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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL/PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
SUBJECT: Ross Perot

Bob:

In accordance with one of Larry’s weekend requests, made on your behalf, I called Ross Perot and asked if I could be of assistance in whatever matter he wanted to talk to you about. After some light chit-chat and a brief discussion of the health of each other’s family members, he said that he needed to get some things squared away with you personally on the subject of his position or status vis-a-vis "the Nixon team". He said that Maury Stans and others were on his back constantly and that he felt it necessary to talk to you about his relationship with us before he gave any answers or took any actions. He went on to articulate his continued high regard for the President and the job he is doing. But he admitted to a feeling of being "pretty much out in left field".

In short, Ross wants to be wooed by a phone call (preferably from the President, but at least from you) and various other gestures back into the fold. His final comment was: "It’s been so long since I’ve heard from anyone there that I suppose if I were half-smart I’d understand the message and know it was meant to be permanent."

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL/PERSONAL
This is in response to the second part of Larry Higby's memorandum of July 19, asking for my thoughts on the best use of Mrs. Nixon, Tricia, and Julie, during the campaign.

I have become a great fan of Mrs. Nixon's -- I think she is a great asset and can be a very substantial addition to the campaign. She should appear with the President quite frequently. In addition, she should have her own schedule of appearances at volunteer projects, hospitals, schools, etc. -- these she does fabulously well. Like the President, her appearances should be at least theoretically governmental. Carefully-selected TV talk shows might be another possibility -- these, however, would have to be carefully selected -- obviously Liz Drew's show would not be appropriate.

I would confine Tricia's appearances to the Deep South and joint appearances with Mr. Cox in which he is a speaker or otherwise the dominant performer. As part of this, she might do some Northern talk shows in conjunction with Mr. Cox or even alone. But these should be carefully selected. Merv Griffin's audience is appropriate -- Dick Cavett's would not be. If anybody has to waste time appearing before women's Republican lunches -- and I hope as little of this as possible can be done -- Tricia is the one.

Julie is excellent before virtually all kind of audiences except the most superheated and sophisticated liberal types. Ethnic picnics, volunteer projects, children's hospitals, schools, etc. -- these are the kinds of colorful, visual, and informal events at which I think Julie does well. Since she speaks Spanish, she should be
programmed for a lot of Spanish-type appearances in New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Texas, and especially California.

My memorandum of June 15 already suggested a Sunday evening before-the-election family show and a Monday daytime Nixon women show -- I reiterate these suggestions here.

cc: Charles W. Colson
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. Haldeman
FROM: Ken Cole

This is in response to your memorandum of June 12 which requested my views and analysis of the following points:

1. The President's posture between the Conventions.

Most people are "down" on politicians and political campaigning. The longer the President can stay above the battle, the better off he will be. The President should keep being "President" just as long as he possibly can. Therefore, he should continue as usual at least up to the Republican Convention.

During the Convention interlude, the President should be engaged in things that reflect favorably on him—follow-up to the trip to Russia, further efforts at ending the Vietnam War, events to highlight the success of his economic program and his concern for the still unemployed. Additionally, he should make one last effort at urging the Congress to pass remaining legislation proposed by this Administration. This could best be done by a series of meetings with Senate and House Committee Chairmen and/or concerned Committee members. In addition, the President could meet with supportive special interest groups.

Meetings such as these would allow the President the opportunity to demonstrate familiarity with his domestic legislation and to articulate the principles which support his proposals. Each meeting should be followed with a press briefing by John Ehrlichman and, if desirable, the appropriate Cabinet Officer. We could,
if planned sufficiently in advance, arrange for network and local TV stories which demonstrate the problem the President is trying to correct and how his solution would work. For instance, on the environmental issue, we could encourage the networks and local TV stations to get film of water pollution which could be utilized in their reports of the President's meeting with Congressional representatives to encourage them to pass his water pollution legislation.

Most importantly, in the Cabinet meeting last Friday we heard the President was eloquent on foreign policy and the balance of international power. He needs to re-articulate publicly his domestic philosophy - what he stands for - what he's for and against domestically. It may be that his acceptance speech at the convention would be the best place, but he needs to set his domestic philosophy before the public, not on a programmatic basis, but in the overall sense he needs to state his goal for the nation domestically and how we are going to get there.

2. The President's posture from the Republican Convention to the Election.

Here again, the longer he can stay "President" the better off he will be. In this case, whether or not the Congress is in session will have some bearing on what the President is able to do. If the Congress is in session, the President should continue the scenario outlined for the between Conventions period. If it is not in session, then we must find graphic ways for the President to demonstrate the failure of Congress. For instance, he could make trips to problem areas and then kick Congress for allowing a problem to go on because of their failure to pass the legislation the President recommended. These trips should be "non-political".

In either event, the President should not start political campaigning until, at the earliest, the first of October. If Congress is still in session then, he should be out of Washington only on weekends. This could perhaps be stretched to include one trip during the week, although I think it is important to convey the image of the President being in Washington "running the country" while others are out campaigning.
The President's efforts should be concentrated in key states. He should not try to visit all 50 states, but he might make some regional visits which would include states otherwise missed, for instance the farm states. He should do events which provide for some kind of encounter with the "average man". Generally these should be issue oriented situations. Additionally, he should also do the standard rallies and motorcades, and although many will argue that the McGinnis book discredited the citizen TV Q&A, I think the same kind of thing which was done in 1968 could be utilized again - assuming we can figure out a way to avoid being accused of rigging the panel.

3. Thoughts as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.

The President should not attack anyone for anything during the campaign. This should be left to the surrogates. He should at all times be the statesman who has brought peace to the world and economic stability to our country. And, who has applied and intends to continue to apply these same visionary attributes to our domestic problems. The President should articulate only positive things relative to key issue areas and key interest groups.

The surrogates on the other hand should be on the attack beginning with the close of the Democratic Convention. What they should be attacking will, of course, be dependent upon the candidate as each has staked out his own positions. It seems to me though that no matter who the candidate is there are two things which we can challenge regardless. One is the failure of the Congress, and the second is the inability of the Federal Government to produce because of bureaucracy. I don't think we should have any qualms about attacking the Federal establishment, even if it means pointing the finger at ourselves, although I do believe we can be divorced from most of the goings on.

4. The opposition's strategy and what we can do.

The Democrats will attack the President's credibility and his lack of concern for the average man. They will have absolutely no regard for the accuracy or validity of their charges and they will use the War, the economy - high food prices and high unemployment - and other people issues
such as hunger, housing, crime and taxes to demonstrate their claims. While we will be tied to specifics, the Democrats will be able to avoid them, and they will get a lot of help from the media in conveying their message.

The President should stay above all of this. He should be on the offensive with issues like peace, the economy and the failure of Congress to legislate his domestic reforms. As I said before, he should not attack the Democrats for their faulty charges. Rather, this should be left to the surrogates whose efforts should be geared, in addition to positive statements, to disclosing the fallacies of opposition proposals, pressuring the opposition for specifics and painting the opposition as extreme and irresponsible. We, like the Democrats, should not be too concerned about the substance of our charges - as long as the President is not making them. Presidential spokesmen will have far more flexibility for demagoguery than will the President.

We should have our own plan as to how to win this election, and the development of the plan should assume that the worst charges possible are made against the President. We should then operate against this plan, and never, once, deviate from it. Just because the opposition makes some false charges, the President should not be rushing out to respond. Rather we should just let it go, or let a surrogate handle it.

My rationale for all of this is that the majority of the people of this country desire most a President who is strong in his leadership, compassionate in his judgments and courageous in the face of adversity. I think they have that kind of President in President Nixon. And I believe that this situation, thanks to the China visit, Russia, the mining of Haiphong and the President's strong action to bring the economy back in line is becoming increasingly clear to the public in general. Everything the President does between now and the election must be geared to contribute to this image.
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. Haldeman
FROM: DOUGLAS H. MACARTHY
SUBJECT: Your Memo of June 12.

The following is in response to the four questions raised in your June 12 memorandum:

1. The President should be visibly involved in domestic issues -- particularly the more gutsy domestic issues which give him a change-oriented, anti-status quo image. The President's foreign policy successes will be easy to bring to peoples' minds during the campaign itself. His domestic policy biases will not -- and some we will not want to bring to mind at that time so as not to offend the more stable parts of our coalition. Between the conventions, the President could address a Spanish group and even visit a barrio; take his domestic policy staff and Cabinet team to a city like Indianapolis for a two-day, in-depth exposure to its problems, visit a rural, agricultural community for a day, appear at a local union meeting and a factory, do a walking tour of a Catholic, ethnic urban community like Bay Ridge, New York City, do a one-day health tour i.e. visit a hospital, an urban clinic, a medical school, make an address on education before a prestige audience dealing with questions like the chit system, non-public education, "free schools", busing, etc. in a coherent, thoughtful way, tying them all together under the theme of eliminating governmental intervention in education as much as possible, do an address on incomes vs. services strategy before a prestige audience of poverty types, announce something on tax reform, sock it to some major corporations once or twice to erase ITT. The President should also do something on the human and personal side -- perhaps my old stand-by Colorado River run or a camping trip or something, anything to keep him out of Key Biscayne and San Clemente and demonstrate he can relate to something other than fat-cat vacation spas.
The President has had a rather vigorous schedule in recent months. Keeping it going will make whatever campaign-related appearances he wants to make seem not so out-of-the-ordinary and non-Presidental. We can also do certain kinds of visual, theoretically governmental, events now that we will not be able to do after September for both lack of time and obvious politics. Between the conventions, then, offers the best opportunity to assert the same sense of dynamism in our domestic policy as we already have made clear on the foreign side. The over-all theme -- which can be related to our foreign policy and the Nixon Doctrine -- is that government has been too active, both at home and abroad, and what we are doing recognizes the need to readjust the balance, return power to the people, take it away from the pointy-headed, sandwich-carrying bureaucrats, and reprivatized much of what government has undertaken in the past decade. This period is also a perfect time to look beyond the conventions and even the election by giving the President's domestic policy a more radical, dynamic image -- in the first term it was necessary to clean up the foreign and economic messes left by the previous Administration; in the second Administration the people can expect a more vigorous attention to domestic issues and one which is explicitly anti-governmental.

2. With something along the lines of the above accomplished between the convention, the question of when he should start campaigning will never really have to be faced. Anything explicitly campaign-oriented can just be woven in to what the President is already doing. Immediately after the convention, the President might do a quickie foreign trip -- the 1970 one, I thought, was fairly effective. Thinking up some excuse for the President to visit the Pope in Italy might be particularly good. When he comes back, his campaign pace should not be much, if any, faster than his between-convention pace. Two kinds of events should be undertaken. The first would be a more limited version of what he should do between conventions. While obviously devotion of a full day or two to something like health or urban problems becomes impossible to arrange after the September 1 date, what is realistic is a one-topic speech event or statement tied to a visual event; i.e. addressing a conservation group and visiting a pollution-control facility on the same day. I could foresee perhaps 10 to 12 half-days spent like this on each of the major issues. The second type of event would be the partisan rally. These should be regionalized, perhaps 5 or 6 the entire campaign. They would be scrupulously prepared so that the President would fly into a city and be met with no less than 200,000 people anytime he did an explicitly partisan event. The cities for these rallies should be picked now and planning should be undertaken immediately. Other than these two kinds of events,
the President should be actively and visibly involved in the affairs of government here in Washington, blasting the Congress for inaction on his domestic program and tying up the final strings on his structure of peace. On the media front, we should have factual, issue-oriented (one issue per message) 30-second to 2-minute spots on 10 or 12 key issues without any involvement personally of the President, a 30-minute "Nixon in the White House" newsy-type documentary to play over and over, a 30-minute Nixon biography for the same purpose, and two one-hour conversations -- one of the President with common people (a veteran, a union agent, a blue-collar housewife, a black, etc.) and one with a group of foreign policy types. The Sunday evening before the election the President might do a 30-minute conversation with a group of kids. Monday afternoon Mrs. Nixon and the girls might do something on prices, education, etc. in an informal setting with one of our women appointees interviewing. The night before the election, the President and family should be on for an hour -- informal issue-oriented but general conversation leading up to a very philosophical, very statesmanlike, but natural, peroration by the President. Ethnic -- i.e. Nixon and Jews -- and negative -- i.e. McGovern and aerospace employment -- spots should be used by front groups in particular areas.

The oratorical tone of the President's remarks can become somewhat more offensive after September 1. The real gut-fighting should be left to others, but the idea that the Democratic Party, even with George McGovern, is the party of big government, large taxes, discord, over-intervention at home and abroad, etc. should be gotten across. The President's partisan speeches can contrast what is the case now with what was the case in 1968. Others should tie George McGovern to the Eastern Establishment, the Council on Foreign Relations, the New York Times, etc. but the President's partisan speeches -- as opposed to the 10 or 12 suggested substantive speeches -- can make it absolutely crystal-clear that George McGovern's idea of change is no different than Franklin Roosevelt's or Harry Truman's or Lyndon Johnson's -- and that that conception of change is now no-change at all. By doing this, the President can take from McGovern the anti-establishment image, identify himself with the little guy and McGovern with the furry people in the Eastern Corridor, and give voice responsibly to people's real concerns. Foreign policy here explicitly should support domestic policy -- Democratic bias towards extending democracy at home and abroad has gotten this country into grave difficulty and what President Nixon is doing is getting it out.
3. and 4. The opposition will be vigorously moderating its position while maintaining its rhetorical and image posture. Liberals care about words more than substance and McGovern believes he can carry them along while expanding his base into the center -- but the psychological posture will not change. Counter-acting it must be done carefully, in two directions simultaneously. On the lower end of the spectrum is the radicalism issue and McGovern's radical posture on a number of different issues -- amnesty, defense cuts as they affect jobs, marijuana, etc. Our efforts here should be restrained so that what McGovern says and not what we say is the issue. They should also be very carefully particularized and very carefully documented. One-liners in the Vice-President's speeches about abortion can only help McGovern by making us seem silly for relying on a minor issue most people are far-advanced on. Mailings, non-national speakers, carefully-distributed pamphlets by front groups, ads in ethnic press, etc., on the other hand, can be extremely helpful. Ditto with Jewish voters on Israeli, defense-space workers in Florida, Texas and California, veterans groups, anti-busing types, etc. The danger here is thinking we aren't getting our position across because we don't read it in the Washington Post. That, really, is what we want. We want to reach with these issues the kind of people who don't read the Washington Post and we should be actually happy if it doesn't appear there, nor on the nightly news shows, etc. The most extreme kinds of charges -- i.e., he's a friend of Ellsberg or Abbie Hoffman, etc. -- should be even more carefully regulated to assure maximal benefit where they help but no disadvantage in the far more numerous areas where use of this material will hurt. Cheap-shotting -- McGovern's $110,000 home, etc. -- should only be in context of a more substantive attack on his essentially Eastern Establishment liberalism.

On the higher end of the spectrum will be the foreign policy issues, welfare, national security, etc. Our efforts here should be equally careful. We must remember that the only way McGovern can win is by holding frustrated middle-class ethnics and taking upper-middle class suburbanites and combining them with the minorities to win bare majorities in the big industrial states like California, Illinois and New York. McGovern knows he cannot take the South. He knows, too, that the kind of support he gets only comes after the most intense cultivation, through media and house-calling, and the development of an emotional-psychological identity among his voters with him. In my view, this means McGovern will have a firmly left-wing Northern Democratic Vice-President and he will spend an unprecedented amount of time campaigning in the Northeast and Mid-west and Far-west. By doing so, it is possible that he could lose the popular vote and still win the electoral vote count. And since it is possible -- and since it is the only possible way he could win -- we should worry about countering McGovern's potential
appeal among these Northern, more sophisticated, more change-oriented voters, and not worry so much about other types of voters who have no choice but to vote for us -- and whose support can be reinforced by the kinds of covert operation suggested above.

Our discussions of the major issues should be on a responsible, positive plane. Our point is that McGovern's proposals are either irresponsible and counter-productive -- his defense budget -- or that they are just retreads of New Deal and Great Society programs. The real change, the real responsible change and particularly libertarian change, has already come from President Nixon. These points should be made by the Vice President, our Cabinet officers, and most of our surrogate speakers.

It would be particularly helpful if we could get liberal Republicans -- i.e. Javits, Scranton, etc. -- out campaigning on these points. The temptation, I know, will be to wave the flag and reach for the punch-line, but we must remember that the audience in front of a speaker is not nearly so important as the columnists, news commentators, etc. through which he is reflected to the public as a whole. In 1970, the President didn't really go around throwing verbal bombs all the time, but because he did a few times that was the impression which was created. We want the tone of our national campaign as opposed to particular community and sect efforts, to be positive -- and to keep it that way we have to be especially cautious in view of the media's desire to see us become negative. This is the best way, indeed the only way, to not let McGovern have the Mr. Clean-honesty-anti-establishment, etc. type issues benefit him among the only voters who can elect him President. We want to embody change and we cannot do that if we are demagoguing -- the media, McGovern's personal impression, his ability to weave out of his positions unless they are explicitly documented, the counter-productiveness of demagoguery among the national constituency, the resulting sacrifice of our Presidential image and the advantages of incumbency make it unhelpful anyway. And if we can take the change, Mr. Clean, anti-establishment range of issues away from McGovern, we have taken away the only basis on which he can possibly win.