

Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
6	70	12/1/1970	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	Copy of a memo from Colson to Haldeman RE: RN and the Harris Poll. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 2 pgs.
6	70	12/1/1970	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Colson to Haldeman RE: RN and the Harris Poll. 2 pgs.
6	70	12/31/1970	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Colson to Haldeman RE: Democratic debts. 1 pg.
6	70	12/9/1970	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Colson to Haldeman RE: debt of the Democratic National Committee. 1 pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
6	70	12/30/1970	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Haldeman to Colson RE: man-to-man coverage. 5 pgs.
6	70	11/30/1970	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Haldeman to Colson RE: Democratic Party debt. 1 pg.
6	70	12/9/1970	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Colson to Haldeman RE: debt of the Democratic National Committee. 1 pg.
6	70	12/7/1970	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Memo	From Colson to Haldeman RE: Chairman of the Republican National Committee. 2 pgs.
6	70	11/2/1970	<input type="checkbox"/>	Domestic Policy	Letter	From Roscoe and Geoffrey Drummond to Colson RE: previous phone call. 1 pg.

<u>Box Number</u>	<u>Folder Number</u>	<u>Document Date</u>	<u>No Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Document Type</u>	<u>Document Description</u>
6	70		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Other Document	Document analyzing voting trends. 4 pgs.
6	70	12/1/1970	<input type="checkbox"/>	Campaign	Memo	From Haldeman to Colson and Finch RE: the 18-year old vote in the election of 1972. 1 pg.

Bob -
my secretary
advises we had
we placed the call
to Harris. I called
Lufkin - he talked
called Harris & then
evening to call him
we call Harris Direct
My gal placed the call -
Sorry, I was
incorrect incorrect
this AM -
Clausen

CONFIDENTIAL

December 1, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12066, Section 6-102
By emp, Date 1-30-81

The President asked me yesterday to talk to Dan Lufkin regarding the latest Harris Poll. I did so. Lufkin talked to Harris, which doesn't help with this one but keeps some pressure on for the future.

I am convinced that Harris will jab us everytime he can; it is somewhat significant that in yesterday's poll on the impact of the President's campaigning, Harris did not publish a positive/negative breakdown. For the first time he printed all four categories of response. This is one of the promises, you may remember, that we extracted from him.

Following my conversation with Lufkin, and at his request, I called Harris directly last evening. He gave me a very interesting analysis of the poll.

Kennedy, Humphrey and Lindsay all run strong with certain groups, badly with others. For example, Kennedy does poorly with older voters, Humphrey badly with younger voters. Lindsay does well in the suburbs, Kennedy does not. Kennedy runs very badly in the south and border states, Humphrey not so bad. Kennedy does well with the Catholics. In short, each of the three arouse strong support in certain areas but strong animosity in others.

What distinguishes Muskie -- and what causes him to run stronger -- is that he does not have the areas of opposition that the other potential candidates do. In addition to holding the Democratic strength, he also picks up Republican and Independent votes in the higher income brackets which the other candidates do not.

Muskie, while he benefits from not having the liabilities of the other candidates, also inspires no enthusiasm. The underlying poll data (interviewee impressions) show that his support is very soft. Harris describes it as "passable;" he is an accommodating candidate, no one is really excited about him either way.

From this Harris concludes that when the infighting begins Muskie's soft support will not hold up (Harris gave me some gratuitous political advice to the effect that we should continue to push Muskie to the left).

Harris further concludes that in any two-way race no candidate against the President could get more than 45-46% of the vote, except Muskie at this time but Harris does not believe that Muskie's support will continue at this level.

Harris is doing another analysis which will be released next week. It shows the President doing as well today as he did in 1968 with virtually every group and with each geographical area except in the middle west where the President's support is badly off from the 1968 levels.

Harris believes that the mid-west has been particularly affected by a recessionary psychology, farmer discontent and the GM strike. He regards this as a "special situation" and concludes that because of the basic Republicanism of the mid-west, we will be able to recover our support there.

The point of his analysis which he says he will make publicly (I will believe it when he does) is that the President is in very good shape when his present support is compared to his 1968 performance except in the mid-west where he believes that the damage will be repaired.

Charles W. Colson

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By EMP NARS, Date 1-30-81

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 1, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

The President asked me yesterday to talk to Dan Lufkin regarding the latest Harris Poll. I did so. Lufkin talked to Harris, which doesn't help with this one but keeps some pressure on for the future.

I am convinced that Harris will jab us everytime he can; it is somewhat significant that in yesterday's poll on the impact of the President's campaigning, Harris did not publish a positive/negative breakdown. For the first time he printed all four categories of response. This is one of the promises, you may remember, that we extracted from him.

Following my conversation with Lufkin, and at his request, I called Harris directly last evening. He gave me a very interesting analysis of the poll.

Kennedy, Humphrey and Lindsay all run strong with certain groups, badly with others. For example, Kennedy does poorly with older voters, Humphrey badly with younger voters. Lindsay does well in the suburbs, Kennedy does not. Kennedy runs very badly in the south and border states, Humphrey not so bad. Kennedy does well with the Catholics. In short, each of the three arouse strong support in certain areas but strong animosity in others.

What distinguishes Muskie -- and what causes him to run stronger -- is that he does not have the areas of opposition that the other potential candidates do. In addition to holding the Democratic strength, he also picks up Republican and Independent votes in the higher income brackets which the other candidates do not.

Muskie, while he benefits from not having the liabilities of the other candidates, also inspires no enthusiasm. The underlying poll data (interviewee impressions) show that his support is very soft. Harris describes it as "passable;" he is an accommodating candidate, no one is really excited about him either way.

From this Harris concludes that when the infighting begins Muskie's soft support will not hold up (Harris gave me some gratuitous political advice to the effect that we should continue to push Muskie to the left).

Harris further concludes that in any two-way race no candidate against the President could get more than 45-46% of the vote, except Muskie at this time but Harris does not believe that Muskie's support will continue at this level.

Harris is doing another analysis which will be released next week. It shows the President doing as well today as he did in 1968 with virtually every group and with each geographical area except in the middle west where the President's support is badly off from the 1968 levels.

Harris believes that the mid-west has been particularly affected by a recessionary psychology, farmer discontent and the GM strike. He regards this as a "special situation" and concludes that because of the basic Republicanism of the mid-west, we will be able to recover our support there.

The point of his analysis which he says he will make publicly (I will believe it when he does) is that the President is in very good shape when his present support is compared to his 1968 performance except in the mid-west where he believes that the damage will be repaired.

Charles W. Colson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 31, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES W. COLSON *WC*
SUBJECT: Democrats' Debts

This refers to my memorandum of December 9, copy attached. We have thus far been unable to obtain an accurate list of creditors. We do know that the Democrats owe approximately \$1 million to AT&T (\$300,000 directly and \$700,000 carried over from the Kennedy and Humphrey pre-convention expenses.) Unfortunately, however, the RNC also owes \$270,000.

AT&T cannot forgive or write off the debts; that would be a corporate political contribution. In accordance with the long-standing practice, they are charging no interest to either of the national committees. AT&T will insist upon full payment of the debts prior to the next campaign, however.

American Airlines is also a large creditor of the DNC. Our relationships with American are not such that I would attempt to urge that they press for collection.

Basically the problem remains that a judgment would be uncollectable; hence, no one wants to precipitate a counterproductive law suit.

All in all, I come to the conclusion that we are much better off not surfacing this issue right now. It could cause the Democrats to issue a sympathy fund raising appeal. Rather, we should put the screws on hard in the summer of 1972 to be absolutely certain these creditors extend no further credit until they are paid. The over-hanging debt is of value to us in that a lot of people won't want to contribute to pay off the debts of a prior election; yet, if the creditors hold firm, that is the way it will have to be in 1972.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Chubb

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By *lmp* NARS, Date *1-30-81*

December 9, 1970

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES W. COLSON *W.C.*
SUBJECT: DEMOCRATS' DEBTS

This is in response to your memo of November 30th regarding the debts of the Democratic National Committee.

When I was in private law practice we were retained by a creditor and were on the verge of suing during the 1968 election. We did not do so because the judgment, even if obtained, would have been uncollectable. One of my partners negotiated a long term pay out instead. The reason for this, as I recall, was that many of the debts were incurred by committees which had no assets.

I have a line out now to obtain a list of the creditors. This may not be easy to come by.

There is one question that you should think about. If a rash of law suits began we might martyr the Democrats, create public sympathy and give them a good fund raising issue. We might be better to let the debts carry and then try to block the Democrats from getting further credit -- at least from the same creditors -- the next time around. I have some questions in my own mind about this. What do you think? *Probably right.*

In any event, as soon as I am able to obtain a list of creditors I will take a hard look at how feasible a series of suits would be. *OK*

December 30, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : MR. COLSON
FROM : H. R. HALDEMAN
SUBJECT : Man-to-Man Coverage

I have read your first cut at how we can effect a system of man-to-man coverage, and it is very well done. I agree that we should meet to discuss this matter further. However, you should proceed right away to develop a more detailed plan, at least for some areas, so that we can begin to operate immediately where possible. Other areas, as you have indicated, are going to require more thought and some may have to be held in neutral until other decisions, such as appointments, have been made.

Some general points:

1. You are correct in assuming that we want to be certain that every major person in every field of endeavor has a principal point of contact here and that someone here on the staff is assigned the responsibility of keeping regular and effective liaison with that person.
2. As you indicated, we need to be certain that each assignment does have a fixed responsibility and that there is active follow up. You should include your thoughts with regard to this in your plan.
3. We need to consider how many of the second level people we can use in this effort. There are a lot of them that can be very effective with proper guidance and we can't rely only on our top staff for this program.

Mr. Colson

Now my comments with regard to particular areas -

- 50 Top Contributors It looks as if we are off to a good start. From time to time, we should let the President see the personalized letters we are sending to each individual so that he has a feeling of what is actually being done.

- Top 180 Contributors Good. Make sure we actively continue to follow up.

- Contributors of \$5,000 or more This is an area where you indicate we need to do more work. Please include your specific thoughts and suggestions with regard to this group in your next report.

- Major Special Interest Groups Your suggestions are okay.

- Labor This should be the subject of the separate meeting that I understand we are going to have in the near future.

- Organized Ethnic Groups Is Pasztor really the answer? I think this is an area where we could do a lot more and would suggest that we develop a much more active ethnic group, not just through the RNC, that we have control of and is at our disposal. RNC is automatically limited to Republicans and this is totally self defeating.

- Business Leaders

We need to develop a better coordinated program of cultivation. Flanigan, Stans, and several other people are helpful but first we must get the thing properly organized. There is a lot of work to be done. We need a detailed plan.

- Political Leaders

The Vice President is now in charge of all relationships with the Governors, and anything we do should be coordinated by him. Let's give him a chance to get organized and get some of his own thoughts going -- give him all the counsel you can.

- Congress

This is a separate problem that MacGregor and Timmons will have to work out and I will discuss this with MacGregor when he comes aboard next month.

- State and Local
Chairmen

You're right. This is a problem area, but one that we could significantly upgrade with an appropriate plan. Get with Harry Dent and see what his suggestions are in this regard, after the new national chairman has been chosen. While Harry will continue to work certain areas, we have a larger political problem that needs to be worked out.

Mr. Colson

- Media
This is something we need to work out on a separate basis. However, I would appreciate any specific thoughts you might have with regard to our approach to the media and assigning a more thorough man-to-man operation.

- Religious Leaders and Prominent Laymen
Looks good. Let's be sure there isn't additional work that can be done that we're not doing. Should we set up a high-level, outside contact or a council that we can effectivly plug into upon the appropriate occasion?

- Youth
Let's get going.

- Cities, Counties, Municipalities
This is another area in which the Vice President is taking over as liaison. Add this to your list of things to discuss with him. We need to do a much better job of effectively presenting our programs. We could do this if the right machinery were set up. Don't you take on doing his work for him - just advise.

- Minorities
Please talk with Brown and Garment and see what plans they have in this area.

- Economists
I agree that we can probably get more effective liaison and the first step is, as you have suggested, to ask McCracken for an analysis of the economic community. Go ahead on this.

- Lawyers
This should be one of our most effective areas, yet we are doing virtually nothing. You should get this program going full blast now. Put someone else in charge - then ride herd. Should be able to use an outside volunteer.

- Celebrities
You already have my comments. Let's move ahead.

- 11E
- * Academicians I agree that Finch can probably do a very effective job of heading up the academicians area, providing we have a substantial amount of backup for him. Please develop a full plan. Talk to Finch and see what his thoughts are and work something out.

 - * Intellectuals I agree that there is a lot more that can be done. The question is who can effectively handle the program. Talk to Price and see if this is really his bag. Also, there are also some people on Ehrlichman's staff who can do a fairly effective job in this area.

 - * Regional Breakdown This is something we will have to work out based on other political considerations, and we need to do some separate work on it.

Some other categories that come up for consideration that you have not mentioned would include: doctors, and indeed the whole area of health - something that we will be going into very heavily next year; service clubs and an effective way to utilize them. I understand that LeTendre will do much of this work, but we need a better reading on what specifically he will be doing.

Please proceed to develop some detailed thoughts in the areas I have indicated. Let me review them and then let us meet as soon as you are ready.

HRH:BK:cg:HRH:pm

November 30, 1970

fr

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. COLSON
FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN

The image being developed of the Democrats as being "resurgent" should be demolished. They owe \$9,000,000.

Would you please check around and prepare a plan on what we could do to cause them to be sued by their dozens of creditors.

HRH:LH:cg

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Check

December 9, 1970

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12085, Section 6-102
By emp NARS, Date 1-30-81

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES W. COLSON *WC*
SUBJECT: DEMOCRATS' DEBTS

This is in response to your memo of November 30th regarding the debts of the Democratic National Committee.

When I was in private law practice we were retained by a creditor and were on the verge of suing during the 1968 election. We did not do so because the judgment, even if obtained, would have been uncollectable. One of my partners negotiated a long term pay out instead. The reason for this, as I recall, was that many of the debts were incurred by committees which had no assets.

I have a line out now to obtain a list of the creditors. This may not be easy to come by.

There is one question that you should think about. If a rash of law suits began we might martyr the Democrats, create public sympathy and give them a good fund raising issue. We might be better to let the debts carry and then try to block the Democrats from getting further credit -- at least from the same creditors -- the next time around. I have some questions in my own mind about this. What do you think?

Probably right.

In any event, as soon as I am able to obtain a list of creditors I will take a hard look at how feasible a series of suits would be.

OK

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

December 7, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:  CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT: NATIONAL COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN

Assuming Bryce says no or that the price is not right, I am passing along a few thoughts for what they are worth. I am aware of the back-up choices -- they are really superb men; none of them, however meet all three of what I think are the major qualifications:

1. Total, exclusive commitment to the President. The Chairman should have no conflicting political ambitions of his own; he should regard himself as the President's agent in making the party machinery function for the President's campaign. Everything else is secondary. The man has to be resigned to being egoless and expendable.
2. It must be a full time job. (Bob Dole is a great guy but, in addition to having his own ambitions, he is a very busy Senator.)
3. The major task of the Chairman should be to make the machinery of the party operate. He must, therefore, be a consummate political pro -- like Bryce -- a Cliff White type who knows how to organize and use the organization (or a Chotiner type without the Chotiner image).

Almost all of our problems with Morton resulted from (1) or (2) above. He wasn't there or he was worried about himself. I am well aware of the President's desire for a spokesman who can tangle with Larry O'Brien. When a party is out of power, its national chairman must be an attractive, articulate spokesman who can put a good face on the party. When a party is in power, its chairman ought to be its best technician and the partisan agent of the President.

We have many attractive, articulate spokesmen in the Administration. We don't need to add another one. Least of all do we need a spokesman who is competing with the President and the Administration for public attention.

The partisan machinery that exists at the Committee can be enormously valuable to us in 1972. The Chairman ought to spend full time making it work in our interest -- and the less he is seen on TV, the better.

The new Chairman should not look upon it as an opportunity to help him build his own political image but rather as a dirty, grimy job to make the Republican political apparatus viable in 1972 in support of the President's campaign.

I know this is none of my business but I've lived in this town through a lot of chairmen -- and I'd like to see us learn from past mistakes.

P.S. How about John Volpe -- loyal and a good organizer (Ehrlichman would second him).

1290
Los Angeles Times Syndicate
National Press Building Washington, D. C. 20004
Area Code 202 638-3760

ROSCOE DRUMMOND
GEOFFREY DRUMMOND

Nov. 2, 1970

Mr. Charles W. Colson
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Chuck,

Delighted to have you phone me the other afternoon. It was most welcome. We did a little extra digging for background and I am enclosing an advance copy of the column which your call evoked.

Please don't hesitate to let us hear from you at any time. We welcome your initiative. We run an open administration. We want to have the benefit of your suggestions.

With cordial regards from us both.

Sincerely,

Roscoe
Jeff

election poll was both significant and startling. When he privately told some friends, whom he assumed would be pleased with the result, he remarked: "You won't believe this, but we have double-checked it and it doesn't come out any other way."

The ~~finding~~ ~~was~~ ~~unexpected~~ was that while the Gallup poll showed Nixon's popularity rating before the campaign to be ~~57%~~^{58%}, it stood firmly at ~~57%~~^{57%} after the campaign.

What makes the result especially ~~meaningful~~^{meaningful} is the question which is always asked: "Do you ~~think~~ approve or disapprove of the way the President is doing his job?"

~~During~~ the campaign, when Nixon was striking out so hard on the law-and-order issue, ~~and after the~~ ~~campaign~~ he was the target of blistering criticism that he was ~~damaging~~ tarnishing the Presidency by thrusting it ~~into~~ unwisely into the heat and scuffle of electioneering.

◎ Gallup found that the public doesn't think so.

But the ~~Harris~~^{***} poll ~~looks~~ looks at the other side of the coin. It shows that Senator Muskie, the leading ~~contender~~ ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~Democratic~~ ~~nomination~~, ~~has~~ ~~been~~ ~~gaining~~ ~~steadily~~ on President Nixon. In May it was Nixon 42%, Muskie 38%; in September it was Nixon 43%, Muskie 43%; and ~~now~~ it ~~came~~⁵ out Nixon 40%, Muskie 46%--with Wallace 10% and 4% undecided.

If these two Gallup and Harris polls accurately reflect voting opinion today, they are saying:

That a comfortable majority approves the way Nixon is doing his job as President.

But that more voters would rather [] have Muskie as President today than Nixon."

At this point two reservations are needed. Today's public opinion may not be tomorrow's. [] In a study of thirty years of polling Barns Roper of Roper Organization Inc. points out that "in nearly every term the lowest ebb of approval is within a year of the end of the term" and that "in the last few months of a term a President's approval rating starts upward again." Nixon's approval rating has remained unusually steady--55 to 60%--and if it starts upward from such a base it would be commanding.

There is [] also a Gallup finding which runs counter to Harris. In the middle of the period [] Harris showed Muskie moving from behind [] to ahead of Nixon. A Gallup [] survey showed Nixon leading Muskie by 7 points, 43% to 36%. If Gallup is right, then the pro-Muskie Harris report contains some question marks.

Three Presidents led their [] potential competitor at mid-term [] --FDR over Dewey in '43, Truman over Dewey in '47 and Eisenhower over KeFauver in '55--and all went on to win re-election. Kennedy led Rockefeller in '63 and then the tragedy of Dallas intervened. [] Two Presidents fell behind their opposition--Truman behind Eisenhower in '51 and Johnson behind Romney in '67--but neither ran for re-election.

In his perceptive study of [] polling [] on [] offers [] observation [] Roper [] pertinent [] for all candidates to bear in mind today:

... "The quality that polls over the years
have shown to rate over all other qualifications is the
personal quality of (italic) Honesty (end italic). The
public wants a leader whose words it can believe, whose
intentions it can trust."

Drummond

482
December 1, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR :

MR. COLSON
MR. FINCH

FROM :

H. R. HALDEMAN

SUBJECT :

18-Year Old Vote in 1972

It has been requested that the two of you in conjunction perhaps with le Tendre, prepare a plan as to how we can organize and get out the 18-year old vote in 1972. Under no circumstances should this be done through the Republican National Committee because the Republican Party has less popularity with 18-year olds than the President.

Would you please forward your recommendation on this matter by Wednesday, December 9.

Thank you.

HRH:LH:pm