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MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES W. COLSON
SUBJECT: Democrats' Debts

This refers to my memorandum of December 9, copy attached. We have thus far been unable to obtain an accurate list of creditors. We do know that the Democrats owe approximately $1 million to AT&T ($300,000 directly and $700,000 carried over from the Kennedy and Humphrey pre-convention expenses.) Unfortunately, however, the RNC also owes $270,000.

AT&T cannot forgive or write off the debts; that would be a corporate political contribution. In accordance with the long-standing practice, they are charging no interest to either of the national committees. AT&T will insist upon full payment of the debts prior to the next campaign, however.

American Airlines is also a large creditor of the DNC. Our relationships with American are not such that I would attempt to urge that they press for collection.

Basically the problem remains that a judgment would be uncollectable; hence, no one wants to precipitate a counterproductive lawsuit.

All in all, I come to the conclusion that we are much better off not surfacing this issue right now. It could cause the Democrats to issue a sympathy fundraising appeal. Rather, we should put the screws on hard in the summer of 1972 to be absolutely certain these creditors extend no further credit until they are paid. The over-hanging debt is of value to us in that a lot of people won't want to contribute to pay off the debts of a prior election; yet, if the creditors hold firm, that is the way it will have to be in 1972.

Tickler - January 1, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES W. COLSON
SUBJECT: DEMOCRATS' DEBTS

This is in response to your memo of November 30th regarding the debts of the Democratic National Committee.

When I was in private law practice we were retained by a creditor and were on the verge of suing during the 1968 election. We did not do so because the judgment, even if obtained, would have been uncollectable. One of my partners negotiated a long term pay out instead. The reason for this, as I recall, was that many of the debts were incurred by committees which had no assets.

I have a line out now to obtain a list of the creditors. This may not be easy to come by.

There is one question that you should think about. If a rash of law suits began we might martyr the Democrats, create public sympathy and give them a good fund raising issue. We might be better to let the debts carry and then try to block the Democrats from getting further credit -- at least from the same creditors -- the next time around. I have some questions in my own mind about this. What do you think?

In any event, as soon as I am able to obtain a list of creditors I will take a hard look at how feasible a series of suits would be.
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT: NATIONAL COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN

Assuming Bryce says no or that the price is not right, I am passing along a few thoughts for what they are worth. I am aware of the back-up choices -- they are really superb men; none of them, however, meet all three of what I think are the major qualifications:

1. **Total, exclusive commitment to the President.** The Chairman should have no conflicting political ambitions of his own; he should regard himself as the President's agent in making the party machinery function for the President's campaign. Everything else is secondary. The man has to be resigned to being egoless and expendable.

2. **It must be a full time job.** (Bob Dole is a great guy but, in addition to having his own ambitions, he is a very busy Senator.)

3. **The major task of the Chairman should be to make the machinery of the party operate.** He must, therefore, be a consummate political pro -- like Bryce -- a Cliff White type who knows how to organize and use the organization (or a Chotiner type without the Chotiner image).

Almost all of our problems with Morton resulted from (1) or (2) above. He wasn't there or he was worried about himself. I am well aware of the President's desire for a spokesman who can tangle with Larry O'Brien. When a party is out of power, its national chairman must be an attractive, articulate spokesman who can put a good face on the party. When a party is in power, its chairman ought to be its best technician and the partisan agent of the President.

We have many attractive, articulate spokesmen in the Administration. We don't need to add another one. Least of all do we need a spokesman who is competing with the President and the Administration for public attention.
The partisan machinery that exists at the Committee can be enormously valuable to us in 1972. The Chairman ought to spend full time making it work in our interest -- and the less he is seen on TV, the better.

The new Chairman should not look upon it as an opportunity to help him build his own political image but rather as a dirty, grimy job to make the Republican political apparatus viable in 1972 in support of the President's campaign.

I know this is none of my business but I've lived in this town through a lot of chairmen -- and I'd like to see us learn from past mistakes.

P.S. How about John Volpe -- loyal and a good organizer (Ehrlichman would second him).
MEMORANDUM FOR H.R. HALEMANN

The President asked me yesterday to talk to Dan Lufkin regarding the latest Harris Poll. I did so. Lufkin talked to Harris, which doesn't help with this one but keeps some pressure on for the future.

I am convinced that Harris will jab us everytime he can; it is somewhat significant that in yesterday's poll on the impact of the President's campaigning, Harris did not publish a positive/negative breakdown. For the first time he printed all four categories of response. This is one of the promises, you may remember, that we extracted from him.

Following my conversation with Lufkin, and at his request, I called Harris directly last evening. He gave me a very interesting analysis of the poll.

Kennedy, Humphrey and Lindsay all run strong with certain groups, badly with others. For example, Kennedy does poorly with older voters, Humphrey badly with younger voters. Lindsay does well in the suburbs, Kennedy does not. Kennedy runs very badly in the south and border states, Humphrey not so bad. Kennedy does well with the Catholics. In short, each of the three arouses strong support in certain areas but strong animosity in others.

What distinguishes Muskie -- and what causes him to run stronger -- is that he does not have the areas of opposition that the other potential candidates do. In addition to holding the Democratic strength, he also picks up Republican and independent votes in the higher income brackets which the other candidates do not.

Muskie, while he benefits from not having the liabilities of the other candidates, also inspires no enthusiasm. The underlying poll data (interviewee impressions) show that his support is very soft. Harris describes it as "passable"; he is an accommodating candidate, no one is really excited about him either way.

From this Harris concludes that when the infighting begins Muskie's soft support will not hold up (Harris gave me some gratuitous political advice to the effect that we should continue to push Muskie to the left).
Harris further concludes that in any two-way race no candidate against the President could get more than 45-46% of the vote, except Muskie at this time but Harris does not believe that Muskie's support will continue at this level.

Harris is doing another analysis which will be released next week. It shows the President doing as well today as he did in 1968 with virtually every group and with each geographical area except in the middle west where the President's support is badly off from the 1968 levels.

Harris believes that the mid-west has been particularly affected by a recessionary psychology, farmer discontent and the GM strike. He regards this as a "special situation" and concludes that because of the basic Republicanism of the mid-west, we will be able to recover our support there.

The point of his analysis which he says he will make publicly (I will believe it when he does) is that the President is in very good shape when his present support is compared to his 1968 performance except in the mid-west where he believes that the damage will be repaired.

Charles W. Colson
MEMORANDUM FOR PAT BUCHANAN

Attached is what I promised you -- a draft of a Lasky piece on Muskie.

There are two caveats. The first two paragraphs were basically what the President dictated. The second caveat is that I am no writer or columnist. I think the meat is here, however, for you to apply your fine hand.

We want to circulate this very, very widely so it should really make its point very hard.

Charles W. Colson