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This document was reviewed in September, 1999, as part of the National Security Council's Chilean Human Rights Abuses Review.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee,
29 September 1970

PRESENT: Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Packard, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Helms.
Mr. Kissinger was out of the country.

Mr. Charles A. Meyer, Mr. Viron P. Vaky, and
Mr. Thomas Karamessines were also present.

Chile

a. Alexis Johnson chaired the meeting in the absence of
Mr. Kissinger and opened by saying that he had called the group
together to "review the bidding." He noted that several of those
present had been able to talk with Chief of Station/Santiago,
over the weekend.

b. Mr. Johnson asked if all agreed with the following
summary: The initial hope of the election gambit with Alessandri
stepping down and Frei replacing him and calling for new elections
was now dead. The second best hope of the cabinet resigning and
being replaced with military--a sort of in-house coup--also seemed
dead, since Frei and the military were passing the responsibility
buck back and forth between them.

c. This brought up the Country Team suggestion that by raising
the noise level with specific economic pressures there was at least
some chance that such signals might be viewed with sufficient alarm
to prompt action by the military.

d. Mr. Johnson said that it wasn't entirely clear how the
reins would be turned over to the military in a constitutional
manner as had been suggested. Mr. Vaky said what we were really
talking about was a coup--although that word might have various
shadings.

e. Mr. Packard said he felt that the situation was serious
enough so that the need to act now was imperative.

f. The coup was pictured by those thinking aloud as Chilean
action with the U.S. as catalyst. We would assure Frei of future
support; we would convey to the military that they would
not be ostracized—they could count on our continued support and cooperation (as opposed to a complete cutoff if Allende came to power).

8. It was emphasized that there would be no military action as of this moment unless these economic pressures were put into effect. Failure to make signals at this time strengthens Allende day by day—he can point to the USA not opposing him at all.

9. Mr. Mitchell asked for an inventory of possible economic actions. Mr. Karamessines ticked off a series of possibilities.

i. Urging some further steps to act now would provide definite leverage—about the only leverage we could exact—and the signals would be unmistakable, most agreed. There was also the MAP program, which could be abruptly cut.

j. Mr. Johnson observed that this approach, swerving from 40 Committee-type action to economic warfare, was tantamount to a change in foreign policy. Mr. Mitchell suggested it was economic protection.

k. Mr. Karamessines stated that this parcel of economic pressure actions constituted the only cards left in our hand. Mr. Mitchell asked what was there left to lose.

m. Mr. Meyer regretted that the U.S. posture if Allende wins (the subject matter of NSSM 97) had not been issued. It contained three options: to isolate Allende; to make him the victim of all ensuing actions rather than the USG; to openly cohabit with him. He went on to say that with Allende in, we could place the burden on Allende for all he did—not ourselves, and after all, Allende would not be around forever.
n. This prompted Mr. Helms to observe that in his experience he had seen other take-overs where pronounced Marxists had accomplished in far less than six years (Allende’s constitutional term) what they had threatened to do and then there were no more elections. He said we should face up to Allende’s statements and take them at face value.

o. Mr. Johnson said he would play the devil’s advocate and interjected that using U.S. economic interests to frustrate Chilean constitutional processes could have far-reaching effects in jeopardizing other U.S. interests in the hemisphere. Mr. Karamessines pointed out contrariwise that a hands-off policy could be read as the USA throwing in the sponge.

p. Mr. Packard repeated his earlier thesis: This is serious enough so we should act now. He offered to stop the MAP program.

q. Mr. Meyer referred to what he considered earlier ground rules of not giving signals until after the 24th.

r. After this give-and-take, back-and-forth exchange, the principals agreed to these actions:

1. Mr. Packard would (a) act to stop the MAP program, and (b) check on the status of [redacted] pulling out.

2. Mr. Johnson would talk with [redacted] formerly with [redacted] intimating that if indeed they intended to withdraw, it would be helpful to the USG if they did that now rather than later.

3. Mr. Meyer would: (a) talk to (b) [redacted] and (c) [redacted]

This was the extent of the specifics but, of course, did not preclude others in the administration from talking to other U.S. business interests in Chile.

s. Mr. Meyer reminded those present that the private sector did not always think or act in concert with particular U.S. policies at a given time and one had to consider the local impact of actions taken by U.S. companies overseas.
t. Mr. Karamessines reiterated that Ambassador Kerry urged
economic actions of this type at this time and Frei was in full
accord.

u. Lastly, the matter of Dr. Seaborg announcing the passing
of enriched uranium to Chile in support of an experimental reactor
(U.S. origin) was raised. Mr. Johnson stated that he had long-term
involvement in the problem of retaliation on political grounds in
the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy and the South African
experience had convinced him that this was not a wise course.

Distribution

Mr. Johnson
Mr. Vaky (for Mr. Kissinger)
Mr. Helms
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SECRET

September 24, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Chile

Attached is the latest message from Korry on the situation in Chile. I think he has a good point in paragraph 3. However, I would feel much more secure if this were done at the highest levels with the governments concerned and on a priority basis. This is precisely the suggestion made by the Chilean [Redacted] to me. He was most concerned about the following countries:

1. The German Government, whose ties and influence in Santiago are strong and pervasive.

2. The Italian Government which, as you know, has major emotional, psychological and empathetic influence in Chile.

To the foregoing I would add [Redacted] based on Korry's own recommendations.

My fear is that if Korry were permitted to romp around, the ambassadors concerned would merely have to consult their governments. It would therefore be far more appropriate to first discuss it with the governments concerned at the highest level and then, assuming they are sympathetic, give Korry authority for local liaison.

The [Redacted] made the following additional points which I am sure you have covered in your previous discussion, but which I am listing here as an assist for today's meeting:

-- Frei is a good [Redacted]. It is especially important that he knows that the United States stands behind him.

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Those who are involved in our work should be assured of both money and safe-havens and provision should be made now to provide these. I would suggest that this has been done with a specific plan which can be used by Korry to reassure his contacts.

We should give immediate consideration to According to the Chilean, there are ample resources which can be made available immediately and which can be used to accomplish a great deal in the way of influencing fence-sitters and those members of the Chilean Government

A real effort should be made now to work on the Chilean military rather than to sit on their hands and add to the doubts of the Chilean military. We must assume that can best judge their style and approaches. They should, however, be armed with authority to convey at least promises of stepped-up, post-coup military support, matériel, hardware and funds and, as a minimum, strong moral support for the kind of action which must be taken.

Consideration should be given -- as Pete mentioned earlier -- to sending a hard-nosed, low-profile, yet nonetheless authoritative representative to Chile to orchestrate what must be done and who will be able to convey special authority and influence in this regard.

When I asked the Chilean whether or not economic difficulties contributed to, or complicated, Allende's chances, he replied that, on balance, subtly applied economic problems posed Allende with real problems and tended to raise concerns about the drift toward Marxism.

The Chilean emphasized that since the election, Allende has consistently lost support. He said that an effective program, managed and controlled by a realistic and enlightened U.S. coordinator, offered the best hope for success.
The Chilean concluded that the foregoing suggestions came from him only with the greatest reluctance and agony, but that he was convinced that risks had to be taken and that if Allende were to be installed, Chile's demise was certain and that while initially talk of compromise and modus vivendi would be employed, ultimately as soon as necessary strength was assembled, democracy would be promptly eliminated and a large base for subversion elsewhere would be established.

Finally, the [redacted] emphasized that rumors of massive Soviet aid, military equipment and reasonable treatment invariably are used to placate doubters.
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Viron P. Vaky

SUBJECT: Chilean Elections--Another View

My memo of June 23 commented on Korry's proposal for political action funding which is now up for consideration.

This memo is intended to suggest a line of analysis that has not, to my knowledge, been surfaced in this context.

So far everyone has focussed on the immediate problem of the election and the objective of keeping Allende from being elected. But achieving that objective does not automatically get us out of the woods; in fact, it might only give us a worse problem later. The point is that what happens to keep Allende from being elected is important in the long run, and could be good or bad.

Next to no thought—to my knowledge—has been given to the long term problem and trend in Chile, and therefore to the perspective of operating now in terms of the long-range. The long-term problem is two-fold; (a) the center of political gravity in Chile is left of center; and (b) there is no existing political force of reasonable permanence that can preempt the Communists/Socialists' base on a sustained basis except the Christian Democrats.

Keeping the Communists/Socialists out of elected power over the long-range depends on one or more of several things happening—erosion of the Communist political base; existence of strong competitive non-Communist political parties; and/or forging of a viable center-right political party (which is difficult now because of (a) above and because there is no good nucleus at the moment).

There is an easy assumption that Allesandri's election would be best for us, based on the superficial circumstance that he is moderate, conservative, well-known and has come to be thought of as representing stability. But I posit the hypothesis that Allesandri's election might be the worst "anti-Allende" solution for us from a long-run point of view, even though satisfactory for the time being.
Alessandri represents no political movement or force; he would be elected as a person and on a personalistic basis. He can therefore be no more than a temporary bulwark. He is old (in his seventies) and Korry and Frei describe him as having "extraordinary debilities, intellectual as well as physical". Korry says (Santiago 26)

"He has no program; he has no organization; he has no understanding of modern problems, not even what the threat of the Marxists represents; he is consumed by a desire to vindicate his actions in his previous administration and to avenge the barbs and the triumphs of the Christian Democrats ...."

If all that is true, it seems to me that an Alessandri administration might well make a Communist victory in 1976 inevitable - for it would hardly seem able to construct the kind of political base and force that could compete with and preempt the Communists over a sustained period.

One of two things seems likely to happen under Alessandri:

--- It would be inert; cause the discontent to swing left and either lead to greater electoral victories by the far left or (less likely) to a military government, which in Chile would have a hard time sustaining itself except by repression; or (and most likely)

--- The Communists/Socialists would make a political deal to support Alessandri in the Congress in return for a free hand to eliminate the Christian Democrats politically - an end Alessandri is likely to support.

If this occurred it would give the Communists an electoral advantage in 1976 and perhaps fatally weaken Frei's base - Frei being the only person with the charisma to unite the country against Allende in the next election.

All of this suggests rather tentatively that we should think of an anti-Allende course that would have its positive side. Perhaps we should aid Tomic to at least come in second. With Alessandri slipping anyway, this would have the advantage of strengthening Tomic to pick up the defection from Alessandri rather than Allende; a Tomic victory or better still a second place over Allende would be satisfactory to us.

Thus, if we combined a political action plan of anti-Allende activities with pro-Tomic funding, we might increase the effectiveness of our effort.
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Viron P. Vaky

SUBJECT: Chilean Election

Ambassador Korry has recommended increased funding for political action in the pre- and post-election period in Chile:

- **for anti-Allende propaganda**
- **for a post-electoral operation to dissuade Radical and Christian Democrats from supporting Allende in any congressional vote.**

It seems to me we have to ask the following questions:

1. **Is there a real possibility that Allende may be elected?**

   Everyone agree(s) that his strength is rising, but there is no clear prospect that he will win and a possibility he will not.

2. **How serious to our interests would his election be?**

   Korry's premise is that Allende is a serious threat to the U.S. and that his victory would result in the establishment of a "Leninist state". It is not clear, however, that Allende can ride quickly and successfully over Chilean forces which would fight the establishment of a "Leninist state", or that the Chileans themselves cannot handle that problem. There is no question that his victory would present problems to us. Whether that means a serious threat to U.S. security and national interest requires a better and more systematic judgment, because how serious we deem the threat to our interest to be will determine the risks we are willing to take to insure his defeat. I do not think we have reached sound conclusions yet, and certainly not a consensus.
3. How effective would Korry's proposals be?

There is no guarantee it would have any real effect, but there is some chance that it may influence a small percentage of voters which could be important in the close race we expect.

4. How serious is the risk of exposure and what is the threat of exposure to our interests?

Korry believes the risk of exposure acceptable, but a significant risk does exist.

Exposure would seriously damage our capacity to have influence in any post-election situation. Exposure of our involvement would strengthen Allende.

5. Do the risks to our long-term interest of an Allende victory outweigh the risks of exposure?

The key question. I am not sure that they do; the problem of an Allende victory may be easier to handle than the election--i.e., we may find it easier to be "involved" if the problem is a Marxist administration than to be "involved" in an internal electoral process.

If we were to be faithful to the prescriptions of our general policy, we should leave to the Chileans the protection of their own interests threatened by an Allende win. There is no real lack in Chile of money or organizational skill. Why should we do for them what they are unwilling to do for themselves? The premise in Korry's proposal is that we cannot count on the Chileans themselves or private US interests to do an adequate job against Allende, and that we cannot afford to let them fail. This is the basic premise and I am not sure it is proved.

RECOMMENDATION: In balance I would go along reluctantly with the pre-electoral phrase which is a stepping-up of what we are already doing. But I recommend against the operation in the post-electoral phase. That is too dangerous, too antithetical to the concept of our general policy and of dubious effectiveness.

What I would surely recommend is that we analyze more rigorously the consequences of an Allende victory, the probable developments and what could be done about them.
MEMORANDUM

I have the following comments on Chile:

1. The plan proposed is designed in part upon a given estimate of how the three candidates will perform -- Alessandri first, but declining; Allende strong second and possibly rising; and Tonio a distant third. I believe, however, that this estimate is dated. According to latest reports Tonio is rising, and the prospect is that all three will be bunched together in an almost dead heat. This suggests possibly different options. It also suggests that the "readings" ought to be reviewed frequently between now and September to determine if shifts in our support are indicated.

2. If Allende is the threat the paper posits, should we not do more than we propose to insure his defeat?

3. The present tactic is to reduce Radical votes for Allende. Presumably, these will shift to Alessandri, but if they divide between Alessandri and Tonio all we may be doing is insuring a three-way split.

4. Why would not a complementary tactic be to strengthen Tonio's appeal? He has to contend with Allende for the same sector of votes. By dividing the left vote between them, there is a good chance of increasing Alessandri's percentage.

5. If we have in the past sought to strengthen the moderates in the Radical Party, should we not think of strengthening the moderates in the Christian Democratic Party? Would it not be good insurance? A moderate left-wing alliance may be needed to confront Allende.

6. The paper posits merely spoiling Allende's chances, but refuses to formulate a plan to support an alternative. It points out that we could live with either, and that either has problems which may not merit our support (page 13). But is this wise? If Alessandri wins at 7% and Allende shows up strong, might we not have a difficult situation for the long haul. This might polarize the society by offering strong political forces at the extremes and destroy the relatively moderate left force that might contend with the Communists/Socialists for leadership of the political left.

Viron P. Vaky
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS  
WASHINGTON  

September 22, 1970  

TOP SECRET—EYES ONLY  

Dear Henry:  

Attached is a draft of a message to Ed Korry which I believe conforms with our discussion this morning. I have cleared it with Dave Packard and Tom Karamessines, and it is pre-positioned in Karamessines' office. Thus, when you have cleared it, have your office call Tom to have it transmitted with any changes that you may have.  

Sincerely,  

[Signature]  

U. Alexis Johnson  

Enclosure.  

The Honorable  
Henry A. Kissinger,  
Assistant to the President.  

TOP SECRET—EYES ONLY  

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END  

9/22/70  

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FROM ALEXIS JOHNSON FOR AMBASSADOR KORRY

Today we considered what we understand is concept that the military take over the government, control the militant leadership of the UP, and offer the Chilean people a general election.

You are authorized to indicate clearly through such channels as you deem most appropriate and trustworthy, that while the decision to undertake such a course must be entirely Chilean, and that if the effort to block Allende from taking office is successful the Chilean military can continue to count on us for MAP support and a maintenance of our close relationship.

I continue to be concerned that you keep your profile on this matter as low as possible and that you keep strictly within your instructions unless and until they are modified. We are prepared promptly to act on any recommendations you may have. Slug all messages on this subject for my eyes only. I will assure that Charlie Meyer and others who need to be are kept informed.

END

9/22/70

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TO: Embassy SANTIAGO

FOR AMBASSADOR KORRY FROM ALEXIS JOHNSON

REF: _______

1. We are puzzled by reference message, especially second sentence of paragraph 1. We had assumed that offer of support to Frei if things worked out so that he could again run for presidency would encourage him to take whatever action is going to be required to block Allende from taking office. We had also assumed that assurance to Chilean military that they would not be ostracized by us but could rather count on us for continued support if they participated in this effort would also be encouragement to them, and we are puzzled that you make no reference to this in your reply.

2. While we reiterate our position that the decision to undertake any such course of action must be entirely Chilean, and that you should keep your profile on this matter as low as possible, you should be clear that we hope the Chileans will find a way to block Allende from taking office. We had hoped and expected that the assurances you were authorized...
to give by our previous message would serve this end. If you
do not believe they will do so, please let us know soonest,
together with any recommendations you may have. We are/cons-
idering what we could/do with respect to the recommendation
contained in paragraph 3 ref tel.

3. Do you feel that the baɪt of becoming UNSYG is acting as
a restraint on Frel and, if so, what thoughts do you have
on how we might deal with this.

End