Timothy Naftali

Hello, my name is Tim Naftali. I'm the incoming Director of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. I'm here today with the Professor David Greenberg of Rutgers, and we're interviewing Herbert G. Klein for the Richard Nixon Presidential Oral History Program. It's February 20, 2007, and we're in San Diego. Thank you, Mr. Klein, for joining us today.

Herbert G. Klein

And the sun is out.

Timothy Naftali

And the sun is -- well it's Southern California; it's usually out. Thank you, and thank you, David.

David Greenberg

Thank you.

Timothy Naftali

Herb, let's start with the very first question here, which is, you met Nixon when you were a journalist?

Herbert G. Klein

That's correct, yes.

Timothy Naftali

Tell us about the first time you met Richard Nixon.

Herbert G. Klein

I met him in 1946 when [unintelligible] were just out of the Navy, and I was a young combination reporter/editor, as you do in the small paper I was working for, "Alhambra Post-Advocate," which was in the district where Nixon was running for Congress. I learned his name first because I was -- among other things I was covering politics, which I was [unintelligible] and whatever else you do at a small paper. And a group of people decided they really needed to have a committee of 100 and that they would use this committee to screen candidates, and that's when the case from the summoned Richard Nixon from Washington to come out and be interviewed. I didn't meet him until after he'd been selected and he was the candidate of that group of 100. By then, they sent him to the different newspapers, and that's when I first met him.
Timothy Naftali

He's clearly -- he's a rookie in the political field. I mean, of course, he's a great debater. What was he like as a candidate?

Herbert G. Klein

Well, he was very interested in being well-acquainted with the press. He would drive by to see us quite a bit. And in those days, why, part of his problem was to be looking older, because he was a young man and I was a young man. In fact, one time I remember when one of his supporters said he had to wear a hat more to make him look older and the same way they did with Pat Hillings later when he succeeded Richard Nixon. I was impressed by him as an individual. I had very little interest in politics at that time. My political background had been that I ran the campaign for an Alhambra man who won the U.S. Junior Chamber presidency; that was about it. So, but I became interested in him, as I listened to him speak, and I listened to him debate, so I became casual friends, not close friends at all.

David Greenberg

Now, Voorhis was a five-term incumbent, I think, and what was it that you think that made the difference for -- there must have been a lot of voters who were voting for Jerry Voorhis in years past who decided to vote against Voorhis for Nixon. Do you --

Herbert G. Klein

Well, I think a lot of this has been misinterpreted -- they say that was because of communism and this kind of thing, which wasn't the case. Voorhis had not paid attention to this district. He was becoming a nationally famous congressman who took pride in what he was doing in Washington, not in [unintelligible] Valley, and so he was damaged, I think, when Nixon made it a local, personal campaign in that fashion. When they had the debates in which they had three or four, I don't remember the exact number, the issues were not communism except to a very slight degree. The issues were more like post-war things: jobs, housing, roads, the things that you have come up with all of those returning from the service going into a new life.

David Greenberg

Did you attend some of those debates?

Herbert G. Klein

I attended all of them.

David Greenberg

You did, and what memories are vivid for you?
Well, my memory was that I thought Voorhis did not perform very well, and I was impressed at how Nixon did perform. I obviously didn't know how good his ability as a debater or anything of this kind, but it was the first time I heard him debate, and I was very much impressed, and I voted for him.

Timothy Naftali

Who are the people around him in the campaign?

Herbert G. Klein

Well, there was one man whose name was Harrison McCaw [phonetic sp]. I believe we called him the silver fox. He was from South Pasadena. There was Frank Jorgensen, who later was active in the state campaigns. Those are the two I remember right off hand.

Timothy Naftali

Nixon wasn't a managed candidate?

Herbert G. Klein

No, he wrote his own campaign with Pat, and at the time Pat Nixon was pregnant, I believe with Tricia, and so she was trying to go out and campaign in the car and things like that. And I decided that I liked him enough that I got the Junior Chamber to come out and turn out for some of his campaign, and we went to his last campaign -- or his last stand, which was in Whittier, and we all dressed up as Indians to come out and beat horns and beat two things to get attention. And Pat Nixon kidded me about that for years afterwards.

Timothy Naftali

Did she give any speeches for her husband?

Herbert G. Klein

She never gave a speech. The only time that I can remember that Pat Nixon almost made a speech was later in 1956, I believe it was, when Richard Nixon had developed laryngitis. And we were in route from Phoenix to Salt Lake, and we were going to be in Oklahoma City the next day, and so when he lost his voice, I spent about an hour trying to talk her into making the speech, and she finally agreed she would make the speech in Oklahoma City. And so he got up to say "hello" and wave to the crowd, and he just kept talking. So that ended Pat Nixon's only attempt to make a speech.

Timothy Naftali

So your sense was that local issues were much more important than --?
Herbert G. Klein

They were, and I think it's been a mistake people have looked at in trying to look at that campaign. It was local issues and lack of attention to the district.

Timothy Naftali

Nixon then goes to Washington. You, of course, stay in Southern California. You interact with him again the next campaign?

Herbert G. Klein

Well, he would come out during the time he was in Washington, and he would hold breakfast meetings with the editors or publishers of the [unintelligible] papers, and he would also call on us. And I became more deeply interested because he would come by and we'd go out and have a cup of coffee, and he would talk to me first about the Hiss matter, and then he went with the Herter Committee, and he would come back and tell me about what he'd seen and what he learned there, and recalled Turkey aid when he went to Greece. I remember one of the things he was talking to me about was when we went to Greece and it was the episode with Tito on the other side, and that he decided the embassy parties were fine, but he would rather be out in the countryside. So he spent most of his time, he told me, going around talking to people in Athens and their surrounding area to learn more about the Greeks and what their stands were. And I think that the Herter Committee and the Greco-Turkey aid trip with Herter really made him into an internationalist; he became a real great expert of the century.

David Greenberg

He's been given credit, I think, along with Eisenhower, for moving the Republican Party toward this international institution away from isolationist, if that's a fair term, maybe it's not, to where the party had been. What was your sense of the constituents and the district in the late '40s? Were they -- did Nixon and others need to sort of lead people and say, "Look, this is a new world," and he kind of had to be a leader and educating the district, or did you think that everybody was kind of leaving the old philosophy?

Herbert G. Klein

No, I think it was a conservative district, despite the fact that they'd been electing Voorhis, at least it was semi-conservative. But at any rate, I don't think people were internationalists at all. I think they were tired of the war, and there was a danger we'd go back to some isolation. He became interested because of what he learned. I give a lot of credit to Herter because Herter gave him a very key role in that committee and all of the things that they worked together on, and Herter appointed him to that committee. And basically when you look at the Marshall Plan or Truman's courageous move in going ahead with those plans, Herter and Nixon played a major role in getting support for that.

Timothy Naftali

Did Nixon ever explain to you how he grew so close to Herter or how Herter took an interest in him?
I don't recall that, no.

Let's talk a bit about the Hiss case. Do you remember any conversations with Nixon about the Hiss case?

I remember he was very worried about the press in Washington, and he had a couple of favorites, I can't remember the man from the "New York Daily News" --

Burt Andrews?

Burt Andrews, yes, who he really had a lot of respect for, tremendous respect, and a man from the "Chicago Tribune," I can't think of his name right now, but I can later. But at any rate, he was worried about what was happening to him, to the extent that one time we had a conversation where he thought that he'd been damaged to a degree that maybe he should leave the Congress. And I remember we talked about this over coffee, and I was thinking maybe I should ask him to appoint me to postmaster. I was a young reporter and it was more money. But I did not ask him, and he did not leave Congress, of course. But he had talked to me in some detail about his concern about the Pumpkin Papers and things like that.

So you felt that that was the very difficult part of, almost at the beginning of the Hiss case, to testify [unintelligible].

Well, Hiss was a great favorite of the press. And he felt that he was being mistreated by the press, and so it became very critical point because that's probably how he gained attention, which brought Eisenhower's attention.

Well, it's interesting because you said he had a good relationship with the press in Southern California.

Yes, in his home area, also the "LA Times."
Timothy Naftali

So it would be fair to say it's not really the press, but it's the Washington press that he feels alienated from?

Herbert G. Klein

Correct, absolutely. He was talking to me about the Washington press and the White House press corps and those who covered the Congress.

Timothy Naftali

And did he explain that the reason he was having these difficulties was that they liked Hiss or they disliked him?

Herbert G. Klein

Well, as I recall, it was that they found it hard to disbelieve Hiss; therefore, they disliked him and didn't trust him.

Timothy Naftali

Did he ever talk about Whittaker Chambers?

Herbert G. Klein

Not a lot, but he talked about that he felt that he was someone who was being honest with him and that he could rely on what he said and what he found in the Pumpkin Papers.

Timothy Naftali

Did he feel that he was getting support from his fellow Republicans?

Herbert G. Klein

I don't remember that.

David Greenberg

Were there aspects of the story that he felt weren't well understood by the public or the press or things that didn't really come to light?

Herbert G. Klein

Well, he thought that he had been treated as someone who was -- it was the McCarthy era, too -- as someone who was trying to expose something, and people found it hard to believe that one of their favorite people, Alger Hiss, could do such things so he thought that he was battling a popular figure and he was an unknown.
David Greenberg

I've seen some of the posters from campaigning he did, not just on his own behalf, but I guess for other candidates in '48 and he went around the country, having already pumped some national attention to this case and really, kind of movie posters. Richard Nixon, you know, fighting communism, talking about the Hiss case in the fall of '48. And do you have any recollection of, you know, him as a campaigner on behalf of the party and --

Herbert G. Klein

I never heard him do that; I only heard him campaign in his own district at that time, but he was a very good campaigner, he believed in -- [break in audio]

Timothy Naftali

So you were talking about -- you mentioned that Pat was a very good campaigner?

Herbert G. Klein

Yes, Pat was wonderful in all of the times of the campaigns because she knew how to relate to people individually. If you stopped at an airport she would be out there shaking hands with people, that kind. In this case, even though she was pregnant, she went out with him. She didn't go door to door, but she went to the meetings.

Timothy Naftali

When people talk about Richard Nixon they often say that there was tension because he was more of an introvert. And so campaigning required that he be more, be somewhat extroverted. Did you see him in this early period having a tough time shifting from being sort of introverted figure?

Herbert G. Klein

I didn't consider him an introvert at all. I guess because he always had a very good ability to relate to you one by one. And my friendship developed because we'd have a lot of times together just one on one, and it was at ease, and we would just sit there and have coffee and things like that, as I said. [phone rings]

Herbert G. Klein

As I said.

Timothy Naftali

Let's talk about -- do you want to ask something about '48?
David Greenberg

Well, I was going to ask about your going to work for him.

Timothy Naftali

Go ahead, go ahead.

Herbert G. Klein

'48, '48 -- who's the guy who ran against him? He was from Pomona.

David Greenberg

A guy named Stephen Zetterberg?

Herbert G. Klein

Zetterberg, yes, Steve Zetterberg. And Zetterberg, I thought, ran a very bad campaign and fell right into Nixon's trap of trying to attack him in his own district in the wrong way, so that I think Nixon won in the primary in that case.

David Greenberg

I think that's right. He won the Democratic primary as well.

Herbert G. Klein

Yes, both.

David Greenberg

Cross-filing?

Herbert G. Klein

Cross-filing and Zetterberg ran a bad campaign. And Nixon ran a good campaign. It probably was because Nixon, after being elected, stayed in close touch with his district. He was a congressman who knew how to service his office, but he had Bill Arnold to help him out on that.

David Greenberg

Now let me ask a question about your role as a journalist, and, you know, journalism as a profession has changed a lot in the last 50-some years. Was it uncommon for reporters, editors at local papers to - - I don't know if this is a fair way of putting it, start to develop loyalties to politicians of one party or another? I mean, would it be seen as, "Oh, this guy is not being objective because he seems to be a Nixon man"?
Herbert G. Klein

Maybe that was taking place at the "LA Times" or somewhere, although they were very, definitely very pro-Nixon.

David Greenberg

Right.

Herbert G. Klein

-- from Norman Chandler on down. But in a smaller paper that kind of question never came up. They were very happy that I had a contact.

David Greenberg

Right, right. So what was it then that led you to go to work for Nixon?

Herbert G. Klein

I went to work for him in 1952, because, in the first place, I did not go to the '52 convention. It was a small paper and they couldn't afford it. And so I was really surprised when he was nominated for Vice President. I was at home, and I had built a new house in Pasadena, and I was out cutting the lawn with the radio on loud. And so when I heard that, I was surprised, but I thought I was pleased for him, but I didn't expect any more. Then a few days later I received a call from [James] Jim Bassett and said that they would like me to come to work and run the press in California.

David Greenberg

Bassett was running Eisenhower's press?

Herbert G. Klein

Bassett was running Nixon's -- his press secretary. He was from the "LA Times." So he left his job as - - no, I think he was city editor at that time. He left the "Times" temporarily, as I did later, to work on the campaign. I guess that would be part of your answer to your question, too.

David Greenberg

Right, right.

Herbert G. Klein

But, so I said, "Well, you know, I'm not sure. You're going to have to call Jim Copley," who owned the papers and who had just taken over because his father died. So Nixon called Jim Copley and got permission to ask me to take a leave of absence and go to work on the campaign.
David Greenberg

So, this was in the summer of right after the convention.

Herbert G. Klein

Yes, my office was in Los Angeles at that time.

David Greenberg

Okay, and so you were then on board for the general election campaign, through the fund crisis, and after the election you went back to the paper?

Herbert G. Klein

To the paper, yeah, and then shortly thereafter -- by that time I was moved and transferred here. So I was living in San Diego by that time.

Timothy Naftali

Let's talk about the fund crisis and what you remember of Richard Nixon's reaction to the crisis. And tell us a bit about the origins. As you were watching the storm, when did you first hear about it?

Herbert G. Klein

What happened was that he decided he was going to make a train trip of the West Coast, so we all -- it was up to us at the California committee to put together the rally in Pomona, where he got aboard the train. And I rode the train out to the San Fernando Valley or something like that, and they went on. And I first heard there was a problem from Jim Bassett, who called me from the train. And when they would pull up to a station that would have phone lines put in right away so they could jump off the train and phone, and the reporters would phone their stories in that way. So I heard about that, and then I heard that they were trying to decide, and suddenly he decided he was going to fly back to California and make the speech. And what I remember about the speech was that he decided he only wanted to be in the studio with Pat Nixon, no one else in the studio, no one in the audience, so he could feel like he was directly talking to people in their living room. And the person who worked on it most with him was Bill Rogers, who was an attorney general under Eisenhower. And so the two of them were the front, primary persons, and Jim Bassett had something to do with the content, but it was mainly Nixon and Rogers. And so they went over and I was in charge of the press at the Ambassador Hotel, where everybody had come together for what was going to happen because he was staying at that hotel. When he returned, no one really knew what the reaction was. And they were to go out and get a plane and go to, I believe it was Idaho, and so we were up in Nixon's suite, Rose Mary Woods, myself, and Jim Bassett and all of the sudden the phone rang, and it was a guy calling from Miami. He said, "I can't get through to Western Union, but I just wanted to tell you I really thought that was a great speech." So that was the first word that we had that the speech had gone over. And then pretty soon we checked and found that Western Union was swamped, and it was probably the most powerful speech ever given in politics because of the reaction to it by the hundreds and the thousands.
And a record TV audience, I mean no audience ever had watched a television speech.

No, but I think even now it probably has more reaction with the magnification of the television itself. The other thing that happened was that they were disappointed because they didn't hear immediately from Eisenhower. We're all in the suite, we're talking about what's happening with them, and we heard from them. And finally -- Murray Chotiner was there, too, and Murray said, "To hell with them. Let's run and get on the airplane." So Murray convinced Nixon to take the operational that he'd done well, he knew he'd done well, and he was not going to chase after Eisenhower's party. And my understanding was there was a debate on the Eisenhower train as to what they should do, with Dewey involved in that part. And so, as I recall, they got on the airplane without ever talking to the Eisenhower people at that time. And when he arrived, of course, Eisenhower said, "That's my boy."

Did Nixon have any allies close to Eisenhower that would give him a sense the old man was changing his mind about the crisis?

Well, Leonard Hall was probably his closest ally, but we didn't hear from any of them. There was a lot of pressure on that train, the debate between the key people in his kitchen cabinet as to what they ought do with this young upstart, the cause of all his trouble, and I think the debate was whether he should force him off the ticket, and obviously when the telegrams came in there was no way they could.

And the telegrams were completely spontaneous?

Absolutely, no effort was made to try to generate them except what he said in his speech, and they'll let us hear.

Did you happen to talk to Pat that night? Was she in the --

She was in the suite with us, yes.
How did she feel about it?

Timothy Naftali

She was angry that they were near. They were all angry. They were disappointed that they didn't get an immediate reaction.

Herbert G. Klein

You say in your book that this experience had a long-term personal consequences for both Pat and Richard Nixon.

Herbert G. Klein

I'm not sure I meant by personal consequences. But I think what it made them determine that -- two things: One is he learned something about television for sure that night, and the other was that they were strong on their own and that they didn't have to just bow to everything they said on the Eisenhower train. And there were times when there was a difference between the messages sent from the Eisenhower train to the Nixon train or airplane, wherever he was. And you know, so they wanted to make this speech, and so he became more independent that night.

David Greenberg

There was also a gap in the reaction between the public, which for the most part was overwhelmingly positive and thinks it's a great speech, and then, you know, a certain group, you might call them the pundits, sort of columnists and so on --

Herbert G. Klein

It became, of course, the "Checkers Speech."

David Greenberg

Right, exactly, who are quite critical from the start, and looking at this, I was just struck by how out of step the people who called it the "Checkers Speech," and who thought it was all hokey and he is just trying to distract us with this cocker spaniel and the cloth coat and so on, and the general public reaction. Did you get a sense that with Nixon and with people around him yourself or others that there was a kind of resentment towards those who were going to play it one way, that wasn't taking stock of what the public was saying?

Herbert G. Klein

Some of the reporters -- there was a poll on the Eisenhower train which showed that there were only 12 reporters were for Eisenhower, or some number like that, a low number. And the reason I knew about that was because my Copley press had Bob Richards, who was our bureau chief on that train,
and Bob was very close to the Eisenhower kitchen cabinet, and so they knew that reporters were going to be against them no matter what, and they were.

Timothy Naftali

Twelve were for Nixon.

Herbert G. Klein

No, for Eisenhower.

Timothy Naftali

For Eisenhower?

David Greenberg

For the ticket.

Timothy Naftali

For the ticket.

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, for the ticket.

David Greenberg

I think Pat at the convention felt that the press had been for Eisenhower, and not for Pat, too.

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, I think they were, yes.

Timothy Naftali

So they survived that night. What effect -- could you talk to us a little bit about Richard Nixon's relationship with Eisenhower? What did this do for the relationship with Eisenhower?

Herbert G. Klein

There was a meeting that they had on an airplane in West Virginia, I think it was, where Eisenhower met him. First there was a debate as to where they would meet, and under what circumstances. This is the kind of game that Chotiner used to like to play a lot. He loved something like that; he could move the chess cards and be the tough guy. So there was that kind of a debate going on back and forth. But once Eisenhower and Nixon met on the airplane, it was my impression that Nixon was pleased to have
the guy he admired a great deal. He thought it was genuine support and that if he had a problem, it was with some of the kitchen cabinet of Eisenhower's.

David Greenberg

Does your sense of thinking about the next eight years -- do you feel that that's how he continued to think about Eisenhower?

Herbert G. Klein

Well, I've read the things that talk about them. He said, "Give me so many minutes and I'll think about it" and things like that. Those are just some of those things you say in a locker room or something that you step out, and [unintelligible] apologized to me a number of times because it all happened. But I think he admired Eisenhower a lot. One of the things that he wanted Eisenhower to do was to allow him to work in the field of civil rights. And that allowed him to head this committee, which opened restaurants and major stores to -- then we called them Negroes. In fact, I just saw a clip the other day, an old clip, that Johnson and I are arguing over Negroes, and that was a very polite word. But at any rate, he felt strongly about the African-American issue, that we should have more, better civil rights for them and so he was anxious to get in that role early on in his job as Vice President.

Timothy Naftali

There weren't many African-Americans in his district.

Herbert G. Klein

No.

Timothy Naftali

Where did that come from? Why did he choose that as his --

Herbert G. Klein

I think from his Quaker background. Because I think that you learn a lot in Quakerism, I believe, that leads you in that direction. It was not a matter of getting votes in his district at all. And I don't think when he was Vice President that he thought that he was doing it for political gain. I think he thought it was right, and he always felt that way. We broke -- over the years, we broke a number of -- I remember one time we were in Springfield, Missouri, and the hotel was not going to allow blacks in so we moved the hotel where the press was, and we had some black reporters. Another funny thing happened on that was, this is fruition, but we had an advance man who decided he wanted to show he could do things cheaper so he bought some slightly used confetti, and when we were going down three blocks of the main street in the convertible, it turned out that the confetti had been wet so that Pat and Dick Nixon were getting hit in the face with these wet pellets. So they had to ride through Springfield, Missouri, with their backs to the front of the car to wave off the pellets.
Timothy Naftali

Do you remember some of the African-American reporters that were covering?

Herbert G. Klein

I don't believe there were many.

Timothy Naftali

Because it's interesting that Richard Nixon's interest in civil rights begins right as --

Herbert G. Klein

Beginning as Vice President, yeah. I don't believe he took any major role in it as a senator or as a congressman. I don't recall that. But it was one of the first things he wanted to do when he became Vice President. I think the other thing, we wanted to travel a lot and learn about the world, which goes back to the Herter Committee.

David Greenberg

Do you remember on the civil rights issue when certain landmark events happened such as Brown v. Board of Education coming down from the Supreme Court, or the bus boycott in Montgomery? Do you remember anything concrete where you were or conversations you might have had with Nixon about some of these major civil rights events?

Herbert G. Klein

No, no, I don't, and I don't think I had many major conversations because -- see, my role in those days was I would -- he would call my publisher, and I would get leave to go on the '52 campaign, I did three weeks in the '54 campaign, in '56 I took over as the press secretary, and then in '58 and '60, and each time he would make the call to my publisher, who was much for Nixon and for Eisenhower. And so he would always release me to work, so I wouldn't see him in between except I would be in Washington maybe twice a year to work with our bureau. And I would always spend some time with him, but I wasn't around when he was thinking about those things.

David Greenberg

Before we jump and ask you a lot about the '60 campaign, the central campaign against Helen Gahagan Douglas, what do you remember of that campaign, because that campaign becomes a national campaign. A lot of people are watching that campaign. It creates some images of Nixon elsewhere in the country. You mentioned how the Voorhis campaign was really a local campaign, so tell us a little about the Senate campaign.

Herbert G. Klein

Well, I was -- in those days, I was really acting on the Junior Chamber, and I'd said I elected a man as the national president and that he was from Alhambra, so that -- being around a small paper you need
stories so I could get the Junior Chamber to say something and go write a story. So at any rate I became active in the state Junior Chamber and when I came to San Diego I became active in the San Diego Junior Chamber, and as such I got to know the state leaders in that organization. It was a big powerful organization in those days. And Nixon was one of the 10 honored people by the Junior Chamber early in his career. So I got the variety of my friends in the Junior Chamber to become chairmen of the Nixon Senate Campaign in different cities, and so it was a campaign run largely by younger people. Although I was not in the campaign myself, I had these people as key people on his behalf working for him, and so that's what I remember most about it. I remember the pink paper, and there was another case about a communist union that she had some relationship to, but I always considered that as something that was brought up by Manchester Boddy. And if you remember in the '50 campaign, the Democrats had about six candidates, and the toughest one against Helen Douglas was a publisher of the "LA Daily News" and was Manchester Boddy, and he was the first one to come out with the pink paper and that type of thing. So I don't consider communism as the key issue there, although it's been written that way. I consider, again, that it was state issues and leadership, which [unintelligible] his philosophy.

**David Greenberg**

Were you having a conversations with Nixon at the time to know what gave him the confidence to run? I mean, he was such a young man and served only two terms to go for this major state Senate seat.

**Herbert G. Klein**

I was surprised when he told me he thought he was going to run. And so I remember having coffee again, and he told me he was thinking about running, and I didn't comment one way or the other, but I was surprised because he'd only been in office less than two terms, but he'd won overwhelmingly, and he'd had a lot of national attention because of the Hiss case. And he thought that this was the time to run because the incumbent was not going to run.

**David Greenberg**

Right, he had the open seat.

**Herbert G. Klein**

Yeah.

**Timothy Naftali**

How did he feel about California press? We know that the local press he felt was fair; the Washington press he felt was unfair. What did he think about California press?

**Herbert G. Klein**

I don't know because I was not a part of the team during that campaign, I'm not sure. But I think he felt that it was basically fair, although he always was suspicious of the press, other than the local press in the [unintelligible] Valley.
Timothy Naftali

Let's fast forward to Russia. You're his press secretary now.

Herbert G. Klein

Yes.

Timothy Naftali

It's 1959. Tell us how you remember the trip happened to Moscow.

Herbert G. Klein

Well, Bob Finch called me and asked me if I'd come back and join the campaign again, and I said, well, "Call my publisher." And so Nixon called the publisher and I went back in June of 1959, and my first assignment was to organize the trip to the Soviet Union, and it had been set up by one of his close friends who was active in the USIA. And the object was that they were going to have this big exhibit there, and they would follow it up with an exhibit in New York, which they did. So my job was to organize what we were going to do with the press coverage and negotiate how those reporters would be treated with the Soviets. So I would feel kind of strange, because I would meet with these people from the Soviet embassy in smaller cafés in Washington. I mean, nobody would see me when we're negotiating the terms, and so I'm negotiating terms that included there be no censorship of any of the reporters on the trip. Where I made a mistake was to not include the reporters in Moscow, and later that became a problem. But also that we could have 200, and then we had to organize how we were going to get them there, and so Nixon flew on the -- probably on the Columbine, which was an Air Force One. And the Columbine was a airplane that was a prop jet, so they had to stop and refuel. I organized that we get the first intercontinental jet flight for the press. And there was a big competition between Pan Am and TWA trying to get airport rights to land in Moscow. So they both wanted to do that and Pan Am could come up with the first jet, so we got out on the airplane at National Airport, where Nixon got on in Baltimore on Air Force One, and I got on with the press corp with two assistants that I'd selected to work with me. One of them was Richard Bean [phonetic sp], who worked for Lockheed Corporation. I got him leave, to leave there to help me. And then there was Peter Kay [phonetic sp], who later became a reporter and editor here.

So anyway, the funny little story is that I got all this press on the plane, and I go to get on the airplane and wave good-bye to my family, who had just arrived in Washington just a short time before. And as I'm waving I hear some jingling in my pocket, and I had the car keys. So in those days I could stop the airplane and go run down and give my wife the car keys and save my marriage. But at any rate we flew to Kennedy and suddenly learned that there was a problem with the airplane, that in the testing they'd found that the third back-up of some kind of system wasn't working, so I had to call ahead to the CIA to get him through and lease an airplane so we could make the flight. And we flew -- it was a pretty relaxed flight except that we got over Soviet air and the Soviet pilots took over. And we realized that we were going to make a record for what the time was so they said they had to fly over the field a couple of times to check out where it was so it'd take longer to make the flight so the record wouldn't be that big, but we still had a big record, which lasted for years. So at any rate, we landed, and the Nixon plane had arrived shortly after. We always timed it so that the press plane would come down
first and his would come down second. And so they had, like a second-rate delegation to meet him. They didn't have any of their top people to meet him there. And we went into the hotel, and there, I remember, that day was that Nixon and Pat decided that they wanted to take a walk, so we were just walking down the streets of Moscow, and nobody knew that Vice President of the United States was there because they hadn't said anything in the papers. And the Russian people come looking at her shoes because they had pointy toes, and they had square-toed, very ugly shoes, so that was a big attention. But the next morning -- so we were there that afternoon, late -- the next morning it was scheduled that the we would go and meet with Khrushchev and Brezhnev, and there were three soviet leaders.

Timothy Naftali

Mikoyan.

Herbert G. Klein

Mikoyan, yeah, so and part of the negotiation would be that no one would go to that meeting. The reporters would wait outside the Kremlin. And I got to the -- Khrushchev's office, and there were two Soviet reporters there, so I insisted that we get two of our reporters there, so I sent a KGB guy to go down to the gate and get them in, and these guys wondered "What's going on here? We're being summoned into the Kremlin." It was Ernie Barcella from UPI and Jack Bell from, I think it was, from AP. So they covered just the photo ops at the beginning in that picture up there.

Timothy Naftali

So you were there when Nixon met Khrushchev?

Herbert G. Klein

Yes, yeah.

Timothy Naftali

What was that like? Tell us about it.

Herbert G. Klein

Well, we'd expected to be where there'd be a friendly meeting and then we'd just talk about the trip and see him later in the afternoon. So at the beginning when the photographers were there, it was very cordial and a lot of hand shaking and patting on the back, that kind of thing. The minute the photographers left and Nixon was -- and I was in the room and our interpreters aren't -- My interpreter was a guy named John Davies, who later became an ambassador. But at any rate, I forget who then, who the official interpreter was, Khrushchev started making a speech about the captive nations, and about every other word would be a swear word. His favorite swear word was "pig shit," and it would be "pig shit" this, "pig shit" that. And our interpreter was getting embarrassed, having to interpret all of this. So this went on for about a half hour with Khrushchev dominating the entire conversation, and they were getting very friendly about it, and it was the Captive Nation's Resolution, as you know, has been passed routinely by Congress to say that we still supported Lithuania and Estonia and Latvia. So,
at any rate, when it was over, we were going to go out to check out the fairgrounds, the exhibition grounds, and meet Khrushchev there later. But as we were walking out he said, "I think I'll go on, too."

So suddenly I find myself with 200 reporters and Khrushchev and Nixon and Milton Eisenhower and Admiral Rickover and all of the these people. And in those days we only had four Secret Service with us, and most of my help had to come from the KGB -- to manage people. While I'm preparing all this, I got a number of calls from NBC and Ampex about -- they had this new thing and would it be possible for us to try -- if I could possibly steal them into their studio, they'd like to show them this new thing, a videotape. Can you stop a minute? I want to get a little water. Totally spontaneous.

Timothy Naftali

Because the thing about, at least President Nixon, is that he liked to script a lot. That he wrote, it wasn't as if he read other people's cue cards.

Herbert G. Klein

No, no, no, he always wrote it.

Timothy Naftali

Always wrote it. But here it's all spontaneous. What was his objective with Khrushchev? When you talked to him before the trip or in the first day of the trip, he didn't expect to spend much time with Khrushchev, did he?

Herbert G. Klein

No, he thought that basically it would be the meeting here in Khrushchev's office and then for the opening of the -- opening ceremonies. We didn't plan anything for the day afterward, which I think was a Sunday. So that was our plan originally. And then, during the four days we were in Moscow, four or five days, there would be another couple of ceremonial things at the -- what's the name of the main place in the --

Timothy Naftali

Kremlin.

Herbert G. Klein

Kremlin, I'm losing the word Kremlin. Anyway, we thought we'd see him a couple of places there, and a lot of those things were scheduled by Ambassador Thompson. But the whole thing at the fairgrounds totally surprised all of the us, everything that happened. My job was to lead them through and to try to keep people in the pack and keep them moving while they're looking at things.

David Greenberg

Were you worried as you were going through this that it was all unplanned, that you could have a major gap here?
Herbert G. Klein

I didn't have time to worry. My objective was to have Nixon see the whole thing. I didn't expect Khrushchev to say very much. And so when we went into the -- what the Ampex people had said to me was that they thought they could come in, and they could talk about the trip and ask about their families and just have polite conversation so that they could see how Ampex worked. And Khrushchev changed all that by what he had to start out dominating until Nixon pointed his finger at him and said, "You don't know everything." So when we left there, I felt that, you know, all these reporters and that it was on film and that it was great to have him on film with Khrushchev, but on the other hand I thought that he had been weak in his debate with him. So I said to him, as we were walking along, "If you're going to get into any more debates, you'd better get tougher because he pushed you around."

Timothy Naftali

What did he say? How did Nixon respond?

Herbert G. Klein

He just said, "Okay," that's about it. And he was talking to Khrushchev on the other side. So we went through like a Coca-Cola -- Pepsi-Cola stand, it wouldn't be Coca-Cola with [unintelligible], and then we finally got to the house, and I left him in the house after they started walking through. What I noticed before I left was that Nixon would say, "These are our refrigerators." And Khrushchev would say, "I know, we invented that." And so that started an argument back and forth, and I left the house as they were wandering through it to try to figure out where I'm going to lead this party next, and all of the sudden I discover that everybody's jammed up in there and it's so jammed that the only way I can get back in is through a window in the kitchen. And then there's a guy standing there catching cameras; it was Bill Safire, who I didn't know at that time. So by that time, they were directly below the kitchen, and they're sort of head to head, talking about foreign bases and atomic weapons and things of this kind and major foreign policy. The unusual thing that I think that happened was that the American people saw in the newspapers the next day that there had been this debate in the kitchen, and the reporters said Nixon had really stood up well and dominated it and had shown Khrushchev how to debate. The whole thing was pro-Nixon. Meanwhile, the Ampex guy decided -- I'm sort of skipping ahead but I'll keep on the Ampex thing because -- when we got through I thought that it would be a good thing if the Ampex film could be shown on Russian television so that the Russian people, who were new to television, could see an American Vice President talking to their people, even though it was a week we'd be in the Soviet Union. So I reached an agreement with them that we would run it simultaneously. So, about two nights later, I was in the hotel, and I got a call from a reporter in Chicago who said, "You know that CBS is going to run a film on the kitchen debate." So I knew and I checked and find out that the Ampex guy had left and taken the film with him. And so I was really unhappy because I wanted to have this dual thing in both countries at the same time. So I didn't know Frank Stanton at that time, and I got a hold of Paul Nebin [phonetic sp], who was a CBS correspondent, and he got me through to Frank Stanton, and the minute I reached Frank Stanton the hotel cut my phone line off. So it went on, so what happened was that American people read the story in the newspaper and then when they saw the weaker debate on television they thought it was one and the same thing.
And they never got to air for the Russians.

They later kept the agreement; we did run it at the same time. So it did get aired to the Russian people.

Did Nixon understand -- after the kitchen debate, did he understand the effect that this would have? I mean, this was all impromptu, a surprise. He'd done better.

He'd done well.

Did he talk to you about it after?

Well, we really didn't have any time because we kept walking through the rest of this, and they were rushed back to the Kremlin in order to have lunch, so I didn't have any private conversations with him. He was with [Ambassador] Tommy Thompson most of the time. And so when we got to the Kremlin, it was obvious that the atmosphere had changed, because we went into this beautiful room with gold everywhere, except where you could see where the ancient pictures has been once because they didn't fit the wallpaper stains. And Khrushchev was trying to be jovial. He would have one of his guys say, "Nikita, tell them about the time you shot the bear." And then he'd tell what he thought was one of his funny stories. So, we had a lunch after this intense debate, which was just like you were saying earlier, talking like nothing had happened. So that's a very social congenial lunch, and during the course of that, why, Khrushchev invited Nixon and Pat to go out to his dacha and spend the night, and that's where they went, and that's where the second picture takes place. But at any rate, after the lunch we went back to the grounds to have the formal ceremonies, and at that time, there were the formal speeches and Nixon made his formal speech, and Khrushchev made his. There was one time when Khrushchev had a toast, which was against the United States, and Milton Eisenhower heard the toast, and, being polite, he raised his glass and Nixon said, "Wait a minute until we get the interpretation." It was one that was against us. That was the way Khrushchev would throw in a little thing here or there when he could. So, that was pretty much that day, and it wasn't really until afterward that I could even talk to him any length of time. By that time we were all pretty tired, so I just talked about, you know, I thought it had gone well, and the reporters, they got a great story.

Did you talk to any of the reporters about it? Like Harrison Salisbury by chance?
Herbert G. Klein

Salisbury was sort of the great leader, and he thought it went well. And they all wrote it that way. So the next day -- they'd been overnight, and then I was to go out with -- I was allowed to take two photographers and, I believe, two reporters, and they were to have the same, which they did, after they'd been out at the dacha for a while. And when Khrushchev met them in the morning and asked them to go for a ride on the river in his boat. So they went down the river, and they pulled up to the beach and he had a lot of people planted there and he'd say, "Are you all slaves?" And they'd say, "No," in Russian. And this is to show off to Nixon and to Pat and Dick. So this was all very friendly. They had about a four-hour lunch in which it was just private; I was not present during the lunch. It was just beautiful grounds, and I talked to Khrushchev a little bit afterward, through his interpreter, but it was all just friendly conversation. By that day, everything was very friendly, and we went through the other things that we did while we were in Moscow.

Timothy Naftali

Do you recall, there's a document that says the Secret Service discovered excessive radiation in the U.S. embassy during the visit.

Herbert G. Klein

I'm not aware of that.

Timothy Naftali

They did, and they were very concerned about it. It became a tiny issue that they regulated, but walking through the embassy yelling so that the microphones could pick it up. I assume everybody's assumption throughout this trip was that they were being bugged.

Herbert G. Klein

Oh, yeah. If we wanted to talk, we either turned the water faucet on loud or go outside and put our hands over our mouths, and I'm sure it was true. I've never been there when I wasn't being bugged.

Timothy Naftali

Let's move ahead to 1960. It's inevitable that the Vice President is going to run for the Presidency. Tell us about the strategy. When you were thinking about the campaign, what were the basic issues that Vice President Nixon felt he should run on?

Herbert G. Klein

Well, first let me talk just briefly about the structure because it was kind of strange. He set it up that Bob Finch was running the campaign, and Bob and I shared everything. He would sometimes deal with the press, and I would deal with the structure and vice versa. So that we had one team of Klein and Finch in the Senate office building and at the campaign headquarters he had -- he later brought in Leonard Hall and [James] Jim Bassett. Bob Wilson, a congressman, was there to help in the scheduling of things. So that the campaign structure was unusual, and often he would tell us both the same thing,
and we would talk back and forth to be sure we weren't duplicating each other. And my impression at the time of the campaign was that he hadn't learned to delegate fully at that time, and didn't think back on that later. But the issues, again, were the national issues. We determined that the international relations ought to be our strength and that his position that way. Another issue was the missile gap, which was pushed by Symington and a guy named Tom Lanphier, who was from here. That was a false issue, as Kennedy found out later. And it was a very clean-cut campaign in which we talked issues and Kennedy talked issues. We didn't try to snipe back and fourth. We made a determination not to bring up the issue of his health, although near the very end, John Roosevelt asked about it, and I said go ahead and use it. So it was used just briefly by John Roosevelt.

**David Greenberg**

What did you know about Kennedy's health and what was just rumor and so on?

**Herbert G. Klein**

It was rumor, yeah. It was kind of an interesting story. We were surprised also when Johnson was nominated to be Vice President, and the first word we got about it was from a minister who was Presbyterian minister named Ed Ellison who was also the chaplain of the Senate. Somehow he got word and he called us and said it was going to be Johnson.

**Timothy Naftali**

When you say, "We decided not to use the health issue," do you remember talking to Nixon about that?

**Herbert G. Klein**

Yeah, he didn't want to use it.

**Timothy Naftali**

And his reason?

**Herbert G. Klein**

That it was unfair; he thought we shouldn't be talking about health or religion. There was a lot of problems on religion early on in which a famous minister from New York -- did you remember his name?

**Timothy Naftali**

Norman Vincent Peale?

**Herbert G. Klein**

Yeah, brought the issue in and he had to back it off. The publisher in New Hampshire, Manchester, New Hampshire --
David Greenberg

Loeb.

Herbert G. Klein

Bill Loeb made an issue out of it, and I denied it and said we weren't going to use it, and he wrote an editorial about me as a weakling, which Bill Loeb would do and then we became very good friends.

David Greenberg

Nixon, of course, you know, in some quarters had this reputation as a very tough campaigner, whether it was the anti-communism or other stuff, and then this gives rise to all of the talk of the "new Nixon," which I know you write a little bit about in the book. Was there an understanding that the 1960 campaign was going to be, you know, to the extent that people were buying into this, the "new Nixon," this was going to be clean, he wasn't going to --

Herbert G. Klein

He was very conscious of the Tricky Dick image and so we had to be very careful about that. Another kind of critical time was when Martin Luther King was put in jail. And I learned about it first, I think, and I came then to see Nixon in the back, I think we were on a train, and in the back car of the train he was with Bill Rogers. And I thought that we should do something about it and talk to -- call him. Bill Rogers argued that we'd hurt ourselves with the Southern black if we did, so Nixon never made the call. And that cost us a lot of black votes, I think.

Timothy Naftali

So in '68 he makes sure to make the call.

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah.

Timothy Naftali

And to also -- his reactions to the assassination.

Herbert G. Klein

Yes.

David Greenberg

But to know that, it's surprising, given what you were saying earlier about Nixon making civil rights kind of a signature issue for himself, in the Eisenhower administration, he might have seen this as an opportunity to get the black vote, in fact --
Herbert G. Klein

But see, that's were he was getting the Southern vote.

David Greenberg

Right, so it's interesting looking at Nixon's positions in these years because there are -- like all politicians, he has to try to court these two constituencies. Did you get a sense of his thinking? I mean, a lot of people have said that at a certain point he starts kind of figuring his support is going to be with white Southerners instead of with black voters, and is he thinking the winds are already blowing that way in '60, or -- ?

Herbert G. Klein

He thought that he wasn't going to get many black votes, and that the Southern vote was very important to us, because Eisenhower had been the first one, sort of broken through the Democratic front in the South. See, we'd also gone through his nomination, which Reagan tried to play to the South more, and Rockefeller was aiming at us from the left, and Nixon was preserving the right against Reagan.

David Greenberg

You're talking about '68?

Herbert G. Klein

'68, yeah.

David Greenberg

I'm thinking even the 1960, with the call to Coretta King, is, you know, was Nixon thinking, well, Kennedy and the Democrats are going to get the black vote now, because a lot of people credit that call that Kennedy made as important.

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, it was. I think Bill Rogers was a principal influence on that. But I couldn't say that for sure; you'd have to read his mind, but that was my impression, and Bob Finch and I thought that he should make the call. Another kind of interesting thing was that how he got into the debates in the first place. He'd given me strict instructions to avoid the debates, and I was being courted by every network person you ever saw, and Frank Stanton one time was answering my phones even, because to them it was their chance to have a big breakthrough. But I was very good in dealing with them on a friendship basis, but we never committed that we would do it. So after we got the nomination in Chicago, he had a press conference and said he announced that he was going to debate, and the most surprised person in the room was me.
David Greenberg

Yeah, I remember that passage in your book. And did you ever ask him, you know, "What changed your mind on this?"

Herbert G. Klein

I never really knew, no.

David Greenberg

Yeah, because it seemed like quite a turnaround.

Herbert G. Klein

My feeling was that he felt he could debate anyone and if he avoided the debates, he would be hounded by it by the hostile press.

Timothy Naftali

What about the fact that he viewed television as an ally, didn't he? That it had been good to him.

Herbert G. Klein

He thought it was his ally, but outside it was his enemy, after the debates.

Timothy Naftali

But after the debate -- I mean before --

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, before.

Timothy Naftali

But wasn't it the sense that he was good on TV?

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, in fact -- I'm trying to [unintelligible]. I think, in 1958, because in those days television was mainly you were making a speech on a platform in an auditorium, and he decided that really wasn't the way to reach someone in their living room, so we came in to New York, where Keating was running for reelection. Rockefeller didn't want anything to do with him. He thought Nixon would be a drag on him. So Rockefeller wasn't there to meet us or anything. And we'd promised Keating that we'd campaign for him. So we insisted we were going to come to New York even though Rockefeller didn't want us. And Nixon decided he should try making a speech on television by sitting on the edge of a desk. And he was so effective in making his speech sitting on the edge of a desk and talking to you on
your sofa that Rockefeller called right after and said he'd like to come down and meet him the next morning and have breakfast. And it had a big effect on helping elect Keating with that speech. And that was sort of a new form of television.

David Greenberg

Right, it was kind of breaking out of the formal, kind of old-fashioned style.

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, right.

Timothy Naftali

Do you recall some tension with Eisenhower over the platform in 1960?

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, Bob Finch and I went to the convention a week early to work with a platform committee and get everything the way that we thought Nixon wanted. And suddenly on, like, I think it was a Friday, we got a call from Don Hughes, who was his military aide, who you should interview sometime, also. At any rate, he said, Nixon just told him that they were going to go to see Rockefeller in New York, and so Nixon and Rockefeller had a telephone conversation, and Rockefeller invited him to come down. He thought that he could bring him more his way, I think, and so they suddenly ran to the airport got on an airplane and the Secret Service was surprised they had to use a car they'd just taken from a counterfeiter to drive him to Rockefeller's place. So they met for hours over dinner at Rockefeller's apartment and at the end of it, Hughes called and said they'd changed the platform approach. So all of the things that we'd been working on they had to change, including the stance on some military issues. And Eisenhower had no idea this was going on. Eisenhower was in Rhode Island. There was a military school there, and he was just on vacation for a few days, and so he became very angry because when the platform had been changed he hadn't been consulted. And he didn't agree with the positions that had been changed to Rockefeller's point of view, and he had a hard time of controlling it. But meanwhile Rockefeller did not press his campaign against Nixon at the convention, and that was sort of a trade off. Afterwards the convention was over, Eisenhower's situation was serious enough that we flew directly to Rhode Island, where Nixon could spend a couple of hours with Eisenhower and sort of explain the situation and try to bring him back aboard, which he did, but Eisenhower didn't give up grudges very easily.

Timothy Naftali

Well, we interviewed Mel Laird, and Mel Laird and Bryce Harlow were the ones who delivered the message to Nixon, that if the platform weren't changed back, Eisenhower wouldn't support him.

Herbert G. Klein

But he already had the nomination. I don't know, I guess he didn't, because that was the start of the week of the convention. I didn't know what you just told me, but it would be at the start of the week, so the minute the convention was over, that's where we flew.
Timothy Naftali

I believe that's one of the changes that had to do with military policy and missile gap and defense spending.

Herbert G. Klein

Yes.

Timothy Naftali

The other was civil rights?

Herbert G. Klein

I didn't know that. With Rockefeller he would have taken a more positive position on civil rights.

Timothy Naftali

[Inaudible] approach to civil rights. And Eisenhower didn't agree. Did you see some -- I mean, Nixon must have been very angry at Eisenhower's response.

Herbert G. Klein

I think he was more concerned than angry. But I don't remember very much about it.

Timothy Naftali

But isn't this about the time when Eisenhower says, "Give me a few minutes"?

David Greenberg

"Give me a week."

Timothy Naftali

"Give me a week."

Herbert G. Klein

I think that occurred before -- that occurred before. That occurred maybe a couple months before, I think. See, another [unintelligible] with Eisenhower was [James] Jim Hagerty was very, very friendly to Nixon, and he was my mentor, and so I am to this day very grateful -- I admire Jim Hagerty. So he was always a force on our side in dealing with Eisenhower.
Timothy Naftali

Could you give us a -- as we obviously won't be able to interview him, give us a thumbnail sketch of Bob Finch. What was he like to work with? What was he like as a man?

Herbert G. Klein

Bob Finch was the finest person I ever worked with in political life. He was very bright, very creative. He would come up with campaign ideas, very honest, straightforward. He was just a great guy. And he was sort of born to be in politics. Had he been elected as a senator, he would have been a great senator. The reason he didn't get elected was because -- I think it was -- a guy named Bell thought that Finch was the primary guy in the primary race, and he spent a lot of money to knock out Finch, and the Oriental from the University of San Francisco was elected. Bob knew how to deal with people very well. He kept contact with politicians across the state. When election night we'd have a system where I would call newspaper editors and find out what they thought was going on in their state or their locality, not by what the polls were, but what they thought was going on. And Bob would call the political leaders across the place and we would give kind of a quick survey of them, Bob was a person who could reach them all. And he had friends across the country, that he'd built up in that way. It's my belief that Nixon wanted him to be his Vice President and that Bob turned it down because he felt there was two things wrong: One was he was from California, and the second one was what it would look like, that it was too much of an in-house thing, a father/son relationship. And it was a pretty noble thing to turn down. But he was superb.

Timothy Naftali

That was in '68. That was the '68 campaign.

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah.

Timothy Naftali

Now, how did Nixon choose Henry Cabot Lodge for '60?

Herbert G. Klein

He was impressed by what he was doing in the United Nations; he made some pretty fiery speeches. But Lodge had made one mistake: When Khrushchev came to the United States, we told him to be tough, and he got too tough. You know, the incident of the Disneyland and all. But Nixon was impressed by what he was saying and doing in the United Nations and felt that he could help us in the Northeast, and so from the start, that was the choice we were going to make. We had to give the impression we were listening to everybody, so we had a meeting of probably about 25 or 30 leaders, and the night after he got the nomination, we're in Chicago, and everybody had a chance to go around the room and say who they were for, and we made sure it was going to be for Lodge.
David Greenberg

Who was in the inner circle with Nixon when that decision was really made? There was this larger group who was giving their input, but who do you think Nixon really relied on in making that decision?

Herbert G. Klein

I think Nixon probably relied on himself mainly. I don't recall any major conversations about Finch that I had. Leonard Hall may have had some effect on it. Turned out it was a bad choice, but --

Timothy Naftali

Who were the other possibilities?

Herbert G. Klein

Sometimes, I get mixed up between '68 and '60. Lindsay would have been later, wouldn't he?

Timothy Naftali

He considered John Lindsay, I mean, the Mayor of New York?

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, later, yeah. Mark Hatfield another in '68. There was a wide variety, but I don't really recall who the exact people were.

David Greenberg

[Unintelligible]

Herbert G. Klein

He was always a Republican. Didn't vote that way, much, but --

David Greenberg

Right.

Herbert G. Klein

How he got to the debate, after he said, we're going to debate. Kennedy had a man named Leonard Reinsch, who was his TV advisor and was a very brave guy, and a great guy -- it's one of the interesting things that's in today's politics verses then. The Kennedy people and ourselves were all good friends, and we would fight and argue and then have drinks together. And [Theodore] Ted Sorensen is still a friend, and I've stayed at Leonard Reinsch's house, that kind of thing. Reinsch and I and [Pierre] Salinger did most of the negotiating on the format of the debates. But we'd enter with a strategy, which would be put together by Finch and Hall and myself and probably Rose Mary Woods, who had a lot to say about policy as well being a very good secretary. So we decided that the debates would build up an
impetus so that the most important one would be the fourth debate just before the election. And our strength was the debate that would be on international relations, so we agreed to have the first one on domestic policy. And the second and third would be on general questions, and the fourth would be on international relations. And that was a mistake, because a big audience was there to see, out of curiosity, what was a debate like. So the biggest audience was for the first time, and then Nixon's weakness in that first debate besides the things that have been said about make-up and that was that he was trying to be too polite again. He was afraid of the "Tricky Dick" thing. His planning was thrown off because of the fact that he had been ill. And so while he was in the hospital, he had to learn how to say a lot of medical terms and describe -- what his illness was -- thrombophlebitis. Anyway, he was sort of scratching to get out and get on the campaign, and so that instead of taking the whole day off on the day of the debates, we flew in to Chicago, and we spoke to the Carpenters Union, which eventually supported him. But he should have spent that time preparing for the debate. We normally, when he was going to do something major like a press conference, you know, we would prepare a book with a lot of questions and answers, and his method of preparing for a press conference or, in this case, for a debate, would be to study them by himself, not do the -- Kennedy's method was to do dirty questions. He'd have his staff fire questions at him. Nixon's would be to isolate himself and study the book and prepare the issues. The only person he really talked to much on that day was Bill Rogers, and he talked to Rogers, our TV guy, about dress and make-up and things like that. And I went back and forth that it's been reported that how many times did he have to paint the wall a different color, and the paint was wet and that kind of thing. And Nixon also, one of the things he wanted me to be sure was that there was no big audience in the studio, because he felt he did better isolated with Kennedy and not having people applauding or tempted to be applauding. So we had the press in one area of the studios in Chicago, and the debate actually took place in isolation with seven pool reporters, and so that was the way we went into the thing. And so he only really spent the afternoon really concentrating deeply on it. And I think he obviously underestimated it. But he could answer any question. The bigger problem was he was trying to be too polite again.

David Greenberg

Did any of his staff have concerns going in that, hey, he hasn't given this major debate enough attention yet? Was there a sense of worry or did it kind of catch everyone by surprise that the TV audience at least --

Herbert G. Klein

Well, we knew that it was going to be a tremendous TV thing. There's no question about that, but we were fully confident that he could handle anything. He didn't want somebody to help him on it. I offered a couple of times, but he said, no, he's taking care of it.

David Greenberg

This is clearly a character trait of his that, you know, one sees throughout his career. It's often a great strength of his, his kind of self-reliance on these things. But it sounds like this may be a situation where that was harmful to him, that his sense of, "I'll do it myself and I'll" kind of --
Also, it's the same method -- he prepared for that just as we would for a press conference. And we'd never -- before a press conference, I might tell some topics I knew were going to come up, but I rarely would try to suggest an answer because he knew what he wanted to say. And that was the case here.

Timothy Naftali

Did he prepare some statements, though, an opening statement?

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, which I don't remember who worked on; it was probably Bryce Harlow some and Bill Safire. Each one had a brief opening statement and a brief closing statement.

Timothy Naftali

So, that he committed to memory before?

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah.

Timothy Naftali

When you saw him that day, could you tell he was sick?

Herbert G. Klein

Well, I knew he was sick because he'd just come out of the hospital. It was a question of did he have enough strength and he appeared to have enough strength, and he did the Carpenters Union thing very well, and he just went over and isolated himself in the hotel. One other funny rumor that came out of it, one was that Democrats would sneak the make-up man in and do kind of enough coverage that we got to Boston after the debates, I hadn't had anything like that happen to us. Our own television make-up guy, who was just instructed by him to put on just the cake make-up, I mean, the powder. The reason that he didn't want cake make-up was because when Humphrey had debated Kennedy in Wisconsin, Humphrey had appeared with too much make-up on, and Nixon felt that made him look like a sissy. And so Nixon's macho was part of why he didn't want to cover his beard much. And he was a little nervous, I could tell that, but felt that it would be cool. And the room had to be very cold because he wanted to have -- that was one of the our big arguments, very cold room so that he wouldn't sweat too much.

David Greenberg

There's a story that I think it was Ted Rogers was in with the producer, whether it was Don Hewitt or whoever it was, and at a certain point you expect them to say, "Focus on my man, focus on my man." But he starts saying, "Focus more on Kennedy, focus more on Kennedy." Because he didn't think Nixon was performing so well and that Kennedy's guy was doing the opposite, saying, "Show Nixon,
show Nixon." Was there a sense, you know, even before the thing was over as you were watching this unfold that it was not going well for him?

**Herbert G. Klein**

No, we had no idea, neither did Salinger. He and I talked about that afterward. Both of us left with no way of knowing what the public reaction had been. And there weren't any great wires or things like that, like after the “Checkers Speech.” Nixon went over to his hotel, and he was dead tired and went right to bed. And I talked to him for a few minutes, and Rose Mary Woods did, and I and my staff went back to do our first big job of spinning. We told everybody we thought we'd won. And Salinger was doing the very same thing. But nobody knew. The only way we finally found out who had won was by crowds the next day. Kennedy had a big increase in crowds, and we had a decrease. And of course you know the story about radio and TV, that Nixon won on radio and Kennedy on TV.

**Timothy Naftali**

When you say won on radio, I mean, in the sense that --

**Herbert G. Klein**

People who listened on radio thought Nixon won. That was shown in polls and everything. People who listened on television thought Kennedy had won. So his appearance had had a tremendous amount of impact, and you know, he had a shirt that was the wrong size, just little things.

**Timothy Naftali**

Because he had lost weight?

**Herbert G. Klein**

Because during his illness he had lost weight, yes. Well, let me tell you that we thought the next two debates were broke about even or Nixon did a little bit better. We put our big emphasis on the fourth debate, and Nixon in the polls showed that Nixon won the fourth debate by about 4 percent, I think. It was a sizable margin, which helped us in our final swing to gain votes in the last 48 or 72 hours. So we probably made the biggest gain, I believe, in the final 72 hours that any candidate has in that period of time.

**Timothy Naftali**

What was the deficit when you were looking at the polls before that 72-hour push? How far behind is Nixon?

**Herbert G. Klein**

I don't recall the exact percent, but I think it was probably about five or six percent. What we did at the last was that we went from Hollywood on a Sunday noon, we made a national television speech. We flew to Anchorage and he made a speech there so we would cover the 50th state, and we actually carried Alaska, which was unexpected. We flew from there to Madison, Wisconsin, for an early
morning rally at the airport. We went to Detroit where we had a four-hour telethon, which was very, very effective, which was the first big telethon that anybody ever had. And we had people some in and speak, Republican leaders and all in support. We went from there to Chicago, where he made a last-minute appeal with Eisenhower both on TV. We flew to Ontario, [California]. From there, we had a 2 a.m. rally on election morning. So that was the complete effort we made, which made up for a good part of the loss.

Timothy Naftali

But afterwards, didn't Nixon feel he had made a mistake by pledging that he'd go to 50 states?

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, he did.

Timothy Naftali

Whose idea was it?

Herbert G. Klein

That was the second big surprise of the press conference after his nomination, where nobody had even discussed it. Where he came up with that idea, I don't have any idea. But that's where he made the pledge, and so we went to Hawaii first, so we could get that out of the way, and we spent a couple of days in Hawaii, which we thought we'd carry. We lost Hawaii and carried Alaska, which was the opposite of what was predicted.

David Greenberg

Right, and Hawaii was after a prolonged weekend, right? This was kind of like the 2000 election in miniature? It was reversed after the weekend. Do you remember a conversation either on election night or the next day with Nixon and his -- you know, what did he say to you when it was sinking in that he had lost?

Herbert G. Klein

Well, election night, of all times, I turned up with laryngitis, so every time I'd have to go down to be on television, I'd have to put steam in my throat so I could talk. So I didn't talk an extra amount with him that night except to -- I would between this make calls or one of my assistants would make calls, and editors, and the system I told you about with Bob Finch. And we got that word to him. But at about 11:00 he decided he probably had lost, and he called Pat and had her come down to where he was. He normally isolated himself on election nights. Had the family in one suite, and he would be by himself with some of us going in and out, and so he wanted to give up at that time, and Bob Finch and I convinced him that he should not, that there was still a chance that we could win; it was going to be close. And so he went down to the ballroom and told him that he was going to wait until morning to decide what had happened. It was a very touching speech and Pat Nixon started to cry when he was making his speech, and it choked us all up. But he did it.
David Greenberg

I've heard this concession speech, where he was in this very prominent, "If things continue as it appears they will." And it sounds like he's, you know, holding out the possibility of, you know, challenging the results, and there were a number of states where challenges were launched. I mean, most famously Illinois and Texas, but a number of others, these challenges were filed and Meade Alcorn and I think it's Rogers, Morton --

Herbert G. Klein

Rogers.

David Greenberg

Rogers? Are holding press conferences. Nixon himself doesn't seem to be directly involved. But going on to --

Herbert G. Klein

Well, we'll start off that night. He had no idea about doing any kind of protest.

Timothy Naftali

Right.

Herbert G. Klein

He just felt that he was probably going to lose, but we talked him into saying that let's wait and see. We had to really talk him into doing that. So that was his way of saying that, not with any idea that he was going to -- we didn't know votes were being stolen. We assumed they were in Illinois, but we didn't know. So when it was the next morning, Bob Haldeman, who was our key advance man, and Bob Finch and I went in and talked to him, and he said I should go down and announce that he was conceding and thank the workers, and we put together a telegram to send to the workers and congratulations to Kennedy. And I had set the time that -- with the reporters that we wouldn't call them back until 10:00 in the morning so they had a little sleep. So I went down and made his concession, and Kennedy told me later that that's when he decided he'd won, when he saw me tell them, condone the concession. We then loaded up on the airplane and flew back to Washington, and en route he decided he wanted to go on to Key Biscayne, so we were in Washington just a short time, and then Bob Finch and I, and Don Hughes picked up our wives. And so it was the three of us and Rose Mary Woods, and I think that was all of us. Went down to Key Biscayne, and we were there for -- that would be on Wednesday we got there, and then on Saturday -- we'd have quiet dinners and things like that, and on Saturday, we were to be over at the Nixons' place for cocktails and then we were going to go to a place called the Key Biscayne Inn for dinner. And Nixon was -- I keep saying Nixon; I always referred to him as Dick in those days, and then when he was President I didn't know what to refer to him as. But at any rate, he was as low as I'd ever seen him. He was just -- I think he had the full impact of what had happened to him. During that week, why, people would be flying in there, trying to convince him to protest the election: Meade Alcorn, Rogers, Vernon, others. So we did talk, considerably about whether he should do that or not. Bob Finch and I argued that it would be a bad
thing to do because it would leave the country without really a leader at a time in the Cold War when it was really important. And he -- I had the feeling that that was what he was thinking about all the time, in spite of the pressure being put on by really the whole Republican Party, and we felt that we'd been cheated in Illinois and Texas and San Antonio there, and Missouri and New Mexico, and that they're, you know, easy enough. Well, the last state, when we decided we lost the election, was Minnesota. Other people thought that there were other states, but when the Minnesota vote came in, we knew we lost the election.

But anyway, going back to this evening at the Key Biscayne Inn, as we walked into the maître d's phone rang and they said it was for Mr. Nixon, and so I said, "Well, I'll take it." And I picked up the phone, and it was Herbert Hoover. Herbert Hoover had had a call from Joe Kennedy, who said, "Would the Vice President speak -- meet with my son?" And so Hoover called to ask him whether he would meet with Kennedy, and so I went in to the dining room table and told him what the conversation had been, and he immediately got very excited and interested and just revived, and he decided that he should. So Don Hughes took him to the little phone booth there and put their dime in and decided he should call Eisenhower before he did anything, and Eisenhower was in Augusta playing golf, but this was dinner. So he was in the phone booth talking to Eisenhower and the maître d's phone rang again, and it was Kennedy. So then I picked that up, and I got the feeling talking to Kennedy that he, too, felt the full impact that day because he just kind of wandered in the conversation. He was very complimentary to me, about, I dress better than Pierre and all of the those kind of little things. And it was just a very nice conversation, and that's when he told me about that when my speech was made is when he decided he had won. But at any rate, so then we went back, and by this time he'd talked to Eisenhower and I had talk to Kennedy, and so he decided that he definitely would do that, and so he went back into the little phone booth and the pay phone and called Kennedy. He was in Palm Beach at the family compound, and Kennedy -- he said he would go up to meet him, and Kennedy said, "No, I can get a helicopter. I'll come to Key Biscayne." So on Monday, he came to Key Biscayne, and they met, just the two of them, in one of the suites at the Key Biscayne Inn. And that was when Nixon told him he was not going to contest the election, and then Kennedy offered him a job in the Cabinet. He did offer him a job in the Cabinet. He said, "No, I should be the loyal opposition." That was his term. I think that was one of the most important decisions he made any time.

David Greenberg

On those protests, I mean, later in November, the RNC and Alcorn and Morton and still doing lawsuits and, you know, making --

Herbert G. Klein

We'd pulled out of it.

David Greenberg

So Nixon couldn't put the kibosh on their efforts or -- I saw one account says, well, he felt this might - - he allowed it to go forward. He's not going to win, but this will at least kind of build people up for '64, or our next time around you get people the sense that we're going to get our rightful due next time.
Herbert G. Klein

Well, by that time we were back in Washington, and I stayed till the inaugural. But I don't recall any major conversation. I think once he made up his mind he was going to stay with that, and he was not going to back off what he told to Kennedy.

Timothy Naftali

Do you remember him during that period when he was trying to make up his mind, actually thinking he might contest the election?

Herbert G. Klein

You know, it was hard to tell. He was so unusually quiet during that time. He was just totally depressed. But my impression was that he was leaning to not contest it, that he was not biting to, he was not anxious to see these guys who wanted to put pressure on him. We'd have to talk him into seeing them. So I felt that he was leaning that way, and I think he was from the start.

Timothy Naftali

What kind of evidence did you have of voter fraud? Was it good, solid evidence? I mean, what was coming out?

Herbert G. Klein

You know, I didn't see the actual evidence, but I'm sure there was very solid evidence. In San Antonio, the way they cheated us was that there were less votes disqualified, and it was a Mexican-American community where they'd had a tougher time of voting, and the Texas ballot then, you had to scratch names off. It was difficult ballot to vote on even. And Chicago, you know, it was well known that Daley stole everything, although he and Daley became good friends after he became President.

Timothy Naftali

The morning of the election in 1960, was the candidate optimistic? Because he knew he was behind before the 72-hour push.

Herbert G. Klein

When I first came across him that morning, he was having breakfast quietly with Julie. He was trying to explain to Julie how he felt, what the problem was in losing, so he knew that he had lost. And so instead of interfering, I just sort of sat on the side of the room and let them talk. It was really a very touching discussion between father and daughter about losing the election, so he knew that he'd lost.

Timothy Naftali

So maybe he was actually surprised it was so close? May have had false hope at the end of the day?
Herbert G. Klein

Well, see the end of the day for him may have been that 11:00 that night. And he knew it was going to be close, but he thought he was going to lose. So I don't think he ever had hope that he was going to win. We probably had more hope than he did.

Timothy Naftali

Let's jump ahead to '62 and the night when he says he's never going to run again. Was he more -- was he more optimistic? Did he think he would win the governorship?

Herbert G. Klein

No, we were -- I didn't plan to join the campaign at that time, and finally he was behind and Sandy was there with Ron Ziegler, and they were two young and inexperienced guys, and I felt that I needed to come in and help, so that time when he called I did agree to come in again for two months. And so I took Ron and Sandy under my wing, and I think they both became very, very efficient guys. And Sandy does a great job for you, I think.

Timothy Naftali

He's great.

Herbert G. Klein

But at any rate, about three weeks before the election was over -- the mistake he made was that he was always talking too much on national issues. We went up and down the state and only [unintelligible] fashion we went to little towns and big towns, but he'd talk about big issues, not about the streets of Shasta or whatever. And so that was a mistake, and I remember we went to Imperial Valley, and we found out that -- we thought we could carry Imperial Valley -- that we were not going to carry it. About that time, we had the Cuban missile incident, and we stopped the campaign immediately, and we were in the San Francisco Bay area somewhere, and so he could find out what was going on and how he should handle that. And that really was the end of the campaign, because all public attention was on what was going on there, and if you look, historically, I think you'll find that the elections across the country didn't change much. After that started happening, you were either ahead or you were behind, and you stayed that way. And Brown was ahead. The peculiar thing about that was that in -- probably it was in 1959 or early '60, they dedicated Candlestick Park, and we were there for the dedication of the ballpark and Pat Brown was. And in the middle he was having problems in the Chessman case so that Pat Brown went out on the pitcher's mound to be introduced and had the most solid booing I ever heard from anybody in political life. The whole audience stood up and collectively booed him because of the Chessman case. In fact, I felt so bad I went out and pulled him off of the mound myself, because his own staff was stunned. And, you know, Nixon went out, and he got a standing ovation. And then two years later he loses the election to Pat Brown. And Pat Brown was a good campaigner, but it was startling change.
David Greenberg

I think he was the mood of the country, with Kennedy, and everything was just blowing in the Democrats' favor. What do you think was --

Herbert G. Klein

We had planned to peak the campaign in the last three weeks, which there were a lot of intense things he wanted to do and talk more on local issues and go to the farmers' market in LA, that kind of thing. And so the timing was all thrown off by that incident and we were behind. So what chance we had to catch up was blown by what happened on the international front.

Timothy Naftali

Since we've raised Cuba, one question we didn't ask about '60 was the story that John Kennedy criticizes Nixon for not being tough enough on Cuba at a time when Nixon knows that the Eisenhower administration is planning to do something, they haven't decided quite yet, against Castro. Do you remember --

Herbert G. Klein

Very clearly. We were in Miami and both candidates spoke to the American Legion there, and Kennedy came forth that he had been briefed by Dulles, by John Foster Dulles.

Timothy Naftali

Allen --

Herbert G. Klein

Allen Dulles, the State Department.

David Greenberg

Allen was CIA. And -- right?

Herbert G. Klein

It would be, it was Allen. So at any rate, we thought that he knew about the train of troops to go in to what became the Bay of Pigs, and from Dulles because he took a stand that we had to get very tough and maybe do something about it, and that put Nixon in a position where he had to take a stand which he didn't really believe in, and that was that we should boycott them, and maybe, I guess it was boycott them, and what do you call it when you patrol ships off?

Timothy Naftali

Quarantine.
Quarantine, yes, quarantine them. So he had to take that position, which he didn't like and didn't believe in. He thought we should go in. And so that led from there, when we got to New York to prepare for the fourth debate, he was about as angry as I'd ever seen him, because he felt that Kennedy had been unfair in this. So he had me call Dulles, and Dulles denied that he told him that, but I didn't really believe him, and Nixon didn't, and so I sort of wrote Dulles off and didn't make a million friends myself there.

Timothy Naftali

So you knew that Dulles was briefing the candidate, and you just assumed that he had talked about --

Herbert G. Klein

Right, but we couldn't prove it. So when it got to the debate, before the debate, Nixon had to take a position which is not exactly what he believed in so that he didn't in any way tip off what we were doing in training those troops. He was aware of the fact that we were training troops in South America.

Timothy Naftali

Did he ever talk to you about William Pauli?

Herbert G. Klein

No.

Timothy Naftali

That was someone who he was sort of talking to about these Cuban issues. So '62, he knows he's behind. Election night, he assumes he's going to lose.

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, so it was a bad night, and I said, "Let's still go down and try to keep people's spirits up." And so once more we talked him into waiting until the next morning because there was some chance we could win, and so he apparently didn't sleep much during that night and none of us did, but we agreed that Haldeman and Finch and I would meet with him the next morning and figure out what to do. And so we went in, and the first thing he said to me was, "I don't want you to try to talk me into going down to that goddamn press." And I said, "No, that isn't our plan." And so I told him our plan was we would handle it just as we did in 1960. And Bob Finch would help write a thank-you to the workers, and I would go down and announce to the press that he'd conceded and analyze why we thought we had lost and go ahead. And so he readily agreed to doing that. So this was maybe 9:00 in the morning and this was to be at 10:00, and so we got everything done, and I told him I was going down. And we had made arrangements with Jack Drown, who was his closest friend, or Pat's -- the Drowns were very close to the Nixons. And Ray Arbuthnot, who was also a great pal of Jack's and had been with us in all of the campaigns, and they're stand-up guys. So they come up to the suite to talk to Nixon while we're going about our business getting ready to concede, and about this time, the television guy we had came
up, and Nixon had been cheerful in going around and thanking everybody on the staff for what they'd
done and shaking their hand and everything, and the television guy came up and just broke down in
tears in Nixon's arms. And about that time, why, Jack Drown and Ray Arbuthnot said, "You're not
going to go down and let the press bluff you out are you?" And with that he said, "No." So I'm down
having this press conference explaining why I think we lost and this kind of thing, and I hear applause
across the lobby, and what we had arranged was that he was to leave out of a back door, and that Pete
Wilson, who was one of the our advance men, would be at the car and shove him in the car and take
him home so he wouldn't see anybody. And so instead of -- once he'd heard from Jack Drown and Ray
Arbuthnot, he decided he'd come down and interrupt my press conference. And when I heard the
applause I'd announced he'd left, and I thought he was in the safe hands of Pete Wilson. Well, at any
rate, the next thing I knew, somebody was tapping me on the shoulder and there was Nixon, who
made his speech.

David Greenberg

I've seen the tape of it, and --

Herbert G. Klein

You see me looking like I'm sick.

David Greenberg

Yeah, Ray Price had told me before I saw the speech that it's not as bad as everybody made it out to
be, and that although there's definitely some anger and resentment, you know, there are also moments
of coherence where he's contained. But it's another one of these classic moments of Nixon on
television having this very important effect on his career.

Herbert G. Klein

Actually, you know, when I went back in the campaign in '69, I decided I'd better read it again. I had
not read it since that moment. I just ran to go to Mexico with my friend Bob Wilson and his wife, and
my wife. So when I read it again, it didn't sound as bad to me.

David Greenberg

That's what Price said, that he re-read it or re-watched it again --

Herbert G. Klein

But the effect that he was an angry man picking on a couple of reporters, and Richard Bergholz was
his principal target.

Timothy Naftali

But it's interesting, again, it's impromptu, and he's a man who's known for his preparation and for
being so careful.
Herbert G. Klein

This went contrary to everything he agreed to from the moment he got up in the morning. He just, on an instant, took the advice and went down because he was angry and sad, I'm sure.

Timothy Naftali

Let's move ahead to the later '60s. Did you assume that he meant it that that was it for his political career?

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, I went down to Puerto Vallarta with my friends, the Wilsons, and that was the end of it, and Howard K. Smith came on with a TV show called the "Obituary of Richard Nixon," which he apologized to me later on, but he did it.

Timothy Naftali

Had Alger Hiss on, right?

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, yeah.

Timothy Naftali

Which must have galled Nixon.

Herbert G. Klein

I'm sure he didn't see it. No, I assumed that was the end of his career. When '64 came up and his friends were trying to talk him into getting back into the race, I was against him getting in. Going back to '62, there was one other important meeting. Before he ran, he was getting advice from a lot of his New York friends, and Len Hall and others that he ought to run for governor. That was a way to keep alive. So he had a meeting of about 10 or 12 of us who were close at some friend's house in Malibu for about two hours one afternoon, and we talked the whole issue through. And he didn't tell us what he decided, but he listened to all of the arguments back and forth and said he was going to talk to Pat and the girls about it. So most of us, thought that -- well, it was pretty even, but most of us thought that he should not run. But I think he'd made up his mind before he left the house, but he didn't want to tell us.

Timothy Naftali

Tell us about the -- when do you see that he's running again?

David Greenberg

Because I have some friends in Venice --
Herbert G. Klein

Talking about that when we were in the Soviet Union in 1959, after we left Moscow we flew in Russian airplanes the whole time, and one of the interesting things was that the doctor with us was an Air Force colonel, I guess he was, anyway, an Air Force officer. And when we flew from St. Petersburg to Novosibirsk, we flew a long way across the country, and one of the his assignments from the Air Force was to take pictures of anything he saw that looked militarily out of the window. And so these airplanes had, like, clothes hangers. You'd hang a newspaper up on these, and that's how you read them on these airplanes. And the KGB stayed up in the front of the airplane with the Vice President and with their key people who were with them, and so I'm back there with the doctor, and so when he'd see something he wanted to take a picture of, I'd go stand in the aisle and see where the KGB was and see if they were in the front so he could take pictures. And so he got a lot of photos out of that plane right behind the KGB.

Timothy Naftali

I want to and ask you, you raised something about Rose Mary Woods. You said that she had an effect on policy.

Herbert G. Klein

Yes.

Timothy Naftali

Give us some examples that you can remember.

Herbert G. Klein

Well, in 1960 she did in particular because we had a scheduling committee, which included Don Hughes, Bob Finch, Rose Mary Woods, and myself. And she was a very key figure in all that. She also, she didn't try to come up with new policy, but she could influence Nixon's view on it because she was always frank with him. And there were never any conversations Rose Mary Woods had that wasn't a very direct one, so sometimes we'd have a problem, and she'd be our go-between. But she was a very smart woman who was totally dedicated to him. And she had a great sense of humor, loved to dance and things like that. But her life was really, completely devoted to Richard Nixon.

Timothy Naftali

How would you describe her political views?

Herbert G. Klein

I would say she was a Republican moderate. But, you know, her view was shaped by Richard Nixon and what her role would be to be able to speak up to him if she thought he was about to do something wrong in what he was doing or what he was saying.
The other thing I wanted to have you talk about was, you mentioned the fact that you thought Kennedy had used religion as an issue in the '60 campaign.

Herbert G. Klein

In the 1960 campaign, Kennedy came to the American Society of Newspaper Editors and made a speech in which he said he was going to test West Virginia to see whether there was still any anti-religious feeling against Catholics. And so he made that sort of the key issue in West Virginia and that was the state that Humphrey needed to carry in order to stay in the campaign. Meanwhile, Bobby Kennedy, he had gone on down there and signed up a lot of slates, and West Virginia voted by slates. And so most of those people were more interested in who was running for sheriff than President. So you signed up sheriffs to be supportive of Kennedy, and when Kennedy carried West Virginia, it was interpreted by the national press as vindication of his religious views, but actually in West Virginia it was matter of the fact that there were more sheriffs for him than anything else.

Timothy Naftali

Was there any concern of dirty tricks during --

Herbert G. Klein

Not from our point of view. Perhaps it would be from Humphrey, I don't know.

David Greenberg

Let's move ahead to '68. What kind of opponent was Humphrey in '68?

Herbert G. Klein

Humphrey was a -- we had Wallace also in that race. Humphrey was a very tough campaigner, and when we thought we should be moving he had more -- he hung on. We did a poll, which was unusual, which was one where we keep going to the same voters all the time, you know, maybe 500 people and go every two or three weeks and ask them where they were. And it was amazing how many people switched between all three candidates at some time during the election campaign; they might have been for Wallace and then they might have been for Humphrey, then they're for Nixon, or in some other order, so that was kind of an unusual aspect of the study where the people moved around that much. And then eventually they deserted Wallace, and we got the majority of those in our poll at that time. But Humphrey told me later that he was surprised when Lyndon Johnson withdrew from the race. He was in Mexico City at the embassy and was watching Lyndon Johnson on television when he learned that Johnson was pulling out of the race, so he didn't get any real help from Johnson.

Timothy Naftali

Where were you the night that Bobby Kennedy was killed?
Herbert G. Klein

It was an important night for me. I was in New York, and I'd gone over to NBC to do a little television interview on the California election. And I went back to the -- they'd arranged we all had suites at the hotel. Haldeman was right below me, and he'd arranged my suite. It was very nice. And so I turned the television on, and I saw Bobby Kennedy finishing making his speech in the Ambassador Hotel, and he went out. It was a ballroom that I had been with Richard Nixon in, you know, 100 times. And you always left that ballroom going through the kitchen, is the way you got out of it without having to shake everybody's hand in the room. So I saw him go into the kitchen and then suddenly the shots rang out. So I was obviously shocked and hoping he was alive. And his press secretary was a friend of mine, who was with him.

Timothy Naftali

Frank Mankiewicz?

Herbert G. Klein

Frank Mankiewicz, he's still a friend. And so, anyway, the question then on my mind was should I call Nixon right away and tell him. I decided, no, it'd be better to not tell him because he's going to need a lot of sharpness the next day regardless of what happened. So I didn't call him, then after a while I decided I should call Haldeman and wake him up. And so I told him about it. And during that night, you know, I thought of -- Wallace had been shot at, and this had happened. And if you're going to be in a campaign, you got to decide whether you're going to be afraid to be next to the candidate or not, whether you're going to be a fatalist. And I decided if you're going to stay in the campaign, you better forget about whatever danger it is, just figure that life will take care of itself and do what you need to do. And it's been a part of my philosophy for my life since that time. But it all occurred that night.

Timothy Naftali

Earlier that year, of course --

Herbert G. Klein

Oh, oh, the other thing on it, what actually happened with Dick Nixon was that Julie and David were watching, and they decided to wake up her father. So they had told him about it. So he knew about it. And during the middle of the night, why, the Secret Service sent agents over immediately to guard all the candidates. And so by morning all the candidates were protected.

Timothy Naftali

A few months earlier, really not much weeks matter, maybe earlier, Martin Luther King had been killed. You had tried to get Nixon to call Martin Luther King in 1960. He handled the issue very differently in '68.

Herbert G. Klein

That was completely on his own. He acted on his own very quickly.
Timothy Naftali

To call Coretta?

Herbert G. Klein

Yes, yes.

Timothy Naftali

Coretta Scott King. Nixon is -- Election Day 1968. Is he optimistic now? He's been pessimistic every other election day --

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah.

Timothy Naftali

-- we talked about, most of them, he seemed rather pessimistic. How does he feel then?

Herbert G. Klein

He's very good. He feels we're going to win. And we didn't have much doubt. Actually it was closer than we anticipated. Just before that, on the Sunday before, there was an interesting incident at -- Johnson had -- I can't remember exactly -- but Johnson had announced that we're going to stop bombing, I think it was, going to stop bombing North Vietnam. So he was calling a halt to the war. And I guess he'd sent over to South Vietnam -- we'd sent them those instructions. And so the rumor was that Anna Chennault had got a hold of him, the President of South Vietnam and told him that he ought to go ahead. Johnson got very angry because Bob Finch had a press conference in which he announced we thought they should go ahead and continue doing it. So on Sunday morning, while Nixon was at his suite in the hotel and Bob Finch and I were there, Lyndon called him and started cussing out Bob Finch on the speakerphone, because he thought this had undercut him and it was a political move on our part. And we thought it was a political move on his part, which I'm sure it was.

Timothy Naftali

Well, there was -- I mean, there were really a lot of rumors that Anna Chennault was talking to them, but she was talking to the South Vietnamese?

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, but I don't know, I don't know personally whether -- I think she did. But I don't know that as a fact.
**Timothy Naftali**

What she did was --

**Herbert G. Klein**

Well, I know she talked to them. She had a lot of impact over there. She talked to them about a lot of issues, but on this particular issue I don't know.

**Timothy Naftali**

Did you know whether his -- whether John Mitchell was talking to them?

**Herbert G. Klein**

I don't know. She'd call me quite a bit for advice and things, but she didn't call me on that.

**Timothy Naftali**

Advice on?

**Herbert G. Klein**

What she was doing, what her public position ought to be.

**Timothy Naftali**

The President is elected. Do you expect to be press secretary?

**Herbert G. Klein**

Yes, I do. I'd envisioned that I would set up a press secretary office modeled after Jim Hagerty. I'd be a strong press secretary and I'd had -- during the campaign I'd decided the mistake I'd made in 1960 was traveling too much, that I needed to be running the entire public relations operation from the headquarters, rather than be traveling on the airplane all the time, where we'd be, you know, jumping at things I had to do, get an article out or whatever, in between airplane stops. So I designated Ron Ziegler to be on the airplane, and I had one of the first land-air portable telephones. It was in a briefcase, which I called my magic carpet. And so I could call him on that, reach him on the airplane.

So what happened on the airplane was that Nixon gave the approval to John Ehrlichman and Bob Haldeman, who were flying constantly with him, to come up with a plan how the White House staff would be organized. They disliked the press intensely, and they knew that if I were to be the press secretary, that I would handle it different than they would. So they decided they would downplay the role of the press secretary and would appoint Ron Ziegler to that position. They originally thought that they would call him the press assistant instead of the press secretary, at a lower pay grade. So I found out that was their plan on election night. And when I found out they were going to use this assistant title and the low pay, I went to them and told them, "If you're going to do Ziegler, you're going to be
undercutting him from the very start, because the press is going to find out that you've done that. And here you have a young guy, and you've weakened him before he even steps into office." So I got them to change it to press secretary and to raise his pay. But I had done, you know, a lot of television during the campaign, and Nixon was impressed by that.

So after the election -- all the television on election night I did. I would be on all the networks and all, every half hour. So in the morning when it was through, we went up to the Nixon suite and we had champagne, and then he and Finch and Haldeman and Ehrlichman are going to fly to Key Biscayne. I was to stay in New York to keep things organized there with John Mitchell. So Nixon came to me on the side and said, "You're just great on television. I want you to do a lot more of that for us." That was all that was said. But right away it was apparent to me that I was not going to be the press secretary, and the way it was outlined, the position, it was not something I wanted to do. I thought it would be demeaning to me to do that kind of a role. So I decided I would challenge the group, because about that time Larry Spivak called and said would I be on "Meet The Press" the following Sunday. So I made up my mind that I said, come up with a plan of what I would like to do, and they could choose or not choose it. So I thought about it. What were the weaknesses in government policy and all? I organized the -- [cell phone rings] Do you want to turn that off? When I looked at the government I decided there was a real need to have a major communications effort, because the Cabinet departments all operated independently. And no one was dealing with the editors and broadcasters around the country, because the whole operation was centered on the White House press corps. So I went on "Meet The Press," and I remember it very well because I had not done that show before, and it's tough. And I answered about four quick questions and I looked over to Larry Spivak, who can be very tough on the air, and they went to a commercial, and he looked over and did like this, and I felt relaxed, because he was a good guy off the air.

So when I got near the end, I decided this was a time I would challenge them. So I answered a question -- it was on Vietnam, and said, "But I'm not sure I'm going to be here to interpret this because I may leave the administration. I haven't made up my mind." And when I got through with the show, Haldeman called on the studio phone right away and said, "The President-Elect said that you shouldn't do anything, that he's going to be back on Saturday, and don't do anything until he has a chance to talk to you." And so I knew that I'd won the battle. And so on the Saturday, we met at the Pierre Hotel. Bryce Harlow was there and Bob Finch and Haldeman and Ehrlichman and the former Vice President. And I outlined my concept for the job and Nixon liked it all. And meanwhile they were on TV -- the Army-Navy game was being played. We're all sports fans. So I could hear that, and when it came to the end and I knew the USC-UCLA game was going to come on, and so I'd invited all these guys to my suite with my wife, to come over and watch the game. And I knew that Nixon wanted to be sure he was home to watch the game. So finally, after he agreed to my concept, he said, "What do you want to call it?" I really hadn't thought about that, so I knew that I had just a few seconds because the game was going to start. And so I said, "Director of Communications." That's how that title originated.

Timothy Naftali

One more question about the '68 campaign. Where did the idea of the -- One more question from the '68 campaign. Where did the idea for Nixon's "secret plan" to end the war come from?
Herbert G. Klein

From the press. Nixon never, to my knowledge, said he had a secret plan. He said he thought he could solve it. And his solution was to negotiate, which is what he did. He did not have a secret plan, and I never heard him say that he did. But the press picked up because he said he could solve it. They picked it up as a secret plan because he wouldn't comment on what it was.

Timothy Naftali

Tell me about the -- during the transition, the administration wanted to announce the entire Cabinet at once.

Herbert G. Klein

That's the President's idea. Each time we would select someone, I was in the new -- what do you call the thing -- the New EOB --

Timothy Naftali

Okay.

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, that's where our transition offices were. So each time he would decide on someone, I would have a press conference for that person there. But when he finalized it, he wanted to announce it on television with all together. And the final job that he hadn't filled was secretary of labor. Meanwhile I was in Detroit to meet with the heads of the auto companies and with a lot of the dealers. They had an annual thing where they brought them in. So I was talking to them and all of a sudden I got a call from the White House, said, "You've got to be back tonight because the President's going to announce in his conference he's completed his" -- And I said, "Well, who did he get for secretary of labor?" And he said, "George Shultz." I said, "Who's George Shultz?" He goes, "He was then dean of the School of Business, University of Chicago." And so I asked the head of General Motors, and he said, "Oh, we use him all the time." So I hurried back and the idea was to have all of them at one time on television, which was the President's idea as far as I know.

Timothy Naftali

What is that? You're director of communications, and this is a major television event that's been organized without your participation.

Herbert G. Klein

I knew we were going to do it, but I didn't know when. And we'd talked about doing it that way. And the other part was that we'd have a meeting with them all in which I would explain to them my function, what their role was in it. So I would select the person that was to run the public affairs office of a Cabinet department, and that person would report primarily to the Cabinet officer, but he would also report to me. So they would have a dual responsibility. So after we had the television show, or before, we delineated my role to them.
Timothy Naftali

From the --

Herbert G. Klein

The other important part of my job was to train them to be on television, so that on Sunday mornings I would spend my mornings trying to be sure they were making the right points and that we wanted them to not have the departments compete with each other as to who's going to be on. So I would select who was going to be on television.

Timothy Naftali

The President chose a secretary of defense who then declined [unintelligible] --

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah.

Timothy Naftali

Do you know some of that story? Remember some of it?

Herbert G. Klein

I just remember -- I knew that he wanted him and he declined. The part I know is that he decided on Mel Laird. Mel Laird would confer with me a lot on who he should have on his staff, because it was -- I looked at it as the most difficult department we had to run. And he wanted to appoint someone who was a friend of mine and his as the public affairs officer. And I told him, because he was unskilled in Pentagon language, he'd get cut up by them, and that he should retain the Democrat for six months or a year and that was Jerry Freedine [phonetic sp] we kept on.

Timothy Naftali

I'm going to jump around a bit because we don't have too much time and there's a number of issues we really should cover. I want to start with one you raised. Tell us about the public affairs side of the space program. You said you had somebody to talk about the moon landing.

Herbert G. Klein

Oh, Dick was very, very interested in that whole space thing. He let Agnew be the contact with it, but he had a personal interest in it. So the day we landed on the moon, I was with -- who was the first astronaut?

Timothy Naftali

Neil Armstrong.
No, it was --

You mean the very first one?

Yeah.

Oh, oh, because he was on the moon. The very first one was Alan --

Allen Shepard. Allen Shepard and I were watching it in the White House. And Dick Nixon and Bill Rogers were watching it in his office in the EOB. So the idea was that we would all watch it separately, we'd go in and see the President and the secretary of state, then we would go do television on it. So it was an interesting thing to me to watch Allen Shepard, because as we're going down, he would move this way like he was steering down himself to the moon. And then he went over and explained it all to the President and to the secretary of state as to what had happened and what the effect was. Then we went on television. And the only injury that Allen Shepard ever got operating on the moon was he jumped in the car and cut his hand on the way to the television studio.

So when the lunar module landed on the --

Nixon was watching carefully.

But watching with you in --

No.

-- in the EOB.
Herbert G. Klein

No, he was watching with Bill Rogers.

Timothy Naftali

Bill Rogers. Now, there was a speech prepared in case the two astronauts, Aldrin and Armstrong, were stranded on the moon. What kind of contingency did you have to prepare for as director of communications in case this was not successful?

Herbert G. Klein

I didn't have anything to do with it.

Timothy Naftali

Tell us about China. When did you have an inkling that the President was thinking of a dramatically new approach to the People's Republic of China?

Herbert G. Klein

Early on, because I knew what he'd written in the magazine --

"Foreign Affairs."

Timothy Naftali

"Foreign Affairs." And he talked about it on and off all during his administration, when we were talking in quiet, that he was interested in -- but I didn't know what was happening between him and Henry Kissinger. And what I do know is that they were sending all kinds of little secretive things. One of the things that always amused me was that one time they decided it was time to let Zhou Enlai know they wanted to talk. So Kissinger -- and they decided what ambassador would have contact with the Chinese, and it was our ambassador in Warsaw. So he sent word to him that the next time he saw the ambassador in China to tell him, just walk up to him and say, "I think it's about time we started talking." And the ambassador just couldn't believe that President Nixon would be saying anything like that, so he didn't do anything. He sends a second time; he still didn't do anything. The third time, Kissinger sent word that either do it or come back. So he walked up to the Chinese ambassador, and the Chinese was startled, and as soon as he could, left the party. And he, we learned later, cabled to Zhou Enlai that this had happened. Zhou Enlai, to me, was the smartest diplomat of any I ever met. I thought he was really brilliant. So he got that. When Henry was making his secret trip from Pakistan to Beijing, I was having a conference of editors in New Orleans, with Southern editors and with five Cabinet officers and the President. And the idea was that I did this in different parts of the country, that you'd have -- in the daytime they would be with each Cabinet officer, and they'd talk about where they related and what they were doing, and then they'd finally have a meeting with the President. The President, that night, while Henry was flying, talked about China, but it was during cocktail hour and nobody paid much attention. Nobody wrote anything. But the USIA, Voice of America, picked up
what Nixon was saying and sent that out. When Kissinger arrived in Beijing, I'm told, Zhou Enlai presented the text of what Nixon had said.

Timothy Naftali

Did you know that Kissinger was on his way?

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, I did know, yeah.

Timothy Naftali

So when were you let into the -- when were you sort of read into the story? When did you know this was happening?

Herbert G. Klein

Just right at the very end.

Timothy Naftali

What was it like to be director of communications with someone like Kissinger, who himself became an international celebrity? After that trip he becomes a celebrity. To what extent --

Herbert G. Klein

Oh, he was a celebrity before. He'd date girls, and that would be a big thing.

Timothy Naftali

But how -- I mean, to what extent were you able to shape his public persona?

Herbert G. Klein

Part of my job was to keep him off television, because the President thought that Henry, with his German accent, would sound too warlike. So I was allowed to use Henry to brief reporters, and he would do that under Ron Ziegler primarily, but I wouldn't let him go on television with that ill effect all the way through.

Timothy Naftali

But, I mean, he did do television.

Herbert G. Klein

Later.
When --

Herbert G. Klein

I don't think even until he was secretary of state.

Timothy Naftali

So that was -- well, to what extent do you think there was a little bit of jealousy also between the President and Henry over -- this was partly jealousy, too. Because Kissinger was very effective on television.

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, but I don't think there was jealousy. I think the President generally was concerned about a war - - you know, war type accent during the Vietnam War. And my observation was that the way the two of them worked was that the strategist was Richard Nixon, and the person who would execute it was Henry Kissinger. So I think that the various things that they devised for the negotiations and all were primarily those that came out of Nixon's mind, and that the person that would do the negotiating would be Kissinger. I didn't go on the first trip, although Ziegler and I had the job of trying to select who the 100 people would be who could go from the press corps.

Timothy Naftali

I think 200.

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, and that was a political fight. Haldeman didn't want some because they were not friendly enough.

Timothy Naftali

Why didn't you go on the trip?

Herbert G. Klein

I was told that somebody ought to stay back and keep things going in Washington.

Timothy Naftali

Who designed -- I mean, who thought about the television images of the trip to China back in this country? Who was thinking about the public affairs part of the trip, from scheduling and --
Herbert G. Klein

Oh, Ziegler and I did primarily, because we had to select who was going to go. I arranged to have a number of -- like, 10 reporters write, each one, a chapter of a book so we could have an instant book. The television time probably came mainly from Roger Ailes, I think.

Timothy Naftali

Well, I was thinking in terms of later on, we've talked about photo opportunities, in the case of the Reagan era. Who was thinking about the photo opportunities in China?

Herbert G. Klein

I don't think anybody. We didn't have enough advance men to really even think about what would happen over there. We just figured it would happen. You know, normally you have an advance man who can tell you about all different things. There were not that many. I went there about three months later, when we had the cease-fire, and the President sent Kissinger and myself to Hanoi to negotiate with the North Vietnamese as to what our relationship would be after the cease-fire. And that's how I got to know Zhou Enlai, because we went there and negotiated -- mainly Henry, but I was just like an aide on it. But it was interesting because it was a time when Jane Fonda had promoted the idea that there'd been a Christmas bombing. We'd wiped out Hanoi. And I had a chance to get their car and their driver and see most of that city in them. What we had done was the most precise bombing job you can imagine. We knocked out every bridge. One place I saw the railroad station had been knocked out on this side of the street, and on the other side little shops were operating. We walked out one block where a pilot got shot down and decided to take some other people with him. But we'd done a marvelous job of knocking it all out. When our airplane landed, they just dried the cement on the runway because there'd been so many bomb holes in it. So at any rate, we went from there to China to talk to Zhou Enlai about what had happened and what our relationship would be under the new thing. And that was when I got to know him some.

Timothy Naftali

We've talked with Mel Laird, and Secretary Laird talked about how important for American public opinion it was to show that we were withdrawing from Vietnam. To what extent did your office work with the Pentagon on these plans for withdrawal and making public the fact that we were withdrawing on date certain a certain number of troops?

Herbert G. Klein

I had nothing to do with the number of troops or what dates it would be at all. My job was just to be sure that it was handled on television correctly and that it was -- so mine was more of a handler's job than a policy job.

Timothy Naftali

A couple more questions, because you've been very patient. One is, in looking through the materials from the 1972 campaign, one gets the impression that for a while, until he dropped out, President Nixon was worried about Muskie, thought Muskie could pose a threat to his reelection. Do you
remember -- I mean, how optimistic were you and the team about President Nixon's -- the likelihood that he would be reelected?

Herbert G. Klein

We thought it was a cinch.

Timothy Naftali

Even against Muskie?

Herbert G. Klein

Even against Muskie, yeah.

Timothy Naftali

Well, once it became McGovern --

Herbert G. Klein

See, we thought that McGovern made it easier. But we felt that his record was such and that we'd moved ahead enough on Vietnam by decreasing troops and all that we would be fine. And the only big problems we could see, I could see, from that campaign were the economy and the possibility of giving a lot of problems with dirty tricks, the Dwight Chapin type thing.

Timothy Naftali

So you knew that to be a problem already?

Herbert G. Klein

I knew that there was a problem there, yeah.

Timothy Naftali

And you knew Chapin? I mean [unintelligible] --

David Greenberg

Dwight [unintelligible] or Dwight Chapin?

Herbert G. Klein

Dwight Chapin.
Chapin, who you knew from USC.

Yeah, I didn't -- he was in Ron Ziegler's class. But he's a great guy, just got involved in these little tiny things, like sending too many pizzas and that kind of stuff.

Segretti was part of that --

Yeah, part of that he carried out further.

Well --

But I thought that Watergate was starting to break loose some, and was just a minor form at that time. I thought Ed -- I went to Haldeman and said -- I think I campaigned for 70,000 miles during that campaign by myself. I made speeches around the country, things like that. So I went to Haldeman and I said that I thought the two things we had to be careful about were to watch the economy, because that could be a serious problem, and the second was to fire two or three people so that it was symbolic of the fact that we're cleaning up whatever problems there were in the White House. Obviously, I should have gone to the President with that argument.

This is before the break-in, the Watergate break-in?

The break-in had taken place earlier.

It had already taken place?

Yeah.
Timothy Naftali

What, what --

Herbert G. Klein

See and there were stories, stories trying to break in "The Washington Post" about Watergate.

Timothy Naftali

Yes, about Segretti?

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, well, but more than Segretti, actually the break-in.

Timothy Naftali

This is just after the break-in. What role did they give -- what role did Haldeman and the President give you to manage the press reaction to the break-in?

Herbert G. Klein

They didn't give me any. That was Zeigler's job.

Timothy Naftali

But you're director of communications.

Herbert G. Klein

But he's the press secretary.

Timothy Naftali

Help me understand, you're director of communications, is it that they thought it was too small of an event that it didn't rise to your level? Why did --

Herbert G. Klein

No, see Zeigler, Zeigler had equal rank with me. We both reported to the President. And so it was an issue that was going to come out of the White House would be one that I wouldn't be getting into it. The problems with the press developed between Zeigler and the press during his briefings, and I fortunately knew nothing about it and so that I could say nothing about it.

Timothy Naftali

Were you a little concerned when they called Watergate a third-rate burglary?
Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, because I thought it was a bad term that he was going to have to eat, which he did.

Timothy Naftali

To set up Watergate, let's go back to '71. What role if any did you play in the Nixon's administration's reaction to the Pentagon Papers issue?

Herbert G. Klein

Pretty major role. We had a lot of meetings in my office right after that started happening, which involved John Mitchell and Mel Laird, maybe Bill Rogers, I'm not sure, Ron Zeigler, and myself, and maybe someone else, I don't know, possibly Colson. And so the question was you know, how do we handle it, because the Pentagon Papers didn't indict us in the slightest. They were all about things beforehand, but our concern was keeping the public supportive of us in the Vietnam War. And so Mitchell was really the dominant factor in the strategy that we ended up with of trying to prevent publication. My approach to it was that the publication was right, had they cleared it, but they knew that we had a rule that you should -- classified documents you should clear, and they hadn't done that, and that was my argument against it. And I was supported some by the courts.

Timothy Naftali

What, what was Mel Laird's position?

Herbert G. Klein

Mel was just very angry about the whole thing because he felt it reflected on him and his department, and he wanted to go get them.

Timothy Naftali

Although he and someone in the Pentagon later concluded that most of this material was already, was not really of great sensitivity.

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah.

Timothy Naftali

What was the strategy for dealing with leaking?

Herbert G. Klein

The person who was most sensitive about it was Henry. And then the President would get angry, and he would see a little thing on the news notes, and he'd write a note on the side to me, "Why don't you
stop talking to these people or just stop talking to them?" And I took the attitude that I'm independent, I can talk to anybody. I never stopped talking to any reporter because I was ordered to. And I always found that with the President that sometimes he would say things to me which might have been harsh and if I just ignored him a couple of days, why, he would say, "I see that you didn't really do that," and I said, "No I didn't," and he said, "That's fine." And I think part of the problem which occurred with people like Colson was that he would take a harsh statement and make it worse. Bob Finch and I, who had been close to Dick Nixon for all those years, never did that. I think that was a serious problem.

Timothy Naftali

Was it just that his temper would flare up when you knew that it would?

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, that he would just sound off and get it off his chest and then just ignore it.

Timothy Naftali


Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, Colson was the toughest person in the administration, and he did a lot of things which I object to to this day. I think that the pressure he was putting on Jeb Magruder probably led Jeb Magruder to some of the things he did on the getting okay on the break-in. I can't prove that. I don't think that Colson ordered it in any way, but Magruder did. I had a theory on how Magruder got John Mitchell to approve it, but again it's my speculation. John had a wife who could be a very big problem sometimes, whether she'd speak out at all hours day or night on whatever issue was bothering her, and then one of my jobs was to try to take care of Martha Mitchell as well. And if there was someone who was controversial, that was me. And so he was taking a little vacation in Florida. Jeb Magruder came down with a list of things he wanted to approve for the committee, and my theory is that he waited until about the last of Martha Mitchell was yelling at John saying, "Get rid of that young guy and come on back here," and so he just sort of checked it off quickly and let it go. I think he was too smart to do something like that deliberately.

Timothy Naftali

One of the things --

Herbert G. Klein

My other theory is that -- I used to talk to Magruder sometimes about what we did in 1960 in intelligence. And in 1960 Kennedy had a guy named Dick Tuck who was a big trickster and a good guy. So he would do -- like, he was the one who planted cookies, Chinese cookies, that said, at a Nixon dinner, something like "Beat Nixon" or something. But at any rate he was Kennedy's guy to follow us around. So I liked the idea of knowing who was our spy. So I would tell him where we were going to be next, and when he would go to a phone booth I would send somebody in the phone booth next and
see what he was reporting in, and that was my idea of intelligence. I think that Magruder set out to do something more cutting edge. I think that's partly how Watergate occurred.

Timothy Naftali

If everyone was optimistic about the campaign and you knew that it was easy, why the pressure of political intelligence in the summer of 1972? I mean, try to help us understand that.

Herbert G. Klein

I think it was because just the point I just made, that they wanted to show that they could do a better job. I don't know whether theories about John Dean's personal interest regarding his wife, I don't know whether that's true or not true. But I put the main blame on Magruder being too weak to resist, who ended up being pressured, but feeling he was pressured by Colson to take stronger action. The whole effort was to win big so you had a landslide. It wasn't to win; it was to win big.

Timothy Naftali

When do you think that became the objective, from the beginning in the '72 campaign?

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, from the beginning. We thought we could win because we had a good record, and we thought that he had kept the public support for him despite the difficulties of the Vietnam War, and we'd had great demonstrations, but the only thing we didn't really have any control over Kent State, and that shook everybody up.

Timothy Naftali

Let's talk a bit about -- you don't mind going back in time. Did you participate at all in the decision that the bombing should be secret, of Cambodia?

Herbert G. Klein

No, in fact, I was put in a difficult position because, you know, I think we knew, I knew, because I would -- the President would send me out occasionally to Vietnam with some governors and congressmen to look at it and bring back sort of a reporter's view of what's going on to him in Vietnam. And so I knew that we were, we were taking action before we announced it. But when we announced it, it had a public reaction far greater than I expected. And the day -- the President spoke one night and the next morning I was due to speak at the School of Journalism at Columbia University, which I did to a very hostile audience, as you might expect. And that night I was to be on the "Dick Cavett Show," and "The New York Times" ran a story saying I was going to be there and there were some threats, so the Secret Service, for the only time, had people in the audience to guard me. Because it really turned public reaction on much stronger than any of us had anticipated.

Timothy Naftali

Is it --
Herbert G. Klein

Also, one of those times when I was in Vietnam I got a call about midnight before we were going to leave to come back. I was there with Bryce Harlow and with some congressmen and Governor [Raymond] Shafer and another governor. And about midnight Haig called me and said that, "I think it would be good if you went over to Phnom Penh tomorrow and talked to the President of Cambodia." And I said, "Well, I can't because I'm supposed to talk to the President of South Vietnam and bring these people back tomorrow." And he said, "You don't hear me, I said Searchlight says you are to go over tomorrow." So I said "All right," so.

Timothy Naftali

Searchlight is Nixon.

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, that's his code. Mine was "Witness." Henry's was "Woodchopper." Anyway, so during the night, every couple hours, somebody would come in from -- some papers from the back channel to give me what I was supposed to do when I got to Phnom Penh. And I went out and I decided I should have someone with me, so I took Governor Shafer with me. We went out in a small jet, and I was surprised that we had four soldiers with rifles with us, and it was because they were shooting at the airport at Phnom Penh at that time. We landed and the ambassador there didn't know why I was there. He arrived in a Checker Cab painted black so it would look like a limousine. And took me to his residence to hide me when I told him that I needed to meet with the President and he said, "Well, the President sleeps late so you've got to wait a while." So I waited, I could see reporters surrounding the place, and then decided I should see a little bit of the town if I was going to. And then we got an appointment with the President at, say, like at 10 or 11 in the morning.

Timothy Naftali

[Unintelligible]

Herbert G. Klein

Yes.

Timothy Naftali

[Unintelligible]

Herbert G. Klein

No it was with --

Timothy Naftali

The President.
Herbert G. Klein

The President. So my purpose, by my instructions, was to assure him that we were supportive of him, that Nixon was going to, and to -- because I was a close personal friend that they could count on us to continue to support him. So I spent about a half hour with him with Shafer there, and then I got Shafer to leave so I could just talk to him personally about it and emphasize it even more. So I did that, and I was trying to figure out what could I give him as a souvenir and I had a Nixon fountain pen I gave him. And then so I then went back to Saigon to report on my conversation to the ambassador and to our chief of operations there, military operations. And then about halfway back to Hawaii, where I was to report to the Navy chief of the Pacific, I got another call from Haig. He said, "Searchlight wants you here tomorrow morning to talk to the Cabinet and a few congressional people." So I said, "Well, I can't because I've got to talk to these people in Hawaii." He said, "We've got another airplane for you. You've got an hour to talk to them and then get on." So I arrived about 3:00 in the morning in Washington, and I had with me a gun, which the South Vietnamese general had given me from -- proud it was made in China, to show me that their weapons were coming from China. And it was a disabled gun, but it was kind of a nice souvenir. So I decided I was going to show this to the Cabinet, and I thought, "How am I going to get this in the White House?" So I called one of my aides about 4:00 a.m., and he figured out how to get it in and delivered to me. And so I met with them and described what was going on with both Cambodia and Vietnam and showed them the gun. And I went to Chicago for a press conference, and then I collapsed.

Timothy Naftali

This was after the secret bombing of Cambodia?

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, it was, yeah.

Timothy Naftali

Where were you on Kent State, the day of the tragedy?

Herbert G. Klein

I was in the White House, and it really alarmed everybody because it, you know, came as a complete surprise. The President didn't know exactly what he should do about it, if anything. So I can just remember that, you know, it was a general alarm as to how to handle it, but we decided the best thing we could do is not to, was deny, to deny any role, and that was Zeigler's role to do that.

Timothy Naftali

But the President was shocked?

Herbert G. Klein

He was very shocked.
He must have been angry at the National Guard for having done --

Oh, yeah, well, you know, it was sure to stir up more trouble. At that time we had buses -- when they would have riots we would have buses surrounding the White House to keep people from climbing in the grounds. I had National Guard troops sleeping outside of my office on weekends in the hallways. Part of my role was to go to where the central headquarters would be to be sure that we didn't have somebody who would be a hot head and get us, take some action, which would provoke more action. So I took that role on myself.

In 1972, what role did you play in shaping the Southern strategy, if any? And --

By 1972, Haldeman was trying to be more dominant, so I had very little role in that.

Because it's very interesting to see how President Nixon tries to deal with George Wallace, particularly on issues like busing.

Yeah.

Do you remember talking about that with him?

No, I don't.

1973, why do you -- how do you decide to leave and when do you decide to leave?

After the campaign, I went with some friends from San Diego down to Puerto Vallarta. My wife just get, like, a week's vacation and while I was there, why, before I left, to our surprise Haldeman called a meeting with the staff and asked everybody to submit their resignation, which we all did. And so I, you
know, I was wondering -- by this time there was more of a riff between Haldeman and myself where I didn't carry out certain things because I didn't believe in them.

Timothy Naftali

Such as?

Herbert G. Klein

Just not talking to certain reporters or they were more of how to handle the press. He would have liked -- he wanted us to cut off handling the press. I thought we should be doing more with the press. And Jeb Magruder would -- and then Larry --

Timothy Naftali

Higby.

Herbert G. Klein

Higby, and Higby would send out all these instructions about doing all this and paperwork, and I just didn't believe in doing it all so I would not do it all. And then I'd let them know what I'm doing, but I didn't want to spend all my time on paperwork. And so at any rate while I was down there I got a call that I should come up to Camp David on certain date a couple days later to have a talk. So I went up not knowing exactly what was going to happen. And I got there and Haldeman met me and said that he thought I ought to resign and that, did I want to become the ambassador to Mexico or did I want to head the USIA, but they wanted to have more control over what was happening in the press office. And I said, "Well, I don't feel that way, and I want to hear it from the President if that's the case." And so I talked to the President, and the President was surprised, and he didn't really ask me one thing or the other. He just talked to me. But I knew then that I was on my way out. But about that time more things started with Watergate, so people, so Haldeman and those people would say, "You've got to stay longer." So I had said in maybe October or so of the year before that I was going to leave sometime early in the next administration, because I thought I really had to get back to making some money for my family. And I -- that was my plan but not in that fashion. So at any rate I decided I would just let the word out that I was going to resign, and so then I got a lot of job offers. I think I had 32 of them or something like that. And I decided I shouldn't stay in the government. There would be no purpose for me. So that was how it happened.

Timothy Naftali

Did they brief you on Watergate? Did they -- I mean, did you -- did they sit down and tell you?

Herbert G. Klein

Well, after I left I got a call. I was in Quebec, no, Montreal, and I got a call from Haig that the President would like to see me in Key Biscayne, and I got a rumor that they wanted me to come back in and handle the Watergate things.
Timothy Naftali

This is when?

Herbert G. Klein

This would be in probably late 1973.

Timothy Naftali

Okay.

Herbert G. Klein

Or early 1974. And so I tried to avoid the call because I thought that was what it was going to be, and I just had started my new job with Metro Media. And so I got some calls from people like Leonard -- -- the attorney.

Timothy Naftali

Oh, Garment.

Herbert G. Klein

Garment, right, and Garment all saying that they really needed the help, and so I did fly to Key Biscayne, and Haig and Zeigler tried to put a lot of pressure on me to come in and take over all the Watergate things, because he was no longer credible. And I said I just didn't feel like I could do it because I had a new job and owed something to my family as well. And they said, "Well, fly on up to Washington with us and let the President talk to you." And so I got on Air Force One and met with the President. The President said, "I know you got a new job and what do you think?" And I said, "I think it would be a real hardship on me. I don't like to tell you no because I've never said no to something you've asked me to do that I thought was reasonable." And he said, "Well, I understand that; that's fine." He started talking football probably. So he never put any pressure on me at all.

Timothy Naftali

But he also didn't talk to you about Watergate did he?

Herbert G. Klein

No, he just, the question was, would I come in and help, and he didn't ask me to help him. He didn't talk about how do you solve it, no, he didn't ask me.

Timothy Naftali

But did he ever? I mean from June of '72 until this point in, let's say, early '74, did President Nixon ever sit down and say, he'd known you for years, say, "Herb, this is what happened."
No, never heard him do that to anybody. Now, I had a very hard time, even after he left office, to get him to say that he was wrong. And finally I arranged for a television show with the guy from Great Britain.

David Frost. I arranged for him to go on David Frost because I thought Frost would be tough and whatever he did with Nixon would be believable. And he came close to saying he was wrong, but he didn't actually say it directly.

Can you tell us a little bit about how you set this up with David Frost?

Well, David approached me, said he wanted to do it, and I knew him for a long time and I thought he was someone I could count on to be honest with him, but he would be a tough questioner, and I knew that Dick Nixon was always at his very best, the tougher the questions, like some of the best things he did with the CBS correspondent.

Dan Rather. One of his best interviews was with Dan Rather. So, anyway, I talked him into doing it.

You talked him into doing it. He needed the money, too, at the point.

Yeah.

But it wasn't the money at that point, it was the question whether he would go on the air and do the -- and my hope was that out of that would come this thing everybody kept saying to him, "Why don't you
just say it was wrong," and he won't say that. So he came close to it on that show but he didn't actually use those words.

Timothy Naftali

Did you actually talk to him about the importance of saying he was wrong?

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah I did, yeah. Before the show I talked to him quite a bit about it.

Timothy Naftali

And what did he say?

Herbert G. Klein

He said he probably would.

Timothy Naftali

He said he probably would?

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, he didn't make a promise. He said he --

Timothy Naftali

Did he actually believe, though, that he'd been wrong?

Herbert G. Klein

Well, I think he believed that his -- I think he thought that Lyndon Johnson and Jack Kennedy had got through with the lot of things. He didn't realize the full force of an antagonistic Congress and a press that was out to get his blood because they had missed the story in the first place. And I don't think he realized the force of that would force him into the position he was in. And I remember the night that, Bloody Saturday, I was --

Timothy Naftali

Saturday Night Massacre.

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, I was in, at that time I was back working for Metro Media and I got a call. And Haig, he says, "You won't believe what just happened but you better know." And because he just -- they just went on
thinking they could get away with it all, and had he just admitted wrong and got rid of a couple people already, it would have probably never have happened.

Timothy Naftali

Help me understand this. He's a man who didn't think he'd get a fair shake from the Washington press.

Herbert G. Klein

Yes.

Timothy Naftali

So he should have been on his guard, and yet he thought he'd get away with it, why?

Herbert G. Klein

Nobody else had been caught up in that kind of thing.

Timothy Naftali

But you'd been around, you'd been around for a while; you'd been to all those campaigns. Was it the same kind of stuff as what Johnson and Kennedy had been doing?

Herbert G. Klein

Well, it was not the same kind of stuff but it was -- what they were doing probably was worse. Johnson's people were stealing money, and you had a lot of questions about his broadcast license, other things like that. That's an entirely different thing. When he said, "I'm not a crook," he really believed he was not a crook. He didn't steal anybody's money. What he didn't realize was that he was exerting power that he didn't have.

Timothy Naftali

Did you get a sense as -- you were talking about your surprise and the White House surprise at the time of Kent State, did you get a sense that the country was changing? You had been, you know, director of communications. Your whole goal was to think about shaping public opinion. Did you ever sense maybe the country was moving in a different direction?

Herbert G. Klein

I knew that we were getting -- well, the best thing he did was he made his speech about -- what do you call the public thing?

Timothy Naftali

The silent majority.
Herbert G. Klein

The silent majority. We really got [unintelligible] mail on that, but I knew that that was wearing out, and the Kent thing speeded it up considerably. Cambodia speeded it up considerably. So our support was weakening. But through the campaign of '72 it was still there.

Timothy Naftali

Did you play a role in shaping the silent majority speech?

Herbert G. Klein

No, that was done at the Speech Department.

Timothy Naftali

What suggestions did you give the President that he didn't take that might have helped his public image in this period when you were director of communications?

Herbert G. Klein

Well, I thought he should have more press conferences. He wanted fewer, and he was encouraged to have less relationship with the press. I thought that he could handle them well, and that if he had more press conferences, more contact, he could handle it, maybe would have realized the intensity of the opposition. That was one of the major things. I thought he was giving Colson way too much leeway. Colson was -- I had a very good working relationship with the President of all the networks and the whole communication structure, and Colson would be undercutting me with that by going secretly to meet them, and they'd call me and ask, "What the hell's going on?" So I thought he was giving too much support to Colson. Bob Haldeman, you know, he and I have had our meeting of the ways and renewed our friendship before he died. He and I and Bob Finch had lunch one time to talk it all out. In fact, in his book he is very kind to us both, but I think he just became too consumed with power. The problem was that he had a lot of young guys who -- they would tell a Cabinet officer, "The President wants this," probably the only time they had seen the President was the weeks he'd been on television. And he had a few too much power was given to, the President delegated too much power to Haldeman and Ehrlichman and to Colson. And the kind of language he used at the -- came out, I've never heard him use anytime when I've been around him. He might swear just a little bit like I've said "damn" or "hell" sometime, but that was about it. He would never use that kind of language.

Timothy Naftali

Did you actually talk to the President?

Herbert G. Klein

No, I didn't go to the President with that kind of thing; I'd talk to Haldeman about it.
Timothy Naftali

But you knew sometimes Haldeman wasn't carrying your mail, wasn't moving your mail.

Herbert G. Klein

Well, I wasn't sure when he did or when he didn't. I was in Haldeman's office one time when Kissinger threatened to resign because Rogers was getting too much play, and we had to calm Kissinger down. So I never knew one way or the other, but I -- the first big fight I had with Colson was over he was putting too much pressure on Magruder, who worked for me. He was trying to get Magruder to do things in my office that -- I protected my office very carefully so that we kept our credibility. Credibility of that office was totally important to me and so that's the kind of thing I would disagree with Colson about. And that is what I was trying to point out to the President, is credibility was the key to the whole thing.

Timothy Naftali

Tell us about Magruder. What kind of person was he?

Herbert G. Klein

He's a very nice young guy who was very weak, and he would let himself get pushed around. The time I had the belt over in his behalf over at Colson, I was surprised how tough Colson could be. Because normally I could call someone in that was junior to me, say, "This is how we've got to do it," and he would agree, and Colson wouldn't move one inch.

Timothy Naftali

Tell us a bit about the relationship between Bill Rogers and the President. Because Bill Rogers -- the President brings Bill Rogers in at a very difficult time, in '73 when he was about to fire Ehrlichman and Haldeman. It's a strange relationship.

Herbert G. Klein

Bill Rogers and Dick Nixon were close personal friends like Bebe Rebozo would be through most all of his career. And he was his best friend in the Eisenhower Cabinet. Henry would have liked it, Haldeman would have liked to get rid of Rogers, but they would never say that to Dick Nixon because Dick Nixon was loyal.

Timothy Naftali

But he did marginalize Rogers.

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, he marginalized what he was doing. And because Bill Rogers wasn't able to cope with the ability to wield power that Mel Laird could do or Henry Kissinger could do, they were -- they could -- they
knew how to move things around in a tougher way. Bill was just a very nice guy and a very smart guy and a very honest guy.

Timothy Naftali

Fast forward a bit. Did you see President Nixon after he had resigned? How long after he resigned did you see President Nixon?

Herbert G. Klein

Well, I saw him frequently afterwards. I don't know how often, but the first call I had after he went to San Clemente, it was pretty memorable. About, before he left, the smoking gun tape had him talking to Colson about me, in which he said, between he and Colson, said, "He's not our kind of guy. He's got egg on his face." That was one of the quotes, and I was playing golf with some friends and I got a call from a reporter, said, "You better get back to your office and see what's been said." So, the way I treated it was, we're friends and I've certainly heard a lot of things said in the locker room which people don't really mean, so I dismissed it that way. But it bothered me some, and about the fourth day he got back he called me on the phone and said, "You know, I want to talk to you about this, and I'm sorry," which I thought was one of the more noble things that he did.

Timothy Naftali

Four days after resigning?

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah.

Timothy Naftali

Did you visit him?

Herbert G. Klein

I visited him, not right away, but I did quite often, yes.

Timothy Naftali

And he was very sick by that time, physically.

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, see, we had the same doctor.

Timothy Naftali

Was he pleased with his performance on the Frost -- in the Frost interviews?
Herbert G. Klein

Yeah, I think, he would never admit he was really pleased, but I think he was. I think he did well. He turned the public opinion around for quite a while. The best press conference he ever had was the very first one when he took office and he really did a great job and all the press left the press conference saying, "There's a new Nixon who just did this press conference." And he'd been open and all and there was a phrase that a reporter came up with in describing the Vietnam War, which he adopted and used it quite a bit just from a reporter. Usually it was hard to get him to admit he liked something that he did, but he liked those two, and I think they both were really very good.

Timothy Naftali

He liked the Frost interview and the first press conference?

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah.

Timothy Naftali

Tell me about his last speech to the Bohemian Club, please.

Herbert G. Klein

He loved the Bohemian Grove, as do I. Everybody who goes there does. And he agreed to make -- the primary speeches are called Lakeside Talks, and the lakeside, being a pond with some grass in front of it, big redwoods in back of it and on the middle Saturday you have about 2,000 men there. In this case, Reagan was there and I know [unintelligible] people like that, sitting on the grass while Nixon spoke. And Nixon belonged to a camp called Caveman; I belonged to one called Spot. There are names like that all over. Reagan's camp was Owl's Nest. Ford is -- I forget what his is. But at any rate he came out there and talked to them, he made this speech, two times I heard him do it, you know different circumstance. One was to the "American Saturday Newspaper" editors two or three years after he left office, which he got a standing ovation from them, which I felt just really excited. I was introducing him, and to have my colleagues give him a standing ovation was really something. And in both cases he took people on a tour of the world and told them what he thought was going on in each part of the world in very precise, understandable terms. And at the Bohemian Grove the rule is that you speak for 30 minutes. And he stood there for 30 minutes with no notes, spoke on this tour around the world and just knocked everybody off their socks. It was probably one of the best speeches I ever heard him make. And he didn't have a single note. Then he certainly enjoyed it so much he stayed a day or two and he sort of wandered around and these people would look at him, the Vice President or the former President. And right afterward there was a political problem. I don't remember what it was. So he called a group of us to his Caveman camp and talked this problem out. Not affecting him personally at all. But whatever it was he --

Timothy Naftali

Was it in the Clinton period or the Reagan period?
Herbert G. Klein

It was probably the Clinton period.

Timothy Naftali

Tell me, did he get philosophical about his career near the end? Did you talk to him about it?

Herbert G. Klein

No, his whole talk was explaining what was going on in the world.

Timothy Naftali

I meant afterwards, when you would see him later.

Herbert G. Klein

Oh, yeah. He felt that he'd done a good job. He was proud of what he'd done on foreign policy. I think he enjoyed the fact that, part of our friendship was always talking about sports, so we'd talk about sports quite a bit when we were together any time, even on a campaign plane. And so he, we'd talk about the baseball teams and he became a big fan of the Mets. I'll tell you a kind of funny little story, too. One time, there were three of us who got the Super Bowls for San Diego, and we had three Super Bowls. So one of the guys was back to meet with the owners in New York, and we had some time, and I said, "Well, why don't we see if we can go over and see the President." He was in New Jersey then. So we went over and found him; it was in a little Italian place that he had. So the first thing he did was take my friend to see his golf score card where he'd had a hole in one at the Bel Air, and he had this, I know he had a lot of pride, he had a five iron and Spaulding ball, and then we sat down and he said, "You guys were in the Holiday Bowl, how come you're not on CBS instead of ESPN?" So I wanted to talk to him about the Middle East; we had to talk about sports for about 20 minutes. That was the way he was.

Timothy Naftali

That's how he relaxed

Herbert G. Klein

Yeah.

Timothy Naftali

Is there any other story you'd like to tell as we end the interview? Is there something that we didn't touch on that you'd like to preserve?
Herbert G. Klein

No, but I'm getting a little tired right now. That's all I can think of right now, but if you want to do something at some other time, I'd be glad to do it.

Timothy Naftali

You've been great, Herb. Thank you for your patience and stamina.

Herbert G. Klein

Well, I'm glad to have the chance to get to know you. I look forward to working with you.

Timothy Naftali

Me, too.

Herbert G. Klein

You can count on me for anything, so.

Timothy Naftali

I appreciate it.

Herbert G. Klein

I haven't been up there for a while. I'll try to get up there sometimes.

Timothy Naftali

Please visit soon. Thank you very much, Herb.

Herbert G. Klein

Okay.

Timothy Naftali

This was great.

Herbert G. Klein

Would you mind handing me that cane?

Timothy Naftali

I'd be happy to.