

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 1 SEPTEMBER 1973

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC

By SPH NARA, Date 8/21/00

7014

[REDACTED]

g

COUNTRY

[REDACTED] /CHILE

DOI

[REDACTED] AUGUST 1973

SUBJECT

VIEWS OF THE CHILEAN ARMY COMMANDER IN CHIEF,

ON POSSIBLE MILITARY INTERVENTION IN HIS

COUNTRY, [REDACTED]

1.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

12011

SAINTS

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] MET WITH A NUMBER
OF SENIOR CHILEAN ARMY OFFICERS, INCLUDING GENERAL AUGUSTO
P I N O C H E T, ARMY COMMANDER IN CHIEF; AND ORLANDO
U R B I N A, CHIEF OF STAFF.

2. [REDACTED] REPORTED HIS
FINDINGS TO [REDACTED] HE CLAIMED THAT HIS
CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL PINOCHET WAS VERY FRANK AND OPEN,
COMMENTING THAT THE LATTER APPEARS TO BE RESIGNED TO AN EVENTUAL
OVERTHROW OF THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT BY FORCE, BUT ONLY WHEN
ALL OTHER AVENUES TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY
HAVE BEEN CLOSED. [REDACTED] SAID THAT PINOCHET APPEARS TO BE
FRIGHTENED BY THE SPECTRE OF CIVIL BLOODSHED AND HE AFFIRMED
THAT THE ARMY AS AN INSTITUTION WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE A COUP D'ETAT
UNTIL THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE CALL FOR SUCH
ACTION. PINOCHET FURTHER COMMENTED THAT THE POLITICAL PARTIES
MUST ASK THE MILITARY TO INTERVENE BEFORE HE PERSONALLY WOULD

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem. controls)

CONSENT TO MOVE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.

3. [REDACTED] INFORMED [REDACTED] THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN IMPRESSED WITH GENERAL URBINA AND DID NOT TRUST HIM. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE [REDACTED] CHIEF OF STAFF REFUSED TO DISCUSS THE [REDACTED] SITUATION AND EVEN AVERTED HIS EYES WHEN TALKING ABOUT NORMAL MILITARY MATTERS. ([REDACTED] COMMENT: PRIOR TO HIS MEETING WITH URBINA, [REDACTED] HAD BEEN TOLD [REDACTED] THAT URBINA WAS A LEFTIST; THUS, HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD URBINA MAY HAVE REFLECTED THIS PREJUDICE.)

4. [REDACTED] ALSO REPORTED THAT MOST OF HIS [REDACTED] ARMY CONTACTS EXPRESSED THE FEAR THAT THE CURRENT SOCIAL/POLITICAL STRIFE IN THE COUNTRY HAD DAMAGED CHILE'S ABILITY TO DEFEND HERSELF FROM POSSIBLE PERUVIAN AND/OR BOLIVIAN ATTACKS. THESE OFFICERS CONTENDED THAT THE PRIMARY PROBLEM WOULD BE THE LACK OF FUEL AND FOODSTUFF FOR THE ARMY IN THE EVENT THAT SUCH AN ATTACK TOOK PLACE. [REDACTED] COMMENTED THAT HE HAD DOUBTED THE SERIOUSNESS OF SUCH FEARS UNTIL HE HAD HEARD THEM EXPRESSED MANY TIMES. ([REDACTED] COMMENT: HOWEVER JUSTIFIED, IT IS BELIEVED THAT CHILEAN ARMY FEARS ABOUT AN INVASION BY PERU

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(classification) (dissem controls)

OR BOLIVIA ARE REAL. THESE FEARS RESOLVE AROUND THE ASSUMPTION THAT THESE TWO COUNTRIES COULD NOT PASS UP AN OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CHILE'S WEAKENED POSITION TO REGAIN TERRITORY WHICH WAS LOST IN THE WARS OF THE PACIFIC.)

5. [REDACTED]

6. FINALLY, [REDACTED]

TOLD [REDACTED] THAT THE USSR CONSIDERS THE CHILEAN REVOLUTION A FAILURE AND DESTINED TO BE TERMINATED BY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(classification) (dissem controls)

MILITARY ACTION. [REDACTED] ADDED THAT ONE COULD NOT EXPECT
SOCIALISM TO GROW OUT OF THE PRESENT CHAOS IN THE COUNTRY.

7. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~