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<td>42</td>
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<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Haldeman to Colson RE: McGovern's position on defense. 1 pg.</td>
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<td>Memo</td>
<td>From Chapin to Dick Moore RE: women and the Republican Convention. 1 pg.</td>
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June 26, 1972

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. COLSON
FROM: H. R. HALEDEMAN

I am sure you noted in yesterday's Washington POST an article on McGovern in which they called him a disciple of Dwight David Eisenhower — this related to his position on defense expenditures.

We should have a rebuttal written to that particular article placed in next Sunday's POST. Get a well-known personality to write the article (someone like Maxwell Taylor or General Omar Bradley) who can refute the McGovern assumptions.

We cannot let McGovern get away with drawing the analogy that his posture on defense is the same as Eisenhower's.

cc: Mr. Buchanan
MEMORANDUM FOR:  
CHUCK COLSON  

FROM:  
H. R. Haldeman  

We should lay out a plan whereby over the next two weeks we are in contact with the major anchormen and correspondents who will be covering the Democratic Convention. Our strategy should be to give them the proper lines about the forthcoming Republican Convention. If we get the proper material to them in the right way, it is conceivable that they will use the same in some of their Convention commentary.

You should work with the 1701 group, as well as with Ziegler, Moore, Scali, Klein, Safire, Clawson and Chapin.

This effort should be handled as much as possible on a one-on-one basis with people contacting those correspondents whom they know fairly well.

Will you please give me a report on this by Friday, June 30.
June 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
SUBJECT: Celebrities

I called Taft Schreiber last evening to review with him the plan for another celebrities event to involve Kissinger. Taft said that he had gone over the list with Dick Zanuck and that they had gone over the undecideds and had come to the conclusion that any event that they would put on would be so insignificant as compared to what Taft threw a couple of weeks ago that it would seem like a secondary party. Taft evidently has explained this to Kissinger and, according to Taft, Kissinger agrees.

Evidently, Taft has talked to Norton Simon and Simon has agreed to hold a dinner on July 7. They will invite some of their celebrity friends. As you know, Simon is now married to Jennifer Jones. According to Taft, Norton Simon is going to come aboard and Kissinger has agreed to do this event. Obviously, the group is going to be liberal-oriented and Taft feels it will be perfect for Kissinger.

When Taft talked to Kissinger, Kissinger asked about the possibility of an event on July 8 and this is when Taft told him about his conversation with Zanuck and got Kissinger to agree to not having a celebrities event.

They have given a list of celebrities to Norton Simon which includes many of the uncommitted people and Taft feels fairly sure that Simon is going to invite them to the Kissinger dinner.

In terms of an event on July 14, Taft is very much in favor of this. He feels the guest list, including wives and girl friends, would carry the number upward to about 300. He says that they had 150 committed prior to the dinner which Mrs. Nixon attended and they have 16 new commitments from young people whom he says, "are damn good". A list of the new commitments is attached.

I have talked to Dr. Kissinger and he substantiates all of the above. It is his opinion that he should not go with any event with celebrities other than
the Simon dinner. I have asked Henry to call Norton Simon today (Wednesday) and encourage him to invite some of the uncommitted celebrities so that Henry will have a chance to talk with them.

Our next step is to see whether you agree with the decision that there is not to be a "celebrity dinner" at Zanuck’s or Warner’s home and that we will let the Simon event serve that purpose.

APPROVE _______ DISAPPROVE _______

Next, we need to develop a formal plan for the event at the compound. My suggestion is that we take one of our best advance men—like Duval and put him on developing the scenario for the reception. We should handle this just as we would any Presidential event and do the basic work on it, using 1701 only for input as to names and checking them all with Taft.

APPROVE DEVELOPMENT OF A PLAN FOR A RECEPTION ON JULY 14 ______

DISAPPROVE _______

OTHER ________________________________
June 26, 1972

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
SUBJECT: CONVENTION

Moore, Carruthers, Tex and I had lunch on Friday to discuss some ideas to sex up our Convention and to keep the President on the highest possible plane.

I understand that it is in our best interest not to lock the President into anything specific too soon. Therefore, we will just keep sending suggestions in. Toes those you don’t like and hold the others as options. We have some sensational opportunities to show off the President during our Convention.

MONDAY, AUGUST 21, 1972

A. Monday night - first night of Convention. The S '76 arrives Homestead. (A crowd of youth or closed.) The Convention is underway - a dead TV period so the cameras switch live to Homestead. The President escorts Mrs. Nixon to her helicopter which departs for the Convention Hall. She will be there for Reagan and the key note. President Nixon boards his helicopter for the compound.

B. Half-way through the evening’s activities, a couple of rumors start:

1. The President has summoned the Cabinet to Key Biscayne this evening immediately after the Convention gavel is down.

2. Speculation in Chicago to the effect the President will address the Legion tomorrow.

C. When the evening session ends, the President has the Cabinet (maybe we would add some 3 or 4 leaders or a couple of Governors) come to the compound. The meeting is from 11:00 p.m. to midnight. There are many things we can do. But look at the effect. The networks will go out of their minds. The next day any of those who attended will be sought after and ideal for interviews. Mystique, drama and...
speculation something is up. Plus it builds the President's team.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1972

A. The President departs Tuesday morning in time to be in Chicago by 12:00 noon to address the Legion. He finishes about the time the third session of the Convention is called to order.

Ziegler does not confirm he is going until early Tuesday morning.

We go through Chicago around noon which gives us crowd possibilities.

Daisy should be on stage for the event.

We have focused attention on the President. Not on Richard Nixon sitting at the compound waiting to be nominated.

We have avoided having to do a raft of things in Miami in conjunction with the Convention.

His remarks are key. They are defense oriented - the near end of the ten year war - or something.

He is acclaimed by a "non-partisan" group.

Guess what the evening news is all about!

B. When the President arrives back at Key Biscayne, he goes to the compound. Later after the nomination (or maybe early before the nomination is placed) he goes to the Youth Rally.

We are somewhat reluctant to have the President come before the full Convention two evenings. If we can create alternates to two Convention appearances, it is probably to our advantage.

The option to the Monday night arrival would be to have the President fly into Chicago from Los Angeles or Washington on Tuesday for the Legion. He could go on to Florida. After the nomination, he could go with the Cabinet meeting.
SUGGESTED FOLLOW-UP POINTS

1. Between the two Conventions, the case between the Democratic platform and the Democrats' performance in Congress should be exploited. A plan should be developed by the Congressional Liaison Staff in conjunction with the Domestic Council Staff detailing activities designed to illustrate Congress' poor performance. The activity should be designed for the period between the Conventions and should assume that there will be very little Presidential time available for his participation.

   APPROVE __________   DISAPPROVE __________

   MacGREGOR SHOULD GET THE ACTION __________

   MacGREGOR AND EHRLICHMAN TO GET THE ACTION __________

   HALDEMAN MEMORANDUM __________

   PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM __________

2. The Domestic Council should be asked to come up with domestic related events during the period between the Conventions. These activities again should be ones which can be handled by people other than the President, as well as perhaps a couple of good recommendations for Presidential activity. These activities should concentrate on special voter bloc efforts, as well as key domestic efforts - in particular, taxation.

   APPROVE __________   DISAPPROVE __________

   DRAFT MEMO FOR HRH TO SEND EHRLICHMAN __________

   SHOULD BE PRESIDENTIAL MEMO TO EHRLICHMAN __________

3. Ken Cole's memorandum states that the President "needs to rearticulate publicly his domestic philosophy - what he stands for - what he is for and against domestically." He states a little later, "...he needs to state his goals for the nation domestically and how we are going to get there." I am not sure that the President knows what his domestic philosophy is. It seems to me that we should have a paper drafted by the Domestic Council, in particular, by Ehrlichman or Cole, which does state what our domestic philosophy is at this time.

   APPROVE __________   DISAPPROVE __________

   OTHER __________
2.

4. It is suggested that perhaps the President consider a trip to Midway if all the indicators are right during the post-Democratic pre-Republican Conventions. The idea would be to dramatize troop cuts and meet with President Thieu.

CHECK IDEA WITH KISSINGER

DROP IDEA

OTHER

5. Colson has recommended that the President be in Washington between Conventions and do one or two highly visible domestic events, perhaps a veto or calling in some food chain retailers.

HAVE COLSON DEVELOP SPECIFIC PROPOSALS

DROP

6. Ken Clawson has recommended that in the post-Convention period the President spend a week to ten days personally meeting with key national, regional, and local Party officials to give them marching orders. He feels it should be kept a closed affair and that we should let the press speculate. Should this idea be checked out with other political types?

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

CHECK MITCHELL FIRST

7. Buchanan and Haig both make the point, as well as Chapin, that we should not shoot every one of our cannons at once. We need to dribble out our material so that McGovern is kept on the defensive. Who is in charge of developing the release schedule for the issue material? Is there any action which should be taken on this front or is it under control?

COMMENT:

8. Rumsfeld says we should enhance the President's advantage of incumbency by finding ways to contrast his Presidential actions with the opponent's rhetoric. I would like to ask Rumsfeld for some specific ways of doing this -- examples or techniques of how he would go about it.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE
3.

9. Clawson raises a point which many others mention in terms of the problem of the economy and unemployment figures. He says historically the Democrats lived from these issues. He proposes creating an almost separate, well-staffed, well-financed internal group whose job would be to solely create an image of economic well-being in the country. He goes on to advocate a counterattack mechanism on the economy to be headed by Colson in collaboration with Mitchell. Should we put this together? Under Colson?

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

COLSON SHOULD CHECK MITCHELL

COLSON SHOULD COORDINATE WITH SHULTZ

DROP IT

10. Buchanan in his original memorandum on the McGovern attack, as well as Ray Price, suggested we nail McGovern early on his radicalism. I assume that you and the Attorney General are signing off on the action memorandum which Buchanan sent in.

YES

NO

OTHER

11. Colson's memorandum had several specific items regarding things that should be hit in the domestic area and action that the President could take or meetings which could be held, etc. It was his May 17th memorandum which was an addendum to the memorandum which I am addressing myself to. I assume that you will act independently on that memorandum.

YES

NO

12. Do you agree that we should set up some villains - bureaucracy, big spenders, abortionists, and perhaps a couple of others and start building them as straw enemies now? We can work up speech material and other facts which the surrogates can start cranking into their talks.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

13. In regard to the credibility and trust issue, do you concur that our surrogates, our Convention apparatus, and everyone should be mobilized in order to plug continually the credibility of the President?

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

HAVE BUCHANAN DEVELOP SPECIFICS THAT CAN ACT AS SPEECH INSERTS

HAVE PRICE AND SPEECH WRITERS DEVELOP SPECIFICS
14. Clawson feels that with the media our strategy must be to discredit and to spotlight the unworkability of almost everything McGovern proposes. The Administration officials must ask publicly the hard questions since the media will not. Should we draft for our surrogates a series of questions which they can start asking about McGovern currently? We can update and move it along as the campaign escalates. Our first step would be to do questions which can be asked prior to the Democratic Convention.

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Should Colson go ahead with this?

APPROVE _______ DISAPPROVE _______

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OTHER __________________________
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1. Realizing the credibility and wisdom in playing off our strong suit of foreign policy, I still see a need (as do several others) to engineer a play for the domestic area. There is absolutely no reason to let McGovern force us early on into a completely defense posture vis-a-vis domestic affairs. Perhaps the whole key to our domestic affairs attack is our pleading the case for getting the economy in order and stressing the merits of the President's economic policy and his courage in moving into his reordering of the economy. We can tie directly to what McGovern's policies would do to economic stability and taxation and make our charge about the "McGovern Market."

2. I like Rumsfeld's idea that we find ways to contrast Presidential actions with McGovern's rhetoric. The question becomes, "How?" We need to get some specifics here and it should be part of the follow-up to this memorandum.

3. I made a point in my original memorandum, and Buchanan made the same point (others alluded to it) of the critical timing in terms of launching our various attacks. We must make certain that by the middle of October we have some initiative left. I favor putting a lot of stock in our ability to react quickly enough to issue charges so as to have the public feel that we are actually on the offensive side and that it is McGovern who is trying to defend. As I stated before, this has got to tie in to Pete Dailey's operation, as well as with those who are monitoring the issues for you.

4. Safire makes the point about picking a villain to attack. This is the same concept that Connally expressed to the senior staff at Blair House about attacking straw enemies. We should take the straw enemies such as the bureaucracy, big spenders, perhaps Congress (I'm not sure on Congress), drug pushers, the abortionists, and others and start building them as giant enemies to the general public now. We can demagogue these enemies through our surrogates in order to insure that when the President takes them on in the heat of the campaign they represent more of a threat to our constituency than they do presently.
5. Although others did not mention it specifically, I want to re-emphasize my point that we keep the debate on issues on the broadest possible range. A one-issue campaign such as law and order was in 1970 should be avoided since it does not play to our advantage. Credibility is the real danger here. The exception as stated before would be a foreign policy crisis.

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June 9, 1972
2:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALEMANN
FROM: DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
SUBJECT: General Thoughts

Some ideas were generated from the trip to California. Check or comment on any which you feel have merit.

1. Have Julie address a high school graduation, perhaps a vocational college. We would keep it short and have it reprinted in Readers' Digest.

2. Make Len Garment our Hugh Sidey and get the Newsweek/Washington Post syndicate to run him. He has the flair and the emotional understanding of the President.

3. Give Dick Moore the job of figuring out how NBC or Metromedia is purchased and develop a plan on it. We could establish our own mini-network or better yet, think big.

4. Get educational TV, Metromedia or whoever to rerun the July 4 Archives speech.

5. Today McGovern is producing slick TV, spending a fortune and using more Madison Avenue techniques and people than we ever did or will. Tomorrow McGovern will be the poor boy. We will be the big spenders, the slick ones and be torn apart by the media.

Let's attack McGovern now. Let's say now that McGovern is a TV age product who is meeting only the test of the tube, not leadership.
6. Send Julie, Tricia or both to the Summer Olympics. The best dates are from September 1 to 4. ABC plans massive coverage and we could do a lot of color things.

7. Wolper says Teddy White told him, "McGovern is not a smart man". Maybe we should get this talk circulated among the press.

cc: Dick Moore
June 28, 1972
11:45 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR:  DICK MOORE
FROM:  DWIGHT L. CHAPIN

I hope you follow-up with someone concerning your thoughts about women and the Republican Convention. We tend to downplay the importance of women in so much of what we do and I think that if we take that attitude concerning the Convention and the election we're going to find ourselves in deep trouble.

The idea you expressed about some of the trashy looking types that will be used at the Democratic Convention and our putting forward good solid positive-looking citizens at our Convention, I think is outstanding. We can use housewives, secretaries, teachers, nurses, you name it. This should all start with the platform hearings and go right through the campaign.

One thing that we should keep in mind is the big issue that single working girls have with the tax burden they must carry. I'll bet if you took a poll among the unmarried secretaries in the White House you would find the tax issue is one of their major gripes.