NUMBER OF STATES HAVING A REPUBLICAN PLURALITY OF TOTAL CONGRESSIONAL (HOUSE) VOTE, 1964-1970

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of States</u>	<u>Total of 1972 Electoral Votes, All Such States</u>
1964	9	50
1966	23	247
1968	25	235
1970	13	83

1970 NATIONAL ELECTION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

States Whose Voters Cast More Votes for Republican Candidates

<u>1972 Electoral Votes</u>	<u>State</u>
6	Arizona
7	Colorado
3	Delaware
4	Idaho
8	Iowa
7	Kansas
5	Nebraska
4	New Hampshire
4	New Mexico
3	North Dakota
25	Ohio
4	Utah
<u>3</u>	<u>Vermont</u>
83	13

In Arkansas more GOP than Democrat votes were cast in the one House contest, but three Democrats were unopposed.

STATES DISTRIBUTED ACCORDING TO TIMES WHEN THEIR VOTERS CAST  
 MORE REPUBLICAN THAN DEMOCRAT VOTES FOR CONGRESSIONAL (LOWER HOUSE) SEATS

Last Four Congressional Elections: 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970

No. of Times Republican Plurality	Electoral Votes	Cast Electoral Vote for Nixon(N)	
		1960	1969
1. In all four elections 64-70			
Kansas	7	N	N
Nebraska	5	N	N
Idaho	4	N	N
North Dakota	3	N	N
Vermont	3	N	N
	<u>22</u>		
2. In 1966, 68 and 70 (not 64)			
Ohio	25	N	N
Iowa	8	N	N
Arizona	6	N	N
New Hampshire	4	N	N
Utah	4	N	N
Delaware	3	0	N
	<u>50</u>		
3. In 1964, 66 and 68 (not 70)			
Montana	4	N	N
South Dakota	4	N	N
	<u>8</u>		
4. In 1968 and 70 (not 64 nor 66)			
Colorado	7	N	N
*Arkansas	6	0	0
New Mexico	4	N	N
	<u>17</u>		
5. In 1966 and 68 (not 64 nor 70)			
California	45	N	N
Illinois	26	0	N
New Jersey	17	0	N
Indiana	13	N	N
Wisconsin	11	N	N
Minnesota	10	0	0
Tennessee	10	N	N
Oregon	6	N	N
Alaska	3	N	N
Wyoming	3	N	N
	<u>144</u>		
6. In 1966 only (not 64 nor 68 nor 70)			
Pennsylvania	27	0	0
Michigan	21	0	0
	<u>48</u>		
7. In 1964 only (not 66 nor 68 nor 70)			
Alabama	9	0	0
8. No G.O.P. plurality in any of last four Congressional elections			
New York	41	0	0
Texas	26	0	0
Florida	17	N	N
Massachusetts	14	0	0
North Carolina	13	0	N
Georgia	12	0	0
Missouri	12	0	N
Virginia	12	N	N
Louisiana	10	0	0
Maryland	10	0	0
Kentucky	9	N	N
Washington	9	N	0
Connecticut	8	0	0
Oklahoma	8	N	N
South Carolina	8	0	N
Mississippi	7	0	0
West Virginia	6	0	0
Hawaii	4	0	0
Maine	4	N	0
Rhode Island	4	0	0
Nevada	3	0	N
	<u>237</u>		
9. District of Columbia	3	-	0
	<u>538</u>		
		TOTAL	

\*few contests, scattered elections

TAB E

STATES WHICH HAVE NOT VOTED REPUBLICAN IN THE LAST FOUR HOUSE ELECTIONS, AND DID NOT VOTE FOR NIXON IN 1960 OR 1968

<u>State</u>	<u>1972 Electoral Votes</u>
New York	41
Texas	26
Massachusetts	14
Georgia	12
Louisiana	10
Maryland	10
Connecticut	8
Mississippi	7
West Virginia	6
Hawaii	4
Rhode Island	<u>4</u>
	142

Alabama and Arkansas can be added to this group. Their ventures into voting for Republican congressmen have been just about that so far.

TAB F

These figures on Congressional and Senatorial vote and Congressional turnout relate to various demographic, socio-economic and political factors. The results are based on in-depth interviews with a selected national cross section of 1513 citizens of voting age. Interviewing took place after the election, during the months of November and December, 1970. The study was another in the regular series which the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan has conducted since 1948.

N = weighted number of interviews and shows relative size of each category.

	<u>Congressional Vote</u>			<u>Senatorial Vote</u>			
	<u>%</u> <u>Dem.</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Rep.</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Dem.</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Rep.</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Con.</u>	<u>N</u>
1. <u>Sex</u>							
Male	54	46	(390)	60	38	2	(340)
Female	56	44	(427)	59	37	4	(402)
2. <u>Race</u>							
White	53	47	(767)	57	40	3	(700)
Negro	87	13	( 52)	97	1	1	( 44)
3. <u>Age</u>							
Under 35	57	43	(193)	58	37	5	(167)
35-44	58	42	(143)	64	35	2	(145)
45-54	54	46	(171)	59	37	4	(153)
55-64	59	41	(158)	64	35	2	(135)
65 and over	45	55	(148)	53	43	3	(139)
4. <u>Education</u>							
Grade School	66	34	(161)	65	34	1	(147)
Some High School	66	34	( 98)	72	27	1	( 88)
High School Completed	52	48	(287)	59	36	4	(253)
Some College	45	55	(130)	54	39	7	(125)
College and Post Graduate	49	51	(142)	50	48	2	(130)

	<u>Congressional Vote</u>			<u>Senatorial Vote</u>			
	<u>%</u> <u>Dem.</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Rep.</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Dem.</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Rep.</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Con.</u>	<u>N</u>
5. <u>1970 Family Income</u>							
Under \$4000	68	32	(125)	70	29	1	(108)
\$4000-\$7400	52	48	(151)	56	43	1	(145)
\$7500-\$14900	56	44	(345)	63	33	4	(310)
\$15000 and over	44	56	(170)	51	44	4	(161)
6. <u>Household Union Membership</u>							
One or more members	65	35	(194)	67	30	3	(200)
No union members	52	48	(615)	57	40	3	(536)
7. <u>Party Identification</u>							
Strong Dem.	91	9	(191)	99	1	0	(166)
Weak Dem.	77	23	(174)	85	13	2	(153)
Indep. Dem.	75	25	( 68)	84	16	0	( 70)
Independent	52	48	( 71)	56	42	2	( 73)
Indep. Rep.	35	65	( 62)	31	65	4	( 59)
Weak Rep.	17	83	(143)	19	73	8	(135)
Strong Rep.	4	96	(107)	6	88	7	( 88)
8. <u>Religion</u>							
Protestant	52	48	(578)	53	45	2	(481)
Catholic	58	42	(167)	68	25	7	(171)
Jewish	86	14	( 25)	87	13	0	( 36)
Other or none	68	32	( 46)	72	28	0	( 54)

SUMMARY OF 1968 AND 1970 CANDIDATE THERMOMETERS

Principal (Candidate)	Mean Score		First Choice Mentions <sup>a</sup>		Last Choice Mentions <sup>a</sup>		Neutral (50° scores)		Don't Know		Standard Deviation	
	1968	1970	1968	1970	1968	1970	1968	1970	1968	1970	1968	1970
Nixon	66.5	59.0	36%	38%	8%	14%	16%	16%	1%	1%	23	28
Muskie	61.4	57.0	16	20	10	10	31	26	8	17	22	26
Lindsay <sup>b</sup>	--	51.8	--	9	--	11	--	31	--	21	--	23
Reagan	49.1	51.6	5	14	17	14	34	25	5	9	22	26
Kennedy, E. <sup>b</sup>	--	50.3	--	26	--	28	--	13	--	2	--	33
Humphrey	61.7	49.9	25	18	13	19	14	20	1	3	27	27
Agnew	50.4	45.9	4	13	13	26	41	18	7	4	21	28
McGovern <sup>b</sup>	--	45.5	--	4	--	12	--	40	--	36	--	22
McCarthy	54.8	44.3	11	6	14	17	32	33	5	17	23	24
Wallace	31.4	31.7	11	12	62	54	13	14	2	6	31	32

<sup>a</sup> These columns add up to more than 100 percent because a respondent could give the same highest or lowest score to several principals.

<sup>b</sup> Ratings were obtained for this principal in only one of the two election years.

DEMOGRAPHIC AND PARTISAN BASES OF CANDIDATE SUPPORT

Overall Average	Candidate	Demo- crats	Inde- pendents	Repub- licans	18-22 year olds	North- ern Whites	North- ern Blacks	South- ern Whites	South- ern Blacks
59	Nixon	47	58	81	56	60	35	61	50
57	Muskie	64	54	48	57	60	67	48	61
52	Lindsay	53	51	51	55	53	61	48	53
52	Reagan	44	52	65	47	52	37	53	45
50	Kennedy, E.	64	45	33	64	49	87	39	92
50	Humphrey	61	45	37	48	50	72	41	81
46	Agnew	37	47	60	38	46	22	50	34
46	McGovern	51	45	37	51	47	53	40	46
44	McCarthy	48	44	39	54	46	52	40	49
32	Wallace	30	35	30	35	28	9	47	12

Source: Jerrold Rusk, Purdue University &  
Herbert F. Weisberg, University of Michigan:  
"Perceptions of Presidential Candidates:  
A Midterm Report" (mimeo, September, 1971)

The Distribution of Party Identification in the United States,  
1952-1970

Question: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (IF REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT) Would you call yourself a strong (R)(D) or a not very strong (R)(D)? (IF INDEPENDENT) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?"

	<u>Oct.</u> <u>1952</u>	<u>Oct.</u> <u>1954</u>	<u>Oct.</u> <u>1956</u>	<u>Oct.</u> <u>1958</u>	<u>Oct.</u> <u>1960</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1962</u>	<u>Oct.</u> <u>1964</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1966</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1968</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1970</u>
<u>Democrat</u>										
Strong	22%	22%	21%	23%	21%	23%	26%	18%	20%	20%
Weak	25	25	23	24	25	23	25	27	25	23
<u>Independent</u>										
Democrat	10	9	7	7	8	8	9	9	10	10
Independent	5	7	9	8	8	8	8	12	11	13
Republican	7	6	8	4	7	6	6	7	9	8
<u>Republican</u>										
Weak	14	14	14	16	13	16	13	15	14	15
Strong	13	13	15	13	14	12	11	10	10	10
Apolitical, Don't know	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	1614	1139	1772	1269	3021	1289	1571	1291	1553	1802