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<th>Document Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11/5/1970</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>Memo from Colson to Haldeman re: disenchantment of Mulcahy, Stone about how their campaign contributions were used. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11/13/1970</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>Memo from Colson to Haldeman re: organizing the Northeast for '72, cultivating Catholic leaders there. 2 pgs.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11/3/1970</td>
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<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>Memo from Colson to Dent re: Bill FitzGerald, National Media Analysis surveys, specifically South Carolina survey, payment for it. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11/6/1970</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>Memo from Colson to RN re: '70 Congressional campaign. Post-mortem on overall strategy, electoral factors, various individual races across the nation. 6 pgs.</td>
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November 5, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. Haldeman

I had occasion to talk to Mulcahy and Stone several times during the closing days of the campaign. I deduced a very serious disenchantment on the part of both of them for the way in which their money was used during the campaign.

I am not saying their points are valid. The facts are irrelevant. What is important is what they think. Mulcahy was very disturbed over the election eve television program. Stone feels that much of his money was wasted in campaign mismanagement. (He made this point on network television last night).

Both men were hit by many too many people and there was no central point for coordinating.

I think we need to move fast to rebuild some confidence. We are going to need both of these men in a big way in 1972. My immediate suggestions are:

1. A small stag dinner with the President for 5 or 6 of the largest contributors -- or maybe just Mulcahy and Stone.

2. Draw them in very soon on our campaign planning for 1972. (This is pure cosmetics -- I recognize their judgment, particularly Stone's, is not worth a damn).

3. Set up a system where they understand that you or I or someone clear all requests for money.

Charles W. Colson
November 13, 1970

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

One of the items I would like to discuss with you when we have a chance to talk is organizing the Northeast. I am convinced that the social issue was very powerful in the Northeast during the past campaign; while it may lose some of its impact in the rest of the country, it will continue to be powerful in 1972 in this region, at least with certain groups. The people most concerned with it are urban, middle income, white ethnics. To exploit the potential, we need to cultivate the right Catholic leaders in several key Northeastern states. These states are winnable if we have the right people and organize them properly.

The Democrats have always built their powerful machines around prominent Irish Catholic political bosses (occasionally Italian). Their Catholic leaders are now becoming much less important while ours are gaining in prominence. For example, consider the situation in the following states:

**Connecticut:** Our Governor-Elect is an Irish Catholic; the leading Democratic politician (Ribicoff) is Jewish.

**New Jersey:** Our Governor is Irish Catholic; the most prominent Democratic office holder is a Yankee (Pete Williams).

**New York:** The Senator-elect is an Irish Catholic; New York's Democratic leaders are predominantly Jewish.

**Rhode Island:** Our candidate for Governor (who still may be elected) is a very attractive Italian Catholic; the Democratic incumbent is Jewish.

**Pennsylvania:** The defeated Republican candidate for Governor (who should remain a power in the party) is an Irish Catholic, supported in this election by the entire church hierarchy in the state; the Democratic Governor-Elect is Jewish, a fact which by itself will help keep the Catholic vote in our corner, particularly in view of the hot parochial school issue in the state.
We should start building Nixon organizations around these men, be sure that we thoroughly cultivate them and use the resources of John Volpe and others to get the right second and third tier leaders on our team early. Men like Proccocino in New York, a former Democratic candidate for Mayor, who endorsed Rockefeller should be brought into the fold. (In fact, if Rockefeller thought that he had a shot at one of the two positions he would like here in Washington after the 1972 elections, we could probably take over his organization intact today and keep it active over the next two years. If this idea has merit, we should do it before the organization is disassembled.)

I fully recognize that if Muskie is our opponent, the fact that he is a Catholic will seriously hamper our efforts in this area. We should proceed nonetheless in the chance that he may not be the candidate and with the further objective of neutralizing blocks of Catholic voters if he is the candidate.

There are also some outstanding candidates whom we should start grooming in these states. I don't believe that anyone running statewide can give much of a lift to the President, but if they are bad candidates, they can be serious drags on the ticket. Work should be started on this now -- not in 1972.

Charles W. Colson

EYES ONLY
November 3, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY DENT

National Media Analysis, headed by a long time loyal Republican Bill FitzGerald, believes correctly or incorrectly that we agreed to pay $4000 for their South Carolina survey. Attached is their final report showing Watson to be in very good shape. I think the issue analysis is particularly well done.

Throughout this campaign FitzGerald has been sending us information based on surveys he has conducted around the country. Even though he has been paid by others to do them, he has been just that loyal to us that I would hope through the Gleason fund we could pay him at least the $4000 that he believes we owe him.

He has been of much greater value to us than just the South Carolina situation and I would not like to leave him with hard feelings in this particular instance. But more importantly, I think he can be very helpful to us in the future.

Charles W. Colson
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: 1970 Congressional Campaign

Neither the failures nor the successes of this campaign can be attributed to any one factor. Indeed, there were significant regional and local factors which weighed heavily in the final outcome. As an illustration, one half of our total national House losses occurred in four contiguous Congressional districts located in North Dakota, South Dakota and Minnesota. Obviously, the farm issue was critical and nothing else in the national campaign could overcome it.

We must also remember the inherent difficulty of translating Presidential popularity into support for individual candidates. We lost many states that you would have carried handily had this been a Presidential election. We just couldn't succeed in making your supporters feel that they had to vote for your candidates. Nor historically, has this ever been easy to do.

Your campaigning was vital in terms of arousing our own troops and eliminating the apathy, which contrary to the normal historical pattern would have this year worked against us. Finally, by campaigning you demonstrated your loyalty to the candidates and to the party. The results, had you not campaigned, would have been far worse and you would have taken the full blame which would have hurt in 1972.

Beyond these general observations, I think some specific points can be made:

1. Law and order is a national issue but it affects voting patterns differently in different areas. The issue helped us in the liberal urban, suburban Northeast but, ironically did very little for us in the conservative, rural Midwest and Far West.
The reason, I think, is that the issue is meaningless where there is no crime and violence problem. If the people in North Dakota are not really concerned about crime or the safety of their homes, they can't get very worked up about their own Senator just because of his poor record on that issue. In the urban areas of the East, where fear of crime and violence is widespread, our stand on law and order (and that of our candidates) was the key issue (except where the economic issue surpassed it).

2. Except in the urban Northeast, we did not succeed in making the public believe that Democrat, Liberal permissiveness was the cause of violence and crime. There are a combination of reasons for this. As noted above, people in the more conservative states, while they are all for law and order, don't blame their own liberal Senator for a problem that they don't personally confront. Secondly, the Democrats in many cases recaptured safe ground on the issue: Stevenson is a classic example. Thirdly, our campaign pitch didn't really come across in a way to lay the responsibility onto the Democrats. In this sense we were, perhaps, too negative. Everyone knew that we were against permissiveness and violence but we didn't sell the point that violence and disorder in our society are caused directly by the rhetoric, softness, and catering to the dissidents which the Democrats have engaged in. We just didn't make the connection in the mind of the average voter.

3. The war issue became neutralized in the campaign. People are generally very satisfied with your handling of the war. Because they are and because it, therefore, has become something of a non-issue, they weren't motivated to vote against those who have opposed you on the war. In short, the issue would have been an enormous plus had you been the candidate but it didn't significantly benefit our supporters or hurt our opponents. Evidence of this was in Massachusetts which has been the most "dovish" state in the
union. There was a war referendum on the ballot -- 440,000 supported immediate withdrawal, 190,000 supported an all-out military victory and 711,000 supported the President's peace plan. At the same time doves won big margins. Your success with the peace issue probably helped us generally, but it didn't hurt our opponents.

4. The economic issue hurt badly. The pocketbook issue is always the gut issue in any campaign. It was this year a question of fear more than fact; concern over whether the country is heading into another recession or, perhaps even depression coupled with continued inflation, was a potent factor in a number of areas. As Scammon has pointed out in his book, the social issue is dominant only if there is no pocketbook issue. This one obviously hurt us in California. (Also, however, was the problem of Murphy's image, age and the Technicolor retainer.) It hurt in a number of Congressional races particularly in the Midwest and in certain areas of particularly heavy unemployment (the vote in Seattle is an example). The economic issue was compounded by the GM strike which unquestionably cost us the Indiana race -- if we have lost it -- and made the Taft race closer than it should have been. The general economic issue was further compounded by the farm problem. Republicans did badly in those states in which high parity price support has always been the issue (Nebraska, the Dakotas, Kansas, for example); witness the four contiguous House seats in which the farm issue beat us and a number of districts that we should have won, but for the farm issue. We had been warned of discontent in the Farm Belt but it was too late to counter it.

5. In general, we probably peaked too early. The Vice President peaked in late September, his line became very predictable and with many voters "old hat." Once committed to it, there was, of course, no way to turn around; perhaps, the tempo and approach could have been varied. Clearly, the Vice President had a very healthy impact in arousing our troops, raising money and generating campaign activity. (His Goodell
strategy was a key to New York.) Once he had peaked, however, his line became increasingly ineffective in winning either Democrats or Independents.

In this general regard the Democrats scored against us, by engendering sympathy. They charged us with dirty campaigning and excess spending, which tended to make us appear to be "overkilling." They were clever in making this more of an issue than it should have been. The press continually reported that we were outspending the Democrats 5 to 1 but failed to report that approximately $3 million was being spent on Democratic campaigns by the Council for a Livable World, the McGovern Fund ($1 million alone), COPE and the National Committee for an Effective Congress.

I am told this issue killed Burton even though Moss outspent Burton 2 to 1. Winthrop Rockefeller was a case in point, as was the sympathy for Lawton Chiles "poor boy" campaign.

People became tired of the campaign ten days to 2 weeks before it was over. We took the blame for excessive spending in campaigning. This hurt us as people became sick of politics and the usual charges and counter charges which they then tended to dismiss.

6. We made significant inroads with the blue collar, white ethnic vote, George Gallup's comments to the contrary notwithstanding. This vote elected Beall, defeated Duffey, elected Buckley and put Prouty over big. We are scoring in this area because of law and order and patriotism. (We are conducting an analysis of selected blue collar districts to test this conclusion.)

Prouty, who was a colorless, ineffective campaigner, carried Democratic blue collar wards in Burlington because of their antipathy toward his excessively liberal opponent. The same happened in Baltimore. Dodd took the blue collars away from Duffy. Buckley swept the white ethnic, blue collar vote. Significantly we did well in areas where unions we have begun to win over are strong (construction workers); badly, where we haven't made progress (the UAW, steelworkers).
7. As in every campaign, there were mistakes made in individual states which hurt us.

Texas: For weeks prior to the election, George Bush was convinced that he had the election won provided no one rocked the boat. He refused to allow us to use some very derogatory information about Bentsen. He resisted any ads -- positive or negative -- and refused to attack Bentsen. We probably should have forced him to do more. Dick Scammon thinks that Bush lost it for this reason and because he ignored the social issue and tried to be more liberal than Bentsen.

Maryland: In the case of Beall, he similarly refused to attack. We ended up doing it for him in a variety of ways and the political situation in Maryland reversed itself dramatically in the last week of the campaign.

Florida: Clearly the split in the party cost us the state.

Illinois: There was no way ever to elect Smith but his campaign grew excessively negative and, I am told, turned the liberal moderates in the Chicago suburbs sour. Also Ogilvie has serious splits in the party (there are some serious warnings here for 1972).

Ohio: The state ticket scandal cost us the Governorship.

Maine: With just a little help from the national level we might have elected a Governor (Irwin was hurt by the feeling the state was written off).

Pennsylvania: Shafer was so disliked, no Republican could succeed him. Scott won, which indicates the Governorship was purely a state issue.

New Jersey: Our candidate made classic mistakes, shifting positions and creating distrust.
Michigan: There was no hope without a candidate.

8. Negativism. Rightly or wrongly, the Democrats and the press made us (the Vice President in particular) appear to be too negative. As indicated in my memo on the Broder articles, we need to stress more and more the positive theme of accomplishment; that we are not only against unlawfulness and disorder but that we are doing things to control it and that we are reforming Government. We need to promote our record of accomplishment as we have done so well in foreign policy.

Conclusion: We made maximum use of national media. Our analysis shows that your campaign resulted in giving us twice the coverage the Democrats got. Without this, I am convinced the result would have been much worse because, especially in the closing days, the effect of your campaign was to take the economic issue out of the news.

As indicated above, in hindsight, I think we could have won a few more, particularly in the Senate, and with stronger party machinery could have done better with our Governorships.

On balance, we did better than the press and the pundits credit us with doing. If you accept the premise that it is inherently difficult for Presidential popularity to rub off on local candidates, then we did very well, particularly in the House.

Finally, I do not think the elections reflect any loss of support for you. To the contrary, I am convinced that had this been our election, we would have won big.

Charles W. Colson