TRANSCRIPT OF A RECORDING OF A MEETING AMONG THE PRESIDENT, H.R. HALDEMAN, JOHN EHRLICHMAN, STEVE BULL, AND RONALD ZIEGLER ON APRIL 26, 1973, FROM 3:59 TO 9:03 P.M.
PRESIDENT: Bob, how're ya doin'?

HALDEMAN: Okay.

(Pause)

PRESIDENT: Had a long day, haven't you?

HALDEMAN: I got the, ah - here's your letters. (Unintelligible) wrote one on each of us, so at least the...

PRESIDENT: Good.

HALDEMAN: And as he said, they are legal letters, not PR letters, but he said they thought they had to be. That's right.

PRESIDENT: Okay.

HALDEMAN: Ah, a quick film was on the rest of that thing. I've heard it before I left (unintelligible). After the discussion on whether to go to the Grand, whether to call a new Grand Jury (unintelligible) that was Ehrlichman's idea at the time (unintelligible) Grand Jury, White House call (unintelligible) Senate Committee.

PRESIDENT: You were there, Haldeman?

HALDEMAN: And, uh...

PRESIDENT: Why did (unintelligible)?

HALDEMAN: I don't know, I don't know, I think that he wanted to set up this meeting with, uh, he wanted Dean to meet with Mitchell and Ehrlichman and Bob, you know. He went through it. Then Dean said, "You were, you know, faced, faced now with the fact that the U.S. Attorney's gonna pull all the defendants back and immunize them, and, uh, send them back to the Grand, Grand Jury." And, uh, he said, "That won't do any good 'cause they'll stonewall. Except for Hunt and that's not proper handling." And the Pres-, you said, "That's why the, the immediate thing you've got no choice
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(CONTINUED): (unintelligible). But that you deal with the one point, is that right?" Dean said, "That's right." You said, "if, if," you said, "Would you agree that if that will buy time we'd better well, better damn well get that done." Dean said, "I think he ought to be given some signal anyway." You said, "For Christ sake give him a way down. Turn it off." You said, "Who's gonna talk to him? I guess Colson. He's the one." Dean said, "Well Colson doesn't have any money, that's the thing. One of the real problems is they haven't been able to raise money. A million dollars in cash is a very difficult problem, as we discussed before." He said, "Mitchell has talked to Pappas. I called him last night. John asked me to call him last night after our dicussion and after you'd met with John to see where that was."

PRESIDENT: John Ehrlichman?

HALDEMAN: I guess. And I said, "Have you talked with Pappas?" This was all in code because Martha Mitchell picked up the phone. And, uh, so I said, "Did you talk to the Greek." He said, "Yes I have." And I said, "Is the Greek bearing gifts." And he said, "Well, I'm gonna call you tomorrow on that."

PRESIDENT: Who's this?

HALDEMAN: Dean to Mitchell.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Dean says, "Did you talk to the Greek." Mitchell said, "Yes I have." Dean says, "Is the Greek bearing gifts." Mitchell said, "Well, I'm gonna call you tomorrow on that."

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: You said then, "Well look, what is it you need on that?" Dean said, "It sounds easy, but that's where our breakdown is, that it's easy to do." You said, "Well if you had it out would you get it to somebody." Dean said, "Well LaRue leaves it in mail boxes, and then someone phones Hunt."
HALDEMAN: They're a bunch of amateurs in that business." And I say, "That was the thing we thought Mitchell ought to be able to do is to find some way to do that sort of thing. None of us know how to." You said?

HALDEMAN: I said. Dean said, "You have to wash it. It has to go to Vegas or to New York City (unintelligible) all that." He says, "I've learned all this after the fact, and I'll be in great shape for the next time around," And I said, "What about the money we moved back in here?" Dean said, "They may have some still." And I said, "Kalmbach must have some." Dean said, "Kalmbach doesn't have a cent." And I said, "Well 350 was all we saved out of the Kalmbach money." I said, "That's the problem. We're so square that we get screwed up in all this." And you said, "Let me suggest this, the Grand Jury thing has appeal. It's at least (unintelligible). And then you got off that subject and turned back to the question of the Grand Jury. Dean said, "Once we start on that though, there's no control. They did an amazing job of keeping it on track before, but (unintelligible) going on (unintelligible)." You asked, "What happened to the Grand Jury?" Dean says, "It depends on what Magruder says. He changes his story all the time." And I said, "That's the, that's one which we have on Magruder. That one is, is that he, he'll be by himself unless they give him immunity, then we have an interesting problem." Dean says, "We have control of who they immunize." You say, "I'm thinking how the President looks. We'd be cooperating and that's where it should be done in the Grand Jury, let me take executive privilege before the Committee." And I said, "Then do you agree with these Grand Jury transcripts?" And Dean said, "That's not up to us, that's up to the court. (Unintelligible) the Grand Jury (unintelligible)." And you said, uh, I said, "It's in our interest to get it out, get the Grand Jury thing out and get our story in public." You said, "Well, let's look at the other possibilities. First one is to say the hell with it -tell them the hell with it -if we can raise the money, and that blows the whistle
and that raises problems. That means they get Magruder, maybe Colson, maybe Mitchell." "No, they can't get Mitchell." Dean says, "This starts the whole FBI action again." You say, "You think they might get Ehrlichman?" Dean says, "Well, Krogh could do it on the sly, because the National Security line won't settle in a criminal situation." But you said, "We have no choice on Hunt, but Mitchell, he's gonna blow no matter what." Dean said, uh, "What was our - I'd like to see how we can lay out everything that you know to the Grand Jury so that if Hunt blows, we'll have already told them." And he said, "Do you mean including the Ehrlichman deal and all that business? I said, "No, not the Ehrlichman deal because Hunt would go to jail for that, too, so he isn't gonna raise that." And you said, "Well that's right, we shouldn't go into the National Security area anyway." And he said, "Well, the other thing we have is, we have the Grand Jury and we have the Committee. The Grand Jury appeals because the President makes the move and that's the place to do it. And the third is just to hunker down and fight." And Dean said, "That's a high risk because somebody will break." You said, "and then what about the President's covering up." He talks on about legal ground of the Grand Jury while our public statement are (unintelligible) Grand Jury discussion of that. You said, "We have to move fast because the sentencing is on Friday." Dean said, "The Attorney General can call Sirica and ask for a delay in sentencing for two weeks. Kleindienst says (unintelligible)." Dean said, "The person I feel we could use is Petersen. It would be awkward for him, but we could remove him from his present post for discussion of that sort of thing, making us, call a special assignment here and have us advised as to what is obstruction and what isn't. (Unintelligible) nuances." You said, "How would you get him out?" Dean said, "Appeal directly to Petersen." You said, "Call him in as a special counsel to the White House rather (unintelligible)." Dean said, "I (unintelligible)." And I said something about Petersen's wanting to
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(CONTINUED): leave anyway. Dean was very surprised at that. Uh, and you said, "Well, follow up and see if Kleindienst can get it put off and, uh, second, get Mitchell down here tomorrow to discuss this." And I said, "Why not tonight?" And then you said, "I'll keep looking through. Well, maybe Dean should report to me at the end of the week and I should stay away from Mitchell's (unintelligible). And you said, "It's good to consider these options when we have the right plan, uh, although it's up. It's no doubt that you were right before the elections. Now the election's over and we need a new plan now." And I said, "We have to turn off the erosion because it comes to the President and we've got to cut it out at any cost."

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible). Well that part of it is better than the first part.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, it's - the whole thing is still...

PRESIDENT: Because I talk about (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: In the context of, of trying to smoke out from Dean what kinds of things he would say to do.

PRESIDENT: Well this part is, I mean, uh, very few things that give me much relief, but that part is, uh, when you look at that, we are not saying there it comes to, uh, to doing it. I don't, the thing I'm concerned about is I did not tell him to do something about Hunt. Did I?

HALDEMAN: No, sir. You didn't.

PRESIDENT: You didn't say anything (unintelligible) about Hunt. You said to get Mitchell down and talk about this thing and I said...

HALDEMAN: Not about this though.

PRESIDENT: No, I know. I meant the point is about Hunt we said, look you, uh, eventually he's gonna blow anyway, remember. I (unintelligible) that thing. We've done that before the election it won't work now.

HALDEMAN: It's, I still think that (unintelligible).
PRESIDENT: It's like when he talks about his trump card, that may be what he thinks. But, let me say, that's a trump card, that's a hell of a son-of-a-bitch for him to play too. It's really an admission that he is involved in the whole...

HALDEMAN: Yep.

PRESIDENT: ...business of Hunt which he, which he is not...

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: ...yet, he never admitted that, has he?

HALDEMAN: No.

PRESIDENT: See, that's the only discussion of the 350 that ever occurred with Dean that you recall or had you discussed earlier the, the 350? In some of our talks I might have, I've...

HALDEMAN: I don't think so, I think because he, he explained it to you in elementary terms that the (unintelligible) that this was the first time you covered it. He outlines (unintelligible)...

PRESIDENT: But in his earlier, earlier (unintelligible) yesterday he did mention the 350.

HALDEMAN: Yeah. Yeah.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

PRESIDENT: So, therefore, that must have been the first time, that's my point.

HALDEMAN: Yeah. The way he s--, the say he told you about it would indicate that...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: it was the first time.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. He said, for example, "Is that your problem with Bob (unintelligible) 350?" , correct? I don't remember. As a matter of fact, Bob, the conversation looking at it, even at its worst, does indicate that the first time Dean was coming in and saying, "Look, there's a cancer in the heart of the Presidency."
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(CONTINUED): And he said, "We got this problem with Hunt." And I say, "Well, God damn, it's the National Security and we've got to turn it off. We've looked at it."

HALDEMAN: What you're also seeing in, for the first time, is that there's a problem with Dean. 'Cause he's told you what he, he's done in, in dropping this money off to (unintelligible) and things like that. He says LaRue -that's the first you know, that sort of thing.

PRESIDENT: That's right. And from that time on, I did not see him until he came in that day for fifteen minutes to talk about resignation, which is also significant, Bob.

HALDEMAN: Or the night you saw him -you saw him Sunday night.

PRESIDENT: Alone?

HALDEMAN: Alone. Wait a minute. After you met with Ehrlichman and me...

PRESIDENT: Oh.

HALDEMAN: ...you called us in here Sunday night, then you had Dean come over.

PRESIDENT: Well, that was after Kleindienst had come over,

HALDEMAN: You have Kleindiesnt in the afternoon, you had Ehrlichman and me come in that evening, then you had Dean come in.

PRESIDENT: Well, I don't want you to bundle this one with that one with Dean and Magruder 'cause I probably just told Magruder (unintelligible). And, and Dean by that time had gone to the Grand Jury, hadn't he?

HALDEMAN: That's interesting, Anderson, Jack Anderson has what he calls a probably astonishing story now been told of how the Watergate cover-up tore apart at the stiches. It's a very -the part of it that I know...
PRESIDENT: Was accurate?
HALDEMAN: Highly accurate.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: He says, for one thing, he says, "Our sources declared categorically that President Nixon had no advance knowledge of the Water break-in and bugging. But the first former Attorney General, John Mitchell, and White House counsel John Dean, also swore to him that they had no part in the illegal operation.

PRESIDENT: Swore to him.
HALDEMAN: "It is well known around the White House, however, that Jeb Stuart Magruder was acting as cam--" I think this is a Colson story. And then it goes into, "As number two man at the Committee, he directed the activities of McCord and Liddy. -Liddy submitted regular reports to Magruder on the bugging under the code name Gemstone. Magruder also arranged for Liddy to draw cash out of the Committee safe. At the request of our (unintelligible) story-of contacting Magruder, Liddy going out to see Kleindienst at Burning Tree. Powell Moore called Kleindienst in the back room and told him they were caught red-handed and, headed by the Security Chief. Kleindienst picked up the telephone--(unintelligible), Kleindienst picked up the telephone--this may be Kleindienst's story. He reached Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. "Henry," instructed Kleindienst, "I want you to be sure that these people are treated as any other person would be treated who was arrested under the circumstances." (Unintelligible) Liddy returned to campaign headquarters and began stuffing his file into a shredder.

PRESIDENT: That's right.
HALDEMAN: "Over at the White House meanwhile, Dean ordered two aides to clean out the files of Watergate conspirator Howard Hunt. Eight cardboard cartons were sneaked out of the White House and stored at the warehouse and later, returned to the White House, most of the documents selectively destroyed."
HALDEMAN (CONTINUED): Dean was ordered by the President to find out if there were any White House people involved. Contrary to the impression given out by the White House, Dean never submitted a written report. Our sources state flatly that Dean used his authority to obstruct the FBI and keep incriminating evidence away from the Justice Department. He even ordered Hunt out of the country. White House Aide Charles Colson, according to one source exploded, 'Do we want to make the White House an accessory to a fugitive from justice?'"

PRESIDENT: Yeah, that's Colson.

HALDEMAN: "One of the President's closest advisors, Ehrlichman, wanted to put out a statement acknowledging Magruder's role in the Watergate conspiracy. This was vigorously opposed by Clark MacGregor, who succeeded Mitchell as campaign chairman." That's Colson also. "A few Presidential advisors, including Ehrlichman and Colson, warned the President to tread water because the Watergate decisions must have been approved by Mitchell and Dean. Mr. Nixon replied that both have denied any involvement and asked for proof. By mid-March the President's faith in Dean began to waiver. He ordered Dean to Camp David to write a belated report on his Watergate investigation. After a few days at the Presidential retreat, Dean reported back to the President he simply couldn't write a report. Angrily, Mr. Nixon took Dean off the Watergate case. Colson meanwhile took a lie detector test and proved his own innocence. Dean was furious, "Now, we're all gonna have to have to take one," Dean groaned. Colson and Ehrlichman also put together information that: One, Dean had advance knowledge of the Watergate bugging; two, Dean had ordered Hunt out of the country; and three: Dean had authorized payments to the defendants to keep their mouths shut. On Friday, April 13th, Ehrlichman confronted Dean with the charges."

PRESIDENT: Did he?

HALDEMAN: Could be. "That night, Dean put together some documents he had been saving which indicated both Haldeman and Ehrlichman had knowledge of the
HALDEMAN: Watergate coverup. The next day, which would be Saturday, Dean took the documents to Assistant U.S. Attorney Earl Silbert and made accusations against Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell, and Magruder. In turn, Dean asked for immunity. Silbert refused to grant immunity. Instead he called in Magruder and confronted him with Dean's revelations. That's the day Magruder broke down. This broke down Magruder who also confessed his role in the conspiracy." (Pause).

PRESIDENT: Dean's story doesn't look as good there, does it?

HALDEMAN: No. Now this is put out - I assume by Colson. And that, the area in it that I don't know - the fact that Colson and Ehrlichman put together information. Chuck's tryin' to tie himself into the...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...to the, you know, attack on this. And this. "Dean put together some documents (unintelligible) That's what I don't understand, how, how did Colson know that?"...that indicated Haldeman invol--" Maybe that's what Colson (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: What kind of documents could Dean possibly have had? (Unintelligible). And so he says Deans had the safe or the files removed and the (unintelligible) parts taken out and then brought it back, he said.

HALDEMAN: And the documents were destroyed (unintelligible). That's the theory I don't, I, I wonder about. I just wonder if there's enough, you know,

PRESIDENT: It isn't.

HALDEMAN: ...made up a story partly.

PRESIDENT: You mean that Colson may be the one that did that to the documents. Is that what you mean?

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible). No. You see, Colson may have called Dean and said, "For Christ sake, get those documents."
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PRESIDENT: Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. There was a story, you know, that Colson's, uh, very worried -Dean, Dean told me -about the documents, Colson. So Dean's covering himself on that. In Hunt's safe. Although Colson, according to Dean, said they were about Watergate. God damn lot of things (unintelligible) since I had that recorder in there. You know, otherwise -we really wouldn't know. Dean would come out, could come out with his so called trump card, with a half-ass saying, "I told the President about it, the President said to get the money and duh, duh, duh, duh," Now there's, now let me say, if you were called to the stand and asked about that conversation, what would you say? Would you, would you say, well it's a privileged conversation, the President was authorizing disclosure?

HALDEMAN: I would say it's a privileged conversation and the President's authorized me to characterize it as I remember it.

PRESIDENT: Yeah sure.

HALDEMAN: And as I remember it, the President, at that point, was very much, very anxious to try and get to the facts -even though Dean had spelled it out to him before I came into the room -uh, what he believed to be the, the complete Watergate story. Uh, and that had led to some areas as, and he had cited examples of, of, uh, problems. And one of the examples he cited was, uh, this threat.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: And the President had apparently picked that up before I came in and then reopened it when I was in there on the basis of trying to sound out Dean on what his recommendations would be in dealing with that option.

PRESIDENT: Exactly.

HALDEMAN: And then he probed different things. He said, "Well, would you do this, would you do that, uh would you recommend this and would you recommend that." It was clear to me in watching that, listening to that discussion, that the President was trying to draw Dean out in terms of what his
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(CONTINUED): approach to it was, what his knowledge was, and what the background of it was.

PRESIDENT: 'Cause I said, "Should we take it to the Grand Jury? Should we, uh, should we make a statement"-and then, the, the key point I make in there is that, I, I think it's the last of the conversation which is the important thing, is that Hunt...

HALDEMAN: ...is gonna blow anyway.

PRESIDENT: Hunt is gonna blow anyway. But that won't work. Basically. But in the interim, you were questioning, as you were in other areas in this thing, you were questioning and probing Dean clearly to determine, not only what facts Dean was talking, but what we could ascertain is the, Dean's role in some of these things. Yes, and I said, "Well, it just isn't gonna work."

HALDEMAN: "Why did the President call you into that meeting, Mr. Haldeman? Well, he frequently calls me into meetings.

PRESIDENT: Sure.

HALDEMAN: ...involving matters of importance that he wants, uh, to be sure (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: "...be sure that this is not just, uh"we had to consider the options and what they were and I wanted you there to consider those options.

HALDEMAN: I don't see it so much that you were considering the options in that sense. You were considering options on how to deal with the Senate Committee and Grand Jury. But as far as the Hunt thing is concerned and that money thing, I didn't, I didn't get the feeling you were dealing the options nearly so much as I had the feeling that you were trying to smoke out what, what courses of procedure would come...

PRESIDENT: Well, it's not only that, but I was also saying, "Well, this is a National Security matter, it's very serious."

HALDEMAN: That's right.
PRESIDENT: "And if, uh, if, uh, if necessary, you've gotta, we, maybe we ought to do something about -can't somebody talk to 'em? Let Colson talk to him." You know, I said, "Lower that." Uh, and, uh, and, and, then Dean said, "Well Hunt, Hunt won't want, uh, reveal the National Security thing because, uh, that's not in his interest, right?" And, uh, (unintelligible), but on the money thing and so forth, uh, then he talked about that he, Dean, had called Mitchell.

HALDEMAN: So if you were exploring the money thing, I would try and see what he, what he was doing 'cause he's raised earlier the problem of money. You didn't understand what all that was about and what the process was. You asked, "Like how do you mean go along? What are you gonna do with money? What...," You know. Dean said, "Well LaRue handles it, that he left it around at, at uh, uh, telephone booths."

PRESIDENT: That's the first time I ever knew LaRue was involved in trying to cover it.

HALDEMAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: That's really first time I really ever knew who handled money or what, or anything. I had read, I shouldn't act dumb, I had read that Mrs. Hunt, that these Cubans got money in bags in (unintelligile). I also read, however, that there was a Cuban Committee, that's how that thing came in there. And, uh, the Pappas thing, the Pappas thing was there but on that -my conversation on Pappas is pretty -I think, uh...

HALDEMAN: Well, and Pappas was the number one of a number of major contributors that we met with. That's right.

PRESIDENT: No, no that's right. And I say, "Yes, I know about Pappas (unintelligible) Pappas and I didn't discuss this, believe me."

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) just knew that Pappas was (unintelligible) and helping with the campaigning.

PRESIDENT: That's right. Well, but Pappas was, said he was helping on, uh...
HALDEMAN: Helping Mitchell?

PRESIDENT: Helping Mitchell on certain things and I said, "Well, that's fine, thank you." But I, he didn't tell me what it was.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: I think it's a matter of fact though that some body said be sure to talk to Pappas because he's being very helpful on the, uh, Watergate thing. Uh, (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: I don't think I said Watergate thing. I said, I said Mitchell wants you to be sure and talk to Pappas. He's very helpful.

PRESIDENT: Very helpful.

HALDEMAN: Well, I may have said helpful in raising money for the pris --, for the defense. You see I, I...

PRESIDENT: Did you go over that point with your lawyer today, that point that the defendants...

HALDEMAN: Yeah, some. They're, they're...

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible), huh.

HALDEMAN: ...still organizing.

PRESIDENT: Give me a little run down on your lawyers if you wouldn't mind. See if there's anything that they've added.

HALDEMAN: No.

PRESIDENT: I don't...

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) they were going through just details today. And, uh,

PRESIDENT: That's good.

HALDEMAN: ...uh, they're going to see the U.S. Attorney this afternoon, I mean they have to be over...

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: ...in court for something else anyway.
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PRESIDENT: They're gonna make their move, (unintelligible) what they're gonna do.

HALDEMAN: They're gonna go in and ask if we could...

PRESIDENT: Be heard.

HALDEMAN: ...be given an earlier appointment.

PRESIDENT: Appointment first.

HALDEMAN: Right. They feel, they're (unintelligible) the appointment. They want very much to get, a, a, private meeting.

PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.

HALDEMAN: Before we get to the Grand Jury.

PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.

HALDEMAN: They're afraid if they push for the Grand Jury the guy'll say, "Well fine, just bring them into the Grand Jury tomorrow morning."

PRESIDENT: That's right. That's right.

HALDEMAN: We don't want that.

PRESIDENT: That's right. Well, that's the line Petersen told me, appointment first. And I said, "Fine, we should ask for an appointment. It's being done."

HALDEMAN: Their position is we don't, we should not then ask for the Grand Jury. We've already made the point to send, uh, Petersen as a guest of the Grand Jury, and what we should be seeking now is the appointment with the prosecutor, which is what Petersen told you to have us do.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: Then following that, it's up to -you see, they're very, they get to sit in, the lawyers sit in on the appointment.

PRESIDENT: That's right.
HALDEMAN: They want to be there. They don't, they aren't there with the Grand Jury. They want to be there and try and smoke out other things. Now, they very much do not want the appointment until you get, uh, the thing from Petersen on whether it should, what he sees as the, as the potential charges on us, posing any problems (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Right. That's right.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) is supposed to be in tomorrow. And so they will seek an appointment, but then they'll say that we can't work it out until Monday or Tuesday.

PRESIDENT: Good.

HALDEMAN: Or something like that. Which, which is true because I'll be going to Mississippi tomorrow so I

PRESIDENT: Right, you go to Mississippi, by all means.

HALDEMAN: And, uh, uh,...

PRESIDENT: Ehrlichman should go too.

HALDEMAN: No, he wouldn't normally go.

PRESIDENT: He shouldn't go then.

HALDEMAN: It wouldn't bother if he does.

PRESIDENT: Fine.

(20 second pause)

PRESIDENT: They'll have Colson. At least in this instance. It's, uh -well Colson basically, nobody else. Let's face it, with all that he's done.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, he is but, I, I really...

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: ...wish he'd quit tryin' to help.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, yeah, yeah, but I mean, it's a White House in one sense b-b-, but here, he's trying to help to nail Liddy. Held better watch out, Dean will try to nail him.
HALDEMAN: Uh, yeah and, or Dean will lash back. Now, Dean will read this and figure out. He asked us if (unintelligible) either came from Colson or Ehrlichman or both. 'Cause it nails Dean, kills Colson, and to a degree kills Ehrlichman.

PRESIDENT: What it says about Ehrlichman is true, is it not?

HALDEMAN: I guess so.

PRESIDENT: That Ehrlichman, uh...

HALDEMAN: Well, he didn't really confront Dean with charges.

PRESIDENT: No.

HALDEMAN: What Ehrlichman did is say -he sort of did 'cause he said, "Here's the way the thing stacks up." I don't think he confronted him with him having advance knowledge because Ehrlichman still doesn't think he did have advance...

PRESIDENT: That's right. Well. Well, Dean...

HALDEMAN: In fact, these charges are not (unintelligible) that Dean had advance knowledge no. Dean ordered Hunt out of the country now that's true, but then he rescinded the order.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: Dean's trying to hang that order on Ehrlichman.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: I guess Ehrlichman's trying to hang it on Dean. And Dean had authorized payments to the defense to keep their mouths shut (unintelligible). I don't think you (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Well I, I don't know that Dean tried to do that.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Dean can say, said very well, "No, I didn't do that for that purpose."

HALDEMAN: He may, he may have a real problem with that though because, in that he, he apparently is speaking directly with the lawyers, which I didn't know.
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PRESIDENT: Dean. That's what...
HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible). LaRue.
PRESIDENT: Oh.
HALDEMAN: That fact that some (unintelligible).
PRESIDENT: Well, LaRue's, LaRue's gonna have to tell everything. He's gonna have to plead guilty in order, that's for sure. Whoever dealt with him is gonna come out.
HALDEMAN: Well, I don't know. I, I assume that Dean dealt—well, I'm sure he had conversations with him and I assume he dealt with him.
PRESIDENT: You didn't have (unintelligible) or Ehrlichman?
HALDEMAN: I don't believe so.
PRESIDENT: Needless to say I...
(18 second pause)
HALDEMAN: Did you know how, I, I sure as hell don't think.
PRESIDENT: LaRue didn't call you and say that we need money for the defendants?
HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) because it, it wasn't...
PRESIDENT: But on that point, Bob, you've got to certainly say your, your story still is I was helping (unintelligible) humanitarian reasons. That's, that's what your counsel says, don't they?
HALDEMAN: Legal fees.
PRESIDENT: Huh?
HALDEMAN: And legal fees, concerned about their (unintelligible). But I'm sure (unintelligible).
PRESIDENT: How 'bout the fifty, about the 350, was that (unintelligible)?
HALDEMAN: Sure. Well, no, the 350, I, the 350 came up in a separate context from their need for money at first which was the question what do we do with this money. And I said, "It should be turned over to the Committee."

PRESIDENT: But who asked you that?

HALDEMAN: Strachan.

PRESIDENT: Strachan. Right.

HALDEMAN: We, I'd forgotten we had the money.

PRESIDENT: Strachan...

HALDEMAN: Strachan was through closing on his files here and getting ready to leave.

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: And he said, "What do I do with the 350?" And I said, "Good Lord, I'd forgotten we had it." That should go over to the Committee. Get it over there quickly. We don't want to be sittin' around here holdin' the trash." And I said to him, he says, and this fits together, I told him to talk to Dean and work out a way of, of getting it over there. And he assumed that, that by that I was saying, work out the legal arrangements because we...

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: got to get, got to get that taken care of. And so he did. And Dean didn't get a, didn't get it moved over. Then Dean, the next I know is Dean is saying to me, "We need money, daily money for the defendants." And I say, "Well, what about, uh, the 350 thing, don't they have that?" He said, "No we haven't been able to get it over there." And I say, "Well we got two needs that both fit. We want to get rid of the money and they need money...

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: ...at the Committee, so why don't we try and work that out."

PRESIDENT: Right.
HALDEMAN: Uh, Dean indicates in the middle of this, that's where there's a discrepancy and I've been checking this -that's one of the facts that I've had the lawyers, try to work out -is this point that you say Petersen says that Dean says that forty thousand got (unintelligible) before the election.

PRESIDENT: That was just dropped in some place, Peter--, Dean told me that.

HALDEMAN: I, well, it's not true. I checked that fact and no money, the date -all that money was held over in Arlington in a safe deposit box until November 28th, and on November 28th it was turned over to Strachan.

PRESIDENT: But your thought was...

HALDEMAN: Now, there's a problem there because Strachan is not sure, he says, what he did with the bag of money when it was turned over to him. Whether he put it in his safe here or whether he gave it to John Dean. And he says he may have given it to Dean.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) speaking or all the 300, rather than LaRue. I though you said...

HALDEMAN: Oh no, ultimately, he knows he gave it to LaRue. He may have, when he first got it, given it to Dean on the grounds that uh, I had told him work out with Dean a way of getting it over there. So the money came, he said to Dean, "Here's the money to get over there," and then Dean -he's not sure whether he put it immediately in the safe or whether he gave it to Dean and Dean held it for a while and then gave it back to him to put in the safe. Now there's a potential which is (unintelligible) out here. I have no reason to believe it's, it's the case but I have no reason to believe it is not, which is that he did give it to Dean and that Dean used it in piecemeal chunks, took money out of it to use for the, the payments to LaRue.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. Gave it to him when? This would be when?

HALDEMAN: After November 28th, 'cause he didn't have it 'til...
PRESIDENT: Why didn't he have it before November 28th?
HALDEMAN: Because it, the subject never came up. It was sitting over in the safe deposit box.
PRESIDENT: That's your best recollection of the money?
HALDEMAN: I don't have any recollections. I had nothing to do...
PRESIDENT: Strachan.
HALDEMAN: That's what I'm told.
PRESIDENT: Strachan told you.
HALDEMAN: I'm told independently by Strachan and by Butterfield. You see, Strachan couldn't get it out of the box, only Butterfield could get it out.
PRESIDENT: Right.
HALDEMAN: Or Butterfield's friend whose box it was. But LaRue, to take the money out of the box, had to meet Butterfield's friend and Butterfield. And Butterfield says that there was one withdrawal in May, he said, 22 thousand.
PRESIDENT: Alright.
HALDEMAN: And there was no other withdrawal until the total thing was taken out on November 28th. He's the one that supplies that date. Strachan says he doesn't know what the date was, but he says it was after the election.
PRESIDENT: Butterfield's memory would be God-damn clear. He (unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: Butterfield's a brilliant, precise, (unintelligible).
PRESIDENT: So that would make it here the question of forty thousand before.
HALDEMAN: Before the election.
PRESIDENT: Just don't -on that one, let me say, I just have no, I'm not sure of anything on that at all. because he stated that some before and some after, but Dean may be wrong.

HALDEMAN: Well, there's another thing that's logged in here that I wasn't aware of, which is that Dean apparently made the point that either Strachan or Higby, at one point, that he would have to mortgage his house in order to get money to keep this thing going. It would indicate that Dean was up to his ass in personal efforts to supply this money and that as he got super desperate, would come back to whatever source he could get. Well, the fact he has Dean...

PRESIDENT: Wait a second. (Unintelligible) mortgage his house?

HALDEMAN: He made that comment. I don't know whether that was a facetious comment or, or a, uh,

PRESIDENT: But he told Higby?

HALDEMAN: No, I'm not sure which. (Pause) But, he said...(20-second pause)

HALDEMAN: Dean said when they ran out of Kalmbach money -I played this part back, made more notes on it. Incidentally, I played the earlier part back to take more notes, take a look though added (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: Hunt getting out by Christmas. Uh, Dean said when they ran out of Kalmbach money, they came down here for 350 that was here. I had to explain what it was for. But he's -they're making the case that he told Dean why he was getting the money. And I said that was sent to LaRue where it belonged. I said, but it was sent in pieces, although the balance was all returned to LaRue, but there was no receipt. We couldn't go through piecemeal giving -no, Dean had sensed -we couldn't continue with piecemeal giving, because I'd have to tell Haldeman why I needed it and he'd get Strachan to go up in the safe. Every time I asked, I had to get Strachan to go to the safe and then have him take it to LaRue, which was a forever operation. Now that (unintelligible) it has to be the Dean
HALDEMAN

(CONTINUED): effort to establish a line different from the fact, because it was not taken out in chunks. But if in fact Dean held the money at some period of time, he may have taken chunks out because Strachan did not count the total. Strachan counted out 40,000 when he delivered 40,000 because he was told by Dean to deliver him 40,000. This was in January. So Strachan had been holding this money, or someone had, from November through December and into January.

PRESIDENT: Oh, it wasn't delivered on November 28th?

HALDEMAN: It was delivered to Strachan on November 28th by Alex.

PRESIDENT: Oh.

HALDEMAN: And it was not delivered to LaRue until January.

PRESIDENT: Why wasn't it delivered to Strachan earlier?

HALDEMAN: Because Strachan was clearing out his files and getting ready to leave and asked me what to do with the money. I said, "Get it back to the Committee." So, Strachan called Alex and said, "Give me the money, I have to get it back to the Committee."

PRESIDENT: Okay.

HALDEMAN: Then he got it and he thinks, because I told him, you know, work it out with Dean, that he may have given it to Dean, but he's not sure. In any event, at some point, it ended up in his safe. If he gave it to Dean, he got it back from Dean and put it in his safe. Because when time came in January to deliver the 40,000, Strachan went to his safe and got out 40,000 and took it to LaRue. And then he says — his recollection is three days later. Dean said, "Deliver the balance to LaRue without counting it, so he doesn't know
HALDEMAN: what was in and what was left (unintelligible).

(CONTINUED): And he asked for a, a receipt for 350 from LaRue and LaRue said, "I'm not gonna give you a receipt, this meeting never happened." So Strachan came back and reported to Dean.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) Strachan.

HALDEMAN: Came back and reported to Dean,, "LaRue said he will not give me a receipt and that the meeting didn't happen." And Dean, said, "That's okay, I'll work it out." And that's, the end of the matter as far as Strachan is concerned, all he knew.

PRESIDENT: Well, about the, that (unintelligible), the 40,000 thing before the election and so forth. Forty thousand is the figure that Dean knew was supposed to be given before the election (unintelligible) he gave forty and that, that was the forty (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Well, it wasn't before the election (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: I understand, I understand, the (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: And also if Dean was tapping this money, if, if Strachan had given it to Dean and Dean was tapping it, it had to have been in December.

PRESIDENT: But if Strachan didn't have it...
HALDEMAN: Strachan didn't get it until November 28th, so it can't have been continually, it can't have been used before the election. I don't know what the, why that's significant but (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: I understand.

HALDEMAN: It's only significant 'cause, 'cause I said that's what the facts are.

PRESIDENT: If this is money for fees even after the election, after they had been convicted is that right, or pled or, what the hell was that (unintelligible). Whether (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: I don't know when they were -convicted. Well, I shouldn't (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: Well before they were...

HALDEMAN: I think it was in January -it was before they were convicted.

PRESIDENT: Before the judge, uh, laid the sentence. So, it was still when they needed money, let's face it. As far as we're concerned, Bob, it looks (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Well, they still owe legal fees, as we know. Their lawyers are still saying they haven't been paid.

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) money to sue. (pause) (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Hum. On the other hand, why do we think their, uh, legal fees and so forth, it was also for support of the families, (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: That's what I was told. I didn't question any of this. I didn't get into what, any details.
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PRESIDENT: Dean told you that?

HALDEMAN: What he said is, "We've got to have money for these guys they're, they're raising cane about family support and their legal fees—about taking care of their families and their legal fees." Now, at that point, they were expecting to plead guilty and go to jail.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. Right, right, right, right, right.

HALDEMAN: Now see, the sentencing, the sentencing wasn't until March because that March 21st meeting was the sentencing, Hunt's sentencing was going to be on March 23rd. So this was long before that.

PRESIDENT: The other part of your (unintelligible) Sirica thing (unintelligible). But if you talk to your lawyers about your furnishing of the money and so forth, uh, uh, what is their, what is their latest, uh, uh, feeling as to what the hell your defense is on that point?

HALDEMAN: Well, they don't feel I have, they don't feel I don't feel I have, they don't feel I have a defense because they, I don't, they don't feel there's a charge.

PRESIDENT: Conspiracy to (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: They can't make that.

PRESIDENT: Why can't they make it?

HALDEMAN: Because there's—be no way that I intend to (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) about his stating that (unintelligible) one of the lawyers (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: They feel I have (A), no motivation to keep him quiet and, (B), uh, no intent to.

PRESIDENT: After the election, that's right. Why doesn't Strachan tell it all, why— you've been asking to get the God damn thing done, right?
HALDEMAN: I never intended he would plead guilty.

PRESIDENT: He hasn't pleaded guilty. But (unintelligible) and pleading guilty or the question is whether he'll talk.

HALDEMAN: Yeah and I, in the first place, I think, as far as I knew, there was no danger in their talking anyway. (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: No real, real (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: That's something incidental, but it's still a mystery to me. I don't — why we care if the Cubans talk. Unless it's about the National Security stuff about the other jobs we did.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: Because...

PRESIDENT: Well, that's what, quite a dif—, conversation differs, because it is foul. It was about the operation.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)...

PRESIDENT: Things that we did and that's why we discussed it awhile.

HALDEMAN: ...had to do with what he did at — not — had to do with what he did at the White House though, not what he did in, in, in...

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: ...in, in this case.

PRESIDENT: That's right, not obstruction of justice.
HALDEMAN: No 'cause if it was obstruction of justice, it was obstruction of justice on a charge not yet filed, which is not obstruction of justice. The charge that he had burglarized the Ellsberg.

PRESIDENT: But even then, we didn't (unintelligible). Dean says, "Well I called Pappas and I told him about your other trump card." He naturally (unintelligible) lawyers all this obviously. Called, uh, Pappas.

HALDEMAN: Well the other thing is that your dealing with the facts here. You're looking at...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...actual things that were said. Dean will be dealing with how he wants to construe those facts and that may not come out exactly the same way. And Dean may be telling his lawyers and may be thinking in his own mind a lot worse than what really happened. What do you think the President instructed him to do in this sort of thing (unintelligible). He said we have to (unintelligible) out, all this sort of thing which is (unintelligible), he didn't. We've just explored segments and we get to the thing somewhere.

PRESIDENT: Where, where he pledged this to you?

HALDEMAN: Where he puts it to us. I think then we may have to pull out this tape recording, and let'em hear it. Somebody like the Chief Justice or somebody, you know. Just, uh...

PRESIDENT: It's better if you can give your recollection now, that's the important part. And then afterwards, afterwards Ehrlichman said "We will not, there's no dice (unintelligible)." Right, on that?

HALDEMAN: Yeah, I guess.

PRESIDENT: So he said, you, you did get...
HALDEMAN: Oh, yeah. Ehrlich--, Ehrlichman, Ehrlichman to me, what I heard on that from Ehrlichman's viewpoint was screw him.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Which surprised me, to be perfectly frank, because I thought Ehrlichman would be concerned about it and he wasn't. He really cold cocked it to the extent that it surprised me very much and he checked with

REEL 2 BEGINS

Krogh who —see this refreshed me now. Dean thinks this thing here about Krogh being in terrible, you know really trouble. And Ehrlichman says, "f talked to Krogh and he doesn't think he's gonna be in trouble at all.

REEL 1 ENDS
HALDEMAN: And it's not -Dean was making Krogh as being trembling with agony, crazy and all sorts of things. Couldn't live with himself, hadn't slept a night.

PRESIDENT: Is this true, or, or what does (unintelligible) with Krogh?

HALDEMAN: Well, Ehrlichman says, says Krogh has no problem. He said it then, he says it now. He talked with Krogh. Krogh's had two hours with 'em.

PRESIDENT: Glanzer?

HALDEMAN: No. I guess it was the Senate Committee.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) very sad. This stuff doesn't involve the campaign does it? Does it involve the Watergate?

HALDEMAN: It involves National Security and the thing, it had to do with people totally unrelated to the campaign.

PRESIDENT: I think part of it, I understand.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. Right.

HALDEMAN: And that's true.

PRESIDENT: Absolutely true and we have it--God damn rights, we're gonna stick hard on that.

HALDEMAN: For that reason, maybe I just don't understand it, but I'm not at all sure that this whole Ellsberg thing coming out is bad.
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PRESIDENT: Why? (unintelligible) Kleindienst (unintelligible). Kleindienst a call. Attorney General Kleindienst please. Thank God you got this tape. Good this is something which this doesn't affect. Basically the tape is the kind of a talk that you, you really have down that the President ought to have licked the son-of-a-bitch when he's trying to find out. Even though I didn't know he was a son-of-a-bitch. What the hell

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) longer 'cause...

PRESIDENT: ...what the hell...

HALDEMAN: ...(Unintelligible) this guy disentangled it himself. (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: What the hell the facts were. What the facts were. We're talking about who was in. I had to find out about you and Ehrlichman. Dean felt he was letting it all out.

HALDEMAN: And the thing that startled you is, and, and it did, clearly, was he said, "Some people may go to jail." You said, "Who?" And he said, "Well me to begin with."

PRESIDENT: And I said--

HALDEMAN: And that really jarred you. You said, "Oh, hell no." You, you can't (unintelligible). I mean clearly it was...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...it was--you could, you could tell by listening to the tape, it, it startled, came as a blow to you.
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PRESIDENT: Which means that he never told me before about this sort of thing.

HALDEMAN: Dean never told you beforehand. Dean, as soon as he told you that, a thought process starts in your mind. "What the hell, you know, who am I dealing with here? What's going on." Because all--he was always talk--he was the dispassionate operator and you knew he was carrying some water on (unintelligible) keep Mitchell on, on, for example.

PRESIDENT: And, and talking to all the, our White House people

HALDEMAN: But you didn't know he was in, in (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: ...and, and (unintelligible), and for carrying sitting in there, things and so forth. Getting the FBI reports, making reports to me. That was my (unintelligible). I didn't--when they talked about the load, I was not thinking basically, Bob, of the load taking care of defendants. He never told me that until this damn conversation was made—in February, I don't know.

HALDEMAN: well, that isn't the load. That, that he was really carrying the load. He was carrying this, trying to keep the whole thing on track as he had all these people lying, uh, bouncing out with all sorts of different tales. (24 second pause)

PRESIDENT: My God, he should have come to us earlier and said--some, some--But Dean, Dean, too, has told you and John, "What the hell, all we're doing here is protecting John Mitchell." Correct?

HALDEMAN: We know that, too.

PRESIDENT: But Bob, I think--we had several conversations on that point. Remember? In February, right.
PRESIDENT: You said, "This whole God-damned thing is about Mitchell. Why doesn't Mitchell get out?"
And--

(Telephone Rings)

PRESIDENT: Hello. AG? Yeah, I said AG. Aren't you Attorney General? Right. I wanted to get, uh, Dick Byrd on, uh, the Colson matter. Oh, okay, boy. Um hum. Yeah, I probably, uh, thought you'd be there. Oh, uh. why did I give you a call, uh. Uh, yeah. (Unintelligible). Yeah. Um. Yeah. All I wanta know is procedure, you know. Let me say, it's six-of-one and half-a-dozen other, Dick, uh, uh, as far as I'm concerned. Let's get the God-damned thing hung out there. Yeah. That's right. That's right. Right, right, right. You do that, and we'll, uh, get the word. Fine. And as far as you're concerned, Dick, there's two possibilities. You, you can go on (unintelligible/REMOVED). Okay.

(Hangs up telephone)

PRESIDENT: Hotter than hell. It was now, or after--the jury. What the hell. Comes down to bust the Ellsberg case. That ain't all bad either, is it?

HALDEMAN: You know, it, it'd be nice if they could convict 'em. (Unintelligible) see if they're gonna get a conviction, otherwise it'd be too bad (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Who's gonna talk if it didn't work?

HALDEMAN: Well, if it wasn't in connection with the legal case, it was in connection with the National Security problems here.
PRESIDENT:  I, I (unintelligible) wondering why (unintelligible) Ellsberg's psychiatrist trying to stick it. You--

HALDEMAN:  I can't figure that either. Some of this stuff in just

PRESIDENT:  Bizarre.

HALDEMAN:  ...completely beyond belief.

PRESIDENT:  Trying to discredit Ellsberg.

HALDEMAN:  Dean also talks in here about a second story job at Brookings.

PRESIDENT:  But they didn't do it.

HALDEMAN:  which they didn't do. It's uh

PRESIDENT:  Yeah. And something in Georgetown, which they didn't do.

HALDEMAN:  (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT:  I think Ehrlichman told me that.

HALDEMAN:  Is that right?

PRESIDENT:  Ehrlichman tells me (unintelligible/REMOVED).

(24 second pause)

PRESIDENT:  Well, whatever Hunt says, could say—certainly there's no motivation for him. Given immunity (unintelligible) say what he did for the National Security people. That, that, uh, say (unintelligible/REMOVED).

HALDEMAN:  He does in terms of whether or not (unintelligible) is paid or not--

PRESIDENT:  That, we really don't know. And that's
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PRESIDENT

(CONT.) a curious thing that Dean got in there about the Greek-bearing case. He said he called Mitchell and Martha was there.

HALDEMAN: He said Martha obviously had picked up the other line, so he talked in code. I remember this.

PRESIDENT: And he said-

HALDEMAN: I had forgotten.

PRESIDENT: I had forgotten.

HALDEMAN: When I heard the tape (unintelligible) completely.

PRESIDENT: And he said, uh, and he, and he, he said to John, he said, uh, "the Greek," which (unintelligible) Pappas.

HALDEMAN: "Did you talk to the Greek?" John said, "Yes." He said, "Is the Greek bearing gifts?" "I'll call you on that tomorrow."

PRESIDENT: Oh.

(Pause)

PRESIDENT: Dean can charge--

HALDEMAN: It's so weird, you know. Stuff...

PRESIDENT: Dean-

HALDEMAN: ...you didn't understand that. You didn't understand at the time, too.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Who was doing what.

PRESIDENT: Dean can charge for his part in our conversation here that, uh, I knew that Pappas (unintelligible/REMOVED).
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HALDEMAN: Well, you can charge it. Sure, you can charge it all you want.

PRESIDENT: What would your answer be?

HALDEMAN: It would be that he, he told you that Mitchell had been in contact with Pappas. You had no idea what the hell it's about. He didn't tell you.

PRESIDENT: Never discussed it.

HALDEMAN: But again, you, you were running out this thing, this string, where did it go.

PRESIDENT: I heard it all on that one day. Well, in retrospect, he hadn't done many things right in this instance, but, uh, I do think that, (unintelligible/REMOVED).

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: I can't believe (unintelligible) that on March 21st (unintelligible). Well, don't you agree?

HALDEMAN: oh, yeah.

(21 second pause)

HALDEMAN: Of course it may be hard to answer at some point, why didn't you bring in a special prosecutor into the White House and the special investigator--or into the (unintelligible) special prosecutor. Why did you keep it to all the people who were there?

PRESIDENT: Why didn't I or why didn't I?

HALDEMAN: Well, why didn't you?
PRESIDENT: I discussed it with people. They, uh, uh,--Kleindienst of course suggested the special prosecutor. (Unintelligible). But I discussed it and, uh, did not bring in a special prosecutor because the prosecuting team satisfied me that they were doing their job. Uh. it'd take months for them to get, you know, uh, to where--

HALDEMAN: Get at them.

PRESIDENT: Right. In other words, I had faith in the prosecuting team. That's really--that is the reason, as you know.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: Sure, you could say why didn't I appoint a commission?

HALDEMAN: That was as of the, uh, fourt--15th of Mar--of April.

PRESIDENT: Dean didn't recommend a special prosecutor.

HALDEMAN: No.

PRESIDENT: See.

HALDEMAN: well, yeah, there was some discussion of the special prosecutor. How (unintelligible)--


HALDEMAN: You were just, you were considering various alternatives.

PRESIDENT: Right. I considered the special prosecutor. I considered the Presidential commission. I considered, you know, three judges, so forth
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PRESIDENT

(CONT.) and so on. And,, uh, I decided against it due to the fact that I satisfied myself that the dist--that the so-and-so was doing, doing the job and, uh, course on the, uh...

HALDEMAN: That's it--you prob--well, see how they're going to undermine that though by

PRESIDENT:  

HALDEMAN:  

PRESIDENT: Let me put it this way, Bob, the special prosecutor can, will wash away by terms of what the Grand Jury does know when they indict a former Attorney General of the United States, God damn it. That shows that we're investi--that this Administration's not covering up any longer. You know what I mean. And that the prosecution did its job.

HALDEMAN: Right.

PRESIDENT: Sure, you can second guess that, too, all the way through, but I, I, I, listen I again, I was relying on Dean. I was frankly relying on Ehrlichman, too. You know, both of them recommended it. Dean didn't want me to have a special prosecutor, did he?

HALDEMAN: I don't think so.

PRESIDENT: Well.

HALDEMAN: I think he was in control. He got--he didn't want a special grand jury (unintelligible) a second grand jury either. (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) Cancer at the heart of the Presidency. I remember when he did spell it out and what to do about it.
PRESIDENT: Well, look at it from his standpoint. He did play a, a game, trivia, diabolical, so forth and so on, but he did it 'cause he thought it was necessary. Everybody (unintelligible). He didn't want Mitchell indicted. He didn't want this whole thing, you know, the, splattered all ov 'er, and then he finally came in to see me. He, himself made a command decision on the 21st of March and told me what the hell the point was. And I said, "Oh, go up and try to write it up." When he got up there, he couldn't write it up, but he did do that, but by God I have to look after myself. He went to the lawyers. They told the, told the Grand Jury.

HALDEMAN: The longer he worked on it up at Camp David, the more he became convinced he's got to get himself a lawyer. That's clear. You know why people kept the secrets from you? (Unintelligible) it was clear he had -he was trying to use cover-up while getting himself a lawyer, he, he gave you criminal legal advice.

PRESIDENT: He did what?

HALDEMAN: He could get -he kept saying you need a criminal lawyer

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ... to advise on what's involved. He said, "The President can't hire one 'cause that'll look bad. I could hire one and the President heed his advice."

PRESIDENT: Didn't Dean, at one time, give us an analysis of the law with regard to uh (Pause)

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible),

PRESIDENT: I, I, I kept coming to that. Maybe T came to that before the 21st.
HALDEMAN: You see, he did more about what was done than I did. Much more than you did. And was answering from a criminal viewpoint of his office, rather than the viewpoint of, of (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: I think we've got to assume that, that I-well, we've gotta check this fact, that, uh, that Dean must have discussed with us, Bob, Dean or somebody--before the 21st of March, payments to the defendants, and basically the 350 and all that. You know...

HALDEMAN: I don't think so.

PRESIDENT: Obstruction of Justice and so forth.

HALDEMAN: I don't think so. I can, I can go back to it and find out.

PRESIDENT: No. We will some day, maybe.

HALDEMAN: Twelve hours of listening to be worked on.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

HALDEMAN: I don't think, I don't

PRESIDENT: I don't think it's gonna make a hell of a lot of difference.

HALDEMAN: All that time you were listening to damn Dean. With him, it was a different

PRESIDENT: There were different things to, uh

HALDEMAN: You were--Why don't you get a quick report from him or something. February 27th.

PRESIDENT: Very--that's, uh, the first time it happened.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

(Pause)
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PRESIDENT: That is, that's when I told Ehrlichman I needed to, uh, get the hell out of this thing.

(Pause)

HALDEMAN: Well, somewhere there in early March, it was early March, you jumped up--you told me several times, "Tell Colson not to deal with Ehrlichman or me, or with you on the Watergate thing. Go to Dean," Dean was handling

PRESIDENT: Correct.

HALDEMAN: ...Watergate. Then you got to the thing when you sort of had a daily report from him.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Ten in the morning for about--in the morning for half an hour, popping in for five, ten minutes, couple times during the day. (Pause)

PRESIDENT: Well, I think probably, and my guess is that when the McCord thing broke, particularly with the defendants, I must have asked Dean at that time. I must have, about what about (unintelligible). But he never told me, though, in my, my recollection. My recollection is totally blank. You know. The problem I've got is the same problem you've got. I just got too many other things on my mind, Bob, and I don't remember. McCord, uh, when was it McCord talked (unintelligible/REMOVED). I was in Florida. I know that.

HALDEMAN: You were in Florida when the, McCord talked.

PRESIDENT: Definitely. 'Cause Ehrlichman called and I told him that. So whatever (unintelligible) I was in Florida.

HALDEMAN: Must have been after this.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: No, must have been after this meeting with Dean. McCord talked to on the day of the sentencing, didn't he? Sure. Remember he sent a letter and, uh, that, yeah, uh, so it was that weekend. It was the 23rd. And Dean went up to Camp David to--and you were in Florida.

PRESIDENT: Well, Dean charged, uh, McCord charged Dean.

HALDEMAN: Did McCord charge?

PRESIDENT: Dean went to Camp David. Somebody charged him. Pat Gray charged him of being a liar. That was, uh...

HALDEMAN: McCord's sentencing was about the same time. He was, he, he, he, charged him of being a liar on the 22nd because it was while we were sitting here. We got the--while we were in our other meeting. We got a wire paper. Someone brought a wire paper saying he was...

PRESIDENT: That Mitchell.

HALDEMAN: Yeah. And you called Kleindienst while we were in here.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: That wasn't about the wire thing, that was about the, uh, uh, Dean with Ervin.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Dean with Ervin. See, we were still on--the main subject was (unintelligible)...

PRESIDENT: ...The main subject was not frankly it was, it was Bittman. Well, hell, a little scrap all the time.

HALDEMAN: It wasn't at all.

PRESIDENT: That was, uh, basically, the whole meeting with, uh, with Mitchell was with regard to Executive Session, do you remember?
HALDEMAN: Yeah, and then it was that weekend that you went to Key Biscayne--went down Thursday night.

PRESIDENT: McCord talked on Friday then. That's what I heard. What, what's the date on that?

HALDEMAN: The 23rd.

PRESIDENT: Now that's correct. Dean, at that point, was then at Camp David. I think that's what popped Dean loose. That put him in (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Yeah, probably.

(18 second pause)

HALDEMAN: And you never saw Dean again after that. Just Ehrlichman.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible). Talk to him on the phone. Well, at Camp David.

HALDEMAN: Did you?

PRESIDENT: I called him.

HALDEMAN: I have got a lot of reports from John Dean, too.

PRESIDENT: What were they? What kind of reports would you call those?

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible/REMOVED). That's when you started following the whole thing, when you really started seeing what the problems were.

PRESIDENT: Tell me, just briefly, what they were.

HALDEMAN: well

PRESIDENT: Dean, you.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)

(34 second pause)
PRESIDENT: Well, that's about when he said Magruder was gonna talk.

HALDEMAN: Well, you were at Key Biscayne, you know. He went down Thursday night. I stayed here to go to that Rogers' dinner for, uh

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...diplomats, diplomats and I came down on Friday...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...morning.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: And he came over and I went over to your house at, uh, 1:15 and I was there 'til 6:30.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: And you had me out calling Colson to check out the question of what he had really said to Bittman and, uh...

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: You had Mitchell to see what McCord was gonna say because we had heard, you know.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: That and you had me to check with Moore on whether we'd probably react to that McCord thing.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: He said we don't react to a prisoner's statement. Then he talked with Dean, and, uh, Dean was giving his evaluation of what McCord might say. (Unintelligible) no significance to that. He said--well, one thing he does say that's interesting after looking back. He said we should not overreact. We should watch and wait, but, uh, McCord's
HALDEMAN (CONT). greatest danger to us is post-June 17th 'cause he's hit on Dean's greatest concern, obstruction. The problem now is we're one step behind. Then Ron came in and he was there for a while. You had to call Rogers and went through the whole executive privilege business. We changed Special Counsel on the 18th, Special Counsel.

PRESIDENT: Well, that's good point.

HALDEMAN: Then I talked to Dean on the 23rd--that doesn't still--on that same evening talked to Dean again. He was trying to figure out alternatives. Said maybe you should send Dean to the Grand Jury and have him tell everything and then let them decide if they want anyone else. He says, "the problem is we've been bailing out everyone else and it's gotten out of hand and compounded the problem." He says, he says "Now we have to protect ourselves because I everywhere, but I won't to purge anyone in the White House." That was when he wanted to go get immunity and all that and he said the only problem for the White House is post-June 17th. "We did things to hold down the, the--you know, any going on before the election that are right on the border." He said if, if Dean is immunized, "If I'm immunized, I could go no further, but then, of course, I'd have to be canned (unintelligible) Grand Jury testimony. He said, "I feel a higher loyalty to, uh, than just to Mitchell and I'm concerned partly about my own ass, so I could go for informal immunity."

PRESIDENT: Well, is that our mistake, not giving it to him? well, let me hassle this thing just a bit. No.

HALDEMAN: Well, then we rattle along through that weekend...

PRESIDENT: Let me, let me just answer my own question. Uh, you know, we didn't do it, for the reasons we all know. The point is that immunizing him would be for the purpose of protecting, Bob, other people in the White House and higher up?
HALDEMAN: Yes, sir. And we didn't, and we didn't need it.
PRESIDENT: Huh?
HALDEMAN: And we didn't need it.
PRESIDENT: Not only didn't need it, but, but it would have been wrong, God damn it, that's the point.
HALDEMAN: So then on the 25th
PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)
HALDEMAN: ...is the next time I talk to Dean, which should be Sunday, I guess. (Unintelligible) and he says, "I see signs of the domino theory here. Hunt had dealings with the Cubans". Dean, he says, "Hunt had dealings with the Cubans. I did not, I mean did not. LaRue may have." So that's how far he was letting me in on it now. He said, "I think we should take action before Thursday. Let it all come out Thursday. For example, Dean's at the Grand Jury. If we try to fight it, we'll eventually lose. Colson thinks we should fight it but he doesn't know the whole picture (Unintelligible)." And, uh, well, it was before Thursday because that's when McCord was gonna go before Sirica or something. He said, "Who McCord names will not be made public Thursday." He said, "I have no knowledge of what Mitchell knows or what he did, nor do I have any knowledge of what Jeb does or what he did and I also don't know the full extent of Gordon Strachan's knowledge." Same. Same. Next day, I talked to Dean in the morning. He calls to give me a report. You're still at Key Biscayne. "Mitchell has a problem, but he may not realize it. I don't really know what Mitchell's problem is, but I think I should go to Mitchell and, and ask him if he really wants everybody to go to jail except him. The point is if he would step forward, it would solve a lot..."
PRESIDENT: At that point there never, there never was
HALDEMAN: For example, Jeb said he and Mitchell were
afraid Colson was, were gonna take this fellow,
this thing over, so they went in ahead.
Probably went ahead with Mitchell's okay.
Wouldn't be the first time (unintelligible) up.
The real question is why Mitchell was going to
such great lengths to keep it quiet. The only
basis would be that it went higher than.
Mitchell, higher than Mitchell.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) I'm sure.
HALDEMAN: And then he was thinking about filing a libel
suit. He was all--he had his lawyers tell the
Washington Post, so they ran a story about him
some time (unintelligible). He said the only
problem for us is after the fact
(unintelligible) quote legal expenses and
personal stuff, close quote, won't wash, he
says. Now for him it wouldn't, at that point,
because he knew more--but this is the thing, I
never understood, Dean's statements. The only
apparent defense is blackmail.

PRESIDENT: Well, held already mentioned blackmail to us.
HALDEMAN: Then he says
PRESIDENT: The 23rd.
HALDEMAN: Yeah. Then he said to me, "You should check
with Ehrlichman and see if he feels Hunt is a
threat." That was the 26th and I was over at
your place for about three hours
(unintelligible) the 27th, Ziegler was in and,
uh, I called Dean cause we were discussing--and
this is the interesting--I called Dean and
calling at your request to say, "We may move
today to send you to the Grand Jury as a public
move." And see, Ziegler too, was in here trying
to decide how to take the step. He
HALDEMAN: (CONT) was saying maybe we ought to offer Dean to the Grand Jury. "Well, what problems do you have with that?" Dean said, "I have no problems." Then he said, "I just talked with Jeb." And that gets into the question of whether there was one or two meetings about (unintelligible). Said, "There's a problem because Jeb says there's only one and I would have to say there, there are two. So, if I have to go to the Grand Jury, I would have to say something different from what Jeb said. That would create a problem." And, uh, he said, "Maybe the thing is to put out a thing saying I request to appear and we approved on the lawyer-client position. (Unintelligible) it's a tough call on the post-June 17th activities." He said, "If it's political embarrassment though, the Grand Jury is the right forum for us." (unintelligible). do the same thing was discussed with (unintelligible). Then he said, "I did review the problem areas." (Unintelligible) is getting down to the paper work. He said, "On the blackmail situation, I was aware that Mitchell and others were being blackmailed by those involved. I sought to ignore it. I was vague on the specifics because of it. The first time I knew it was when Mitchell told me the defendants wanted help regarding money for bond, money to raise their bond. That came from Mrs. Hunt, Bittman, Parkinson, Mitchell and LaRue. They were threatening to cause general havoc if they weren't helped. Parkinson said he didn't want to be involved any further, so Bittman used O'Brien. O'Brien was unhappy about it, too, but, you know, (unintelligible). O'Brien reported the threats to Mitchell, Magruder and Dean. Dean passed it on to some people in the white House. After (unintelligible)"

PRESIDENT: Passed it on--he's not referring that to me.

HALDEMAN: No.

PRESIDENT: That's involved.
HALDEMAN: No. He's hanging Ehrlichman and me on that and he hadn't gotten to the point of reading (unintelligible) yet. He just puts it back. Then he says, "After Mitchell had the original threat, he told Dean to tell Ehrlichman and Haldeman, uh, to use Kalmbach to raise the money. Ehrlichman called and authorized that. And Kalmbach raised the money and delivered it per instructions to LaRue, about $70,000. Next time there was a trip to be made and there was no money available, Stans and LaRue were aware that there was 350 at the White House for polling. The White House hadn't spent it and wanted to return it. Only Strachan, with Haldeman's approval, could spend the money. The problem is (unintelligible) would undoubtedly be in the press, so the money sat in Strachan's safe. Mitchell told Dean to ask Haldeman for some of the money (unintelligible) surely that it, would be replenished. Dean told Haldeman, said this is a bad situation (unintelligible) LaRue or O'Brien says it's a crisis. Haldeman said have Strachan get the money but get it clear as soon as possible. Get all of the money out of here and get a receipt for it. Strachan did, but got no receipt. 'This is, this is his (unintelligible). He said, "I'm not aware of the extent of the threats that were made to the Committee, beyond those two examples. But there were two blackmail threats made directly to the White House: One, Mrs. Hunt and Colson's secretary, (unintelligible). Colson didn't know what it was about at first: (Unintelligible) phone calls, (unintelligible) O'Brien; the second was when O'Brien told Dean that Hunt insisted on meeting, sent a message to Dean regarding 72 plus 50 if not received he'd re-consider his options and expose his seamy things about Ehrlichman and Krogh. nean advised Haldeman and Ehrlichman of this threat. Ehrlichman requested Dean discuss it with Mitchell and Colson. He discussed it with Mitchell, but not Colson. Mitchell said in a meeting later that there was no problem. He's not in a position to fully evaluate..."
That was your...

"...in a position to fully evaluate about blackmail and everyone concerned—everyone was concerned about dire threats to the White House, but (unintelligible) blackmail we imagined the worst. Now clemency—O'Brien told Dean that Bittman was asked by Hunt to deal with Colson. Ehrlichman said (unintelligible) Bittman, he did. Colson said it was essential that Hunt be given assurance. He, Ehrlichman, agreed. Colson told Bittman he could make no commitment, but as a friend, he would assist, (unintelligible) the actual statement. Hunt was satisfied with this." (Unintelligible). And he said,"There was a problem with why a delay in giving notice to the FBI (unintelligible)."

Dean says that, Gray talked to Ehrlichman's office, told them about (unintelligible/REMOVED) crook." And that's the end of that phone call the 26th.

Boy.

(Pause)

On the 27th, (unintelligible), he says he had a long conversation with O'Brien. O'Brien's very distressed with Mitchell. He says Mitchell could cut the whole thing off if he would just step forward, did sign off on the Watergate. Jeb told O'Brien and Parkinson he believes that the whole Liddy thing was put together by the White House before it was presented to them. Dean cooked this up probably at Haldeman's instructions, the idea of the super-intelligence operation.

Dean is reporting what Jeb says now.

He's reporting what O'Brien tells him that Jeb tells O'Brien. "Mitchell bought it. It was an accomplished fact that the center (unintelligible) and then there was a hiatus. Dean's appeared in Mitchell's office. Liddy
unveiled his plan. Nobody bought the first plan and nobody bought the second plan—just lingered. Liddy was pushing to get something done. Colson got into the act, pushing to get something. The final step was when Gordon Strachan called Magruder and said Haldeman told him to get this going because the President wanted it.” Now—See that's the Magruder line Dean was working on at that point.

PRESIDENT: Has Magruder changed that line?
HALDEMAN: Oh, yeah. Yeah.

PRESIDENT: You don't think he says that the President (unintelligible) huh?

HALDEMAN: No. But I've got all—those dates where he totally says the opposite. Mitchell called Liddy in and read him the riot act because of the poor quality of the stuff they were getting and Dean says, "Here's my theory. I think Mitchell and Magruder have their ass in a sling, they're mixing apples and oranges for their own protection. For example, about how little Dean told Liddy regarding Dean's political intelligence regarding demonstrations and so forth I didn't know." Dean says, "I didn't know anything about it. The fact is that the first meeting (unintelligible), in other words, absurd. The second meeting, I, Dean got Mitchell off the hook, said the plan was impossible and I told Haldeman afterwards if it's impossible, he should get out. Dean saw the problem and wanted to get ten miles away from it. The problem is Liddy is (unintelligible). O'Brien says Magruder wants to meet, but that's the motive of giving O'Brien the story. He's trying to scare Dean and he.

PRESIDENT: Who, O'Brien is?
HALDEMAN: No. O'Brien says that's Magruder--and O'Brien says he doesn't really believe Jeb, but he's not sure. He sees this point of mixing apples and oranges. He's very disappointed in Mitchell, but he won't tell him so. "O'Brien suggested that if we want to force this to a head, he, O'Brien, who's retained by the committee, could waive his retainer and report to the President on all the facts," which is--in effect is what he did. You see, came out and talked to Ehrlichman.

PRESIDENT: O'Brien came out and talked to Ehrlichman?

HALDEMAN: Yeah. Dean's report (unintelligible) "Hunt's at the Grand Jury today. He doesn't know how far it'll go. They'll probably get into the money, but not as desperate today. He's on the brink. Bittman called O'Brien yesterday and said Hunt was shaky. McCord's walking out and Hunt thinks maybe it's his turn. (unintelligible)." Dean said, "We're not really at the crunch as we were last night. Liddy's lawyer (unintelligible). O'Brien and Parkinson are getting shaky themselves. Dean is asking his lawyer for a statement saying he knew nothing in advance. Mitchell offered to leave during December or January. He heard absolutely nothing more on the intelligence crew. June 17th did see Liddy five or six times but (unintelligible) the campaign. The reason Dean called Liddy on June 19th was that Kleindienst had told him that Liddy saw him on the 18th before (unintelligible) out of jail. Liddy told Kleindienst (unintelligible) Ehrlichman. The Warren Commission idea, he still thinks it's possible. He's trying to pick it apart. The President could say, 'Here's what's charged to the White House, uh, against the White House and the Committee, puts it all into perspective of politics, says it's all bad. In fact the Commission (unintelligible) the situation. The press, the Senate Committee,
HALDEMAN

(CONT): and so on, prejudged (unintelligible) Weicker and so on. The FBI's falsely charged. The Justice--the U.S. Attorney has falsely charged. No man's above the law, but under these circumstances, there's no possibility of (unintelligible) facts. He won't fight it if all are given fair treatment. So, I've created a super panel, in cooperation of all investigative agencies. All people tell all. All people have agreed to waive trial by jury. The panel can remove a Federal employee, levy fines, and post criminal sanctions (unintelligible) also submit, if they want to. Anyone who does not submit all information be turned over to the justice, the Justice Department for criminal prosecution. No judgment before all the facts received and we'll, then we'll make note of all the findings (unintelligible) action taken, proceed in secret as soon as possible." The advantages he says of this are that nothing will be done until after the '74 elections. The President maintains the ultimate stroke which is a (unintelligible) until '75--'til '77. He suggests a panel of Earl Warren, Tom Clark, a former governor of some kind of (unintelligible). The President should call Ervin down and tell him what the plan is. Explain why. Ask him to hold his hearings in abeyance and ask him to serve on the panel. Then he says "You also should consider the President and Mitchell having a one-on-one talk. The President should find out what Mitchell's true perception is." (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Well, at least Dean at that time was still our lawyer, wasn't he? (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Well, he was building his own case at the same time. You see it evolved bit by bit. Now later that day, he calls, says, "O'Brien talked to Mitchell today. Mitchell asked Jeb to come up. Mitchell will tell Magruder, 'I ain't going to jail. You make your own decision.' "Mitchell told Dean to stiffen up. Said, "If you go before the Grand Jury
HALDEMAN

(CONT). you won't be believed 'cause your story doesn't jive with mine.” So told him yesterday that he would open a can of worms. Dean thinks that Mitchell is saying that Dean should do everything Mitchell's way. Jeb said McCord did budget work for Liddy and maybe Liddy told him (unintelligible) to Magruder, Mitchell, and they said--got it down. Jeb did talk to Gordon Strachan (unintelligible). He thinks Dean, Jeb should hire a good lawyer (unintelligible). We should beat Magruder to the punch on immunity by immunizing Dean. See this--now he's on the immunize Dean kick now for (unintelligible) save his own. The problem is Jeb's perception of the truth is bad. Changes all the time. He doesn't really know the truth. Dean thinks that Sirica oughta be (unintelligible) scare everyone. No chance for a fair trial.

PRESIDENT: Well, I, I could call Sirica.

HALDEMAN: Oh, yeah. The panel is better 'cause they make a fair assessment of the facts out of the public eye. Maybe Colson (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: And also the Special Counsel for that.

HALDEMAN: And then--still, the same day, he says, "Hunt's gonna give him a written statement and take the Fifth on everything else. Peterson won't know 'til later what, uh, comes out." He says, "Hunt--Dean is getting reports from Petersen as to what's happening in the Grand Jury." (Pause) Dean reports later that McCord is going to the Grand--going to the Senate before he goes to the Grand Jury.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Dean feels that in 24 hours he'll have documentation proving you didn't know anything
HALDEMAN: about the Watergate. He already has Jeb's account, Magruder's state--John Mitchell's statement. Liddy is (unintelligible). Regarding the post-June 17th there's a good chance to hunker down and survive. Dean goes to the Grand Jury (unintelligible) should waive privilege (unintelligible) first one. Announced Woodward of the Washington Post called Gerry Warren. Said they don't want to be polarized on this. They want to set the thing to rest and they'd be--interview the President. That's the 27th. That get's us into the 28th, which was the day that Mitchell came down, met with Dean, then with Magruder and then Magruder with Dean.

PRESIDENT: But not with me that day?
HALDEMAN: No, sir.
PRESIDENT: Yeah. I only saw Mitchell once.
HALDEMAN: Yeah, you didn't see him that day at all. That's when Mitchell told me the Jeb story isn't the final passage of the White House. Liddy and Colson. Colson called Jeb twice to get going on this thing. Specifically, (unintelligible) O'Brien. Mentioned Florida. Liddy told Magruder later that he was better. Colson called. Gordon Strachan probably had a lot of the--of the Committee--he had some. Copy of (unintelligible) Strachan and Colson. Strachan told him that I had approved the plan.

PRESIDENT: Strachan told Dean?
HALDEMAN: No. Strachan told Jeb.
PRESIDENT: Jeb. okay, what's this
HALDEMAN: Jeb's story to Mitchell. It's the same
PRESIDENT: And Jeb may not still be saying that at all.
HALDEMAN: I know he's not.
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PRESIDENT: You do know he's not?
HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: You (unintelligible) what he said to the U.S. Attorney, do you?
HALDEMAN: No. I know what he says he said. I know, I know what he says, he was going to say.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: And I know what he told Ehrlichman he said.

PRESIDENT: Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah.
HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible/REMOVED). That's mainly on the problem of Dean. Dean testifying (unintelligible).

REEL 3 BEGINS

Later that day, Dean called me--Dean's down now, the 28th.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: He's done.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, yeah.
HALDEMAN: Uh, you told me to give you a report that evening on whether there was anything from Dean, so I checked to Dean on the phone.

REEL 2 ENDS
HALDEMAN: You called me at home.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. Yeah.

HALDEMAN: No, I guess it was at 7:15 at night. No, it must have been longer because I gave you the (unintelligible) and, uh, that's when you called to tell me you were going to read the speech from the desk rather than...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...stand up. And you said give me a report if you have anything from Dean. I checked Dean. Dean said Hunt spent four hours with immunity. There are no problems for us

RESTRICTED—“D”

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible). He said O'Brien had a long conversation with LaRue which evolved into a discussion of Mitchell. And LaRue said that, as a student of Mitchell, he feels John's on the verge of breaking.

PRESIDENT: Mmm.

HALDEMAN: Dean told Mitchell and Magruder, regarding Bart Porter, that he didn't remember Porter talking to him. O'Brien talked to Porter today and said he had talked to (unintelligible). Dean says he can't do what Mitchell and Magruder told him to do. The more he looks at the full speech, I think,
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HALDEMAN, the more he thinks we should work it out. Mitchell and Magruder both said that they both signed off on Watergate.

(Partially intelligible/REMOVED).

PRESIDENT: Funny, Dean says Colson's June activity—this after the March 21st thing.

HALDEMAN: Oh, yeah. This is a week later.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

HALDEMAN: This is a question whether Dean can avoid that point. I raised the question but you avoided the point. (Unintelligible) Mitchell (unintelligible). He said, "Well, one way I can avoid it is if I'm not called. A narrow waiver that restricts me might work." Then, he says, "I feel it is imperative that we get a criminal lawyer. Maybe I could hire one, as the President's consultant. The best one I know is Hugh Schwartz, he's a Democrat (unintelligible). The only other one I know is Charlie Schaffer in Rockville"—and now that's one of his lawyers.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, that's right, Schaffer is. Schaffer. I think (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Okay, Schaffer. Uh (Pause) that's all on that (unintelligible). Mitchell, the next time Mitchell talks to me, with, regarding Dean—O'Brien feels it'd be a mistake for Dean to announce. Better to get the charges out first and structure it so we have an understanding (unintelligible). Undisputed in the Grand Jury—no problems (unintelligible) against White House spokesman (unintelligible). Mitchell says, "Everyone tells me that Dean is up-tight and he's not making proper judgments. I strongly suggests that you
HALDEMAN,

Continued: make sure that Dean doesn't go off halfcocked without your reviewing." I'm the only one--"Haldeman's the only one Dean can trust, his opinion of Ehrlichman is incredible." It's frightening (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: No, I should establish contact with Dean and maintain it.

PRESIDENT: Did you do that?

HALDEMAN: I have all along.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: As you can see (pause). Then we went to San Clemente

PRESIDENT: For a week.

HALDEMAN: ...and we give the stuff to--I don't have anything significant on Watergate over the weekend until the day that you came, on Monday.

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: And that morning Mitchell called me to say that O'Brien met with Dean and Dean's taken the unique stance and that the only salvation now is for me to talk to Dean. If Dean does say what he suggests he's going to say, he will unravel the whole thing. And, uh, Mitchell's surprised because after the meeting the other day, which would have been (unintelligible), I thought he understood. Dean's using Haldeman as the reason that he have to stay with us, because he told Haldeman about the meeting afterwards so he can't (unintelligible) the facts on that. He said, "Some of the post activities
HALDEMAN: are also a problem. We should consider the solution of Dean not testifying. That would solve several problems and we got ample grounds for that.” (Unintelligible) suggestion.

PRESIDENT: Do you think we could have gotten away without--without--Dean not testifying?

HALDEMAN: No, we never, we, we, we never got to that point.

PRESIDENT: No. He went in anyway.

HALDEMAN: Dean says, Dean calls me, a few minutes later that same day. He says his lawyer says that Dean must not talk to Mitchell and Magruder. Now Dean must answer for Watergate. He would rather take the potential Fifth, than to cause anyone a problem, (unintelligible) potential indictment. Strachan is being worked on by Magruder. Moore had lungh--with Kleindienst, about the Special Prosecutor thing, and he, Kleindienst thinks he has to do this (unintelligible) device to avoid (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Yeah. If Dean tells the truth, Dean says "If I tell the truth it will start finger-pointing that would be unbearable." I have no idea what Mitchell said before the Grand Jury but Mitchell must consider what he said would conflict with what O'Brien knows. O'Brien told Dean Saturday that Jeb is not now concerned with Dean's testimony.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: O'Brien really knows all the facts. Dean's lawyer says don't write his story down and, and don't give a (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Talking about Dean now--That's an interesting little (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: And that afternoon, April 2, at San Clemente, you and Ehrlichman and I had a long meeting. And you said it's important, one, that the President be isolated from all these discussions. Tell all the parties that the President has other problems, with the Committee, Congress, South Vietnam and so on. (Unintelligible) schedule (unintelligible) first three months of all this.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: He said no, I can't talk to the people concerned anymore, for example Dean, Moore, and Colson, and Mitchell, and Bush, and the Vice President. I can't talk to any of them, so Ehrlichman must get in conference with all concerned.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: And second, there must be no falling out on charges -like Ehrlichman -all different directions. Can't have this "every man for himself." Dean (unintelligible) after this you went into (unintelligible) case review -strategy -and what it would cost the (unintelligible). Talked about campaign. The next day Mitchell called the first thing in the morning and said, "Paul O'Brien will be out in California Wednesday night..."-this was like Tuesday, he was talking,-
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HALDEMAN,

Continued: "...to meet with Kalmbach on Thursday morning."
I urge strongly that Haldeman see him and set it up through Dick Moore. I did set it up for Ehrlichman to see him myself. Then, the next day, the fourth...

PRESIDENT: That was pretty good investigation though, when you come to think about it, Bob.

HALDEMAN: Damn right.

PRESIDENT: Um hmm.

HALDEMAN: Yes sir. The next day, on the fourth, Dean calls me, we're still in San Clemente, and said his lawyer saw the U.S. Attorneys, Silbert and Glanzer, and they just sat and listened to take their temperatures as representatives of Dean regarding what would happen. What they found was that one, Dean will be called, probably next week, under the same conditions as Mitchell, with no cameras and not enough to go after him. Number two, Dean is not a target for the Grand Jury, also Haldeman is not...

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) never gonna get (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: ...they don't believe that they're gonna have to call Haldeman at all except possibly to corroborate other statements. Number three, Liddy has talked to the U. S. Attorney but his lawyer doesn't know it. They believe -see I think this is a lie, because they've told Dean that Liddy hasn't talked to them.
PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: I think this is how they started to break Dean. They told his lawyers that Liddy had told the whole story. That's when Dean started cracking, I think. Because they've said Liddy has talked to the U.S. Attorney, his lawyer doesn't know it, the U.S. Attorney believes Liddy. He has freed the White House from their minds. It was to make us feel good.

PRESIDENT: Dean makes you feel good?

HALDEMAN: But we don't know what he said. The lawyers say Dean must not talk to Jeb. This morning Jeb called and Dean's lawyers (unintelligible). Fourth, they discussed the (unintelligible) business on privilege. Dean won't and can't take the Fifth Amendment, say the U. S. Attorneys. His lawyers say he may have to on the technicals. They told the Attorneys that, and the U.S. Attorneys say they won't pursue the technical violations. (Unintelligible) Dean's lawyers think there will be practical immunity regarding the after-the-fact technical violations.

PRESIDENT: Um hmm.

HALDEMAN: They talked about the funny positions of the Grand Jury (unintelligible). Dean's view of the Ehrlichman matter, that some arrangements have to be made on ground rules only that only first hand knowledge, not hearsay.
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PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Yes, but now Dean then should be hard-line fellow here. Then—he tells me that Mitchell's called Moore—that in Dean's office Clawson talked to Mitchell yesterday—said that Parkinson says—the (unintelligible) payoff (unintelligible) McCord's gonna say the (unintelligible) is a lie (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

(Pause)

HALDEMAN: The next day Dean called me and said, regarding his story, there's no real problem. He has an idea we ought to go public. If we want the facts (unintelligible). We'll know how to do it. He said let's cut the Watergate out, let the U.S. Attorney summarize that later (unintelligible) not jeopardize and then release a full report. Then let Ervin go ahead (unintelligible) Watergate.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) can't handle the Watergate properly.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's all Watergate is.

HALDEMAN: He said he's put it to the Grand Jury one day next week (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: After all that, you see, he's already had his talk with the Grand Jury and the, uh, U.S. Attorney said (unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: Yep, then on the seventh, which was Saturday, we were still in San Clemente, he said his lawyers talked to the U. S. Attorneys. He said they only want the facts on Watergate, but he's told them everything he knows. They don't believe Hunt, they're gonna push him harder, they want me to be in tomorrow. He said on the eighth, off the record, no action. Haldeman says attorney-client and so forth, we're at the moment of truth, the Grand Jury still does not know what they want, they only want the pre, they're not interested in the post.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: They want Dean because they (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: They're sure interested in post now, aren't they?

HALDEMAN: Yep. That was the weekend, (unintelligible) on television on Sunday.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

(Pause)

HALDEMAN: I didn't even see it, see it (unintelligible) on Sunday night.

PRESIDENT: I don't see how you can manage to carry all the load.

HALDEMAN: I just listen.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible).
PRESIDENT: Huh?

HALDEMAN: A couple days went along when I didn't talk with you. (Unintelligible), That's what Mitchell was saying, and Ehrlichman was saying.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, that's right.

(Pause)

HALDEMAN: So, uh, (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Yeah. Maybe you can get John over and talk a little before you go home.

HALDEMAN: Check to see if there's anyone who wants to (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Oh, I want you to know, I haven't had any report yet from Kleindienst. I'm keeping in touch with him. He said he’d (unintelligible) to see if (unintelligible) what there are several others and I asked them what, what they are going to do with that memorandum that was sent up there. I let John (telephone conversation begins) --Yeah, yeah, I'd like to point this out right now. --Oh yeah. --No, no. --Yeah, I see. --Yeah. Right. --Yeah, uh, he, Bob told me that. He's just been here a few minutes, and he told me, and I think that's very important. Now on the Pat Gray story, what's your advice as an officer? --Yeah. --Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. --Right. --
Continued: What? Maybe, uh, maybe you should.

-(Unintelligible) April 15th, uh
--Yeah.--Right.--Right, I said
right--Yeah.--Yeah. Yep.--Ah.--Sure who,
uh--Yeah, I just think you're, uh,, maybe your
attorney should know that. What do you think?
I don't know. Yeah. Right. -That's right.
Right. That's right. -Yeah. Why don't you drop
-maybe you can come over, we can talk it over
here. It would be a great help. Fine, fine.

... The story regarding Mr. Gray's safe has
broken.

PRESIDENT: Kleindienst, please.

HALDEMAN: Who has it?


PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) Sure as hell is, you've just
gotta (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: First the New York Times called my lawyer, then
he said he had a report, a first-hand report
from a high administration official, that that
official and Haldeman had engineered the
cover-up of Watergate. My lawyer -now whether
it's really a first-hand report -you heard it
with your own ears. My lawyer said yes. He
said a high present official or former official
(unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Who, Mitchell and Haldeman?

HALDEMAN: The lawyer said, uh, Mitchell. The reporter
says that Mitchell said in his presence and the
presence of other reporters, off the record,
that he and Haldeman engineered
Continued: The Watergate cover-up. Yes, the lawyer is (unintelligible). But I don't believe, I think that's pure fishing on the part of Hirsch. (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Mitchell, Mitchell's drinking.

HALDEMAN: That's the only thing I told the lawyer. Mitchell was drunk last night or something on the way back on the plane from Florida (unintelligible). Mitchell is certainly a professional Grand Jury testifier. I'd recommend him.

PRESIDENT: Yeah (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: I think also Mitchell might have said it in a joke. You know, where he said that they're planning on it, and then say, "Yes, as a matter of fact, you smart-ass bastard, Haldeman and I sat down and engineered the whole fucking cover-up. Now what more do you want?"

PRESIDENT: The cover-up or the, or the, uh, the or the (unintelligible) or the bugging?

HALDEMAN: That's neither here nor there; I don't think I'd talk to Mitchell.

PRESIDENT: What John is referring to, in view of this disclosure, he feels that he may have to take leave because of the (unintelligible) involvement. That's what he was told on the phone, I told him you talked to John. Well, uh...

HALDEMAN: Well, when he "deep-sixed" the stuff...
PRESIDENT: Yeah (unintelligible) but that they, the, the story is that the, that Ehrlichman and Dean...

(Telephone rings)

Yeah, yeah. -About the, uh, report from the Times. Oh, yeah, go ahead, yeah. -Yeah. I see, fine, good, good. I'll call you tomorrow. -The other thing—Dick, you know, there's the deletion. I think I should talk to you about this involved Pat Gray—involving the, the, the—Dean giving them the contents, some of the contents from Hunt's safe. And, uh, the New York Times (unintelligible) uh, and, and that Gray did, and that Gray destroyed it, you know. Uh, don't you feel that under the circumstance, that uh, Gray, uh, I don't know, I think I'm overreacting, but uh, especially under these circumstances, don't you think he ought to resign? What do you think? How, how do we handle this? Do you want to think about it? What can we do? Call me back? -Well, the point is that—Yeah, well, we're not going to have you do it tonight, but I guess, I think I should, right, but I mean the story, uh—What's Henry think, uh, we should do about it? —Yeah. —Right. —All right. —Well, can I ask you and, uh, you can think a little about it? —Uh, we'll, uh, know, uh, the uh, let me say though, and I know this is, uh, an awful thing, but uh, believe me, I want the whole damn thing out, don't you? Tell it as it is. —Well, sure, sure, it's going to come out
Continued: in the paper. But Dick, Dick, for crying out loud, God damn it, these damn things happen. Uh, I have preference, we've got to get them out. You know. That's my responsibility, my responsibility, and by golly I'm going to meet it. Yeah. All right. -Well. Fine. Bye... He says "Well, we'll think about it."

(Pause)

Petersen, uh, please, Assistant Attorney General...I'll tell Ron (unintelligible) John's trying to (unintelligible/REMOVED) John shouldn't ask for a week. Look, he knew, he knew, he knew. (Unintelligible). Look, the point is, he knew this was part of (unintelligible). Right?

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible). For Christ sake, he, he, uh, observed the turning over of the stuff to the FBI. Now if you've got an FBI Director that's out of his mind, that isn't Ehrlichman's fault.

PRESIDENT: But he said that, because of the innuendo of the arrest, he wanted to take a leave until it was cleared up.

HALDEMAN: No, no, no.

PRESIDENT: Then if that happens, then, u~, Bob, basically, uh, Dean would have to, you would have to, wouldn't you? Dean would have to as well.

HALDEMAN: Dean should have been out long ago, if you can follow it up. Maybe it, maybe...
(phone rings)

PRESIDENT: Hello -Oh, I just wanted to, uh, I just wanted to, uh, talk to Dick Kleindeinst. He said held chat with you, uh, uh. I just wanted to get your reaction to how we, uh, how we, uh, how we handled the Gray situation up at, uh (unintelligible). Do you want to think about it overnight or should you react right away or what? -Good. -Yeah. But how long can he really stay on? Uh -But he should. -Let me ask you this. Rather than my doing it, uh, I suggest that you ask Dick. Uh, you, would you mind discussing it with Kleindienst, uh, I, I think, uh, let's, let's not put it in a, put it in a context where I, uh, uh, I love him too, I love all of you, but you know what I mean. I, I want him, I want him to be this way so that he doesn't look like an ass. And I said, uh, wouldn't you, if you were in such a position, prepare to have, uh, Dick perhaps -needless casualties (unintelligible). Why the hell did we start the damn thing? I'll be damned if I know. But I don't know what to do. That is another part of the, uh ... Well, in any event, then, would you, uh, would you just, uh, would you, would you mind, would you talk to Kleindienst and say Look, uh, would you--.talk to Pat and tell Pat, uh"-Just a second here, just a second, somebody's on another line, let met get to another phone, hold on.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible/REMOVED). Does Petersen know why Gray destroyed the (unintelligible)? In other words, what Ziegler says ought to be guided at least in part by what
HALDEMAN,

Continued: explanation Gray is going to give. Petersen's (unintelligible/REMOVED).

PRESIDENT: Yeah. (Unintelligible). All right, I, I'm ready to talk how. But the one question I was going to ask you about is that, what, what in the world is Gray going to say as to why he destroyed it? Cause he obviously figures, well he counted on. Uh -Yeah. -Right. -Did he have you put some confidence in Ehrlichman and Dean? -That's good, well he isn't, uh, he can't say that Ehrlichman and Dean told him to destroy? Did he? Did he, by the way, see that story, uh, really wouldn't stand-up for him, I mean apart from needing help, for for him? Why does, why does, for example Ehrlichman and Dean call the Director of the FBI over and say, "Look, here's some documents, destroy them." Why the hell didn't they destroy 'em themselves? -I-see. -I see. -Yeah. -Yeah. -Um hmm. -Yeah, and that he's going, uh, and that is what basically he's going to say, or has he said it? -Yeah. -Yeah, that, that Dean told, he said that these were documents that were wholly unrelated to the, the, to the Watergate, and that they should be destroyed. But that, that -you know I, I, I think he, if he leaves, you know what I mean, and so forth and so on, for him to, for him to say that a, that, that, that record is, the story, in my view, simply doesn't, doesn't ring too damn much true. You know what I mean now? Why didn't, why in the world did the, did Dean and/or Ehrlichman, uh, call the Director of
Continued: the FBI, hand him documents, and then say "Take them because they're not related to Watergate, and destroy them." You see my point? That's, that's a screwball, that's a screwball -That's, I don't think he's there on another matter but that's a screwball purpose. What did Dean tell you? -Yeah. Dean says that Ehrlichman told Dean to destroy them. -- Uh, that's the so called "deep-six" then? -Right, right. -Right. -- Well, I don't know, I'm not going to try to tell anybody to change the story and so forth, that is because I want, I understand we want the truth, but I, I, I just can't uh, believe, I just can't believe that, uh, anybody, I can't really believe that anybody's gonna believe that the Director of the FBI was handed some documents and told to destroy 'em. Ha! You wanna see? -My God yes. And that he did it I mean destroyed them. Bet J. Edgar Hoover's got every, uh, every doodle that anybody ever had around, right there in his files. Right. -When, uh, when will, uh, will Gray, uh, make, make this go back to our people here? -Well, uh, well I'll tell you what. -Yeah. -I'll tell you what you do, uh, because basically uh, uh, how far, how far I want to get into this damn thing, I don't know. But I mean, I, I heard this, this insane story that, that the event -that how this -What, what function Ziegler set, function Ziegler set (unintelligible) -I just, yeah, but that's our problem, he said well, we can't say that we just, I mean we had some, you know, we, in other words
Continued: the, our investigation here is the one that we've been undertaking, uh, the, uh, 21st of March, uh, we had information about this, but we haven't had the damn thing corroborated. You know what I mean? Yeah, I've never had, I've, Dean, I mean, let me put it this way, Pat Gray never told me this. Uh, he, uh, he's told You this. Remember, he's told you - He first told you, as I remember, Henry, that nobody ever got any documents, and then later on he said, "Yeah, I got some but I destroyed 'em." Right? So uh, he was put in a tough position, there.

-Although, although on the other hand that's, uh, something you don't live with, and I guess that's your point. You were investigating him, he may have forgotten but, uh - I see. It was a casual conversation. - Right. Right. - Yeah. - And then the next day he said he refreshed, he refreshed his recollection and said, "Yes, I did get the documents, and I was told to destroy them." That's what Pat Gray now says, is that correct? - Yeah. - Well, I don't believe that, uh, (unintelligible). You see, the point is when you say that, uh, that, that Dean thinks that he fixed it and so forth, you haven't had Ehrlichman (unintelligible) you haven't had that corroborated yet, because basically, uh, Ehrlichman was in the room when this happened and Ehrlichman when it happened and Ehrlichman of course knows, uh, he, uh, he uh, uh, and, uh, I'm gonna have to talk to him about this. I have to. But the point that I, the point that I make is this: whether or not, uh,
Continued: whether, whether, uh, uh, d-did Dean corroborate 
Gray's story? That's what one thing I'd like to 
know. Did Dean say that in the presence of 
Ehrlichman, that, that he or Ehrlichman, or both 
told Gray "These are politically sensitive, 
unrelated to Watergate, and they should be 
destroyed." Did Dean say that? -That's the 
whole point, you see, I think, I don't, uh, now, 
let me say, let me say, let me, let me say this, 
on this, for your information, I've questioned 
Dean about this, uh, uh, he uh, uh -I see -What? 
-Yeah, yeah, no, after, uh, after we had your, 
our talk, you know, I said, I said that, uh, he 
just said I, we handed the doc-, he gave the 
documents to Gray. That's, uh, you know what I 
mean, and uh, that was that. He didn't say, but 
he never said we told him to destroy them. You 
see my point? But hell Dean was, uh, well let, 
let me put it this way. Assuming he had, why 
the hell is he going to implicate himself in 
such a thing as that? He can let Gray take the 
ramp for it. -Yeah. --Yeah. Yeah, and he 
didn't. -Right, right. That's right. -Right. 
Right, right, right, right, right. Right-Right. 
-Yeah. -I see. -I see, but that was not done, 
-That's right. -Incidentally, may I ask, without 
reviewing the contents, did, uh, did you get to 
the bottom of the Sheppard mystery? -Okay. 
Exactly.-Oh, hey, the reason why they thought 
that I was putting up the transcripts, huh. -Ha 
ha ha ha ha ha ha ha -Yeah. -Well,
Continued: let me say this, uh, one of the, one of the (unintelligible) my record is clear on is I, you could swear on, on a stack of Bibles that I, in fact I've probably bent over more backward more than most people would have that did this. Fell on the Grand Jury, I do not want to know. I know. Right, right, and uh -by direction. All right. -On the, uh, on the Gray thing, uh, it seems to me that, uh, that Gray, you should have your meeting with Gray immediately. The three of you. Don’t have him make a statement; however, until uh, until uh, he uh, I don't know whether, whether he should even make one tonight. Uh, uh, you know what I mean? I'm not sure I could react that soon. But I know that, uh, he's got convictions and maybe we shouldn't act like, uh ... I think that under the circumstances that the destruction done or, even though it was done with no legal intent, uh, this ah, this uh, stupidity of the, it's unbelievable (unintelligible). He'll have to resign, which would be the best ... Who's second man, Uh (unintelligible) over there? Felt (unintelligible) -Yeah. -That's right. I know. Yeah, I know. -I know. I know. No that's (unintelligible). No, no, we, we've got to be cleaned out, got to be cleaned out. My point is, my point is, this is not the time. This is not the time. I am not ready to name Gray's successor. I'm still searching, you know, and so therefore, but, but, but the point is if Gray leaves -Huh, what? Yeah. -But the point that I want to get across here, that they haven't been nalning anybody to succeed Gray, I've got to do it on the basis of, uh, you know, an Acting Directory at this point and, uh, and I do think we're going to have to make this to the point, to the point that, uh... I'll have to be leaving now, do you have a meeting at, uh, 6:10, uh, you and
Continued: Dick, uh (unintelligible) are going to meet with Gray (unintelligible) over hhere? Or should Gray ----Oh, I see. -Yeah. -Yeah, he's gotta think about it and uh, and he shouldn't make a. I don't think that Gray should pop off with a statement tonight on the thing. Uh, does that, doesn't that make sense? -Yeah, after all, because basically he's gonna have to say what the situation is. Now what is your suggestion as to what, uh, uh, anybody else, I mean (unintelligible) investigating the matter. I mean after all, this is one of the things you are investigating this, this, this whole damn "deep-six"thing. Remember, I told you to locate the list, find out, you haven't, you haven't even, uh, you, well, as a matter, you, you haven't even had Dean's statement under oath yet, have you? And you haven't had Ehrlichman under oath? So (unintelligible) for a full moon. -Yeah. -Well, uh, one, one, one thing else, uh, that the, uh, what about your, what about your, your, your meeting with Dean? Uh, isn't it about time you get that done? Let's just get this thing rolling, or is that something (unintelligible)? When are you going to meet him? -His attorney, -Yeah -Right. -Yeah. -See, the problem I have is this, as you see, but the, but the, but the problem I have is that, uh, they say, "Well what are you going to do about Ehrlichman?" Question is, "What, what are you going to do about Dean?" You see what I mean? -You see. -So therefore, the point is, the, the point is that, ah -Yeah, yeah, I know, I know, oh, no, no, no, no, what I am referring to though is the terms of, of uh, of when you were going to get. Now I understand
Continued: all in our conversation that, uh, that the attorneys for Haldeman and Ehrlichman are going to meet with the U.S. Attorneys and arrange for, uh, first the informal interview, which you suggested was the proper procedure. That's going to be done very soon, I understand. I suppose (unintelligible/REMOVED). Then, uh, so we get that out of the way. Uh, and then, of course, they will be able to go over to Grand Jury after they've had their meeting. Uh, but getting back to the Dean thing, uh, it came to me that, uh, uh, you've got to get Dean in there to them, uh, you know what I mean? I mean you've gotta, you've gotta decide the Dean thing, and-- Let me just say one thing, that on that, the decision is yours. He'll get, he comes to you, but, but don't be concerned about what he told, I mean, uh, what he holds, uh, trump card or blackjack and so forth. There's not going to be any blackmail here, and uh, don't you agree? -What's that? -Right. -Right.--Are Magruder's and Dean's stories variable (unintelligible)? -Um hmm. Yeah. Yeah, you want Dean to plead. Yeah. Then you got a case. --That's right. -Yeah. -I know you are. You're still sure of both Ehrlichman and Haldeman, but you've gotta get, but the part that, I, I understand and I'm not trying to take you out around the case, the only thing I think the plea is, uh. How I can still sit here with, uh, I mean, I mean I'm restless with Ehrlichman and Haldeman's problem, naturally, if we, if you, but then I also have to wrestle with Dean's problem, because I'm aware of information that you are. I mean, I agree and our blank conversation, but I'm aware of those conversations see, and, I
PRESIDENT,

Continued: cannot move until, uh, without practically jeopardizing your, uh, prosecution. Can I? -No, but I guess they didn't tell me. I mean the point is, uh, if you're -All right, then I'll wait for you, but uh, I would say that, uh, Dean's decision ought to be made soon, uh, and uh, remember there's not going to be any blackmail or nothing of that sort. Call here, I want to follow this damn thing, and uh, I want it clearly understood. But, uh, we're, uh going to be concerned about blackmail anyhow. It's (unintelligible) him. I mean, uh, it's not the President, you can be sure of. The President's family all know that they may try a little of that and they may say, "Well, they all knew about the cover-up and so forth", all right, fine, but uh, don't let 'em blackmail you. Don't you be a bit concerned. I mean Dean, let me put up that Dean now has about as much, I'm afraid, in view of what has happened here, he has got about as much, uh, credibility as, as Magruder has, which ain't much. That's the problem. -Yeah. -That's right. -Would you like, like anybody. Okay. Well, let me know about your day. How you go with Dick Kleindienst. Call me right back. ...Well, you heard it.

HALDEMAN: Huh, the solution to that. Kleindienst said he had one iota of a (unintelligible) to get Gray off in a corner alone and say "You son-of-a-bitch, you can't talk like that". Yet he won't do it, maybe after this -and Gray will -and what you have to do is, is not tell me what to say, I'll just say, "Pat, I'm astonished at what you're going to say. I don't believe it and I want you to...
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PRESIDENT: Well...
HALDEMAN: ...tell me, is that true?"
PRESIDENT: Yeah. Here is the problem that, uh -the thing that of course is the loose cannon out there is again the son-of-a bitch Dean,
HALDEMAN: Yeah.
PRESIDENT: Dean says he gets the story that Ehrlichman told him to destroy the documents. So forth (unintelligible) "deep-six" them and he said (unintelligible) but You heard what I said well now, that's a totally ridiculous story, I mean, if they're going to destroy the documents why would they call the Director of the FBI over and say, "Look, here's some documents, destroy them."
HALDEMAN: More than that, I thought Dean's story was that I said that, but he thought better of it. So he didn't.
PRESIDENT: And they gave 'em to Gray.
HALDEMAN: So he gave them to Gray. Dean's told me that...
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: ...several times. This doesn't fit that (unintelligible).
PRESIDENT: Kleindienst, please.
HALDEMAN: On the other side, you might want to use Kleindienst. He said Ehrlichman called
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HALDEMAN

Continued: Gray at home Sunday night at 10:45 about the envelope in question, and Gray said, "John, I'm gonna say, I didn't know anything about it." He said, "Yeah." I said we deny it. I said, "Dean has, has talked about the delivery of the documents," add he said, "You can't let him say that." I said, "Well, Pat, he's already said it." And he said, "Well, I'll deny it." And he said, "You've gotta back me up." And then I called back, remember, four minutes later...

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible). Well, whatever it was. He was sitting right here.

HALDEMAN: We met for twenty minutes. All right, I called him back, told Bob, and said, "Pat, I can't leave our previous conversation alone. You can't deny it, because I'm gonna have to back up Dean when he says he delivered it. But what you said is that you must tell the truth, Pat. You've got to state the facts, don't get crosswise on this."

PRESIDENT: The problem is, what is Dean going to say about this today? That's the point, isn't it? The point is what the hell he says about this, isn't that? See, we haven't got anybody to talk to him. Ziegler?

HALDEMAN: Ziegler could.

Reel 4 Begins

UNIDENTIFIED: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: I suggested to Ron that he talk to Dean, but he wants to talk to you first.
PRESIDENT: All right, get Ron over here (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Would you ask Ron Ziegler to come to the President's office, immediately, please? Thank you.

Reel 3 Ends
HALDEMAN: Gray said to you in that second conversation he didn't know where the papers came from, and I (unintelligible) say he didn't open it, but he destroyed it. And you put the thing downj the total shock saying he destroyed it.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. I know. You, you, you, you, you showed it. You showed me here and well, he says, there goes my, uh, career.

HALDEMAN: Well, the trouble is now talking. Sure did.

PRESIDENT: Well, I, I, I saw the expression.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) said just threw you right, I mean (unintelligible) it would.

PRESIDENT: Yes, So I've a curious situation here I'd like to know more about (unintelligible) really important.

EHRLICHMAN: I didn't tell you about this problem of why you didn't act on Gray sooner. (Unintelligible) Gray's two statements to Petersen. You can reason him out. In other words, Petersen's still investigating. But you say all the witnesses and all haven't been called again.

PRESIDENT: I know. But don't you think that in view of this--do you think Gray should resign?
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PRESIDENT: Yeah. Hello.

OPERATOR: (Unintelligible) calling.

PRESIDENT: Uh, Dick, are you where you can talk?-Yeah. One thing I think is very important and perhaps that, uh, awfully difficult to (Unintelligible) Pat Gray, uh, that, uh--a story to the effect--I'm talking now about the truth--a story to the effect that he came over to, uh, Ehrlichman's office and received documents and was told by Ehrlichman and/or Dean to destroy them, first, is not true. That's (unintelligible). What happened is, uh, is basically that he was handed the documents, and then the stupid fellow didn't--told him they were not related to Watergate, but they were political, uh, documents, politically, uh, uh, documents and they were delivering them to him. Now, it, it seems to me that Gray, uh, frankly, that he just walks out and says--I mean, you know (unintelligible)--but that he walks out and says something that is not true, because, uh, Ehrlichman has (unintelligible) I talked with Dean and, my God, what Dean will say now, I don't know. I mean there, uh, but, uh, but my talk with Ehrlichman, which I know is, uh, is the God's truth. They handed him the documents and I, I remember that when, uh, this matter came up, Ehrlichman called--you see the curious the--just so you know the facts, Petersen first called Patrick and said, "Did you have any, uh, did you receive such documents?" And Gray denied having ever receiving any. D-denied it twice.
PRESIDENT: Then, finally, he said he refreshed his continued memory. He said, yes, held received them, but he destroyed them. Well now, the point is, uh, I, uh--Ehrlichman called Gray also, uh, and said, "Pat, what about those envelopes that you got?" And uh, uh, and Pat, of course--of course he denied, you see--he said, "You remembered it, you got them," and he says, "Where the hell are they?" And he says, "I destroyed them." and Ehrlichman was utterly shocked. And I'm sure Dean was utterly shocked. Over what Dean would say now, I don't know. There was discussion of--Dean says there was a discussion we ought to get, we oughta destroy the documents in Hunt's safe that had nothing to do with Watergate, and so forth. But the point was, it was not done. It was handed to Gray, and Gray did destroy them. But the critical point is this--that th-, the Director of the FBI--it's bad enough for him to say, "I took the documents, and I destroyed them because they weren't related to any cases you had, and I didn't feel we should have (unintelligible)." That's bad enough. But if he says that I destroyed them because I was ordered to, can you imagine what that makes him look like? And I, I want you to have a heart to heart talk with him on that point, 'cause I don't want to (unintelligible) that you're a liar. So, uh, are you (unintelligible)?

(Pause)

PRESIDENT: Yeah--Yeah. All right--right. All right. Fine. All right. You call me back. Bye, bye...Well, crisis a day, crisis an hour.
ZIEGLER: Yes, sir. Dean (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Right. Yeah. Well, I don't know, uh, when--the Times will run the story in the morning?

ZIEGLER: Oh, I suppose so. Yes, sir.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. And, uh, who'd they get it from? Do they know?

ZIEGLER: It's all over town, apparently (unintelligible) true.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

ZIEGLER: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: And are they referring to the fact that--are they saying that--are they, are they using in the story the fact that Ehr-, Ehrlichman and Dean, and/or Dean ordered Gray to destroy them?

ZIEGLER: It doesn't say ordered him.

PRESIDENT: Told him to destroy them?

ZIEGLER: It doesn't say told, it says

PRESIDENT: He destroyed them (unintelligible).

ZIEGLER: ...following--after a meeting.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

ZIEGLER: Uh, Truitt, uh, his comments, uh, it was after he had referred--he also had referred to the fact that the material was forged documents blaming uh, Kennedy for the assassination of (unintelligible).
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HALDEMAN: Diem.

PRESIDENT: I thought it was Diem.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

ZIEGLER:

RESTRICTED-“B”

I don't know what I am--all I'm saying is what Truitt...

PRESIDENT: I understand. I understand. But that's I think probably what it was. I don't know. That's uh, but, uh, does anybody know what the hell the documents were?

HALDEMAN: The only person I know who has ever said that that's what it was is John Dean.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. Somebody has seen those documents. Somebody has got to have seen the God damn documents.

HALDEMAN: Fred Fielding saw them.

PRESIDENT: 'Spose it helps, er, has anybody talked to Dean?

HALDEMAN: (Sigh). Dean told me that Fielding saw the documents.

PRESIDENT: And that they involved the assassination of Diem?

HALDEMAN: No, he--yeah, I guess he did. He said that th--, among them was--he said there was a bunch of very bad political stuff and among them was some phony document, uh, that, that, uh--saying that Kennedy has instituted the assassination of Diem. You think that was (unintelligible) Dean? (Pause)
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PRESIDENT: Yeah. As I...
HALDEMAN: Dean says he never looked at it. He says Fielding is the only one
PRESIDENT: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Well, I would think this--it would be important first, for, uh--you have not reacted yet.
ZIEGLER: No, I didn't think I should. Colson talked with me.
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
ZIEGLER: I think he wanted you to react to a story
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
ZIEGLER: ...such as this, and I'd overreact all over the place...
PRESIDENT: I agree.
ZIEGLER: ...(unintelligible)... 
PRESIDENT: I agree. Now the point is, uh, should John react?
ZIEGLER: I think he should. Whatever the situation is, as he knows it, I think you're -Colson should release it.
PRESIDENT: Should, should Dean react?
ZIEGLER: Well, (unintelligible)
PRESIDENT: I didn't think he was (unintelligible).
ZIEGLER: But (unintelligible).
PRESIDENT: Well, it would be helpful to know what the hell he's gonna say, would you mind explaining it to John, say-we're getting queries on it and, uh, and, uh, and, uh, and, uh, the, uh, that the question is, uh, I just, is blackmail what you're, uh--what are, what if anything, uh, you're gonna say? What is your thinking?

HALDEMAN: Should we get into the fact that one report is, understand that, that ... or, or we

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...that Gray claims that...

PRESIDENT: Gray?

HALDEMAN: ...that Gray was ordered to destroy them.

PRESIDENT: By Dean?

ZIEGLER: I don't know.

HALDEMAN: Well, you do now.

PRESIDENT: I told you that. I got that, I got that from, I got that from--I just talked to Kleindienst. Kleindienst told me, and Petersen.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Petersen claimed he's told him (unintelligible) that, uh, Gray's, that uh, that uh, their version--Gray's version is that he was ordered to destroy them. By Dean. And that that's what the story is (unin-
continued telligible) and say, "Was that the case or did you just hand it to him?"

ZIEGLER: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: See what I mean?

ZIEGLER: Yes, sir.

PRESIDENT: I just want to get, I just want to know what he's gonna say. I'm just trying to find out. Say, "John, uh," and uh, tell him we're not gonna--we don't comment stories here. Don't comment on 'em from here. Not now."

EHRLICHMAN: And ask him not to say anything without checking with you first.

PRESIDENT: Any you ask him...

ZIEGLER: Okay. Let me just state it here.

PRESIDENT: All right.

ZIEGLER: In the last few days (unintelligible). I have not been checking with Dean about how he responds.

PRESIDENT: I see. All right.

ZIEGLER: ...(Unintelligible) asked me to do this, so that's fine.

HALDEMAN: Well, this is different. This isn't just a Dean story.
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PRESIDENT: This is one that involved getting out Ehrlichman and Gray. That's the problem we've got. Just say, uh, "John, the only purpose of this is to, uh..."

ZIEGLER: (Unintelligible)

EHRlichMAN: (Unintelligible) cover-up, right?

HALDEMAN: Right. Here, in a way

PRESIDENT: Yeah. HALDEMAN: ... I think we have to

PRESIDENT: Yeah, I mean, the President has to know. I mean, uh, what uh, what uh, what what happened on that day?

ZIEGLER: Okay.

PRESIDENT: I mean, uh, what is his recollection? Just like to, like to know and that--er, Ron

ZIEGLER: Yes, sir.

PRESIDENT: ...under no circumstances (unintelligible) no, no, we can't.

ZIEGLER: Right.

PRESIDENT: Uh, we can't talk about it, but uh, (unintelligible)--I think with this one we have to know.

ZIEGLER: Okay.
(Door closes)
(Unintelligible conversation/REMOVED)

PRESIDENT: Well, let's see what we can do--uh, John, uh, I, I told Bob, uh, what your suggestion was and he said that we can't do that. (Unintelligible) part of the case and we have to--it's simply--makes the case. But the reaction to that, and so forth.

EHRLICHMAN: That was Frank Strickler's reaction, too.

PRESIDENT: Who is Frank Strickler?

EHRLICHMAN: Our, uh, our number two lawyer.

PRESIDENT: What did he say?

EHRLICHMAN: He said he just--he didn't think that we had, uh, anything to worry about and that it was not that big a deal. He said it was a big deal for Pat Gray, but it won't mean anything to you. Once we get, uh, get a position on it.

PRESIDENT: But, well, what did he think you should get a position on?

EHRLICHMAN: That's what we talked. I sent a copy of this over to him and, uh, with the understanding that we would talk about (unintelligible) want to talk about. (Pause)

PRESIDENT: All our problems were (unintelligible/REMOVED) but the most stupid thing that you could possibly have the Director (unintelligible) I'll never forget the look of shock on (unintelligible).
EHRLICHMAN: What--did, did Petersen say that when he talked to Gray the first time that it was a casual conversation, and doesn't Pat hold that against him, or something to that effect?

PRESIDENT: No. He said, "Yes," he said that Gray is sorta casual and he asked him twice and that--Kleindienst told me that Gray denied twice that he had gotten the documents. He denied it twice. And then finally refreshed his recollection and said, "Yes, I got it." (Pause)

HALDEMAN: Then it's then Petersen tended to appreciate that. I gather it (unintelligible).

EHRLICHMAN: Appreciated, you mean, uh, uh, did it offend Gray?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: No, no, no, no, no, he just said that. He says he just, he's just gotta take over this thing. And he said one of those god-damned thing is uh, just uh, you know, he--I don't--know.

(Twenty Second pause)

PRESIDENT: Not that it's--makes a hell of a lot of difference but who do you think, what do you think the source of this--(unintelligible) right out of the Grand--not the Grand Jury--U.S. Attorney or Dean?

EHRLICHMAN: Dean.
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PRESIDENT: You think Dean?

EHRLICHMAN: Dean, yeah.

(Pause)

It hasn't been to the Grand Jury. Either got to be the Justice Department or Dean or me.

PRESIDENT: Well, obviously (unintelligible) the Grand Jury, but I meant, u-, u-, u-, u-, by the Justice Department, the prosecuting team, the lawyers' department, the prosecuting team. See, undoubtedly (unintelligible).

ZIEGLER: He had just left for home, his secretary says.

HALDEMAN: Ha! (Unintelligible)

(Pause)

PRESIDENT: Well, Ron, I think that's what you have to do here. That son-of-a-bitch.

ZIEGLER: You know...

PRESIDENT: Ah, it's a story that will effectively knock him--destroy him. Get the word to the FBI and I'll soon know whether the FBI Director--what he's gonna say. But, I don't care what he says, Gray's got to go tomorrow. Or would you agree?

ZIEGLER: Yes, sir. I would agree.
PRESIDENT: He can't--I mean, if he, if, if he destroyed them because he was ordered to (unintelligible) if he destroyed them. (Unintelligible)--he's gotta go either way. You see my point is, uh, that this potentially happens. Right?

HALDEMAN: Well, hell, material given to the eminent Director of the FBI in his official capacity, to identify the sensitive materials not related to the case at hand--purpose of giving them to him obviously was to have, have them retained.

PRESIDENT: Sure.

HALDEMAN: He went out and destroyed it. The guy is a frigging idiot.

PRESIDENT: That's right. That's exactly what happened. That's the truth in that.

EHRLICHMAN: I didn't want any part of it. He asked me why, and I

HALDEMAN: He said he was gonna lie and asked you to corroborate his lie.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

EHRLICHMAN: And never, interestingly enough, never said, "But you told me to destroy this."

HALDEMAN: That's right.

EHRLICHMAN: Which put it back...

PRESIDENT: Right. Right.

EHRLICHMAN: ...and then the normal reaction...

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) when I called back if I had said, "Pat, you're gonna have to tell the truth, "if, if, in fact, he believed that I had instructed him, he would have said, "Well, yeah", so and so, and so and so.

EHRLICHMAN: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: You've got pretty good witnesses to that conversation.

EHRLICHMAN: One--at least one of whom I can use. (Laughter)

HALDEMAN: Use that, can use that one. I'm not sure I (unintelligible) could anymore. (Pause)

PRESIDENT: If he goes, I think, uh--who could I do with as Acting Director?

HALDEMAN: I don't think you should (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: But, uh, Bob, is there anybody else over there now, Bob, John, the Department of Justice that I could use? (Unintelligible). Okay, Ron, my boy.

ZIEGLER: Okay, I'll be reporting back.
PRESIDENT: Can you report back on your Dean conversation?
ZIEGLER: Yes, sir.
PRESIDENT: Thank you. You got anything else you want to ask about?
ZIEGLER: No.
PRESIDENT: All right. Okay, Ron.
(Pause, door closes)
UNIDENTIFIED: Ambrose.
PRESIDENT: You can put Ambrose in there as Acting. Where is Ambrose now?
UNIDENTIFIED: He's still over in the Narcotics Administration. He's about to leave. You could ask him to stay on for awhile.
PRESIDENT: I'd rather put somebody like that in than to put Felt in. Right?
UNIDENTIFIED: Yeah.
EHRlichman: If Ambrose, if he won't do it for a couple of months, why, uh, you know, he's clean and, uh, (unintelligible) political coloration. New York Republican. Is he a campaigner? Would he agree to help as a campaign worker, because...
PRESIDENT: Oh, no. No, no. It...
EHRLICHMAN: Regarding that because of qualifications well, anyway, back when he had campaigned a lot, not a lot, yeah

PRESIDENT: For us?

UNIDENTIFIED: Sure. He's conservative.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: So he has a political coloration (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Yeah, but I'm not, (laughs) the point is I'm not, uh, we're not putting him in there for, well, remember the (unintelligible) Senate confirmation. We're just thinking of somebody temporary until somebody else can be put in there.

HALDEMAN: Uh huh.

(Pause)

Well, you could bring somebody like this James Q. Wilson from Harvard in temporarily, with the understanding in advance that he was only temporary 'cause you're not considering him on a full time basis.

PRESIDENT: We really ought to get somebody in the government. How about Ruckelshaus? Sure. (Unintelligible) Ruckelshaus, just for a couple of months?

HALDEMAN: Let him take a leave of absence.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: But this other thing--take this one?
(Pause)
(Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: Well, we've been thinking (unintelligible) a possibility for the job, too.

HALDEMAN: Right. Right. Right. He probably wouldn't be interested in this as a permanent thing, but (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: If it's a temporary thing, maybe--
(Forty Second Pause)

PRESIDENT: Well, I don't know what Dean is trying to prove by this, uh, but (unintelligible). (Pause) (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: Yeah (unintelligible).

EHRLICHMAN: But that kind of--the way the story came from the Times, it was that Gray had told friends de-da, de-da, but that's a standard New York Times, that line. (Unintelligible).

(Pause)
(Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: Can I see, uh, John, uh, can I see what you have in my statement?
EHRLICHMAN: Sure. Then I'll -Bob changes it somehow. I'll read it to you if I could. It's pretty screwed up (unintelligible). "Mr. Gray received some of the contents of the Hunt safe from Mr. Ehrlichman's office from Mr. Dean in June, 1972. Mr. Dean had previously sealed it in a large envelope. Mr. Gray was told by Mr. Dean that the contents were sensitive materials not in any way related to the Watergate case. Mr. Ehrlichman was present but neither then nor at any other time did he give Mr. Gray any request, suggestion, or instruction regarding what should be done with the contents. Mr. Ehrlichman does not know the nature of the contents. Up until April 15, Mr. Ehrlichman assumed the FBI Director still had the contents. Mr. Ehrlichman discovered certain new facts concerning the contents of the Hunt safe on April 15, 1973. He promptly reported his findings to the President the same day, and they were relayed to Mr. Petersen, the Assistant Attorney General. The matter has been under investigation by him since."

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

EHRLICHMAN: "Certain new fact concerning the contents" (unintelligible) "concerning the status of the contents."

PRESIDENT: Yeah. That's right.

EHRLICHMAN: Or the, uh, the current, uh, position of the contents or something. Condition -the status -we already got that.
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PRESIDENT: Concerning, concerning the, uh...
EHRLICHMAN: The status of the contents. The disposition.
UNIDENTIFIED: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: Yeah.
PRESIDENT: Oh, the disposition is the--what I'm driving at.
EHRLICHMAN: Yeah. Yeah.
PRESIDENT: You gonna let Ziegler put that out, or will that be your (unintelligible).
EHRLICHMAN: (Unintelligible) a couple of first names (unintelligible).
PRESIDENT: What's your thought, John, have, uh, Ziegler put that out?
EHRLICHMAN: Well, Ron would rather not. He, he would rather not.
PRESIDENT: Yeah, (unintelligible)
PRESIDENT: Why don't you just put out the statement yourself, John?
EHRLICHMAN: Fine.
PRESIDENT: I think it's best...
EHRLICHMAN: Fine.

PRESIDENT: I think it's best that you do that rather than having--Ron should stay in a position, "I'm not gonna comment on this case," so forth and so on.

EHRLICHMAN: The White House Office could still put it out. Gerry Warren just puts it out.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: ...as a statement by John D. Ehrlichman.


(Fifty Second Pause)

PRESIDENT: He told me, incidentally, that the judge is taking under advisement the situation--didn't I, didn't I tell you?

EHRLICHMAN: No.

PRESIDENT: He is taking under advisement-the situation with regard to--(unintelligible).

EHRLICHMAN: Um hmm.

PRESIDENT: The break-in, and, uh, he is making, making no decision on this (unintelligible) the Brady issue (unintelligible) now, or hold in-gto the fact that (unintelligible) post trial (unintelligible) grounds that it's just not, uh, pertaining (unintelligible).

EHRLICHMAN: (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: I would hope and pray that they were (unintelligible).
EHRLICHMAN: Now, did I, er, understand from your end of the conversation that they're still trying to get Dean to make a guilty plea?

(Pause)

PRESIDENT: (Sighs) You see, here's the problem.

(Pause)

They got Magruder ready to plead. But they need Dean to--and, uh, um-(Pause)

EHRLICHMAN: Are Magruder and Dean (unintelligible)?

PRESIDENT: No. They're not. They're...

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible).

EHRLICHMAN: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Who basically, as I say, were mortal enemies (unintelligible) Dean and Magruder are.

EHRLICHMAN: Well, Magruder ran for his ass very much; Dean had to coach him into his perjury.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, yeah. That's--Dean (unintelligible). He can slide out of everything else, but that, I can't see any, anything, any--all right. So they'll still talk to their lawyers with regard to, uh, what Dean is gonna do. And I guess Dean logged this kind of stuff in for the purpose of increasing his bargaining power. If then--(Pause)
PRESIDENT: continued
On the plea, wouldn't you (unintelligible).

EHRLICHMAN: I don't know.

PRESIDENT: Well, what...

EHRLICHMAN: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Go ahead.

EHRLICHMAN: (Unintelligible) what it's about.

PRESIDENT: Well, just say, "But, but at the ending, uh, cross that bridge wherever it comes (unintelligible) of the blackmail." John, don't you agree?

EHRLICHMAN: (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: Huh?

EHRLICHMAN: No.

PRESIDENT: You can't do it. You can't do it. You, you can't be, I can't be. Even a Presidency cannot be and, uh, (unintelligible).

EHRLICHMAN: How can you ask me what I mean in my notes, I didn't (unintelligible). I had I better call and redictate this (unintelligible/REMOVED).

PRESIDENT: Yeah. Would you like to (unintelligible).

EHRLICHMAN: May give it to a secretary...

PRESIDENT: Yeah, Jan's around.

(Pause)
I wonder if this changes our situation, John, with regard to (unintelligible). (Pause) The book, you know. I wonder if you (unintelligible) move on it today (unintelligible) long time. (Pause) (Unintelligible) expect contributions. You've got that problem. And I--there's no way, Bob, I can figure the son-of-a bitch. You heard what I told him? And I said get him in (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: Well, that's true. He talked, uh, to their lawyers and apparently got into a plea.

HALDEMAN: I don't really understand that. Why do they have to get into plea? Why don't they just subpoena (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Well, to get more out of it.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible). I wondered if (unintelligible), but you shouldn't hit Ron, all of you. (Pause) (Unintelligible).
EHRLICHMAN: (Unintelligible) uh. Mr. Ziegler, please.

PRESIDENT: Uh, (unintelligible) get more deeply involved.

(Phone rings)

Yeah, hold on your Dean call (unintelligible/REMOVED).

HALDEMAN: You either...

PRESIDENT: This is a pretty--you know what I mean, you can't, uh, (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: This is not deadly problem. It's damaging but not here. Unless Gray decides to take this, this course--if he tries to--if he goes out that way. I'm sure we can because it shatters the FBI (unintelligible). But that's inevitable. And that's--we cannot do that. No matter what Gray says. Even if he was ordered to destroy it and did, uh--it shatters him. But, I--this is why I totally believe Dean. I am absolutely convinced he did not tell Gray to destroy them.

PRESIDENT: Did Dean--did you ever pass Dean or did you ever get to discuss this with him?

HALDEMAN: Yeah. And Dean said I didn't discuss it with him, he told me about it, but this is one that he considered one of his greatest moves. Was--now Dean does say

PRESIDENT: Ehrlichman told him to destroy it but he didn't do it.
HALDEMAN: But he said I was too smart for that. I figured out how to do it, which is to put it in the hands of Pat Gray and then, then, have the FBI put it in a sealed envelope that won't be used by these bastards who were leaking stuff out of the FBI. Just put in the Director's office in secret files.

UNIDENTIFIED: He thought that was an accident.

HALDEMAN: That's for sure. He went back and as I understand it Ehrlichman agreed with him (unintelligible) much better idea (unintelligible). That's his line. I have no reason to believe Ehrlichman did tell him to destroy it. I have a feeling he decided to destroy it.

UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Gray did it?

HALDEMAN: No, Dean did it. But then he thought through that he shouldn't destroy it. But soon figured out that the way to avoid the strike was to turn it over to Gray. We turned the other stuff over to the FBI agents (unintelligible) Gray. I don't think Dean--I really don't think Dean tried to destroy them.

PRESIDENT: Oh, I know (unintelligible).

(Pause)

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible).

(Pause)
UNIDENTIFIED: Dean hates Gray because Gray called him a liar and (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Then Dean could pos-, possibly could say that Ehrlichman ordered him, "to destroy it.

HALDEMAN: And then you mean, because we have to try and get both Ehrlichman and Gray (unintelligible). I don't think he knew it, I think Dean--Dean's interest--if you wanted to get Gray, this is a hell of a good way to get Gray. But when he said that I didn't tell him to destroy lem, the dumb son-of-a-bitch did that himself.

PRESIDENT: Look, you've been through, now--we've been through most of the stuff (unintelligible) March 21st thing to be quite honest that's his (unintelligible) that is his, uh, trump card, that's his trump card.

HALDEMAN: No.

PRESIDENT: You don't think that's his trump card? What the hell do you think his trump card (unintelligible)?

HALDEMAN: I would guess it's Petersen.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible/REMOVED). This administration (unintelligible). No, on this one--on this one he's (unintelligible). The encouraging part about it is the latter part that you wrote me today. Do you (unintelligible) legal matters. You recall it quite categorically (unintelligible) we went through all the documents and personal papers (unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: And if you go--if you go into something that has to be purged, I would say yes--this is, this is the worst, uh, trump card he's got. If it is his trump. (Unintelligible) I don't think it pulls his scheme off.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Because I don't think they could do that. In the first place I think it's defensible, but in the second place I don't think it's--I don't see how they can do anything with any of it.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: No, Petersen. The other thing is Dean could go public with it. Uh...

PRESIDENT: Does Dean worry (unintelligible) ought to handle her.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)

(Pause)

PRESIDENT: That's why I don't understand what they want with you (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: I don't know yet.

PRESIDENT: But we'd better get Dean to the Grand Jury.

HALDEMAN: I don't (unintelligible) Dean. But I think--we can't try to, uh...
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PRESIDENT: We can't try too but I can't be a witness either (unintelligible). So he says he has, so he says he had a certain conversation with me. What would the damages be (unintelligible)?

HALDEMAN: Well, if he does that, then what I would have to put out--uh, the whole story. That you were investigating this thing. That you were drawing Dean out. That you went through a whole series of questions and, uh, alternatives pushing to, to drive out, draw out lines and, uh, you know.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. Well, you know. See, when this matter came up, I called you into the office (unintelligible) I put up with (unintelligible) but you were involved with Don Segretti, weren't you? (Unintelligible) I mean, I don't care. But I wouldn't put it all out. I'd, ah, I'd simply flatly deny it.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, well (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: I think what you have to say is it's an act of a desperate man. That's when the, uh, that particular point in time, that's exactly what the President--the President at that time did not see that.

HALDEMAN: Where is the President when (unintelligible). You have to (unintelligible) to destroy Dean. If he puts that out, then you've got to destroy them both.

PRESIDENT: That's right.
HALDEMAN: You can't worry about nuances (unintelligible) because then (unintelligible) uh, uh (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Well, that much. Should Moore ever talk to Dean?

HALDEMAN: Well, I don't know. I, I don't know to what end. I don't know...

PRESIDENT: See if there's any--just for the purpose of saying, "John, want to be a man to man (unintelligible). Bill, the record is (unintelligible/REMOVED)." Not when you get into the fact that Ehrlichman and Haldeman are (unintelligible/REMOVED).

EHRLICHMAN: Maybe so. If only you don't do it.

PRESIDENT: Me? I will never see him.

EHRLICHMAN: You can't--I think

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

EHRLICHMAN: You can't take any more overt moves.

PRESIDENT: No.

EHRLICHMAN: Uh, just passes why Dean (unintelligible). That makes a record that you can't (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible/REMOVED) thank God they are the one I always make, but nevertheless it's uh

EHRLICHMAN: You can't. I don't, I don't mean...
PRESIDENT: Why shouldn't Moore?

HALDEMAN: Maybe Moore could. Dick Moore is (unintelligible).

UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) Watergate.

HALDEMAN: You have the insight (unintelligible) difficulty.

(Pause)

PRESIDENT: But they're not trying to get Moore (unintelligible) Petersen (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: If Moore's going to do it, I'm afraid you'll have to ask him. Because I don't think he would take anything. I think

PRESIDENT: I asked

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: I'm asking your judgment as to whether or not you think Moore (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: And if he doesn't--I think you've got to say--you've got to ask him to do it. Without giving the reason why.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) to Moore.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

(Pause)
HALDEMAN: If then—if you have that, if you have Moore in a position to be able to say the President told me (unintelligible) Dean (unintelligible) Petersen's friend. Why?

PRESIDENT: Well, you've got Dean in a position (unintelligible) Moore.

HALDEMAN: Moore should be instructed not to say that you told him to do it.

PRESIDENT: Moore...

HALDEMAN: In doing that...

PRESIDENT: Moore, Moore is gonna pay me (unintelligible/REMOVED). Well...

HALDEMAN: I'm afraid that's one thing I've lost under this is trust in anybody. Just try to figure who you can trust and who you can't (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Except me. You've got to trust me.

HALDEMAN: Oh, I do. I'm talking about any of the other (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) I've gotta trust him (unintelligible) trust him (unintelligible). (Fifteen seconds unintelligible/REMOVED). Yes, sir.

PRESIDENT: I would say one thing, too. Remember, you and your lawyers say that Grand Jury (unintelligible).
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HALDEMAN: I think, I think so

PRESIDENT: Your lawyers still think that, uh, you've been on the, uh, cover-up team.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: Do you think that, uh...

HALDEMAN: Well, if you could do that, then my position is that there is nobody on earth that you might discuss that with.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) Strachan.

HALDEMAN: No, sir. I didn't discuss it with Strachan. He's a donkey. There is no way Dean could corroborate anything (unintelligible). There is no way that, that the prosecutor could corroborate Dean's testimony.

PRESIDENT: Getting back to (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: No, and when I (unintelligible) and I've never said to Dean anything that (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Getting back to the critical question (unintelligible). This certification I'm prepared to (unintelligible) too bad that you would, it would put Dean in the same bag, we've got--I've got to get him the hell out of here. But what about the Liddy thing? What about it, John? (Pause) (Unintelligible) too sure they are (unintelligible) people in all that the (unintelligible) capital (unintelligible).
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EHRLICHMAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) capital (unintelligible).

EHRLICHMAN: That's right.

HALDEMAN: I don't know. What do you mean by it? I've been tempted by the (unintelligible) to be perfectly frank 'cause I don't, I don't--I have a difficult, basic problem right now, uh, I either have to take a leave...

PRESIDENT: Or you've got to run the show.

HALDEMAN: Or I've got to get back and start running this place

PRESIDENT: You're goddamned right.

HALDEMAN: This is the point Henry made. He said, "If you're gonna stay here, you've gotta start giving some orders and cracking some heads..."

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: "Banging things around. I mean you can't just stay here in limbo."

PRESIDENT: I know Bob. That's John's problem. John's (unintelligible) mind could not really, you know, concentrate on it very much. That's the real problem.

HALDEMAN: And it's been hard, too, when you get, you know, every afternoon, you know, you just sit here knowing...

PRESIDENT: Some other story's gonna turn up.
HALDEMAN: You don't know what it's gonna be. But you know, goddamned well, the phone's gonna ring and Ziegler's going to say "Yes, what's the matter with (unintelligible)." I get it every night at home. I got a call from him last night and said, "Where do I have to be quoted on that story?" He said, he said, "I hate to disappoint you, but there is a plan." Uh, I want to uh--I'll tell you if it's Dean to leave, it's very tempting. It bothers the lawyers

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...not nearly as much as the resignation, 'cause the resignation...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: They say then

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

EHRlichman: ...really cut it off.

PRESIDENT: The leading thing that it could be, uh,—let me, let me spin it out the way I would feel. Uh, the way I—would say, uh, because of this, this, the charges that are made and so forth, at first I get, I, I would put out the same—at the same time I would put out, I would put out the statements of the lawyers 'cause I have your statement. Uh, the lawyers (unintelligible) uh, however, I, I, I hear, hear they can't do those things, so forth and so on. However, because of the charges and so forth that have been made and will continue to
be made, leaks from the Grand Jury, the story of
(unintelligible) and so forth and so on, my
hope--that (unintelligible) conduct the office
(unintelligible). I feel under the
circumstances that uh, the proper course of
action is to allow you--my theory is for me to
take a leave, until uh.
[Reel 5 begins]

PRESIDENT: until (unintelligible) like to have an
(Cont.) opportunity to clear myself of charges or until,
until, I am completely clear of these charges or
any others (unintelligible) charges or are any
other wrongdoing uh, because I can't, uh, with
integrity, which you have insisted upon
(unintelligible)...

[Reel 4 ends]

PRESIDENT: ...and, uh, I. I, would say
(REMOVED) I just, must--re-
thinking. I told, told Ron to help. Told him
to call the Dean as to, whether we wanna
get--whether maybe if we ought not to do that.

UNIDENTIFIED: Um hum.

PRESIDENT: That is why, uh, my (unintelligible) gave that
control if, if, if give you any information
first, first Dean's gonna say one of two things.
He'll either say, well, one, uh, Ehrlichman told
him to destroy it, which would be false. And
then you'll have to say-then you're up against
two people lying, or you've gotta say, uh, Pat
Gray is lying. It might not (unintelligible)
destroy them. Let's just let it develop
naturally.

EHRLICHMAN: And the facts are now we have something from him
already. Uh, now, Ron thinks probably this
should not come out of his office.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, uh, could you get, uh, Ziegler?
(Hangs up telephone)

PRESIDENT: Well, you could put it, uh, out of your office.
I mean, how do you do it (unintelligible).

EHRLICHMAN: Well, I don't know. Uh, my attorney, I suppose.
(Telephone rings)

(Hangs up telephone)

EHRLICHMAN: I just talked to Wilson.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN: And, uh, he, he approved this, and uh, doesn't mind except that, uh, this whole thing in context is nothing to get excited about unless Gray makes a statement which implicates you or me or somebody around here, in which case, (unintelligible) it's gonna have to be handled (unintelligible).

He says you're not going to settle for the first story, regardless of the man and his job, the statement implicating, for example, uh, (unintelligible).

UNIDENTIFIED: The President ordered him to destroy this?

EHRLICHMAN: Well, no, he's saying if there's any evidence that the White House ordered it. He said that's gonna - that's gonna, back headlines so big that you never saw the statement you put out, anyway, he said.

UNIDENTIFIED: Pretty good. Yeah, yeah.

PRESIDENT: Kleindienst (unintelligible) no Petersen, Petersen. Yeah.

HALDEMAN: You have to say this old guy is a pretty good PR man.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) he, uh, uh, I guess (unintelligible).
EHRLICHMAN: He said, "Do not try to get John Dean's concurrence or cooperation." He said (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Right.

EHRLICHMAN: You were just saying, and, uh, he had a little language to change. So, uh, I'm, I'm ready to go on this, and I'll just defer to your judgment and so forth, on how, how to put it out. Obviously, I would rather put it out here. This is where my office is. This is where I'm doing business, but, uh, uh, I don't ask Ziegler to vouch for it, uh--

HALDEMAN: Just put out a little statement by John Ehrlichman. They run it off and then (un intelligible) stick it out there (unintelligible) also press secretary (unintelligible) the point is--

PRESIDENT: Why, just give it to the—just call in a New York Times reporter and give it to him.

HALDEMAN: You could call (unintelligible).

EHRLICHMAN: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: And just say, uh, "You put a girl on. I'll dictate my statement."

PRESIDENT: Yeah, that's the way I think I'd do it.

EHRLICHMAN: Right.

PRESIDENT: I think that's fair (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: The New York Times will compose it.

PRESIDENT: Right. Say you've gotta, you've gotta call the press office.

HALDEMAN: Then the press office refers to your statement in the Times.
EHRLICHMAN:  Or, I could give them a copy of it as I gave it to the Times and if they get inquiries on it, they just say, say, "Well, we've got a copy of the statement he gave to the Times."

HALDEMAN:  That's right. So they put it back out and find an answer.

PRESIDENT:  Certainly.

HALDEMAN:  We should talk about--certainly we've been doing it as individual answer type. If the television reporter got (unintelligible).

EHRLICHMAN:  Yeah, okay, that's what we'll do. (Unintelligible) I better go and do that. That office has a deadline.

PRESIDENT:  All right. Fine. Do that. I've gotta try to get (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN:  (Unintelligible) You ought to stay until you put someone on to dictate my statement that I--at this stage, we appreciate your (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

EHRLICHMAN:  Do that on a personal basis.

HALDEMAN:  Yeah.

PRESIDENT:  Good night. Bye, John--trying to get--

HALDEMAN:  (Unintelligible) Gray sure appreciated putting all this (unintelligible). (Pause)

HALDEMAN:  How would you do that on the (unintelligible), What would you--would you bring someone in to take over the role?
PRESIDENT: I think you'd have to, particularly with Cole, (unintelligible) Ehrlichman, in that job.

HALDEMAN: Is Rush (unintelligible)?

PRESIDENT: I think it's a (unintelligible) thought of Rush, of Rush.

HALDEMAN: The New York Times says it has it all solved (unintelligible). (Telephone rings)

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) serious.

PRESIDENT: Hello. Yeah. I wondered if you'd had your talk with uh, with Patrick. Yeah. Let me say, let me say that, uh, the one picture I think that (unintelligible) about this, that is totally devastating, because, uh, I have checked my notes on what Dean's told everybody here. Uh, I also, on this, this, this matter and, uh, Ehrlichman has put out, has put out his little statement. Pat Gray (unintelligible) was not told to destroy any, and he must not say that. That's that. You see, that's gonna compound it. Particularly in view of the fact that he had two conversations (unintelligible) where he remembered getting it. The, the, the only thing, if you--you see, if he agrees, you've gotta put it to him quite personally. I, I don't want to do it myself if necessary, but I will. But he can't do that because I would have to say he lied on it, so--Yeah, yeah. But, but, let me say--no, no, he, he must not. All that does is to say--look, uh, you understand? It doesn't help, it doesn't help him, uh, anymore and it hurts terribly here. You know the point? Yeah, yeah, just as a result of this, yeah, I understand. But, what do you do about Dean then? Uh, print it up or something? Yeah. (Pause) Yeah. On Gray? Well, I'm not suggesting that, uh, Gray will go, uh, uh.
PRESIDENT: We don't have to do that to him the first thing, and just based on this one story. Is that what you're suggesting? Well, I'm, I'm not well, I'm, I'm, well, think about it. I agree. I agree, cause he's got a right to his day in court, too, and we don't have, and another thing--I don't have a substitute, not yet. Okay.

(Hangs up telephone)

PRESIDENT: He's got a point there. He says, "I just don't see how you can have Gray go and others not go, too." The whole, you know what I mean, uh, story. Well, it's (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: I don't understand that. That guy is just somewhat, for some reason, he’s obsessed with our leaving the--

PRESIDENT: Well, how can he?

HALDEMAN: Everything.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) what I told you (unintelligible) said about Dean.

HALDEMAN: Not to him?

PRESIDENT: No. I said, "What about Dean?"

HALDEMAN: What'd he say?

PRESIDENT: He said,"Well (unintelligible)" He said, the, I said, "You can't--if you're gonna say that somebody else lose, uh, uh--"

HALDEMAN: There's something, I checked with (unintelligible). Why does he want to get out now? I'll tell you.

PRESIDENT: That his case--

HALDEMAN: Well, if Ehrlichman goes out, he's got one
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HALDEMAN: hell of a problem, Petersen has. Ehrlichman continued is, is--he's hell-bent to destroy Petersen.

PRESIDENT: Well, will Petersen do this to Gray?

HALDEMAN: Yes.

PRESIDENT: To Dean--

HALDEMAN: ...in alliance with Dean. See, John's convinced that Petersen's out to get him because the--and that the Justice Department knew about it because John tried to remove Petersen along with everybody else except one guy, one of the people he failed--the New York Division.

PRESIDENT: Oh, yeah.

HALDEMAN: And what I mean, Kleindienst may be wrong about Baker (unintelligible) Petersen (unintelligible) but I have a feeling that he has his motivation to try to get John out of here and, uh, knows that if John stays in here and survives this, that Petersen never (unintelligible) again.

PRESIDENT: What do you think, looking back (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: Frankly, we need, uh, I, I, I guess I agree with this, with that, that, I, I, I (unintelligible) concluding that I know this is a problem. The problem we have is getting the God damn White House (unintelligible). I mean, I

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, and I, I mean, I, I really can't. I can't call (unintelligible) do is worry about other things and so forth, you know, matters and that sort of thing. I don't--
I think I'd put the burden on somebody else (unintelligible) obviously, uh (unintelligible). Well, the other thing's true, too.

The other thing you could do is put the burden to someone else and then just leave 'em here. Another thing, you have a facade of a few hours, a day of, of subsequent stuff.

Yeah.

...that people (unintelligible) and get John to do the same.

I really feel (unintelligible). I've gotta feel that (unintelligible) almost at this point, Bob, fight the God damn thing better outside (unintelligible).

Personally, I agree with that. I told you, I...

Your lawyers don't agree with that.

...I'd feel better and I--it, it'd work better and everything else. Uh, I'd have a hell of a time if I resigned, because I'd lose all of the facilities in one way or another...

Right.

...and you lose that fear, (unintelligible) you see, which should be, which is an extremely important fear to have in the mind of the prosecutors and other people.

That's right.

Once I, once I'm resigned...

Well, (unintelligible) I...

Do everything again (unintelligible).

To leave, to leave, to leave...
HALDEMAN: They've still got (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: ...to leave here, that's why—and I say once this thing—is uh, uh, clear (unintelligible) and then that at least carries you through the trial. That's what I want—through the God damn trial, and after that, you may want to resign.

HALDEMAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: You probably will.

HALDEMAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: And (unintelligible) will say, "Christ, I've had enough of this shit", and uh, that's that.

HALDEMAN: I think that may be right.

PRESIDENT: And John Dean wants it, too, (unintelligible) undoubtedly before (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Of course you may, you may find then it all gets cleared up, and you'll be in good shape when you come back. There's some different kind of a way

PRESIDENT: A different way. Well, is this it?

HALDEMAN: ...which may be inevitable anyway.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) totally different way.

PRESIDENT: Totally different.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: And, uh, just work on a broader basis.

PRESIDENT: Of course, you know, uh, in other words, after the, uh—
HALDEMAN: Not in politics, you could never use me...

PRESIDENT: Never in politics.

HALDEMAN: ...in any political thing again.

PRESIDENT: But, Haldeman, what I really want you for, frankly, is, uh, I, I really want to cut it out. I, I'm getting (unintelligible). Sure, you're the (unintelligible) of the God damn foundation.

HALDEMAN: Uh.

PRESIDENT: But maybe you don't want to do that.

HALDEMAN: No, I don't know. I don't know whether I should.

PRESIDENT: For your sake?

HALDEMAN: Yes.

PRESIDENT: Well, we'll see, we'll see, but you could do something else in Government (unintelligible) --not ev--nothing that required confirmation.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) I don't want to stay in Government.

PRESIDENT: Huh?

HALDEMAN: I have no interest (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Well, why'd you say you'd come back and do something else?

HALDEMAN: The White House, that would be the only place, and...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...but not as Chief of Staff.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: You could come back as, as--
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PRESIDENT: Staff Director.

HALDEMAN: I want to do it because I think I'd get out of the mainstream (unintelligible) I think he's probably right.

PRESIDENT: Anyway, that's--let's don't cross that bridge. My point is to leave, it seems to me it becomes really imperative from the standpoint of running the White House. That's what I'm concerned about. I, I just--I know this, I know nobody would even--nobody would even come, uh, within--I mean it's imperative-running, morale, everything else, you know what I mean? Uh, it isn't putting it in good faith to say that the President cut his losses, he's got to cut through you--it's a very good cut, but the point is, is, is really that, but I really feel, from the standpoint of running it, you gotta get somebody (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: That's right. That's the point.

PRESIDENT: I think that I could get Rush, try to run this place.

HALDEMAN: And some of those guys that (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Sure. How did we come up with Dean? Listen, let me ask you this, who--

HALDEMAN: How about Bill Casey?

PRESIDENT: Do you think held be better?

HALDEMAN: I don't know.

PRESIDENT: Rush?

HALDEMAN: Rush would be easier for you.

PRESIDENT: The point about is that Rush has got a little more class.
HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: I mean, basically, he's...

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: ...a lot like you as far...

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Whereas I think Casey's kind of dirty.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. I think he's sort of political. Rush is totally apolitical, which I like. Cole is perfect for the, uh, Ehrlichman, and, uh, what I meant is that he's gonna have to grow a hell of a lot, but, uh, Cole'll be very good. Just gonna have to, to deal with the public, an effective Chief of Staff. Well, one of the beauties of your situation is that you've got your organization. Parker's doing a terrific job. Bull, I just can't (unintelligible) I used to bother you, but he's doing a hell of a job, he really is.

HALDEMAN: Yeah. Bull (unintelligible) his own judgment (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: But I'll make the judgments.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) you see...

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

HALDEMAN: Steve (unintelligible) and Parker is, is good on paper.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, and I wanna get to know them all. I want to get to know Parker better.

HALDEMAN: That's Parker's strength.

PRESIDENT: Parker, uh, on basic stra--schedule--is he good?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: Is he a good (unintelligible) of Congress or not?
HALDEMAN: RESTRICTED—“D”

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: And, uh, in the (unintelligible) of paper work and all that (unintelligible) is, is superb.

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: He really is. He's a young guy, but God is he (unintelligible). And he's doing it all anyway. I don't really, I mean, I just...

PRESIDENT: How do you think we'll do with regard to Higby. He wouldn't want (unintelligible) I suppose.

HALDEMAN: White House.

PRESIDENT: I don't wanna--I just don’t wanna have problem around, problem area there.

HALDEMAN: I think you probably ought to get him out.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. See what I mean? It's--Ron is a problem area. Higby--Christ with...

HALDEMAN: I think you oughta get him out just because they'll call him as a witness (unintelligible) if they make a case on me, you're talking about. If I'm only a witness, they won't call him.

PRESIDENT: No, I know.

HALDEMAN: If I’m, if I'm a target (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: Them, then, they'll have him, that's, uh, that's bad (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: If you brought a guy like Rush in, Higby could be useful as hell...

PRESIDENT: Oh, Christ.
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HALDEMAN: knows more than I do about (unintelligible).
PRESIDENT: Now what would you do with this? You could let Higby stay on a leave basis. Letting him stay until the Grand Jury (unintelligible) these people break Rush in (unintelligible) that, that's the way I, I look at it.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)
PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)
HALDEMAN: He won't.
PRESIDENT: Hell of an operator. Any of his aides.
HALDEMAN: He'll be a good man.
PRESIDENT: Now, then, the problem to leave (unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: Stop in September.
PRESIDENT: Only when all of this is cleared away. That, that (unintelligible) gets us away from the end of the Grand Jury, if he indicts you, and if you're not indicted, you could come back. No? You're gonna have to say maybe to me then.

HALDEMAN: Well, see, we're not now.
PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)
HALDEMAN: We don't know what their answer's gonna be.
PRESIDENT: Don't know the answer. That's right, but the point is we wanna be cleared of these charges of having to meet the Grand Jury, the committee, everything else. I'd put it all out. You know what I mean? You've gotta go before that damn committee at some point and you wouldn't want to come back here and have to go before the committee from here. So, really, that's what it comes down to. I think in Ehrlichmants case, I (unintelligible).
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HALDEMAN: You testify paying the taxpayers' money (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: We, oh, we can't go on (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: I think (unintelligible) basically, I've gotta (unintelligible) but for about six months.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. That's right. It's, it's--do we, do we give leave at this point?

HALDEMAN: No, but what we do, the thing about leave--we ask you to give us all the time we want...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...getting ready to go.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) possibly have six months. You can just say we...

PRESIDENT: Both of you have several months of leave.

HALDEMAN: Take a month. We've never--taken leave or--

PRESIDENT: Yeah. Eight holidays, eight, or eight or ten major holidays, and several months (unintelligible). Then there must come a time, of course, when we break it off.

HALDEMAN: Either this is going to go on forever--you can't drag it on (unintelligible) when you've passed the legal (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: It may get to that point when (unintelligible) that, you should...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

(Pause)

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) I think you normally would. Yeah.
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PRESIDENT: Sure.
HALDEMAN: I think if you normally would go, you should. If you normally wouldn't...
PRESIDENT: Right.
HALDEMAN: ...you shouldn't.
PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)
HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) you wouldn't have normally gone.
PRESIDENT: That's right. Absolutely.
HALDEMAN: But if you're on the manifest, you sure as hell should do it because (unintelligible) gonna have to be taken off.
PRESIDENT: Good.
HALDEMAN: You have a problem, you can take your time.
PRESIDENT: Well, we'll be back
HALDEMAN: You'll be back at 8:30. Yeah, yeah.
(20 second pause)
HALDEMAN: It's a new, uh, new (unintelligible).
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: Yeah, okay.
PRESIDENT: You get that?
HALDEMAN: Yeah.
(16 second pause)
HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) a week, isn't he? On March 20?
PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: Okay, so I'll call you back, I'll bet you were. Yeah, you too.

(Hangs up telephone)

HALDEMAN: He talked (unintelligible) and he says, uh, he said he would (unintelligible). He said, "Let me ask you a few questions. Did John Dean know that you’re putting the statement out?" and Ehrlichman said, "No, I (unintelligible)."

PRESIDENT: (unintelligible)

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) and then he said, "The way we got the story is that we were told that in a meeting, you turned to Dean, said, 'Well, John, you live across the river. Why don’t you throw it in the river on your way home tonight?' (Unintelligible) the new phraseology, deep six?

PRESIDENT: (unintelligible) no, no, I was saying...

HALDEMAN: John says--oh, then Woodward of the Post has the story that Ehrlichman and Haldeman were told by Dean on March 20th the jig was up and that we all should be prepared to go to jail if necessary and we agreed.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, we, ...
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: ...in reaction to this.
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: Colson put this out.
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: To get Dean (unintelligible).
PRESIDENT: Yeah, look. That's gonna just crack all over the place. Now let's go back to the Dean thing, Bob, I, I just--I know that this is, uh, this is, uh, you know what I mean? The record made, which incidentally, a hell of a lot of people are bored, you know, uh, but, but, in my view, in my view I am not firm because I am not going to condemn people on the basis of what I consider to be uncorroborated evidence, and on the basis of what both of you were told that's what I'm saying (unintelligible). I'm just not going to do it. They could say, "Look, the White House, they're going to charge." That means that every time when somebody comes under fire, he resigns because he no longer can do his job. Hell, no. He doesn't resign unless, and I, I, I (unintelligible) unless he, if, if an individual--it's the President's responsibility to see not only that everybody in government, particularly those in the White House, uh, not only do nothing illegal, but that they be the higher standard, the standard of, uh, you know, of, uh, conduct worthy of uh, this, and that's, and that is the test I am going to apply on this matter.

HALDEMAN: You've got to consider now, too--

PRESIDENT: In other words, uh, that's what both of you would want. We do have a higher standard. We don't just say, "Well, listen, I, I'm ice skating on a thin edge."

HALDEMAN: Uh, I would--I think my lawyers would say I'm making a mistake saying that--

PRESIDENT: Your lawyers may be wrong.
HALDEMAN: My personal view is that I'm better off. I know I'm better off personally.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: But, I'm, I'm finished personally, uh--

PRESIDENT: Yeah. It's because of these facts against you.

HALDEMAN: That's right (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: And you understand, if you're indicted

HALDEMAN: If I'm indicted, I will resign.

PRESIDENT: ...you'll resign, but that doesn't finish you necessarily.

HALDEMAN: No.

PRESIDENT: Because I didn't...

HALDEMAN: No, no.

PRESIDENT: Is that the difference?

HALDEMAN: Yeah, and I think that we could.

PRESIDENT: You see, let me, let me point out the difference between the resigning at the request of the President and resigning because you're indicted. If you resign because you're indicted, then it's the judicial process.

HALDEMAN: I have no reason for it.

PRESIDENT: And then you've got a reason for it.

HALDEMAN: And now I don't (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Now, God damn it, you morally, don't think...

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: ...that you're guilty.
HALDEMAN: I morally don't think I'm guilty and publicly I don't have a reason. I have allegations that are not true. There's nothing in the public allegations that even has a basis of truth to this charge.

PRESIDENT: That's right. Right.

HALDEMAN: But there may be later, because there are, as we know, some, some areas of potential jeopardy.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, you mean the Segretti crowd?

HALDEMAN: Oh, uh, the 350.

PRESIDENT: Oh, the 350. Oh, on the legal side.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: And then, of course, on the moral side, the question about whether you knew of the Segretti crap and (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) not clear on that, but I, depends on how that comes out.

PRESIDENT: But (unintelligible) what Strachan says and (unintelligible) but anyway, that's gonna come out, but also you're on (unintelligible) let me say, you can fight like hell. I mean, and I can--Watergate--before that committee you've gotta fight like hell and you may have to start fighting like hell publicly now, too.

HALDEMAN: But in the meantime, I can, I can, instead of

PRESIDENT: Worrying about it.

HALDEMAN: This really, it really bothers me. I'm sitting here now worrying about gotta have a White House staff meeting, gotta pull people together, gotta get things clean. Now something else is, I can't (unintelligible) really don't know.

PRESIDENT: No.
HALDEMAN: I--

PRESIDENT: I can't (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Well.

PRESIDENT: But it looks good.

HALDEMAN: It of course (unintelligible) position.

PRESIDENT: I think John, John's case prompted this thing. This is gonna be-this thing--this, uh, the shit has hit the fan with this one for him. You know what I mean. (Unintelligible) whatever Gray says. If Gray says he didn’t destroy it, but he did destroy it, (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) it's, it's so shitty that it's, it's, uh--

PRESIDENT: But it looks like Ehrlichman was trying to destroy evidence.

HALDEMAN: It hurts us and there is still a view that you've raised and several others opposed to what we've accomplished, uh, more than we have really needed. If, if you feel (unintelligible) place, uh, well, we could make it real, I guess, if you bring him in (unintelligible) Ehrlichman will be no problem. (Unintelligible) Cole. Bring a guy like Rush in. You could do it on a temporary basis. In other words, you could detail him from the State Department--a year--to function in this role and, uh, uh, and pending the outcome of the thing whether you have him resign as, as Undersecretary and appoint a new Undersecretary. What seems to me to make a leave, uh (unintelligible) easily you have to, uh, uh, uh, you have to just (unintelligible). I think that's essentially the same problem you have now. That puts Henry in an awkward position, with Rush in particular.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: But Henry has no problem.
PRESIDENT: Rush maybe--Rush can get along.
HALDEMAN: That's right.

(Pause)
HALDEMAN: 

RESTRICTED--“D”

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: Well, that's another, another thing you can do about it.

PRESIDENT: 

HALDEMAN: 

RESTRICTED--“D”

PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: ...the thing. What you do is--
PRESIDENT: You got another one that I could just put in the office, know what I mean. I really need, uh, what I have to say it, you see, you see...
HALDEMAN: Uh.
PRESIDENT: ...you've got to know your way around in here, uh, in the White House. I don't wanna put Ash in. Just--Harlow?
HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)
PRESIDENT: Terrible.
HALDEMAN: He couldn't stand (unintelligible). He couldn't stand (unintelligible) two days without (unintelligible).
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PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: If held, uh--

PRESIDENT: See, the Rush move, I'm afraid, if you don't think he's the proper man, we could put him over there. You might need a permanent man.

HALDEMAN: You might want to try him.

PRESIDENT: In, in view of the (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: We've got enough good people under me.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, and basically I'm never gonna have in the future the same relationship I had with you.

HALDEMAN: You know that, that's

PRESIDENT: That's all changed. Already it's changed.

HALDEMAN: Sure.

PRESIDENT: I mean that's like we changed with Bull. It was changed with the others. Now I could sorta do it a lot differently than I've done previously.

HALDEMAN: That may not be fact. It's the fact that we have a lot of criticism for the way we've done it,

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: ...doing it differently, you could get some credit for it.

PRESIDENT: Right. I could also say (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: That's not a bad idea. We can say, "Thank God he's making his own choice instead of relying on the sons-of-bitches that...

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: ...screw everything up."
It's just that--this idea just occurred to me at this moment.

(Presidential voice)

Kleindienst

...so somebody is head of this, somebody is head of that, so forth and so on. Now, how do you handle the staff, uh, the, the, uh, Henry says "Did you (unintelligible)" I don't know what he's talking about or (unintelligible) but God damn it you've gotta, gotta start...

(Haldeman voice)

...he's gotta start cooling it down (unintelligible) you, Dean, so forth and so on. You've gotta work, work it out. Of course, I've got to meet more with Henry, and with Rogers, and (unintelligible).

(Haldeman voice)

You don't realize what you're...

(Presidential voice)

I know.

(Haldeman voice)

Of course, Henry won't, Henry won't grind an axe.

(Presidential voice)

Well, he will...

(Haldeman voice)

He wouldn't feel--Rush won't solve that problem.

(Presidential voice)

No.

(Haldeman voice)

Staff secretary.
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PRESIDENT: Staff secretary and, uh--
HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)
PRESIDENT: Well, I'd have to, uh, assume the, uh, person the others...

HALDEMAN: 

RESTRICTED—“D”

but you could make him, uh, sort of a temporary replacement for someone like Huntsman. (Unintelligible) maybe we...

PRESIDENT: But that won't work, Bob, for the reason that (unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) too tough, but, uh (unintelligible).
PRESIDENT: See, bring Rush over basically is an indication of a permanent replacement rather than (unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: That's the problem, that's the problem.
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: Hard on people on a temporary assignment.
PRESIDENT: Then what the hell does Rush do? He does, lawyer--I don't know what he does. Somebodyts gotta (unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible/REMOVED) we dropped, we dropped (unintelligible) a long time ago (unintelligible/REMOVED) he had nothing to do with Watergate at all. We could have a hell of a time if we brought a guy in like Rush and it didn't work out.

PRESIDENT: The point is that, uh--
HALDEMAN: It might very well, now, that we--
PRESIDENT: Right.
HALDEMAN: It's hard for you, instead of working with a new person,...
PRESIDENT: I know, I'm a hard man to work for. I'm a hard man (unintelligible), You know what I mean? Trust people.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but you

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: You expect results. One of the problems you've been having, you're not going to get the results that you expect and then you, you just, that's--you gotta face that, you're not getting that. (Pause)

PRESIDENT: I could rely more on (unintelligible) which I

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but you could, you, you, are able to deal with (unintelligible) well.

PRESIDENT: I can say basically on the staff meeting, I think there should be staff meetings (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: There's another guy you could bring in temporarily would be accepted and could do it, would be controversial, but it might not be a bad move and you could do it on a temporary basis. See whether it'd work, decide then (unintelligible). Thanks very much.

BULL: The Attorney General called (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Yes.

HALDEMAN: He called (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Kleindienst, please. Hello. Oh, hello, Dick. How are you? Yeah. Yeah. Right, right. (90 second pause) But he, but he, then, then did not--you say, did not say that he was ordered to destroy them. Is that, that--(pause) yeah, (30 second pause) Yeah. But it was Dean, too. That's right, that's right, that's right. (Pause) Yeah. Right.
PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) you off. Right, right, right. That's—I know (unintelligible) but how do— we just— look, then you should say nothing. Yeah, yeah, but in terms of the resignation (unintelligible) talked to Dean. What about Dean? He said that Petersen (unintelligible). They're gonna have to, they're gonna have to get Dean. You know what I mean? And, uh, Dean’s lawyers, uh (unintelligible) can you give him immunity? Dean. Dean? But you won't, will you? Right, that's right. Is there anybody advising him? That's my point. Well, then, then basically all you can talk to Dean about is, not immunity, but you may talk about, uh whether you'll give him the fairest treatment we can. Isn't that right? There's no way you can give him immunity for example, for perjury, is there? You see now that—no, I—well, that, that's right, that's right. No. Yeah, Yeah. Uh, and, and, and, that's the point and you also can, can say, uh, uh, he's gonna be (unintelligible) on Pat. What's your advice? What, what, what, what do you and Henry think? Uh, uh, I'll take care of my problems. Let me tell you— tell Petersen he shouldn't, uh, he shouldn't, uh, I mean, uh, uh, I've got my own. I can handle my own way you know, uh, uh, after all it's a little bit different version from what Petersen told me. Petersen told me that Ehrlichman had ordered uh—that Gray is gonna say that Ehrlichman ordered to destroy the documents. Now that's proved not to be true. Yeah. I want the damn truth. I don't care whether—I don't—I know Petersen hates Ehrlichman, and that's all right, too, but I, I, I don't want, I don't want, I don't want Petersen to go easy on him. Yeah. Right. Yeah. (Pause) Yeah, obstruction's about, in what way? But not to cover up anything. Oh, I see. I get it. Well, I think that—I don't think that. I like Petersen, I mean myself, you know what I mean. Uh, you trust him, now, don't you? Yeah. All right. Uh, gonna clean
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PRESIDENT: up, but I mean I can't, I, I, I'm talking
continued to him, I'm talking to him, as if he, he's my
counsel now, and I've, uh, I've (unintelligible). Yeah (unintelligible) but my point is-, yeah, my
point is to come back to the judgment whether
Petersen, whether Petersen, whether he should do
it on the basis of, uh, his total legal
(unintelligible). This is, this is another, uh, view of the--He thinks his ability to deal with
the charge, but this, he, he, should say exactly
what happened here, uh, that he would have
delivered these files, uh, but, uh, we were told
they were not, not in any way related to the
Water gate. They were totally political
documents. (Pause) That he didn't open it.
That's right. Well, it, it, it, that's why the
destruction line won't work, you see? Yeah. Why
didn't he look into it to see what they were?
Oh, boy. No. no he musn't.

[Reel 6 begins]

PRESIDENT: Let me say--look, Pat must not ever say that
(Cont.) publicly. If--let me think--if he says that,
that's a conclusion (unintelligible) public--my
point is if he says that the White House
counsel, of course, Dean, ordered him to
destroy, uh, if he, that he, that he drew that
collection uh, but you understand, that makes
him look like a God damn--it looks like--it
looks like there--it not only looks like a fool,
it looks like the two of them together were
conspiring to destroy evidence.

[Reel 5 ends]
They, they can't do it, he's got to put it, Pat's got to put it, he's got to be, he's got to put it in terms--(24 second pause) That are, okay. (11 second pause) Now he should not have to do that to, Dean or anybody else (unintelligible). Well he can't get hurt, Ehrlichman didn't say, Ehrlichman was there. Yeah. (pause) Wonderful, loyal fellow and sometimes just rigidly (unintelligible) but, but, but let me say one thing, he's interested in the President's (unintelligible). But I must spy that the solution would be to testify, that I was ordered to destroy these documents or, and even that I gathered the impression that Mr. Dean wanted me to destroy them, that's practically the same thing, huh? Ah, well do your best on it, but you see my point? I mean, ah, you, you tell him, you tell him, "Pat, that just doesn't,-.that just doesn't add up.” (unintelligible). Well, I cannot, that's, that's what he, that's what he would say tomorrow (unintelligible). Yeah. Well, what would he do tomorrow, resign (unintelligible) because of his charge? (pause) Well, under the circumstances (unintelligible), ah, that he, ah, let's just put it this way, let's just put it this way, ah, the matter is very grave ah--would appear before the Grand Jury. The Grand Jury would indict him. You don't think so? Why not? Yeah, well that's the point. (39 second pause) You mean that ah, as far as, what about the conspiracy to cover up (unintelligible) was just bad judgment. I frankly think myself I'm not, I'm not of the view, just based on the newspaper stories, I'll reconsider. I not only feel that as far as (unintelligible) has begun, ah, I think frankly we ought to treat him like we're treating the others, now God damnit, the Grand Jury, let's see what the Grand Jury does. But in the end, we're gonna pass and it'd be out anyway, I'm sure. You know what I mean?
And ah, ah (I've got to--I, I may move, I may move
on this thing so (unintelligible). Fair enough? All
right. But ah, tell me about ah (unintelligible).
Tell him (unintelligible) tomorrow. That's right.
Don't do a damn thing which would result in a
newspaper story. (Unintelligible). Petersen, I've
got a lot of things to do and ah tell, tell
Petersen w ' hen you're talking to him that I
appreciate his hard work on this thing.
(Unintelligible) counsel because I'm just
(unintelligible) now. And, uh, after all Dean
(unintelligible) that's right, Dean, ah the New
York Times (unintelligible) reporters. (32 second
pause). In other words, then he's gonna look like
the-bastard. That's what, that's the way this
thing better just better come out. Because it's
the truth, it's the truth. But what about--he has
everything to do on it. Yeah, yeah. Right. Yeah,
yeah. Right. Now, now he's trying to pin
everybody else with it, he says that ah, he says
that the, yeah. Thank God (unintelligible) has
just not been available. You do know, I never saw
him personally though, they're resigned about this
and then that'll look better because, because of
the Gray confirmation on February the,22nd. Never.
Never. That's right. Or February, now wait a
minute, now let me just check the book here. 27th,
27th, 27th of February. That's right. And
then-never, except, except one time to sign my
wills. That's right. I, look that's the way we
work here, you know, I mean, I told the man in
charge that's uh--oh, we have been with them,
(unintelligible). Last summer? I never, well you
just listen, let's get one thing straight. I, the
President, never saw John Dean once except to sign
a new will. And that was on August the 14th, that
was the first, in signing the, that was the only
time I ever saw him. But simply, everything that
has been put out by Ziegler, and Dean ought to
know, was based on what people told him. There was
no Dean written report, but, but my God, Dean
orally said that, why do you, why do you think Dean
(unintelligible) a will which he can deliberately
get out and say (unintelligible)? Cause Dean told
him, that. Why would Ziegler
PRESIDENT

(CONTINUED): have said that? Did he, did--Right, did he give you the impression that he did see me? I'll be damned. All right, well anyway, uh, I do think that, ah, ah--Well, I think he's gonna stay there until uh, uh they pick, uh, until I, uh, r1l try to pick his successor within a reasonable time. But you know what I mean and you, you do know that. But he shouldn't just resign for this. I, I've really discovered (unintelligible) but I don't think he should put out a story about his version of it. Yeah. He said, now let me see. No, he says no. He said, I'm uh, he said this is a newspaper (unintelligible) on which I'm not gonna comment on a newspaper story (unintelligible). I've asked, I've asked to testify before the Grand Jury and that's what he should do. Bye (phone slams). It isn't much better. Let's get the God damn facts to the Grand Jury.

HALDEMAN: I think you'd better tell Ervin. Henry Kissenger's waiting to see you. Will you see him later? (unintelligible) you can't see him tonight (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: All right, I'll see him but it has to be in the morning ah, see what time.

BULL: I'll schedule him 8:30 in the morning sir. Remember you have to meet with (unintelligible) at nine.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, 8:30, if, if it isn't urgent.

HALDEMAN: That's what he said, he said, uh, (unintelligible) Dean's (unintelligible) so...

PRESIDENT: 8:30 in the morning's fine, tell him I'll see him at 8:30 in the morning before I go to Florida. Well'you tell Ehrlichman it's gotta be, gotta be (unintelligible). Uh, nothing's gonna change, nothing about Gray's gonna change. I just don't think we can have Gray resign. I don't want Gray's statement of resignation to come out tomorrow in direct conflict with Ehrlichman. That's what I'm concerned about, that's just, that's just if Gray's successor (unintelligible) 'cause, uh, we can't wait for (unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: What is Gray gonna say?

PRESIDENT: As of now Bob? He just says, "I'm gonna get out of here before the Grand Jury."

UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) what? What he's gonna say to the Grand Jury now—is that, uh first that, uh, he, uh, came over to Ehrlichman's office and ah, John Dean handed him a pack of quote (unintelligible) "highly sensitive national security papers."

HALDEMAN: National security?

PRESIDENT: National security, highly sensitive. That had absolutely nothing to do with the Watergate and they should not see the light of day, they shouldn't be in, uh...

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: ...the, uh, FBI files. He took them, he then would say that, that ah he gathered that, that, uh (unintelligible) they should be uh, they should be, uh, destroyed. I think that was an interpretation (unintelligible)

HALDEMAN: Plus that's innocent.

PRESIDENT: That he made the mistake but he says the idea they shouldn't see the light of day, the national security then it should be very well interpreted. Also, he says they don't feel that he's guilty of a crime. (17 second pause). Plus Ervin's, uh, what he said earlier about these, he was there, he heard (unintelligible) obstruction of justice. Then he'll say these papers were delivered early and stated there was never any intention of destroying them and he discussed this, uh, with (unintelligible), uh, he was amazed when he heard they had (pause).

HALDEMAN: That's true.

(Pause)
UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible/REMOVED) (pause)

PRESIDENT: What do his lawyers say about that?

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)

UNIDENTIFIED: I suppose they had to say that, that's as far as (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Well

HALDEMAN: Be sure to get him thinking on that because what we have to do now is call Petersen in. He’s the one guy whose (unintelligible) advised there were no papers relating to the Watergate and (unintelligible) can't make a case and say there's been any obstruction (unintelligible)...

PRESIDENT: At that point...

HALDEMAN: ...concerning the case of Gray's defense.

PRESIDENT: If it was apparent. He told me he left wires and other kind of crap, he should have investigated it (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: I think if they're subpoenaed, should he go down (unintelligible) and that I told him to do this.

PRESIDENT: (Pause) Well uh, we should, uh, and then we should know 'cause I, I, I know that, I know that, I don't mean now. But, I mean, let me give you the, the argument for resignation (unintelligible) leave for now (unintelligible) Ehrlichman's gonna be on (unintelligible) and, uh, Baker asked (unintelligible). It doesn't make any difference right now. The President feels (unintelligible) without (unintelligible) that’s why the President rather than the Grand Jury signs that. In other words (unintelligible), Grand Jury because the arguments against (unintelligible), orderly way to do it (unintelligible). In my view, whether it should involve the, the leave of absence, it seems to me it can carry from the standpoint of frankly (unintelligible/REMOVED) that way we could, uh, I think prepare you for (unintelligible) with John.
(CONTINUED): (Unintelligible) you got to be in a position to get out there and wage your damn case. I suppose how you, how you would, how you would handle that problem but they're, they're being paid, and we (unintelligible) of course (unintelligible) in terms of (unintelligible), several months at least (unintelligible) but they will be (unintelligible). The problem that you have, the problem that you have with Dean (unintelligible) now the only thing that I sure as hell am not going to take a leave of you two without being (unintelligible). My point is, this situation is so temporary, you know what I mean, he's either gonna be uh, uh, defendant or (unintelligible) fooling around with the defendants (unintelligible). For example,

RESTRICTED—“D”

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: Yep, he says you may, we may get in a position to make the rest of us look better, he just, he (unintelligible) some of which he says (unintelligible). Uh, one thing he did say was this, he was amazed when I said that, that (unintelligible) together and he said probably you got the impression (unintelligible). "Why hell", he says, "Around here and so forth we have the impression, from talking to John Dean, that you practically was in your office every uh; sitting in your lap, about uh, every few days." And I said, It's ah,,

HALDEMAN: That's true. (Unintelligible) Dean is the same way (unintelligible), February 22, then he was in every day, approached me every day for a couple of weeks.

PRESIDENT: He was down every day.

HALDEMAN: And he hasn't been in since.

PRESIDENT: Except after the, he was down every day 'til March.

HALDEMAN: It wasn't quite every day, he's been gone for quite a number of days.
PRESIDENT: Yeah, every day until March, uh, 25, I think. If I'm, uh, right
HALDEMAN: Yeah but, uh--
PRESIDENT: I was gone part of that time.
HALDEMAN: He was in the 27th and the 28th, you saw him the 1st, then he wasn't in the 2nd, he wasn't in the 3rd, he was in the 4th, he wasn't in the 5th, he was in for ten minutes on the 6th, 25 minutes on the 17th, again not very much there in early March. Not at all on the 8th, not at all on the 9th, not at all on the 10th, not at all on the 11th, not at all on the 12th, not at all on the 13th, then he started on the 14th. That's when he really started, March 14th, and that was when you had Dean and Moore, then he started that cycle. You met with them on the 14th, you met with them on the 15th, you met with Dean alone on the 16th. Dean alone on the 17th. Nothing on the 18th. Oh yeah, Dean and Moore on the 19th. Dean and Moore on the 20th. Dean and me part time on the 21st and with Mitchell on the 22nd, and that was it, you never met with him again except at Camp David. Let's see now it all adds up to a total, the total time over the period from the Watergate to now has been ten months, for approximately 12 hours.
(Unintelligible)
PRESIDENT: Oh. Sure.
HALDEMAN: And virtually, and, and virtually all of that, well, all of it was in the period of one month and virtually all of it in the period of, uh, a week or ten days. (pause) From the time of the Watergate to February 10...
PRESIDENT: I can't figure out how Ehrlichman can (unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible).
PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)
HALDEMAN: John (unintelligible).
PRESIDENT: Well, these people are good.
HALDEMAN: Some.
PRESIDENT: Do you think-(unintelligible)?
HALDEMAN: I sure was, I sure was. I thought Dean was
doing one hell of a job. (unintelligible)
PRESIDENT: Yeah, right.
HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) will say. And I think he was.
PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)
HALDEMAN: Because I think I was right, I think what
happened is he cracked, that he had Dean swing
his own--It kept getting tighter and tighter and
then something happened, then he put himself in
the hands of the lawyers, and that's when he...
PRESIDENT: That's right.
HALDEMAN: I don't think he probably had it on with the
lawyers and I don't think that, uh, well, I
think he got himself into the soup without
realizing it, and I don't think he really,
really realized it until he got there at Camp
David and started laying it out.
PRESIDENT: Well, do you think. You realize that
(unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: I think he began (unintelligible) the legal
problems, I think he thought everybody had
problems, they weren't really all that serious,
they were, they were--
PRESIDENT: Cancer at the heart of the Presidency.
HALDEMAN: Well, yeah. But that was when he thought it
would be cut out. And at that point he was so
(unintelligible) days later thinking Mitchell
would just step out and take the blame for this.
He weighed his (unintelligible) with the
Watergate not the cover-up.
PRESIDENT: Yeah, on that point--
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HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: From the first conversation it was covered up.

HALDEMAN: He was starting to worry about the cover but he didn't--he was still--

PRESIDENT: Hunt, remember, talking about lawyers.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) from that first conversation.

HALDEMAN: He thought Hunt would blow on the Watergate and on that Ehrlichman stuff.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: Not on the, not on the cover-up. He wasn't worrying about the cover-up as a legal problem (unintelligible). He was only worried about the problem that he was in it. He wasn't able to handle the cover-up and it was a lot later that he realized that the cover-up, for him, was a legal problem, a critical problem (pause). The time he talked to you, the cover-up was a practical problem.

PRESIDENT: And how do you deal with it?

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible/REMOVED) problems a little earlier.

PRESIDENT: The fact that--

HALDEMAN: I don't know that. Well, yeah, apparently, looking back now, he did regard the discussion--

PRESIDENT: In other words, uh Liddy's and Hunt's attorneys' fees (unintelligible) would blow this thing inside of the White House, that in effect was the conversation.

HALDEMAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) was about.
HALDEMAN: That's right.
PRESIDENT: Not blow the White House.
HALDEMAN: No sir. Not blow the Watergate and not blow the cover-up.
PRESIDENT: Right.
HALDEMAN: Hunt blew it when he was saying (unintelligible) the fact he was which was clearly known (unintelligible) (pause) at that point you didn't know he was paying off your people, nor did I.
PRESIDENT: You, you've hit upon a very important point there, that, that in terms of the conversation we had with him, had nothing to do with Hunt blowing on the Watergate.
HALDEMAN: That's right.
PRESIDENT: On the-cover-up of the Watergate.
HALDEMAN: That's right.
PRESIDENT: 'Cause Hunt was gonna blow on the national security matters.
HALDEMAN: That's right.
PRESIDENT: And, therefore, I was deeply concerned.
HALDEMAN: That's right.
PRESIDENT: And that's what got us into the whole thing.
HALDEMAN: And in, inad-, inadvertently also, going in and discovering all that was happening on-Watergate (12 sec. pause) which he still doesn't know what was happening.
PRESIDENT: You think they'll call Pappas (unintelligible)?
HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible). I don't think he's gonna do all this stuff. I think he's gonna strike at us, he keeps lobbing these things out (unintelligible). I think he's got a whole bag of goodies probably (unintelligible). Everything he just said is a problem.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) obstruction of justice.

HALDEMAN: No, I think he'll start getting Colson and Ehrlichman.

PRESIDENT: Why not (unintelligible)?

HALDEMAN: May, maybe Ehrlichman. I don't think he will. I just don't think he will. That's you know, I don't think the guy is, is a--

PRESIDENT: Lawyers.

HALDEMAN: Ben--, Benedict Arnold (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: His lawyers might want him to (unintelligible) the President (unintelligible)President (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: But, what I mean, threatening to set out to do (unintelligible) appeals court (unintelligible). He's lost his mind completely (unintelligible) regardless of the fact of the cover-up (unintelligible). Totally different kind of job. (Unintelligible) socially a couple years ago in case he will (18 second pause) I don't think, I really don't think--I can't help but worry about that but I don't think--

PRESIDENT: Well--

HALDEMAN: This is real and--

PRESIDENT: Understand, understand that if, ah, they pull that on, ah, Henry Petersen (unintelligible) that Haldeman was there. All right, if, uh, Haldeman was there, you take my word for it (unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: Have you told him.

PRESIDENT: No.

HALDEMAN: Well I wouldn't, I wouldn't anticipate that (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: I haven't told ya this. I have told Petersen so that he's on notice, that, that there was a discussion of this problem that (unintelligible/REMOVED). That's what triggered my mind and I also said that's when he maybe became aware of the President's (unintelligible) that triggered (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: I think you're on--that's right.

PRESIDENT: Then I would say, I would say that uh (unintelligible). Pappas, I assure you, what the hell, I didn't know anything about that I was here (unintelligible) and I had to go for a (unintelligible) eventually (unintelligible) I determined (unintelligible). I think that's, that's when this started. (Unintelligible/REMOVED)

HALDEMAN: I found out that I can't, in listening to that, I can't imagine that he would get caught, he would have to have been disciplined first that's--

PRESIDENT: You got to remember

HALDEMAN: I'm sitting there playing this thing back and forth on the tape to pick up every little scratch. He's sitting there in the meeting, he's had, had it for a different purpose in your office (pause).

PRESIDENT: But when I called him he said (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: That's right. And Dean going out there, putting it out to the press is a mark of a real shit.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).
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HALDEMAN: Not very nice thing to do. He was totally irresponsible to put out the fact that he did.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) Anyway, it's done, it's done, and that isn't the real problem here, we got to get back to that.

HALDEMAN: Oh no, I agree.

PRESIDENT: The whole fact that he called.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: Well he was

HALDEMAN: Compromise, no question on that it was in

PRESIDENT: But, uh, incidentally, the Gray decision was right. I (unintelligible) basis of (unintelligible) I don't know whether it was (unintelligible) (noise) did he leave?

HALDEMAN: I don't know, maybe (unintelligible) find out (noise) uh (unintelligible) is, is he gonna (unintelligible) went home. Okay. I may call him back. Goodbye, (hangs up phone) (unintelligible) us over for dinner.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) hard to go out (unintelligible) it's a hard ball (unintelligible) on this that One, but by God we did, Bob.

HALDEMAN: We got to do it.

PRESIDENT: The mark of, what do you call it, the real mark of strength, you know, we may be torn up inside, we got to walk right out there and let people see it.

HALDEMAN: Right. (Unintelligible) especially you.

PRESIDENT: Huh.

HALDEMAN: Especially you.
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PRESIDENT: Yeah, all of us.

HALDEMAN: (15 second pause) (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: Huh, the only thing that, I mean, we, I don't want to beat your head to death on it, uh (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Go ahead.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

HALDEMAN: Go ahead, I'll have a coke or something.

UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible)

(Unknown person leaves room; Sanchez enters room; voices in background)

SANCHEZ: Yes, sir.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) what you want.

SANCHEZ: Sir?

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

SANCHEZ: Yes, sir.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

SANCHEZ: Yes, sir.

HALDEMAN: Got any gingerale?

SANCHEZ: Yes, sir.

HALDEMAN: Do you?

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

HALDEMAN: If not, I'll have a coke.

SANCHEZ: Yes sir.
HALDEMAN: Either one.
SANCHEZ: All right.
HALDEMAN: (Pause) (Picks up phone) (Unintelligible) the problem is that--Yeah. Okay (Hangs up phone).
UNIDENTIFIED: Well (unintelligible) I suppose we'll get some, new evil sign, what about Watergate.
PRESIDENT: We had a couple of authorities on (unintelligible)
HALDEMAN: Is the President moral is the questioni
PRESIDENT: Haldeman, Haldeman, Mitchell question mark and Nixon question mark. This is purely the, uh, political (unintelligible) is a little kid's style (unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: Now the signs here--
PRESIDENT: Part of it--
HALDEMAN: As we well know.
PRESIDENT: Signs, signs of time. (Unintelligible) relation, but, on the leave thing, Bob, when you come down to it, I've argued this, I've, I've sweated over it before (unintelligible) we stand firm (unintelligible) or (unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: What it really comes down to is resignation.
PRESIDENT: For everybody.
HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) official.
PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)
HALDEMAN: Well, yeah, but not when you go back. Ehrlichman has as much of a problem (unintelligible). I would back off of resignation (unintelligible)
HALDEMAN: instead, you know, on the basis of what he had talked about with Klein, he thought that was the right idea but he said (unintelligible) other ramifications. He wasn't so sure it was. Connally backed off, Rogers backed off.

PRESIDENT: But on the other hand--

HALDEMAN: Parts of that, is they talked you into it.

PRESIDENT: Parts--

HALDEMAN: It's hard to say it to you. If they talk to me--

PRESIDENT: But part of that...

HALDEMAN: We can sit down--

PRESIDENT: ...part of the, but part of the combo (unintelligible) Rogers and Connally, I think both now would would, would perhaps lean to leave...

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: They didn't, they don't back off of that too far--

HALDEMAN: I mean Connally says, and I feel he was my respected (unintelligible) tries to (unintelligible) Rogers tried to the point.

PRESIDENT: I know. We're going ahead and get to the problem.

HALDEMAN: But Connally says, "If you can make it, the strongest position for you and the strongest position for the President is for you to stay there. But it's also the highest risk." And he said, and "The risk is, is really, you know--Because if you stay there and you get clobbered then you, you got one hell of a problem, that's, that's the thing to do is, is to take leave and that greatly reduces the risk, if not almost all of it." So they send (unintelligible) it greatly increases your vulnerability, but, doesn't...
PRESIDENT: Doesn't kill you.
HALDEMAN: ...doesn't kill you. But if resignation is the safest...
PRESIDENT: For the Presidency...
HALDEMAN: ...it is the most dangerous from your viewpoint and it's the, it doesn't add very much to what the leave provides.
PRESIDENT: Because you've got that option...
HALDEMAN: From the Presidency but it takes away a lot from you. And it also takes something away from the Presidency because you (unintelligible)
PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)
HALDEMAN: That's right and it eliminates the, any possibility of a option down the road (noise) which really can't discuss (noise) if (unintelligible) the first.
PRESIDENT: You see the argument, the argument against the leave, of course, is that well you, you can't argue (unintelligible/REMOVED) just postpone it and see what happens.
HALDEMAN: That's right. If it is inevitable.
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: And he's right if it's inevitable. Maybe we got to say that it is inevitable. Uh--
PRESIDENT: But if we say it's inevitable
HALDEMAN: If you say it's inevitable you’re saying something that you shouldn't say.
PRESIDENT: ...if we say it's inevitable though (unintelligible) any other time.
HALDEMAN: Except for the problem that poses on the defense.
PRESIDENT: That's what I'm saying.

HALDEMAN: And those are your problems as well as ours.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, because, because I don't want our people convicted, now do your lawyers believe that resignation would hurt them in your case?

HALDEMAN: Little hard to say.

PRESIDENT: How about a leave?

HALDEMAN: Resignation would hurt Ehrlichman too, but not as much.

PRESIDENT: Not as much.

HALDEMAN: They, in their interests, of course, uh, felt it isn't really, they're pretty, uh, they are so devoted, you know, the fact (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: The point is, Bob, look we got to do, and, I feel right now as you know (unintelligible) do something, do something (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Well, Yeah, but, you but this is, there is very great merit to the argument that--

PRESIDENT: Yeah. At this point though you got to stay one ahead, step ahead of the herd. I feel if we did the right thing (unintelligible) that (unintelligible) know all about but that was ah

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) yeah.

PRESIDENT: Right. (Unintelligible) his option. I didn't do it and so now they say what do you do now, I think that was right, I think that bought us some time. I think the President looked very good at this last meeting, uh--

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but they're still, they're turning on the President now, the editorial stuff and all of this...
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PRESIDENT: On the grounds that-

HALDEMAN: ...and the resignations will not, and the resignations will make that worse, not better.

PRESIDENT: They're pressing on it because (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: No, on the grounds that he is responsible.

PRESIDENT: That's right. Well, isn't that identical to what I just--

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) they're now saying, firing Haldeman just won't do any good. Because that's just imminent, the story is gonna be that Haldeman's gonna resign...

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: ...all over--

PRESIDENT: But then what do they want (unintelligible)?

HALDEMAN: That we--

PRESIDENT: To block, uh, to, uh, to resign, too.

HALDEMAN: No, no, there's no call for that and no call for impeachment, in any serious degree (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Has he?

HALDEMAN: I think so, somebody (unintelligible/REMOVED) the, they're the (unintelligible) to starting to move to the President, that the President can't assign the blame for this to anybody else. The President must take the blame, must then clean the thing up and let's see what happens.

PRESIDENT: All right, that's what I had (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: That's beyond simply saying, and it has nothing to do really with the legalities of the matter and what they're, they're arguing the other side is, that what the President may do, is do what Truman did...
PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: ...which is do not take any action and just let the Grand Jury decide who the criminals in the staff were. And once they decide that, uh, uh fire 'em and then never say anything about it. Now, they're arguing? that, uh, the fault there is not that he failed to clean out the staff but that he failed to...

PRESIDENT: Say something.

HALDEMAN: ...to say something, uh, and...

PRESIDENT: Well, I think I should say something.

HALDEMAN: ...I think you're to the, yeah, I think you're you you got to say, you've got to say something to the extent that this is a lousy, cruddy mess and, and (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Yeah, I might, if it seems fitting, I might say it to the Chamber of Commerce (pause) that, I mean I can't go up there (unintelligible) about Watergate. I know you're all concerned with it (unintelligible) then the problem I have (unintelligible) that I not pass the responsibility to the (unintelligible). Here's the way I feel. I feel that about the, about the leave, I'm thinking, Bob, of another point that I just don't—I know this much, I don't give a shit what the Democrats think, I only care one hell of a lot about having the Republicans come down here with their resolutions if they would (unintelligible). I just, I, I, I know you--

HALDEMAN: Republican resolution demanding Haldeman's resignation.

PRESIDENT: Haldeman said, now on the basis of this they probably are demanding it.

HALDEMAN: How do they know that?
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PRESIDENT: They don't know? Oh it will be in the papers in the morning.

HALDEMAN: No need for that.

PRESIDENT: I think Ehrlichman's comment (unintelligible) because Gray (unintelligible). But you see, I'd like to beat (unintelligible) to the punch. What I'd like to do...

HALDEMAN: The one problem we got with that is, is is now they say that if the President will just remember a couple of weeks ago...

PRESIDENT: Two weeks ago.

HALDEMAN: ...Rockefeller (unintelligible) George Bush (unintelligible) Vice President. If the President will just say, he will cooperate with the investigation then we have no problem. So they said he'll cooperate with the investigation. Then they said, "Well that isn't enough the President's gotta hit harder." So last week we hit harder--

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) his ass (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: You could fire 'em, you could fire Haldeman. So you fire Haldeman and you think they're gonna say, "Well that takes care of the Watergate case, now let's go on with the nation's business." Hell no. They're gonna say now you got to fire everybody else, you got to fire Haldeman, (unintelligible). You gotta fire Pat Gray over there. That's gonna be (unintelligible). You gotta get rid of the Attorney General because that probably, they'll turn on Petersen at some point. There will be all (unintelligible) and Petersen and (unintelligible) then they'll just keep boring in because their target is not (unintelligible).
PRESIDENT: Oh sure, Bob, I know that. I know that but, but we've been even facing that. That doesn't mean that at this point that, ah, that you just sit there like a sitting duck, you know what I mean. Let's take a look, let's fact it,

RESTRICTED—“B”

HALDEMAN: We had to do something.

PRESIDENT: But we had to do something, you know.

HALDEMAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: And we kept one jump ahead of the
RESTRICTED—“D” sheriff. Now in this case, that's what we're doing. I know who the target is, Bob. I know this isn't gonna satisfy them. I know they hate my guts and they're always gonna hate my guts. When I say they--However, I think with you, I think, I think, I think the congressional guys, for example...

HALDEMAN: They, they would be (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: ...the Republicans...

HALDEMAN: They would be satisfied.

PRESIDENT: ...I think the Republicans--yes. I think Petersen--

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) Thank God, he did something.

HALDEMAN: If you get Ehrlichman out too. Well, just, just think you did something, there are, there are a lot of them that would be delighted to see...

PRESIDENT: Like they were with Sherman Adams.

HALDEMAN: ...really who want to see John bombed and Dean put both of us...

PRESIDENT: Yeah, yeah, yeah.
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HALDEMAN: They really would.

PRESIDENT: 'Cause, basically it's part of the problem of being on the White House staff. They hated Adams. And, I say that, but they don't all really, but ah--

HALDEMAN: No they don't. I've got lot of (unintelligible). You'll find a lot of good supporters (unintelligible) 'not bring, not enough to carry, carry the thing and you'll get a lot of criticism from, from our loyalists, that's the other thing. Our super-loyalists will be offended by. (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: That's where the leave is better than resignation.

HALDEMAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: The leave--

HALDEMAN: And it isn't fair, it's--

PRESIDENT: Well that's Bill Rogers' point.

HALDEMAN: Fairness is a factor in it.

PRESIDENT: Well I'll tell you, let me put it this way, ah (unintelligible) say Petersen made ah, ah good, ah point that might ah be (unintelligible). Ehrlichman brought up a point. He said, "I should never hate said it." (Unintelligible) they should resign. (Unintelligible) they should resign on the basis (unintelligible) and I indicated that (unintelligible) it's not fair (unintelligible), they have a right to be. He said, "Mr. President, that speaks awfully well for your (unintelligible), but it doesn't speak for your (unintelligible)."

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible)

(REEL 7 BEGINS)

PRESIDENT: I don't know what would be better but the point is, my nature is not to be a vicious
PRESIDENT


(REEL 6 ENDS)
PRESIDENT: And even with Hickle, God damn it. Destroying (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: I know.

PRESIDENT: It was a tough thing for me to do. I don't like to hurt people and I don't like to do it. You know what I mean? And, basically, I'm a stand up guy. Stand up for my friends. I might (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Sir.

PRESIDENT: I told people that they lose ball games. Ya know. I call them when they're down. I stand with them when they're sick. I mean this is another character

HALDEMAN: But...

PRESIDENT: ...of the President.

HALDEMAN: ...but, the argument the other way i-is whether (unintelligible). That's a very admirable human trait, and it's an admirable Presidential trait--until it gets in the way, of the proper running...

PRESIDENT: ...of the office...

HALDEMAN: ...of the office...

PRESIDENT: Here, Bob...

HALDEMAN: ...that is you cannot (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Here, Bob, is the critical point with you and I and John Ehrlichman are concerned. It has no concern. It is gonna get worse. It is gonna be worse. And it's in the way (unintelligible) and ah, John can't do his job. You can't do your job and ah, guess because
PRESIDENT: (unintelligible) you're really (unintelligible).

(Cont’d) maybe it'll do the job. And also, I think another thing about this you have read Six Crises, that statement in Six Crises--nothing about the chapters, but the introduction, which I took almost a month to write. But in the introduction basically on the old pro-proposition of crises book then I—I (unintelligible). But you have the problem of (unintelligible), ah, the point is the question, the worst time, the very worst time is to try and make the goddamned decision. once you've decided, then you feel fine. Then you'll have a period afterwards when you're you will not (unintelligible). Buy my point is we're in a position now, where we should decide and then go on. You see my point?

HALDEMAN: Yeah. If you can do it.

PRESIDENT: Well, you can can't do it.

HALDEMAN: That'll only you gotta be sure that once you decide)that would enable me to move on in order to speed up the (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: You see. The resignation thing, the resignation thing, frankly, let me tell ya, the reason I buckled it, right--

HALDEMAN: I didn't want it, ya know.

PRESIDENT: God damn it. I'm not gonna do something I think is wrong. The hell with (unintelligible). I can run the Presidency one way or another. Right? It's wrong.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Yeah, but, but then the second point is, (unintelligible). The President's gotta take a vote of right or wrong with his people.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.
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PRESIDENT: That's the normal factor. Unless it impairs the operation of the President. Now we get to the point (unintelligible) postpone where in the beginning where it does impair. In other words, although it impairs your operation, it impairs John's operation and I've got this goddamned Congress to deal with. I've got a hell of a lot of battles to fight. And I've got to clear the goddamned air. How do you do it? Do you clear the air th-the (unintelligible) but at least you get a couple of targets who move from one place to another. It's true that they'll target in more on me. But, then I'll assume the responsibility and I will, I want to say, I am responsible. I regret and I, uh, I do not pass the buck to anybody else, (unintelligible) with Mitchell. I don't wanna make a Checkers Speech for the sake of the press (unintelligible). Well...

HALDEMAN: I think I like your idea of doing it in the Chambers group. It may be a good speech to give to a live audience.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) this to the press...

PRESIDENT: Maybe it's changed...

HALDEMAN: ...even with a live audience (unintelligible),

PRESIDENT: ...Or do you think, it should be a prime time (unintelligible) reach that point now that you've (unintelligible) the God damn story now.

HALDEMAN: Can you do it at the Chambers (unintelligible)?

PRESIDENT: Huh?

HALDEMAN: It maybe, shouldn't be a live audience. Maybe you as President and you have a problem in the Presidency dealing with the American people as such, that you'd ask the President, wh-what he should state carefully.
PRESIDENT: And frankly (unintelligible). Except the fact of, uh, (noise) (unintelligible) I think probably the only hope (unintelligible) (noise).

HALDEMAN: Yeah. (Unintelligible). Well, let's say if you do it, you're not very far ahead of the wave. You may be ahead of it a little, and...

PRESIDENT: I don't have...

HALDEMAN: ...very far ahead, and I think maybe you wanna be a little bit ahead.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: So, it's gotta override the press.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. And on that, the only problem with doing the prime timer, right now, I think the time to do the prime timer is when the Grand Jury acts.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: You see...

HALDEMAN: I, I all right (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Yeah, yeah.

HALDEMAN: Where...

PRESIDENT: Yeah. An-, and otherwise, otherwise other things are gonna come out separately. Now, the Grand Jury's acted and I'm gonna rely on the highest standards of conduct, and everybody here, as far as the people are concerned, even though they weren't indicted. I feel it best that they not be here, or they feel that they cannot serve. You know what I mean. We gotta go through all that, uh, the higher standards. You're gonna get at the bottom of this. You're gonna cooperate with the Ervin Committee. Let's get some new rules and so forth and so on. The most
PRESIDENT: important thing is to preserve what we have.

(Cont'd) That there's no whitewash in the White House. Ah, make that speech and say, I assumed the responsibility and, I mean, I want you to know why it all happened. I want to tell you the story without any of the polish. Just being President was not at all an issue. And ah, ah, now ah, I have no other responsibilities to the founders of my country, except to be President, and I'm going to certainly devote (unintelligible) of this country (unintelligible.REMOVED). Just can't have this, this violent take-over. Violent, violent take-over (unintelligible) so forth and so on, but you see, beside this and the other, they want an (unintelligible) speech. There's no excuse for the fact the other (unintelligible) clearly.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) I'm not making it just for the fact that there are eight, there were 36 incidents of this, or 14 incidents of that. There were 15 incidents of that (unintelligible). A lot of this (unintelligible) think of it this has happened, but this is no excuse for violence. We are responsible for what people feel (unintelligible) uh, but uh, I think Yeah. Now we're gonna go forward, we've got great things to do for this country. I'm confident that put it in circles I didn't do it, I didn't handle it (unintelligible), I was just God damn busy. Actually, I really had an excuse.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: Ah, not a justification, but I got an excuse.

PRESIDENT: What, that I was busy?

HALDEMAN: Oh, sure. That the President, you know, take other than the few that are starting to (unintelligible) on the President to take the
HALDEMAN: responsibility, but even there, the thing is,
(Cont'd) his responsibility is that he wasn't on top of
it, and that the people
PRESIDENT: Where's the, what's the Agronsky line about
impeaching the President. Impeached for what?
Ah, cover-up or what.
HALDEMAN: Don't know.
PRESIDENT: Bull shit. Let me say that ah, that was
Ehrlichman's point, he said, and that would be
John Dean's point. But do you think the people
of the United, ah, the United States are gonna
impeach the President on the basis of John Dean?
(Unintelligible), I mean, I know -I'm not
speaking of impeachment in terms of a trial or
something like that, but I've been thinking of
impeachment in terms of being the public mind.
I mean, John Dean's zingers just burn
(unintelligible) Dean's been totally discredited
by it right now. We may be wrong.
HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) basically right. That's one of
the-problems of me being here (unintelligible),
PRESIDENT: I know, and you and John must not be concerned
if they have gotten Dean out of the way, we
could say thanks.
HALDEMAN: Well, that is our concern. But if, ah--
PRESIDENT: I know, but, concern is--
HALDEMAN: Concern is (unintelligible) perspective.
PRESIDENT: The point is, we know he's gonna be handled
differently, don't we Bob? We know he's gonna
(unintelligible) and the President isn't
judging, on this is the thing. I knew for so
God damn long that there was prosecutor
(unintelligible).
HALDEMAN: I'm kinda thinking now, that if we go this route
PRESIDENT: It ought to be done soon.
HALDEMAN: Now that maybe, you ought to give Ehrlichman and
me a chance to go out first.
PRESIDENT: ...and keep Dean?
HALDEMAN: Throw him out.
PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible),
HALDEMAN: And let us at least get some credit for taking
the initiative and you--
PRESIDENT: I, I, I think there's a good--
HALDEMAN: ...we'd be a lot better off if we--
PRESIDENT: That's right, that's right, and may--
      (Unintelligible).
      And now, what I'm thinking may happen is the
best (unintelligible). Maybe Dean will come in
and ah, maybe
HALDEMAN: Besides, then I think we oughta wait a few days
and then go out at different times then. I
think, I think if we can, I don't think we want
the one story that
PRESIDENT: Yeah, yeah, Ehrlichman, Haldeman and Dean.
HALDEMAN: If we survive it.
PRESIDENT: Yeah.
HALDEMAN: I think we need a separate story. I think the
way we can do it, since you can't treat us
differently, okay.
PRESIDENT: Bob (unintelligible) shit.
HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) You should fire him and take leaves from us.

PRESIDENT: Ehrlichman?

HALDEMAN: Ehrlichman. But that creates a different problem for you, so that you can't deal with. It could be explained later. Can't be explained now. But we could move out front just by you not telling anybody, including Dean and or anybody else

PRESIDENT: All right, so (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: ...and then Dean will have to decide what to do, or what his next tactic is. And (unintelligible) with Dean, I wouldn't ask for--

PRESIDENT: Oh no. (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: I would wait a few days.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: And then maybe have somebody tell Dean, say "Look, John, in view of the way you been behaving, you gotta (unintelligible)."

PRESIDENT: The U.S. Attorney will handle him. I, and I think, I really think if you would write your leave letters and what I'd like to do, Bob, I could give a crack over the weekend. I have some commitments (12 second unintelligible/REMOVED) it. Now you've got a very good point. And let's, God damn it, let Dean sweat, then he'll say, "Well, I got Haldeman and Ehrlichman". That's all right, too. Then he will have accomplished one of his goals. Then we'll see who the hell else he's after. See what I mean? Well, I don't know if John will buy this, but I'll...Well John...

UNIDENTIFIED: Yes sir, excuse me...

PRESIDENT: Look, let me tell you something. You say this story, this FBI thing, for a lawyer like John, who is such a God damn respected, honest, decent, you
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PRESIDENT: know, and regardless of (unintelligible) this is a hell of a blow for him, see what I mean? That, that, he is innocent. You and I know what the Christ he meant that uh, tell that God damn Gray, for Christ's sake, take this stuff, look at it, keep it, but it ain't about the Watergate, this is just a bunch of shit that, that this ass hole Hunt had. Right? That's what he meant. Correct? Well, Bob, is he gonna read that, it's gonna be a rough son-of-a-bitch, John, and, ah, just say well, he, he can't get out based on that story, let me tell you, I don't want to have the Congress hassle John. I don't want to (unintelligible) I just feel (unintelligible). Look, I can stand up against 'em and I have (unintelligible) but, but, but apparently John, you know, we've got one of these curious situation (unintelligible) and God damn it, we've got, we've got hard liners (unintelligible/REMOVED) hard liners they're a cruel bunch of bastards. (Unintelligible) I sometimes think I'm the only one (unintelligible) presentations come in (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Maybe not

PRESIDENT: Maybe I should, maybe I should, can get into that job, maybe, like, like I said, I really think, I, I, I really thought at times (unintelligible), but I couldn’t do it for him.

HALDEMAN: Couldn't do it for Connally either.

PRESIDENT: No. Guess not.

(Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: Well, basically you know, without

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) live with it.

PRESIDENT: Well, I've got to live with it and also let's face it, I can do this job better than anybody else.

HALDEMAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: And at this point in the day.
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HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) all the problems.

PRESIDENT: And we'll survive the problems. This does not kill the Presidency.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: It is tough, it is tough, or, or do you agree with that? (More than one person talks, all unintelligible),

PRESIDENT: Malarkey. As you know, so many people think, Burns thinks we're finished (unintelligible). You don't think we're finished?

HALDEMAN: No. (Unintelligible) I don't mean to say its not a...

PRESIDENT: Our problem.

HALDEMAN: ...our problem, but it is...

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: It's not, uh, it's not a (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: I know John won't buy it, but Bob, he's got to. You talk to him.(Unintelligible) Dean floating out around there (unintelligible/REMOVED) now, John after this story broke, you remember, he wanted to take leave, right, he wanted to quit today.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, that's interesting.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Right.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible),

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible/REMOVED). Damn thing to do. I would do it before, I'd do it Saturday, so it gets done.

HALDEMAN: Okay.
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PRESIDENT: And incidentally, when the, I think when the speech is made though, do you think it should be in the oval office?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: All right, good.

HALDEMAN: I haven't really thought about it much, but, off the cuff, ah

PRESIDENT: On the other hand, when I do the Chamber (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Well, I kept it open, but I just wonder if I should do the Chamber?

HALDEMAN: (Noise) (Unintelligible),

PRESIDENT: This (unintelligible) of the Chambers Monday that I got the other fellow with Tuesday, on this (unintelligible) Chambers Office (unintelligible) and I just wonder if I should brush over the Chambers (unintelligible) I got the ah, I got this big thing on the (unintelligible) next day over at the ah, Public Affairs Chamber, sure. I don't think I could, see I really can't do the Chamber without saying something about this.

HALDEMAN: Why not?

PRESIDENT: I could.

HALDEMAN: I think you have to. If you do it, you have to do it without saying anything. 'Cause when you say anything you've got to say everything.

PRESIDENT: That's right. Good.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: I'm doing this Stennis thing. That's no skin off my (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: That's right.
PRESIDENT: The Chambers a different thing in this town with all the reporters and all the rest.

HALDEMAN: The whole focus will be on Watergate.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. They'll say why didn't, he didn't mention Watergate. Somebody said why didn't you talk about Watergate? I really don't think I should do it. The (unintelligible) bunch is pushing for it.

HALDEMAN: Well, but you know the Chamber, uh, thing doesn't change anything.

PRESIDENT: I don't think it does either

HALDEMAN: I said

PRESIDENT: ...two labor groups and why don't I do the Chamber thing. Well, I'm busy.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible). (Noise).

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible/REMOVED). You know I've got to re-, got to reverse myself a little on Agnew (unintelligible/REMOVED). I liked his standing up with us (unintelligible/REMOVED).

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible/REMOVED) exactly the reason David Brinkley said last night which is that he can't separate himself from you and still get the nomination.

PRESIDENT: And that's why probably Connally (unintelligible/REMOVED). No.

HALDEMAN: No. Connally (unintelligible/REMOVED).

PRESIDENT: Connally is a decent, decent man, no, you're right. Well, I, I, I, I, I have had some conversation with Connally and Connally just thinks, by God, that I ought to be doing the job (unintelligible) just feel damn sorry about--he likes you (unintelligible) particularly
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President: doing a good job. And why that worked out that way (unintelligible/REMOVED).

Haldeman: That doesn't worry me a bit (unintelligible).

President: 'Cause in the end it's going to be (unintelligible). You know what I mean. We've got to get out the God damn story. People have forgotten the violent years involved. They have forgotten...

Haldeman: That's right.

President: I mean, "Fuck you Mr. President", "Fuck you Tricia", and all that shit, not just words but what violence, the destruction, the tear-gassing at the convention. What the...

Haldeman: (Unintelligible),

President: In the name of God?

Haldeman: Enough people out in front of this place over the years.

President: Well, I know, rough, the threats...

Haldeman: Oh.

President: Get together and-- "D" can do one thing--I want the threats collected, remember. I told you that, will they do it?

Haldeman: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

President: Okay (unintelligible) if you completely agree with them (unintelligible). I mean, we don't have any investigators, that's our problem, see.

Haldeman: Yeah, yeah.

President: See, see.

Haldeman: They would be good investigators.
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PRESIDENT: Huh?

HALDEMAN: They would be good investigators (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) you know what I mean? I really think-that, (noise) you know, I really think (noise) that the number of threats, the number of uh, the number of demonstrations, uh, get all the hate letters that you can, good God, let's put out the Chamber of Horrors.

HALDEMAN: There's plenty of it.

PRESIDENT: Huh?

HALDEMAN: There's plenty of it. (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: There is, but I, they've got the laws on it.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: There's a list, a summary, a catalogue which he manages to keep vitriol wrapped around it.

PRESIDENT: Maybe you ought to let (unintelligible) do it. Okay. Alright, thank you. 'Preciate it. I don't know, what do you want to do about the (unintelligible). You see how I feel, but you gotta do it.

HALDEMAN: I'll put John and I'll...

PRESIDENT: The departments, the departments that I... Let me put it this way...
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(Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: I would, uh, (noise) talk with Rogers (unintelligible) Executive Privilege (unintelligible) still, you remember that I had (unintelligible). I want you to know that it occurred to me that uh, (unintelligible). I checked with Krogh, you know, and I said I talked RESTRICTED—"D" You get what I mean.

HALDEMAN: Wouldn't that be a cheap thing to do?

PRESIDENT: I, I'll tell you what I'm gonna...

HALDEMAN: What, what, what, that would be perfectly understandable.

PRESIDENT: You know what, no, you know what though, we've got the--what ticked me off was on the (unintelligible). I, I, I know Len Hall (ph) in, in indicating that he remembered what had happened An the Adams case

HALDEMAN: What happened there was that you...

PRESIDENT: He said that he, he said, I know that, that Adams might have cheated Eisenhower. Eisenhower said "I want to keep him."

HALDEMAN: Huh.

PRESIDENT: So it was really compounded, that's why Adams hated my guts ever thereafter.

HALDEMAN: That's what happened?

PRESIDENT: That's what happened. But anyway...

HALDEMAN: That was really, that is...

PRESIDENT: In your, you see, there are cases of other people, like you were, you can, but, as far as the top people are concerned, the man has gotta talk to him about it. You don't agree?
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HALDEMAN: Oh I think...

PRESIDENT: Why hell, yes!

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) he had no sense to know better, but I think they would have been perfectly understandable, uh, about (unintelligible). He said...

PRESIDENT: John has got to understand it, from the stand point of the fact that they, this kind of Dean (unintelligible). Dean is out to get him, more than you Bob,...

HALDEMAN: Yeah...

PRESIDENT: ...more than you.

HALDEMAN: ...I think that's right.

PRESIDENT: The next story will be from Dean: John Ehrlichman called (unintelligible). And we just don't have that (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: John engineered the, the cover-up.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: Something like that.

PRESIDENT: He is the mastermind, which is not true, right?

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible). Absolutely right.

PRESIDENT: You see, you know, you had one example of it right (unintelligible) when you said, "How the hell did you get Ehrlichman's statement out? Do we go through Ehrlichman on that? Or Ehrlichman (unintelligible). Now if you're on leave, God damn it, then you can fight it practically...

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: ...from where you are.

HALDEMAN: Yeah, yeah, there's no question on why it doesn't come from the White House any more. Right? Okay.
PRESIDENT: I'll write it up, don't be too long.
HALDEMAN: We can do it.
PRESIDENT: Good.