<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box Number</th>
<th>Folder Number</th>
<th>Document Date</th>
<th>No Date</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Document Type</th>
<th>Document Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2/8/1972</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>Request from Colson for staff meeting to discuss relationship with Goldwater, Goldwater's role in campaign. 2 pgs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8/10/1972</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>Memo from Colson to RN about WH relationship with Pierre Rinfret, Rinfret's role in campaign. 2 pgs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SCHEDULE PROPOSAL
Date: February 8, 1972
FROM: CHARLES COLSON
VIA: DWIGHT CHAPIN

MEETING: SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER

DATE: As soon as it can be scheduled.

PURPOSE: To discuss with Senator Goldwater his role in the upcoming campaign.

FORMAT: -- Oval Office
-- Senator Goldwater
-- 15 minutes

TALKING POINTS: To be provided by Charles Colson

PRESS COVERAGE: None

STAFF: None

RECOMMENDED BY: Charles Colson
Patrick Buchanan
William Timmons

BACKGROUND: Our working relationship with Goldwater's staff is very poor. His press aide, Tony Smith and the Senator have been giving us totally different stories as to the role that the Senator wants to play in the upcoming campaign. The Senator appears to want us to help him with speeches and speech material; while his aide has let it be known, in no uncertain terms, that he does not appreciate White House interference. In a private discussion, the President can explain to the Senator how very much we need his help, ask Goldwater specifically what he needs from us and what procedure we should follow.
Beneath the surface is probably also the feeling on Goldwater's part that he is not appreciated as fully as he should be. Every time he meets with the President he is good for several weeks thereafter, but then he begins to feel neglected, used and out of the mainstream. Goldwater is terribly important to us, but it is obvious that his staff keeps working on him building up hostility towards the White House. This is part of the old "protect your boss" syndrome.

Unhappily, Barry does need the stroking right now and specifically we need to set up some kind of a direct relationship with him. If, in the course of the meeting, the President could say that Timmons and/or Colson and/or MacGregor will be calling you directly sometimes and when they do it is a matter of utmost importance, then I think we might be able to crack through the problem we are having with the Goldwater staff. Obviously we will not abuse this, but there are times when we need Goldwater and we simply are unable to get him programmed because of the difficulty we are having with his people.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT: Pierre Rinfret

In response to your memo of August 9 regarding Pierre Rinfret, I met with Rinfret yesterday to discuss not only the attitudes of business and financial writers he has encountered, but also his own involvement in our campaign.

Rinfret is very much out of sorts with us at the moment I think, justifiably so. A month ago MacGregor and I met with Rinfret and agreed that he would be a "principal economic spokesman" for the campaign. MacGregor and I had been very much impressed with some of the brilliant and well publicized attacks that Rinfret had made on McGovern. We agreed that he would be something of a one-man truth squad. He in turn asked for involvement in the Platform process and some recognition publicly that he was acting as an adviser to the Administration and the campaign apparatus.

In accord with our agreement, we released a story that Rinfret would be prominent for us in the campaign. Stein, Flanigan, and Shultz immediately raised very strenuous objections. As a result, while Rinfret has been flitting around the country attacking McGovern, MacGregor and I have been unable to keep our part of the agreement. He is not involved in the Platform process. We have not scheduled the photo with you which Rinfret requested and instead of his being a one-man truth squad, he has been asked to join a committee of 15 prominent economists.

Rinfret is well aware that our in-house economists have vetoed his role in the campaign. He has discussed it with Connally twice.
Connally is very disturbed at the way in which Stein, Flanigan et al have reacted to Rinfret and believes we are making a very serious error. Connally describes Rinfret as one of the most "gifted and articulate" spokesmen in the country. He believes that Rinfret should be brought in, stroked often and kept out front as the "principal economic spokesman" attacking McGovern. Connally, as you may know, is very high on Rinfret and his ability.

Based on my discussion with Rinfret yesterday, I think we may be able to satisfy him at least for a while by simply bringing him in for a photo with you. We cannot use him in the Platform process because of Stein's objections. I think perhaps if Rinfret has one meeting with you and a photo, he is enough of a self-promoter to carry it from that point by himself. He is perfectly agreeable to going anywhere in the country, talking to editorial boards, speaking to groups, attacking McGovern, going on TV, etc., but at the moment his feelings are badly bruised and, hence Connally and I believe that a meeting with you at this time is quite important. Beyond that, I will simply try to keep our own people calm while Rinfret goes out front for us.