Timothy Naftali

Hi, I'm Tim Naftali. I'm Director of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library Museum here in Yorba Linda, California. I'm delighted that today, September 5, 2007, I have the pleasure of interviewing Bud Krogh for a second time for the Richard Nixon Oral History Program. Bud, thank you for subjecting yourself to this a second time.

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Thank you for inviting me back. I didn't know after the first one that there'd be a second chance, and I'm glad there is.

Timothy Naftali

I'm going to ask you a few miscellaneous questions, and then we're going to get to the one anecdote we didn't get to last time. But in reading "Integrity," a couple of things came to mind that I thought I'd ask you about. One was your responsibility for our international policy towards the drug issue. We've interviewed Charles Rangel. Do you remember his interest in the drug issue, and, at one point apparently, President Nixon called him about Turkey, because Turkey was a major concern of ours.

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Yes, I do remember Congressman Charles Rangel's interest in drugs, and he was one of the people on the Hill who I think understood the threat posed by international drug problems, particularly heroin coming into this country from Turkey and from other countries. He could always be counted on as a person who would support us. And when we submitted legislation to Congress to set up some of the offices like the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention to be able to move forward with the Turkish government to get them to go out of growing poppy, we briefed Congressman Rangel and in all of it, he was always very supportive. I counted him not only a professional supporter but a personal friend; I thought he was terrific.

Timothy Naftali

I asked him about the methadone clinics, and he was a little -- he wasn't a great supporter of the methadone clinics. We discussed how the Nixon administration was truly a pioneer in introducing those clinics.

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

We were, and I understood some of Congressman Rangel's concern about methadone maintenance, because what it basically was was to provide methadone to heroin addicts in a way, so that they would not feel that they had to go out and score heroin and then basically have to do the crimes to be able to get the money to buy the heroin. We felt that methadone as a blocking agent, because it blocked the heroin high, was a form of or a modality of treatment that would make some sense. And Dr. Jerome Jaffe was the person that we asked to come into the government. Jeff Donfeld was the White House
staff person who helped develop the methadone maintenance program, and it took us about a year, year and a half to develop it in such a way that we felt we could go national with it. And then we put together the legislation to create the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, which basically moved methadone maintenance out into the country as a whole. We started in Washington, D.C., with the narcotics treatment administration under Dr. Robert DuPont. Based upon that experience, we felt we knew enough to be able to expand it around the country, and I feel it had a direct effect of being able to reduce those crimes directly related to people who had heroin addiction problems.

Timothy Naftali

Thank you. You were on the Department of Justice's Crisis Management Committee.

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Yes. Did you handle any of the hijacking issues?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

My assignment on the hijacking issues were to come up with a program that would stop them. Now what happened was an aircraft was hijacked from, I believe, National Airport. I think it was a Southern Airways jet, and I would have to check that out. But I believe someone was killed in the process of that hijacking. And the word came back from the President that we were to stop the hijacking. And we met in my office, in the old executive office building, sat around our tables, and said, "Well, it's probably going to require some draconian steps to do it," and we thought through it, "Well, what can we do?" Well, we ought to check everybody that goes to an airport that's going to get on an airplane and has to go through a metal detector system. We're going to check his carry-on baggage, and we're going to have a law enforcement person present at every major concourse throughout the United States. And we looked at that and said, "This will be viewed as the most intrusive program on a person's privacy ever put forward by the government." So we went to Ehrlichman, John Ehrlichman, the Domestic Affairs Advisor, and said this is what we think we'll be able to stop those who arrive at an airport, buy a one-way ticket with cash, without luggage. At least we're going to be able to stop that, be able to check them, and that was the pool of people from whom the hijacking pool was taken. And he said, "Well, I think you ought to try it at National Airport first." So we put it into effect at National. This was before it became Reagan Airport, and we were immediately sued by the ACLU, which, we wanted to be sued, because we didn't know whether or not it was consistent with the judicial understanding of what the fourth amendment required. Were these wise and reasonable searches or are they unreasonable searches? Well, we got before a judge in Washington, D.C., who looked at the program, looked at what we were trying to do and concluded this is reasonable. So we had a legal basis on which to build a national program after testing it out in Washington, D.C., and that's the way we did a lot of things. Like in the narcotics methadone programs, we tested it out to see what the effect would be in Washington, D.C., and then we knew enough to be able to put it into effect nationwide.

Timothy Naftali

Were you part of the discussion regarding air marshals?
Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

I was part of the air marshal discussion, part of a lot of the discussions where we had different methods for trying to stop hijacking. Air marshals was one of them; profiling was another. As I said, where somebody would show up at the airport, buy a one-way ticket with cash, without luggage, they would go into a secondary sort of investigation, they would be checked out more thoroughly. The Air Marshal Program raised a lot of questions for a number of us, particularly if they were armed. What would happen if there was an altercation, an air marshal shot off his gun, and the plane goes down? That's a government problem of first order. But we did conclude that air marshals were a good idea, and they were onboard, I forget exactly how long -- I think now they're using them all the time. But we felt that the intervention programs that we had set up would be more effective than the air marshals that were being used at that time. And, interestingly enough, skyjackings stopped. I mean, it was basically ended after we put this program into effect for years and years. And Tim, I had to go testify before a congressional committee about this program, and I was asked, "Do you think this program is responsible for the cessation of skyjacking?" And I said, "Congressman, I don't know. It's entirely possible, but the last hijacker took the last plane that was going to be hijacked before we put this program into effect. As a policy person, I can't tell you categorically that this program was successful. However, politically speaking, we put the program into effect, and there are no skyjackings since it's been in effect. I think it's been a huge success." And he smiled and granted me that.

Timothy Naftali

One perhaps -- do you think some role was also played by the agreement we had reached with Cuba?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Yes, I mean, the agreement with Cuba where they were going to return those skyjackers -- in other words, there was no going to be lying on the beach in Havana afterwards in Cuba; they were going to be sent back. Obviously, it had a lot to do with it. I mean, there are a number of different pieces in that program. I like to think that what we did with the airports was a major one.

Timothy Naftali

No doubt, but do you remember any debate over whether to be dealing with the Cubans?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

There was some discussion about that, but remember, this was an administration that was not afraid to have the President go to China. I don't think we were averse to be able to talk to the Cubans where it could serve our mutual interests. And I didn't think that Castro wanted these people in Cuba anyway, and the planes were almost always returned, so it didn't seem to me like that was a problem in negotiating with the Cuban government.

Timothy Naftali

The Southern Air hijacking was I think, in November or December '72, so was this --
Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Well, then --

Timothy Naftali

There were a number of them. There were a lot of hijackings.

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

I may have gotten the wrong skyjacking or hijacking that precipitated it, but there was something that was a precipitating factor to putting those three elements into effect that didn't stop it from that point forward.

Timothy Naftali

And where were you in your career? This was -- was this before or after the Fielding, the [unintelligible]?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

This would have been before the Fielding Operation, which was in September of 1971.

Timothy Naftali

Thank you. Let's move to the Fielding Operation. You talk about the August 11th memorandum to John Ehrlichman. You reveal in your book that there was a fifth paragraph.

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Yes.

Timothy Naftali

Did you approach MI5?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

My understanding is that we had approval, to that fifth paragraph request, was that we contact MI5 to see whether or not Dr. Ellsberg, while a student at Cambridge, has been overheard. I don't believe there was any follow-up to that afterwards. It would've probably -- before we could have made that contact, it would've taken two or three weeks, and then the next three weeks was the preparation for the Fielding break-in. After that was over, we basically shut down that part of that operation. I don't think there was ever any contact made with MI5.
Timothy Naftali

In your book you mentioned that it was Hunt who thought that perhaps Ellsberg could be a latter-day Kim Philby?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Yes, I remember that discussion in Room 16. He felt that Cambridge had been a hotbed of, maybe a potential subversion of students and that Daniel Ellsberg was known to be a brilliant student, had spent some time at Cambridge. By the way, I have since gotten to know Dan Ellsberg pretty well, and we're good friends, and he's written the foreword to my book. And his response to that point about his potentially being a Soviet spy was that that is the worst nonsense that he could have ever have imagined. "How could you have thought that?" And I said, "Well, it just seemed like a logical conclusion to draw at the time."

Timothy Naftali

To what extent was the handling of secret materials, your understanding of the handling of secret materials, a product of your time in the Navy?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

I think the handling of secret materials was -- I don't want to say in large measure, but in some measure a product of my Navy experience. I was a communications officer on board a capital ship, the USS Yorktown. I dealt with the secret, top-secret information that came into the ship over a three-year period. We were trained to feel that these were absolutely the most important secrets to be kept, not to be disclosed, but most of that information was tactical. It didn't have much to do with, sort of, high policy secrets. But I came from that with a really strong sense that, when something was classified secret or top-secret, to release it is to do something that is inimical to the interests of the United States. I felt that then, and to some degree I feel that way today.

Timothy Naftali

I wanted to know about what you recall of Hunt's relationship with Colson during the period just before the break-in at Dr. Fielding's office. Did you have a sense of how often Hunt was reporting to Colson?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

My sense is that Howard Hunt was in the unit because Chuck Colson had been given the assignment to use whatever information was obtained to discredit Dr. Ellsberg. That was his assignment, and that Howard Hunt's job was to provide that information to Colson if and when it had been obtained by the unit. My sense of it is that there was an ongoing reporting link between Hunt and Colson. Hunt never kept me apprised of those conversations. That's what gave me a lot of discomfort when the unit was set up, because here was a group of four people, one of whom drawn from Henry Kissinger's staff, David Young, who I assumed was maybe staying in contact with Henry during that time, Henry Kissinger, at that time. I came from Ehrlichman's staff, brought in Gordon Liddy from Treasury. He,
Howard Hunt, coming from Colson, Chuck Colson, the White House staff. A very unwieldy group, and not knowing for sure what those reporting links were, I assumed that Howard Hunt did keep a pretty close relationship with Chuck during that time, but I don't know that for a fact. I made that as an assumption.

Timothy Naftali

I was also going to ask you just to help clarify something. The last time we talked, you told us a story of your going to see President Nixon after you came out of jail, after he resigned. I sense from that conversation, from your recollection of that conversation, was it you went to him because you felt you needed to apologize?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Yes.

Timothy Naftali

You felt you needed to apologize because you felt he had not authorized what you did?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

I did not feel that President Nixon ever specifically authorized a break-in into the office of Dr. Fielding. I felt that he had set the tone, the foundation for it, by explaining to me and to Ehrlichman that what we were dealing with was a national security matter of highest national security importance. But I felt that the decision that I made and the recommendation that I made in 1971, which led to the Fielding break-in, was really the seminal event that led, as I point out in my book, inexorably to Watergate and to his resignation. So after I left the government in 1973, in May of 1973, I thought long and hard about what really had occurred, and I felt that I had not demonstrated the good judgment and the wisdom when I was running the White House Plumbers that I should have. And then after getting out of prison in 1974, I felt that I needed to go see him. And maybe it was for my own sense of being able to close the loop that I felt terrible about what had happened, I felt, in some measure, responsible for him. And it was interesting in that conversation, he said he felt responsible for what had happened to me, too.

Timothy Naftali

Well, he actually, when you look at the interviews with him, he couldn't remember if he'd authorized it or not.

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Well, I know that, and he asked me that question, "Did I authorize that break-in?" And I told him, I said, "I do not believe you did." I said, "I knew that he had authorized the Brookings Institution break-in." That's on a transcript. It's very clear what he expected to have been done. John Dean specifically went out and stopped that. At a great, I think, personal cost went out and told Ehrlichman that we cannot do this, and it was shut down. And I told the President, "From my understanding of the
facts, you could not have known this beforehand." And interestingly enough, after the break-in, John Ehrlichman went to see the President. There was a transcript of this conversation. And he told the President, I believe it was the 8th or 9th of September, "We had a little operation in California, but it's better that you not know about it." Now, my assumption was that that was the first that the President had heard about it. If that's the case, he could not have authorized it in advance. I think he was always a little unclear because maybe he wasn't certain which break-ins he did authorize -- oh my. [laughter] -- but I'm very certain, in my own mind, that he did not give explicit authorization to the Fielding break-in in advance.

Timothy Naftali

Because when -- we've interviewed John Dean, and one thing he says is that you and he have a different recollection on something you once said to him.

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Yeah, he recalls that I told him that the instructions for the break-in came directly out of the Oval Office. I don't recall saying it with that degree of detail. I do remember saying that the whole impetus for what we have been doing came directly out of the Oval Office. There's a distinction between that. One is he is complicit in the authorization; the other is he set the foundation on which that decision to break into the office occurred. I don't know exactly what I said to John Dean at that point, but my intent was not to say that the President explicitly approved the break-in.

Timothy Naftali

Do you think Charles Colson knew about the break-in beforehand?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

I don't. I have a feeling that Howard Hunt was very careful as to what he would tell Chuck Colson as to what we were doing. Now, I needed to get some money for this operation, and I asked Chuck Colson to provide that money to me, and he did, and I made that available to Hunt and to Liddy. There may have been some discussion between Hunt and Colson as to how the money was going to be spent, but I don't know that for a fact. And my sense of it is that Chuck did not know in advance, and he was very clear with a special prosecutor that he did not have advance knowledge of that break-in, and I take him at his word in that. I did not tell him.

Timothy Naftali

So you just asked for money for what?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

There's going to be money for travel, some equipment, hotel costs, whatever they were going to need to pay, to expend to make the trip from Washington, D.C., to California. They went through Chicago; they had other things. I believe it was $2,000.
Timothy Naftali

But you would ask them for money to pay for what?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

To pay for the operation.

Timothy Naftali

But what would you have told him? You just said, "I need some money"?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

I would've told them, "I need some money for some of the things that are being worked on by Hunt and Liddy to --

Timothy Naftali

To develop the information that he wanted.

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

It would've been very generic, very non-specific, so that he would not have known, specifically, how that money was going to be spent.

Timothy Naftali

Okay, thank you. Kent State.

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Kent State.

Timothy Naftali

Where were you?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

I was at lunch at the Federal Club in Washington, D.C. It's very close to the White House. I had told my office where I was, waiter came over, said that, "You've got a call from your office. You have to take it right away." When I took the call they said, "This has happened at Kent State." I went back, excused myself from my guests, and went immediately back to the White House to learn what had happened. I believe it was a Tuesday morning, a Monday or Tuesday morning, I forget which morning it was that week, after the Cambodian incursion had occurred. And it was just awful. I mean, it was just a terrible blow. Because we had managed to be able to handle all major demonstrations in Washington,
D.C., without harming anybody, and some of us -- of course a lot of the people that came to
demonstrate were people we went to school with. These are our friends. And then it all unfolded and
what had happened. I was not privy to the development of the President's statement about that, but as
I read it later, I was disappointed in it because it laid a lot of it off on the demonstrators as the
protesters of "this is what happened." I mean, some of us were just sick at heart at that, because giving
live ammunition to the National Guard, a decision had been made, and it was just one of those things
that was a deeply tragic affair, which would not have happened but for the Cambodia decision. I
learned later, in talking to people, that the President felt terrible about that, and I think that might have
been part of the reason why he went out to meet with some students that morning at the end of the
week. After his press conference, he went out to talk to some demonstrators who had come to
Washington from all over the eastern seaboard at that point. That was a very sad week, very tragic
week.

Timothy Naftali

Tell us about the decision to put buses around the White House?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

I was in the Justice Department crisis group when we were trying to think through how do we protect
the White House? And I had started working on how to respond to major demonstrations right with
the counter inaugural in 1969 and had sort of developed a theory about how to do it, is that you
present the least amount of potential provocation from violence to those who are coming to
demonstrate, but you keep in reserve all of the potential to respond to it if an attack occurs or if they
get through your line. And I remember a meeting in the Justice Department, presided over by Richard
Kleindienst, the Deputy Attorney General, and others, who had different ways of approaching
demonstrations. And I remembered the conversation wasn't lighthearted necessarily, but there was a --
I'm trying to think of his name -- Bill McCaffrey, who was a lieutenant general at the time, who I think
was the commanding officer of the military district around Washington, D.C. And he and I were
talking with each other, and I think I said, "Well, you know in the old westerns, John Wayne just used
to circle the wagons, and that was enough to be able to protect people inside the wagon train." And
that led off, "You know, we've used buses before at different places in the city, when there have been
demonstrations." And one thing led to another and we said, "Well, why don't we consider just basically
leasing buses from the metropolitan districts, the utilities that run these bus companies, and circle the
wagons?" And we did, and I think it turned out to be a good decision. As I remember saying in the
meeting, "Look, what's the worst that they could do? They can punch holes in the tires, they can break
the windows, and they can write graffiti on the buses, but they're not going to get to the fence. And we
can put a cordon of people there and when they try to come over, we can squirt them with some tear
gas, and they'll slide back down to the other side." And to me, it's different looking at a bus than it is
looking at a cordon of SWAT-clad policeman, which, to me, invites a confrontation. And I was a firm
believer then, and I still am to this day, that you have to provide the protection, but you do it in a way
that is the least provocative and likely to incent an attack. And we had guys that from the military
district inside the old EOB there up on, I believe, the fourth floor. I did my tour, made sure they were
all properly in position before the day began and, of course, as you know, the President then went out
to the Lincoln Memorial, early in the morning, I believe May 9th, which was a very bizarre day.
Tell us about that bizarre day.

Well, that bizarre day was a bizarre day.

4:00 -- what, 4:30?

4:30 in the morning, I was in the Secret Service command post, and over the loudspeaker came the words, "Search Light is on the lawn." And -- "Search Light" being the President's Secret Service code name -- and I immediately punched in Ehrlichman's home number, reached by signal, and got him up and said, you know, "The President is out and about, and I think he's on the lawn in the Rose Garden." And he said, "Go over and render assistance right now." And so I did, and rushed across West Executive Drive, took the stairs two at a time and went out in the Rose Garden just in time to see the taillights of the President's limousine go out the southwest gate and immediately commandeered a limousine. Ran back, got in another car that -- they were all there waiting for us, to be used -- and found out where the President was going and followed him up to the Lincoln Memorial. Couldn't have gotten there more than two or three minutes after he got there, went up the stairs to see what was going on, and found him in discussion with, at the start, 10 to 15 young people, students who had come in from all over the East Coast. And Dr. Tkach was there, and Manolo Sanchez was there; I believe that was it. Plus I think only four Secret Service agents. It was woefully understaffed. And it was a scary time, because we got up there while it was still dark, and he spent about 45 minutes, maybe longer, talking to these students. I heard a lot of it, listened to it, wrote down some of it after it was over, but basically it was a time when I was really, really afraid for his safety. And I know that he wrote later on that he had never seen the Secret Service quite so frightened, and he certainly got that right.

We did not have a sufficient detail to protect him if somebody had decided to try to attack him or assault him. But it was totally unplanned, unscripted. His own notes at that meeting are extraordinary, about what he covered in that period of time. It was not just a drop-by. This was a major effort to communicate with these young people. And the crowd grew, it got bigger as they began to realize this is not Rich Little; this is Richard Nixon. This is the real guy.

What was his manner like?

His manner was intense, trying to reach out into them, to communicate with them. I'd never seem him do it like this before. He had no talking points. He was trying to empathize with them as best he could. He talked about how when, before World War II, he had been a pacifist, had supported Neville Chamberlain and then had changed his mind and felt that Churchill was a wiser man than Chamberlain.
had been. Talked about how what he was trying to do was to make this country safer. He wanted to end the war; he shared their aims. It was an amazing effort to try to find a way to communicate with them. Then he did talk about travel. He talked about a lot of things that I think that the young people around him felt was off the point, was not really related to why they were there. And after about 45 minutes of it -- I don't know exactly how long it was, but it was a long time -- he walked down the stairs, and I followed him, and he got in his limousine. And he saw some students at the bottom, and he asked one where they were from, and they said Syracuse University. And I think he mentioned that they have a good football team in Syracuse, and the story in the paper the next day was, "President goes to Lincoln Memorial and talks football." Well, he didn't talk football; all he did was acknowledge that Syracuse had a good football team. He got in his car, and I thought we're now safely in route back to the White House, and we go up -- is it Constitution Avenue? -- at speed, and we go right by 17th, which we would have turned off to go into the White House, and go up to Capitol Hill. And I don't know, you probably know that story.

Timothy Naftali

Before we get to that, I just want a word picture for people. First of all, why were you up at 4:30 in the morning? What were you doing in the old executive office building?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

My job in the White House was sort of a jack-of-all-trades, but one of them was the security of the White House during times of demonstration. That's why I was part of the attorney general's crisis group. I had worked very closely with Jerry Wilson who was the chief of police, very close with the mayor, very close with Secret Service. I was the guy who had, I think, to make sure that we had all of the different pieces in place. Secret Service had the responsibility, but I also want to make sure that the Secret Service had everything in place. And now we're not just dealing with Secret Service protection, we're dealing with a military unit inside the White House grounds, inside the old EOB. This is not just Secret Service. This is the U.S. Army there as well. We also had General Services Administration officers at different places, protecting the Federal facilities, and we had the Metropolitan Police Department positioned at different places. I needed to know -- and I did know -- where all of them were located. So my job was to make sure that the perimeter was intact. I walked the perimeter, made sure that the buses were chock-a-block. There were no places where people were going to come through. And then I went into the Secret Service command post after completing my rounds to make sure everything was intact. That was about 4:15 in the morning. Hadn't slept that night because there had been a movement of the military, all these trucks coming in and disgorging these soldiers in combat gear inside the old EOB. There are the courtyards inside, which is where their trucks were parked, and then in full gear they went up to the fourth floor and were sitting along the halls of the fourth floor.

Timothy Naftali

And you had received intelligence that there was going to be a massive demonstration?
Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Oh, yes, oh, I mean, the intelligence was based upon what we heard from all over cities all around the eastern seaboard. I mean we felt that there would probably be over 100,000 people descending on the city that day. And it probably was a larger number than that. We had ways -- I forget exactly where the intelligence was coming from, but the FBI, Secret Service and others were tracking movements of people coming in. You could see people coming in the night before, some of them camping out on the Mall. They were all over the city at that point. I don't think that we had a police department count going through the night, but I knew that there were a lot of people out there that were going to be coming. This was now very different than what had happened the year before, with the new mobilization to end the war in November and the moratorium in October or even the counter inaugural in January, which were planned and organized. This was just an eruption of people around the eastern seaboard who were going to come and protest against the President's decision to the incursion into Cambodia.

Timothy Naftali

And then what happened at Kent State just ratcheted up the tension?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Oh, it ratcheted up the intensity, because I think the announcement of the incursion was April 3. I think it was at the end of the month. You go through the weekend; Kent State occurs and, of course, that picture of that young woman leaning over the body of that young person who had been shot was one of the most tragic photographs I think ever taken. And that went all around the world, and that was, I believe, three to four days before people were coming to Washington to just demonstrate against the war, against the President, and against his decision to go into Cambodia.

Timothy Naftali

There was tension among the White House staff, wasn't there?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Yeah, there was a lot of tension. A lot of people were upset about the Cambodia decision, that it ought not to have been made. This was now our war. That decision, I think, probably was a major one. And now it was no longer Johnson's war, which we're ending. This is now Nixon's war. And this is now, what, 14 months after we had been sworn -- 15 months, January to May of 1970 -- January '69 to May of 1970. So this was really going to be more and more our war that we had to deal with, and there was a lot of upset people in the White House. And I knew that, really, the game had changed with that Cambodia invasion. It was going to be something for which we are going to be held responsible.

Timothy Naftali

How did you feel, since you had been to Vietnam, I think at least twice. You had worked on land reform with your law school teacher. The Cambodian incursion was not part of your plan.
Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

No, it was not part of my plan. I was very distressed by it, and distressed too, to learn that one of my dear friends, with whom I had been in Vietnam, Elizabeth Pond, who was a "Christian Science Monitor" correspondent had been captured during the Cambodia invasion, with Dick Dudman, of the, I believe, the "St. Louis Post-Dispatch." And she had been captured and she was held for quite some time, almost died. So it was personal as well as something that I felt as a policy matter -- I listened to the President's justification and understood it, and could see the military logic of it, but I also see that once that decision was taken, that made it our war more than anything else before that.

And of course Kent State really accentuated that. I felt that the President's policy to end the war was the right one: gradual disengagement, Vietnamization, all of the things that Secretary Laird put into effect. But Cambodia really changed the nature of that deal.

Timothy Naftali

Please give us a word picture. You're standing on the Lincoln Memorial. It's 5:15 in the morning, thereabouts. There are what, a hundred thousand students?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

I would say at 5:15 in the morning there were probably were 100,000 students throughout the Mall, interspersed around the Mall. We had starting when he first got there, maybe, 5, 10, 15, the crowd getting larger as people would walk up the steps, because the Lincoln Memorial is a magnet for people in Washington, D.C. The sun just beginning to come up in the East, sort of a pinkish glow, it was almost surreal in a way. Here we are, just to the right of the statue, of the Lincoln statue, just right off to the right, the second inaugural carved into the wall, and it's hushed and nobody's saying anything. The President is talking to them. And I'd never seen anything like this before; it was almost hypnotic in its power in a way. And yet the tension, the fear that I could sense from the Secret Service, of that they had had their four guys looking, covering their quadrant around the President, because they weren't quite sure who was going to be coming up those stairs. I didn't know who was coming up. I could see Manolo getting increasingly agitated, Dr. Tkach worried.

Timothy Naftali

And the students would just come up as the President stood on the --

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Just stood up at the top and sort of acknowledged when they would come in, and then they would come closer to him, and it wasn't really an angry dialogue at all. It was more of a monologue.

Timothy Naftali

Did he go up to the statue?
Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

I don't recall his going to the statue. He might have gone up there before I got there and then had come back to this area at the top of the stairs where he was carrying on this conversation. But it was the most amazing thing I'd seen since I'd been in Washington to watch the President, after he has ordered an attack, had given a press conference, up there, in a totally unscripted period of time, reaching out to these young people, trying to share with them what he was feeling. And he said some things about how we could clean up the environment, we could do all of these things to take care of the material things, but it's really the matters of the spirit that are the most important. It's the spiritual things that really gives meaning to life. I happen to believe that's true myself, so I was just riveted by what he was saying, which I'd never heard said anyplace else. Of course, everyplace else mostly were talking points or pretty well structured conversations.

Timothy Naftali

Were people walking up the stairs to talk to him, or was he sort of lecturing a small group?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

It was a small group that he was talking to.

Timothy Naftali

Below him, or on the --

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

No, they were basically at the same eye-level. They would come up and join this group, and some would look in and someone would get closer and they'd look at each other and stand back a little bit, look in and say, "Yeah, that's him." And then just sort of look, and they're exhausted. These are young people who have been driving all night. And this is the man we have come to protest against and he's right there. And I'm watching this and, you know, why is he right there? All of our plans to protect the White House were assuming that he was inside, you know. Who would have thought he would have gone outside? Nobody said, "What if the President goes out at 4:30 in the morning and wanders up to the Lincoln Memorial, what are we going to do about that?" That never came to anybody's consciousness, so, I mean, this is not only unscripted, we're playing it as it lies, and I look back on that as one of the most intense periods. And one of the things that was in the back of my mind was, if something happens to him up here I'm going to be testifying for the rest of my life before investigative committees and commissions. You know, this is not good. So it was just an amazing time.

Timothy Naftali

Did somebody or did Dr. Tkach or Manolo whisper in his ear, "You've got to go now, Mr. President"?
On occasion they would come up to him and say, "You know, I know I think we have to go now, Mr. President." I mean, Manolo was quite -- he wanted to take the President -- "Yes, yes, I'll get to it." But he just kept on and kept on and kept on, and finally, he realized it's getting light now, and you can look out on the Mall and on the reflecting pool and see people all over the place, and I figured, we've got to get out of dodge; you know, it's time to go.

Timothy Naftali

Who finally got him to go?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Manolo, and Dr. Tkach. Secret Service was not about ready to take him by the arm -- I took him by the arm later that morning -- but Manolo said, "It's time to go." And we finally got him to go down the stairs, and he got in his car and went off.

Timothy Naftali

So was he at reflecting pool side or the other side -- which side of the Lincoln Memorial were you --

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

The car was right at the base of the stairs, reflecting pool was due east, so he would've been a little bit to the north, sort of --

Timothy Naftali

Facing the Potomac or facing the pool?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Oh no, facing the pool, he was not facing the Potomac. He was on the east side of the Memorial. And my car was right behind his and waiting for me, and so I got in my car, and then he got in his limousine and I thought it's over, now he's going to go back and we can protect him and he just fires up to the east and went up to Capitol Hill.

Timothy Naftali

Now tell us what happens when you get to Capitol Hill.

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Well, we get to Capitol Hill and gets out of his car -- and I believe we were almost right at the central part of going into the Capitol on the east side -- and walked in and he took a left turn. And we might have gone in through the House entrance. I don't recall exactly which entrance we went in. Secret
Service will have this record. But we went in, and we walked through to the House Chamber, and Manolo's with him at this point and Dr. Tkach. I have not -- I've been holding back. I'm observing all of this, but I'm not part of this group just yet. And we walk into the House chamber, and the President went and sat down and said, "Manolo, go up and give a speech." And I had gone up to be able to look down at this, and Manolo said, "I didn't want to do that." And he said, "No, go give a speech." So Manolo went up to the speaker's platform in the House and said a few things, I forget what he said, and then the President started to applaud. Manolo came down and then we went out of the chamber and started to walk back towards Statuary Hall, went through Statuary Hall, and he noticed a woman -- an African-American woman, an older woman -- is swabbing the floor. And he went over to say hello to her, and I'm now getting closer, so I can observe what's happening and asks her name and her name, I believe, was Carrie Moore. And she had her Bible with her, and she held it out, and the President said, "Do you read the Bible?" And she said, "I read it every day." And something happened then that moved me a great deal. And he held her hand and he said, "My mother was a saint." And Carrie Moore just nodded to him and then he said, "You be a saint, too." And she said, "I'll try, Mr. President." And I wasn't sure exactly what had gone on, but something communicated, through her, his recollection of his mom. It was, for me, a beautiful moment, and Secret Service is off to the side, they're watching us, and I'm probably eight feet away. I'm just watching this occur. And then he turned, and we started walking through Statuary Hall, and he motioned me over to be next to him. And we walked together through the rest of the Capitol, over to the Senate side. And he wanted to get into the Senate chamber, but it was locked, couldn't get in. And I think he wanted to see his office where he'd been Vice President. We did not have access to any of those places. And then the car had -- his car had, I think, had been brought around to the Senate side, because by now we had more Secret Service support.

Timothy Naftali

Were there any congressional folks around?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

No, it was very quiet, 5:45 in the morning, not a lot of people working on Capitol Hill --

Timothy Naftali

Did he explain to you what he was doing?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

No, didn't explain what he was doing, he was just walking through the Capitol, wanted to show Manolo the Capitol early in the morning. I was personally frightened a lot of that morning, I mean, just not knowing what was going to happen next. And when we got to the Senate side, we couldn't get into the chamber, and we walked to the eastern exit, and that's when I first saw Haldeman and Chapin. And I believe Ziegler had come in. Ehrlichman did not come in. I mean, it was unusual for me to look forward to seeing Bob Haldeman, but I was looking forward to seeing Bob Haldeman, and it was, "Okay, now the cavalry is here; things are going to be okay now." So I was ready to go out and get in my car and Bob said, "No, no, you're coming with us. Get into the President's car."
Timothy Naftali

Did the President look okay?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

He looked -- bags under his eyes, flushed, drawn, exhausted. But weren't we all? None of us had slept. Maybe he had slept for a couple of hours. I hadn't slept at all.

Timothy Naftali

When you were in the House chamber, did he ask Manolo to say something in particular?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

No, just go up there and give a speech.

Timothy Naftali

Where was he sitting?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

He was sitting right in the front row, in the front row. Just went up to the speaker's platform, and the President was in the front row.

Timothy Naftali

You mentioned in your book that Manolo actually did give a speech.

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Yeah, he did give a speech. I don't remember what he was saying. I'm just watching this thing -- I've never seen anything like this before. This is the most incredible sight I've ever seen, you know, what's going on here? This is not within my regular context. You know, this is like -- I'm way outside that. And I couldn't tell the President's mental state, I mean, I just heard him. It was a tour de force of explaining his thought and his feelings to the students up at the Lincoln Memorial. You know, why are we at Capitol Hill? I couldn't fathom why we were there. And then we got in the car on the Senate side, and I'm sitting in the jump seat, and the President's behind me, and Bob is off to the left, and we're headed back to the White House, or so I thought. And then the President said, "I don't want to go back. I want to go have breakfast. Let's go to the Mayflower Hotel." And so we had to skirt the White House, we went down into -- I think it was Constitution again -- and took a right turn, came back into the Mayflower from K Street and had breakfast at the Mayflower Hotel with some very astonished waitresses who were the first shift of the day. I think they opened it up at 6:00. And the President wrote about what he ate, and I have no clue what I ate, but I know what he ate because he wrote about it, and I remember his ordering corned beef hash with an egg on it. And he looked down at the table at me, and he said, "Bud, did you call Ehrlichman?" And I said, "Yes, sir, I did." And he said, "That was
too early to call anyone." And I said, "Yes, sir, it was early." I didn't want to say anything more, just, "Yes, sir, it was early." And I figured that's something that he obviously didn't like. I didn't find out until later that he'd given the Secret Service instructions not to call the staff. And it was just because I had been in the Secret Service command post that I had found out that he was at large.

Timothy Naftali

You get back into the car.

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Well, not right away.

Timothy Naftali

No?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

We go outside the restaurant, and we take a left, and we're walking down Connecticut Avenue, and he said, "I want to walk back." And I know we can't get in, because we've got buses around the whole place. And so the limousine is just going along, you know, three miles an hour on this side of the street. They'd shut down the street. And Haldeman's on the other side, and he mouths over the top of the car, "Stop him. Stop him." That's what I interpret, so I went up and took him by the elbow, and I said, "Mr. President, you can't walk back. There's no way in." And so he pulls his arm away, and I look back over at Bob, he says, "Stop him." So I basically took him more forcefully, and I said, "Mr. President, we can't walk back, there's no way we can get into the White House grounds, except through the E Street entrance, which is a car's route in. We can't walk back." And he pulls his arm away and sort of glowers at me and turns around and gets in the car. And so I got in the jump seat -- the President's behind me, Haldeman's back -- and we go down to the E Street entrance, take a left, and he sees the buses for the first time. And he turns to Haldeman, and he says, "Whose idea are all of these goddamned buses?" And Haldeman, without missing a beat said, "It was Bud's idea." So I figured I'm done; that's it. So we swing up on the way back to the White House, I got out of the car and I turn to Bob and I said, "Well, three strikes and you're out." I said, "I called Ehrlichman pretty early, I physically assaulted him, and he thinks the buses are a bad idea." I figured this has not been a good morning for me or for the President. I didn't know how it was go to play, and Bob was really reassuring. He said, "Bud, look, you did everything right, go back and write it all down before you forget it." And I did, I wrote it all down, as best I could in the state that I was in. But in a way, I saw him in probably the most psychologically exposed, raw period of his Presidency that I had observed. And I was really blown away by his ability to speak as clearly as he did about so many subjects and still be exhausted. And still -- and say things that resonated with what I believe were true and in many ways bound me to him in ways that I hadn't before, because I had never seen him in that kind of environment before. Later, I did read Haldeman's diary for that day, and he said he felt that the President was in as extreme a condition as he had seen him in his Presidency, and they needed to find some way to get him some rest after that.
Timothy Naftali

So you saw a certain vulnerability that you hadn't seen before?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Never seen before, no, and a willingness to just put it out there for these young people. And it wasn't just to show Manolo what he could do. I sensed there was a genuine effort to reach these kids, which he didn't feel he could do under the staged productions that we basically would put on in the White House. You know, bring in these people and meet the President and everybody knows what they're going to say in advance, but there's nothing spontaneous, extemporaneous or improvised. Those are pretty well canned meetings, but this was not.

Timothy Naftali

It's astounding that he wanted to walk back.

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Yeah, he wanted to walk back. And one of the buildings on the northwest end of Lafayette Park had a Vietcong flag hanging out the window, and I didn't feel it was wise for him to see that flag, which he would have seen if he had walked back. But there was no way in, you couldn't get in through Lafayette Park. We basically had cordoned off that whole section.

Timothy Naftali

How had he left? You said he hadn't seen the buses before, so how had he left the White House?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

He left in pitch black. It was dark.

Timothy Naftali

Oh, so he couldn't see.

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

You couldn't see anything. Well he was sitting in the back of the limousine, off he went. He had no idea.

Timothy Naftali

That the whole place was -- did you have buses on the other end of the south lawn?
Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Oh, we had buses all the way around. We had buses all the way around. They had all come in at that night.

Timothy Naftali

Did you ever do that again? Did you ever ring the White House with buses again?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Not that I recall that we ever needed to have that kind of 360-perimeter protection, but that was -- We'd used buses before on some intersections, that I think during the MOBE [National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam], there had been some places we felt we wanted to shut down, but this was the only time that we had basically circled the whole place.

Timothy Naftali

Did you have a conversation with Haldeman or Ehrlichman after the Lincoln Memorial walk, to talk about it?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

No, no, we had other things to work on.

Timothy Naftali

Did the President ever refer to this again?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Never, no. You have to realize that this was a time where every day is filled with stuff they were working on. It was just a --

Timothy Naftali

How did you blow off steam?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Running, I was a runner. I started running in '71 -- well actually, I did some in '70 -- I had gained a lot of weight in the first few months and then I started running on the ellipse, and then I'd run down to the Lincoln Memorial and then -- I had a pretty standard four to five mile lunch run, and it saved my life. I mean, it was -- I had to have something to be able to basically keep stable.
These must have been terribly tense times.

Oh, they were. It was just -- I was closer to it than anybody on the staff, because my job was to be liaison with the police department, the Justice Department, the Marshals office, the GSA officers, obviously, the technical division of the Secret Service, so I could see it up close. Now, you know, things could have happened that had been very dangerous. Other people on the staff felt we were under siege. When they saw the buses it was like, "Have we come to this in America, where we now have to circle the White House with these buses to protect the President?" And I think that, for me, it was the least expensive and least risky way to provide that security. Others might have seen it as more of a, you know, we're in a revolutionary state. I didn't believe that, but I did believe we were under threat from people who might do something really dangerous if we hadn't done that.

Was there much concern about the Weathermen Underground?

There's always concern about it. We didn't know who would be planting explosives. They'd blown up different places around the country. It was, yeah, that was an abiding concern. I felt that with the Secret Service, we had a pretty good chance of being able to keep bombs from being detonated near the White House, but it was -- nothing was fool-proof. And my practice was to be out there among them. Basically when demonstrations occurred, I would go out, come back in, go out, because there's an emotional content to a demonstration that you've got to feel so that you know how to respond to it. When the moratorium came through, I felt it was going to be peaceful, and I knew people carrying candles going by the White House. We would even provide walkie-talkies to some of the organizers so they could communicate with each other. And I worked that deal with one of the organizer and the deal was we'll give you walkie-talkies, but we're putting the crystals in them, and we're going to be able to tune in. And from their point of view that's okay, because they needed to be able to control their own people. Every demonstration had its own dynamic. I wasn't involved in the one in 1971. John Dean did that, and I was in Hawaii at the time, and I had long since passed off that responsibility. I came back into it -- I think I told you about it about the Bureau of Indian Affairs crisis before -- so I just came in for a five-day period on that one.

I'm trying to remember what -- you helped Len Garment out on that one, right?

It was a little more than that. I was at home on Friday, before the election of 1972, and John Dean was counsel for the President. He's responsible for the security of the White House. And this was at a time when the campaign was over; we could not lose. I mean, we basically were ahead in 49 states, and
I don't think anybody wanted to win Massachusetts. So here we were at the end of a term, things were looking very good, and I got a call from Walter Washington, who was the mayor. And he was down at the Bureau of Indian Affairs with Dean Francis from the National Cathedral. And he said, "Bud, I'm looking at this, and this is looking very, very dangerous to me." And he said there are some people who want to go in and take this group of Indians, who are part of the Caravan of Broken Treaties that had come in a few days before, and pulled them out of this building. And my sense was this could lead to a real conflict. A lot of people could get hurt. And I said, "Well, how are you going to handle it?" And he said, "No, I was going to ask you that. What do you think I should do?" And I said, "I can't tell you, Walter. I don't work in that field anymore." And he said, "Well, I would like your advice on this because you're my friend, and I've got the police here, and we're prepared to support an action to pull these people out of this building. But my sense of it is, from what I've heard from someone who'd been inside that this could lead to a violent confrontation." And I said, "Well, if I were in your position, I'd send my police home." And he said, "Well, I just want to get your personal advice." "But I'm not telling you what to do, Walter, I'm just -- you've asked me for my personal advice." Now Walter and I were very close friends. We were social friends; we were professional friends. I trusted him; he trusted me. I hadn't been working on District issues for some time, or protests. I got a call not too much later from John Dean, he said, "What did you tell the mayor?" And I said, "I just gave him my advice."

And he said, "Well, all of the police are gone." And he said he was not pleased with that, and he said, "I think this is your crisis to solve." So I now had several hundred police and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and I begin a four-day, very little sleep, how do we solve this problem? And I went over to the Justice Department, where they had some meetings going on, the same crisis group, Kleindienst is presiding, they talk about things like vertical envelopment to the building, which is a Vietnam term, which we're going to land choppers on the roof, and we're going to gas them out, which is one of the things they're talking about. And I'm just listening to this like, "What kind of craziness is this?" And we worked through the weekend, and they are in the building. They want to be martyred. I'm learning about it because we had a very courageous young woman of the White House staff by the name of Bobbie Kilberg, who was able to get into the building with the wife of Senator Fred Harris, LaDonna Harris, who was a Native American. And Bobbie reported back to me and to Len Garment and Brad Patterson and to Dirk Nordell [phonetic sp] and Walt Minnick, who I've now brought into my office as a crisis group in the White House, and I've said, "They want to be martyred, and they welcome an attack." And Kleindienst, in our meetings that we'd had with him, decided that, "They are in a state of trespass, and they are damaging Federal property, and I'm going to get a court order that they should 'cease and desist from their state of trespass.'" And I forget exactly the sequencing, but those -- one order came out, I think, over the weekend, and it ordered the Indians to vacate the building by 5:00 on Monday afternoon, the day before the election. And so Bobbie went back over to the building on Monday morning. I basically moved down to the White House and was sleeping on my sofa. It's just the way things are. And she reported back in on Monday that they had put on war paint, they had made weapons, and they were ready for an attack from the government. And I went over to another meeting at the Justice Department, I believe early, late morning on Monday, and the attorney general had decided that they were going to move in and pull these Indians out. They were going to use gas. They had enough firepower, enough people to be able to do it. And I came back to the White House with Walt Minnick, who, by the way, wrote this story up in the letter to my judge, Gerhard Gesell, who
sentenced me to prison the next year. And as we came back to the White House, I just said, "We cannot let this happen."

And we got back to my office, and Bobbie again had gone in the afternoon and reported back at camp, she said, "Bud, it's a tinderbox; it's ready to blow up. This will be a terrible thing to the President's policies with the Indian Nation," which the President loved. I mean, he had the most progressive policies, I think, Native American policy, we had. And I saw all of that going down the tubes, all of it, it's gone. And so we sat around my desk, and Bobbie -- talk about just physical and moral courage, she's the hero in the piece -- kept informing us of what was going on. And finally, around 4:00 in the afternoon, the government was going to move. They had the order. We were completely within our rights as a law and order administration to go pull them out. I called Ehrlichman in San Clemente, and I said, "I'm going to paint a picture for you, John. You're going to fly back tomorrow, and you're going to be at a great victory. But you're going to look out the left window, and you're going to see an orange glow on the horizon. And as you land, as you're coming into Andrew's, that will be the Bureau of Indian Affairs on fire. And my best estimate to you is that the headlines are going to read, 'So many Indians slain,' 'So many policeman killed,' and the third one down will be, 'Nixon wins in a landslide.' That's my best estimate of what will happen if we attack in an hour." And Ehrlichman's like -- I remember his lines -- "I take your point. I'll get right back to you." And he calls me back within ten minutes, real quickly and he said, "The President agrees with you, shut it down, no violence." Pick up the phone, call Kleindienst and I said, "I want everybody with a gun away from the building, we're not going to attack. And we're not going to move them out. We're going to have to go back to the court. I need more time." And he screams at me on the phone, and he just yelled, "Did you go behind my back?" And I said, "No, sir, I went right in front of you. And if you want to call out there, that's fine. But I'm telling you, the President wants this solved with no violence, and I want every marshal, anybody with a gun, away from the building."

Timothy Naftali

Had he called the White House already?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

He'd already talked to Ehrlichman before and gotten approval to go for it, and I went right in front of him.

Timothy Naftali

And they were going to storm the building?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

They were going to go in the building, as necessary, with gas and start physically pulling out -- there are hundreds of people in the building. They had made Molotov cocktails; the children were next to the Molotov cocktails, in the room, in the building. It was a tinderbox; it was ready to go. They wanted the building to blow, to burn. And so are we going to precipitate that? And so then something happened. Bobbie went back to the building, and I said, "You've got to go tell them we're got going to attack you, and we'd like to talk to you some more." And so she did. And she said she went in, and she
told them, "We're not coming in, but we want to talk with you some more about what your grievances are." And they had a list of them. And that's when the magic of Leonard Garment and others really came to the fore, because we were able to arrange for a meeting in the White House that Len Garment participated in. Now there are people that are working this in the Bureau of Indian Affairs, a lot of other people. I'm not part of that. Bobbie is my link to what's happening. My job is the liaison with the law enforcement community, what are we going to physically do about this? And I didn't want them around anymore, so we had a meeting in the White House that evening, which began with a prayer with the Indians. They didn't send over Russell Means or Dennis Banks, who were two of the leaders of the Caravan of Broken Treaties. These were some others. And so that went quite well, but they also wanted to negotiate that they would not be prosecuted if they left the building, they would not be held accountable for any costs, and I said, "Well, what's the deal with these people over there, Bobbie?" And she says, "They don't have any money." Now I know how to solve this, and I called Frank Carlucci. He was either Deputy Director of OMB or whatever. I said, "Frank, how much cash to you have around?"

And he said, "This is the Federal Government; we don't deal in cash; we deal in..." -- I said, "You don't, but you've got grantees out there that you've given money to, who have cash in bank accounts -- how much can you get?" He called me back not too much later and he said, "I can get $66,650." I said, "Bring it over." He brought cash over in a strongbox, and we bought them out. Went over and set up there, and "Where are you going?" Gave them a certain amount of money to buy gas, buy bus tickets and the rest, and they were all out of the building by Wednesday. And they were gone. Now, a huge amount of damage was done to the building, over a million dollars of damage. And they took files. They stole files, sensitive files that could not be replaced, took them off with them. And on Thursday, Ehrlichman called me up and he said, "I've just been called by Rogers Morton, Secretary of the Interior, and he has ordered me to order you to go over to the Bureau of Indian Affairs so you can see what you have wrought." So I took a staff person and went over and we walked through the building, and I'll tell you Tim, it was in shambles. It smelled bad. They hadn't used all the restrooms. They hadn't had enough food, type writers, keys punched out of the typewriters, walls torn apart, a lot of damage. And I just remember going through it and saying, "You know what I don't see here? I don't see any bodies." And we can fix this building. Congressional committee was started within about two weeks afterwards. They asked me to testify. Fred Fielding, a deputy counsel to the President, invoked executive privilege so I did not have to go up and testify, but Carlucci did. And fast-forward now to 2004, the reunion of all of the people that used to work together on the White House staff, were in the State Department, Frank Carlucci is there, and I went up and said, "How much money?" He said, "$66,650." It's 2004, that's a long time away from 1972, but that shows you that that had a major effect on us. That's the story, so I did help Len Garment solve that.

Timothy Naftali

Yes, you did. That's a lot cheaper than losing lives.

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Loosing lives, to me, would have been catastrophic. It would have been the worst possible thing at that time.
Timothy Naftali

What was Kleindienst thinking?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Kleindienst was acting attorney general. He wanted to show that he was a law and order guy. He was within his legal rights to do what he did, but this was not a legal issue. It was and it wasn't. It was a political issue. It was a policy issue. It was a humanitarian issue. It was an ethical issue. It was a spiritual issue. It was all those things. And he wouldn't speak to me for two months, until the Shoreham Hotel ball, after the inaugural, in 1973. And we were there together in our tuxes and all the rest, and he spots me across the room and he just bee-lined over to me and I figured "Oh, now we're going to have it out, finally." And he got up within about three inches of my face and he said, "You were right." And he pushed me back and walked away. And then things were fine between us after that.

Timothy Naftali

And Bobbie Kilberg, the Native Americans let her go in and out?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Yeah, yeah, and when you read her account of what she saw in that building, I don't know how she had the courage to do it, because she was frightened that she was going to get killed or that they were going to keep her as a hostage or, I mean, some dreadful thing.

Timothy Naftali

How was it that she was there? We'll ask her her story, but what do you remember of how she got to be in that position?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

Because we asked her to go over and find out, because nobody else could do it. They wouldn't let anybody else get in. And she knew the Indian Nation issues better than anyone. Brad Patterson, Len Garment, Bobbie Kilberg, they were the heroes of this piece. I had my piece of it, but the fact that she would go into that building at that time and go back again, it just -- I mean, I was just awestruck by what she was able to do. And that saved the day. Without accurate information, if we hadn't known how ready they were to die, or to be martyred, we would have made the wrong call, so you could see that that intelligence was fundamental to our being able to move.

Timothy Naftali

You were -- you had access to our best domestic intelligence in that era, you had to as the crisis manager. You, of course, know, unfortunately, what happened three decades later. Was there good coordination of information on domestic matters, domestic terrorism matters in that era?
Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

I think it was adequate; it was fair. But I had good links with the FBI, with people that were sort of serving in the White House that were FBI people. I had good access to people in the Justice Department. I was not viewed by the attorney general as an outsider, when I would go. I mean, I think John Mitchell and I had a very good working relationship and with his staff people, Don Santerelli, and I had a good relationship with Kleindienst. But Kleindienst's job was not my job. My job was, how do I preserve and protect the President's interest in this? I'm looking at this through his lens. Kleindienst is looking at it through the lens of the attorney general, who wants to enforce the law, which is fine, but it's not an adequate lens. It's not broad enough to see all the different ramifications. That's my job. And I was fortunate, because the President, at that point, trusted me and was willing to go with the recommendation that I would make. And that was built from the counter inaugural, when I did the memorandum to Ehrlichman explaining how we had protected the President's motorcade back in 1969, January 20th. And the President read that memo, knew it came from me, and I think -- because he read just about everything that was sent to him. I mean, memos you'd send to Ehrlichman, if they were on subjects the President was interested in, he'd get them, and he'd write notes on them. Sometimes you'd see them; sometimes I wouldn't. I didn't see what he wrote on that one until much later that he said, "On balance, they did a good job", you know, on being able to keep that from --

Timothy Naftali

Did Ehrlichman ever say to you why he had given the go-ahead initially to storm the building?

Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr.

No, he never did, but I think he viewed this as being taken care of by the attorney general. It's in the hands of the Justice Department; they know what they're doing. When the Waco incident happened, I felt guilty that I hadn't written the article about how we solved the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Because when the government launches an attack, which they did at Waco, and you're launching it against a group that is temporarily insane, you can't control the outcome. It just spins out of control. And that happened within weeks after Clinton had been, I think, confirmed. Or Janet Reno had just come on board, and apparently Web Hubbell was the guy that made the decision or was part of the decision when they attacked that building. That's another story. But you see when we were dealing with this, we had four years of experience of how to deal with demonstrations and protests and, again, the theory is you use the minimum amount of force to be able to achieve an outcome, but you back it up with sufficient power if you need it. So the way you solve the BIA is you don't go in with your troopers. Let's go in with money. Let's find some other way to do it.

Timothy Naftali

Now, the Indians, of course, don't fit the definition of a terrorist group, nor do the demonstrators, but was there some concern that there were people who were professional, committed professionally to violence?
Yes, I think the Weathermen was a group that we did know -- I was getting intelligence about that. I think my files still have some of that information. And we knew that there was, I think it was at University of Wisconsin, that they'd blown up a research lab, and a guy's -- all of his research went up in smoke. And that there were these isolated incidents around the country, and it's an abiding concern. But in Washington, I don't think we, at least that I recall, had direct intelligence about any kind of terrorist plot or any group that was going to blow up stuff. Now, my memory is a little hazy on that, there may have been stuff there, but my staff and I, the way we thought this through was: The people are coming here to demonstrate. They're entitled to do it under the first amendment; it's a constitutional right. Our job is to enable them to do it in such a way that they don't get hurt, we don't get hurt, and they don't destroy property. What can we do to accomplish that end? And I felt that what we had to do was have linkages with them. We had to be able to talk to them and explain what our interests were. And whenever we were able to do that, we were able to help them conduct their demonstration in a way that I think served their political ends -- that's why they're there -- but in a way that was not going to be dangerous or disastrous for the government or for us.

You said you were not involved in handling the Vietnam Veterans Against the War demonstration.

No, that's 197 --

1971, and that was John Dean?

Yeah, I just had zero involvement in that. I was doing other stuff.

You've been great, sitting for a second interview. Is there any other anecdotes you'd like to preserve?

Well, let's see, a lot of them are in my book.

I know, it's a great book. It's wonderful.
Egil "Bud" Krogh, Jr.

I tried to -- the BIA story's not in the book.

Timothy Naftali

Nope, the BIA story's not, and I'm glad we now have Carlucci's story and Garment's and yours, and we'll have to talk to Bobbie Kilberg, too.

Egil "Bud" Krogh, Jr.

Yeah, you have to talk to Bobbie. Bobbie is one of my heroines in all the world. I mean, when you read her story, and ask her to refresh her recollection, because I sent her her notes that she did for me. I have a huge file on the Bureau of Indian Affairs because my middle son wants to write a play, a screenplay about this, because there's no way, Sunday night that this was not going to devolve into violence, and it didn't. Why is that? Why did it not happen? And I deeply believe, the Indians, some of them, were praying deeply -- they did not want to injure themselves or others. There were some of them that did, and later on, at Wounded Knee, there was the altercation where people got killed. But it didn't happen on our watch in D.C.

Timothy Naftali

So we've covered a lot today. And yes, if this were a book chat program, I would now take your book and wave it. But thank you, it's been wonderful.

Egil "Bud" Krogh, Jr.

Yeah, it's always fun.