TRANSCRIPT OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE
PRESIDENT AND H.R. HALDEMAN IN THE OVAL
OFFICE ON APRIL 26, 1973, FROM 8:55 TO 10:24
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PRESIDENT: Hi.
HALDEMAN: Hi.
HALDEMAN: Just to show you somebody still has faith
PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)?
HALDEMAN: No.
PRESIDENT: Your daughter?
HALDEMAN: No.
PRESIDENT: Uh.
HALDEMAN: Our former gardener, when we lived out in
Candlewoods, wife, sent back, her, she sent
a Easter, and she had it brought into town, Easter time and...

PRESIDENT: It's to you then.
HALDEMAN: No, that's to you, to President Nixon.* She
had a big talk with (unintelligible) and
she'd baked a cake for us.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: She had sent me a card saying...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: ...keep plugging or something...

PRESIDENT: Right.
HALDEMAN: ...and she sent that for you and she sent a cigar which was stuck on with a rubber band, but Just (unintelligible)... 

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) 

HALDEMAN: there are a lot of just plain Americans around too. 

PRESIDENT: Sure there are a lot of people, and, uh, what we have to do is to keep our faith, right? 

HALDEMAN: Yep. 

PRESIDENT: Straight on. 

HALDEMAN: Yes, indeed. We got a... 

PRESIDENT: Now Burger is saying, about, about... 

HALDEMAN: Really not much of anything. We've got a meeting with, with the lawyers, uh, gotta put some more stuff together for them, dates and times and all, you know, we're trying to get everything. Anticipating... 

PRESIDENT: Um hum. 

HALDEMAN: Chinks in the armor, anywhere. Uh, but I, I didn't talk to them last night. 

PRESIDENT: Um hum. 

HALDEMAN: So there's nothing beyond -nothing from them and, uh, the only alternative, -there are a couple of thoughts on, on, uh, forgetting about the case for a minute, now in the general situation thing, right? We've got a problem in that its hard to act at all until the Grand Jury does some thing for til some til Justice does something you don't have any grounds...
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PRESIDENT: Um hum.
HALDEMAN: ...for action and any action you take prejudices both...
PRESIDENT: That's right.
HALDEMAN: ways, the prosecution and the defense.
PRESIDENT: That's right.
HALDEMAN: They are (unintelligible) the type that can help us. Best thing is this and keep us, they sort of got us out there and maybe we just figure that's the way it is. You ride through that.
PRESIDENT: I don't think there's anything to do.
HALDEMAN: There probably isn't the, uh...
PRESIDENT: I solve the problem as I...
HALDEMAN: There's a need from, uh, a public viewpoint to, uh, sort of make the, pull the White House together I think, make things look better -look like they're...
PRESIDENT: Like we're right.
HALDEMAN: ...under control which they are, I mean, there's no...
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: There's no -there was lit--...
PRESIDENT: That was good that Henry's story, came out yesterday about (unintelligible) and so forth.
HALDEMAN: Um hum. Um hum.
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PRESIDENT: Very good. Even though...
HALDEMAN: And, uh, there all this stuff with uh, you know, that you're restructuring the White House staff and all that.
PRESIDENT: Yeah, Laird, for Christ sake.
HALDEMAN: That's a strange one. But, uh,...
PRESIDENT: Well, there was, uh, feeler made a long time ago where everybody could come back, you know, under some -I don't know what it was about. Probably Congressional, this Congressional thing.
HALDEMAN: Yeah, I talked to him.
PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)
HALDEMAN: Well, let's set himself up for, uh, office and not - even if there were...
PRESIDENT: Well, I must say Haig handled himself yesterday.
HALDEMAN: He called me yesterday morning and said, uh, he said, "I've got to go out, I've got to go public today." And I said, "Well that's your first mistake." And he laughed and he says, "I agree, but I, this is a commitment I made a long time ago and it would look worse to cancel it, uh now," and stuff. Uh, said, "If you have any guidance on anything you want me to say, let me know." But he said, "Here is - here is my position." Then he laid out that, "What I'm gonna say is that President - I have full confidence in the President's...
PRESIDENT: ...Sure, he had (unintelligible) and all that.

HALDEMAN: And, uh he said, "I don't think I should say anything more than that." And I said, "I think you're absolutely right." And he says, "These bastards are trying to divide us. They're trying, uh, to push us in and the same people who have always been against us like the Brooks and Schweikers and (unintelligible)...

PRESIDENT: Um hum.

HALDEMAN: "...we still have a problem with, and, of course, the press."

PRESIDENT: Yes.

HALDEMAN: He says, "I think we've just got to, uh, 'til the President moves an-an-and when he moves, we got to support that track position all the way and nothing else and not go beyond it."

PRESIDENT: That's right, Bob.

HALDEMAN: Goodness, that's great. (Unintelligible) going out today. Uh, the, uh, media clamor -you know, I, I don't know I, I was trying to think whether it was some thing from this side can be done.

PRESIDENT: Just don't think there is, Bob.

HALDEMAN: That, what you're hanging up on, what we're hanging up on, now is if there, if there should be a move on me, it should follow or compliment, should be tied with, it should follow a move' on Dean. You can't -(coughs) excuse me -you can't make the move on Dean...
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PRESIDENT: Yeah
HALDEMAN: ...until you have some reason for it.
PRESIDENT: That's right. Basically he, he's not, he you see, has not confessed -well, in a sense, he's confessed to me but he hasn't to the Attorney General and officially you understand it?
HALDEMAN: That's right.
PRESIDENT: They have their arm's length of the all discussions. So...
HALDEMAN: 'cept they don't have, the basis if you don't have the basis -it's makes you look bad here...
PRESIDENT: That's right.
HALDEMAN: In a sense that -because there's the public mind...
PRESIDENT: Um hum.
HALDEMAN: ...has Dean pretty well fixed, they have Mitchell pretty well fixed and they have Magruder pretty well fixed.
PRESIDENT: That's right.
HALDEMAN: They keep -they're, they're, they're careful about fixing me. They, they say the closest to fixing we they get is, I must have known.
PRESIDENT: That's right.
HALLEIDIAN: Because the way we ran things here, couldn't happen without me knowing.
PRESIDENT: That's right.
HALDEMAN: And that imputes to the White House the control of the campaign, and somewhere it seems to me that's got to be pumped on. You know, you controlled all of your campaigns.

PRESIDENT: Huh? Before.

HALDEMAN: But as President you weren't able to control your campaign.

PRESIDENT: Deliberately did not.

HALDEMAN: And I would (unintelligible)...

PRESIDENT: Deliberately (unintelligible). Right.

HALDEMAN: ...and didn't really try to, to except to keep on top of what when on.

PRESIDENT: Ehrlichman (unintelligible)...

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) idea now.

PRESIDENT: Hmm.

HALDEMAN: Well, we got to be a little careful about that because there was in the, uh, post Watergate area, era, uh,

PRESIDENT: Campaign.

HALDEMAN: ...there was a, a political meeting twice a week in Ehrlichman's office, with uh,...

PRESIDENT: Okay.

HALDEMAN: ...MacGregor and, and Harlow...
PRESIDENT: I was referring though to the...
HALDEMAN: ...and Mitchell I think came...
PRESIDENT: ...I was referring to the, uh, the pre-Watergate thing.
HALDEMAN: Yeah, and they're; uh, -really none of us had, it's amazing, when you go back and look through the papers how little any of us, you or me or Ehrlichman, was involved in any of that stuff.
PRESIDENT: Talking a little about you know what I mean, we all know soon what's going to happen on that case in California, you know, I, uh,...
HALDEMAN: Ellsberg.
PRESIDENT: Ellsberg, right. I, uh, had filled John in. He prob--...
HALDEMAN: Yes, he's told me.
PRESIDENT: ...(unintelligible). Just worry the hell out of him but, Bob, uh, he had to worry about it,
HALDEMAN: That's right
PRESIDENT: ...knew that was going to come out, I mean, they, uh, uh...
HALDEMAN: He's not, no, he's not uptight about it at all.
PRESIDENT: Let me tell you why, the, the reason that is, as you know, that photo was in that file and they were bound to find it.
HALDEMAN: Yeah, I didn't know that, but, uh...

PRESIDENT: Did you hear about it?

HALDEMAN: No, not until I heard that tape yesterday. I, I still don't know what that means -you mean that they took a picture, when they broke in, and that picture was in Hunt's file in the stuff they turned over to the FBI.

PRESIDENT: That's why Dean's saying that, the uh, Ehrlichman is uh, uh, that, that Hunt's gonna blow the whistle on him, is blackmail.

HALDEMAN: Does Ehrlichman know that, that photo was in the file?

PRESIDENT: Yes, he does. But Ehrlichman, Ehrlichman says he, he knows about the break-in.

HALDEMAN: Oh yeah.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) told him, I mean the point is that break-in, -therefore, Bob, isn't a question of the photo, it's all, it's all admitted, no question about that being proved -that Dean up and told 'em, all about it.

HALDEMAN: Well one 'Interesting development that gets into this whole time, time becomes one hell of a problem here and it scents to me for your sake, speed is of the essence, that...

PRESIDENT: Um, hum.

HALDEMAN: ...every hour sooner everything can happen, the better.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: But, uh, Dash told Garment yesterday that they want Ehrlichman and me next week at the Senate Committee, uh, in-internal. You know that pre-, preliminary meeting kind of thing.
PRESIDENT: Um hum.
HALDEMAN: Because they're doing their interviews to build their case for the hearings.
PRESIDENT: Well, you and Ehrlichman have got to get before a Grand Jury before then -(unintelligible) go.
HALDEMAN: See, that's what John's view was.
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: That we can't get up there until we've gone to the Grand Jury...
PRESIDENT: Absolutely. That's gonna be that should be your view throughout, everybody here, we will not go before that Committee until, uh, we have understood, you could say, that we were to be before the Grand Jury, as soon as we finish the Grand Jury -you've asked Congress that's-(unintelligible). Your lawyers are, should get me a letter, (unintelligible) will get me a letter. I'll have, I’ll have that ready to go. And you, -you know, but you and John should not appear before that -at the end. Uh, well I guess you don't want Garment to tell them.
HALDEMAIN: 'Cause I must say now it really looks as if, uh, you have more privacy at the Senate Committee than you do with the Grand Jury. That Grand Jury thing's in credible. The prosecutors 'apparently called Jack Anderson in...
PRESIDENT: Yeah, I know. I heard about it.
HALDEMAN: ...and convinced him that he was disserving the case by printing this stuff. So he's not gonna print it verbatim anymore he's gonna paraphrase.
PRESIDENT: Yeah. (Laughs).
HALDEMAN: Which just makes it even worse. Even it's verbatim...

PRESIDENT: Except that when the prosecutors told him that, Jack Anderson said that he was getting it from a good Republican. What do you mean a good Republican, you mean a Republican on the staff that would remain—I mean the prosecutor's staff. Who you talking about. That's ridiculous. It's somebody—I think it's Glasner or Glaysner or whatever his name is, but that's not very true.

HALDEMAN: That's probably from one—of the court—one of the reporters.

PRESIDENT: Well, it could be. I doubt it though.
HALDEMAN: How could he keep on doing that though. I just, that's what bothers me cause I go before the Grand Jury and they put it, put it...up and give Jack Anderson my minutes...

PRESIDENT: Um, hum, um hum.
HALDEMAN: ...and he selects what he's gonna paraphrase to put out, you're gonna have...

PRESIDENT: Right.
HALDEMAN: ...another...
PRESIDENT: Right.
HALDEMAN: ...(unintelligible) who cares.
PRESIDENT: Right.
HALDEMAN: he's gonna...
PRESIDENT: Oh Bob, your stuff is out anyway.
HALDEMAN: Yeah, it really is.
PRESIDENT: Right. Oh, that, that a couple of quick things. He said that, uh, -this is all this stuff here (unintelligible) -that uh, he talked about Segretti, and, uh, they're trying to get into the fact that Segretti had apparently had something to do with the Jackson memorandum on Muskie or something like that. Apparently, they left the thing that's, that's hanging on Segretti. He says Segretti's scared, and I said is that why he pled the Fifth Amendment? He said maybe so. He said also -we're trying to check through that he did in a Canuck letter Jesus Christ, I don't know anything about who did the Canuck letter. You know nothing about either of those. Of course, you're line with Segretti's is going to be, that he totally exceeded his... authority now.

HALDEMAN: Well, yeah, in the first place that, that he didn't have...

PRESIDENT: ...any authority from you, I know.

HALDEMAN: ...any authority from me, nor did I have knowledge of what he did, I had a 'knowledge of the premise on which (unintelligible)'

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) he was supposed to have
HALDEMAN: ...set up

PRESIDENT: That's right.
HALDEMAN: ...and that was clearly...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: ...and was specifically spelled out to him not to be anything illegal.
PRESIDENT: Somebody, incidentally, in that connection is preparing to (unintelligible) somebody the counterattack that we're gonna make on their campaign tactics. Is that correct, or is that false?

HALDEMAN: I don't know now. They were, but I haven't stayed in touch with that

PRESIDENT: I think it is necessary if you could get before the Committee - that you be prepared to do that. See? The minute you get before that Committee, you gotta do that.

HALDEMAN: Yeah. (Pause)

PRESIDENT: Now Ehrlichman realizes that they may call Dean up there and Dean will have to reveal what the operation was. And that's gonna be a hell of a story, of course. Watergate buggers broke in Ellsberg's office. Boy, oh wow, huh! How do you evaluate that? Now, the bad thing - who knows, you know. There's so much now. It appears more and more that we're I guess (unintelligible) wrong. Here, I see where they fired some poor guy that hired a college kid for the purposes of participating in counter demonstrations and I can't understand that either. (Unintelligible)...

HALDEMAN: (unintelligible) why is that George Gordon. He was in here in your office on that day Reese brought the young guys in. He was the more valuable guy. (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Right. I know that Bob, but - what in the name of God is wrong with that?

HALDEMAN: Not a damn thing, and it just...
PRESIDENT: You've got (unintelligible). Do they think, they think for one moment that the demonstrators, that get us all over the place, were all unpaid?

HALDEMAN: Well, of course not.

PRESIDENT: They were not paid.

HALDEMAN: And we weren't, we -he wasn't putting demonstrators in to hit them.

PRESIDENT: No.

HALDEMAN: He was putting people into the demonstrators that were getting us, to find out what they were doing.

PRESIDENT: That's right. We can do something about this. And I don't think people like the, uh, you know, the uh, what they did. That's why I said if you could — may I just say on the counterattacks (unintelligible) career, (unintelligible) tire to do much on that. But let's get ready on that, shall we? Another thing is that Ehrlichman and you should put together, Ehrlich-, apparently a pretty formidable thing, some thing that Ziegler could perhaps get, get out in an policy sense — the Presidential initiatives calling within the staff for action on this thing. You know what I mean that Ehrlichman mentioned several things I'd forgotten. He says that I said look for Chist sakes, get this out, get a hold of MacGregor, get a hold of this one, get out a statement get sworn statements from, get — uh, this was later, but all through the summer I was gonna...
HALDEMAN: Yeah.
PRESIDENT: Uh, or do you think that's worth it?
HALDEMAN: Yeah.
PRESIDENT: I think the record that I was not here sitting on my ass to watch my purse like a you know pig in a poke. Or is that worth it now?
HALDEMAN: I think something is. No, I think it is. I'm, I'm not sure...
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: ...whether you want that out separately or whether you try to tie that into...
PRESIDENT: Um hum.
HALDEMAN: ...something that is the next step.
PRESIDENT: Right. Oh it's only part of the step. I agree, I agree. Don't just throw it out there and let it be tilled. But, I -the entire record has got to be put out by somebody, uh, it may be. Look it here -the way I look at it is that you, when before the Ervin Committee have got to be the guy defending the White House on the campaign, and also defending the campaign. Bob. I don't mean I'd (unintelligible) in the campaign, but what I-mean is, this, uh, if you could, you been thinking of that anyway, you know.
HALDEMAN: Yeah.
PRESIDENT: And I was thinking anybody else can't do it, Ehrlichman can't do it, so forth and so on. But, by God, you can
and that's gonna be a very important function for you. I think, in addition to that, there's got to be some body, I mean Ehrlichman or somebody who's got to get out that Nixon directed the Watergate thing, which is not one of just sitting on my ass, you know -asking everybody, asking the White House people were you involved. I never made a statement, Ziegler never made a statement without I don't think that Ziegler lied. I don't. I'm just not going to let anybody keep making that statement. He did not, he never lied. Ziegler always recorded what he had been told, you know. He didn't go out there and deliberately lie to say that somebody had been cleared. Do you think he did?

No, but, but see, that's what their (unintelligible) is, is -no. Well, Mollenhoff's hitting him that he lied He, he's sent up this screen thing. But I don't think the others buy that, but what they do buy is that his credibility is no good, because what he told them has now proved not to be correct.

That's right.

Not because he intentionally lied, but, but because he was not told the correct information...

Uh, huh.

...to tell them.

That's all right. That's what he's got to say. We've got to save Ziegler now, you know.
HALDEMAN: Okay, but so then now they challenge him. He says -now like, like they within yesterday -he said the White House staff, "There have been no changes in the White House staff." Uh, and then they say, "Well, how could we believe that any more than... maybe that's what they told you, but, but, maybe there have been."

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: And, uh, "How do we know that there's any...

PRESIDENT: ...say of my own knowledge or gentle men, my own knowledge or something like that. You know what I mean. And he's got to separate it out. Ziegler's, uh -well White House press secretaries are often attacked for lying...

HALDEMAN: Oh, yeah.

PRESIDENT: ...representatives and so forth and I wouldn't get all spent up about that.

HALDEMAN: No, and I, I think that's but I think it's uh,...

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: ...it's another area, that -but there needs to be more action on business as usual in here, I think. I think that's want I'm...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...trying to say. There needs to be a, uh, uh, within the inside. Now to their credit, some of the young guys in here got together yesterday and, uh, said these are, you got; and I'll tell you, you got some shits in this place, but you got about 90 percent of just really sterling people.
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PRESIDENT: Right.
HALDEMAN: And they on their own initiative got together and said we're getting hacked from the outside here on this crap about everybody buried himself in the White House and the, the you know.

PRESIDENT: Well the one thing I'm (unintelligible) all the secretaries.
HALDEMAN: Well, that's the one idea that came out of that meeting.

PRESIDENT: Another thing I'm going to do, I'm having a long meeting with Shultz today, and I'm having a meeting with the Troika.
HALDEMAN: I, uh, -you do need to do that.

PRESIDENT: Oh, and I'm having a meet --, a meeting Saturday morning.
HALDEMAN: Good.

PRESIDENT: Uh, who with? Judge.
HALDEMAN: These guys made the point -they recognize, they said it's obvious that, that some of the people here have got to concentrate on, on this other thing. In the meantime, it's up to us to rally to the cause here.

PRESIDENT: Right.
HALDEMAN: And get, keep things going right and looking right while we're doing that. One thing they came up with as an idea, that I'm not so sure is bad, is that we haul in, uh, the staff and the sub-cabinet for another one of these periodic briefings that we do, that we've done, you know, from time to time, absolutely without your participation.

PRESIDENT: This time.
HALDEMAN: No, no they say that if, if it's a imperative fact in this that the President must not participate but where, uh, Ehrlichman gives them a run-down on the energy...

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

HALDEMAN: status and Shultz gives them a rundown on the economics, (unintelligible) gives them a rundown on the (unintelligible). Look...

PRESIDENT: Right, right, right.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) run out. And I made 'the point that yet that -this is very delicate but it's got to be worked out and I think maybe it can be. We can't overlook the fact that the Watergate factors's here, you know...

PRESIDENT: We're not overlooking it.

HALDEMAN: And we're not overlooking it, but we can't overlook the fact that all of us have far more important missions in the long track...

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: ...than that and,...

PRESIDENT: ...and the President is (unintelligible) doing everything we can to get to the bottom of this. Believe me, uh, every individual here is expend --, is expendable, uh, in the event that the Watergate thing is, uh, touches him, even, even innocently, you know or something like that.

HALDEMAN: Yeah. I just gotta make this point and get...
PRESIDENT: Very good.
HALDEMAN: ...and get everybody sorta...
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: ...snapped back into, uh,...
PRESIDENT: But could you do that? Could you do that soon?
HALDEMAN: I, I think so.
PRESIDENT: Well, I'm all for it, I'm all for it.
HALDEMAN: And I think it's probably a good thing to do.
PRESIDENT: Well, I don't think I'd try to do it maybe Friday night or this status thing.
HALDEMAN: First of the week maybe.
PRESIDENT: Tomorrow -well do it Monday, why don't you do it Monday. Put it down, Bob let's follow it. Let's kick, kick hard.
HALDEMAN: Good.
PRESIDENT: Let me come back now to our tapes of yesterday, our --you, had you -let me ask you two or three questions. Uh, have you, you haven't had a chance to listen to the rest?
HALDEMAN: No, I'll do it after the lawyers meeting today.
PRESIDENT: Um. When will that be?
HALDEMAN: We're meeting with them at 10:30. I don't know how long that'll take, but as soon as welfare through with that I, you know.
PRESIDENT: What you have for the rest is the rest of that day.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but I can check forward and backward a little bit and see whether you'd have anything.

PRESIDENT: Hmm.

HALDEMAN: It's just, you just I don't meant to be, uh, slow on that, but it's...

PRESIDENT: I know.

HALDEMAN: You got to understand (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: I know.

HALDEMAN: ...like looking at a piece paper where you can skim through it...

PRESIDENT: I know, I know.

HALDEMAN: ...have to listen to the whole thing, you can't skim...

PRESIDENT: I know. What did happen after that, that day, the 21st? Did I see Dean again that day?

HALDEMAN: Yes sir. Well, not alone, I don't believe.

PRESIDENT: That's one. I didn't see him alone is the important thing

HALDEMAN: You saw him with Mitchell and us and then you saw him with John and me. You saw him twice more that day but, but...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: ...groups. No. No. No. No. Wait I'm wrong. Let me get my book. Bring me in the green, uh, Presidential log book. You know the one I mean? Uh...

PRESIDENT: When did he go to Camp David?

HALDEMAN: Friday, I believe.

PRESIDENT: Huh?

HALDEMAN: Friday, I think.

PRESIDENT: When was the, the 21st?

HALDEMAN: Wednesday. Let me get the log book. Let's be sure, 'cause, I'm, I'm...

PRESIDENT: Isn't it your-view that that basically is what Dean's talking about with regard to this bomb - big play

HALDEMAN: Maybe, but I don't see how. I think, it's some, I think something else and just trying to go back through the Dean stuff to see what it could be. I think, think- (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: The reason I asked is that Petersen mentioned to Higby the fact that, uh, "Don't let the President get into the position of obstructing justice." Well, hell, I don't know what the hell he means.

HALDEMAN: Uh, he may mean the business of you, uh, saying, "Don't give immunity."

PRESIDENT: Uh, I've changed. We've covered that base.
HALDEMAN: Okay. You, that was your last meeting with Dean. You never met with Dean again.

PRESIDENT: Thank God.

HALDEMAN: You met with Dean and I came in that morning.

PRESIDENT: I called him on the phone a couple times, I told him—I'd discuss it then.

HALDEMAN: Well, I can check that—go out and get my phone log.

PRESIDENT: Yes. I may—No the phone logs, but, uh, the—that won't prove anything 'cause we don't have any tapes.

HALDEMAN: Yes, we do. Well, it depends on what phone you used. We do if you phoned from here. And from the EOB office and from the Lincoln Room, cause you had those phones covered. 'Cause that was in that evening, 5:30 you met with Ehrlichman, Dean and me for 40 minutes over at the EOB.

PRESIDENT: What was, do you remember that was about?

HALDEMAN: That was about the Ervin business.

PRESIDENT: Right. And then?

HALDEMAN: And then...

PRESIDENT: When'd the next one come in?
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HALDEMAN: ...then the next morning, Thursday morning, late morning, uh, Ehrlichman and Dean and Mitchell and I met.

PRESIDENT: But didn't see me.

HALDEMAN: Yeah. Then we came to meet with you at about 1:45.

PRESIDENT: That was the only time I had with Mitchell.

HALDEMAN: Just to put your frame of reference in there that was the morning, that was the day we had the Sub-Cabinet meeting, the White House staff thing over--the thing you came over.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...and gave them a little shot there. Then you came over here. You met with Shulcroff (ph) for twenty minutes and then you had Sanniaria...

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: ...in and then you had, uh, Bush, Brock, Michael and Timmons in.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Campaign committees. Then you met with the Commission on Marijuana...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...stuff and with some Mrs. Bedford and her nephew, whoever that was. Now...

PRESIDENT: Old woman.
HALDEMAN: and Congressman Butler...

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: ...and Congressman Edwards and Sid (unintelligible)...

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: ...and Herb Klein and his family...

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: ...and, uh, then Zeigler for a few minutes and then Shulcroff (ph) for a few minutes and then you had for a hour and a half with Ehrlichman, Dean, Haldeman and Mitchell. Now of that--you actually met 100 minutes of that, Ehrlichman, and I were there, and 110 minutes Dean and Mitchell were there. So you had ten minutes with Dean and Mitchell either before or after John and I.

PRESIDENT: Well, I had Mitchell alone, I don't know whether Dean...

HALDEMAN: This shows Dean was there.

PRESIDENT: Uh huh.

HALDEMAN: It can be wrong, this you know, there can be mistakes in this log.

PRESIDENT: I recall that I had Mitchell stay back, a minute, remain back, I don't remember Dean out there.

HALDEMAN: You see he may have waited in the outer office, you may have kept Mitch-Mitchell in your inner office and Dean may have waited in the outer office for Mitchell to come out.
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PRESIDENT: Uh, that's more likely...

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible). But then the girl wouldn't know. She doesn't know until they come out of the outer door. Then that afternoon was when you had your meeting with Ehrlichman and Shultz when Shultz your helicopter landed and Shultz went on talking.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: And—you wrote that memo about—it was one of Shultz' better moments. And then you left for Key Biscayne at six o'clock or 6:30.

PRESIDENT: Right, so I must have called Dean from Key Biscayne then.

HALDEMAN: Well, if you did, we wouldn't have a tape.

PRESIDENT: What date is that?

HALDEMAN: That's the 22nd.

PRESIDENT: By that time, Dean was...

HALDEMAN: Dean went to Camp—I'm not sure whether Dean went to Camp David on the 23rd or the 24th but, uh, somewhere in there, he went to Camp David. I, I'm told it was the 23rd. Then when he came back...

PRESIDENT: And he stayed until when?

HALDEMAN: The 26th.

PRESIDENT: Um hum. Of March.
HALDEMAN: But then you never met with him again.
PRESIDENT: I didn't.
HALDEMAN: See on the 30th we went to California. We got back here from Camp David the 28th
PRESIDENT: Oh, I made my speech the 28th
HALDEMAN: ...you came back from Key Biscayne on Monday night, the 26th.
PRESIDENT: Right. Then I worked on my speech.
HALDEMAN: Tuesday, you met with Kissinger for an hour, then with me for an hour, then and then with Husheba (ph).
PRESIDENT: Right. Tell that (unintelligible) was right.
HALDEMAN: And then, you had a meeting with Ehrlichman and me...
PRESIDENT: Right.
HALDEMAN: ...and then you had Congressman Congresswoman Boggs.
PRESIDENT: Right, right.
HALDEMAN: ...came in
PRESIDENT: Right, right.
HALDEMAN: And then you spent an hour with Bill Rogers...
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PRESIDENT: Right.
HALDEMAN: ...after Boggs, and then another hour with me, and then it was clear for a while and when another hour with me later. Then you went over to look at your new bowling alley that evening.

PRESIDENT: Right.
HALDEMAN: With Julie.
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: Then the next morning, Wednesday, was a--well you were working on your speech and you saw me for a few minutes

PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: ...in the morning, for about an hour at noon, and for...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: ...twenty minutes at the end of the day.

PRESIDENT: Right.
HALDEMAN: Thursday you met with Shultz for a few minutes in the morning and Kissinger for a few minutes, me for a 'Lew minutes mid day. Then you did have Ehrlichman and me in on Thursday.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: For two hours.
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PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: 2:30 to 4:30 and Ziegler in for a little bit during that. And that was—I've the, got notes on...

PRESIDENT: Something must have developed that day.
HALDEMAN: Yeah, it was getting Ziegler to put something out.

PRESIDENT: Oh, oh, Ziegler was making—that's right.
HALDEMAN: Yeah, on the 29th, that's—when you put out the statement. And then, uh, then you met with Ehrlichman for an hour

PRESIDENT: And then I made my statement.
HALDEMAN: ...in the afternoon. You made the speech that night and then the next day you were just up to your ass in alligators.

PRESIDENT: I know, I know, John, uh, I know, Bob.
HALDEMAN: Uh, State legislators and some fellow from...

PRESIDENT: Right, right.
HALDEMAN: ...Shultz,
(phone rings)

a jillion things. And then we left for California that evening at 6:00 or 5:30.

PRESIDENT: 6:00 the 30th?
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HALDEMAN: You met with Ehrlichman and me for an hour here before we left.

PRESIDENT: That was, that was, that was the week in California.

HALDEMAN: That's right, that was. The next night was the John Ford dinner.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: And you spent a lot of time with us that morning.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. We were still talking Watergate then. That was under you...

HALDEMAN: Ehrlichman's going to work on Watergate.

PRESIDENT: That's how we were trying to get out that whole business...

HALDEMAN: And...

PRESIDENT: See why I had Ehrlichman do this I don't know, what, I mean we, you could try to reconstruct it and say, "Well, I lost confidence in Dean." I don't think it was that so much as that Dean was under so much heat, I just figured...

HALDEMAN: ...You just weren't getting anywhere. You were getting, you were--it was a s--, typical move where you weren't getting results one way and you started attacks in another way. It wasn't so much lost confidence ...

PRESIDENT: Right. That's it. Right.

HALDEMAN: John's (unintelligible) really lost confidence it was just lost, uh...
PRESIDENT: Just gotta get more...
HALDEMAN: You weren't getting results.
PRESIDENT: Wasn't satisfied with results.
HALDEMAN: And Dean was saying, "Now I can't get this thing down."
PRESIDENT: That's when we talked about, having the, making a public statement with, with Miller in California and all the rest.
HALDEMAN: That's right
PRESIDENT: That's a long time ago. All right, I've got that ticket pretty well in mind. Now let's look at this business. First with regard to these tapes. I don't know how you can reconstruct it, but I think that the, for, for your information, the directive I've given you is, uh, its been customary without, and I, I don't think it should ever get out that we taped this office, Bob. Have we got people that are trustworthy on that? I guess we have.
HALDEMAN: I think so.
PRESIDENT: If it does, the answer is yes. We only, but we only taped the National Security, uh, information. All other, all other, all other information is scrapped, never transcribed. Get the point? That's what I want you to remember on these, if you will. See my point. That's just a memorandum for your file basically that you make, that you are, but, uh,—I think that's very important, very important You never want to be in a position to say the President taped it, you know. I mean taped somebody.
HALDEMAN: Well, the whole purpose of this was for National Security.

PRESIDENT: That's right, I uh,...

HALDEMAN: The reason they were...

PRESIDENT: You mean...

HALDEMAN: ...other steps were taken...

PRESIDENT: Yeah. I know, I know.

HALDEMAN: ...for taping other places.

PRESIDENT: I know but I just don't want this to be—I just don't want that tape for example, I don't want you to, I don't want you to disclose that to Ehrlichman or anybody else, I mean that's just something—I know what you can tell Ehrlichman. Just say you went over it and it's about the same as...

HALDEMAN: I've, I've already, what I said to him is, is that the tape—he knows I...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...went over it of course. Uh, I said, "It, it basically says what the President recalled."

PRESIDENT: That's right. Now, with regard to the...

HALDEMAN: Which it does. It's—your recollection of that was almost, almost verbatim, (unintelligible).
PRESIDENT: Not very, not completely. The question is whether or not--did I at that time, order Dean to pay off Hunt, "Go to work, Dean..."

HALDEMAN: No.

PRESIDENT: "...the money to pay him off."

HALDEMAN: No.

PRESIDENT: Not at the point that (unintelligible). You're sure I didn't. Didn't I say, "Well, now what ought to be done is to put the cork in the bottle," or some damn silly thing. I don't know. I thought I

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but if it was, that was rescinded and it was a, and it was a, it was a, "shouldn't we do this, we at least have to do that." You were drawing him out. You did not order him to.

PRESIDENT: With regard to clemency, if the subject ever comes up, you could say it uh must have, quite (unintelligible) obviously, it, uh,--you can say it and, "The matter was discussed (unintelligible) the people." And the way it came up, is that, I there talk about uh, doing it before Christmas, you know, doing it at Christmas. And I said, "Well, you couldn't even consider it until after 1974. We do it without the elections." You understand?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.
PRESIDENT: I mean couldn't even consider it, I mean that's the point, because, because that puts it more in the context of the crime, see what I mean?

HALDEMAN: Yep.

PRESIDENT: I don't know, do you?

HALDEMAN: I don't...

PRESIDENT: What troubles me is whether Dean, Dean has made a memorandum of this. Well, the fact that he had memoranda is irrelevant with what (unintelligible)...

HALDEMAN: Well, let's, let's look at this point though.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: That area is totally privileged until you come to an impeachment proceeding. There's no way that that can be brought out because it--there's no way that, that the Presidential, there's no forum for going into Presidential, uh, guilt, except an impeachment.

PRESIDENT: I know.

HALDEMAN: And they have got to impeach you first before the proceeding starts and they aren't going to impeach you.

PRESIDENT: No, I, I slept a little on that and it's good for John to look at it that way. My God, what the hell have we done to be impeached?
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HALDEMAN: But John doesn't believe you have either and John doesn't believe you can be impeached.

PRESIDENT: No.

HALDEMAN: Or, or will be. What he believes is...

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: ...that's, that's the game Dean is trying to play.

PRESIDENT: That's right. That's what he's talking.

HALDEMAN: Does not believe it's, uh, it's a game of any potential.

PRESIDENT: Uh.

(Pause)

I made a call, that's the thing you have to remember, sometime about what the hell we going to do about—what's been done about Hunt, money he's asked for. You know what I mean?
HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: That's a possibility, Bob. Now how would you, how would we talk about that problem. (Unintelligible) trying to find out what...

HALDEMAN: What he was up to...

PRESIDENT: What, what this thing, how deep this thing ran. I had to find out. All right now, the big question: when I learned this on the 21st -why didn't I go running right over to the Attorney General and say, "Look, I found out that Hunt is, Bittman's asking for, for money." It is a question of how long it took me to, to reach the, the, the conclusion that we reached, you know, that Dean (unintelligible) 14th, you know, Ehrlichman went over to give his report. (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Hmm, you didn't know what the facts were.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: You didn't (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Uh, you didn't know where, where they stood on it, they were still...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: talking to Hunt and all that and it wasn't, there wasn't a timely problem there anyway. I mean it wasn't a matter of something, that whatever Hunt knows or doesn't know, he's gonna go on knowing, or not knowing.

PRESIDENT: No, no. The question is whether or not that, that Hunt, (unintelligible) didn't know, but the fact that an overture had been made by Hunt's attorney for, for payments.
HALDEMAN: But you didn't know what the nature of this payment business was. You didn't know what they were talking about in terms of payments. 'Cause you were trying to smoke it out.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: That's right. Then you were trying to smoke out whether that involved other payments and you know, was this the first time and then Dean in this conversation logged in a, it'll take a million dollars over some, over the next year.

PRESIDENT: I, I remember that I logged that in...

HALDEMAN: Okay.

PRESIDENT: ...I can recall...

HALDEMAN: Okay. Right. Was that a million dollars to Hunt or to all of the defendants and the, it, it comes to your attention that somebody has been working something out with the other defendants. You logged that in. Well, you said, what about the Cuban Committee? And, uh,...

PRESIDENT: Yeah, I said, uh, I said, "How will you do this?"

HALDEMAN: You didn't, you didn't know,...

PRESIDENT: ...Cuban Committee...

HALDEMAN: ...you didn't...

PRESIDENT: I had read about the Cuban Committee in the paper that's true.

HALDEMAN: That's right. Well, then you didn't know then and I submit that you don't know now.

PRESIDENT: That's right. Who did it. Well, I didn't know then...

HALDEMAN: Where's the line drawn between a legitimate effort to provide legal fees and an illegitimate effort to buy off defendants.
Then the question comes, "Mr. President, did you know the effort was even being made to buy -pay legal fees?" And the answer is, I didn't. I did not know that, I didn't know...

_not til this point._

I didn't know about the 350.

That's right.

I didn't know about the launching of Kalmbach.

That's right.

You remember.

That's right.

I, I did not know, uh, I had read, I had read stories to that effect, but I didn't frankly look into them. But basically, I frankly had this --I said, "Well, it must be a bunch of Cubans, or something like that and I thought of (unintelligible). (Both talk at once)

I didn't know about La Costa. My point is and I'm not trying to be selfish, but I, the point is, the story is very true that I didn't know a thing. Now there's only one weakness in that, that, the Pappas thing, the Pappas thing, where he said, "Yes I know about Pappas." But...

Oh, but that was right in that same time frame.

I know, I know-But he said, "I understand --" Did I say, "I understand that Pappas is helping," or, he said, "Pappas was helping?"

He said, "Mitchell has talked to Pappas." You just quickly logged it in,...know.
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PRESIDENT: Yes, yes, I know. Well, the point was what I was referring to only was not that Mitchell had talked to Pappas, but that Pappas never mentioned that here in this office. Never mentioned that, I know. All he said is that, I'm helping uh, helping, uh, uh, uh, John's special projects," and I said, "Well thank you very much. I appreciate it very much." He didn't tell me that it was about.

HALDEMAN: Okay.

PRESIDENT: So after that conversation...

HALDEMAN: Okay. Now that -See...

PRESIDENT: You see what I mean. (Unintelligible)...

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) all this stuff.

HALDEMAN: Yeah. But it's, again, you're a long ways from having to make this case. You need to know what John has, but, uh, that was, that, that Pappas thing was so, you know, just, just--your "I know" was almost lost in the thing, he, he was going on, you injected, I know" He he to be damn alert to have remembered that and put it down.

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: And you gotta assume that maybe he was, but, but the odds are very much against it.

PRESIDENT: Well, that's what they were.

HALDEMAN: Unless he's got a tape or something else. But I just don't -tape. I do not accept that as even a remote possibility.

PRESIDENT: I just can't believe that anybody, that even John Dean, would come into this office with a tape recorder.

HALDEMAN: And I think if he did, that's one more discrediting thing on him. I mean you just make the point that that's inconceivable, that a man...
...tape recorder, puts that out in the press.

But then that indicates he was coming in to try to trap the President. So what was his motive, what were your motives, what were the Justice Department's motives and prosecutors' motives at that point? They didn't know there was, that -you look at the things in the context of the times. There was no -at that point, there wasn't any real feeling that there was a cover-up thing, that's come out. That's just (unintelligible) out of Dean's thing, Dean report.

Well, I think there had been hush money talk John, Bob.

It was a story, there was a hush money story and James McCord...

McCord, McCord remember, said "Hush money," didn't he...?

I'm not sure when. Somewhere in there he did...

Before March. But, uh, there was a hush money story.

I don't know.

Oh, yeah, sure. Well anyway it doesn't make any differ-that's, uh, that's what it is. But, uh, he was practically saying that Hunt's, uh, -he said, "Look, Hunt needs money here. Bittman has said that. Hunt's got to get money here or he'll blow all the seamy help -the seamy side." Wasn't that the story, this is (unintelligible)...

"Bring Ehrlichman to his knees."

"I'll bring Ehrlichman to his knees immediately."

"...'Cause I'll put out the seamy things that I did for him and Krogh."
PRESIDENT: Basically, basically the Dean, uh, the Dean (unintelligible) might be, that he said he told the President that he was going to do this. The President, as a result, said to him (unintelligible). There, and so that is the President being engaged in. Dean told me when I called him on Sunday, I recol-, I recollected this. He said, "You know I know how that statement with regard to no immunity got into your st-, into your statement." And he just, he logged that out, this is a guess of course, he (unintelligible). Remember the April 17th tape. But, I'm just trying to look at things as he may (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: He told Larry, that. That whoever, that his statement you know, that," I'm not gonna be a scapegoat and all that. "He put that out -he said?That, that reached the right place."

PRESIDENT: That it reached the right place.

HALDEMAN: And he said, "The people that I was talking to got the signal, something to that effect.

PRESIDENT: Um hmm.

HALDEMAN: Said! I'm not out to get anybody, I'm not, I was just thinking...

PRESIDENT: It's true the signal (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: It got through.

PRESIDENT: Huh?

HALDEMAN: He said, "I was sending a signal and-it got through." And that, "The people I was sending it to understood."

(Pause)

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) meant that it got to me, understand. 'Cause we said, "He's not gonna be a scapegoat." (Unintelligible) all the facts. (Unintelligible) thing, that's been good. That's been proper. This is because of his threats that he -he never made any threats to me. Meaning, you know, about, uh, he said, "Hunt was gonna blow the whistle," -not that he was...
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HALDEMAN: He had a tough problem though, I think that, that the one thing that he put out on your conversation is unfortunate saying, "You're still my counsel."

PRESIDENT: I didn't say that.

HALDEMAN: But, he says you did.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: And, uh, that's his -and that was the headline: "Nixon Calls Dean, Says You're Still My Counsel." That gets to this thing that I keep saying and I, I...

PRESIDENT: ...that, he has to go. But let me say...

HALDEMAN: ...and that you shouldn't express confidence in him.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. Yeah. All right. I know, I agree with that, but, but you're still my assistant. Ehrlichman's still that, this and that, but my point that, I make there is that all, every move I make with Dean I check with Petersen. I said, "Now anybody is to leave here..."

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: "...I want to know."

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: And I said. "Are you dealing with Dean?" "Yes, we're still talking to him in terms of..."

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: No sir, I can defend that -not confidence. It's up to...

HALDEMAN: Well, it gives the appearance, the public appearance if not so, because he put it out. You doing it privately to Dean is fine. his...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: putting it out publicly is not, because it puts you in the problem then of when you do have to move on Dean, which is inevitable—I would assume. I mean, they have to either indict him or give him immunity and you've got to move on Dean if--either way. Uh, when you do...

PRESIDENT: One thing you and Bob--John got to work on is the game plan on how you handle John Dean. I mean the uh, you see. Let's face it, you uh, you and Bob remember, the only reason I put the immunity thing in there Bob, John, I mean Bob,...

HALDEMAN: Um hum.

PRESIDENT: ...'cause John insisted it go in there, do you recall?

HALDEMAN: Yes, I sure do.

PRESIDENT: I think Colson did too as I recall. But John was the one. But say—be sure that you say that nobody gets immunity and tell Petersen nobody’s to get immunity— that it is.

REEL 2 BEGINS

Whether that was a good move or not, I do not know.

REEL 1 ENDS

(Unintelligible) as far as the individuals are concerned.

HALDEMAN: I don't know, I think...

PRESIDENT: On the other hand, giving him immunity, he's gonna always have something hanging over your head anyway, isn't he? If you got that kind of guy.

HALDEMAN: Well,...

PRESIDENT: The only thing is...

HALDEMAN: ...Also...
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PRESIDENT: ...Dean's gonna be (unintelligible). It's a question really, Bob, which I (unintelligible) with your attorneys, I should look -how is he going to to be most vindictive. He knows a lot of ambitious things. He's gonna be most vindictive as a witness, with immunity, or most vindictive? And they say well yes, he's got to prove a lot because you know, uh, well, he's got enough to prove. No problem there. But as far as the President's concerned, he's got to be most vindictive, because -we really got to put the (unintelligible) out. Come back to that once again.

HALDEMAN: Well, the problem you got...

PRESIDENT: Let's leave out Ehrlichman and Haldeman, but, here's Dean -how's he gonna take on the President. The President's kindness.

HALDEMAN: Okay, then how do you, how do you...

PRESIDENT: ...live with it?

HALDEMAN: How do you live with that? And how do you live with the knowledge that other people have?

PRESIDENT: Oh, well, no, no. The immunity doesn't, doesn't get, doesn't mean that he (unintelligible) doesn't know that he has a crime. It only means that you don't, don't hit him for it. Because he talked.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but the only reason for granting immunity, to any witness, is to nail a more important defendant.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: Immunity to the defendant is to make him a witness for the purpose of nailing a more, more important defendant in terms of someone who...
PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Well it goes back to their citing you because in your crime message you, you pushed for new immunity laws, apparently. Uh, so that we quit nailing the little guys in the Mafia rings and start nailing the big guys.

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: Okay, and that's the theory of immunity, obviously.

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: And they're making a big thing out of that. So that if you give immunity to Dean...

PRESIDENT: Well, they don't think I can crack him on that.

HALDEMAN: No.

PRESIDENT: Not this case.

HALDEMAN: No, but the point is if you give immunity to Dean...

PRESIDENT: He's a major guy.

HALDEMAN: Then what you're doing is saying he is a little guy.

PRESIDENT: Oh, yes, I know.

HALDEMAN: And, therefore, there are major guys. Now they don't need Dean's immunity to make Mitchell. There are no other more major people than Mit--, than Dean, except Ehrlichman, Haldeman and you,...

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: ...in the White House and Mitchell at the Committee.
PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: They've already got Mitchell. So the only thing you can give him immunity for and the only reason they can justify immunity is if they nail someone above him. Otherwise the immunity was a cover-up.

PRESIDENT: A cover-up. Wait a minute. Cover-up for the President maybe, but not for Ehrlichman and Haldeman? (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Or someone within there. It's a cover-up -no, it's a cover-up to, to, uh, keep -no, no, that's right, 'cause if he talks, it's gonna nail somebody. Okay, then it's not a cover-up, it's an inducement for lying.

PRESIDENT: Inducement to get somebody.

HALDEMAN: Or does he get Dean off of this count, because he could get you on something, else -me, which is the fact.

PRESIDENT: Me, yeah. Or something he might not be able to get me on, but he could embarrass me.

HALDEMAN: Yeah. Could make an attempt, I don't think he can get you and I don't think he'll even make the attempt.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, but, Bob, but, but why all these threats, veiled threats that he's making, John, uh,...

HALDEMAN: To play his game now. Same as Magruder made all kinds of veiled threats about lying. But when he gets down to the crunch he isn't doing it. He's, he's telling the truth. Magruder was over here saying he is going to involve me.

PRESIDENT: Did he tell you that?
HALDEMAN: Sure. He didn't tell me, he told other people. He told Dean.

PRESIDENT: He's gonna involve you?

HALDEMAN: Sure. It was to get me lined up. He told Larry that, I think, at some point to, uh, get the word to me. That was involve me in stuff he knew it wasn't true.

PRESIDENT: Magruder is supposed to lie like hell.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but I'm not sure he is now.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. You're...

HALDEMAN: I don't know what he's doing now.

PRESIDENT: You're damn sure now that Strachan doesn't tell...tell the truth.

HALDEMAN: I've told him to.

PRESIDENT: I don't want him to get in trouble.

HALDEMAN: Consistently said that he's got to tell the truth and, uh...

PRESIDENT: I think he is.

HALDEMAN: I assumed that he is.

PRESIDENT AND

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)...

PRESIDENT: ...on such materials as to whether a budget came over to whether lie did this or that or the other thing.

HALDEMAN: He's sure a budget didn't.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: As I understand it, he's sure that a budget didn't.

PRESIDENT: Right.
HALDEMAN: He is, he does have this concern about these three...

PRESIDENT: Yeah, yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...pieces of paper or these three documents.

PRESIDENT: But, it did not indicate that they were telephone taps. That's true.

HALDEMAN: No, they didn't and as I understand, Magruder's thing, he says they weren't identified either.

PRESIDENT: Well, he said, uh, I think he's trying...

HALDEMAN: And the interesting thing is all the testimony that's come out so far indicates that those taps were identified by Gemstone as a code name. Whereas the material that he had, he says was identified as Stage Coach Two--or whatever. I don't know. That's a, it's a kind of curious, maybe irrelevant discrepancy, but it's, it's kind of -the secretary Who says that she typed this stuff up on special paper that was identified as Gemstone.

PRESIDENT: This is on the taps.

HALDEMAN: And Gordon, way back when he said, you know, there, there may be a problem because thinking about it afterwards there are these three things that came over, these three Stage Coach Two I--, items that, uh, maybe, uh, looking back on it—may be the result of the Watergate.

PRESIDENT: But he did not think so at the time.

HALDEMAN: Not when he got it, because he didn't know there was a Watergate.

PRESIDENT: Did he report to you that he thought this was tap material?

HALDEMAN: No, sir.
PRESIDENT: And, uh, you never -you may have seen

HALDEMAN: What, what he says he thinks he reported to
  me was that--he thinks he may have given one
  of 'em to me

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...in a stack of a lot of other stuff and
  that in that he may have--I-, in, in, he, he
  said he probably identified it as Attached
  Tab H or something is a, uh, is a, uh, co--, sample
  of the intelligence operation that
  they've got going.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Or of the output of the intelligence
  operation they've got going or something
  like that. Everybody says it produced
  nothing so, you know, it was the kind of
  thing nobody was very interested in.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: And that would be the way he would do it.
  He, like he would send me the whole
  telephone operation kit and say attached is
  the, is the plan for the telephone
  operation, operation telephone, thing and I
  wouldn't look at it.

PRESIDENT: You say that as far as your precaution is
  concerned that the, that Dean conversation
  and all you have so far the part where you
  have come to, into the room, but no more.
  You've got, you've got, how much more would
  you say you've got to go on that?

HALDEMAN: I would guess I have another ten or fifteen
  minutes maybe to go. It isn't--I don't
  think it's very much.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: I'm not sure, there's no way to tell.
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PRESIDENT: Well, you've got to do some
(unintelligible). I don't remember. I
don't, God damn it, until this day remember
what hap--, I don't really remember, do you?
Whether you were told after that, well look
for Christ sakes get this money.

HALDEMAN: No, I don't think so.
PRESIDENT: You don't think so?
HALDEMAN: No.
PRESIDENT: 'Cause (unintelligible) remembered that
much, Bob.
HALDEMAN: And if I, were, I said that we can't.
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: And I know we didn't.
PRESIDENT: But I would say we'll do what you can do to
help Mitchell but -I might of said to him.
get this, this to Mitchell.
HALDEMAN: Nope.
PRESIDENT: Get this message to Mitchell.
HALDEMAN: No, I don't even think that. I'll--you may
be right, 'cause you've been right on the
rest of it and pretty accurately, but I sure
don't remember that.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) I remember as much as I had
thought about (unintelligible) I, I, we've
got to keep the cork in the bottle and so
forth. Well, even looking at all of that,
looking at it, looking at it, at its worst
and, let's face it the-it was not some thing
that he just came in and said first reaction
(unintelligible) of the White House
(unintelligible) there's a cancer and he
says well, it's growing daily and so forth
and so on. He says there is the
PRESIDENT: problem, for example, of the pay-offs

(CONT’D) (unintelligible) recount the payments and I'd say why is that. He says well, for an example, uh,-he's got Kalmbach in this memorandum, hasn't he. The call was made to Kalmbach and then Kalmbach raised the money. Got a little on Pappas but that's almost coincidental, isn't it? It's almost incidentally. It's...

HALDEMAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: Mitchell--Pappas is helping Mitchell, didn't he say?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: I don't think we can...

PRESIDENT: I said, I know about that. Now wait-go ahead (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Well, I was gonna say I don't think that we can pretend that, that we didn't know there was, was an interest on Mitchell's part in raising money for the defendants.

PRESIDENT: 'S right. Well, I...

HALDEMAN: But I sure as hell don't know what it was for.

PRESIDENT: I, I-wait a minute. Start...

HALDEMAN: I mean, you didn't know about it, I gave you (unintelligible)...

PRESIDENT: I know that. (Unintelligible) went through this. I really didn't.

HALDEMAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: I didn't know, you know, I mean I didn't. I deliberately got--the staff protected me from it for their credit and I just wasn't getting involved.
HALDEMAN: It wasn't even a matter of protection. It was, it was not—something that was necessary to, to get to you.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: It didn't involve you.

PRESIDENT: That's right. That's right.

HALDEMAN: It wasn't (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Then, then he did (unintelligible) Bittman is talking to O'Brien and so forth and so on. I said, well, my God, there's about $1,000 sitting beside a road and so forth. Do we go into what the seamy side was at all? The conversation didn't go on too much?

HALDEMAN: No, not really.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, then I said well...

HALDEMAN: Little bit on the fact that it was National Security. It was—no—well, yeah, he said it was the, uh, break-in on the Ellsberg.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. Right, right. Then he ques—...

HALDEMAN: And he said and some other things.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: That was the only specific he cited...

PRESIDENT: And some other things and I said...

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: ...'cause I said well, that was National Security that was involved. Yeah, but there were some other thing as. What the hell they were I don't know.

HALDEMAN: He didn't seem to either.
PRESIDENT: Yeah, and I said well, uh, I said alright. See, they're gonna get Hunt up and I suppose Hunt could have told, told about other things he did. I wonder what the hell that means, though, Hunt says, well, if the White House had, had to do that or the other thing. It just shows the White House has a bad foul up, doesn't it.

HALDEMAN: The point came up that you knew that he had--Dean said something about, you know, you well, he had done some stuff on the, on the, uh, the ITT, the Dita Beard thing and you said, "Oh yeah, I know that." And then you said, "I didn't know," you said, you said, "I didn't know Hunt had done it, but I knew that they're working or something on that."

PRESIDENT: It's in the papers.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: That's a fact. We (unintelligible) there.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: That's a Colson operation. Colson (unintelligible) Hunt. I was--(unintelligible) idea was Hunt's (unintelligible) all about. He told me that somebody had gone out there and so forth and so on. That was the last—then I wasn't concerned about it—-I mean what the hell that was a common--I mean in my conversation with Dean...

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: Are you? Not on this thing.

HALDEMAN: No.

PRESIDENT: It was in the papers. Yes, I remember that, I, you know—I didn't know the White House was involved in it and so forth. Colson never said he was. You know, he
PRESIDENT: never told me. He told me about what was
(CONT'D) going on. Held give me daily reports about
what had happened to Dita Beard and so forth
and so on, but you know how he was. He's,
thank God. Then I said, well I said, well
now, how about this money and he'd say well,
I've got—it's gonna blow it. And I said
well, we gotta, at least we oughta, at least
get that much, didn't I? Or what did I
say—or we ought to keep the cork in the
bottle that much or some damn phrase like
that.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: Is that what I said?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: And I said, uh, how much would it cost-- a
million dollars. I said, well we can get
the money but how do we get it to the
defendants? And I said, well we can do it
through Cuban Committee. Right?

HALDEMAN: And he said no. No, you know, that was
(unintelligible)
PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) way we’re doing it now. The way it's being done.

HALDEMAN: No, he didn't say that.

PRESIDENT: LaRue said it. (Unintelligible)

HALDEMAN: No. He said, he said, "Mitchell has LaRue out getting money," which I told him was a very bad thing to do, he shouldn't, he shouldn't be doing that.

PRESIDENT: No. All right, how do you, help me, how would you have me explain the, the (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: See, that's the other thing. If you give Dean immunity he can go into all that. He can't make any case but he can sure, as hell make a lot of embarrassment. If he doesn't have immunity, he, he has no incentive to get into that, area, because he is deeply implicated when you get into that.

PRESIDENT: Oh, in other words, he's deeply implicated so he's gonna go down and so, therefore, he turns madman and says, "I'm gonna take the President on, destroy this Administration, because they wouldn't give me immunity."

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: There's the argument, Bob. (pause) Right. (pause) But come back to the, put the, uh, uh, the cork in the bottle, at least we've got to take care of Hunt. How would you explain that?

HALDEMAN: That's exactly what you were doing. You were drawing him out. We're running this thing out all the way trying to get a, trying to get a fix on what, what he thought the limits were, the parameters of it, what outta, you know, what at least ought to be done or what at most ought to be done, where it was gonna lead to--because he was making the case
HALDEMAN: that this is, a, an ongoing problem that'll
(Cont'd) go on not only through the, uh, Administration but after you leave.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, I, can, I think I brought out the point that it would be used. He said that it wouldn't—and he said it wouldn't matter then.

HALDEMAN: He said "It'll hurt in history, but it won't be significant."

PRESIDENT: Actually, what it really was, you've got to realize, it's like the La Costa conversation we had. It was really not a question of, of setting something up or something like that—it was, it, it created awareness of a problem and a brainstorming on the problem and no condoning of the problem...

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: ...except for the fact that I said well...

HALDEMAN: It was aggressively doing recognition. But the problem was different than what we thought.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: We thought there was a, a matter of taking care of these people's fees and stuff.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, that's what you thought.

HALDEMAN: Then...

PRESIDENT: I...

HALDEMAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Then...

PRESIDENT: I thought...
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HALDEMAN: ...it gradually, though, later, as this develops and as these pressures build up and the Hunt thing comes into pretty much focus cause it's this big demand for, you know, "this or else" kind of thing--which is the first time I had ever heard of "this or else" sort of a, of a threat, or whatever you want to call it, raised in this regard. Up until then it was "we need money for these people to keep, you know, all this thing on the track. Keep their attorneys in..."

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: "...in place."

PRESIDENT: One thing we did do, I remember, I did give Dean the business of what the legal ramifications were, I think he did and certainly (unintelligible). Uh, uh, uh,--I said, "What, what about the legality of payments? I mean that for fees and support. (Unintelligible) I understand that--is that illegal? Is that obstruction of justice?"

HALDEMAN: He said, "No."

PRESIDENT: I don't know.

HALDEMAN: Did he say, "No"?

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: I think that's in there. I think you raised that question and this point, this payment of legal fees and so forth--'cause that's what he was talking about, was paying legal fees. He said no.

PRESIDENT: Then how did the blackmail stuff come tip?
HALDEMAN: Well, that's because then it's the Hunt thing and, and. I guess other stuff was building up to the point of, you know, we're being blackmailed now and as, we talked about it--he, he even mentioned that as a defense. PRESIDENT: Yes, I know. Said that, "Our defense is blackmail". I think at that point I almost laughed because I, the, President could say, "We, we paid money because we're being blackmailed." After saying, "We won't be blackmailed to the Cubans," to the others. But we did raise that point, didn't we--but I think I've raised it other times though, with Dean HALDEMAN: But, you see, there was, there--I don't think... PRESIDENT: It would indicate other knowledge of the fact that some payments were being made because I must have had some knowledge, I mean, uh, as we got into the, as I got into the investigation Vob, in February, when I first got into it. It was after the Viet Nam announcement, after the 23rd, after the Inauguration. I never got any, any of this crap about defendants or attorneys' fees or anything at all here remember with you or anybody else. At that point, I first began to talk to (unintelligible) the Ervin Committee. At some point, the question of probably in addition to this conversation, and I don't want you to need to go back to read that over, not at this point--but at this conversation on the real question was oh, "what is the legal situation with regard to the payment of fees and so forth," and he said, Well you can be paid fees, but you can't pay support." I think I heard that on that case. I don't know whether it was support. Support... HALDEMAN: That may have been our lawyers talking to you 'cause... PRESIDENT: No. No.
HALDEMAN: ...they're, they made the point that the support thing doesn't, doesn't hold up at that point in time because the defendants were out on bail and, therefore, were able to earn their own support.

PRESIDENT: When are they out on bail?

HALDEMAN: They're out on bail all the time, which I didn't know. I thought they were in jail all the time.

PRESIDENT: Oh, I see.

HALDEMAN: They were arraigned and let out on bail a couple of days later or, you know, they said.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) out all summer. Hunt and all the rest.

HALDEMAN: Apparently.

PRESIDENT: "Well, I've got to support these attorneys' fees—that's Mitchell's line. (Unintelligible)...

HALDEMAN: No, 'cause the support thing—they thought they were gonna go to jail. They were planning to plead guilty, they were worried about support of their families in the long haul. I'm not, I'm not talking about immediate support needs. You're looking at a guy looking down...

PRESIDENT: What do your attorneys, say, uh, for example, you say, the motive, you, John as to what makes you (unintelligible) the conspiracy thing on the support for defendants, in other words...

HALDEMAN: We didn't, we didn't...

PRESIDENT: ...the launching of Kalmbach and so forth.

HALDEMAN: We didn't have any have any motive and we did not launch Kalmbach. We didn't take initiative on any of this stuff.

PRESIDENT: Okay, fine.
HALDEMAN: Our, our thing was passive, uh, non, non
disapproval really

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: and because Mitchell said there was a need,
we didn't--and Dean said there was a need,
we...

PRESIDENT: Well, talk to, Ehrlichman did make a call to
Kalmbach, you see.

HALDEMAN: No--talk...

PRESIDENT: That's sort of, that's what at least the
U.S. Attorney says.

HALDEMAN: I think it-went the other way. I think
Kalmbach called Ehrlichman.

PRESIDENT: Allright, whatever it is, fine.

HALDEMAN: ...Because Kalmbach had an agreement with us
that...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...he didn't do stuff, unless he had an okay
from here. Because he didn't want to get
into Stans' fund raising. So when Dean...

PRESIDENT: Kalmbach was gonna say certainly that all he
was doing was raise money for the
defendants.

HALDEMAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: That's right. For their attorneys' fees.

HALDEMAN: That's right. Well, no he says for hu--,
humanitarian purposes.

PRESIDENT: That's right. Well, isn't that true?

HALDEMAN: It is, I'm told.

PRESIDENT: What did your attorneys say on that?
You've...
HALDEMAN: It is.
PRESIDENT: ...asked them that haven't you?
HALDEMAN: They're--yeah.
PRESIDENT: The critical question they'll ask you, well.
HALDEMAN: That's, that's--I've gotta go 'cause I gotta get some stuff put together. That's what I've got to--that's one of the areas we're gonna cover today. (Unintelligible) all that out. See we, they studied this stuff and then they looked to the problems and then worked backwards on them.

PRESIDENT: Right.
HALDEMAN: Where they see--oh, so far, they're, they're satisfied everything they've come up with. They're satisfied with.

PRESIDENT: Well, have they ever zeroed in on this, this is subject A. I, I'm satisfied on (unintelligible) that they can't make a case. I'm sure, I'm satisfied and, uh, all the stuff in, in between. They can't make a case. The point is, except for the raising of the money and the tran--, transaction of money for the purpose of so-called "hush money." That is obstruction of justice depending on intent. You must have discussed this with him in some language, Bob.

HALDEMAN: Oh, yeah. And they're, they're, they've been researching the statutes on the, on the question. They're...

PRESIDENT: The question is corruption is the word.
HALDEMAN: Well, one, one of them is corruption, the other one is willful. Uh,...
PRESIDENT: Uh, just a second. Now...

HALDEMAN: And, and they say we're, they think we're on very sound ground because of that. They were concerned at one point that there's a circumstantial chain and that if, if intent or willfulness is not required, that we might have a problem because of the circumstantial chain, but their research of the statutes as of yesterday, convinced them that that either corrupt...

PRESIDENT: Corrupting.

HALDEMAN: ...corrupt or willful. One statute is corrupt and the other is willful. One section. Uh, that, uh, uh, those are required and that they have a very sound case on that basis. They thought, they thought they could carry, they thought they had the case even on the circumstantial that they were concerned about it.

PRESIDENT: What is the situation with regard to what Dean actually did? You don't even know that he...

HALDEMAN: I don't know.

PRESIDENT: I don't think he hid anything with regard to...

HALDEMAN: Well, it sure (unintelligible) that he did—by McCord and some of those people.

PRESIDENT: Well, that he meet with then, and delivered money to them?

HALDEMAN: He, he had $175,000 that he delivered.

PRESIDENT: He did?

HALDEMAN: Well, I don't know. That's what McCord said. Now, I must say that everything that McCord has said has proven to be accurate or virtually everything he's said.
PRESIDENT: Accurate?
HALDEMAN: Yeah.
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: And we can get him on the fact that it's hearsay. That it's hearsay seems to...
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: ...from what we pick up the other directions, it doesn't seem to be erroneous hearsay.(pause)
PRESIDENT: So McCord, McCord says that John Dean delivered him $175,000.
HALDEMAN: No, it isn't, it, that isn't that clear. He says John Dean--didn't deliver McCord-McCord has nothing on first hand. It would be that McCord says that Hunt told him or Liddy told him or something like that.
PRESIDENT: How Dean, being a lawyer, so smart as he is now, could have not, have not just--tell everybody not to do this or that or the other thing. S-, he could have gotten himself so involved in that is more than I can figure out.
HALDEMAN: Maybe he didn't. McCord maybe has a wrong...
PRESIDENT: No, no.
HALDEMAN: ...pitch on that, too.
PRESIDENT: Right. But how Dean, uh...
HALDEMAN: Well, you see Dean told me when he was working back through this stuff, he said, "If I can just get--send me to the Grand Jury and give me immunity and we have no problem, because I'm the only one in the White House who has any real problem on this and they--it, it
HALDEMAN: would stop at me and if I'm immune it
(Cont'd) doesn't matter." He said, "It would mean
I'd have to leave the White House."

PRESIDENT: When did he say this?
HALDEMAN: Hmm?
PRESIDENT: When did lie say this?
HALDEMAN: Somewhere in this period, when we were
talking about the strategy of Dean going to
the Grand Jury which was in that

PRESIDENT: Before the 21st (unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: No, after.
PRESIDENT: But I was not there.
HALDEMAN: No, sir.

This was probably on the telephone while he
was at Camp David when he was spinning out
different routes of how you could work this
out. At least that is what I think. And
his point then was, "Nobody else has any
problem on this but I do. And if I can get
immunity, and I can still spin it out which
will clear everybody else and it stops at me
and I have immunity so I don't get hung." And
then the thing that worried him about
was that he said, "I guess that would mean
I'd have to leave as counsel." But, at that
point, he was trying to spin out a plot that
would keep him on as counsel.

PRESIDENT: No way.
HALDEMAN: And as it turned out what he was working on was a--not a factual thing for you, but an elaborate case of how to pull John Dean out of the soup.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Which is understandable 'cause he was...

PRESIDENT: Then he got his attorneys in--his attorney to go to see the U.S. Attorney. When did his attorneys, (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: I don't know.

PRESIDENT: When...his attorneys go to see the U.S. Attorney?

HALDEMAN: I don't know...I don't even know if we can find out.

PRESIDENT: When, in other words, did Dean start, uh, --it must have been, uh, uh, March 21st, when we were in California.

HALDEMAN: He didn't have an attorney then. It was, it was on, it was past March 28th.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...when I, had that very long call with him. He didn't have an attorney then.

PRESIDENT: Not then, not then--March 28th, then. We were in California 'til when? April, uh...Hell. We were in California on March 28th to...

HALDEMAN: March 30th to April, uh, 7th, something-9th.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, April 9th.

HALDEMAN: April 8th, we came back.
PRESIDENT: April 8th.

HALDEMAN: We were back in the office here then on the ninth. And the ninth is when you got Garment going on—'cause you met with him for a few minutes that day after you met with Ehrlichman and me.

PRESIDENT: When was this, on the ninth? Yeah. Gonna handle the Committee hearings.

HALDEMAN: See that's what we were worrying about.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) still concerned about the Committee?

HALDEMAN: Sure.

PRESIDENT: Shows on my schedule here John Dean on the 16th.

HALDEMAN: Of April?

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: That's correct.

PRESIDENT: What the hell was that about.

HALDEMAN: Well, that was after,--the 15th was the day you met with Kleindienst and everybody.

PRESIDENT: Oh, that was the resignation.

HALDEMAN: You met with Dean the night of the 15th also.

PRESIDENT: Un hum.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) in.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: And that was the resignation deal...
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PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) the 16th.

PRESIDENT: The night of the 15th I guess was when he reported that he had talked to the U.S. Attorneys (unintelligible). April the 16th he should go, he ought to resign, you know what I mean, that's--you see, let me put it this way, one thing has got to (unintelligible). Bob, you and John are not--there's no way in my opinion that Dean can do a God damned thing more to you than (unintelligible) fact. (Unintelligible) do anything. I think Dean is gonna do everything he can (unintelligible) anyway. You get my point?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: So John's theory, the President should fire Dean's ass out of here, etc., has to be examined in terms of does that--and this is not in terms of accepting blackmail. I'm not talking about immunity. But does that unnecessarily, unnecessarily, uh, give Dean a motive where he'll go wild against not only Ehrlichman and Haldeman, which he already is doing, Bob, and will do again, but, to try to drive the White House to account, the President. That we've got to look at all the parts and do the best we can not to let that happen. You see, that's the reason why the idea of, of firing Dean's ass out of here and, frankly maybe put the blame on him for what he did and didn't do, uh, but it, it would certainly, it would certainly serve a reasonable and justified purpose in engaging John and you, although it would help one way or the other, mind you. Well, I mean I don't think, I don't think, except for discrediting him. On the other hand, uh, treating Dean, uh, in and also, in a different way. I mean, not, not in the way in which we give immunity, because we can't. We can't be blackmailed into immunity from Dean. You know what I mean, he is a (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Yeah.
And, and the prosecutors don't want to give him immunity now. That's their decision, not mine. I've told (unintelligible) that. that's up to them. What the question is, the question is, how do you get him to leave

Well, that...
The human factor...
Yeah.
...(unintelligible)...
You can't, you can't make an overt move on Dean, un--, unless there's a, a reason which is a better reason than you have now.

Let me say, there's a, also (unintelligible) Dean is--I asked Petersen, I said, "What the Christ is the matter with Dean? That he seems to be after you." Petersen, of course, said he had (unintelligible) you know, about Grand Jury leaks and so forth and supplying everything he can.

(Unintelligible),
I know, I know. But, but, Bob, it's, uh, you know what I mean, it's...
Yeah.
...it's not what a big bomb is in my opinion. Don't you agree?
I don't know.
Yeah.
I don't know. He may have, he may, if he's gonna see Petersen about a big bomb, it may be a big bomb on Petersen.
PRESIDENT: No, but he told me that he would like to see me in Florida before he made his final decisions about pleading self-incrimination, "or whatever I'm gonna do" and but he did say this--he say "I may want to see you before I make it." I said, "Well John, I just I (unintelligible) I said, "Well John, let's see what, how the situation evolves." I told Petersen about that, of course, and Petersen's, Petersen said, "Don't see him I said, "Fine." I says won't see him." I said, "Let me worry about that, that's my job." You know what I mean. 'Cause he figures (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: John.

PRESIDENT: And so on and so on. And he--that's it. Right. I can't bring John in. The only purpose of bringing John in is--very important. There's a human factor involved here which you've got to bear in mind which, Ehrlichman, you understand, better than Ehrlichman (unintelligible). You got the human factor. Dean's says, and I think, I mean,--according to Petersen, he said, "He's never gonna be able to express anything but the greatest respect for and even affection for the President." Now, I don't know whether that is the case that is with others or not. But, uh,--was Higby's report...

HALDEMAN: Same thing.

PRESIDENT: What's Ziegler say he said on that?

HALDEMAN: Same thing, that he has no, and, you know, that he was trying to give advice to the President a the sense in this thing and don't let the President get caught in the obstruction of justice type stuff and all that.
PRESIDENT: He told him "Don't let the President get (unintelligible) in obstruction of justice. What do you think he meant by that? I know I asked you this earlier, but...

HALDEMAN: I don't know. I, I think that was working or, his own ass but not in the way of trying to hurt, trying to hurt the President. I, I think he will use everything he's got except that. I don't think, unless he becomes a madman that, that, is the danger that I guess you do have to have to possibly contend with but--so the argument there is you don't want to do anything to to drive him to becoming a madman but you, in the same point cannot let a record be made of you protecting him.

PRESIDENT: No, no. Oh, no, no. But Bob, I am, uh, in, I am in a totally defensible position.

HALDEMAN: I think that...

PRESIDENT: Everyday I asked Petersen I say, "What do want me to do with regard to Dean?" I asked him what he wanted me to do with regard to Magruder.

HALDEMAN: RESTRICTED—"D"

PRESIDENT: Huh?

HALDEMAN: RESTRICTED—"D" But, that's...

PRESIDENT: RESTRICTED—"D"

HALDEMAN: Well,...

PRESIDENT: I think.

HALDEMAN: RESTRICTED—"D"
PRESIDENT: I know.

HALDEMAN: RESTRICTED—“D”

PRESIDENT: I mean, I, I, I have, I, I don't have, I, I agree. I like your counsel. I agree that he's a counsel and a friend. But the point is or Dean said that...

HALDEMAN: Our lawyers don't even agree with him as a counsel. Our lawyers totally distrust Petersen.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, I know. They distrust him. They distrust him. But I, but he's all I got Bob, and, uh,—I think though, that Petersen on the other level, other hand, I, I had repeated that so often to him I never failed to (unintelligible) we just, we'll just say, "We got that taped, Henry." You know, "The EOB's taped, isn't it?" Okay, I (unintelligible) that way time and time and again. Now, I, I just want to understand what the situation is here. I have not--I'm treating them all the same. But, I,—I'm gonna wait until I hear from you now you gotta get me further instructions, you let me know. That's why I asked for the report on you and John. And I said, "As far as Dean is concerned," he says, "Well, we're still having talks with him at arm's length." I said, "All right," I said, "I, I'm, I'm I just can't make a move, from the arm's length (unintelligible)..."


PRESIDENT: So, what I'm getting at is—there's the human factor. Now the other point that I made is this. Dick Moore was up to see (unintelligible) today. I went to end the Moore assault. He likes Moore very much, everybody likes Moore. And he said, "Moore is, who we, we don't see him as a defendant, we see him as a witness.” He also sees Kalmbach
PRESIDENT: basically as a witness, rather than a
(Cont’d) defendant, except on the money stuff. On
the money he says--the money, uh, an
aberration and so forth. But, Bob,
everybody's gonna be convicted of something
on the money and that means they're gonna be
fined, rather than imprisoned. They don't
send you to prison, for say violation of
campaign laws--spending laws, do they? Yeah.
Well, I think that's the case anyway. That's
what the situation may be or it may not be.
Coming around

HALDEMAN: As I understand it the only person you can
hang on violations of campaign spending laws
is the treasurer of the campaign. He has
the total liability.

PRESIDENT: Who is that? Sloan?

HALDEMAN: It was Sloan and then it was Glenn Sedam, I
guess.

PRESIDENT: RESTRICTED—“D”

and Kalmbach spent some money and so forth
and so on and so on, but anyway, my point is
this, speaking of Moore, there's that and so
I'm gratified.

HALDEMAN: Right. You can't do anything with that.
That's just...

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) recollection.

HALDEMAN: That's what it is. I--no, no, no, I'm not
suggesting he lied ubt...

PRESIDENT: ...My point is if you had felt La Costa was
important, you could have told me that. It
wasn't. I mean, you didn't discuss the
matter with (unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: Passing...

PRESIDENT: A passing reference at La Costa...

HALDEMAN: And it was in the same (unintelligible)...

PRESIDENT: ...to the fact—what, that, uh, that, uh, a passing reference to what, to the...

HALDEMAN: ...need for money.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, for the defendants. And how was it left (unintelligible)?

HALDEMAN: I don't remember, I don't remember. I'm not even sure I was in on the thing 'cause I don't remember at all.

PRESIDENT: Moore's recollection was something about the fact, well—oh, Rocher—, or John Ehrlichman's supposed to have said, "Well, let Rockefeller, Mitchell, get Rockefeller, give him half a million dollars, "a typical Ehrlichman crack, you know.

HALDEMAN: Which is not bad.

PRESIDENT: Not bad. In other words, the money was talked about and they said, "Gee, that's the way it is," but we're not gonna get into it.

HALDEMAN: That's exactly right. That's the line we had always taken.

PRESIDENT: The line, the line we had, uh, you're getting into except for the fact that my conversation—you better keep the cork in the bottle on this.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but we didn't.

PRESIDENT: Huh?

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but that they didn't go any further. (Unintelligible)...

PRESIDENT: You mean the question (unintelligible)...

HALDEMAN: ...(Unintelligible).
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PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) The other point is that, that on Moore-'I'm gonna ask you--Moore has been very close to Dean. Is there anything out of the way, I mean. See there's nobody that can talk to him. I can't let Petersen go over-and, how 'bout Moore gets back having him just have him say that have a talk with Dean. Keep us there. See what the hell he has in mind. Would it be useful?

HALDEMAN: I don't know. I don't, I don't know what uh, Moore's position is...

PRESIDENT: ...position, the position that, uh, uh, that, uh--let me tell you, the only thing we got (unintelligible) Dean (unintelligible). We have one (unintelligible). If he doesn't get immunity, if convicted, then there's only one place where he will ever get any possibility of clemency.

HALDEMAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: That's the other point.

HALDEMAN: But I sure wouldn't say that to him.

PRESIDENT: Oh, no, no, no. But, I mean, after that, that's gonna be in the back of his head. Absolutely. All right. When we see you again (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: I don't know, I don't know.

PRESIDENT: Well, ok...